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God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Necessity.

Having proved, that God has a certain and infallible Prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to show the consequence; how it follows from hence, that these events are necessary, with a Necessity of connexion or consequence.

The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think. that on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not.

In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.

l. It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars:

1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed.

2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connexion was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence 36 of which is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connexion of its existence.—Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible, and indissoluble connexion between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connexion of the event with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is no necessary connexion between a proposition being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposition, which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all Necessity, may be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding: and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing, as for that understanding to see evidence of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence where there is none; for that is the same thing, as to see that to be which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.

But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all Necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence or proof; an evident thing must be either evident in itself; or evident in something else: that is, evident by connexion with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence, or the Necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there any proof, or evidence in any thing else, or evidence of connexion with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all Necessity, (if any such event there be,) neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.

Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form; all in absolute Contingence, without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connexion at all with any thing foregoing: I say, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself, as yet, was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else; for evidence in something else, is connexion with something else: but such connexion is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this thing would happen; for by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the same, with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation, no superior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance, towards discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not; but on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.

III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows. It is the same as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all Necessity, that nothing hinders but it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be; and that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all Necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake; because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so, as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know; or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing which we cannot comprehend.

Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which follows from such decrees, than the absolute 37 Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The connexion between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connexion, between the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.

There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, which is the same thing, as great a Necessity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connexion possible between the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this.

And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of connexion and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature, enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees, which do not at all increase the Necessity, are not inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man’s liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any Necessity which absolute decrees infer.

Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God’s Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 474, &c.) he says, “God’s Prescience has no influence at all on our actions.—Should God, says he, by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man’s state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all.—Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more fixture, than they could be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God’s decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end.—Hence God’s Prescience renders no actions necessary.” And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites Origen, where he says, ”God’s Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God’s Prescience that they will be:” and Le Blanc, where he says, ”This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen.“ In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, (p. 95 - 99.) And the Author of The Freedom of the Will, in God and Creature, speaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents ”Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than After-knowledge,” or to that purpose.

To all which I would say; that what is said about Knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether Prescience be the thing that makes the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the Necessity. 123123    This distinction is of great importance in the present controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby’s objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no other necessity but the decretive, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion, viz. that if any thing is foreknown because it is decreed, every thing is foreknown on the same ground, of for the same reason.—And then, this proving too much —the decretive appointment of all the evil in the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore impossible—they reject the whole doctrine of necessity as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they cannot clearly disprove what is advanced against them, they infer that there is somehow a sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or some false principle assumed were they but happy enough to detect it. But our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connexion by which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because decreed. The truth is, that some events are foreknown to be certain because foreordained; and others, because of the tendency there is in the nature of things themselves.—Should any, in the way of objection, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the divine will, or decree; we apprehend there is no evidence to support such an assertion. For instance, is it owing to a decree that the nature of any created being is dependent on the first cause? That a creature, however exalted, is not infinite? That any relation should subsist between the Creator and a creature? Or that, if equal quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of nay decree in the case? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have made such things otherwise? Let it be observed, however, that God is the almighty Sovereign over nature—not indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than to make spirit to be the same thing as matter, and vice versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but—by the position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, if God create a world, that world must depend upon him, as a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and identity of things. For what is it to create, but for an independent cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent existence? So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the consequences be necessary, if the antecedent be established; yet the antecedent itself is not necessary, except from the decree; for there is not, in the nature of things, any antecedent necessity that a world be created. That is, to suppose its non-existence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the nature of things, and to assert a contradiction, thought the antecedent itself be not necessary. And hence also in the instance now specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of decree, but not the consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God decreed the dependence of the world upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather than to five. These remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly show, that some things are necessary because decreed,—as the creation, the preservation, and the government of the world; the redemption, the purification, and the salvation of the church:—and that other things—as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially moral evils—come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown, only by connexion, of consequence. That is, if the antecedent, which is under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if another antecedent be established, another consequence will follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance: if holiness be given and continued to a redeemed creature, as an antecedent; excellence, honour, and happiness are the necessary consequences. But if sin operate without control, as the antecedent, dishonour and misery must be the necessary consequence from the same cause.—W. If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way: because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove or be an evidence of a thing being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true; therefore there is a Necessity that it should be otherwise; whether the Knowledge 38 be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the Knowledge.

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the thing known now to he necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true.—I freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge: but then After-knowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain After-knowledge proves that it is now, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past existence on the event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the Knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The necessity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must he a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or which is the same thing, known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of Knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain. And there is nothing but the necessity of truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the firm and infallible connexion between the subject and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connexion. So God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connexion of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future existence, but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then, he sees a firm connexion between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.

I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, that mere Knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity, supposes futurity; and a certain Knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or, which is the same thing, the Necessity of the event.

I would observe one thing further; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God’s Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground, and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

To illustrate this matter; let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble: if it be so, then, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm, and necessary, as the existence of these effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other.—Now let us suppose future existences, some way or other, to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause. These effects and images having already had actual existence, render that matter of their existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise; and this proves, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm, and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered.

Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God’s Prescience, against the continuance of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose; “That when we talk of Foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect Knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.”—To this I answer,

1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge proves the Necessity of the truth known; whether it be before, after, or at the same time.—Though it be true, that there is no succession in God’s Knowledge, and the manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible Knowledge of it; he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are always in God’s view as evident, clear, sure, and necessary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass.

God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, does not hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence: yea the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass.

We know, that God foreknows the future voluntary actions of men, in such a sense, as that he is able particularly to foretell them, and cause them to be recorded, as he often has done; and therefore that necessary connexion which there is between God’s Knowledge and the event known, as much proves the event to be necessary beforehand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connexion between that written prediction and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise, than that the prediction and the event should agree: 39 and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event should come to pass: and this is the same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary.—So that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in God’s mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the existence of the events known. Yea,

2. This is so far from weakening the proof, given of the impossibility of future events known, not coming to pass, as that it establishes the foregoing arguments, and shows the clearness of the evidence. For,

(1.) The very reason, why God’s Knowledge is without succession, is, because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty. All things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were present; the view is always in absolute perfection; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls the things that are not, as though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objection, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in the strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God’s view so much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his Knowledge of them.

(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God’s Knowledge: for it is the immutability of Knowledge that makes it to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on, viz. that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then a change in God’s Knowledge and view of things, were possible. For if the known event should not come into being, as God expected, then he would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and succession in his Knowledge. But as God is immutable, and it is infinitely impossible that his view should be changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree; and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vitae interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio.

On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration, than that God’s certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.

Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not all infer any more fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God’s omniscience, and universal Prescience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes’s doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own God’s omniscience, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious grace; on this ground, that those doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them under Necessity, must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the Necessity of men’s volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God’s commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being leveled against their own doctrine, as well as against that of the Calvinists. 124124    In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated, that foreknowledge infers necessity; such a necessity as exists in the connexion of a consequent with its antecedent; and has represented, in various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions follow from the opposite hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be improper in this place briefly to inquire into the rationale of those principles; by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence, and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connexion with others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corresponding ordinal numbers. 1. Any kind of necessity is a sufficient ground of foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience; but as is the kind of necessity, or the nature of the connexion between cause and effect, so is the nature of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature of the connexion affects—not the certainty of the event, but the mode of causation; or from what cause the certainty arises. 2. All necessity, or certainty of connexion between antecedent and consequent, must arise form one of these two cources, viz. the nature of things, or, the decree of god. Chance is nothing; and nothing has no properties, consequently has no causal influence. 3. The necessity which arises from the nature of things, is either absolute or hypothetical. absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or God. He exists absolutely; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to have exited, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent being; but a contingent being necessarily implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies a cause; and consequently a first cause. 4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or nay event whatever, is only of hypothetical necessity. Any event is necessary, only on account of its relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connexion, between an event and the first cause, is either in the way of contrast, or in the way of dependence. 5. There are two things necessarily related to the first cause by way of contrast; passive power, which is a natural evil—if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in their necessary tendency, may be so called—and sin, which is a moral evil; or something which, in point of obligation, ought not to be. 6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is a that of dependence. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon god, as an effect depends upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any contingent being should continue to exist, any more that begin to exist, independent of the first cause. Sublata causa, tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an axiom in metaphysical science. 7. It was before observed, that all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient of a deficient cause. 8. A defect, no less that active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding consequence must follow; but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counteracted by a decree; so far counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause. 9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only; but the defect which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is also a cause in the sense of an antecedent; otherwise a created existence would be as indefectible as the creating of first cause, which involves the most absurd consequences. 10. Defect is either natural or moral; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. natural defect arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God’s natural perfections; which contrast forms the primary difference between creator and creature. 11. This natural defect is different from defectibility; for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect not a cause; a liableness to defection. But the question returns, what renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness to defect, or its defectibility, assigns no true cause: for the question returns as before, what makes it liable, what makes it defectible? 12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circumlocution, that PASSIVE POWER, to express that natural defect, which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the moral) perfections of God. 13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature; for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.—Therefore to say, that a creature is not he subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is: which is the grossest pantheism—the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists. 14. All antecedents originate in either passive power or the divine decrees. From the former proceed, according to the nature of things, all evil consequences; from the latter, all good. 15. moral defect, is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holiness of God; and arises, as a necessary consequence—not from the divine decree as its antecedent, but —from the hypothetical nature of things; that is, passive power, IF not aided by a decretive interposition, and IF also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being. 16. The removal of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of nature: but IF the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from what it was as to its causal influence, the consequences can no more be prevented, than the nature of things can be changed. 17. That nature of things, or that necessity of consequence, whereby the effect is infallibly connected with its cause, is nothing else but the essence of truth, emanating from the first cause, the god of truth, or the true god. 18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected with its cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an end, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or the antecedents to this consequence, are decreed. 19. Hence, an event may be necessary, either because virtually determined by the divine will, be a series of antecedents; or because the nature of things operates without being affected, as to their causal influence, by decretive antecedents. 20. To suppose any sort, of any degree of defect, to be decreed, is absurd in different ways. It is contrary to an established axiom, that from good nothing but good can proceed - and it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently arises from the nature of things. 21. In reality, divine decrees (as before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or series of positions, which are so many antecedents, counteracting defects arising from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows, that if there were no passive powers there could be no divine decrees. For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things; the decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and therefore unworthy of divine volition. 22. Hence also, whatever event is in itself good, is an object of divine decree in its antecedent; and the event itself is connected with the decretive position by the very essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions. 23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable nature, is to be regarded as an antecedent; from which all possible happiness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is no the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive will, but of absolute necessity, but all antecedents in a creature, or every causal influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only possible mode of securing a good result. 24. As is the antecedent, so is the consequent; for the connexion is formed by eternal truth. If therefore a good event —for instance, a virtuous of holy choice—be the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position. 25. In reference to God, the proper and only ground of infallible certainty that his choice is good and praiseworthy, is the goodness of his nature. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible nature in him, in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure in the goodness of his choice. And in reference to a created being, the proper and only ground of certainty that his choice will be good, is the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone is a sufficient causal influence; but the goodness of a creature’s disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by decretive influence of a nature corresponding with the nature of the effect. 26. From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we infer, that God foresees all good, in every created being, in every mode, in every event, by the evidence of a decretive necessity; a necessity resulting form actual influx, or perpetual energy, in the position of antecedents, and the essence of truth connecting the causal influence with the effect. 27. From the same principles we learn, that God foresees or foreknows all evil—however blended with the good, as the different colours in a pencil of light are blended—in every being, and in every event where found, by that necessity which is hypothetical only; a necessity resulting form the nature of things left to their own causal influence; which influence, in any circumstances, will manifest itself in the way of contrast, of dependence or both united. 28. Again: Volitions are acts of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act proceeds form decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The moral quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil. 29. A voluntary act morally good, is altogether of decretive necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of consequence. 30. The physical quality of a voluntary act morally bad, is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed; but the moral quality of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation, connexion, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of light, and may be known by the light excluded. 31. How the bad quality of a moral act may be foreknown by the evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what is moral, evil, or sin, but what ought not to be, in point of moral obligation? Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge of what ought to be. 32. If therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniscient by constituted relations, or voluntary appointment; what ought not to be may be known by evident consequences.—W. 40

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