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CHAPTER XXIV.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

Various theories. THE theories on this subject have been numerous, and contrary to one another. It is now proposed to mention some of the principal of them. We shall first mention the theory of Mr. Hobbes and his followers, Hobbes. who deny that there is any natural distinction between virtue and vice, and maintain that by nature all actions are indifferent, and that our ideas and feelings on the subject of morality are altogether the effect of education and association. Mr. Hobbes did indeed maintain that men are bound to obey the civil government under which they may happen to live, and to conform to the religion established by 160law, however contrary to their own private judgment. Law of the land. All moral duty, according to this theory, was resolved into the authority of the law of the land. As no natural moral rule existed, it was held that, except so far as a man was restrained by civil authority, he had a right to do what he pleased; and while he confined himself within these bounds, he need feel no concern about the consequences of his conduct.

Mandeville. Perhaps the most extraordinary system of virtue ever promulgated was that of Mandeville, who maintained that all pretensions to virtue were mere hypocrisy, which men assumed from the love of praise. The defect of the hypothesis. This writer forgot that hypocrisy assumes it as true that that which is counterfeited is an object of esteem and approbation among men. That virtue consists in the mere pursuit of pleasure, or of our own interest, is a system as old as Epicurus, Epicurus. and has had many abettors up to this time. The arguments in favour of this theory 161are exhibited in their most plausible dress by Nettleton in his “Treatise on Virtue.”

The Happiness theory considered. But the whole plausibility of the arguments depends on the pre-established connexion between happiness and a virtuous course of life. That true happiness is the natural effect of virtue, falls entirely short of proof that the essence of virtue consists in the tendency of certain actions to the person’s true interest; whereas, when we perceive an action to be virtuous, we are conscious that it is not from any view of the connexion of the action with our own happiness that we approve it; but our judgment is immediate, founded on a moral character perceived in the act itself. And in many cases virtue requires us to deny ourselves personal gratification for the sake of others. A man supremely governed by a regard to his own interest, is never esteemed a virtuous man by the impartial judgment of mankind. According to this theory, the only thing censurable in the greatest crimes is, that the guilty person has mistaken the best method of promoting his own happiness. Upon this principle 162a man is at liberty to pursue his own interest at the expense of the happiness of thousands, and if he is persuaded that any action will tend to his own interest, he is at liberty to do it, whatever may be the consequences to others.

Archdeacon Paley. Dr. Paley adopts the principle that all virtue consists in a regard to our own happiness, taking into view the whole of our existence. His definition is, however, a very complicated one, and deserves to be analyzed.

Paley’s definition of virtue. “Virtue,” says he, “is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness,” according to which definition the good of mankind is the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue. If the question be asked, why we should seek the good of mankind, the answer is, from a regard to our everlasting happiness; and if the question be, why we should make the will of God the rule of our conduct, the answer must be the same; 163so that really all virtue is resolved into a regard to our own happiness.

Consequent difference between a good and a bad man. Now every man desires to promote his own happiness, and according to Dr. Paley’s theory, the only difference between an eminently good man and one of the opposite character is, that the one pursues a wiser course than the other; but they are both actuated by the same motives.

Neglects intrinsic moral differences. This theory loses sight of all intrinsic difference between moral good and evil, and admits the principle that happiness is the only conceivable good, and that any thing is virtuous the tendency of which is to promote our greatest happiness.

Cumberland. A theory the opposite of that which makes a regard to private interest the ground of virtue, is the one which makes all virtue to consist in a regard to the public good. This is the theory of Bishop Cumberland in his work, De Legibus, and is not essentially different from the scheme of those 164who make all virtue to consist in disinterested benevolence. Disinterested benevolence. No doubt, much that deserves the name of virtue consists in good will to others, and in contributing to their welfare; but it is not correct to confine all virtuous actions to the exercise of benevolence. We can conceive of benevolence in a being who has no moral constitution. Something of this kind is observable in brute animals, and atheists may exercise benevolence to their friends. The indiscriminate exercise of benevolence to creatures, without any respect to their moral character, might appear to be an amiable attribute, but it could not properly be called a moral attribute. Regard for one’s own welfare. A prudent regard to our own welfare and happiness is undoubtedly a virtue. It has been considered so by the wisest of men, and we know that prudence was one of the four cardinal virtues of the heathen. As the whole is made up of parts, it is evident that if it is a virtue to promote the well-being of the whole, it must be so of each of the parts. The pursuit of our own happiness where it does not 165infringe on the rights of others, has nothing evil in it, but is approved by every impartial mind. Some who maintain that all virtue consists in benevolence, admit that we may seek our own happiness just as we seek that of our neighbour; but the human constitution is not formed to exercise that abstract impartiality. Abstract impartiality not to be expected. While we are bound to promote the welfare of our neighbour and of strangers, our obligation is still stronger to endeavour to secure our own happiness; and if a friend and a stranger stand in equal need of a benefit which we have it in our power to bestow, it is evidently our duty to consult first the welfare of our friend, other things being equal.

Butler’s remarks on the disinterested scheme. What Bishop Butler has said on this subject in his short treatise on “Virtue,” is worthy of consideration: “It deserves to be considered whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make others so; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good 166of others whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in our language—it should seem that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desires of our own and their happiness, and from sorrow in missing it.”

Benevolence not the whole of virtue. Again, “Without inquiring how far and in what sense virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it may be proper to observe that benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the 167degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood, upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and misery by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each of them, though nothing indeed would be more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other, yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant consequences; as that examples of gratitude and friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one man should by fraud or violence take from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment and his vexation in the loss; suppose that no bad consequences 168would follow, yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence and injustice, no otherwise vicious than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to society, then, if in any ease, a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice as the whole foreseen inconvenience likely to be brought upon others by it would amount to, such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all.” “The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some rather than others, abstracted from all consideration of which conduct is likely to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery.”

Defective definitions of virtue are dangerous. The danger of this theory is not by any means so great as that of the selfish scheme, be cause it comprehends a large part of actions which are truly virtuous. But all definitions of virtue which are not so comprehensive as to embrace the whole of moral excellence, are injurious; not only by leaving out of the catalogue of virtues 169such actions as properly belong to it, but by leaving men to form wrong conceptions of what is right and wrong, by applying a general rule, which is not correct, to practical cases. When it is received as a maxim that all virtue consists in seeking the happiness of the whole, and when a particular act seems to have that tendency, men are in danger of overlooking those moral distinctions by which our duty should be regulated. This effect has been observed in persons much given to theorize upon the general good as the end to be aimed at in all actions.

Edwards on Virtue. President Edwards has a treatise on Virtue, in which he enters very deeply into speculation on the principles of moral conduct. His definition of virtue has surprised all his admirers: it is, “the love of being as such.” When, however, this strange definition comes to be explained, by himself and his followers, it amounts to the same as that which we have been considering, which makes all virtue to consist in disinterested benevolence.

Hopkins. Dr. Samuel Hopkins, who was his pupil, and 170well understood his principles, gives this as his definition of virtue, and has it as a radical principle of his whole system. It will not therefore be necessary to make remarks on President Edwards’s theory.

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