Table of Contents

Title Page

Part I. Wherein Are Explained and Stated Various Terms and Things Belonging to the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse

Part II. Wherein It Is Considered Whether There Is or Can Be Any Sort of Freedom of Will, as That Wherein Arminians Place the Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such Thing Ever Was or Can Be Conceived of.

Section I. Showing the Manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, Consisting in the Will’s Self-Determing Power

Section II. Several Supposed Ways of Evading the Foregoing Reasoning Considered.

Section III. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, and Volition in Particular, Can Come to Pass Without a Cause of Its Existence.

Section IV. Whether Volition Can Arise Without a Cause, Through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

Section V. Showing, That If the Things Asserted in These Evasions Should Be Supposed to Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, and Cannot Help the Cause of Arminian Liberty; and How, This Being the State of the Case, Arminian Writers Are Obliged to Talk Inconsistently.

Section VI. Concerning the Will Determining in Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent in the View of the Mind.

Section VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, Consisting in Indifference.

Section VIII. Concerning the Supposed Liberty of the Will, as Opposite to All Necessity.

Section IX. Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.

Section X. Volition Necessarily Connected with the Influence of Motives: with Particular Observations on the Great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb’s Assertions and Reasonings about the Freedom of the Will.

Section XI. The Evidence of Gods Certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of Moral Agents.

Section XII. God’s Certain Foreknowledge of the Future Volitions of Moral Agents, Inconsistent with Such a Contingence of Those Volitions as Is without All Necessity.

Section XIII. Whether We Suppose the Volitions of Moral Agents to Be Connected with Any Thing Antecedent, or Not, Yet They Must Be Necessary in Such a Sense as to Overthrow Arminian Liberty.

Part III. Wherein is Inquired Whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue, Praise, and Dispraise, &c.

Part IV. Wherein the Chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and Defense of the Aforementioned Notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, &c. and Against the Opposite Doctrine, Are Considered.


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