INTRODUCTION.

I. PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this—that it admits of degrees—from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption. But the very lowest presumption does not prove a thing to be probably true; especially if (as there may be probabilities on both sides) there are any probabilities against it; yet it partakes of the nature of probability, for by frequent repetition, it will amount to moral certainty. Thus, the observation of the ebb and flow of the tide to-day begets a very low presumption that it may happen to-morrow; but this observation often repeated gives us a full assurance that it will.

II. From observing a likeness in this event to another which has come to pass, we determine on the probability of its occurrence, and so of every thing else.²²Though the common experience of the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit to any thing proposed to their belief, yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by Him who has the power to change the course of nature, there, under such circumstances, they may be fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation. This is the proper case with miracles, which, well attested, do not only find credit them selves, but give it also to other truths which need such confirmation.—Locke. Therefore, the foundation of probability is expressed in the word “likely” (verisimile), like some truth, or true event, in itself, or in its evidence, or in some of its circumstances; and thus it daily happens that we have a presumption, an opinion, or full conviction of the truth of an event, past or future, according to the frequency of the observation of a similar one under similar circumstances. For example, we conclude that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength of a man—that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it, for such a number of days, will be its certain destruction. Whether we judge, expect, hope, or fear, we are guided by the same principle of observed similarity.

III. But the extent of our observation being 15 limited, it may warrant a fair conclusion in the way of analogy, though a false one. Thus the prince who lived in a warm climate,³³A Dutch embassador, entertaining the King of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, among other things, told him that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if it were there. To which the king replied, “Hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man, but now I am sure you lie.”—Locke. who had never seen water but in a fluid state, naturally inferred that there was no such thing as water becoming hard.⁴⁴But it has been well observed, by Dr. Leland, that experience may assure us that facts or events are possible, but not that the contrary is impossible. The greatest uniformity and frequency of experience can not prove the certainty of an event, nor even afford the least probability that it would never happen otherwise. For aught we know, there may be occasions on which it would fail, and secret causes in the frame of things which sometimes may counteract these by which it is produced. The field of our observation being more extended, we do not consider this any presumption against the possibility of water being frozen. We know that it is supposable that there may be frost in England any given day in January next, and probable on some day in that month, and morally certain some time or other in the winter. Therefore, probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information.

IV. It relates only to beings of limited capacities. 16 Every thing is certain to an Infinite Intelligence, for every thing must be observed by Him absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false; but with us most things are only probable. In questions of real or imaginary difficulty, the lowest presumption on one side more than on the other determines the question; and, in the common pursuits of life, even in questions of great consequence, we find men considering themselves bound to act not only where there are merely slight probabilities in favor of success, but when these are equalled, or even exceeded, by probabilities against their succeeding.

V. But whence is it that likeness produces a presumption, opinion, or full conviction? And how can we be certain that the conclusion drawn by analogy is correct? This belongs to the subject of logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered; but it is evident (and enough for the present purpose) that this general way of arguing is natural, just, and conclusive; for there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow,⁵⁵“A man brought into being at maturity and placed in a desert island would abandon himself to despair when he first saw the sun set and the night come on; for he could have no expectation that ever the day would be renewed. But he is transported with joy when he again beholds the glorious orb appearing in the east, and the heavens and the earth illuminated as before. He again views the declining sun with apprehension, yet not without hope: the second night is less dismal than the first, but is still very uncomfortable on account of the weakness of the probability produced by one favorable instance. As the instances grow more numerous, the probability becomes stronger and stronger: yet it may be questioned, whether a man in these circumstances would ever arrive at so high a degree of moral certainty in this matter as we experience, who know not only that the sun has risen every day since we began to exist, but also that the same phenomenon has happened regularly for more than five thousand years, without failing in a single instance.—Beattie on Truth. and be 17 seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.

VI. For introducing this sort of reasoning into the subject of revealed religion, we have the authority of Origen, who has observed, that “he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature.” And it may be added, that he who denies the Divine origin of the one, on account of these difficulties, may, with as much reason, deny that of the other. We argue from the likeness that exists between the revealed and the natural dispensation of Providence, that they have both the same Author; at least, that the objections against it are of no force, from difficulties in the one analogical or similar to what are found in the other, which is acknowledged to be from God, for an Author of nature is here SUPPOSED (and to this assumption there can be no objection, 18 since it is not denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidences of religion; and if it were, as there is no presumption against it prior to the proof of it, so it has been often proved, with accumulated evidence, from final causes, abstract reasonings, tradition, the general consent of mankind, &c., &c.).

VII. As to the degree of weight to be attached to this argument from analogy, in some cases it will amount to a practical proof—in others merely a confirmation of what can be otherwise proved; yet its chief force will be to answer the objections against the system both of natural and revealed religion, and it will possess considerable force in answering objections against the evidence of it—the argument being conclusive in proportion to the degree of the whole analogy or likeness. It is to be distinctly observed that, in this analogy, we argue from known existing facts to others that are like them.

VIII. This has been shown to be a method of proof, practical, usual, and conclusive in various degrees. It does not argue from hypothesis, or from the possibility to the propriety of a better form of Divine government. Those who argue from hypothesis, reason either from assumed principles, or from certain principles assumed to be applicable to cases to which they have no ground to apply them. The former resemble Des Cartes 19 building a world upon hypothesis; the others act like those who explain the structure of the human body from mere mathematics, without sufficient data. As to those who run into the wild extravagance of planning an improved state of things, the plan fixed on by the wisest speculator probably would not be the very best, even according to his own notion of “best.” For what would he propose. That which, both by occasions and motives, was productive of the greatest virtue, or greatest happiness, or both combined; i. e., when fully expressed, that all creatures should, at first, be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of being; that nothing—at least nothing of hazard or danger—should be put upon them to do; or that they should, in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness. And how would he effect this. He would do away with the method of government by punishment, as absurd and contrary to happiness; and he would either not give them any principles which would endanger their doing wrong, or he would lay the right motive of action before them in so strong a manner as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it. We may at once give this General Answer: Following the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge some ends to be preferable to others; and our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to 20 God, and to deny all imperfection of Him; this is a practical proof of His moral character, for it is the voice of God speaking in us; from hence we conclude that virtue and happiness are essentially united, and that under His government right must prevail. But the necessary means of accomplishing this end, we have not faculties to determine. Even in the little affairs of this present life, we are not competent judges, and we are likely to be much less so in a system of such extent as this world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached from the whole creation.

We shall first apply the argument from analogy to the foundation of all our hopes and fears—a future life.

QUESTIONS—INTRODUCTION.

1. How is probable evidence distinguished from demonstrative; and to what may the former at length amount? Illustrate this by a fact in nature.

2. What exception does Locke justly produce to the following general rule, namely: that from observing a likeness in an event to another which has come to pass, we determine on the probability of its occurrence and so of every thing else?

3. What imperfection naturally attaches itself to our reasoning by analogy, from the extent of our observation being limited? Quote Dr. Leland’s observation as to the exact value of experience, in reasoning upon a reported fact.

4. How do men act in all worldly affairs, with respect to probable evidence?

5. Quote the argument from Beattie by which he endeavors to prove that likeness would produce presumption, then opinion, lastly conviction.

6. What does Origen say upon the application of analogy to religion? How does Butler support and confirm his argument?

7. What degree of weight is to be attached to the argument from analogy; and in what consists its principal excellence?

8. What general answer may we give to those who would argue from the possibility to the propriety of a better than the existing form of Divine government?