Epistle of St James: Greek Text with Introduction, Commentary as Far as Chapter IV, Verse 7, and Additional Notes

ΙΑΚΟΒΟΥ

ΙΑΚΩΒΟΥ

¹ΙΑΚΩΒΟΥ θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ χαίρειν.

I. 1. Ἰάκωβος] For the person intended see Introd., pp. xi ff. The name is Ἰακώβ in LXX., but has been doubtless Graecised as a modern name, as so many names in Josephus. Probably it was common at this time: three are mentioned by Josephus, and curiously one the brother of a Simon (Ant. xx. 5, 2), another coupled with a John (B. J. iv. 4, 2). The third is an Idumaean (B. J. iv. 9, 6). [James brother of Jesus Christ is also mentioned (Ant. xx. 9, 1) (if the passage be genuine). See pp. xv, xxi f.]

θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. δοῦλος] The combination θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ., though grammatically possible, is against Scriptural analogy, and would involve a very improbable want of balance. The absence of the article is due to abbreviation and compression of phrase. See note on 1 Peter i. i (p. 15 b). An unique phrase as a whole, it unites the O.T. θεοῦ δοῦλος (-οι) (Acts iv. 29; 1 Pet. ii. 16; Apoc. saepe and esp. i. 1; and, in greeting, Tit. i. 1 Παῦλος δοῦλος θεοῦ, ἀπόστολος δὲ Ἰ. Χ.) with St Paul’s δοῦλος Ἰ. Χ. (Ἰ. Χ.) (fully in Rom. i. 1; later Phil. i. 1, δοῦλοι Χ. Ἰ..; as also Jude 1; cf. 2 Pet. i. 1).

This coupling of God and Christ in a single phrase covered by δοῦλος is significant as to St James’ belief. Without attempting to say how much is meant by it, we can see that it involves at least some Divineness of nature in our Lord, something other than glorified manhood. This is peculiarly true as regards a man with Jewish feelings, unable to admit lower states of deity. It thus shews that he cannot have been an Ebionite. Even St Paul’s salutations contain no such combination except in their concluding prayers for grace and peace. An analogous phrase is in Eph. v. 5, ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ..

The conception is not of two distinct and co-ordinate powers, so to speak; as though he were a servant of two lords. But the service of the one at once involves and is contained in the service of the other. Christ being what He is as the Son of the Father, to be His servant is impossible without being God’s servant; and the converse is also true. κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. is the full phrase illustrated by the early chapters of Acts; esp. ii. 36: God had made Jesus both Lord and Christ. This true sense of χριστός is never lost in N.T.; it is never a mere proper name like Ἰησοῦς, which though a significant name is still a proper name like any other. “Χριστός” has indeed, as a title, a little of the defining power of a proper name, because it. represents not merely its etymology “Anointed” but מָשִׁיחַ. Ἰ Χ. is not merely “Jesus the Anointed” but “Jesus, He who has been looked for under the name ‘the Anointed,’ having therefore the characteristics already 2associated with the name, and more.” Accordingly, though we often find Χ. Ἰ. where Χ. is intended to have special prominence, we never have κ. Χ. Ἰ. but only κ. Ἰ. Χ., as here, Ἰ. standing between κ. and Χ. and thereby declared to have the character of both, but specially linked with Χ., κ. being prefixed to both together.

δοῦλος, servant] Probably in the widest sense, answering to Κύριος, equivalent to “doing His work in His kingdom, in obedience to His will” (cf. Acts iv. 29). It is misleading to call δοῦλος “slave,” as many do, for it lays the whole stress on a subordinate point. It expresses in the widest way the personal relation of servant to master, not the mere absence of wages or of right to depart. But St John in Apoc. (x. 7) uses the O.T. phrase “His own servants the prophets,” from Amos iii. 7; Dan. ix. 6, 10; Zech. i. 6, and probably has this in mind in calling himself “the servant of God” (i. 1). And it is not unlikely that St James also has it in view, not necessarily as implying himself to be a prophet, as Jn probably does, but. as standing in an analogous relation to God and His kingdom.

ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς] . Equivalent to Israel in its fulness and completeness. It has nothing to do with the return or non-return of the different tribes from captivity. Josephus believed the ten tribes to have remained in great numbers beyond the Euphrates, and in 4 Esdras xiii. 45 they are said to be in Arzareth, which Dr Schiller-Szinessy (Journ. of Philology, 1870, pp. 113 f.) has shewn to be only the אֶרֶץ אַחֶרֶת (“another land”) of Deut. xxix. 28, referring to Sanhed., shewing that that verse was referred to the ten tribes. They are also the subject of later traditions. But whatever may have been thought about the actual descendants of the twelve tribes, and their fate, the people was thought of as having returned as a whole.

After the return, when Judah and Benjamin apparently alone returned to any very considerable extent, the reference to tribes, as a practically existing entity, seems to have come to an end, except as regards the descent of individuals through recorded genealogies, and the people that had returned was treated as representing the continuity of the whole nation, Judah and Israel together. (See Ezek. xlvii. 13; Ezra vi. 17; viii. 35.) This would have been unnatural if the tribes had been previously the primary thing, and the people only an agglomeration of tribes: but in reality the true primary unit was the people, and the tribes were merely the constituent parts, the union of which expressed its unity.

Accordingly our Lord Himself chose twelve Apostles, and spoke of them as to sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And in the Apocalypse 12,000 are sealed from each of twelve tribes. Cf. xxi. 12-14.

Hence τ. δ. φ. is equivalent to τὸ δωδεκάφυλον (ἡμῶν), Acts xxvi. 7, which occurs also Clement i. 55 (cf. 31, τὸ δωδεκάσκηπτρον τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, answering to Test. xii. Patriarch. Napht. 5, τὰ δώδεκα σκῆπτρα τ. Ἰσραήλ from 1 Kings xi. 31 ff.; see LXX.), and Joseph. Hypomnesticum (Fabricius Cod. Pseud. V.T. ii. p. 3) τοὺς δώδεκα φυλάρχους ἐξ ὧν τὸ δωδεκάφυλον τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ συνίσταται. Both forms of speech in Lib. Jacobi i. (1, 3).

By keeping up this phrase St James marked that to him the designation of the Israel which believed in Christ as the only true Israel was no mere 3metaphor. To him a Jew who had refused the true Messiah had ceased to have a portion in Israel.

ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ] The term comes from Deut. xxviii. 25 (LXX.), and also sparingly from later books; also from the more frequent use of the word διασπείρω, which in this connexion is freely used, as well as διασκορπίζω, for זָרָה, to scatter, or blow abroad. The cognate זָרַע, to sow, is used in this sense only, Zech. x. 9 (LXX. καὶ σπερῶ αὐτοὺς ἐν λαοῖς). Even here the notion is merely of scattering, not of sowing seed destined to germinate, and probably this was all that the LXX. anywhere meant. The idea of the Jews among the nations being a blessing to them and spreading light is found in the prophets, but not, I think, in connexion with the image of seed. The corresponding Hebrew word is simply גּוֹלָה, exile (lit. stripping), and hence the exiles collectively.

From the original seat at Babylon, which still continued a main home of the Dispersion, it spread under Alexander and his successors westward into the Greek world, Syria, Egypt (Alexandria and Cyrene), Armenia, Asia Minor, and at last Rome. It was like a network of tracks along which the Gospel could travel and find soil ready prepared for it in the worship of the true God, and the knowledge and veneration of the ancient Scripture.

χαίρειν] See Otto in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol., 1867, pp. 678 ff. The common greeting in Greek letters. The Semitic was of course שָׁלוֹם or (Chald.) שְׁלָם. In letters in the Apocrypha χαίρειν often occurs, as also εἰρήνην or εἰρήνη (together, χ. and εἰρήνην ἀγαθήν, 2 Macc. i. 1). Hence it must have been freely used by Jews as well as heathens. In N.T. it occurs three times: Acts xxiii. 26, Claudius Lysias to Felix (heathen); xv. 23, Jerusalem letter to Gentile Christians at Antioch, etc.; and here. It has been pointed out that the Jerusalem letter was also not improbably written by St James, but nothing can be built on a coincidence in itself so natural. Here, the Greek form is probably preferred to εἰρήνη, etc. for the sake of the next verse.

²Πᾶσαν χαρὰν ἡγήσασθε, ἀδελφοί μου, ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσητε ποικίλοις,

2. πᾶσαν χαράν, all joy] Not “every (kind of) joy,” as from the variety of trials; nor yet “joy and nothing but joy” negatively, but simply “all” as expressing completeness and unreservedness. Hence it includes “very great,” but is not quantitative, rather expressing the full abandonment of mind to this one thought. Thus Aristides i. 478 (224), τὸ δὲ μηδ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἑωράκαμεν ἀξιοῦν πεπαιδεῦσθαι πᾶσα ἂν εἴη σνμφορά; also Epictetus (ap. Gebser Ep. of James p. 8) 3, 22 εἰρήνη πᾶσα; 2, 2 πᾶσά σοι ἀσφάλεια, πᾶσά σοι εὐμάρεια; 26 πᾶσα εὔροια; and Phil. ii. 29; 2 Cor. xii. 12; Eph. iv. 2.

χαράν] Joy, from ground of joy, by a natural figure. The χαράν catches up χαίρειν. “I bid you rejoice. And this I say in the most exact sense, though I know how much you have to bear that seems anything but matter of rejoicing. Just circumstances like these should you account occasions of unreserved joy.”

On the sense, see 1 Peter i. 8 with v. 7. But virtually it comes from Lk. vi. 23, and the Beatitudes altogether.

ὅταν with aor. subj.] Although suggested by present circumstances, the exhortation does not take its form from them. It is not “now that you are encountering,” but “when ye shall,” and probably also, by the common frequentative force of ὅταν, “whensoever ye shall.”

περιπέσητε] Not “fall into” but “fall 4in with,” “light upon,” “come across.” First used of ordinary casual meetings, as of persons in the street or ships at sea; then very commonly of misfortunes of all kinds, sickness, wounds, a storm, slavery, disgrace, etc. So the two other N.T. places: Lk. x. 30; Acts xxvii. 41. The idea then is that, as they go steadily on their own way, they must expect to be jostled, as it were, by various trials.

πειρασμοῖς, trials] An important and difficult word, entirely confined to O.T., Apocr., N.T., and literature founded on them; except Diosc. p. 3 B, τοὺς ἐπὶ τ. παθῶν τειρασμούς, experiments, trials made, with drugs in the case of diseases, i.e. to see what their effect will be.

But the word goes back to πειράζω, which is not so closely limited in range of authors. First, “tempt” is at the utmost an accessory and subordinate sense, on which see on v. 13. It is simply to “try,” “make trial of,” and πειρασμός “trial.”

Nor on the other hand does it, except by the circumstances of context, mean “trial” in the vague modern religious and hence popular sense, as when we say that a person has had great trials, meaning misfortunes or anxieties. Nothing in Greek is said πειράζειν or called a πειρασμός except with distinct reference to some kind of probation.

Young birds are said πειράζειν τ. πτέρυγας (Schol. Aristoph. Plutus 575). But more to the point, Plutarch (Cleom. 7 p. 808 a) says that Cleomenes when a dream was told him was at first troubled and suspicious, πειράζεσθαι δοκῶν, supposing himself to be the subject of an experiment to find out what he would say or do. And still more to the point Plutarch Moralia 15 p. 230 a, Namertes being congratulated on the multitude of his friends asked the spokesman εἰ δοκίμιον ἔχει τίνι τρόπῳ πειράζεται ὁ πολύφιλος; and when a desire was expressed to know he said Ἀτυχίᾳ.

The biblical use is substantially the same. In O.T. πειράζω stands almost always for נַסָּה (also ἐκπειράζω) and πειρασμός for the derivative מַסָּה. נַסָּהis used for various kinds of trying, including that of one human being by another, as Solomon by the Queen of Sheba, but especially of man by God and God by man. Of man by God for probation, under the form of God exploring; of God by man always in an evil sense, “tempting” God, trying as it were how far it is possible to go into disobeying Him without provoking His anger; with this last sense we are not concerned. The trying or “proving” (A.V.) of man by God is sometimes, but not always, by suffering. In one chapter (Deut. viii. 2) it is coupled with עִנָּה, κακόω, “humble” or “afflict”; but the context shews that “proving” is meant, as it is also in Judg. ii. 22; iii. 1, 4. The cardinal instance is Abraham (Gen. xxii. 1). Πειρασμός chiefly refers to temptations of God by men, also probations of Pharaoh (Deut. iv. 34; vii. 19; xxix. 3). There only remains Job ix. 23, very hard and probably corrupt (LXX. altogether different, Vulg. poenis), where “probations” may possibly be said in bitter irony, but “sufferings” is most improbable, considering the derivation.

In Judith, Wisdom and Ecclus. πειράζω similarly has both uses, viz. of God by man, and man by God; also πειρασμός in Ecclus., not only of Abraham (xliv. 20; as also 1 Macc. ii. 52), but more generally; but in ii. 1; xxxvi. 1, on the one hand the context implies affliction, on the other the stress lies on probations. These two are interesting passages as preparing the way for St James. (1) xxxvi. 1, τῷ φοβουμένῳ Κύριον οὐκ ἀπαντήσει κακόν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πειρασμῷ (whatever comes will come by way of trial), καὶ `άλιν ἐξελεῖται. Still more (2) ii. 1, Son, if thou settest thyself to serve the Lord God, prepare thy soul εἰς πειρασμόν etc. Cf. ii. 5, ἐν πυρί δοκιμάζεται χρυσός κ.τλ.

In the N.T. other shades of meaning appear. Besides the ordinary neutral making trial, and God’s trial of man, and man’s evil trial or tempting of God, we have men’s evil making trial of one whom they regarded as only a man, the Scribes and Pharisees “trying” or tempting our Lord, not tempting Him to do evil, but trying to get Him to say something on which they could lay hold.

But further a peculiar sense comes in at what we call our Lord’s temptation (Mk i. 13, πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ; Mk. iv. 1, πειρασθῆναι ὑπὸ τ. διαβόλου; Lk. iv. 2, πειραζόμενος ὑ. τ. δ.). In Mt. (iv. 3) the devil is then called ὁ τειράζων.

For ποικίλοις, divers, see note on 1 Pet. i. 6 (p. 41).

³γνώσκοντες ὅτι τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν·

3. γνώσκοντες, taking knowledge, recognising] Not necessarily a new piece of knowledge, but new apprehension of it.

δοκίμιον, test] In N.T. only here and, in similar connexion, 1 Pet. i. 7, a very hard verse. In LXX. only in two places, both rather peculiar. (1) Prov. xxvii. 21, representing מַצְרֵף, a “melting-pot”; but the change of order shews that “test” was meant by LXX., “there is a δοκίμιον for silver and a πύρωσις for gold.” (2) Ps. xii. 7, צֲלִיל, probably a “furnace,” a difficult and perhaps corrupt passage. Similarly the cognate words δόκιμος, δοκιμάζω in LXX. mostly refer to silver or gold tried and found pure, to a trial by fire. [See Deissmann Bib. Stud. sub voc., and Expositor 1908 p. 566.]

The rather rare word is always the instrument of probation, never the process. Similar places are Herodian ii. 10. 6, δοκίμιον δὲ στρατιωτῶν κάματος: Iamblichus Vita Pythag. 30 p. 185 fin., ταύτην (τ. λήθην) δή μοι θεῶν τις ἐνῆκε, δοκίμιον ἐσομένην τῆς σῆς περὶ συνθήκας εὐσταθείας.

κατεργάζεται, worketh] A favourite word with St Paul.

ὑπομονήν, endurance] The word ὑπομονή (A.V. patience) is hardly used by classical writers (an apophthegm in Plutarch Moralia 208 c, and an interpolated clause in his Crassus 3) to describe a virtue, though frequently for the patient bearing of any particular hardships. It stands for קָוָה and its derivatives in the sense of the object of hope or expectation (as Ps. xxxviii. 8, καιὶ νῦν τίς ἡ ὑπομονή μου; οὐχὶ ὁ κύριος;), and perhaps hope itself in the LXX. and Ecclus. (Fritzsche on xvi. 13). But late Jewish and Christian writers use it freely for the virtue shewn chiefly by martyrs: thus 4 Macc. i. 11, τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ ὑπομονῇ, and often; Psalt. Solom. ii. 40; Test. xii. Patriarch. Jos. 10; in the N.T., Lk. xxi. 19 (cf. Mt. xxiv. 13); St Paul often; Hebrews; 2 Peter; and Apoc.; later Clement 1. 5; Ignatius ad Polyc. 6; etc.

No English word is quite strong enough to express the active courage and resolution implied in ὑπομονή (cf. Ellicott on 1 Thess. i. 3). “Constancy” or “endurance” comes nearest, and the latter has the advantage of preserving the parallelism of the verb ὑπομένω. The resemblance of this verse to Rom. v. 3 f. should be noticed, though probably accidental.

⁴ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι, ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι.

4. ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, have a perfect work or result] The sense, obscure in the Greek, is fixed almost certainly by the context. The phrase is suggested by, and must include the meaning of, κατεργάζεται in v. 3. Endurance is represented as having a work to do, a result to accomplish, which must not be suffered to cease prematurely. Endurance 6itself is the first and a necessary step; but it is not to be rested in, being chiefly a means to higher ends. Here the Stoic constancy is at once justified, and implicitly pronounced inadequate, because it endeavours to be self-sufficing and leads the way to no diviner virtue. The work of the Christian endurance is manifold (elicited by divers trials, v. 2) and continuous, not easily exhausted; it remains imperfect (so the connexion of the two clauses teaches) while we are imperfect. This use of ἔργον is illustrated by the common negative formula οὐδὲν ἔργον, generally translated “no use,” as in Plutarch Lysander 11, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲν ἔργον αὐτοῦ τῆς σπουδῆς ἐσκεδασμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων: Publicola 13, οὐδὲν ἦν ἔργον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἡνιόχου) κατατείνοντος οὐδὲ παρηγοροῦντος. The combination of τέλειον with τὸ ἔργον occurs Ignat. Smyrn. but it is not a true parallel.

τέλειοι, perfect] This word in St James, as applied to man, has apparently no reference, as in St Paul, to maturity, and still less to initiation. It expresses the simplest idea of complete goodness, disconnected from the philosophical idea of a τέλος. In the LXX. it chiefly represents תָּמִים, a variously translated word, originally expressing completeness, and occurring in several leading passages as Gen. vi. 9 (τέλειος); xvii. 1 (ἄμεμπτος); Deut. xviii. 13 (τέλειος); Job i. 1 (ἄμεμπτος); Ps. cxix. 1 (ἄμωμος). The Greek τέλειος in a moral sense, rare in the LXX. and virtually wanting in the Apocrypha, recurs with additional meanings in Philo, e.g. Legum Allegoriae iii. 45—49 (in contrast with ὁ προκόπτων. ὁ ὰσκητής).

It regains its full force and simplicity in Christ’s own teaching, Mt. v. 48 (“Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect”); xix. 21 (“If thou wilt be perfect” contrasted with “What lack I yet?”). These passages are probably the chief sources of St James’ usage.

ὁλόκληροι, entire] The principal word τέλειος is reinforced by the almost synonymous ὁλόκληρος, the primary sense of which seems to be freedom from bodily defect either in a victim for sacrifice or in a priest; that is, it is a technical term of Greek ritual. In extant literature we do not find it before Plato, and he may well have introduced it into literature. It soon was applied in a wider manner to all freedom from defect (cf. e.g. the Stoic use in Diogenes Laert. vii. 107) being opposed to πηρός, κολοβός, χωλός. But the original sense was not forgotten, and can be traced in the usage of Josephus and Philo, though not in the LXX.

Thus τέλειος and ὁλόκληρος (which are used together somewhat vaguely at least once by Philo, Quis rerum div. heres? 23 p. 489) denote respectively positive and negative perfection, excellence and complete absence of defect (cf. Trench N.T. Synon. § 22). It is quite probable however that St James uses ὁλόκληρος with a recollection of its original force in Greek religion, and wished his readers to think of perfection and entireness not; merely in the abstract but as the necessary aim of men consecrated to God.!

ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι, coming behind in nothing] Λειπόμαι with the dative means not mere deficiency but falling short whether of a standard or of other persons, the latter when expressed being in the genitive. Essentially it is to be left behind, as in a race, and it comes to be used for the defeat of an army, strictly for its ceasing to resist the enemy and throwing up the struggle. There is thus a suggestion of acquiescence in shortcoming as a thing to be striven against (cf. Gal. vi. 9; Heb. xii. 3; 2 Thess. iii. 13). Compare the use of ὑστερῶ and ὑστεροῦμαι in St Paul and 7Hebrews (e.g. 1 Cor. i. 5, 7, ἐν παντὶ ἐπλουτισθητε ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ πάσῃ γνώσει. . . . ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι).

The object of comparison is usually expressed, rarely implied (as Diodorus Sic. iii. 39; Plutarch Nicias 3); but λείπομαι is also used quite absolutely, as here, in Plutarch Brutus 39 (ἐρρωμένους χρήμασιν ὅπλων δὲ καὶ σωμάτων πλήθει λειπομένους); cf. Sophocles Oed. Col. 495 f. Ἐν, commonly omitted, occurs Herodotus vii. 8; Sophocles l.c.; and Polybius xxiv. 7 (legat. 50); see also Herod. vii 168.

This final clause, added in apposition (cf. i. 6, 8, 14, 17, 22, 25; ii. 9; iii. 2, 8, 17), not only reaffirms negatively what has been already said positively, but suggests once more the idea of continual progress (a “race” in St Paul’s language, as Phil. iii. 14; cf. “the crown of life” in v. 12) implied in the earlier clauses.

The spiritual force of this and similar verses cannot be reduced within the limits of “common sense.” An “ideal” interpretation can be excluded only by “frittering away a pure and necessary word of Christ Himself. The perfection in all good, after which every Christian should strive simply as a Christian, is infinite in its nature, like a heavenly ladder the steps of which constantly increase the higher we climb: but woe to him who would make landings in it out of his own invention and on his own behalf” (Ewald, Jahrbücher iii. 259).

⁵Εi δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, αἰτείτω παρὰ τοῦ διδόντος θεοῦ πᾶσιν ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ·

5. εi δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, But if any of you lacketh wisdom] If any, i.e. whoever. The preceding λείπόμενοι suggests λείπεται with a somewhat different sense and construction. Λείπομαι with the genitive meaning to “be wanting in” is rare, this sense being an extension of the commoner to “be bereaved of”; it occurs Sophocles Elect. 474 (γνώμας λειπομένα σοφᾶς); Plato Menex. 19, 246 E; Pseud: Plato Axiochus 366 D (repeating ἄμοιρον); Libanius Progymn. p. 31 A (λ. τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐνθέου μανίας); besides Jam. ii. 15.

σοφίας] The context fixes, without altogether restricting, the sense of wisdom. “True perfectness cannot be where wisdom still is wanting; and wisdom, the inward power to seize and profit by outward trials, cannot be supplied by the trials themselves: but it may be had of God for the asking; He will send it direct into the heart.” It is that endowment of heart and mind which is needed for the right conduct of life. “All salutary wisdom is indeed to be asked of the Lord; for, as the wise man says (Ecclus. i. 1), ‘All wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath been with Him for ever.’ . . . But here there seems to be a special reference to that wisdom which we need for use in our trials, etc.” (Bede).

This human and practical idea of wisdom is inherited from the meditative books of the O.T. and the later works written on their model. Compare “the fear of the Lord that is wisdom” (Job xxviii. 28), where wisdom is the knowledge of the most essential facts and the power to walk instinctively by their light. It is remarkable to find wisdom holding this position in the forefront of the epistle, quite in the spirit of the elder theology. See further the notes on iii. 13-18.

ἁπλῶς, graciously] The combination with giveth early led to the assumption that ἁπλῶς requires here the sense of “abundantly,” but without authority (cf. Fritzsche Rom. iii. 62 ff.) and against the true context. On the other hand, a large body of evidence forbids us to admit only the meanings “simply” or “with singleness of heart,” and establishes a nearer approach to “bounteously” than most good critics have been willing to allow (see below).

In the best Greek authors the guidance 8of etymology is strictly followed, and ἁπλοῦς as a moral epithet denotes only the absence of guile or duplicity. Later writers comprehend under the one word the whole magnanimous and honourable type of character in which this singleness of mind is the central feature. Kindred and associated epithets are γενναῖος (cf. Plato Repub. i. 361 B, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον . . . οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα), ἐλευθέριος. (Aeschines, p. 135, Reiske), and μεγαλόψυχος. Truthfulness, liberality, and gentleness variously appear as manifesting the same high sense of honour.

The transition may be seen in Xenophon Cyropaed. viii. 4, 32 ff., where Cyrus blames alike those who magnify their own fortune (so thinking to appear ἐλευθεριώτεροι) and those who depreciate it, and adds, ἁπλουστάτου δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ποιήσαντα ἐκ ταύτης ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ καλοκἀγαθίας. But the usage became clearer subsequently. Scipio (Polybius, xxxii. 13, 14) resolved πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τὴν ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀκρίβειαν (i.e. his strict legal rights) τηρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ συγγενέσι καὶ φίλοις ἁπλῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ γενναίως κατὰ δύναμιν. One of Timon’s friends (Lucian Tim. 56) professed that he was not one of the flatterers, greedy of gold and banquets, who paid their court πρὸς ἄνδρα οἷόν σε ἁπλοῖκὸν καὶ τῶν ὄντων κοινωνικόν. David is said by Josephus (Ant. vii. 13, 4) to have admired Araunah τῆς ἁπλότητος καὶ τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας, when he offered his threshing-floor and oxen. M. Antony’s popularity is attributed by Plutarch (c. 43) to his εὐγένεια, λόγου δύναμις, ἁπλότης, τὸ φιλόδωρον καὶ μεγαλόδωρον, ἡ περὶ τὰς παιδιὰς καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας εὐτραπελία. Brutus, having tempered his character by education and philosophy, seemed to Plutarch (c. 1) ἐμμελέστατα κραθῆναι πρὸς τὸ καλόν, so that after Caesar’s death the friends of the latter attributed to Brutus εἴ τι γενναῖον ἡ πρᾶξις ἤνεγκε, considering Cassius ἁπλοῦν τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ καθαρὸν οὐχ ὁμοίως (cf. Philopoem. 13). The Persians desired Ariaspes for their king, as being πρᾷος καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος (Plutarch Artaxerx. 30). Ὁ μὲν ἁπλούστερος, though opposed to ὁ πανουργότερος, is the high-minded friend who, when admitted indiscreetly to a knowledge of private affairs owing to his too complaisant manners, οὐκ οἴεται δεῖν οὐδ᾽ ἀξιοῖ σύμβουλος εἶναι πραγμάτων τηλικούτων ἀλλ᾽ ὑπουργὸς καὶ διάκονος (Plutarch Moralia 63 B). Wine is said to quench πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν (besides fear) ἀφιλότιμα καὶ ἀγεννῆ), and ἄοινος ἀεὶ μέθη καὶ σκυθρωπὴ ταῖς τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων ἐνοικεῖ ψυχαῖς, ἐπιταραττομένη ὑπὸ ὀργῆς τινος ἢ δυσμενείας ἢ φιλονεικίας ἢ ἀνελευθερίας· ὧν ὁ οἶνος ἀμβλύνων τὰ πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ παροξύνων οἰκ ἄφρονας οὐδὲ ἡλιθίους ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦς πεοεῖ καὶ ἀπανούργους, οὐδὲ παρορατικοὺς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ καλοῦ προαιρετικούς (ib. 716 A, B). We are reminded of this passage of St James by the following: “So I think that the gods confer their benefits in secret, it being their nature to delight in the mere practice of bounty and beneficence (αὐτῷ τῷ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν). Whereas the flatterer’s work οὐδὲν ἔχει δίλαιον οὐδ᾽ ἀληθινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἐλευθέριον” (ib. 63 F).

There are traces of a similar extension of meaning in Latin, as Horace Ep. ii. 2, 193, “quantum simplex hilarisque nepoti Discrepet, et quantum discordet parcus avaro” (cf. “the cheerful giver” of Prov. xxii. 8, LXX., and 2 Cor. ix. 7); Tacitus, Hist. iii. 86, “inerat tamen (Vitellio) simplicitas et liberalitas, quae, ni adsit modus, in vitium vertuntur”; and perhaps Vell. Paterc. ii. 125, 5, “vir simplicitatis generosissimae.”

Himerius (Ecl. v. 19) affords the nearest verbal parallel to St James: εἰ δὲ ἁπλῶς διδόντος λαβεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον, τῶς οὐ πλέον, ὅτε μηδὲ προῖκα κ.τ.λ. Here however ἁπλῶς is not ethical at all, but retains its common classical 9meaning “absolutely,” that is (in this connexion) “without a substantial equivalent.” In St James the need for adopting this meaning is removed by the sufficient evidence for “graciously”; and it is excluded by the contrast with “upbraideth.”

In Jewish writings ἁπλοῦς is generalised in a different direction to denote one who carries piety and openness of heart before God into all his dealings. So the LXX.: 1 Chron. xxix. 17 for ישֶׁר; Prov. xix. 1 (cf. x. 9; 2 Sam. xv. 11); Aq.: Gen. xxv. 27; Job iv. 6; Prov. x. 29; Sym.: Job xxvii. 5 for תָּם ,תֹּם, and תֻּמָּה; Wisd. i. 1; 1 Macc. ii. 37, 60; 3 Macc. iii. 21; and the whole Test. vii. Patriarch., esp. the Test. of Issachar (e.g. 3), not without reference to the original meanings, as in opposition to περίεργος.

In St James (as in Rom. xii. 8; 2 Cor. viii. 2; ix. 11, 13) the late Greek usage and the context certainly determine the chief shade of meaning, but with clear reference to singleness. “Liberally” (A.V.) would be the best translation, if we could preserve exclusively its proper ethical sense; but by “liberally” we now usually mean “abundantly,” and that is not the particular aspect of God’s bounty indicated here by the following words, whatever may be the case in the passages of St Paul. On the whole graciously, coupled as it is with giveth, seems the nearest equivalent.

καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, and upbraideth not] The opposition is clearly to graciously, not to giveth: to upbraid is not to refuse, or even to vouchsafe “a stone for bread,” but to accompany a gift with ungenerous words or deeds. Ὀνειδίζω often has this sense in classical writers from Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 6. 10; cf. Demosth. de Coron. § 269) onwards (see exx. in Wetstein). In Ecclus. it is a favourite word (with ὀνειδισμός), and occurs more than once in strictly parallel passages: “My son, give not reproach with thy good deeds, neither painful words with every gift. Will not dew assuage the hot wind? So is a word better than a gift. Lo, is not a word more than a good gift? And both are with a gracious man (κεχαριτωμένῳ). A fool will upbraid ungraciously (ἀχαρίστως ὀνειδιεῖ), and a gift of the envious dissolveth the eyes” (xviii. 15-18). “The gift of a fool will profit thee not, for his eyes are many, instead of one. He will give little and upbraid much, and open his mouth as a crier: to-day he will lend, and to-morrow ask back; hated is such a man” (xx. 14, 15). “Have respect . . . unto thy friends concerning words of upbraiding, and upbraid not after thou hast given” (xli. 17, 22).

By this contrast of mean and ignoble benefactors, St James leads on from the naked idea of God as a giver to the more vital idea of His character and mind in giving (cf. i. 13, 17 f.; iv. 6; v. 7), answering by anticipation a superstitious thought which springs up as naturally in the decay of an established faith as in the confused hopes and fears of primitive heathenism. The subject is partly resumed in v. 17.

διδόντος . . . δοθήσεται] Giveth what? Wisdom doubtless in the first instance; but, as the immediate occasion of prayer becomes here the text for a universal lesson, St James’ meaning is best expressed by leaving the object undefined. In like manner the “holy spirit,” promised in Lk. xi. 13 to them that ask, is replaced in the parallel Mt. vii. 11 by “good things” without restriction.

This verse has much in common with some of Philo’s most cherished and at the same time most purely biblical thoughts on God as a free giver and on wisdom as specially the 10gift of God. But his language, beautiful and genuine as it often is, suffers much from being overlaid with a philosophical contrast between this wisdom (virtually “intuition”) and the knowledge and discernment which come by processes of education. The wisdom of St James, for all its immediate descent from heaven, excludes no lesson of experience in thought or life.

⁶αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν διακρινόμενος, ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος ἔοικεν κλύδωνι θαλάσσης ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ·

6. αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν διακρινόμενος, but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering] Taken from our Lord’s words in Mt. xxi. 21, Mk xi. 23; cf. Jam. v. 15. Not the mere petition avails, but the mind of the asker, the trust in God as One who delights to give. Wavering is no doubt the right translation of διακρινόμενος in this verse (as Mt. Mk, ll. cc.; Acts x. 20; Rom. iv. 20; xiv. 23), though singularly enough this sense occurs in no Greek writing, except where the influence of the N.T. might have led to its use. It is supported by the versions, the Greek commentators on the N.T. from Chrysostom and Hesychius, as well as by the context of all the passages. It is probably derived from the common meaning to “dispute” (Jer. xv. 10; Acts xi. 2; Jude 9; cf. Ezek. xvii. 20 codd.; xx. 35 f.; Joel iii. 2), of which there is a trace in the passages of Romans. Compare the use of διαλογίζομαι, to “dispute with oneself,” in the Gospels.

ἔοικεν κλύδωνι θαλάσσης, is like a rough sea] Κλύδων appears never (not even Polyb. x. 10. 3) to mean a “wave,” but always “rough water” (“the rough sea” A.V. Wisd. xiv. 5) or “roughness of water”; it is frequently coupled with σάλος.

ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ, blown and raised with the wind] This appears to be the nearest approach to the meaning of the Greek allowed by the English idiom. Ἀνεμίζω, occurs nowhere else in Greek literature, and might by its etymology express any kind of action of the wind. The equally rare analogous verb πνευματίζω is used where fanning is intended (Antigonus Caryst. ap. Wetst.). The compound ἐξανεμίζω is preserved only in the Scholia on Homer Il. xx. 440 (ἦκα μάλα ψύξασα, interpreted τῇ κινήσει τῆς χειρὸς ἡρέμα ἐξανεμίσασα: Steph. s.v.), where likewise it denotes the gentle air made by a wave of the hand. The cognate ἀνεμοῦμαι is to “be breathed through (or, swelled out) by the wind” (whence a singular derivative use peculiar to writers on Zoology), except in one passage; and its compound ἐξανεμοῦμαι has the same range, with the further meaning to “be dissolved into wind.” An epigram in the Anthology (A. P. xiii. 12) applies ἡνεμωμένος to the sea, described as roaring (βρόμος δεινός) and causing a shipwreck. With this exception the evidence, such as it is, implies a restriction of ἀνεμίζω to gentler motions of the air: and in St James the improbability of an anticlimax forbids it being taken as a stronger word than ῥιπίζω.

Still more definitely, ῥιπίζω means strictly to fan either a fire or a person. It is formed not from ῥιπή, a “rushing motion” (as applied to air, a “blast”), but from the derivative ῥιπίς, a fire-fan; and consequently expresses only the kind of blast proper to a fan. This restriction appears to be observed in a few passages of a rather wider range. Thus ῥιπίζομαι is applied to dead bodies allowed to sway freely (?) in the air (Galen. x. 745 ed. Kahn); to sea foam carried inland (Dion Cass. lxx. 4); to spacious and airy chambers (ὑπερῷα ῥιπιστά, Jerem. xxii. 14); to water preserved by motion from the “death” that would follow stagnation (Philo, 11de incor. mundi 24). Lastly an unknown comic poet (Meineke iv. 615) calls the people an unstable evil thing (δῆμος ἄστατον κακόν), which altogether like the sea is blown by the wind (ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται) and from being calm raises its crest at a trifling breeze (καὶ γαληνός . . . πνεῦμα βραχὺ κορύσσεται. These leading words are clear, though the line is corrupt). The compound ἀναρριπίζω always means to “fan a flame” literally or figuratively.

The prima facie notion of billows lashed by a storm is therefore supported by hardly any evidence; and indeed the restless swaying to and fro of the surface of the water, blown upon by shifting breezes, is a truer image of a waverer (cf. Dion Cass. lxv. 16, Vitellius ἐμπλήκτως ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐφέρετο, ὥσπερ ἐν κλύδωνι). In the tideless Mediterranean even a slight rufflement would be noticed in contrast with the usually level calm, and the direct influences of disturbing winds are seen free from the cross effects of other agencies.

⁷μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήψεταί τι παρὰ του κυρίου¹⁵¹⁵κυρίου] κυρίου, ⁸ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, ἀκατάστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ.

7, 8. We have to choose here between three constructions, each marked by a different way of punctuating between the verses. (a) With a colon, making two separate sentences (A.V.); “let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord: a man of two minds is unstable in all his ways.” (b) With a comma making v. 7 a complete sentence, with v. 8 added in apposition (R.V. text); “let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord, a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways.” (c) Without a stop, making v. 7 incomplete without part of v. 8 (R.V. marg.); “let not that man think that a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways, shall receive anything from the Lord.”

In (a) and (b) it is “that man” that is said not to receive from the Lord, and so that is blamed. Now who is “that man” — “he that wavereth” or “if any of you etc.”? The whole context excludes him that merely “lacketh wisdom” from blame: blame here attaches not to the absence of wisdom, but to the failure to ask for it, or to the asking without faith. Therefore the constructions (a) and (b) require “that man” to mean the waverer. As an independent proof that he is meant, it is urged that “that man” is itself a reproachful designation. Undoubtedly it might be so employed; but St James’ usage does not favour the supposition. He has the same word for man (ἄνθρωπος) in six other places, but nowhere with a trace of reproach and apparently always in emphatic opposition to other beings. Thus the opposition is to God’s other “creatures” in i. 19; to “the devils” in ii. 20 and probably 24; to “every kind of beasts etc.” in iii. 8 f.; to beings not “of like passions” v. 17; and so here to “the Lord.” Likewise there is no force in a cumbrous reproachful description (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος) thus closely preceding an explicit rebuke: in Mt. xii. 45; xxvi. 24 the weight of the words is in harmony with the peculiar solemnity of the subjects. If no reproach is implied, the phrase is still more inexplicable by Greek usage as applied to the person last mentioned.

On the other hand, if he that “lacketh wisdom” be intended, all difficulty vanishes. The obvious way of setting aside the last person and pointing back to the person mentioned before him would be in Greek the use of the pronoun “that” (ἐκεῖνος); and the insertion of “man” we have already seen to be explained by the opposition to “the Lord.”

Since then “that man” must naturally mean him that merely “lacketh wisdom,” and so cannot be identified with the subject of rebuke, the constructions (a) and (b) (of which (b) is certainly the more natural) are excluded, and the two verses become one unbroken sentence. I am not 12aware of any intrinsic advantage of the constructions (a) or (b) that would lead us to set aside this conclusion, though habit makes us assume a pause at the end of v. 7. Perhaps a feeling that the words “unstable in all his ways” must denote a punishment, not a sin, may have introduced the construction (a) into late MSS. of the Vulgate (inconstans est), and so into A.V.: in reality this instability is strictly neither sin nor punishment, but in some sense the transition from the one to the other. The position of the verb (in the Greek) at the beginning of the clause is explained by the length and elaborateness of its subject.

Although the man deficient in wisdom is not directly rebuked, the form of the sentence implies that he is concerned in the words spoken of others. Though not assumed to be a waverer, he is virtually warned that he may easily become liable to the reproach, and reminded of the nature of his relation as a “man” to “the Lord” of men.

8. ἀνήρ, man] A different word from that used in v. 7, and wholly without emphasis.

δίψυχος, of two minds] The image of δίψυχος (lit. “two-souled”) represents either dissimulation (suggested to modern ears by “double-minded” in A.V.), or various kinds of distraction and doubt. Here faithless wavering is obviously meant, the description in verse 6 being made more vivid by an additional figure. Perhaps, as Calvin suggests, there is an intentional contrast with the manner of God’s giving; “graciously” (ἀπλῶς) being according to the primitive meaning of the Greek “simply”: Ita erit tacita antithesis inter Dei simplicitatem, cujus meminit prius, et duplicem hominis animum. Sicut enim exporrecta manu nobis Deus largitur, ita vicissim sinum cordis nostri expansum esse decet. Incredulos ergo, qui recessus habent, dicit esse instabiles etc. There may also be an allusion to “loving God with all the soul” or “the whole soul,” ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῃ σου (Deut. vi. 5; Mt xxii. 37). The idea was familiar to the Greeks (δίχα θυμὸν or νόον ἔχειν etc.) from Homer and Theognis (910 Bergk); cf. Xenoph. Cyropaed. vi. 1. 41. It appears less distinctly in 1 Kings xviii. 21, and perhaps 1 Chr. xii. 33 (Heb. “a heart and a heart,” not LXX.). We are reminded of St James by Ecclus. i. 28, “Disobey not the fear of the Lord, and approach Him not with a double heart” (ἐν καρδίᾳ δισσῇ).

The word itself δίψυχος δίψυχία, διψυχέω) occurs here and iv. 8 for the first time. It is sprinkled over the early Fathers rather freely, and is found occasionally in later times in the novelist Eustathius (viii. 7; xi. 17 f.), as well as in ecclesiastical writers. Probably all drew directly or indirectly from St James (Philo, Fragm. ii. 663 Mangey, uses διχονοῦς ἐπαμφοτερής, where St John Damascene has the heading περὶ δειλῶν καὶ διψύχων). The early references are Clem. I. 11, 23; in both cases διστάζοντες is added as if to explain an unfamiliar word: the latter passage (ταλαίπωροί εἰσιν οἱ δίψυχοι, οἱ διστάζοντες τῇ ψυχῇ κ.τ.λ.) seems quoted from an earlier writing (as it is likewise in Ps.-Clem. II. 11); the reference in this passage is conjectured by Lightfoot to be to the prophecies of Eldad and Medad referred to in Hermas, Vis. ii. 3, and therefore current early at Rome: they are said to have prophesied to the people in the wilderness, so that it is probably a Jewish, though possibly a Christian, book; Ep. Barnab. 19 (cf. δίγνωμος, δίγλωσσος ib.; διπλοκαρδία 20); Const. Ap. vii. 11 (“Be not of two minds in thy prayer (doubting) 13whether it shall be or not (cf. Herm. Vis. iii. 4. 3); for the Lord saith to me Peter upon the sea, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?”); Ps.-Ignat. ad Heron. 7; Hermas passim; and Didache Ap. iv. 4 οὐ διψυχήσεις πότερον ἔσται ἢ οὔ (whence the usage in Barnabas, Hermas, and Const. Ap.). The reproof to Peter literally “on the sea” (ὀλιγόπιστε, εἰς τί ἐδίστασας; Mt. xiv. 31) may have been present to St James’ mind, as he had just drawn a comparison from the sea,

ἀκ. ἐν πάσαις τ. ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ] As “a man of two minds” is a slightly varied repetition of “he that wavereth,” in like manner “unstable in all his ways” answers to “like a rough sea etc.” This parallelism is in itself enough to prove that the absence of the conjunction after “two minds” is expressive, and denotes not simple co-ordination but sequence: “a man of two minds and so unstable in all his ways.”

ἀκατάστατος, unstable] Things properly are called ἀκατάστατα, when they do not follow an established order of any kind (καθεστηκότα: cf. Aristot. Probl. xxvi. 13). The word is rarely applied to persons. Polybius (cf. Demosth. de fals. legat. p. 383) seems to mean by it “fickle” or “easily persuaded” (vii. 4. 6); he couples the substantive with madness (μανία) a few lines further on. Other examples are Epictetus (Diss. ii. 1. 12: φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται) “in a state of trepidation”; Pollux “fickle” (vi. 121), and also “disorderly,” i.e. “stirring up disorder” (vi. 129); the translators of the O.T. “staggering” or “reeling”: Gen. iv. 12 (Sym.) ἀνάστατος καὶ ἀκατάστατος with varr., σαλευόμενος καὶ ἀκαταστατῶν (στένων καὶ τρέμων LXX.), Lam. iv. 14 (Sym.), ἀκατάστατοι ἐγένοντο LXX.) τυφλοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐξόδοις, Isa. liv. 11 (LXX.), “tossed with tempest” (A.V.), of Zion compared to a ship, and apparently Hos. viii. 6 (Sym.) where the “Quinta Editio” has ῥεμβεύων; Plut. II. 714 E, says that wine makes τ. γνώμην ἐπισφαλῆ καὶ ἀκατάστατον; cf. Σκοτόμαινα νύξ ἐστιν ἐν ᾗ μαίνεται καὶ ἀκαταστατεῖ τὰ οὐράνια in Etym. Magn. 719, 34. The verbal resemblance of Tob. i. 15 (ἐβασίλευσεν Σενναχηρὶμ ὁ υἱὸς ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ [al. αἱ ὁδ. τῆς Μηδίας] ἡκαταστάτησαν [so B; Α κατέστησα, א ἀπέστησαν], καὶ οὐκέτι ἡδυνάσθην πορευθῆναι εἰς τὴν Μηδίαν) is curious but hardly more: the meaning seems to be “his roads” (possibly “his ways of government”) “were full of disorder and therefore unsafe.”

On the whole it can scarcely be doubted that St James intended, or at all events had in view, the physical meaning of ἀκατάστατος employed by the translators of the O.T.; so that the two leading words of the phrase make up a vigorous metaphor, “staggering in all his ways.” But the English word “staggering” hardly suits the tone of the verse; and “unsteady” has other disturbing associations. “Unstable” (A. V.), though somewhat feebler than the Greek, must therefore be retained, and has the advantage of covering the alternative meaning “fickle.” Compare Ecclus. ii. 12, “Woe to cowardly hearts and faint hands, and a sinner that walketh upon two paths.”

ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ, in all his ways] Ὁδοῖς retains its original force as “roads” or “journeys” more distinctly than the English equivalent. “In all his ways” is perhaps, as Bede says, in prosperity and adversity alike; whether suffering trial or not, he has no firm footing. The formula occurs Ps. xci. 11 and elsewhere.

The last two sentences may be thus paraphrased: “A prayer for wisdom, to be successful, must be full of trust and without wavering. Wisdom comes not to him that asks God for it only as a desperate chance, without firm 14belief in His power and cheerful willingness to give. Such a one is always tossed to and fro by vague hopes and fears; he is at the mercy of every blast and counterblast of outward things. While he allows them to hide from him the inner vision of God’s works and ways, he cannot go straight forward with one aim and one mind, and therefore lacks the one condition of finding wisdom; he is a stranger to that converse with God, in which alone the mutual act of giving and receiving can be said to exist.”

A passage of Philo deserves to be appended; much of the context is necessarily omitted. “Whatsoever things nature gives to the soul need a long time to gain strength; as it is with the communication of arts and the rules of arts by other men to their pupils. But when God, the fountain of wisdom, communicates various kinds of knowledge (τὰς ἐπιστήμας) to mankind, He communicates them without lapse of time (ἀχρόνως); and they, inasmuch as they have become disciples of the Only Wise, are quick at discovering the things which they sought. Now one of the first virtues thus introduced is the eager desire of imitating a perfect teacher, so far as it is possible for an imperfect being to imitate a perfect. When Moses said (to Pharaoh, Ex. viii. 9) ‘Command me a time that I may pray for thee and thy servants etc.,’ he being in sore need ought to have said, ‘Pray thou at once.’ But he delayed, saying, ‘To-morrow,’ that so he might maintain his godless feebleness (τὴν ἁπαλότητα τῆς ἀθεότητος) to the end. This conduct is like that of almost all waverers (ἐπαμφοτερισταῖς), even though they may not acknowledge it in express words. For, when any undesired event befalls them, inasmuch as they have had no previous firm trust in the Saviour God, they fly to such help as nature can give, to physicians, to herbs, to compound drugs, to strict regimen, in short to every resource of perishable things. And if a man say to them, ‘Flee, O ye wretched ones, to the only Physician of the maladies of the soul, and forsake the help which mutable (παθητῆς) nature can give,’ they laugh and mock with cries of ‘To-morrow,’ as though in no case would they supplicate the Deity to remove present misfortunes” (De Sacrif. Ab. et Caini, 17-19).

⁹Καυχάσθω δὲ [ὁ] ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινὸς ἐν τῷ ὕψει αὐτοῦ, ¹⁰ὁ δὲ πλούσιος ἐν τῇ ταπεινώσει αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου παρελεύσεται. ¹¹ ἀνέτειλεν γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος σὺν τῷ καύσωνι καὶ ἐξήρανεν τὸν χὸρτον, καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσεν καὶ ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἀπώλετο· οὕτως καὶ ὁ πλούσιος ἐν ταῖς πορείαις αὐτοῦ μαρανθήσεται.

9-11. A return to the original theme of v. 2, bringing in the characteristic contrast of rich and poor as a special application of the principle of rejoicing in trials. There is probably a reference to the Beatitudes such as they appear in St Luke (vi. 20, 24). An indirect opposition (marked by But and also by the brother) to the waverer of v. 8 is doubtless also intended. Poverty, riches, and the change from one to the other may be among the “ways,” in all of which the waverer is found unstable.

9. The order in the Greek is important. ὁ ἀδελφὸς belongs equally to ὁ ταπεινός and ὁ πλούσιος, so that “let the brother boast” is common to both verses. As St James bids his “brethren” count it all joy when they fell in with trials, so he here points out the appropriate grounds of boasting to each member of the brotherhood, the body who might be expected to take a truer view of life than the outer world.

καυχάσθω, glory] In the O.T. and Ecclus. “glorying” or “boasting” drops altogether its strict sense, and signifies any proud and exulting joy: so הִתְהַלַּל (ἐπαινοῦμαι) Ps. xxxiv. 3; lxiv. 11 etc.; and καυχῶμαι Ps. v. 11; cxlix. 5; Ecclus. xxxix. 8 etc. In the N.T. the word is confined to the Epp. and common there; but rarely loses its original force, probably out of St James only in the parallel Rom. v. 2, 3, 11 and in Heb. iii. 6; in other apparently similar cases the effect is produced merely by obvious 15paradox. Possibly the extension had its origin in Jerem. ix. 23 f., quoted 2 Cor. x. 17. Here καυχάσθω repeats the χαράν of v. 2 with a slight change, meaning joy accompanied with pride.

ταπεινός, of low estate] Poverty is intended, but poverty in relation to “glorying” and contempt, a state despised by the mass of mankind. Ταπεινός means indifferently “poor” and “poor in spirit” i.e. “meek,” two notions which the later Jews loved to combine: it is often used in both senses in Ecclus.

τῷ ὕψει αὐτοῦ, his height] Not any future elevation in this or the other world, but the present spiritual height conferred by his outward lowness, the blessing pronounced upon the poor, the possession of the Kingdom of God. Continued poverty is one of the “trials” to be rejoiced in.

10. τῇ ταπεινώσει αὐτοῦ, his being brought low] Suffering the loss not of wealth only, but of the consideration which wealth brings. Ταπείνωσις might mean “low estate,” as in the LXX.(and Lk. i. 48 from 1 Sam. i. 11); but St James’ language is not usually thus incorrect, and the classical sense is borne out by the context. The correlation with v. 9 is not meant to be exact. The rich brother is to glory in his being brought low whenever that may be, now or at any future day (see v. 1). If the “trials” of the times included persecution, the rich would be its first victims. This is a marked feature in the persecution of the Jews by the mob of Alexandria under the Emperor Gaius (Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 18; e.g. πένητας ἐκ πλουσὶων καὶ ἀπόρους ἐξ εὐπόρων γεγενῆσθαι μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἀνοίκους καὶ ἀνεστίους, ἐξεωσμένους καὶ πεφυγαδευμένους τῶν ἰδίων οἰκιῶν κ.τ.λ.).

ὅτι, since) This introduces not an explanation of being brought low, but one reason why the rich brother should glory in it, or more strictly why he should not be startled at the command to glory in it. Perfection (v. 4) is assumed to be his aim: our Lord taught that riches are a hindrance in the way of perfection (Mt. xix. 21 ff.): and this doctrine loses no little of its strangeness, when the separable, and so to speak accidental, nature of riches is remembered.

ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου, as the bloom of grass] Taken from the LXX. rendering of Isa. xl. 6: πᾶσα σὰρξ χόρτος πᾶσα δόξα ἀνθρώπου ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου. χόρτος, properly “fodder,” means in the LXX. such grass, or rather herbage, as makes fodder. It stands rightly for חָצִיר (cf. Job xl. 15), in the first place here as in the two following verses. But ἄνθος χόρτου is put for צִיץ הַשָּׂדֶה, which is rightly translated ἄνθος τοῦ ἀγροῦ, “the flower of the field,” in the parallel Ps. ciii. 15. The LXX. nowhere else translate שָׂדֶה by χόρτος, nor will it bear that meaning: hence χόρτου is merely an erroneous repetition. The unique image taken from the flower of grass had therefore an accidental origin, though it yields a sufficient sense.

Grass is frequently used in the poetical books of the O.T. to illustrate the shortness of life, or the swift fall of the wicked. To understand the force of the image we must forget the perpetual verdure of our meadows and pastures under a cool and damp climate, and recall only the blades of thin herbage which rapidly spring up and as rapidly vanish before the Palestine summer has well begun. By “the flower of the field” the prophet (and the LXX. translator) doubtless meant the blaze of gorgeous blossoms which accompanies the first shooting 16of the grass in spring, alike in the Holy Land and on the Babylonian plain (Stanley Sin. and Pal. 138 f.; Layard Nineveh i. p. 78).

παρελεύσεται, pass away] Παρέρχομαι and “pass” answer strictly to each other in their primary and their metaphorical senses: the Greek word here, as often in classical writers, means to “pass away,” i.e. pass by and so go out of sight; it is employed in precisely similar comparison, Wisd. ii. 4; v. 9.

Which passes away, the rich man or his riches? Notwithstanding the form of the sentence, we might be tempted by the apparent connexion with v. 9 to say his riches (ὁ πλοῦτος included in ὁ πλούσιος). But in that case the only way to avoid unmeaning tautology is to take the comparison as justifying the mention of impoverishment rather than the exhortation to glorying in impoverishment; “let the rich man glory in his being brought low, for brought low be assuredly will be, sooner or later.” This gives an intelligible sense; but no one having this in his mind would have clothed it in the language of vv. 10, 11. St James must therefore mean to say not that riches leave the rich man but that he leaves his riches. This is the interpretation suggested by the natural grammar of v. 10, and no other will suit the last clause of v. 11.

But a difficulty remains. St James would hardly say that the rich man is more liable to death than the poor, and the shortness of life common to both is in itself no reason why the rich should glory in being brought to poverty. Probably the answer is that St James has in view not death absolutely but death as separating riches from their possessor, and shewing them to have no essential connexion with him. “Be not thou afraid when one is made rich, when the glory of his house is increased; for when he dieth he shall carry nothing away: his glory shall not descend after him” (Ps. xlix. 16, 17). “Whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?” (Lk. xii. 20). The perishableness was familiar to heathens of all nations: cf. Horace Od. ii. 14 “Linquenda tellus et domus et placens Uxor; neque harum, quas colis, arborum” etc. The argument goes no further than to lower the relative value set upon wealth, and cannot by itself sustain the exhortation of v. 10. But the exaggerated estimate of wealth here combated involved much more than exaggeration. It set up riches as the supreme object of trust and aspiration, and fostered the vague instinct that there was a difference of nature corresponding to the distinction of rich and poor. Thus in effect it substituted another god for Jehovah, and denied the brotherhood of men. To a rich man in this state of mind the lesson of the prophet was a necessary preparation for receiving the teaching of Christ.

I1. ἀνέτειλεν, riseth] This is the common classical (gnomic) aorist of general statements founded on repeated experience. There is no clear instance of this use in the N.T. except here and v. 24. Rapid succession is perhaps also indicated by the series of aorists, though too strongly expressed in A.V. Not unlike is Ps. civ. 22, ἀνέτειλεν ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ συνήχθησαν (so all MSS. except B).

σὺν τῷ καύσωνι, with the scorching wind] A rare word in ordinary Greek, and there chiefly used for some very inflammatory kind of fever (καύσωνος, θέτμης — Suid. where Bernhardy refers to Herod. Epim. p. 196); in Athen. iii. p. 73 A it denotes noontide heat. This seems also to be the meaning in Gen. xxxi. 40 (A all.; καύματι E) and Song of 3 Child. 44 (A Compl. al.³; καῦμα B all., καῦσος all.); also in Mt. xx. 12; Lk. xii. 55 (aestas latt.); and perhaps Isa. xlix. 10, where the Hebrew has nothing to do with wind.

On the other hand in the O.T. καύσων is a frequent translation of קָדִים (often also rendered νότος) the east wind of Palestine (the Simoom) destructive alike by its violence and its dry heat acquired in passing over the desert. This sense alone occurs in all the chief Greek translations of the O.T., and again apparently in Ecclus. and Judith. The only trace of it out of the Bible is in the Schol. to Aristoph. Lysist. 974, where a whirlwind is probably intended. St Jerome on Hos. xii. 1 recognises both senses (“sequique καύσωνα, hoc eat aestum,” and further on “sequuntur καύσωνα, id est ariditatem sive ventum urentem”), describing the wind as “injurious to the flowers and destroying every budding thing.” Again on Ezek. xxvii. 26 he notices willowy, “which we may translate burning wind,” as an appropriate rendering of קָדִים (“Auster”), and then goes on to refer to Mt. xx. 12 with apparently only the heat in view (“totius diei calorem et aestum”). On the whole there can be little doubt that the O.T. sense is that intended here (“the sun with the scorching wind”). In Jonah iv. 8 the east wind (καύσων) that beat upon Jonah rose with the sun. For its effects on vegetation see Gen. xli. 6, 23, 27; Ezek. xvii. l0; xix. 12. It is said to blow from February to June [v. Enc. Bib. pp. 5304 f.].

ἐξέπεσεν, fadeth away] This is one of the words in this verse derived from Isa. xl. 7, where (as in xxviii. 1, 4) it stands for נָבֵל, to fade or droop away. The notion of dropping off is not distinctly contained in the Hebrew, as it is in Job xiv. 2; xv. 33, where ἐκπίπτω is equally applied to flowers. The strictest parallel is Job xv. 30 in the LXX., but the Hebrew is different. Possibly various metaphors combined (cf. Fritzsche Rom. ii. 281) to give ἐκπίπτω its genuine Greek sense of ending in failure or nothingness; so Ecclus. xxxi. 7; Rom. ix. 6; and the “received” reading of 1 Cor. xiii. 8. But the same force belongs to the root prior to all special applications. πίπτω itself has a hardly distinguishable sense (to “fail” as well as to “fall”), which is associated with παρέρχομαι v. 10) in Lk. xvi. 17. Hence ἐξέπεσεν was probably intended to convey, and will certainly bear, the sense of withering away rather than falling off.

7’) ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ, the glory of its pride] Each of the principal words will bear two renderings. Εὐπρέπεια might mean “comeliness,” “grace,” “beauty.” Πρόσωπον might be simply the ‘face’ of the grass or flower, by a common metaphor for its outward appearance or ‘fashion.’ Εὐπρέπεια, however (used in O.T. for various Hebrew words), usually includes a notion of stateliness, or majesty. So Ps. xciii. 1, ὁ κύριος ἐβασίλευσεν, εὐπρέπειαν ἐνεδύσατο; Ps. civ. 1, ἐξομολόγησιν καὶ εὐπρέπειαν ἐνεδύσω (א, B); Jerem. xciii. 9, ἐγενήθην ὡς ἀνὴρ συντετριμμένος . . . ἀπὸ προσώπου Κυρίου καὶ ἀπὸ προσώπου εὑπρεπείας δόξης αὐτοῦ: Bar. v. 1 ἔνδυσαι (Ἰερουσαλήμ) τὴν εὐπρέπειαν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξης εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα: Wisd. v. 16, τὸ βασίλειον τῆς εὐπρεπείας: Wisd. vii. 29, ἐστὶν γὰρ αὕτη (σοφία) εὐπρεπεστέρα ἡλίου: etc.

The varied figurative use of פָּנִים (“face”) in the O.T. was closely followed in the LXX. by πρόσωπον, which brought in with it from prior, though late, Greek usages the secondary notion of a person in a drama, or a representative. In late Jewish Greek the old Hebrew idiom to “accept the face” (i.e. “receive with favour”) obtained 18fresh extensions, and thus in various ways the associations of the word πρόσωπον became more complex. It seems to mean a “person” (“personage”), as the possessor of dignity or honour, in Ecclus. xxxii. (xxxv.) 15 (12), μὴ ἔπεχε θυσίᾳ ἀδίκῳ, ὅτι κύριος κριτής ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν παρ᾽ αὐτῷ δόξα προσώπου, i.e. “the glory which distinguishes one person from another has no existence in His sight.” Compare Wisd. vi. 7, οὐ γὰρ ὑποστελεῖται πρόσωπον ὁ πάντων δεσπότης, οὐδὲ ἐντραπήσεται μέγεθος Not unlike is Ecclus. xxix. 27, ἔξελθε, πάροικε, ἀπὸ προσώπου δόξης: cf. 2 Macc. xiv. 24, καὶ εἶχεν τὸν Ἰούδαν διὰ παντὸς ἐν προσώπῳ, ψυχικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ προσεκέκλιτο. “Person” in this rather loose sense would accordingly seem to be the most exact translation here, but would involve too harsh a figure in English; and “pride” nearly expresses what is meant.

On the whole clause cf. Isa. xxviii. 1-5. The rendering here given has the advantage of recalling v. 9 (“glorying,” “low estate,” “height”).

μαρανθήσεται, wither away] Μαραίνομαι denoted originally the dying out of a fire (cf. Aristot. de vita et morte, 5), but came to be used of many kinds of gradual enfeeblement or decay. In classical Greek there are but slight traces of its application to plants (Plutarch, Dion, 24; Lucian, de Domo, 9; Themistius, Or. xiii. p. 164 C, ἄνθος ἀμυδρὸν ἀρετῆς μαραίνεσθαι). But this is the exact sense in Wisd. ii. 8; and Job xxiv. 24, ἐμαράνθη ὥσπερ μολόχη (al. χλόη) ἐν καύματι ἢ ὥσπερ στάχυς ἀπὸ καλάμης αὐτόματος ἀποπεσών, which curiously resembles the text. Hence probably also the meaning “scorch” in the only remaining instance in the O.T. and Apocrypha, Wisd. xix. 20.

The idea of gradual passing away, which is characteristic of the classical use, is out of place here, where the rapid disappearance of the grass is dwelt upon. The fitness of the word comes solely from its association with the image just employed: it can mean no more than “die or vanish as the grass does.”

πορείαις, goings] The known evidence for the reading πορίαις is insufficient; but in any case it is merely a variation of spelling. There is no authority for the existence of a word πορία signifying “gain” (πορισμός), which is a blunder of Erasmus founded on a false analogy of ἀπορία and εὐπορία. Πορεία means a “journey,” and is very rarely used in any secondary sense, unless by a conscious metaphor indicated in the context. The only clear cases discoverable are Ps. lxviii. 24; (Isa. viii. 11;) and Hab. iii. 6 (whence the interpolation in Ecclus. i. 5). This is the more remarkable as τρίβοι and ὁδοί are abundantly so used in the LXX. Herder’s ingenious suggestion that there is an allusion to travelling merchants (as undoubtedly iv. 13 f.) has great probability. At all events the common interpretation of “goings” as a mere trope for “doings” seems too weak here. The force probably lies in the idea that the rich man perishes while he is still on the move, before he has attained the state of restful enjoyment which is always expected and never arrives. Without some such hint of prematurity the parallel with the grass is lost.

The addition of the elaborate description in v. 11 to the simple comparison in v. 10 seems to shew how vividly St James’ mind had been impressed by the image when himself looking at the grass: what had kindled his own imagination he uses to breathe life into the moral lesson. In the last clause of the verse he returns, as it were, from the contemplation to his proper subject, and ends with an echo of the last words of v. 8.

“Let God alone be thy boast and thy greatest praise (Deut. x. 21), and pride not thyself upon riches, neither upon honour, neither etc., considering that these things . . . are swift to change, withering away (μαραινόμενα) as it were before they have fully bloomed.” Philo, de vict. off. 10 (ii. 258).

¹² Μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν, ὅτι δόκιμος γενόμενος λήψεται τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν.

12. The parenthesis (vv. 5-11) ended, St James returns to his first theme, trials. He has dealt with them (vv. 3, 4) as to their intended effects on human character, as instruments for training men to varied perfection. He has spoken (vv. 5-8) of the process as one carried on through a wisdom received from God in answer to trustful prayer, depending therefore on a genuine faith, which in its turn depends on a true knowledge of God’s character. He has spoken (vv. 9-11) of the true estimate of poverty and riches, or rather of the contempt and honour which they confer, as characteristic of the right mind towards men, which should accompany and express the right mind towards God. Now he returns to trials, once more in relation to God, but from quite a new point of view, not as to their effects on character, but as to the thoughts which they at the time suggest to one who has no worthy faith in God.

μακάριος, happy] Not “blessed,” but as we say “a happy man.” Cf. its use in the Psalms (e.g. i. 1) and in the Beatitudes. St James drops the paradoxical form of the original theme in v. 2. Not now trial, but the patient endurance of trial is pronounced “happy.” Thus the explanations in vv. 3, 4 are incorporated with the primary exhortation in v. 2.

ὑπομένει, endureth] Not “has to bear,” but “bears with endurance,” the verb recalling ὑπομονήν (v. 3). So Mt. xxiv. 13; Mk xiii. 13 compared with Lk. xxi. 19. In 1 Pet. ii. 20 the force is very apparent. The phrase Μακάριος ὁ ὑπομένων (B: ὑπομείνας A, etc.) occurs Dan. xii. 12 (Thdn). Compare v. 11.

δόκιμος, approved] Again this word recalls the δοκίμιον of v. 3. It means one who has been tested, as gold or silver is tested (Zech. xi. 13, LXX.; cf. Ps. lxvi. 10), and not found wanting. “Approved” is not quite a satisfactory rendering in modern English, though it is the best available here. “Proved” or “tried” in their adjectival sense would be less ambiguous, if the form of the sentence did not render them liable to be taken for pure participles, expressing not the result but the process of trial.

τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, the crown of life] The precise force of this phrase is not easy to ascertain. One of the most ancient and widely spread of symbols is a circlet round the head; expressing chiefly joy or honour or sanctity. There are two principal types, the garland of leaves or flowers (στέφανος) and the linen fillet (διάδημα, μίτρα). From one or other of these two, or from combinations of both, are probably derived all the various “crowns” in more durable or precious materials, sometimes enriched with additional ornaments or symbols. Each type is represented by a familiar instance. The chaplet with which the victor was crowned at the Greek games is a well-known illustration as used by St Paul. A fillet under the name of “diadem” was one of the insignia of royalty among the Persians, and was adopted by the Greek and Graeco-Asiatic kingdoms after Alexander. This ancient original of the modern kingly crown is never called στέφανος in classical Greek; but the same Hebrew word עֲטָרָה, which is always rendered στέφανος by the LXX., 20denotes some royal headdress of gold (shape unknown) in 2 Sam. xii. 30 (the golden crown of the Ammonite king taken at Rabbah) || 1 Chr. xx. 2; (Ps. xxi. 3;) Esth. viii. 15; as well as the symbol of glory, pride, or beauty (cf. Lam. v. 16), στέφανος sometimes standing alone, sometimes being followed by a defining word (στέφανος, δόξης, τρυφῆς, καυχήσεως, τῆς ὕβρεως, κάλλους, χαρίτων; Ecclus. vi. 31; xv. 6). This idiom clearly comes from the general popular use of chaplets, not from any appropriation to particular offices.

Which then of the various uses of crowns or chaplets has supplied St James with his image? In such a context we should naturally think first of the victor’s crown in the games, of which St Paul speaks. On the other hand, the O.T. contains no instance of that use (it would be impossible to rely on the LXX. mistranslation of Zech. vi. 14, ὁ δὲ στόφανος ἔσται τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν, really the proper name Helem); and apparently the Apocrypha has no other instance than the description of virtue, in Wisd. iv. 2, which ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι στεφανηφοροῦσα πομπεύει, τὸν τῶν ἀμιάντων ἄθλων ἀγῶνα νικήσασα. In any case we must take St James’ use with that of St John in Apoc. ii. 10, where again we have the crown of life. The phrase probably came from Jewish usage not now recorded. But when the two contexts are compared it is difficult to doubt that the Greek victor’s crown is an element in the image. Even in Palestine Greek games were not unknown; and at all events St James writing to the Dispersion, and St John to the Churches of Proconsular Asia, could have no misgiving about such an allusion being misunderstood. There is of course no thought of a competitive contest; all alike might receive the crown. It is simply the outward token of glad recognition from the Heavenly Lord above, who sits watching the conflict, and giving timely help in it. It expresses in symbol what is expressed in words in the greeting, “Well done, good and faithful servant!” The martyrs of Vienna and Lugdunum are said in the well-known epistle (Euseb. H. E. v. 1. 36) to receive “the great crown of incorruption” as “athletes.” “The crown of incorruption” is also spoken of in the Mart. Polyc. 17, 19. (So also Orac. Sibyll. ii. pp. 193, 201, quoted by Schneckenburger.)

Life is itself the crown, the genitive being that of apposition. There is no earlier or contemporary instance of this genitive with στέφανος, except 1 Pet. v. 4: but the form of expression recals Ps. ciii. 4. “Life” is probably selected here in contrast to the earthly perishableness dwelt on in vv. 10 f. But it does not follow that perpetuity is the only characteristic in view. Fulness and vividness of life are as much implied. The life is an imparting of God’s life: “enter thou into the joy of thy Lord¹⁶¹⁶[For the way in which the N.T. fills out the older image of life see Hort’s Hulsean Lectures, pp. 100 ff.]” The idea cannot be made definite without destroying it. The time when the reception of the crown of life begins is likewise not defined, except that it follows a period of trial. Its fulness comes when the trials are wholly passed.

ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο, which He promised] “The Lord” is a natural interpolation. The subject of the verb is to be inferred from the sense rather than fetched from v. 5 or 7; it is doubtless God. The analogy of ii. 5 shews that words of Christ would be to St James as promises of God; and such sayings as that in Mt. xix. 29; Lk. xviii. 29 f. may be intended here. But equally pertinent language may be found in the O.T., as Ps. xvi. 8-11, where the comprehensive idea of “life” well illustrates that of St James: see also Prov. xiv. 27; xix. 23. Zeller (Hilgenfeld, J. B. 1863, 93 ff.) tries to shew 21that the reference here is to the Apocalypse passage. Probably the promise comes from Deut. xxx. 15, 16, 19, 20.

τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν, them that love Him] This phrase is common in the O.T., usually joined with “keeping of God’s commandments”; but singularly absent from the prophets (exc. Dan. ix. 4), who speak much of God’s love to men. Here see Ps. xxxi. 23; cxlv. 20; also Ecclus. xxxi. 19; Bel and Drag. 38. As St James describes endurance as leading to the crown promised to those who love God, he must have regarded it as at least one form, or one mark, of the love of Him. But then all the preceding verses shew that he considered endurance when perfected to involve trust in Him, unwavering conviction of His ungrudging goodness, and boasting in that low estate which Christ had de-dared to be height in His Kingdom. Probably, specially chosen, the words sum up in the Deuteronomic phrase adopted by Christ the Law as towards God (Deut. vi. 5, ap. Matt. xxii. 37 || Mk. xii. 30 || Lk. x. 27), just as we have the second part of the Law in ii. 8, conforming with St James’ treatment of the Law as spiritualised in the Gospel.

Ἀγαπῶσιν in 1 Cor. ii. 9 is substituted for ὑπομένουιν ἔλεον in Isa. lxiv. 4. Compare Jam. ii. 5 (on which see Exod. xix. 5, 6); Rom. viii. 28 (τ. ἀγ. τὸν θεόν); 2 Tim. iv. 8 (τ. ἡγαπ. τ. ἐπιφάνειαν αὐτοῦ); also the use of אָהַב itself in Ps. xl. 17 || lxx. 5 (οἱ ἀγ. τὸ σωτήριόν σου).

¹³μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος λεγέτω ὅτι Ἀπὸ θεοῦ πειράζομαι· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπείραστός ἐστιν κακῶν, πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα.

13. In contrast to him who endures trial, bears it with ὑπομονή, and thereby receives life, the opposite way of meeting trial, yet accompanied with a certain recognition of God, is to yield and play a cowardly and selfish part, and to excuse oneself by throwing the blames on God as the Author of the trial. Of course this, like most of the ways rebuked by St James, is a vice of men whose religion has become corrupt, not of men who have none at all.

As far as the first clause is concerned, the use of language is easy. The πειραζόμενος of v. 13 takes up the πειρασμόν; of 12, and that the πειρασμοῖς of 2. Πειρασμός is still simply “trial,” “trying,” the sense of suffering being, as we saw, probably latent, as in Ecclus., but quite subordinate.

ἀπὸ θεοῦ, from God] Not a confusion of ἀπὸ and ὑπό, which would be unlike St James’ exactness of language; the idea is origin not agency: “from God comes my being tried.” The words in themselves are ambiguous as to their spirit. They might be used as the justification of faithful endurance: the sense that God was the Author of the trial and probation would be just what would most sustain him, as the Psalms shew. But here the true phrase has been corrupted into an expression of falsehood. The sense of probation, which implies a personal faith in the Divine Prover, has passed out of the word πειράζομαι: just as God’s giving was; thought of nakedly, without reference to His gracious ungrudging mind in giving, so here His proving is thought of nakedly, without reference to His wise and gracious purpose in proving. Somewhat similar language occurs in Ecclus. xv. 11, 12.

πειράζομαι, tempted or tempted by trial] Now comes the difficulty: we have passed unawares from the idea of trial to that of temptation, by giving what is apparently a neutral, practically an evil, sense to “trial.” Trial manifestly may have either result: if it succeeds in its Divinely appointed effect, it results in perfectness: but it may fail, and the failure is moral evil. If we think of it only 22in relation to this evil when referring it to God, we mentally make Him the Author of the moral evil, in other words a tempter.

We are so accustomed to associate the idea of temptation with πειρασμός, that we forget how secondary the sense is. It is worth while to see what evidence it has from usage. We saw that the only O.T. and Apocryphal senses are: (1) trying of men by God (good); (2) trying of God by men (evil); (3) trying of men by man, which nay be either neutral as in the case of the Queen of Sheba, or with evil purpose, but not properly a “temptational” purpose, as those who tried to entangle our Lord in His words. But the N.T. has another use. Three times in the Gospels the idea of tempting comes in, not as the sole sense but still perceptibly; viz. in the Temptation, the Lord’s Prayer, and “Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation” (Mt. xxvi. 41 and parallels). To see the exact force and connexion we must go back to the O.T. In Genesis God stands face to face with Abraham; He alone is visible as trying him. But not so later. The Book of Job does not apply the words “try,” “trial” (Heb. or Gk) to Job: but it is a record of a typical trial, recognised as such in Jam. v. 11; and while the result of the trial is perfectly good, the agency of Satan is interposed: the same process is carried on for his evil purpose and for God’s good purpose, so that he is an unconscious tool in God’s hand.

Exactly similar is the passage in Lk. xxii. 31, on Satan desiring to have the apostles to sift them as wheat: his evil purpose there stands in subordination to the Divine purpose for perfecting Apostleship. Probably so also in the Temptation: Mt. iv. 1 πειρασθῆναι (πειραζόμενος Mk i. 13, Lk. iv. 2) ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου (Σατανᾶ Mk i. 13), i.e. the appointed probation of the Messiah takes place through the adversary who strives to tempt Him with the ways of false Messiahship. But in Mt. we have further ὁ πειράζων, and this in connexion with 1 Thess. iii. 5, μὴ ἐπείρασεν ὑμᾶς ὁ τειράζων, probably means not the Divinely ordained agent of probation, but he who tries with evil intent, i.e. the Tempter, “lest it prove that ye have been tried by the Tempter” (by him and not by God only). Cf. 1 Cor. vii. 5 (1 Cor. x. 13; Gal. vi. 1 are not certain); also πειρασμός 1 Tim. vi. 9; 2 Pet. ii. 9; Apoc. iii. 10.

So also in the Lord’s Prayer πειρασμόν doubtless starts from trial, but trial considered as a source of danger rather than of effectual probation, as seems to be implied by the antithesis of (masc.) τοῦ πονηροῦ. The Lord’s Prayer virtually rules the sense of μὴ εἰσέλθητε (Mt. xxvi. 41 and parallels). This implication of evil in the idea of trial apparently came from this idea of Satan’s part in Divine trials. Thus the notion is not so much tempt in the sense of “allure,” “seduce,” as “try with evil intent.”

It is difficult to find traces of Jewish influence going as far as the N.T. goes, but we do find “trial” with an evil sense attached, as the Evening Prayer in Berachoth 60 B, where sin, transgression, trial, disgrace stand in a line (cf. Taylor 141 f.).

ἀπείραστός . . . κακῶν, untried in evil] The meaning of ἀπείραστός has been much discussed. It appears in this shape in St James for the first time in Greek literature, though Boeckh has recognised it in the shortened ἀπείρᾶτος (as θαυμαστός, θαυμᾶτός, etc.) of Pindar, Olymp. vi. 54. The preceding words at first sight suggest an active force “incapable of tempting to evil” (so Origen on Exod. xv. 25). A few cases of verbals in -τος in an active sense governing cases occur, but only 23in the tragedians. Ἀπροσδόκητος (Thuc.) and ἄπρακτος with two or three other doubtful instances are used actively by prose writers, but without governing a case. Considerable internal evidence would therefore be required before such a sense could be accepted here, while in fact it would reduce the next clause to an unmeaning repetition. Ἀπείραστός therefore, being from πειράζω, ought in strictness to be only a true passive, “not tried or tempted,” “unattempted” (so Joseph. B. J. vii. 8. 1, μήτ᾽ ἔργον ἀπείραστον παραλείποντες; Galen, in Hip. Aph. i. 1 [xvii. B 354 ed. Kühn] πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ἀπειράστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές, or “incapable of being tried or tempted”: and ἀπ. κακῶν might well be “incapable of being tempted by evil things,” i.e. virtually “to evil,” though the phrase would in this sense be singular; so apparently Ps.-Ignat. ad Philip. 11 πῶς πειράζεις τὸν ἀπείραστον; (? Leuc.) Act. Joh. 190, Zahn [c. 57* Bonnet] ὁ γὰρ σὲ (John) πειράζων τὸν ἀπείραστον πειράζει; and a scholium in Oecumenius. In this way we gain a forcible antithesis to the following clause, but with the loss of causal connexion with the preceding.

The active and passive senses being then excluded by the context, the neuter remains, if only it can be sustained philologically. Now while πειράζω belongs to Epic and to late Greek, and has no middle except once in Hippoc. de Morb. iv. 327 T. ii. (Lob. ap. Buttm. ii. 267)¹⁷¹⁷Moreover the difference in sense was broken down: πειράζω = πειρῶμαι in Acts xvi. 7; xxiv. 6; (reading) ix. 26. πειρῶμαι only in Acts xxvi. 21. In Heb. iv. 15 for πεπειρασμένον ‘tempted’ many MSS. have πεπειπαμένον., the Attics used πειράω and also the middle πειρῶμαι, whence they had the verbal ἀπείρᾶτος in both passive and neuter senses, which cannot always be distinguished. The phrase ἀπείρατος κακῶν, meaning “having had no experience of evils,” “free from evils,” seems to have been almost proverbial: it occurs in Diod. Sic. i. 1; Plut. Moral. 119 F; Joseph. B. J. ii. 21, 4 (cf. iii. 4, 4): Athenag. de resur. 18 (where the Strasburg MS. has ἀπείραστος); Themist. vii. p. 92 B (Wetst.). It is quite possible that the two forms, having the strict passive sense in common, were at length used indiscriminately, ἀπείραστος borrowing from ἀπείρατος its wider range: and so we find in Theodoret de Prov. v. (iv. 560 Schulze), οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐδείσαμεν, εἰ παντελῶς ἀπείραστος αὐτῶν (sc. venomous serpents) ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις μεμενήκει. But, even without supposing St James to have lost the distinction, we can readily understand that he may have seized the familiar ἀπείρατος κακῶν, and by a permissible license substituted the kindred ἀπείραστος in conformity with the πειράζω and πειρασμοί of his context.

Similarly his κακά are not, as usual in this phrase, misfortunes, but moral evils. In English the force is best given by the abstract singular, “untried in evil,” i.e. without experience of anything that is evil. The argument doubtless is: — God’s own nature is incapable of contact with evil, and therefore He cannot be thought of as tempting men, and so being to them the cause of evil. Compare M. Aurel. vi. 1 ὁ δὲ ταύτην (τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν) διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει.

αὐτός, Himself] That is, He for His part (not so others). This the proper sense of αὐτός is compatible with a neuter as well as with a passive rendering of ἀπείραστος: the order is not αὐτός δὲ πειράζει.

πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα] This statement cannot possibly be taken in the original sense of πειράζει. The whole passage rests on the assumption that πειρασμός as trial does come from God. The word has therefore in this place acquired a tinge partly from the misuse of it in the mouth of the man excusing himself, partly from the 24κακῶν of the following clause; it means “tries” in the sense that the man talks of “trying,” tries for evil, i.e. tempts.

At first sight it looks strange, taking this verse with the next, that St James in denying that God tempts is silent about Satan as the tempter, while yet he does in antithesis speak of a man’s own desire as tempting him. The silence cannot possibly arise from any hesitation to refer to Satan or to his temptations: that supposition is historically excluded by the general language of the N.T. St James as a Jew of this time would be more, not less, ready than others to use such language; and it lies on the surface of the early Gospel records on which his belief was mainly founded.

It is striking that the Clementine Homilies, representing a form of Ebionism, i.e. the exaggeration of St James’ point of view, lean so greatly on the idea of Satan as the tempter that they say absolutely, what St James here says only with a qualification, that God does not πειράζειν at all. In contrasting sayings of Christ with false teaching, it says (iii. 55) τοῖς δὲ οἰομένοις ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πειράζει, ὡς αἱ γραφαὶ λέγουσιν, ἔφη, Ὁ πονηρός ἐστιν ὁ πειράζων· ὁ καὶ αὐτὸν πειράσας, probably from an apocryphal Gospel. And so on the theory that any doctrine of the O.T. which the writer thought false must be an interpolation, he calls it a falsehood (iii. 43) to say that the Lord tried Abraham, ἵνα γνῶ εἱ ὑπομένει; and (xvi. 13) with reference to Deut. xiii. 3 he boldly substitutes ὁ πειράζων ἐπείραζεν for the LXX. πειράζει Κύριος ὁ θεός σου ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι εἰ κ.τ.λ.

This illustrates St James’ caution. He was as anxious as Hom. Clem. to maintain at all hazards the absolute goodness of God, but he entirely believed and upheld the O.T. language. Meanwhile to have spoken here of Satan would have been only substituting one excuse for another. It was as practical unbelief to say, I sin because Satan tempts me, as to say, I sin because God tempts me. In each case it was an external power. What was needed to bring forward was the third factor, that within the man himself, and subject to his own mastery. The whole subject involved two mysteries, that of God as good in relation to evil, that of God as Providence in relation to human responsibility. Explicitly and implicitly St James recognises both sides of each antinomy: he refuses to cut either knot by the sacrifice of a fundamental truth.

¹⁴ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος·

14. ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας, but each man is tempted by his own desire] Here the particular temptation belonging to the πειρασμοί of persecution is expanded into temptation generally, to doing evil acts, not merely not persisting in good. It is violent to connect ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας exclusively with the following participles: ὑπό goes naturally with a passive transitive verb immediately preceding, unless the sense forbids. There is no need to take either verb or participles quite absolutely: as often happens ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ., standing between both, belongs to both, but especially to the verb as standing first.

ἐπιθυμίας, desire] This must be taken in its widest sense (cf. iv. 1) without special reference to sensuality: such desires as would lead to unfaithfulness under the πειρασμοί of of persecution, to which the Epistle refers at the outset, are not likely to be excluded. It is not abstract desire, but a man’s own desire, not merely because the responsibility is his, not God’s, but also because it substitutes some private and individual end for the will of God: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας 25occurs 2 Pet iii. 3 (cf. Jude 16, 18); 2 Tim. iv. 3.

The meaning of the Greek words needs nothing beyond themselves to explain them. But it is likely enough that St James had in mind, when he was writing, הַיֵצֶר הָּרַע, or “the evil impulse,” often spoken of in Jewish literature, starting from Gen. vi. 5; viii. 21 (“imagination”), properly the set or frame (πλάσμα) of the heart or of its thoughts, occasionally identified with Satan, but oftener not. Cf. Weber, Syst. der alt-synagog. Pal. Theol. 204 ff., 223 ff.

The representation of the desire as a personal tempter, probably implied in this verse and clearly expressed in the next, may contain the idea that, not being evil intrinsically, it becomes evil when the man concedes to it a separate voice and will instead of keeping it merged in his own personality, and thus subject to his authority. The story of Eve, with the Jewish allegories on the same subject, can hardly have been absent from St James’ mind: but it does not meet his purpose sufficiently to affect his language. On the other hand he probably pictured to himself the tempter desire as a harlot. Here too a Christian distinction may be latent in the image: the desire tempts not by evil but by misused good (cf. v. 17).

ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος, being enticed and allured (by it)] Δελεάζω, to allure by a bait (δέλεαρ), is frequently used metaphorically, as here. Ἐξέλκω, a rather rare word, is not known to occur in any similar passage. The sense of Aristotle’s πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐξελκυσθείς (Pol. V. 10, p. 1311 b 29) is too obscure to supply illustration. Several commentators cite as from Plut. De sera num. vind. (no ref.), τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλκειν: Plutarch’s real words are (p. 554 F), τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδοκε. The combination with δελεάζω, has naturally suggested here the image of fish drawn out of the water by a line (οἱ δὲ ἔλκουσι· ἐπεὰν δὲ ἐξελκύσθῃ ἐς γῆν — Herod. ii. 70, of the crocodile), in spite of the obvious difficulty that the bait ought to precede the line: but the whole conception is unsuitable to the passage. The simple ἕλκω is used for the drawing or attracting operation of a love-charm (ἴυγξ: so Pind. Nem. iv. 56; Xen. Mem. iii. 11, 18; Theocrit. ii. 17 ff.; as duco Verg. Ecl. viii. 68); and soon came to be applied to any pleasurable attraction (Xen. Symp. i. 7; Plat. Rep. v. p. 458 D with πείθειν, but ἐρωτικαῖς ἀναγκαῖς; vii 538 D, ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτά, πείθει δὲ οὒ τοὺς καὶ ὁπῃοῦν μετρίοθς; Philostr. Ep. 39, καλὸς εἶ, κἂν μὴ θέλῃς, καὶ πάντας ἕλκεις τῷ ἀμελουμένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ βότρυες καὶ τὰ μῆλα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο αὐτόματον καλόν; Athan. Or. cont. Gentes 30 on men leaving the way of truth, on which they have been set διὰ τὰς ἔξωιεμ αὐτοὺς ἑλκούσας ἡδονὰς τοῦ βίου; Ael. N. A. vi. 31). It is associated with δέλεαρ, δελεάζω, in Plut. Moral. 1093 D, αἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ ἁρμονικῆς δριμὺ καὶ ποικίλον ἔχουσαι τὸ δέλεαρ [ἡδοναὶ] οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀποδέουσιν, ἕλκουσαι καθάπερ ἴϋγξι τοῖς διαγράμμασιν. Philo says (i. 512), ἐπιθυμία μὲν γάρ, ὁλκὸν ἔχουσα δύναμιν, καὶ ἂν φεύγῃ τὸ ποθούμενον διώκειν ἀναγκάζει. Such seems to be the sense here, ἐκ being prefixed to denote the drawing out of the right place or relation or the drawing aside out of the right way: cf. ἐκκλίνω, ἐκπίπτω, ἐκστρέφομαι, ἐκτρέπομαι, and especially (though not in N.T.) ἐξάγω. The present tense of the participles expresses only the enticing and alluring action of the 26desire, antecedently to its being obeyed or resisted. Renderings of ἐξελκόμενος like “drawn astray,” though in themselves more expressive than “enticed,” would therefore involve an erroneous anticipation of the next verse. Cf. on this use of ἕλκω Creuzer in Plotin. de pulchr. pp. 249 ff.

¹⁵εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν, ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκυεῖ θάνατον.

15. εἶτα, next] Εἶτα, when historical (in Heb. xii. 9 it is logical), marks a fresh and distinct incident, whether immediate or, as in the parable of the Sower (Mk iv. 17; Lk. viii. 12), after an interval. Thus here it separates the temptation from the yielding to temptation implied in συλλαβοῦσα.

ἡ ἐπιθυμία, the desire] That is, either his desire generally, as the article in v. 14 suggests, or that particular desire of his which tempted him; not desire in the abstract.

συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει, conceiveth and bringeth forth] The double image distinguishes the consent of the will (the man) to the desire from the resulting sinful act, which may follow either instantly or at a future time. On the other hand the compact phrase adopted from the O.T. (Gen. iv. 1, 17 etc.) participle and verb brings thought and act together as a single stage between the temptations on the one hand and the death on the other: the sin dates its existence from the moment of consent, though it is by act that it is born into the world.

ἁμαρτίαν, a sin] This might of course be “sin”: but the individual sense suits the passage better; each special desire has a special sin for its illegitimate offspring. The personified sin of this verse is neither momentary thoughts nor momentary deeds, but has a continuous existence and growth, a parasitical life: it is what we call a sinful state, a moral disease which once generated runs its course unless arrested by the physician.

ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα, and the sin, when it is fully formed] Ἀποτελεσθεῖσα is not exactly “full-grown,” a sense for which there is no authority, but denotes completeness of parts and functions either accompanying full growth as opposed to a rudimentary or otherwise incomplete state, e.g. of the winged insect in contrast to the chrysalis and the grub (Plato Tim. 73 n; Pseud.-Plato Epinom. 981 C; Aristot. H. A. v. 19, p. 552 a 28; Generat. Animal. ii. 1, p. 732 a 32; iii/ 11. p. 762 b 4), or possessed by beings of high organisation (Aristot. H. A. ix. 1, p. 608 b 7, man as compared with other animals ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην). Similarly it is used of mental or moral accomplishment (gen. Hipparch. vii. 4; Oecon. xiii. 3; Lucian Hermot. 8, ὃς ἂν ἀποτελεσθῇ πρὸς ἀρετήν). In virtue of its morbid life the sin goes on acquiring new members and faculties (cf. Rom. vi. 6; Col. iii. 5) till it reaches the perfection of destructiveness. It may be safely assumed that ἀποτελεῖσθαι does not mean, as some suppose, the carrying out of a sinful thought into act, though purposes, desires, hopes, prayers are said ἀποτελεσθεῖσα. The image requires in this place a sense applicable to a living being.

ἀποκυεῖ θάνατον, giveth birth to death] The precise force of ἀποκυέω, here and in v. 18, is not altogether certain. Τίκτω, which St James has just employed, is the usual literary word for the bearing of a son or daughter by the mother (only poets employ it of the father): it has reference to parentage, the relation of mother to child. Ἀποκυέω, as most commonly used, is the medical or physical word denoting the same fact, but chiefly as the close of pregnancy (κυέω): thus a person named is very 27rarely said ἀποκυεῖσθαι; while this verb is often applied to the young of animals, and in the case of human births the accompanying substantive is usually βρέφος or some other neuter form. Perhaps in consequence of this neuter and so to speak impersonal reference, ἀποκυέω seems further (though the evidence is scanty) to have been specially applied to cases of births abnormal in themselves or in their antecedents; as of Athene from the brain of Zeus (Et. Mag. 371, 35) of misshapen animals (Herodian i. 14, 1); or of one species from another (Phlegon passim) etc. Here there is no father. The birth of death follows of necessity when once sin is fully formed, for sin from its first beginnings carried death within.

For other images of the relation of sin to death see Gen. ii. 17; Ezek. xviii. 4; Rom. v. 12; vi. 21 (the nearest in sense to St James’ language), 23; vii. 11, 13; 1 Cor. xv. 56; cf. 1 Jn v. 16.

¹⁶Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί.

16. μὴ πλανᾶσθε, be not deceived] Occurs similarly 1 Cor. vi. 9; xv 33; Gal. vi. 7: in each case the danger lies in some easy self-deception, either springing up naturally within or prompted by indulgent acceptance of evil examples without. The “wandering” forbidden is not wandering from right action, but from a right habit of mind concerning action. The middle sense “go not astray” is possible here, but the passive “be not led astray “is preferable (2 Tim. iii. 13; cf. 1 Jn iii. 7). Delusions like these, St James means to say, would not be possible to men fully embracing the fundamental truth “Every gift” etc.

ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, my beloved brethren] So v. 19; ii. 5. The simple ἀδελφοί or ἀδελφοί μου recurs often in the Epistle.

¹⁷πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθέν ἐστιν, καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα.

17. The first part of this verse admits several constructions. The commonest makes ἄνωθεν the predicate, and καταβαῖνον κ.τ.λ. epexegetic, “every good gift (or, giving) etc. is from above, descending etc.”: ἄνωθέν ἐστιν is however a weak and unlikely phrase; contrast ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰμί (Jn viii. 23) with ἀνωθεν ἐρχόμενος (iii. 31); ἦν δεδομένον σοι ἄνωθεν (xix. 11). This difficulty is removed by making ἄνωθεν dependent on καταβαῖνον etc., which is thus taken into the predicate: but the substitution of ἐστὶ, καταβαῖνον for καταβαίνει either is unmeaning or enfeebles the sense; in iii. 15, οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη , the participle is adjectival or qualitative, as the next clause shews, while here a statement of fact is required. Both constructions are liable to a more fatal objection, incongruity with the context. The doctrine contained in them is clearly enunciated in the Apocrypha and still more by Philo, being an obvious inference from O. T. language; and little if at all less clearly by heathen writers; but it is out of place here. Though every good gift were from above, yet evil gifts might proceed from the same source; and if so, the good God might remain the tempter. A perception of the difficulty has led Bengel and others into forcing an impossible meaning upon πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθή, “a gift (giving) altogether good,” and then extorting from this translation the sense “nothing but good gifts.”

The true construction was pointed out by Mr Thomas Erskine (The unconditional freeness of the Gospel, Edinburgh, 1829 [ed. 3] pp. 239 ff.). The predicate is ἀγαθή and τέλειον ἄνωθεν, “every giving is good and every gift perfect from above (or, from its first source), descending etc.”; paraphrased by Mr Erskine, “there are no bad gifts, no bad events; every appointment is gracious in its design, and divinely fitted for that design.” Ἄνωθεν is more completely appropriate to τέλειος than to ἀγαθός 28(cf. Symb. Antioch. Macrost. ap. Athan. de Synod. 26, p. 740 D [732 B Migne], οὐδὲν γὰρ πρόσφατον ὁ χριστὸς προσείληφεν ἀξίωμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνωθεν τέλειον αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον εἶναι πεπιστεύκαμεν): but had its force been intentionally limited to τέλειον (as Mr Erskine apparently assumes), it would hardly have been placed at the end; and it makes. excellent sense with both adjectives. On this view St James must mean by “every gift” every gift of God: the limitation is supplied by the context, and is further justified by the absolute use of ἡ ὀργή, [τὸ] θέλημα (see Lightfoot, On Revision of the N.T., 105 f.), and by the converse use of δῶρον absolute for an offering of man to God (Mt. xv. 5; Mk vii. 11; Lk. xxi. 4 [true text]). Thus i. 5 and this verse complete each other: God’s giving is gracious and ungrudging in respect of His own mind; it is good and perfect in respect of its work and destination: δόσις and ἀγαθή form the intermediate link.

δόσις . . . δώρημα, giving . . . gift] These cannot possibly be synonyms: rhetorical repetition of identical sense in other diction is incompatible with the carefully economised language of all writers of the N.T., and here the words are emphatically distinguished by means of πᾶσα, πᾶν, and the separate adjectives. The difference is probably double. Since δόσις is often not less concrete than δόμα, and δωρεά (as always in Acts) than δώρημα, the variety of termination might have had no significance. But it was easy to use either δόσις and δωρεά or δόμα and δώρημα; so that the contrast of forma and genders would be singularly clumsy if it was not intentional Aoalr occurs elsewhere in the N.T. only in Phil. iv. 15, where it is verbal, δόσεως καὶ λήμψεως: so Ecclus. xli. 19; xlii. 7. It is also verbal in Philo (Leg. Alleg. iii. 20, p. 100; de Cherub. 25, p. 154), being in the second place treated, like δωρεά, as a species of χάρις. In one passage (Rom. v. 15 f.) St Paul distinctly employs δωρεά in the same relation to δώρημα as χάρις to χάρισμα (cf. Mart. Polyc. xx. 2); and the other places where he uses δωρεά gain force if it is taken as qualitative or semi-verbal (Rom. v. 17; 2 Cor. ix. 15; Eph. iii. 7; iv. 7: so probably also Jn iv. 10; Heb. vi. 4). On this evidence, direct and indirect, the relation of “giving” (so the Geneva and “Bishops” Bibles) to “gift” must be accepted as distinguishing δόσις from δώρημα.

Another difference, probably here subordinate, is independent of the termination. In the second passage cited above, and also Leg. Alleg. iii. 70, p. 126, Philo distinguishes the δῶρα and δόματα of the LXX. in Numb. xxviii. 2 by value, calling δῶρα “perfect good things,” and stating that δόσις is a “moderate grace” (χάρις μώση), δωρεά a “better” grace: but this conception is otherwise unsupported. On the other hand δωροῦμαι, δωρεά, δώρημα usually imply free giving, sometimes with anticipation of a return but still not as matter of barter; and Aristotle (Top. iv. 4, p. 125 a 17) chooses δόσις as an illustration of a “genus,” δωρεά of a “species”; “for δωρεά,” he says, “is a δόσις without repayment” (ἀναπόδοτος). This secondary difference cannot be rendered concisely in English without exaggeration: and indeed δώρημα merely gives prominence to what in this context is already latent in δόσις. Moreover in good Attic writers δόσις when not used technically is chiefly applied to Divine benefits, e.g. several times in Plato: so Plutarch (C. Mar. 46, p. 433 A) represents Antipater of Tarsus as counting up the happinesses (μακαρίων) of his life at its end, καθάρερ φιλοχρήστου τῆς τύχης ἅπασαν δόσιν εἰς μεγάλην χάριν τιθεμενον.

ἀγαθή, good] Ἀγαθός denotes properly what is good in operation and result to things outside itself, utility in the utmost generality (Mt. vii. 17 πᾶν δένδρον ἀγαθὸν καρποὺς καλοὺς ποιεῖ), and hence beneficence where there is a personal agent. So Ecclus. xxxix. 33, “All the works of Jehovah are good (ἀγαθά;), and he (or, they) will supply every need in its season.” “Good” gifts in particular (not deceptive gifts of evil effect), and that as given by God, are the subject of a saying by our Lord (Mt. vii. 11; Lk. xi. 13) which St James may have had in view: but the conception is widely spread.

τέλειον, perfect] As ἀγαθός expresses the character of the gifts, derived from the Giver, so τέλειος expresses the completeness of their operation when they are not misused. Philo says θέμις δὲ οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι, ὥσθ᾽ ἁλόκληροι καὶ παντελεῖς αἱ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου δωρεαὶ πᾶσαι (i. 173); χαρίζεται δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἀτελὲς οὐδὲν, πλήρη δὲ καὶ τέλεια πάντα (i. 447).

ἄνωθεν, from the beginning or from their source] The commonest sense “from above,” found in various similar passages, is harsh here in combination with the adjectives, though the etymology may have dictated the choice of the word, as specially appropriate to the subject of the verse. It is rather, as often, “from the beginning” (so Lk. i. 3; Acts xxvi. 5; Gal. iv. 9); or, with a slight modification, “from their source,” origin suggesting the ground antecedent to origin. Nearly similar is the use in Dion Cass. xliv. 37: ὅσοις δὲ ἄνωθεν (“from their ancestry,” as the context shews) ἐκ πολλοῦ σπέρμα ἀνδραγαθίας ὑπάρχει; Ps.-Demosth. p. 1125, πονηρὸς οὗτος ἄνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀνακείου κἄδικος; Athenag. de Res. 17, αὕτη γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις, ἄνωθεν καὶ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ τοιήσαντος συγκεκληρωμένην ἔχουσα τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν; Clem. Alex. Protrept. iv. p. 50, χρυσός ἐστι τὸ ἄγαλμά σου, . . . λίθος ἐστίν, γῆ ἐστὶν ἐὰν ἄνωθεν νοήσῃς. God’s gifts are inherently good and perfect in virtue of His nature.

καταβαῖνον, descending] Sc. “as they do.” This clause is explanatory of ἄνωθεν. They are good and perfect, because their source is good and perfect.

τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, the Father of lights] In Greek literature and in Philo πατήρ is sometimes hardly more than a rhetorical synonym for “Maker,” usually coupled with a more exact word such as ποιητής or δημιουργός: but this lax use finds no precedent in Scripture, and leaves the sense imperfect here. God’s relation to finite things must include authorship; but the authorship required by St James’ argument must be combined with likeness, and a higher perfection in the likeness. Every light is an offspring of the perfect and primal Light, and in some sense bears His image: its character as a light fits it to set forth that character of God to which St James makes appeal. Philo calls God “an archetypal Splendour (αὐγή), sending forth numberless beams” (i. 156); “not only Light, but also [a light] archetypal of every other light, nay rather elder and more original (ἀνώτερον) than an archetype” (i. 632); and “the primary most perfect Good, the perpetual fountain of wisdom and righteousness and every virtue,” “an archetypal exemplar of laws and Sun [? archetypal] of sun, intellectual [Sun] of material [sun], supplying from His invisible fountains streams of visible light to all that we see” (ὁρατὰ φέγγη τῷ βλεπομένῳ) (ii. 254).

The plural φῶτα has various applications, to lamps or torches, to windows, and to days. In the O.T. אוֹר, “light,” and מָאוֹר, “a light” or “a luminary,” are distinguished (markedly 30in Gen. i. 3 ff., 18.; contrast 14 ff.). But the phrase אוֹרִים occurs once (Ps. cxxxvi. 7), the subject being the heavenly luminaries, and there the LXX. also has φῶτα (in place of the usual φωστῆρες), as it has again in Jer. iv. 23 with the same sense, but apparently not reading the Massoretic text. The next clause suggests that the luminaries of the sky were present to St James’ mind, nor indeed could he have forgotten the chief of visible lights: it does not however follow that they alone were meant to be denoted by τῶν φώτων, which would more naturally include all lights, and that invisible as well as visible (see next verse and iii. 15, 17). The words “Father” and “lights” taken in their proper sense illustrate each other. Plutarch (ii. 930) uses the phrase πολλὰ τῶν φώτων quite generally, so far as appears, while his immediate subject is the moon.

παρ᾽ ᾧ, with whom] This peculiar use of παρὰ, too lightly treated by commentators, occurs in two other phrases of the N.T., both repeated more than once; παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ θεῷ, πάντα γὰρ δυνατὰ παρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ (Mk x. 27; with Mt. xix. 26; Lk. xviii. 27); οὐ γάρ ἐστιν προσωποληψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ (Rom. ii. 11; and virtually Eph. vi. 9). In the Gospel saying παρὰ ἀνθρώποις is probably formed only in antithesis to παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, itself taken from the common or Alexandrine text of Gen. xviii. 14, μὴ ἀδυνατεῖ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ῥῆμα, where the original reading (Dov, Hil. a deo, B being deficient here) seems to be παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, as the Hebrew suggests, followed by the best MSS. of Lk. i. 37. The usage probably comes from the Hebrew instinct of reverence which preferred “in the presence of God,” “with God” (עִם) to “in God” (בְּ); so Ps. xxxvi. 10, παρὰ σοὶ πηγὴ ζωῆς; cxxx. 7, παρὰ τῷ κυρῖῳ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ πολλὴ παρ᾽ αὐτῷ λύτρωσις; Job xxvii. 11, ἀναγγελῶ ὑμῖν τί ἐστιν ἐν χειρὶ Κυρίου, ἅ ἐστιν παρὰ Παντοκράτορι οὐ ψεύσομαι. Winer’s reference (p. 492 Moulton) to the “metaphysical” conception of possession, power etc. (penes) is forced; and the frequent meaning “in the sight of” (v. 27) is still less applicable. In the only classical passage cited (Matthiae, Winer) Demosthenes uses παρὰ with depreciative circumlocution analogous to but not identical with the biblical diction, εἰ δ᾽ οὖν ἐστι καὶ παρ᾽ ἐμοί τις ἐμπειρία τοιαύτη (De Cor., p. 318), “if indeed any such skill does reside with me.”

οὐκ ἔνι, can be no or there is no room for] Ἔνι is not a contraction of ἔνεστι, ἔνεισι, but simply ἐνὶ, the Ionic form of ἐν, retained in this Attic idiom like πάρα without the substantive verb: so P. Buttmann Gr. Gr. ii. 375; Winer-Moulton, p. 96; Lightfoot on Gal. iii. 28, where as in Col. iii. 11 the use is identical. The same force adds indignant irony to St Paul’s question in 1 Cor. vi. 5, οὕτως οὑκ ἔνι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδείς σοφὸς ὃς κ.τ.λ.; “is it impossible that there should be among you etc.?”, as it adds playful irony to the suggestion in Plato’s Phaedo (77 E), μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται, “perhaps it is not impossible that even among us etc.”: there is no reason to think that ἔνι ever becomes a bare equivalent of ἔστιν.

παραλλαγή, variation] Παραλλάσσω, παράλλαξις, παραλλαγή, are words of wide range, perhaps starting from the notion of alternation or succession attached to the adverb παραλλάξ, but in common use applied to all kinds of variations (different states of a single thing), and then all differences as between one thing and another; not to speak of several derivative senses. The various periodic changes of the heavenly bodies are doubtless chiefl intended here. In the North of Scotland the emperor Severus, says Dion Cassius (lxxvi.13), τήν τε τοῦ ἡλίον 31παράλλαξιν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἡμερῶν, τῶν τε νύκτων καὶ τῶν θερινῶν καὶ τῶν χειμερινῶν μέγεθος ἀκριβέστατα κατεφώρασεν. There is of course no reference to parallax in the modern sense, though it was known (παράλλαξις) to at least the later Greek astronomy. For the doctrine cf. Mal. iii. 6; Ps. cii. 25 ff.

τροπῆς, change] Though τροπή often means a solstice and sometimes also an equinox, this sense is excluded by the combination with “shadow,” which must be intelligible through obvious phenomena without astronomical lore. Τροπή is a favourite word with Philo, usually coupled with μεταβολή, denoting any change undergone by any object. Some passages approach this verse, as i. 80, “When the mind has sinned and removed itself far from virtue, it lays the blame on things divine (τὰ θεῖα), attributing to God its own change (τροπή)”; i. 82, “How shall a man believe God? If he learn that all other things change (τρέπεται), but He alone is unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος)”; ii. 322, “It is unlawful that he [the high priest, Num. xxxv. 25] should have any defilement whatever attaching to him, either owing to deliberate act or in virtue of a change in the soul without purpose (κατὰ προπὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀβούλητον: cf. βουληθείς in v. 18).”

St James may have had chiefly in view either night and day (cf. Bas. Hex. Hom. ii. p. 20 B, καὶ νὺξ σκίασμα γῆς ἀποκρυπτομένου ἡλίου γινόμενον), or the monthly obscurations of the moon, or even the casual vicissitudes of light due to clouds.

ἀποσκίασμα, shadow] Either the shadow cast by an object (more commonly σκίασμα, as several times in Plutarch, τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς, the shadow cast by the earth on the moon in an eclipse), or a faint image or copy of an object. On the strength of this second sense some late writers supposed St James to mean “not a trace (ἴχνος) of change”: but usage gives them no support, and shadow no less than change must form part of the primary image. The genitive doubtless expresses “belonging to change,” “due to change” (“shadowing by turning,” Geneva).

The whole verse may be compared with 1 Jn i. 5 ff.: here temptation to evil, there indifference to evil, is declared impossible for the Perfect Light. But here the name Father introduces an additional conception, illustrated in the next verse.

A few lines may be quoted from a striking Whitsun Day sermon of Andrewes on the present verse (p.752, ed. 1635). “Yet are there varyings and changes, it cannot be denied; we see them daily. True: but the point is per quem, on whom to lay them. Not on God. Seems there any recess? it is we forsake Him, not He us: it is the ship that moves; though they that be in it think the land goes from them, not they from it. Seems there any variation, as that of the night? it is umbra terrae makes it: the light makes it not. Is there anything resembling a shadow? a vapour rises from us, makes the cloud, which is as a penthouse between, and takes Him from our sight: that vapour is our lust; there is the apud quem. Is any tempted? it is his own lust doth it: that entices him to sin, that brings us to the shadow of death: it is not God; no more than He can be tempted, no more can He tempt any. If we find any change the apud is with us, not Him: we change; He is unchanged. Man walks in a vain shadow: His ways are the truth; He cannot deny Himself.” [iii. p. 374.]

¹⁸βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας, εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ 18¹⁸αὐτοῦ] ἐαυτοῦ κτισμάτων

18. The details of this verse are best approached by asking to whom it refers. Does St James mean by ἡμᾶς “us” men, the recipients of God’s word of reason; or “us” sons of Israel (Jew 32and Christian not distinguished), the recipients of God’s word of revelation generally; or “us” Christians, the recipients of God’s word of the Gospel? Several considerations appear to shew decisively that he meant mankind generally. First, the natural sense of κτισμάτων: a chosen race or Church would surely have been called a firstfruit of “men” (as Apoc. xiv. 4: cf. Jam. iii. 9), not of God’s “creatures”; the force of κτισμάτων is pointed by ἀπεκύησεν (“gave . . . birth”). Second, the connexion with vv. 12-17, which evidently refer to God’s dealings with men generally: a statement applicable only to Christians, or Jews and Christians, could not have been affixed to them with such close structure of language, or without at least some word of clear distinction. Third, the absence of articles with λόγῳ ἀληθείας: a Jew, much more a Christian, could not fail to call the revelation made to him “the word of [the] truth”; St James never indulges in lax omission of articles; and the sense excludes explanation of the omission by a specially predicative emphasis. Fourth, a comparison with v. 21: if, as we shall find, τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον can mean only “the inborn word,” not any word proclaimed from without, there is a strong presumption that the “word of truth” of the earlier verse is the same. This conclusion is free from difficulty except on the assumption that St James could not call an inward voice of God “a word of truth,” which will be examined below; and no other words of the verse favour, even in appearance, a more restricted reference.

βουληθείς, of set purpose] Βούλομαι and θέλω, though largely coincident in sense, and often capable of being interchanged, never really lose the distinction indicated by Ammonius, De diff. verb. p. 31, βούλεσθαι μὲν ἐπί μόνου λεκτέον τοῦ λογικοῦ, τὸ δὲ θέλειν καὶ ἐπὺ ἀλόγου ζῴου, and again (p. 70), θέλειν καὶ βούλεσθαι ἐὰν λέγῃ τις, δηλώσει ὅτι ἀκουσίως τε καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρέγεταὶ τινος (quoted though not accepted by W. Dindorf in Steph. Thes.). Θέλω expresses the mere fact of volition or desire, neither affirming nor denying an accompanying mental process: βούλομαι expresses volition as guided by choice and purpose. Hence βουλή, “counsel,” agrees exactly in sense with βούλομαι, and the derivative βουλεύομαι differs only by accentuating deliberation of purpose still further: accordingly βουλεύομαι is substituted for βούλομαι in inferior MSS. of Acts, v. 33; xv. 37; 2 Cor. i. 17.

A distinction the inverse of this has been for many years traditional, founded on a part of Buttmann’s acute but not quite successful exposition of Homeric usage in the Lexilogus (194 ff. E.T.). He observed that θέλω is applied to “a desire of something the execution of which is, or at least appears to be, in one’s own power”; while βούλομαι expresses “that kind of willingness or wishing in which the wish and the inclination toward a thing are either the only thing contained in the expression, or are at least intended to be particularly marked”: and he assumed purpose or design to be involved in the former kind of desire. But the observation does not sustain the inference. The cases in which we naturally speak simply of volition are just those in which action either follows instantly or is suspended only by another volition of the same agent: while the separation of wish and inclination from fulfilment exactly corresponds with the separation of the mental process leading to a volition from the volition itself, which is not in strictness formed till action becomes possible. This view is in like manner illustrated by two accessory observations. In Homer the gods are said βούλεσθαι, not θέλειν, although their action is unimpeded. Buttmann explains this peculiarity by a respectful 33intention to emphasize “the inclination, the favour, the concession”; but it seems rather due to a feeling that the volitions of gods are always due to some provident counsel (Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή). On the other hand the antithesis ἂν οἵ τε θεοὶ θέλωσι καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε (Demosth. Olynth. ii. 20, p. 24, cited by Dindorf) probably rests on the contrast between the absoluteness of the Divine volitions and the human need of deliberation before decision. Again the meaning of inclination latent in βούλομαι is often extended so as to include preference or relative inclination: but as a rule preference implies comparison, and comparison belongs to the mental antecedents of volition, not to volition itself.

Βουληθείς, like βουλόμενος, might doubtless mean “of His own will,” i.e. spontaneously, without compulsion or suggestion from without: but such a sense is feeble in this context. On the other hand it cannot by itself express graciousness of will, as some have supposed. If we give βούλομαι its proper force, an adequate sense is at once obtained. Man’s evil thoughts of God are inconsistent with a true sense of his own nature and destiny, as determined for him from the beginning by God’s counsel. Thus the words “that we might be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures” would by themselves shew why St James might place the Divine counsel or purpose in the forefront. But there is much reason for thinking that βουληθείς further refers to the peculiarity of man’s creation in the Mosaic narrative, as having been preceded by the deliberative words “Let us make man,” etc. It is morally certain that the rest of the verse is a paraphrase of what had been said about the creation in God’s image: and if so, St James, in recalling God’s purpose concerning man, might naturally point to the mysterious language of Genesis which seemed to invest man’s creation with special glory on this very ground as well as on the other. It is at least certain that the same interpretation was placed on these words of Genesis by several of the gathers (Philo’s explanation is quite different), and that without any apparent dependence on St James. It is probably implied in Tertullian’s remarkable fifth chapter against Praxeas (e.g. Nam etsi Deus nondum Sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa Ratione intra semetipsum habebat tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per Sermonem mox erat dicturus; cum Ratione enim sua cogitans atque disponens Sermonem eam efficiebat quam sermone tractabat). The language of others is quite explicit. Macarius Magnes (Fragm. Ham. in Gen., Duchesne De Macario Magnete, p. 39): καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτίσματα ῥήματι μόνῳ παρῆκται. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔσχεν ἐξαίρετόν τι κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν παρὰ ταῦτα. Βουλῆς γὰρ προηγουμένης ἐκτίσθη, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου δειχθῇ ὅτιπερ κτίσμα τίμιον ὐπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν οὐδὲν ἕτερον δείκνυσιν ἢ ὅτι συμβούλῳ ἐχρήσατο ὁ πατὴρ τῷ μονογενεῖ αὐτοῦ τῷ υἱῷ ἐπὶ τῇ τούτου κατασκευῇ κ.τ.λ. ... βουλῆς γὰρ ἐνέργεια τὸ πᾶν [p. 1397 B-D, Migne].

ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς, gave us birth] i.e. at the outset, antecedently to growth. We are His children, made in His likeness. See note on v. 15.

λόγῳ ἀληθείας, by a word of truth] This phrase is evidently capable of various senses, according to context. In O.T. (Ps. cxix. 43; Prov. xxii. 21 bis; Eccl. xii. l0) it is a word of truth uttered by men in the common ethical sense, words of veracity or of faithful34steadfastness. In 2 Cor. vi. 7, ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας, it means “utterance of truth” in speaking such things as are true and recognised as true; the matter of it having been previously called ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (ii. 17; and esp. iv. 2, τῇ φανερώσει τ. ἀληθείας). This message of truth as a whole is called ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀληθείας Eph. i. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 15. In this last sense St James is understood by those who assume him to refer here directly to the Gospel. As seen above, this agrees neither with the absence of articles nor with the context. We must at least see whether the words cannot naturally bear a meaning which connects them with the original creation of man.

It is at first sight tempting to have recourse to the Jewish conception of the Creation as accomplished by ten Words of God (“And God said”). So Aboth v. 1, “ By ten Sayings the world was created,” and refit in Taylor; Aristob. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiii. p.664 says that “Moses has spoken of the whole creation (γένεσιν) of the world as θεοῦ λόγους.” In this case λόγ. ἀλ. would be the actual words described as spoken. But it is not easy to see how they could be called λόγ. ἀλ., and moreover this sense, while it would suit well with ἔκτισεν or ἐποίησεν, does not harmonise with ἐπεκύησεν.

We must therefore seek the explanation rather in the distinctive feature of man’s creation in Gen. ii. 7, the special imbreathing from God Himself, by which man became, in a higher sense than the animals, “a living soul.” But how was this a word, a word of truth? The answer is given by looking back from the word of truth in the special Christian sense. St Peter (i. 23) speaks of Christians as ἀναγεγεννημένοι not by (ἐκ) a corruptible seed but an incorruptible, διὰ λόγου ζῶντος θεοῦ καί μένοντος: he goes on to quote Is. xl. 6-8 on the abidingness of the word of the Lord, and adds that this ῥῆμα is τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ὑμᾶς: in other words, the essence of the Gospel was an utterance (ῥῆμα) of God’s Word or speech to mankind. Here the abiding word of God stands to the new birth, or renewal, in the same position as λόγ. ἀλ. in St James to the original Divine birth, and the word is called a seed. This large view of God’s revelation is, next, what we find in e.g. Ps. cxix., where the spiritual conception of God’s law, which pervades the psalm (and of which we shall find much in St James), is exchanged occasionally for a similar conception of His “word” or utterance (v. 142 compared with 160), the word which abideth for ever in heaven. And now thirdly St James looks back beyond the Law to the original implanting of a Divine seed in man by God. By this Divine spark or seed God speaks to man, and speaks truth. This is the conception of Eph. iv. 24, τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα . . . τῆς ἀληθείας, and Col. iii. 10, εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὐν. And so Aug. De Gen. ad lit. iii. 30 enquiring wherein consists the image of God says “Id autem est ipsa ratio vel mens vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. Unde et Apostolus dicit, Renovamini etc.”; and again (32) “Sicut enim post lapsum peccati homo in agnitione Dei renovatur secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit eum, ita in ipsa agnitione creatus est, ante quam delicto veterasceret, unde rursum in eadem agnitione renovaretur.” Here the human agnitio is correlative to the Divine λόγος. Philo (De opif. 28, p. 20) says γεννήσας αὐτὸν (Adam) ὁ πατὴρ ἡγεμονικὸν φύσει ζῶον οὐκ ἔργῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ διὰ λόγου χειροτονίᾳ καθίστησι τῶν ὐπὸ σελήνην ἁπάντων βασιλέα. Thus the distinctly perceived word of truth of the Gospel enables St James to look back to the creation, and regard that too not only as a Divine birth, but as a Divine birth in virtue of a Divine seed which 35was also a Word of truth, the means by which all other words of truth were to enter man. [See on 1 Pet. l.c.]

εἰς τὸ, in order that] It is needless here to consider the debated question whether εἰς τὸ with infinitive following a verb denotes always purpose, or sometimes only result (“so that”). Here Divine purpose is clearly meant (cf. iii. 3): the relation of man to the world is part of God’s plan, and cannot indeed be separated from His purpose respecting man himself.

ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ (v. ἐαυτοῦ) κτισμάτων, a kind of firstfruits of his creatures] Here again the phrase has force at all three stages of revelation. It is manifestly true of Christians (cf. Rom. xi. 16): true also of Israel, as Jer. ii. 3 ἅγιος Ἰσραὴλ. τῷ κυρίῳ, ἀρχὴ (רֵאשִׁית) γενημάτων αὐτοῦ; and again Philo de const. princ. 6 (ii. 366) τὸ σύμπαν Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος . . . τοῦ σύμπαντος ἀνθρώπων γένους ἀπεωεμήθη οἷά τις ἀπαρχὴ τῷ ποιητῇ καὶ πατρί; and lastly of the human race (cf. Rom. viii.)

κτισμάτων] Wisdom ix. 2, καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ σου κατασκεύάσας [κατασκευάσας] ἄνθρωπον ἵνα δεσπόζῃ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ γενομένων κτισμάτων. Amb. Hex. vi. 75, Sed jam finis sermoni nostro sit, quoniam completus est dies sextus et mundani operis summa conclusa est, perfecto videlicet homine in quo principatus est animantium universorum, et summa quaedam universitatis, et omnis mundanae gratia creaturae. . . . Fecerat enim hominem, rationis capacem, imitatorem sui, virtutum aemulatorem, cupidum caelestium gratiarum.

¹⁹Ἴστε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί. ἔστω δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι, βραδὺς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι, βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν,

19. Ἴστε and ἔστω δὲ] So read for Ὥστε and ἔστω without δέ, which is Syrian only, the connexion between the clauses not being perceived.

Ἴστε may be either indicative or imperative. But St James (iv. 4) has the other form οἴδατε in indicative; and probably used this shorter and sharper form for distinction, to mark the imperative; this being also the best sense. The N.T. writers commonly use οἴδατε; but ἴστε occurs in two other places (Eph. v. 5; Heb. xii. 17), both of which gain by being taken imperatively, the former in particular.

Here St James repeats positively what he has said negatively in v. 16. In vv. 13-15 he was combating error; and then he finally says Μὴ πλανᾶσθε as introductory to his fundamental doctrine of 17, 18. That doctrine being now set forth, he a second time calls attention to it on the positive side, as the basis of what he is going to say. “Know it well, my beloved: brethren (the old address repeated). And on the other hand” (δέ, with tacit reference to the acquiescence in evil hinted at in v. 13).

πᾶς ἄνθρωπος] There is force in iἄνθρωπος with reference to v. 18. The expression is not equivalent to πᾶς, but everyone of the human race, that race which is God’s offspring and endowed by Him with a portion of His own light.

ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι] There are two grounds for this admonition: (1) suggested by λόγῳ ἀληθείας (see v. 21); (2) the love of violent and disputatious speech was to be a special object of attack in the Epistle (c. iii.).

The admonition itself is common enough among moralists (Greek exx. in Wetstein, Theile, etc.), and especially in Ecclus. as v. 11-13; iv. 29 (reading ταχύς with Aא*, not τραχύς); xx. 5 ff. etc., and indeed in O.T. (Prov. xiii. 3 etc.). But in this connexion the sense must be more special, as also v. 20 shews; and the reference must be to speaking in God’s name or on God’s behalf. What is desired is a quick and attentive ear to catch 36what God has spoken or is speaking, to be alive to any λόγος ἀληθείας of His, rather than to be eager to dictate to others about His truth and will in a spirit of self-confidence and arrogance.

Then he goes on in a secondary way to βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν, because this arrogance of magisterial speech was closely mixed up with violence of speech, zeal for God being made a cloak for personal animosities.

²⁰ὀργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ οὐκ ἐργάζεται.

20. ὀργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς, for a man’s wrath] Not “the wrath of man.” It is not exactly the broad distinction of human as against Divine wrath, which would require ἀνθρώπου or τῶν ἀνθρώπων; but a single man’s anger, the petty passion, of an individual soul (cf. τ. ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας, v. 14). Contrast Rom. xii. 19, τῇ ὀργῇ, the one central universal anger, which is only a particular form of the universal righteousness.

δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ οὐκ ἐργάζεται, worketh no righteousness of God] Not “the righteousness of God,” but no righteousness which is a true part and vindication of God’s righteousness. The late text has οὐ κατεργάζεται by a natural correction: this would more distinctly express result. Result is of course included in ἐργάζεται, but the main point is that a man’s anger is not a putting in force, a giving operation to, any true righteousness of God, as it professed to be.

²¹διό ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν κακίας ἐν πραΰτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν.

21. διό clearly marks the connexion of the verses, shewing that 19 f. must be so understood as to prepare for δέξασθε and the accompanying words.

ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν, defilement and excrescence] These illustrate each other, being cognate though not identical images. περισσεία is by no means to be confounded with the semi-medical περισσωμα, as it were the refuse of the body. The proper or usual sense of περισσεία is simply abundance, superfluity; usually in a good sense as overflow; sometimes in a bad sense, as beyond measure.

The special image here is evidently rank and excessive growth. So Philo interprets περιτέμνεσθε τ. σκληροκαρδίας as τ. περιττὰς φύσεις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῖ which are sown and increased by the unmeasured impulses of the passions (De vict. offer. ii. 258); also βλασται περιτταί . . . τ. βλαβερὰν ἐπίφυριν (De somn. i. 667); and other passages have the idea without the word. For the contrast to the original proper growth see Ps.-Just. De Monarch. i.: τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὴν συζυγίαν συνέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας λαβούσης εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας θρησκείας τε τῆς εἰς τὸν ἕνα καὶ πάντων δεσπότην, παρεισδῦσα εἰς εἰδωλοποιίας ἐξέτρεψε βασκανία τὸ ὑπέρβαλλον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγαλειότητος, καὶ πολλῷ χρόνῳ μεῖναν τὸ περισσὸν ἔθος ὡς οἰκείαν καὶ ἀληθῆ τὴν πλάνην τοῖς πολλοῖς παραδίδωσι.

Whether St James has trees particularly in view may be doubted, but he probably means simply “excrescence.” The violent speech was not, as it was supposed to be, a sign of healthy life: it was a mere defilement and excrescence on a man considered in his true character as made in God’s image.

κακίας, malice] It might be quite general, “evil”; but it seems here to have the proper sense of “malice”: what was called “holy anger” was nothing better than spite.

πραΰτητι, meekness] The word is contrasted with κακίας: the temper full of harshness and pride towards 37men destroyed the faculty of perceiving whatever God spoke.

τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον, the inborn word] A simple phrase, made difficult by the context. Heisen has 120 pages on it. Its proper meaning is “inborn,” or rather “ingrown,” “congenital,” “natural” (often coupled with φυσικός). It is used in opposition (Heisen 671) to διδακτός, ἐπικτήτος, ἐπείσακτος, etc. This agrees with the derivation. Φύω or φύομαι is to grow, or causatively, to make to grow, as of a living being putting forth fresh growings (growing teeth, beard, etc.), or a higher being creating that which grows, or a parent producing offspring. So ἐμφύοααι almost always is to be inborn in, to grow as part of. Where the causative use occurs (with one peculiar figurative exception Ael. N. A. xiv. 8 of eels fixing their teeth in a bait), it is always said of a higher power (God, nature, fate) who causes some power or impulse to grow up in a man or other living being from birth.

Occasionally there is a secondary ingrowth, a “second nature,” as we say; and both verb and adjective have this sense too. Thus Clem. Str. vi. 799, λαμβάνει τοίνυν τροφὴν μὲν πλείονα ἡ ἐγκεντρισθεῖσα ἐλαία διὰ τὸ ἀγρίᾳ ἐμφύεσθαι, i.e. “grows into” a wild olive, not “is grafted into,” which would be mere tautology after ἐγκεντρισθεῖσα. Also ἔμφυτος Herod. ix. 94 of Evenius, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτίκα ἔμφυτον μαντικὴν εἶχεν, i.e. he had a Divine gift of prophecy, not as a receiver of prophecies, but as the possessor of a power within himself. Such passages as these are useless for shewing that the word can mean implanted. So also passages in which God’s bestowal of the gift is spoken of in the context. Thus Ps-Ign. Eph. 17, διὰ τί λογικοὶ ὄντες οὐ γίνομεθα φρονιμοί; διὰ τί ἔμφυτον τὸ περὶ θεοῦ παρὰ χριστοῦ λαβόντες κριτήριον εἰς ἀγνοίαν καταπίπτομεν, ἐξ ἀμελείας ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ χάρισμα ὁ εἰλήφαμεν ἀνοήτως ἀπολλύμεθα; Similarly Barn. ix. 9, οἶδεν ὁ τὴν ἔμφυτον δωρεὰν τῆς διδαχῆς αὐτοῦ θέμενος ἐν ἡμῖν: where τ. διδαχῆς cannot be doctrine or revelation imparted to us, but an inward Divine teaching to interpret allegory, as is shewn by the parallel vi. 10, εὐλογητὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, ἀδελφοί, ὁ σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν θέμενος ἐν ἡμῖν τ. κρυφίων αὐτοῦ: and still more the corrupt passage i. 2, οὕτως (or, οὗ τὸ) ἔμφυτον τῆς δωρεᾶς πνευματικῆς χάριν εἰλήφατε (<τῆς before δωρ. C).

It is therefore impossible to take τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον as the outward message of the Gospel. He could never have used in that sense a word which every one who knew Greek would of necessity understand in the opposite sense. It may be that the idea of reception (δέξασθε) is transferred from the external word: but in any case it has an intelligible meaning. The word is there, always sounding there; but it may be nevertheless received or rejected. This notion of the reception of a word already within is like κτὴσασθε τὰς ψυχάς (Lk. xxi. 19), or κτᾶσθαι τὸ σκεῦος (1 Th. iv. 4). There is special force in ἔμφυτον contrasted with ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσ.: these are unnatural, accidental; the voice of the word within is original and goes back to creation.

This sense (Schulthess and as against the wrong sense Heinsius in loc.) has ancient authority. Oecum. (? e Did. Al.) has ἔμφυτον λόγον καλεῖ τὸν διακριτικὸν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ χείρονος, καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμὲν καὶ καλούμεθα. Cf. Athan. Or. c. Gent. 34, ἐπιστρέψαι δὲ δύνανταο ἐὰν ὅν ἐνεδύσαντο ῥύπον πάσης ἐπιθυμίας ἀπόθωνται καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπονίψωνται ἕως ἂν ἀπόθωνται πᾶν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλότριον τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μόνην αὐτὴν ὥσπερ γέγονεν ἀποδείξωσιν, ἵν᾽ οὕτως ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρῆσαι τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς λόγον, καθ᾽ ὅν καὶ γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυνηθῶσιν. κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γὰρ θεοῦ πεποίηται καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν γέγονεν . . . ὅθεν καὶ ὅτε πάντα τὸν ἐπιχυθέντα ῥύπον τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀφ᾽ ἐαυτῆς ἀποτίθεται, καὶ μόνον τὸ κατ᾽ 38εἰκόνα καθαρὸν φυλάττει, εἰκότως διαλαμπρυνθέντος τοῦτου ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν πάτερα, οὗ καὶ ἐστιν εἰκὼν ὁ σωτήρ, λογίζεται κ.τ.λ. See also 33 fin., διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ τῆς περὶ θεοῦ θεωρίας ἔχει τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς γίνεται ὁδός, οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς λαμβάνουσα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου γνῶσιν καὶ κατάληψιν. Also Vit. Anton. 20 (812 AB).

τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν] The simplest sense is right. The contrast is between life and death, the “soul” being the living principle; as Mt. xvi. 25 etc., but esp. Lk. vi. 9. [See note on 1 Peter i. 9.]

This life-giving power as ascribed to the inborn word becomes intelligible if we consider it as differing at different ages of the world according to the stages of experience and of revelation. It is always the testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae (cf. Rom. i. 19 ff.), but the testimony becomes enlightened and enriched ns time goes by. To Christians the inborn word speaks with the increased force and range derived from the Gospel: but what St James is referring to here is not the original reception of the Gospel as a word from without, but the renewed reception of the word within whatever its message may be: it is the original capacity involved in the Creation in God’s image which makes it possible for man to apprehend a revelation at all. Cf. also Deut. xxx. 14 and St Paul’s comment on it in Rom. x. 6 ff.

²²Γίνεσθε δὲ ποιηταὶ λόγου καὶ μὴ ἀκροαταί μόνον παραλογιζόμενοι ἐαυτούς

22. Thus far we have had the relation of hearing to speaking, and hearing has been commended before speaking. But the formalistic spirit of the Jewish Christians could give this too a wrong turn, as though hearing were all that were needed. There remained another antithesis, hearing and doing, and to this St James turns by way of precaution.

γίνεσθε, shew yourselves] i.e. in hearing, to prove that you hear rightly.

ποιηταὶ, doers] Cf. Rom. ii. 13; and Jam. himself vv. 23, 25; iv. 11. So with τ. νόμου 1 Macc. ii. 67. It is founded on our Lord’s sayings Mt. vii. 24 etc., the close of the Sermon on the Mount, just as τέλειοι in v. 4 expresses the close of its first chapter (v. 48) on the Old and New Law.

ποιηταὶ λόγου] Not the Word whether external or internal, but any word that has authority. It is almost adjectival, “word-doers,” as we say “law-abiding,” “law-breakers.”

ἀκροαταί] used in N.T. only in the same passages, Rom. ii. 13 and Jam. i. 23, 25. It expresses listening, but is specially used of the disciples or hearers of philosophers; and probably. also in Judea, where the attendance on the rabbinical schools was strongly inculcated.

Cf. R. Shimeon son of Gamaliel in Aboth i. 18, “All my days I have grown up amongst the wise, and have not found aught good for a man but silence: not learning but doing is the groundwork, and whose multiplies words occasions sin.” So also v. 20, “There are four characters in college-goers. He that goes and does not practise, the reward of going is in his hand. He that practises and does not go, the reward of practice is in his hand. He that goes and practises is pious. He that goes not and does not practise is wicked.” And again v. 18, “There are four characters in scholars. Quick to hear and quick to forget, his gain is cancelled by his loss. Slow to hear and slow to forget, his loss is cancelled by his gain. Quick to hear and slow to 39forget is wise. Slow to hear and quick to forget; this is an evil lot.” But St James uses the common language in a wider sense.

παραλογιζόμενοι] The word occurs Col. ii. 4, where the context rather suggests “delude by false reasoning.” But it is very doubtful whether the word has that force. It has two chief meanings, not to be confused, from two meanings of λογίζομαι, to misreckon, cheat in reckoning, and so cheat in any way; and to misinfer, draw a wrong conclusion from the premises, but without implication of evil intent. It is used several times in LXX. for simple beguiling, though by words. Lightfoot refers to Dan. xiv. [Bel and D.] 7. Cf. Ps. Salom. iv. 12, 14 (παρελογίσατο ἐν λόγοις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρῶν καὶ κρίνων), 25.

²³ὅτι εἴ τις ἀκροατὴς λόγου ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ ποιητής, οὗτος ἔοικεν ἀνδρὶ κατανοοῦντι τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ,

23. κατανοοῦντι, taking note of] Not merely to see passively, but to perceive: as Plato (Soph. 233 A) γάρ πω κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον, “I do not catch the question.” Cf. Mt. vii. 3; Acts vii. 31, etc.

τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, the face of his creation] Not altogether easy. The phrase must be taken with τ. τροχὸν τ. γενέσεως (iii. 6), but I speak only of the simpler case here presented. Here it is often understood as “his natural face” (A.V.), lit the face of his birth, with which he was born, i.e. his bodily face. But if such a meaning were intended, no such circuitous and obscure phrase would have been used; τ. πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ, would have been enough, no other face being mentioned. Also the image so presented has no force: if it is merely a case of hasty looking or intent looking, all that is said in v. 24 is otiose.

The γένεσις is his birth strictly, in antithesis to later degeneracy; but the face is the invisible face, the reflexion of God’s image in humanity. St James is still consistently referring to Gen. i. The face which a man beholds when he receives the Divine word is the representation of what God made him to be, though now defaced by his own wrong doings. So Eustathius in Od. xix. 178, καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἡ Πηνελόπη ὀκνεῖ διορθοῦσθαι τὴν φύσιν, καὶ περιττοτέρα φαίνεσθαι αὑτῆς, καὶ τ. εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐκ γενέσεως προσώπου διαγράφειν εἴτε μεταγρέφειν, where the contrast is between Penelope’s natural face and its disfigurement by artificial cosmetics.

There is special fitness in the word because it is used in LXX. for תּוֹלְדוֹת and מוֹלֶדֶת, and has thus (from Gen. ii. 4; v. 1) given Genesis its Greek name. In itself the word is neuter in force, and in Greek philosophy it rather represents natural processes as governed by necessity, not by Divine will. But to a Christian Jew the only γένεσις could be that of the Pentateuch, Psalms and Prophets, the beginnings of things as coming from the hand of God; so that it virtually carries with it the association of our word “creation”; and it is to be observed that κτίσις, though found in Apocr. for “creation,” is never so used in LXX. proper, though κτίζω (as well as ποιέω) is; there being no Hebrew substantive meaning “creation.” Cf. 2 Macc. vii. 23, ὁ τ. κόσμου Κτίστης, ὁ πλάσας ἀνθρώπου γένεσιν καὶ πάντων ἐξευρὼν γένεσιν.

²⁴κατενόησεν γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπελήλυθεν καὶ εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο ὁποῖος ἦν.

24. κατενόησεν, he takes note of ] The verb as before: he sees himself and knows that it is himself that he sees, the new man κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα. The aorist denotes the instantaneous 40and quickly passing character of the seeing.

ἀπελήλυθεν, is gone away] He went away and remains away: a contrast to παραμείνας. It was a passing glance, not taken up into his life, but relinquished.

εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο, straightway forgetteth] Again the aorist because the forgetting was a single and immediate act.

ὁποῖος ἦν, what manner of man he was] I.e. his original image antecedent to change and becoming. Cf. Apoc. iv. 11, διὰ τὸ θέλημά σου ἦσαν (not εἰσίν) καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν, where ἦσαν perhaps expresses the Divine idea, realised visibly in κτίσις.

On the whole thought of the verse cf. Origen Hom. in Gen. i. § 13, “Semper ergo intueamur istam imaginem Dei, ut possimus ad ejus similitudinem reformari. Si enim ad imaginem Dei factus homo, contra naturam intuens imaginem diaboli, per peccatum similis ejus effectus est; multo magis intuens imaginem Dei, ad cujus similitudinem factus est a Deo, per verbum et virtutem ejus recipiet formam illam quae data ei fuerat per naturam.” Also Athan. (Or. cont. Gent. ii. p. 3) speaks of man as having nothing to hinder him from attaining to the knowledge concerning the Divinity, for by his own purity (καθαρότητος) he always contemplates the image of the Father, the God-Word, in whose image also he is made, . . . ἱκανὴ δὲ ἡ τ. ψυχῆς καθαρότης ἐστὶ τὸν θεὸν δἰ ἑαυτῆς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, as the Lord also says, Blessed are the pure, etc.” See also the passage cited above on v. 21.

So also virtually (though confusedly) Oecum., but supposing the word to be the Mosaic Law (διὰ τ. νόμου μανθάνοντες οἱοὶ γεγόναμεν) and again speaking of a spiritual (νοητόν) mirror.

²⁵ὁ δὲ παρακύψας εἰς νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ παραμείνας, οὐκ ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς γενόμενος ἀλλὰ ποιητὴς ἔργου, οὗτος μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ ἔσται.

25. παρακύψας, looketh into] The notion of a steady gaze has been imported into the word from the context, and prematurely. It seems never to have any such meaning. Κύπτω and all its compounds express literally some kind of stretching or straining of the body, as up, down, or forward. Παρακύπτωis the stretching forward the head to catch a glimpse, as especially through a window or door, sometimes inwards, oftener outwards. When used figuratively, as here, it seems always to imply a rapid, hasty, and cursory glance. So Luc. Pisc. 30, κᾷπειδὴ μόνον παρέκυψα εἰς τὰ ὑμέτερα, the speaker says to the philosophers: “As soon as ever I had merely looked into your world, I began to admire you, etc.”; Bas. Ep. lxxi. § 1, εἰ δὲ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρτι παρακύψαι φιλοτιμούμενος πρὸς τ. βίον τ. Χριστιανῶν: “If so and so making it his ambition just now to cast a glance at the life of Christians, and then thinking that his sojourn with us confers on him some dignity, invents what he has not heard, and expounds what he has not understood” : where all turns on the slightness and superficiality of the acquaintance; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 8, p. 554, ποῦ γὰρ τοῖς ἰδίωταις πρὸ μικροῦ θέμις εἰς ἡγεμονικῆς (imperial) ψυχῆς παρακύψαι βουλεύματα; Ach. Tat. ii. 35 [cf. Jacobs, p. 593] of beauty that παρακύψαν μόνον οἴχεται; D. Cass. lxii. 3, Boadicea of the Romans, ἐξ οὗπερ ἐς τὴν Βρεταννίαν οὗτοι παρέκυψαν, “from the time that these men put their heads into Britain”; lxvi. 17, of emperors who partly reigned together, each of them believed himself to be emperor ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε καὶ ἐς τοῦτο παρέκυψεν, “from the time that he put his head into this,” i.e. began at all to reign (lii. to is not quite so clear); Demosth. Phil. i. 24 (p. 46 fin.) auxiliary troops παρακύψαντα 41ἐπὶ τὸν τ. πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῖ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα; they just shew themselves for the war, and then sail off.

St James could not have used such a word to contain within itself steady looking, and it must therefore have a meaning analogous to Lk. ix. 62, putting hand to the plough, the stress being on παραμείνας. It answers to κατενόησεν ἑαυτόν. [See on 1 Pet. i. 12.]

νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, a perfect law, even that of liberty] Here the word has become a law, but a perfect law, just as they are interchanged in Ps. cxix. The starting point is language such as we find in that Psalm, also Ps. xix. 7: but Christ’s word in the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. v. 48), itself founded on Deut. xviii. 13, is the main source, that being the sum and climax of Mt. v., the subject of the new or rather subjacent Law. (On the recognition of the heathen as having a law and covenant see Isa. xxiv. 5 and Delitzsch and Cheyne.) Thus St James refers at once to the Gospel and to what was before the Law (cf. Rom. ii. 14 as to the heathen): his “perfect Law” unites both. It is perfect, as expounded by our Lord, because it deals not with single acts but with universal principles.

τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας] In what sense? Irenaeus thinks of free-will: but that is not in the context. In LXX. ἐλευθερία is never used in any such figurative or ethical sense. The nearest approach in sense is in Ps. cxix. 32, 44 f., 96 (רָחָב ,רָחַב, “broad,” πλατύνω, πλατυσμός, πλατεῖα, where the reception of God’s law is represented as giving spacious room in which to walk, removing the narrowing bondage of petty personal desires (cf. Wordsworth’s Ode to Duty). The idea of the Law as a source of freedom was not strange to the later Jews: so Aboth iii. 8 (R. Nechoniah Ben Ha-Kanah), “Whoso receives upon him the yoke of Thorah, they remove from him the yoke of royalty and the yoke of worldly care,” etc. (p. 60); also Perek R. Meir (=Aboth vi.) 2 (R. Joshua Ben Levi), “It (the Bath Kol) saith, And the tables were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, graven upon the tables (Ex. xxxii. 16); read not charuth ‘graven’ but cheruth ‘freedom,’ for thou wilt find no freeman but him who is occupied in learning of Thorah” (p. 114, with Taylor’s note); and also Philo, Q. omn. prob. lib. 7 (ii. 452), ὅσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμου ζῶσιν ἐλεύθεροι: but he has also the Stoic language about the freedom of the wise man: cf. Sacr. Ab. et Cain, 37 (i. 188). But St James seems to mean more than ethical result; rather the character of the law, as positive not negative (“Thou shalt love . . .”) and depending on expansive outflow, not on restraint and negation.

καὶ παραμείνας, and there continueth] The first meaning is to “stay where one is”: then to “stay with a person loyally”: also absolutely to “persevere,” esp. in contrast to others who fall away. Diod. Sic. (ii. 29), contrasting the Greeks with the Chaldaeans and their hereditary lore says: παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁ πολὺς ἀπαράσκευος προσιὼν ὀψέ ποτε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἅπτεται, καὶ μέχρι τινὸς φιλοπονήσας ἀπῆλθε, περισπασθεὶς ὑπὸ βιωτικῆς χρείας, ὀλίγοι δὲ παντελῶς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀποδύντες ἐργολαβίας ἕνεκεν παραμένουσιν ἐν τῷ μαθήματι. The idea then probably is “perseveres in” the law, not perseveres looking at it, nor abides beside it. So Ps. i. 2, καὶ ἐν τ. νόμῳ αὐτοῦ μελετήσει ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός.

γενόμενος, shewing himself] As γίνεσθε in v. 22.

ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς . . . ποιητὴς ἔργου, 42a hearer that forgetteth...a doer that worketh] The first genitive must be adjectival: not exactly an adjective “a forgetful hearer,” but a hearer in contrast to a doer, and so characterised by forgetting. This sense of a characteristic, or even something stronger, is always to be traced in these Hebraistic genitives in Greek. In like manner ἔργου is quasi adjectival, and so without the article: with the article it would have to be in the plural.

μακάριος] not εὐλογητός. “Happy” in the sense “to be envied.” He may have delight in it or he may not: the state itself is good and desirable: if he is in a right mind, he cannot but delight in it. This μακάριος hardly goes back to the Sermon on the Mount (it comes nearer Jn xiii. 17): rather it is to be referred, if any whither, to the Psalms, not least to Ps. i.

ἐν τῇ ποιήσει, in his doing] Not διὰ τὴν π. Not a reward, but a life. His action is the action that is right and therefore μακαρία. It refers back to ποιητής.

²⁶Εἴ τις δοκεῖ θρησκὸς εἶναι μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν γλῶσσαν ἑαυτοῦ 19¹⁹ἑαυτοῦ bis] αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ ἀπατῶν καρδίαν ἑαυτοῦ, τούτου μάταιος ἡ θρησκεία.

26. δοκεῖ, seemeth] Sc. to himself, as often.

θρησκός, religious] An interesting but extremely rare word. Not known except here and in Lexicographers; Latt. religiosus. The derivation is probably directly from τρέω, and it seems to mean one who stands in awe of the gods, and is tremulously scrupulous in what regards them. The actual renderings in Lexx. are strange: Hesych. ἑτερόδοξος, εὐγενής (?); Et. Nag. and Suid. ἑτερόδοξος; Et. Gud. ὁ ἑτερόδοξος, αἱρετικός. Oecum. (Did.), having previously said that θρησκεία denotes something more than faith, a knowledge of secret things (κρυφίων, interprets θρησκός as “one who knows and exactly keeps the things hidden (ἀπορρήτων) in the Law.” We get more help from other glosses in Hesych. θρέξατο ἐφυλάξατο, ἐσεβάσθη; θρεσκή ἁγνή, πάντα εὐλαβουμέην; θρεσκός περιττός, δεισιδαίμων. None can come from this passage: so that they attest other lost passages, all having the idea of cautious observance of religious restrictions, sometimes spoken of with praise, sometimes with blame. This exactly answers to the proper meaning of religiosus, as of religio which is properly the gathering up of oneself in awe, and consequent scrupulousness. It thus belongs to an early stage of what we now call religion, containing indeed elements which are and must be permanent, but still as a whole narrow and immature, not including faith in God or love of God. Now this was just the; spirit of much of the later Judaism, notwithstanding its opposition to the spirit of the prophets and of much else in the O.T., and it was apparently getting the better of the Jewish Christians. Men prided themselves on a special religiousness because (as in the Gospels) they made clean the outside of the cup and of the platter and tithed mint and cummin. Thus the word, though not here used in an evil sense, is used probably in a limited sense, in the sense which these persons would use for themselves. θρησκός would be the word which they would choose to express their ideal man.

These two concluding verses of c. i. bring together the two points of Christian conduct, which he has been dwelling on since v. 19. From 19 to 21 he taught slowness to speak and so here he teaches the bridling of the tongue. From 22 to 25 he taught doing as against barren hearing: and; so here and in v. 27 he gives illustrations of rightful doing.

χαλιναγωγῶν γλῶσσαν ἑαυτοῦ, bridling his tongue] A very common figure, worked out more fully in iii. 2 ff.

ἀπατῶν καρδίαν ἑαυτοῦ, deceiving his heart] This answers to παραλογιζόμενοι ἑαυτούς in v. 22. He again, as in 20, implies that the unbridledness of tongue aimed at was one which was defended as the speech of uncompromising zeal.

μάταιος, vain, to no purpose] At once unreal in itself and ineffectual. Cf. ματαία ἡ πίστι ὑμῶν (1 Cor. xv. 17). It is much used in the O.T. for the futility of idols and idolatry (and hence in N.T., Acts xiv. 15; cf. 1 Pet. i. 18), and so Jer. x. 3, τὰ νόμιμα τ. ἐθνῶν μάταια. But still more Isa. xxix. 13 (repeated by our Lord Mt. xv. 8 f.; Mk vii. 6 f.), μάτην δὲ σέβονταί με, etc. (LXX. not Heb.); especially applicable here to a depravation of the true religion.

θρησκεία, religion] A far commoner word than θρησκός, and probably of wider sense, but still a word of very limited history. It occurs twice in Herod. ii. 18, 37, both times with reference to the Egyptians, first about an abstinence from certain flesh, and the second time (ἄλλας τε θρησκίας ἐπιτελέουσι) about white robes, circumcision, shaving, frequent washings, etc., all cases of personal ceremonial (so also θρησκεύω ii. 64). It is apparently absent, as also θρησκεύω, from Attic literature: but like many words found in Herod. came into use in late days. It is doubtful whether there is any earlier instance than this, except Wisd. xiv. 18, 27 (-εύω xi. 16; xiv. 16), all of worship of idols or lower creatures. In N.T. in a good sense, τ. ἡμετ. θρησκείας, Acts xxvi. 5, which illustrates the use of εἴ τις . . . θρησκός: and in St Paul (Col. ii. 18) θρ. τ. ἀγγελων (also 23, ἐθελοθρησκεία). It has a more positively bad sense in Philo, Quod deter. pot. 7 (i. 195), where a man who uses purifications or lavishes wealth on temples and hecatombs and votive offerings is called θρησκείαν ἀντὶ ὁσιότητος ἡγούμενος. But shortly afterwards Clem. Rom. uses it freely in a good sense (x1v. 7), τῶν θρησκευόντων τ. μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ ἔνδοξον θρησκείαν τ. ὑψίστου, and lxii.1, περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀνηκόντων τῇ θρησκείᾳ ἡμῶν, the virtuous life “suitable to our worship” of God, as just expounded by a prayer. And still more strongly Melito, p. 413 Otto, οὐκ ἐσμὲν λίθων θεραπευταί, ἀλλὰ μόνον θεοῦ τοῦ πρὸ πάντων . . . καὶ τ. χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . ἐσμὲν θρησκευταὶ: where θεραπευταί is equal to or better than θεραπευταί. And so often in the Fathers and other later writers. What is commonly said that θρησκεία means only ritual is not exact. θρησκεία is simply reverence of the gods or worship of the gods, two sides of the same feeling. The reverence gives rise to ceremonial rites, not of worship but of abstention, which are often called θρησκεία. The worship was expressed in ritual acts, which sometimes are called θρησκεία, esp. in the plural θρησκεῖαι. But the fundamental idea is still what underlies both. Besides, however, the exx. already cited, there are others which especially connect it with Jewish ceremonial religion, as 4 Macc. v. 6, of refusal to eat pork or things offered to idols. Thus St James is still using the word preferred by the Jewish Christians, not that which he would have chosen independently.

²⁷θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἁμίαντος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ αὕτη ἐστίν, ἐπισκέπτεσθαι ὀρφανοὺς καὶ χήρας ἐν τῷ θλίψει αὐτῶν, ἄσπιλον ἐαυτὸν τηρεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου.

27. θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἁμίαντος, a pure and undefiled religion] It is not ἡ καθ. καὶ ἀμ. θρ. He does not say or mean that what follows includes all that can be called pure and undefiled religion.

Why these particular words, καθαρά and ἁμίαντος, rather than ἀληθινήor some such word? Because he is still keeping in view the pretension made on behalf of the vain religion, viz. that it was pure and free from pollution. This alone would suffice to shew that St James had chiefly in view ceremonial θρησκεία, the washings and purifications of late Judaism, multiplying Levitical ordinances. These terms which you claim, he means, for your vain θρησκεία do really belong to something very different (Lk. xi. 41).

παρά] In His sight, in His presence, and so in His eyes.

τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ] The two names are probably combined with reference both to what has preceded and to what is going to follow. The false religion spoke much of God, but forgot that He was also Father. A true sense of being His children would lead to a different conception of Him and of the kind of service acceptable to Him. And again, to think of Him as Father was to think of men as brethren; a point of view forgotten in this θρησκεία which set no store on such brotherliness as is involved in the visiting of orphans and widows.

ἐπισκέπτεσθαι, to visit] The word is often used in O.T. of God visiting individual persons or His people: but no case like this. Ecclus. vii. 35 has it of visiting the sick, and so Test. Sim. i; Mt. xxv. 36, 43 (the latter ἐν φυλαηῇ as well as ἀσθενοῦντα): and it seems an ordinary Greek usage as Xen. Cyr. v. 4. 10; Mem. iii. 11. 10; Plut. Mor. (ii. 129 C, τ. φίλους ἀσθενοῦντας; Luc. Philops. 6.

The word must doubtless then be taken literally: not the mere bestowal of alms, but the personal service. The Bible represents God as specially taking thought for the fatherless and widow, as their “father,” Ps. lxviii. 5 (cf. Deut. xxvii. 19; Isa. i. 17; Ecclus. iv. 10). In contrast Mk xii. 4o (|| Lk. xx. 47), the devouring widows’ houses is a mark of the scribes.

ἄσπιλον, unstained] Quite a late word, apparently not extant before N.T The force of the word here is that after St James has noticed the acts of brotherly care towards orphans and widows, he returns to the claim of purity, as though to point out that there was indeed a purity and undefiledness in the strictest sense to be pursued, not from fictitious and artificial pollutions, but from a power able to infect and pollute the inward self.

ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, from the world] The use of κόσμος here is remarkable. The word can hardly be used neutrally here, as though St James meant only that the κόσμος contained things that might bring moral defilement. The κόσμος is evidently thought of as itself defiling. The same comes out yet more strongly in iv. 4, and probably also in the difficult iii. 6. We are used to this language as conventional. But it needs investigation as to its strict meaning and origin. There is nothing of the kind in the first three Gospels or in the Acts or (strange to say) the Apocalypse or Hebrews: very abundant in St John’s Gospel and first Epistle; and 1 Jn. ii. 15 furnishes a remarkable parallel to iv. 4. It is not very clear in St Paul (2 Cor. vii. 10), ὁ κ. οὗtow [1 Cor. iii. 19; v. 10; vii. 31; Eph. ii. 2] being, at least partly, a different conception; but it is found in 2 Peter, distinctly in ii. 20, τὰ μιάσματα τ. κόσμου (ct. ἄσπιλον), and indirectly i. 4; ii. 5 (bis); iii. 6. Thus it is clear in St John’s Gospel and Epistle, 2 Peter, and St James. There is nothing to be made of the common Greek sense 45as the visible universe, or the order of it. This physical sense seems to belong to some places where the word is used, but not to those where the κόσμος is in any sense evil.

The conception must be Jewish: can it be traced back to the O.T.? Certainly not the Greek word from the LXX., for there it has only the “order” or “ornament” meanings. In the Apocr. it is the world, but not in an evil sense. In the LXX. its place is apparently taken by οἰκουμένη, which represents the Heb. תֵּבֵלּ, a curious ancient word, always used without the article, meaning apparently at first the fruitful soil of the earth, and then as a virtual synonym of “earth,” but esp. earth as the habitation of men. Sometimes, like “world,” it is naturally transferred to the collective races of men. Hence we get an intermediate sense in Ps. ix. 8, where God appears as judging תֵּבֵלּ in righteousness, and the phrase is repeated in the later psalms, xcvi. 13; xcviii 9. But it acquires a more distinctly bad sense in the early chapters of Isaiah, xiii. 11; xiv. 17 (21); xviii. 3; xxiv. 4 (see foll. vv. for sense); xxvi. 9, 18. In these passages it means the sum of the fierce surrounding heathen nations, the powers of the heathen world at once destructive and corruptive (xxvi. 9), and see Cheyne’s note, who calls attention to two points: “(1) the Jews are in constant inter-course with the heathen; (2) they suffer, not merely by their political subjugation, but by the moral gulf between themselves and the heathen.” Thus תֵּבֵלּ is virtually the ideal Babylon of the prophets and still more of the Apocalypse. Delitzsch (Isa. xxvi. 18) rightly calls it a κόσμος: and conversely we may say that the N.T. κόσμος probably came from this source.

To Jewish Christians scattered through the Empire, to the Christians of Ephesus (1 Jn), the contact with the heathen world would be a perpetual source of moral danger, and they would be tempted to all sorts of risks from trying to avoid collisions with it. Its injurious effects would be many; but their prevailing characteristic would be defilement. In St John, and perhaps to some extent here, we have the paradox of the holy people itself becoming the world, by putting on in other forms the maxims and practice of an outer world. At all events the evil is conceived of as residing not in anything physical, but in a corrupt and perverted society of men. This is probably always the true ethical sense of “world.” Thus the two clauses answer to each other in respect of the outward objects of the two forms of pure religion: the one is a duty of communication with men for good, the other a duty of avoiding such evil as comes from communication with men.

The whole verse has doubtless a paradoxical shape, though this is explained by the latent antithesis to the spurious θρησκεία. But in any case the conception is that of Isa. lviii. 3-7 (esp. 6); Zech. vii. 4-10.

It closes the paragraph 19-27 with a general statement as to religion, corresponding to vv. 17, 18, which form a general statement as to theology concluding the first section.

II. ¹Ἀδελφοί μου, μὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 20²⁰Χριστοῦ] Χριστοῦ, τῆς δόξης;

II. 1. ἀδελφοί μου] The preface being ended St James turns to the special points of practice which he had directly in view. He makes no further exordium, but breaks at once in medias res with this personal appeal, putting ἀδ. μου in the forefront. It does not occur again at the beginning of a sentence till the close (v. 19).

In what follows in this verse three points of construction require consideration: 46 the mood and general force of ἐν . . . ἔχετε; the nature of the genitive τοῦ κυρίου in connexion with τὴν πίστιν; and the construction and consequent interpretation of τῆς δόξης.

ὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε] This is often, naturally enough, taken as an imperative: but this gives a rather tame sense, and gives no exact sense to ἐν πρ. ἔχετε, and especially to the position of ἐν πρ. as coming before ἔχετε. It is more natural to take it as an interrogative appeal to their consciences: “ Can you really think ἐν προσωποληψίαις that you are having or holding the faith etc.”

The plural -αις probably expresses “in (doing) acts of:” When words having an abstract sense are in the plural, the meaning is either different kinds (as “ambitions” = different kinds of ambition) or different concrete acts or examples. The abstract has no number strictly speaking: but a plural at once implies a number of singulars to make it up, and (apart from kinds) things concrete can alone be numbered.

προσωποληψίαις, acts of partiality] This group of words has a Hebrew origin. נָשָֹא פְנֵי, “to receive the face of,” is much used in different books of the O.T. for receiving with favour an applicant, whether in a good or bad sense. The exact force of the phrase is not clear. נָשָֹא has not the strong sense “accept,” “welcome,” but rather either simply “take” or “lift up,” and some accordingly adopt “lift up.” Against this Gesen. Thes. 915 f. (cf. Hupfeld on Ps. lxxxii. 2) has argued with much force: but he has not succeeded in explaining the precise manner in which “taking the face of” comes to have the required meaning. From the sense of receiving a particular person with favour would naturally come the perversion, the receiving with undue favour, i.e. favouritism, partiality. In some of the passages the partiality is spoken of as due to bribes: but this is an accident: the partiality itself is what the phrase denotes. It is variously rendered by the LXX. as λαμβάνω πρόσωπον, προσδέχομαι πρ., θαυμάζω πρ. etc. The N.T. has λαμβ., θαυμ., βλέπω εἰς. From the commonest rendering were formed a group of compound words, προσωπολήμπτης Acts x. 34; ἀπροσωπολήμπτως 1 Pet. i. 17; προσωπολημπτέω, Jam. ii. 9; and προσωπολημψία here and three times in St Paul. They are doubtless words of Palestinian Greek.

ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.] The two most obvious senses of the genitive here are the subjective, the faith which our Lord Himself had, and the objective, the faith in Him. The former is not a likely sense to be meant without some special indication of it: the latter is not supported by any clear parallels, and (taken thus nakedly) gives a not very relevant turn to the sentence. The true sense is doubtless more comprehensive, and answers to an idea widely spread in the N.T.; “which comes from Him, and depends on Him,” “the faith which He taught, and makes possible, and bestows”: it is a faith in God, enlarged and strengthened by the revelation of His Son; the faith in God which specially arises out of the Gospel and rests on Him of whom the Gospel speaks. It thus includes a faith in Christ: but this is only the first step on the way to a surer and better faith in God. “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.” This is the probable sense always where πίστις is followed by Ἰησοῦ or similar words. Even Mk xi. 22, ἔχετε πίστιν θεοῦ, is not so much “Have faith in God” as “Have faith from God. Trust on, as men should do to whom God is a reality.”

τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν] It is impossible to determine precisely how much meaning St James put into these words. But they do not differ from St Paul’s formula, and probably to say the least go much beyond what the disciples meant by κύριος in the days of the ministry. They must be taken with i. 1.

τῆς δόξης, who is the Glory] Δόξης is very difficult in this position. Some take it with πίστιν, changing the meaning of πίστιν: Have ye the faith in respect of glory? equivalent to, Do ye take the same view of true glory and dignity? This gives a fair sense; but imports an unnatural force into πίστιν, and leaves the transposition of τ. δόξης inexplicable, besides disturbing the connexion between τ. πίστιν and τ. κυρίου etc. The other interpretations, “faith in the glory,” “glorious faith,” are evidently impossible.

Another favourite way is to take it with τ. κυρίου (so A.V.). The possibility of two genitives, ἡμῶν and τ. δόξης, cannot be denied: so in 1 Tim. iv. 2 δαιμονίων and ψευδολόγων are probably independent genitives governed by διδασκαλίαις: also Acts v. 32 (T.R.); 2 Cor. v. 1; Phil. ii. 30; Mt. xxvi. 28: (Winer-Moulton 239). But τ. κυρίου τ. δόξης is itself a phrase at once so compact and so nearly unique (1 Cor. ii. 8; cf. ὁ θεὸς τ. δόξης Ps. xxix. 3, and probably thence Acts vii. 2) that the division of it into two distant parts is not probable, and can only be taken as a possible interpretation.

It is needless to examine the combination with Χριστοῦ, or with the whole phrase τ. κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ.

There remains the possibility of not taking it as directly dependent on any preceding words, but in apposition to Ἰ. Χ., “our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Glory”: so Bengel. Several passages of the Epistles give a partial confirmation. Rom. ix. 4, ἡ δόξα seems to be the glory of the Divine presence (O.T.); 1 Cor. xi. 7, a man is said to be εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ, which may be taken with v. 3, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ χριστοῦ ὁ θεός; Eph. i. 17, ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ. ὁ πατὴρ τῆς δόξης, where the two clauses seem to stand in precise parallelism and it seems impossible to give the second an intelligible sense except it means that the Son was Himself the Glory; Tit. ii. 13, τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χ. Ἰ., where it is on the whole easiest to take Χ. Ἰ. as in apposition to τ. δόξης τ. μεγάλου θεοῦ κ. σωτῆρος ἡμῶν. Illustrative passages are 2 Cor. iv. 6; Heb. i. 3 (ἀπαύγασμα τ. δόξης, He who is an effulgence of the Father’s glory being thereby Himself the Glory); possibly 1 Pet. iv. 14; also Apoc. xxi. 11, 23, where note the parallelism to καὶ ὁ λύχνος αὐτῆς τὸ ἀρνίον. [See Add. Note.]

But was there anything to lead to such a representation? The O. T. speaks much of the כָּבוֹד of the Lord. From this and from the late dread of connecting God too closely with lower things arose the Jewish conceptions of the Glory יְקָרָא, and the Shechinah. See Weber 160 on the Glory as in Heaven; 179 ff. on the Glory and the Shechinah, and the relation of the Shechinah to the Word in the Targums (cf. Westcott, Introd.⁶ 152); and 182 ff. the combination of both conceptions (Word and Shechinah) in the Shechinah in Talmud and Midrash. Now the Word of the Targums is the true antecedent of the Logos in St John, much more so than the Logos of Philo; and it would be only natural that the other great conception which linked God to men, that of the Glory, should be transferred to Christ as the true fulfiller of it.

The force then of the title here would probably be that the faith of Christ as the Glory was peculiarly at variance with this favouritism shewn to the rich: since He who represented the very majesty of heaven 48was distinguished by His lowliness and poverty: cf. Phil. ii. 5 ff.; 2 Cor. viii. 9. As St James (iii. 9) rebukes the cursing of men who are made in the likeness of God, so here he rebukes the contemptuous usage of poor men, even such as the Incarnate Glory of God Himself became.

²ἐὰν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος ἐν ἐσθῆτι λαμπρᾷ, εἰσέλθῃ δὲ καὶ πτωχὸς ἐν ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῆτι,

2. εἰς συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν, into your (place of) assembly] The word means either the assembly or the building which held the assembly, and either makes sense: in Jn vi. 59, xviii. 20 it is the assembly clearly.

Two subjects of historical interest, the thing and the word, demand notice. As regards the thing synagogue see Plumptre in Smith’s Dict.; Schürer ii. § 27. The date when the synagogue-system arose is unknown. It is remarkable that there are no clear traces of it in the Apocrypha; yet probably there is a reference in Ps. lxxiv. 8 (Maccabaean). But it was widely spread in the first century in all places where Jews were to be found.

The name “synagogue.” The origin is doubtless the LXX., but in a confused way. There are two chief words in O.T. (cf. Schürer l.c. [and Hort, Christian Ecclesia]) for kindred meanings, קָהָל, “congregation,” and עֵדָה, “assembly”: in this sense עֵדָה is almost always rendered συναγωγή, קָהָל ἐκκλησία about 70 times, συναγωγή about half as many, other words very rarely. Probably ἐκκλησία was, chosen for קָהָל, because both words express the calling or summoning of a public assembly (convocation) by a herald. Both עֵדָה and συναγωγή are somewhat more general words. But the difference in usage was very slight. They stand side by side in Prov. v. 14 (where see Delitzsch), also (Heb.) Exod. xii. 6; and [ἐξ]εκκλησιάζειν συναγωγήν occurs several times; also συνήχθησαν . . . ἐκκλησία (sic) 2 Ezra x. 1, and ἐπισυνήχθη ἐκκλησία 1 Macc. v. 16. This O.T. double use recurs in Apocrypha, especially Ecclus. and 1 Macc. The late traces of ἐκκλησία is shew that it must have survived, apparently as the body of men making up a congregation, the religious community so to speak; and also as the community of the whole nation (Mt. xvi. 18), as in the O.T. (For the Hebrew words used see Schürer l.c.) The late use of συναγωγή was apparently limited to the individual buildings, or to the congregation as assembled in them. There is some evidence of its being employed to denote some religious associations among the Greeks (see Harnack cited below), but probably this had nothing to do with the selection. It is very common for Jewish synagogues in N.T.; three times in Josephus; also Philo, Q. omn. prob. lib. 12 (ii. 458), “The seventh day is reckoned holy, on which abstaining from other works, καὶ εἰς ἱεροὺς ἀφικνούμενοι πόπους, οἱ καλοῦνται συναγωγαί, they sit in ranks according to age, the younger below the older, placed for listening with the fitting order.”

Now, as far as evidence goes, the Christian usage was to adopt ἐκκλησία both for single congregations and for a whole community. For the building it is not used in the apostolic age, though it was afterwards. On the other hand the Christian use of συναγωγή is very limited: see a long note in Harnack Hermas Mand. xi. 9. He shews how rarely and as it were etymologically only it was used by ordinary Christian writers, and it at last became definitely the synagoga contrasted with ecclesia as in Augustine; and in earlier writers it some-times is used in a depreciatory sense like our “conventicle.” What however especially concerns us here is 49the evidence for its use among Jewish Christians, see Lightfoot, Phil. 190: Epiph. (xxx. 18) states that the Ebionites call their church συναγωγήν and not ἐκκλησίαν; and Jer. Ep. 112. 13 says of the Ebionites, “To the present day through all the synagogues of the E. among the Jews there is a heresy called of the Minaei” etc. This makes it very likely that Jewish Ebionites inherited the name from the purer days of Jewish Christianity, and that St James does here distinctly mean “synagogue”: and since he elsewhere (v. 14) speaks of τ. πρεσβυτέρους τῆς ἐκκλησίας, i.e. the living congregation, the difference of word suggests that here the building is meant.

χρυσοδακτύλιος] Not known elsewhere. The adjective was doubtless chosen to express that the wearing of gold rings, probably a multitude of them (τῶν δακτυλίων πλῆθος ἔχων, Luc. Nigr. xiii.), was characteristic of the kind of man.

ἐσθῆτι λαμπρᾷ contrasted with ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῆτι] The two words are strictly opposed, as often; practically new glossy clothes and old shabby clothes. Λαμπρός has nothing to do with brilliance of colour, being in fact often used of white robes. Artemidorus (ii. 3 s. fin.), after enumerating the omens from garments of all sorts of colours, concludes ἀεὶ δὲ ἄμεινον καθαρὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ ἱμάτια ἔχειν καὶ πεπλυμένα καλῶς ἢ ῥυπαρὰ καὶ ἄπλυτα, πλὴν τῶν τὰς ῥυπώδεις ἐργασίας ἐργαζομένων.

³ἐπιβλέψητε δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν φοροῦντα τὴν ἐσθῆτα τὴν λαμπρὰν καὶ εἴπητε Σὺ κάθου ὧδε καλῶς, καὶ τῳ πτωχῷ εἴπητε Σὺ στῆθι ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ 21²¹ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ] ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου,

3. ἐπιβλέψητε δὲ ἐπὶ, and ye look with favour on] Ἐπιβλέπω ἐπί is often used in LXX. of God looking with favour on men; not apparently of men on men. But Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iv. 2, p. 1120 b 6) says (in giving) τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου, to pay no regard to oneself and one’s own interest.

καλῶς, in a good place] Ael. V. H. ii. 13, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν καλῷ τ. θεάτρου ἐκάθητο; xiii. 22, Ptolemy having built a temple for Homer αὐτὸν μὲν καλὸν καλῶς ἐκάθισε, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς πόλεις περιέστησε τ. ἀγάλματος.

στῆθι ἢ κάθου] It is uncertain whether to read στῆθι ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον (B ff), or στῆθι ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον. Probably the former, notwithstanding the want of verbal balance. Stand anywhere contrasted with sit in a particular humble place.

ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου, below my foot-stool] Ὑπό might be “down against,” i.e. close up to, with the accessory sense of lowness. But more probably “below” in the sense of in a lower place, as Plutarch Artax. v. (i. 1013 E) καθεζομένων τῆς μὲν ὑπ᾽ αὐτόν, τῆς δὲ μητρὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτόν.

⁴οὐ διεκρίθητε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἐγένεσθε κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν²²²²οὐ διεκρίθητε . . . πονηρῶν] διεκρίθητε . . . πονηρῶν;

4. No καὶ before οὐ; perhaps omit οὐ (B* ff) which gives the same sense, substituting affirmation for question.

διεκρίθητε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, divided in your own minds] As i. 6; explained by Mt. xxi. 21, ἐὰν ἔχητε πίστιν καὶ μὴ διακριθῆτε, appearing in Mk xi. 23 as καὶ μὴ διακριθῇ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ πιστεύῃ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.; cf. Acts x. 20; Rom. iv. 20; xiv. 23 (ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως): cf. Jude 22. The idea is that the singleness and strength of faith is split up and shattered by the divided mind, professing devotion to God yet reaching away to a petty and low standard. Ἐν ἑαυτοῖς is in antithesis 50to what follows: the wrong-doing to others is traced back to its root within, just as in iv. 1.

κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν, judges swayed by evil deliberations] The genitive is not unlike i. 25. The idea seems to be “judges swayed by evil deliberations or thinkings”: contrast Prov. xii. 5, λογισμοί δικαίων κρίματα. διαλογισμός is a very elastic word. In Mt. xv. 19 διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί (|| Mk. vii. 21, οἱ διαλογισμοὶ οἱ κακοί) stand at the head of the evil things that come forth from the heart, and probably mean malicious evil plottings (cf. 1 Tim. ii. 8, χωρίς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμοῦ), answering apparently to the single Hebrew word מְזִמָּה, properly only a thought, device, but usually an evil device. In various places of St Luke it is used of the plotting of the Pharisees and the imperfect faith of the disciples. Probably the mere suggestion that they made themselves κριταί contained a reproach: cf. iv. 11: they broke the command of the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. vii. 1). But further the office of a true judge is to divide, to sever right from wrong: but here the division was dictated not by justice according to the facts, but by evil divisions within their own minds (cf. Rom. xiv. 10, 13), by evil calculations, as we might say. Contrast Lk. xiv. 12 ff. Such moral distraction is a form of διψυχία, and opposed to the singleness of faith.

⁵Ἀκούσατε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί. οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἐξελέξατο τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ πλουσίους ἐν πίστει καὶ κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν;

5. ἀκούσατε, hearken] An imperative like ἴστε in i. 19, but with a sharper tone, as of a warning prophet: cf. especially Isa. li. 1, 4, 7. It introduces an appeal to a truth that could not be denied by any who accepted Christ’s Gospel. It is softened at once by ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, of which ἀγαπ. here occurs for the last time (previously in i. 16; i. 19, where likewise there are appeals to accepted but practically belied truths).

οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἐξελέξατο, did not God choose] What choice by God is meant here? In our Lord’s apocalyptic discourse Mt. xxiv. 22 (with ||8) He spoke of the shortening of the days of tribulation for the elect’s sake, and Mk adds οὓς ἐξελέξατο, which is virtually implied in the verbal ἐκλεκτούς. The conception doubtless is that the infant church or congregation of Christians owed their hearing and reception of the Gospel to God’s choice. Here as elsewhere it is not a simple question of benefit bestowed on some and refused to others: those on whom it is bestowed receive it for the sake of the rest: they are God’s instruments for the diffusion of His truth and salvation. This choice of Christians by God from among heathenism or unbelieving Judaism is spoken of by St Paul 1 Cor. i. 27 f. (a passage much resembling this) and Eph. i. 4. It is implied in various places where ἐκλεκτός or ἐκλογή is spoken of. Both words occur often in St Paul, ἐκλογή in 2 Pet. i. 10, and ἐκλεκτός especially in 1 Pet. viz. i. 1; ii. 4, 6, 9, where St Peter carries it back to two passages of Isaiah, one xxviii. 16 LXX. only (cf. Prov. xvii. 3 LXX.) properly “well-tried”; the other xliii. 20, where as in neighbouring chapters and some Psalms it refers to Israel as the object of God’s choice. But ἐξελέξατο itself stands in a still more fundamental passage, Deut. xiv. 1, 2. [See further on 1 Peter ll. cc.]

St James does not however refer directly to Christians but to the poor. The reference is doubtless to the special manner in which Christ’s own preaching was addressed to the poor. The Gospel was not intended to be confined to them; but they were to be its first and its strictly primary recipients, the recipients who would 51best shew its true character. “Blessed are ye poor” are the first words of the Sermon on the Mount: πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται is the culminating mark of Christ’s true Messiahship, founded about Isa. lxi. 1, which is quoted in full in the words spoken in the synagogue at Nazareth which head the ministry in St Luke (iv. 18), as the Sermon on the Mount does in St Matthew.

τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ, the poor in the eyes of the world] Τῷ κόσμῳ might be taken as “in relation to the world”: but more probably ‘in the eyes of “the world”’ (cf. 1 Cor. i. 18, τ. ἀπολλυμένοις κ.τ.λ.; 2 Cor. x. 4 δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ; Acts vii. 20 ἀστεῖος τ. θεῷ). Cf. Lk. xvi. 15 τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὑψηλόν, said to the φιλάργυροι Pharisees. “The world” is used in the same sense as before, here as judging by an external and superficial standard.

πλουσίους ἐν πίστει, to be rich in virtue of faith] Not “as being,” but “to be” expressed more explicitly in Eph. i. 4 by εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κ.τ.λ.

The meaning is not “abounding in faith,” which would weaken the force of πλουσίους in this connexion, but “rich in virtue of faith”: their faith of itself constituted them not only powerful, able to move mountains, but rich: see 2 Cor. vi. 10; viii. 9; Apoc. ii. 9; iii. 18; and esp. 1 Pet. i. 7. The explanation is that the use and enjoyment of riches contain two elements, the thing used and enjoyed, and the inward power of using and enjoying it; and this inward power is so intensified and multiplied by a strong and simple faith in God that it so to speak extracts more out of external poverty than can without it be extracted out of external riches. Cf. Ps. xxxvii. 16 and in spirit the whole Psalm; Test. Gad 7, ὁ γὰρ πένης καὶ ἄφθονος, ἐπί πᾶσι Κυρίῳ εὐχαρισοτῶν, αὐτὸς παρὰ πᾶσι πλουτεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὸν πονηρὸν περισπασμὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας, heirs of the kingdom] The kingdom of heaven is what in the Sermon on the Mount is especially pronounced to belong to the poor. The Gospel preached to them is the Gospel of the kingdom. In Lk. xii. 32 we have “Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom”; and less distinct passages abound. The combination κληρον. τῆς βασιλ.. occurs in Mt. xxv. 34 and in St Paul (I Cor. vi. 9 f.; xv. 50; Gal. v. 21: cf. Eph. v. 5), but not in connexion with the poor. The conception of inheritance is common however in similar contexts, and especially in the O. T. It is involved in the conception of sonship, as Gal. iv. 7.

ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν, which He promised to them that love Him] This corresponds exactly to the use of the same phrase with τὸν στέφανον τ. ζωῆς in i. 12. Even with that peculiar phrase derivation from the Apocalypse was seen to be unlikely: much more this commoner phrase from Apoc. i. 6; v. 10. The promise referred to is probably Dan. vii. 18, 27, though our Lord’s language may possibly be meant, or may at least give definiteness to the older language. Τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν is, as before, the general Deuteronomic term expressing fulfilment of the new and perfect Law.

⁶ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡτιμάσατε τὸν πτωχόν. οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι καταδυναστεύουσιν ὑμῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια;

6. ὑμεῖς δὲ] in the strongest contrast.

ἡτιμάσατε] Sc. in that act. Not merely failed to give him honour, but treated him with dishonour. So Prov. xiv. 21; xxii. 22; and cf. 1 Cor. xi. 22.

οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι, do not the rich] What follows shews that rich men not Christians are meant. But this does not force us to take the rich and poor of v. 2 as other than Christians. Within the Christian body there were both classes: but further the whole body was bound to regard itself emphatically as a band of poor men in the face of the wealth and power of the encompassing heathen or even Jewish world. The whole passage reminds us that the name Ebionites for the Jewish Christians of Palestine has nothing to do with an imaginary Ebion, but is simply the Ebionim, the Poor Men.

καταδυναστεύουσιν ὑμῶν, oppress you] Δυναστεύω is to “be a potentate,” “have” or “exercise mastery,” either absolutely or over some one in particular: sometimes in a neutral sense, sometimes with a bad sense “lord it over.” Καταδυναστεύω expresses the same more strongly, violent exercise of mastery, tyranny. It occurs in Xen. and often in late Greek: much in LXX., chiefly for יָנָה, to oppress; as the poor Ezek. xviii. 12; xxii. 29; (LXX. Amos viii. 4); also Wisd. ii. 10. The case is usually (always in LXX.) the accusative, but the genitive occurs Diod. Sic. xiii. 73 fin. and Symm. apparently (Ps. lxiv. 4), cf. Wyttenb., as often happens with compounds into which κατά enters.

καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕλκουσιν ὑμᾶς, and are not they the men that drag you] Not “drag you in person,” as is shewn by v. 7. The pretext of law covered violent usage: cf. σύρω Acts viii. 3; xvii. 6. [Swete on Ps.-Pet. iii.]

εἰς κριτήρια, into courts of justice] Here the meaning can hardly be “suits,” though κριτήρια may mean this. Better, as sometimes, courts of justice, though we should have expected ἐπί rather than εἰς.

It can hardly be doubted that this means judicial persecutions, whether formally on the ground of being Christians, we cannot tell for that time. No definite law against Christians is likely to have then existed. But if they had become objects of dislike, it was easy to find legal pretexts.

⁷οὐκ αὐτοι βλασφημοῦσιν τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπικληθέν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς;

7. οὐκ αὐτοι βλασφημοῦσιν, are not they the men who abuse] Βλασφημέω carries with it nothing of our sense of “blaspheme” as containing some extreme irreverence towards God. It is simply abusive and scurrilous language whether directed against God or men. Very rare in LXX. It comes here from Isai. lii. 5 where the word is נָאַץ, properly expressive of contempt, usually rendered παροξύνω (even with τὸ ὄνομα) or some such word (one derivative is once βλασφημία, Ezek. xxxv. 12).

τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα, the honourable name] Worthy of admiration, not contempt and contumely. Καλός is what is good as seen, as making a direct impression on those who come in contact with it; contrast ἀγαθός which is good in result.

τὸ ἐπικληθέν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, by the which ye are called] From the LXX. of Amos ix. 12 (quoted Acts xv. 17) literally following the Hebrew, but also Jer. xiv. 9. The phrase is adopted for its vividness. The name was as it were laid upon them, stamping them with a special allegiance.

What name does he mean? Probably Χριστός or Χριστιανός, as 1 Pet. iv. 14, 16; cf. Acts xxvi. 28. That is, the watchword, as seen in the Acts, was “Jesus is Christ”: and so in the more important and significant name of the two the whole sense became concentrated. If the Epistle was indeed addressed first to Antioch, it is an interesting fact that there the disciples were first called Christians. 53It matters little for St James’ meaning whether the name was chosen by Christians themselves or given by others in reproach (Tac. Ann. xv. 44, quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat). It would soon be willingly accepted: and if this had not taken place when St James wrote, it would at least contain the καλὸν ὄνομα Χριστός. [See Lightfoot, Ignatius vol. I. p. 400.]

⁸εἰ μέντοι νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικὸν κατὰ τὴν γραφήν Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε·

8. μέντοι, indeed, really] Not an easy use of this particle, which occurs Jn five times; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Jud. 8. In St John and St Paul it clearly has its commonest (adversative) sense “however,” “howbeit,” and perhaps also in St Jude. Hence commentators naturally try to find the same sense here. A sharp and intelligible adversativeness is obtained by supposing St James to be replying to an imagined plea of the Jewish Christians that they were shewing their love to their neighbours by their civility to the man with the gold rings. It is hardly credible however that so absurd a plea, of which there is not the least hint in the text, should be contemplated by St James; and it is difficult to find any other way of satisfactorily justifying an adversative sense. It seems more likely that μέντοι retains its original force of a strong affirmation, which is not confined to answers to questions, though they furnish the commonest examples. It is virtually little more than a strengthened μέν, and a δέ naturally follows. It thus becomes equal to “if you indeed,” “if you really.” This kind of sense is common in Xen. especially the Memorabilia (as i. 3. 10 with εἰ; i. 4. 18 with ἤν; see Kühner: also his Gr. ii. 694 f.: of. Sturz Lex. Xen. iii. 114 f.). The force of the particle seems to lie in an implied reference to a contradiction between the respect of persons and a virtue specially claimed, namely fulfilment of the Law. Thus just as St James had rebuked the unreal ἀκρόασις, the unreal θρησκεία, the unreal πίστις, so here he rebukes an unreal keeping of the law.

τελεῖτε, fulfil] As Rom. ii. 27. In both places the peculiar word was probably chosen to express that it is not a direct performance, but a virtual fulfilment: cf. Rom. ii. 14 f.

νόμον . . . βασιλικόν, a royal law] The order shews that either βασιλικόν is accessory (“a law, a royal law”), or has a special force, a law which well deserves to be called “royal.” But in what sense royal? Probably not in the vague figurative sense common in Greek to denote anything specially high or worthy (sometimes βασιλικὸς καὶ θεῖος); nor again in the Greek application to laws, perhaps starting from Pindar’s famous νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς (on which see Thompson Gorg. 484 B), of which the most interesting for our purpose are in Xen. Oec. xiv. 6 f. and Ps.-Plat. 317 C. Probably one of two senses, either fit to guide a king, a law such as a true king would take for his own government as Ps. lxxii., Zech. ix. 9, and the Gospels in so far as they set forth our Lord as a king; — or, more probably perhaps, a law which governs other laws, and so has a specially regal character. This sense gains in probability if taken with the context. St James does not deny that there was an obedience to a law of some rank or other. When our Lord rebuked the Pharisees (Mt. xxiii. 23), it was for tithing herbs on the one hand and leaving τὰ βαρύτερα τ. νόμου, judgment, mercy, and faith, on the other, adding “these ought ye to have done etc.”; thereby implying the existence of less weighty parts of the law. So here the law, fulfilling which was made a boast, was not denied, but with it was contrasted by implication the neglect of the higher and more fundamental law of love. 54One of the two commandments, of which our Lord had said that on them hung all the Law and the Prophets, might well be called royal.

There is no difficulty in thus applying so wide a term as νόμος to a single precept, since the precept itself was so comprehensive. Thus in Rom. xiii. 8 ff. the separate commandments are called ἐντολαί, but this the sum of them is called a νόμος, and by one not improbable interpretation τὸν ἕτερον νόμον.

κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, according to the Scripture] Doubtless the O.T. (Lev. xix. 18) : the saying had a double sanction, Scripture, and the Lord’s ratification of it.

καλῶς ποιεῖτε, ye do well] This has no sarcasm, as some suppose: simply “ye do well” (cf. v. 19; Mk vii. 37; Acts x. 33; 1 Cor. vii. 37 f.; 2 Pet. i. 19; 3 Jn 6). “I do not complain of you for seeking to fulfil a law, but for neglecting the true value of one law as compared with another: if you are fulfilling a law of the high kind, you are indeed doing well.”

⁹εἰ δὲ προσωποληπτεῖτε, ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε, ἐλεγχόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὡς παραβάται.

9. προσωποληπτεῖτε, ye have respect of persons] Apparently ἅπαξ λεγόμενον.

ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε] A strong phrase, which must mean more than “ye commit sin.” Probably a reminiscence of Mt. vii. 23 (Sermon on the Mount), where those who say “Lord, Lord” are at last addressed, “I never knew you, depart from me of ἐργάζόμενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν” (from Ps. vi. 8). St James never uses ἄνομος, ἀνομία; and ἁμαρτία is often used as virtually a synonym, though the conceptions are different. Moreover (see v. 10) it is quite possible that he refers to a willingness to treat this conduct as no sin at all.

ἐλεγχόμενοι, convicted, shewn to be guilty.

τοῦ νόμου] The definite concrete law of Moses.

παραβάται, transgressors] Cf. Rom. ii. 25, 27; Gal. ii. 18. Παραβάτης is not used in LXX.; though παραβαίνω much (and παράβασις once), chiefly of covenants but also of laws and commandments, just as in classical usage: the strict sense is to “over-step.” The point is that the sticklers for law are marked as essentially “law-breakers,” and that on the chewing of legality itself. Probably there is no reference to such places in the Law itself as Exod. xxiii. 2; Deut. xvi. 19: otherwise the following yelp would lose force.

¹⁰Ὅστις γὰρ ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσῃ, πταίσῃ δὲ ἐν ἑνί, γέγονεν πάντων ἔνοχος.

10. ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσῃ, keep the whole law] The subjunctives τηρήσῃ . . . πταίσῃ are certainly right according to the best MSS. It is the only quite certain N. T. example of ὅστις or ὅς with subjunctive without ἄν, though it has some good authority in Mt. x. 33 (not xviii. 4). But it certainly occurs occasionally in good Greek authors. There is no real difference of sense, though a”v marks the indefiniteness more explicitly. See Kühner ii. 205 f., better than Winer-Moulton 386.

This is probably said with reference to the plea that the whole Law had been observed. The verse seems to be a reminiscence of our Lord’s answer, Mk x. 21, ἕν σε ὑστερεῖ; Lk. xviii. 22, ἔτι ἔν σοι λείτει (cf. Mt. xix. 21, εἰ θ͓λεις τέλειος εἶναι), said after an enumeration of the commandments of the second table, and the profession that they had been kept. The selling of goods and giving to the poor there corresponds antithetically to the neglect of the poor here.

τηρήσῃ] No longer τελέσῃ. The more formal word is appropriate here.

πταίσῃ, trip or stumble] As iii. 2 bis. It is incipient falling (Romans xi. 11): cf. Deut. vii. 25. Common in Philo.

γέγονεν πάντων, is become (makes himself) guilty of all] Ἔνοχος is used with genitive or dative of crimes, or punishments, or, as here, precepts. Properly speaking it means simply “bound by,” “subject to,” “coming under.”

The force of πάντων is determined by ἑνί: it is all separate points or items that make up the Law.

Various Jewish writings contain sayings like this verse (Schöttg. 1016 ff.); as Shabbath (R. Jochanan): “If a man do all (of the 39 works prescribed by Moses), but omit one, he is guilty for all and each.” There is nothing in the O. T. exactly answering to this: but Deut. xxvii. 26, after the various specific curses on Mt Ebal, ends with “Cursed be he that confirmeth not (all) the words of this law to do them,” where the LXX. and Samar. insert πᾶσιν, and St Paul (Gal. iii. 10) so quotes the passage. The insertion is partially supported by Deut. xi. 32 (taken with vv. 26, 28) as Delitzsch points out. The same principle of the Law being one whole is implied in Mt v. 18 f., ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ μία κεραία . . . μίαν τ. ἐντολῶν τούτων τ. ἐλαχίστων.

¹¹ὁ γὰρ εἰπών μὴ μοιχεύσῃς εἶπεν καὶ μὴ φονεύσεις· εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύσεις φονεύσεις δέ, γέγονας παραβάτης νόμου.

11. ὁ γὰρ εἰπών κ.τ.λ.] It is very unlikely that the two commandments are chosen at random, as though both were unconnected with προσωπολημψία. If this were the case, there would be no clear and coherent course of thought. It is quite possible that Μὴ μοιχεύσῃς implies that such sins as adultery were really avoided and condemned by those who dishonoured the poor; and that they made their condemnation of fleshly sins an excuse for indulgence towards spiritual sins. At all events Μὴ φονεύσεις is directly connected with the matter in hand, because murder is only the extreme outcome of want of love to neighbours or brethren. Our Lord (Mt. v. 21-26) had carried back murder to the expression of anger (cf. Jam. i. 19 f.), and though St Paul (Rom. xiii. 8, 9) had carried back all commandments of the second table alike to love of the neighbours, the 6th was evidently the most direct expression of the principle common to all, for (v. 10) “love worketh no ill to a neighbour.”

¹²οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας μέλλοντες κρίνεσθαι.

12. οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε, so speak ye, and so do] The two chief spheres of shewing forth love or its absence. We have had them paired already in i. 19-21 contrasted with 22-25, i. 26 contrasted with 27; and are now going to have them on a larger scale, in inverted order, ii. 14-26 contrasted with iii. 1-12. Both are exemplified in the treatment of the poor in the synagogues, the contemptuous language accompanying the loveless acts.

ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας, as by a law of liberty] This use of διὰ with κρίνεσθαι is singular, though disguised by the ambiguity of “by,” which denotes κατά with acc., or ὑπό with gen. (cf. Jn vii. 51, “Doth our law judge a man?”), as well as διὰ with gen. Apparently it comes from Rom. ii. 12, ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἧμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται, where it apparently means “on terms of,” “in a state depending on,” and corresponds to some other peculiar uses of διὰ by St Paul, as διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς (Rom. ii. 27); δι᾽ ἀκροβυστίας (iv. 11); διὰ προσκόμματος 56(xiv. 20); (?) διὰ δόξης (2 Cor. iii. 11); (?) δι᾽ ἐπαγγελίας (Gal. iii. 18). Thus the sense would seem to be not that the law of liberty is the standard or the instrument by which they are to be judged, but that they are to be judged as men who have lived in an atmosphere, as it were, of a law of liberty, and subject to its conditions. The two conceptions are closely related, but διὰ seems to lay stress chiefly on the present state rather than on the future judgment. It is probably for this reason that διὰ νόμου ἐλ. stands before μέλλοντες.

A law of liberty, exactly as i. 25: viz. Christ’s Law, as distinguished from the Mosaic. The transition from the Mosaic Law in vv. 10, 11 to the Christian Law here corresponds precisely to the transition in the Sermon on the Mount from the one jot or tittle, one of these least commandments of Mt. v. 18 f., to “Except your righteousness etc.” of Mt. v. 20, where the exceeding righteousness of the Christian disciple consists not in the performance of a greater number of positive precepts than the Scribes and Pharisees, but in the inner subjection of the spirit to the law of love, taking possession not of individual acts or abstinences, but of the whole life.

The whole passage implies that under the unity of the external law there lies a much deeper unity of the spiritual law. If the whole external law was broken by the murderous conduct of a man who kept himself clean from adultery, much more was wrong done to the whole spiritual and free law of love by the attempt to keep any part of conduct exempt from it.

¹³ἡ γὰρ κρίσις ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος· κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεον κρίσεως.

13. ἡ γὰρ κρίσις] To be interpreted by κρίνεσθαι: the Divine judgment: cf. v. 9.

ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος, without mercy to him that hath shewed no mercy] The requital is in kind, cf. Mt. vii. 1, 2, and the parable of the Two Debtors, Mt. xviii. 21-35, esp. 33. Here not love but mercy or pity is named. It is quite possible that St James is not thinking exclusively of the treatment of the poor in the synagogue, but going on to a wider range of kindred conduct (cf. i. 27), and the absence of tenderness which is a common mark of the Pharisaical or perverted religious spirit. But in any case the word is in place, for while love is the universal fundamental attitude between man and man according to the Divine plan of the world, the characteristic form which love takes when directed to the poor is pity. To suffer with their suffering is the test of its reality.

κατακαυχᾶται, glorieth against] This is the true as well as the common reading: another ancient reading is κατακαυχάσθω, and another, less attested, κατακαυχᾶσθε. The abrupt introduction of this apophthegm gave rise to various conjunctions, δέ the best attested, also (T. R.) καὶ, also quoniam or “for.”

The verb itself recurs iii. 14, and is found Rom. xi. 18; also three times in LXX., scarcely at all elsewhere. The sense of the image will depend on the interpretation of ἔλεος and κρίσεως. The opposition of the two words is singular, because they are coupled in the O. T., Ps. ci. (c.) 1; (LXX. xxxiii. (xxxii.) 5); virtually Hos. xii. 6; Mic. vi. 8; Zech. vii. 9. In these places κρίσις, מִשְׁפָּט, means the quality by which justice is done, as by an actual or virtual judge. ἔλεος is in like manner coupled with righteousness, and with truth. The same combination with near appears Mt. xxiii. 23 (with faith added), these being the weightier matters of the law neglected by the Scribes and Pharisees. This cannot however be St James’ sense. Except as applied to God’s judgment, he never uses κρίνω, κρίσις, κριτής in a good sense; but always as governed 57by “Judge not that ye be not judged.” Here, as the previous ἡ κρίσις suggests, there must be at least some reference to the Divine judgment on its condemnatory side, as κρίμα iii. 1, and κριθῆτε v. 9. The image then probably is that κρίσις comes so to speak as the accuser before the tribunal of God, and ἔλεος stands up fearlessly and as it were defiantly to resist the claim. Is it then human or Divine ἔλεος, the plea of the mercy that has been shewn in life or the Divine mercy resisting the Divine condemnation? Probably neither without the other: the two mercies are coupled as in Mt. v. 7, in the Lord’s Prayer, and the Two Debtors.

There is a somewhat similar use of καυχῶμαι (not κατακαυχ.) in Ecclus. xxiv. 1, 2. Schneckenburger well refers for a similar virtual καύχησις to 1 Cor. xv. 55. On the general sense cf. Or. Sib. ii. 81, Ῥύεται ἐκ θανάτου ἔλεος, κρίσις ὅπποτ᾽ ἂν ἔλθῃ.

It is however probable that in so far as St James contemplates this sense of the defying of judgment by mercy, it is only as a particular case of a universal truth. That is, he may mean that this final triumph of mercy proceeds from the previous and inherent superiority of mercy to κρίσις, human as well as Divine, answering to the superiority of mercy to sacrifice (Mt. ix. 13; xii. 7). Mercy is greater and better than human κρίσις in this narrower sense (an echo of κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν in v. 4), just as the Gospel is greater and better than the Law: and they who recognise and act on this truth become recipients of the Divine mercy, and have passed beyond condemnation by the Divine judgment in so far as it is embodied in the Law.

Unless this sense is present, it is difficult to account for the absence of δέ. Since there is no conjunction, this clause can hardly be merely antithetical to the preceding, but must supply its foundation: the quoniam gives the truer connexion, though not the whole of it.

¹⁴Τί ὄφελος, ἀδελφοί μου, ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις ἔχειν ἔργα δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ; μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν;

14. We now come to the section on faith and works.

ἀδελφοί μου] Marking a fresh appeal, though closely connected with what precedes.

ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις ἔχειν, if a man say he hath faith] We have already had (i. 22 ff.) hearing without doing: here we have believing without doing. We have also had a spurious θρησκεία: here we have a spurious πίστις. The profession of a πίστις has been already presumed in ii. 1, where St James implies that the true faith of Jesus Christ was absent or defective. Our Lord in St Luke’s account of the explanation of the Parable of the Sower (viii. 13) had spoken of a temporary believing, which fell away in time of πειρασμός. The expression of it is “Lord, Lord”; and the fἔργα μὴ ἔχῃ here exactly answers to Lk. vi. 46 (καὶ οὐ ποιεῖτε ἃ λέγω), just as the listening to words without doing in i. 22 f. answers to Mt. vii. 24, 26. The hearing the word, which is also spoken of in the Parable of the Sower, is the first step of reception; and belief marks another step: the failure may take place at either stage.

It is to be observed that here at least St James does not say ἐὰν πίστιν ἔχῃ τις but ἐ. π. λέγῃ τις ἔχειν: it is not faith without works but the profession of faith without works that thus far is pronounced unprofitable.

There is no reason for referring this spurious claim to faith to a Jewish origin. There is no clear evidence for anything answering to it among the Jews. It would on the other hand be a natural accompaniment of a slackening Christian devotion. 58“Faith” or “believing” was emphatically the Christian watchword, hardly less prominent in the first three Gospels than in St Paul or St John. And the corruption of the Christian type of religion would need reprobation by the authority of one in St James’ position quite as much as the corruption of so much of the Jewish type of religion as the Jewish Christians retained. The question of justification introduces a fresh element; but we do not reach that till v. 21.

ἡ πίστις] Naturally “the faith,” “that faith,” the faith which is compatible with the absence of works. The phrase doubtless implies that there was something to which the name might in some sense be given; though it is not what St James recognises as genuine faith.

σῶσαι] As i. 21.

¹⁵ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ γυμνοὶ ὑπάρχωσιν καὶ λειπόμενοι τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς,

15. This verse shews the connexion with what precedes. The examples of deficient works to which St James at once flies are taken from the treatment of the poor, quite as much as all that has been said about places in the synagogues.

ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ] The explicit notice of both sexes brings out two degrees, as it were, in the helplessness which craved the sympathy and support of Christians. The women, as in the special example of the widows in i. 27, would have all the needs and difficulties of the men, and the additional needs and difficulties falling naturally to their sex, especially in ancient times.

The term “brother” “sister,” repeated from i. 9, calls attention to the special ties between those who by believing in the Son had acquired a closer and deeper tie of brotherhood as alike children of the Father. There was a true sense in which it was applied to all mankind: but in those days when the little community was surrounded by a more or less hostile population, the specially Christian sense had peculiar force. Christ too had in this connexion spoken of His own brethren, Mt. xxv. 35 f., 40, 42 f.

γυμνοί, naked] In the conventional sense of Scripture, as needing clothing, corresponding to the next phrase on the need of food.

ὑπάρχωσιν] Ὑπάρχω denotes not simple being, but being in a state or condition as distinguished from what is temporary or accidental: it is used properly with reference to antecedent states. Often it means what one is by nature: but that specially strong force comes from the context. The prior continuity is the main thing. Hence what is implied here is that not some casual poverty but habitual poverty is meant.

λειπόμενοι, in lack of] With the gen. just as in i. 5. In this sense of outward destitution Just. Mart. uses it absolutely. Ap. i. 67, οἱ ἔχοντες τοῖς λειπομένοις πᾶσιν ἐπικουροῦμεν; and again, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφανοῖς τε καὶ χήραις, καὶ τοῖς διὰ νόσον ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν λειπομένοις.

Omit ὦσιν after λειπόμενοι; the participle instead of λείπωνται continues the indication of ὑπάρχωσιν, expressing a habitual condition, not an accidental want of food.

τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς] Simply the food needed day by day, daily food.

¹⁶εἴπῃ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν Ὑπάγετε ἐν εἰρήνῃ, θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, μὴ δῶτε δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, τί ὄφελος;

16. εἴπῃ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν] He first begins indefinitely, “if a man say to them,” and then after αὐτοῖς adds ἐξ ὑμῶν, implying that such a speech would really be the speech 59expressive of the temper of their own minds, though only one here or there might have the boldness to put it into these words.

Ὑπάγετε ἐν ειρήνῃ, Go in peace] A common Jewish farewell (Judg. xviii. 6 etc.: and used by our Lord Lk. vii. 50 etc.): here a dismissal, a sending away, in euphemistic and seemly form.

θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, be ye warmed and filled] These words are usually taken as imperatives. Plumptre ingeniously suggests that they are indicatives; the unreal assertion that the poor are warmed and fed being a repetition of the unreal assertion that they had faith when they shewed such a lack of love. But it is difficult to get this sense out of the words as actually put into the mouth of the speaker, not as another’s description of his act. We must therefore keep to the imperative sense. It is not a mere substitution for the optative, “I hope you may somehow get warmed and fed,” but an exhortation to go and get for themselves the means of doing this. It reminds us to a certain extent of “Send the multitude away that they may buy for themselves victuals” (Mt. xiv. 15 and parallels). Not that there is any clear reflexive force in the middle, which is probably rather a passive, or at least not distinguish-able from such: but it does lie in the use of the imperative. The use of the present tenses, not aorists, goes with ὑπάρχωσιν and λειπόμενοι, as marking the reference to a continuous state, “get your food and clothing now and always.”

θερμαίνω, χορτάζω. Two strong words seem to be purposely chosen. “Warming” (Heb. and LXX.) is spoken of as an effect of clothes: Job xxxi. 20; Hag. i. 6 (cf. 1 Kin. i. i). Plut. Symp. 691 D speaks of the same garment as warming in winter, cooling in summer. Galen, V. M. S. ii. (ap. Wetst.) speaks of it as a common incorrect custom to speak of a thing as warming, because it hinders chilling.

χορτάζω, originally of pasturing cattle, is used in late Greek of feeding men: but usually, perhaps always, with the sense of feeding to the full, satisfying.

Thus the warm garments and satisfying food correspond to ἐν εἰρήνῃ.

μὴ δῶτε δὲ, and yet ye give not] Transition to the full plural. Though one alone might be ready to speak the words, the general line of conduct was common to a large number.

τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, the things needful to the body] Ἐπιτήδειος is properly what is convenient or fitting, useful. But τὰ ἐπιτήδ. by usage are ordinary necessaries, sometimes called τὰ ἀνάγκαια ἐπιτήδεια.

τοῦ σώματος has force in relation to the following comparison (οὕτως καὶ). It is an appeal to an example from the obvious realm “of the body.”

¹⁷οὕτως καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ἔργα, νεκρά ἐστιν καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.

17. οὕτως καὶ, even so] What is the precise comparison? i.e. what is it that in vv. 15, 16 is compared to faith as being liable to be dead? The result spoken of is that the body is, as a matter of fact, chilled and starved if it has not necessaries. Presently, in v. 26, St James says, in a similar comparison about the deadness of faith without works, that the body without spirit is dead. One is tempted to assume that he meant the love or beneficence is dead if it contents itself with words. But there would be no real image there, merely a repetition of the dead faith in a particular application. Moreover τί ὄφελος points not to the unreality of the beneficence but to the absence of result in the way of starvation 60prevented. Apparently the comparison is to the words spoken: they are dead words inasmuch as they produce no effect on the supposed need. This is Grotius’ explanation, and although not altogether satisfactory, it seems to be the best. Most commentators overlook the need of explanation altogether. Wetstein quotes from Plaut. Epidic. i. 2. 13 f. A man asks another for money: the reply is “If I had it, I certainly would not refuse it”; and then comes the rejoinder, Nam quid to igitur rettulit Beneficum ease oratione, si ad rem auxilium emortuum est?

ἔχῃ ἔργα, have works] A remarkable phrase, but very expressive of St James’ true meaning. The works are not something added on to the faith, but elements of it, parts of itself.

νεκρά ἐστιν, is dead] Again the same, not merely “useless” or “unacceptable” but “dead.” It is no question of faith v. works, but whether faith is faith if it has no works.

καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, in itself] This brings out the same yet more emphatically, “in and by itself,” not merely in relation to other things, not merely in its utility, so to speak; but in its own very and inherent nature.

¹⁸ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις;23²³ἔχεις;] ἔχεις κἁγὼ ἔργα ἔχω. δεῖξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, κάγώ σοι δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν.

18. ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις, But some one will say] An extremely difficult verse, The natural way of taking ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is as the words of an objector, and then it is difficult to see how the next words could be put into an objector’s mouth. It is then suggested that the τις is virtually St James himself, like “so that a man shall say etc.” (Ps. lviii. 11) as often wrongly interpreted (the true meaning being “men shall say”); but this is very unnatural from every point of view. Accordingly it is often now supposed that a third person is introduced, mainly on St James’ side. This however only lessens, by no means removes, the difficulty. (1) It is very unlike St James to favour the broad positive statement addressed to those whom he is rebuking, “Thou hast faith, and I have works”; (2) ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is a most unlikely phrase for introducing one who is more for than against the writer; and (3) the supposed speaker disappears thenceforward, and it is difficult to see what good purpose would be served by this momentary introduction.

Not only the most natural but the only natural way to understand ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is as introducing an objector, one of the persons rebuked (τις . . . ἐξ ὑμῶν), as in 1 Cor. xv. 35 (cf. Rom. ix. 19; xi. 19). Indeed it is difficult otherwise to understand the σύ, of v. 19, ὦ ἄνθ. κενέ of 20, and βλέπεις of 22, but especially 20. In 24 there is a return to the plural in ὁρᾶτε, but the intermediate singular 2nd person singles out someone for rebuke, who can be no other than the τις of 18, for the τις of 16 belongs exclusively to the illustration.

A very fair and, to say the least, not improbable sense may then be obtained by taking Σύ to ἔχω alone as put into the objector’s mouth, the rest of the verse being taken as St James’ own reply; and further by taking Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις by itself as a question. Questions of this kind are very common in St James, and 19 is best so interpreted. The sense will then be “Thou, James, hast thou faith, that thing which thou slightest in me? I for my part as well as thou (κἀγώ) have works”; that is, “I do not allow 61that I have no works, I have works (sc. works of the law) in addition to my faith: can you conversely say that you have faith in addition to your works?” St James’ reply then attacks the notion that faith and works are two separate things. All turns on χωρίς, which does not mean simply “without,” but “apart from,” “separated from.” “Shew me,” he says, “thy faith apart from the works, the works that properly belong to it and should characterise it”; implying that this is an impossibility; “and I will shew thee by my works the faith, the faith belonging to them and inspiring them.” That is, he turns the tables, and pleads that it is he alone, not the antagonist, who can shew both. The form δεῖξόν μοι . . . κάγώ σοι δείξω occurs Theoph. Ant. i. 2, Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν φῇς Δεῖξόν μοι τὸν θεόν σου, κἀγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἄν Δεῖξόν μοι τὸν ἄνθρωπόν σου κἀγώ σοι δείξω τὸν θεόν μου; where two impossibilities are set against each other: but in St James the κἀγώ σοι is positive, not merely contingent on the other shewing. The whole is little more than a paraphrase of “By their fruits ye shall know them.”

¹⁹σὺ πιστεύεις ὅτι εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν 24²⁴θεὸς ἔστιν] ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν; καλῶς ποιεῖς· καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν καὶ φρίσσουσιν

19. σὺ πιστεύεις, thou believest, dost thou not?] The sense is not very different whether we take it as indicative or interrogative: but interrogative is more forcible.

ὅτι εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν, that there is (exists) one God] MSS. much divided. The best attested readings are εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν and εἶς ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν (or, inverted, in the common form, εἶς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς). The second (and third) would mean “that God is one.’ Cf. Deut. vi. 4 etc. On the whole it is more probable that St James is not singling out the detached affirmation of unity, but taking all together thefirst article in the creed of Jew and Christian alike, an article not first only but fundamental. The meaning apparently is “you claim to have a belief detached from works, though you claim likewise to have works independently: well, what is that belief? Take it in its simplest and most fundamental form, the belief that there is One God. A belief without works necessarily consists in belief in a proposition; belief not in One God, but that there is One God. Well, so far so good: thou doest well.”

καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν, the devils also believe this] Καὶ is of course not “and” but “also,” they as well as thou.

πιστεύουσιν] Sc. this, believe that this is true.

τὰ δαιμόνια] Here as in the Gospels we must not think simply of “powers of evil,” as such, but of the πνεύματα πονηρά or ἀκάθαρτα by which those called demoniacs were possessed. The reference is probably to the Gospel narratives, “What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us? We know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God” (Mk i. 24 etc.).

φρίσσουσιν, shudder] Properly the same as the Latin horror, the standing of hair on end with fear. Specially used of awe of a mysterious Divine power, as often of the adepts in the Greek mysteries. Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 251 A, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καὶ τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται. It is something at once more distant and more prostrate than worship. Cf. Ast on the above p. 449 and Wytt. on Plut. ii. 26B. An Orphic fragment quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. v. 724 and Euseb. P.E. xiii. 13 (Hermann pp. 453 f.) on God: 62Δαίμονες ὃν φρίσσουσι, θεῶν δὲ δέδοικεν ὅμιλος; an oracle ap. Lact. de ira Dei xxiii. (and in Latin Aug. Civ. Dei xix. 23), Wolff Proph. Orac. p. 143:

Ἐς δὲ θεὸν βασιλῆα καὶ εἰς γενετῆρα προπάντων,

Ὃν τρομέει καὶ γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα

Ταρτάριοί τε μυχοὶ καὶ δαίμονες ἐκφρίσσουσιν;

and a magical invocation (Ὀνειροπομπὸς Ἀγαθοκλεῦς (sic) in A. Dieterich Papyrus magica Mus. Lugd. Bat. p. 800: Lips. 1888), Θώθ, ὅν πᾶς θεὸς προσκυνεῖ καὶ πᾶς δαίμων φρίσσει. There is thus no force of “and yet” in καί before φρ.: it is rather “their belief” is so strong and undeniable that it ends in a kind of strong homage. It is a proof that they believe, not something done in spite of it.

Thus the force of the clause lies on the word δαιμόνια (cf. δαιμονιώδης iii. 15). A belief such as this, even though its contents are so true and important as a belief in One God, cannot be a very Divine thing when it can be shared by the δαιμόνια.

The whole then turns on the real nature of the belief or faith supposed, and Bede seems to have understood it rightly, when, taking up language of Augustine, he says: “Sed nec Deum credere et contremiscere magnum est, si non et in eum credatur, hoc est si non ejus in corde amor teneatur. Aliud est enim credere illi, aliud credere illum, aliud credere in illum. Credere illi est credere vera esse quae loquitur: credere illum credere quod ipse sit Deus: credere in ilium est diligere illum. Credere vera esse quae loquitur multi et mali possunt, credunt enim esse vera, et nolunt ea facere, quia ad operandum pigri sunt. Credere autem ipsum esse Deum, hoc et daemones potuerunt. Credere vero in Deum soli novere qui diligunt Deum, qui non solo nomine sunt Christiani sed et factis et vita.” (For reff. to Aug. see Pearson Creed p. 16.)

²⁰θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων ἀργή ἐστιν;

20. θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, but wilt thou gain the knowledge] He is now going to prove his point by reference to Scripture. The words are equivalent to “Do you ask me what proof I have that . . .”

ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, O vain man] Ἄνθρωπε probably in contrast to δαιμόνια, a being who shouldest have such a much better faith than δαιμόνια.

Κενός (by itself) is not at all common as applied to men: it denotes pretentiousness, hollowness accompanying display. Thus Epictet. ii. 19. 8, “But if I am κενός, especially at a banquet, I astonish the visitors by enumerating the writers (on a particular subject)”; iv. 4. 35, κενόν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὑ δεῖ ἐπαιρόμενον. Plutarch Sertor. xxvi. (581 F), “to despise Mallius ὡς κενοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος; Moral. 81 B, agriculturalists like to see ears of corn bending down, but those that are lifted by lightness κενοὺς ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἀλαζόνας; and so of youths intending to philosophise, those who are most κενοί and deficient in βάρος θράσος ἔχουσι, and a gait and walk and countenance full of scorn and contempt. The use of ἄνδρας κενούς (lit. empty) in Judg. ix. 4 does not help. Probably the sense is rather analogous to the Greek sense than identical. It is doubtful whether personal arrogance is intended here. Rather the unreality of the kind of faith professed, a faith which had no inner core to it.

ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων] Probably as before (v. 18) this faith separated from the works belonging to it.

ἀργή, worthless] So best MSS., not νεκρά, which comes from v. 26; ἀργός is worthless, i.e. either not working, idle, 63lazy, or producing no works in the sense of results, hence useless, fruitless, ineffectual, as 2 Peter i. 8, οὐκ ἀργοὺς οὐδὲ ἀκάρπους; and perhaps Mt. xii. 36, πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργόν. This sense would suit the context: but as there is an apparent contrast to συνήργει in v. 22, it is better to refer it rather to the act of working than to the result. Τῶν ἔργων are the concrete works capable of being spoken of separately; so that there is no tautology, the working being thought of with reference to the agent, and ἀργή here meaning “inactive,” putting forth no powers.

²¹Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἀνενέγκας Ἰσαὰκ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ το θυσιαστήριον;

21. St James comes now to his examples to prove his point.

Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν] These words stand first, before οὐκ, in the sense “Take Abraham our father for instance, was not he,” etc. “Abraham our father” in a combination of senses, as the father of the old Israel (Mt. iii. 9, etc.), as the father of the new Israel which had arisen out of the old Israel (claimed by Stephen, Acts vii. 2), and above all as the father of those who have shewn faith (Rom. iv. ii, 12, 16; Gal. iii. 7 ff.). The context seems to shew that this last is chiefly meant. Abraham’s example is important for this purpose just because he was the typical instance of faith.

οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων] The words do not express whether he means that works had a share in it, or that works alone were concerned: but the former sense alone can be reconciled either with the general argument or with the quotation in v. 23.

ἐδικαιώθη] This word is manifestly to be interpreted in the first instance by its O.T. usages. The active voice δικαιόω represents the Piel and Hiphil of צָדַק both causative, to cause to be צַדִּיק (δίκαιος), just as δικαιόω) as applied ethically to persons is properly to make δίκαιος. The passive voice δεκαιοῦσθαι is one of the representatives of the Kal of the same verb, to be צַדִּיק or δίκαιος, a word chiefly though not exclusively used in Job (see especially Isa. xliii. 9, 26; xlv. 25), and sometimes rendered δίκαιος εἰμι, or in English “to be righteous.” So far all is etymologically clear: the active is to make righteous, the passive to be made righteous. But then comes the question, does צַדִּיק or δίκαιος or righteous mean always simply a quality in a man without reference to the recognition of it? Certainly not. Various passages (e.g. Ps. cxliii. 2) express or imply the sense of being righteous in God’s sight, and this is almost the only sense of the active, chiefly with the force “defending the cause of,” “pleading for the righteousness” or “innocence of.” The same senses reappear freely in Ecclus. So in N.T.: Mt. xii. 37; Lk. vii. 29; x. 29; xvi. 15; xviii. 14 (not to count ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία etc., Mt. xi. 19; Lk. vii 35); besides all the passages in St Paul, and also Acts xiii. 39 where St Paul is the speaker.

Leaving then for the present St Paul out of sight, that we may not disturb St James’ argument, we have naturally here the sense “Did not Abraham appear righteous in God’s sight on the ground of works?”

ἀνενέγκας κ.τ.λ.] From a combination of Gen. xxii. 2 (ἐνένεγκον) and 9, ἐπέθηκεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον. There is sometimes doubt when ἐπὶ stands before τὸ θυσιαστήρ. whether it means “to” or “upon”: but here doubtless, as the Hebrew suggests, it is “upon,” as Mt. v. 23; 1 Pet. ii. 24. The meaning is that this act was distinctly a work. The faith in God which Abraham felt was carried out in a piece of conduct which tried it to the utmost.

²²βλέπεις ὅτι ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη,

22. βλέπεις, thou perceivest] It is 64so obvious, when looked at, that there is no room for doubt.

ἡ πίστις, the faith] Sc. in this case: the faith in antithesis to the works was not separate from them but wrought with them.

συνήργει, worked with] A bold image. The faith not only was followed or accompanied by works — that is expressed in τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ — but itself worked with his works. Not for faith plus works does St James plead, but for faith at work, living, acting in itself, apart from any value in its results; συνήργέω is properly to be a συνήργός: not used in LXX., but twice in Apocr. and in four other places of the N.T.

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and by the works] Ἐκ as before, in consequence of, by effects proceeding from.

ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη, the faith was made perfect] So long as the faith was not exercised, it was in a manner imperfect. It gained maturity and completeness by being thoroughly acted out. This is the only place where St James uses this verb (common in N.T., especially Jn, 1 Jn, Heb.), but τέλειος, as we have seen, he has five times, and this nearly answers to ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω in i. 4. It is to be observed that the two clauses are exactly complementary to each other. The works received the co-operation of a living power from the faith: the faith received perfecting and consummation from the works into which it grew.

²³καί ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα Ἐπιστευσεν δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ. καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη.

23. καί ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα, and there was a fulfilment of the Scripture which saith] The usual phrase, as Lk. iv. 21, etc. The Divine word spoken is conceived of as receiving a completion so to speak in acts or events which are done or come to pass in accordance with it. This idea of filling, or giving fullness to, is always contained in the biblical use of fulfilling, though not always in precisely the same sense. ἡ γραφή probably the individual saying of Scripture (ἡ γραφὴ αὕτη in Lk.).

The passage Gen. xv. 6 was the one which most clearly expressed the faith of Abraham and which at the same time connected it with the accounting it on the part of God as righteousness. The words ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ. are equivalent to saying ἐδικαιώθη (he, not the faith). Philo, Leg. All. iii. 81 (p. 132) paraphrases them, Ἀβραάμ γέ τοι ἐπίστευσε τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δίκαιος ἐνομίσθη. The two passages are brought together also in 1 Macc. ii. 52, Ἀβραὰμ οὐχὶ ἐν πειρασμῷ εὑρέθη πιστός, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην; for the πειρασμός doubtless refers to Gen. xxii. 1, ὁ θεὸς ἐπείραζεν τὸν Ἀβραάμ.

καὶ φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη, and (so) he was called the friend of God] Probably the meaning is that this was another result of the faith which be shewed in the sacrifice of Isaac, the first result being the fulfilling of the words spoken of him with reference to an earlier exhibition of faith. The reference itself is doubtless mainly, if not wholly, to Isa. xli. 8 (Heb. Sym., not LXX. ὃν ἡγάπησα) “who loved me,” not “whom I loved” (see Cheyne); 2 Chr. xx. 7 (Heb. not LXX. τῷ ἡγαπημένῳ σου); but v.l. τῷ φίλῳ apud Field), and ἐκλήθη means not “acquired the human title,” but “was Divinely stamped” with that unique name. At the same time the name, though doubtless originating in Isaiah if not earlier, was widely spread, and St James may have had Greek authority for it. See the authorities in Lightfoot on Clem. Rom. 10 (Clement refers to it 17 also); and Rönsch in Hilg. Z. S. 1873 iv. 583 ff., and Wetst. Philo 65uses it, even substituting it once for τοῦ παιδός μου in Gen. xviii. 17. Judith viii. 26=22 in lat. vg., “quomodo pater nester Abraham tentatus est, et per multas tribulationes probatus Dei amicus factus est.” Cf. Wisd. vii. 27; Clem. Hom. xviii. 13; Recog. i. 32. So also Lib. Jubil. 19, Ber. R. on Gen. xiii. 8, etc.; and the name is still in use among the Arabs, El Khalil. Weil, cited by Rönsch 585, quotes “When Abraham by Nimrod’s command was to be thrown into the fire, the heaven with its angels and the earth with all the creatures therein