Chapter I. Conscience, or the Moral Faculty.
Chapter II. The Moral Faculty, Original and Universal.
Chapter III. A Moral Faculty Being Supposed, Whether Its Dictates are Uniform?
Chapter IV. How Far All Men Are Agreed in Their Moral Judgments.
Chapter V. Whether Conscience is the Same as the Understanding, or a Faculty Different from and Independent of It.
Chapter VI. The Moral Sense Compared with Taste.
Chapter VII. Moral Obligation.
Section VIII. The Supremacy of Conscience.
Chapter IX. Whether We Always Do Right by Obeying the Dictates of Conscience?
Chapter X. Whether There Is in the Mind a Law or Rule, by Which Man Judges of the Morality of Particular Actions?
Chapter XI. The Moral Feeling Which Accompanies Every MOral Judgment.
Chapter XII. Belief in God, as Connected with the Operation of Conscience.
Chapter XIII. Moral Agency, and What Is Necessary to It.
Chapter XIV. Man a Moral Agent.
Chapter XV. Man Not Under a Fatal Necessity.
Chapter XVI. Man’s Direction and Government of His Actions, and His Consequent Responsibility.
Chapter XVII. Objections to the Uniform Influence of Motives.
Chapter XVIII. Summary View of Liberty.
Chapter XIX. The Kind of Indifference Which Has Been Considered Essential to Free Agency.
Chapter XX. Whether Men Are Accountable for Their Motives; or Whether Desires and Affections Which Precede Volition, Have a Moral Character.
Chapter XXI. The Division of Motives, Into Rational and Animal.
Chapter XXII. Whether Morality Belongs to Principles as Well as Acts, or is Confined to Acts Alone.
Chapter XXIII. Moral Habits.
Chapter XXIV. The Nature of Virtue.
Chapter XXV. The Nature of Virtue, Continued. Different Hypothesis.
Chapter XXVI. The Nature of Virtue. Continued.
Chapter XXVII. Whether Virtue and Vice Belong Only to Actions.
Chapter XXVIII. The Author of Our Being Considered in Relation to Moral Science.
Chapter XXIX. The Phenomena of the Universe.
Chapter XXX. Duties of Man to the Creator as Thus Manifested.