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CHAPTER LXIVThat the Soul is not a Harmony359359This doctrine, the first crude form of materialism, is refuted by Plato, Phaedo, 88b, c, 93, 94; Aristotle, De anima, I, iv, 1-7.

THE maintainers of this view did not mean that the soul is a harmony of sounds, but a harmony of contrary elements, whereof they saw living bodies to be composed. The view is rejected for the following reasons:

1. You may find such a harmony in any body, even a mere chemical compound (corpus mixtum). A harmony cannot move the body, or govern it, or resist the passions, as neither can a temperament. Also a harmony, and a temperament also, admits of degrees. All which considerations go to show that the soul is neither harmony nor temperament.360360In Chap. LXIII an opinion, attributed to Galen the physician, is rejected, that the soul is the temperament (complexio), as ‘sanguine,’ ‘bilious,’ or the like.

2. The notion of harmony rather befits qualities of the body than the soul: thus health is a harmony of humours; strength, of muscles and bones; beauty, of limb and colour. But it is impossible to assign any components, the harmony of which would make sense, or intellect, or other appurtenances of the soul.

3. Harmony may mean either the composition itself or the principle of composition. Now the soul is not a composition, because then every part of the soul would be composed of certain parts of the body, an arrangement which cannot be made out. In like manner the soul is not the principle of composition, because to different parts of the body there are different principles of composition, or proportions of elements, which would require the 131several parts of the body to have so many several souls, — one soul for bone, one for flesh, one for sinew; which is evidently not the case.

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