__________________________________________________________________ Title: Doctrinal Theology Creator(s): Schmid, Heinrich (1811-1885) CCEL Subjects: All; Theology __________________________________________________________________ HEINRICH SCHMID, D. D. The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church Third Edition, revised Translated from German and Latin by CHARLES A. HAY, D. D. and HENRY E. JACOBS, D. D. Augsburg Publishing House Minneapolis 15, Minn. THE DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH Copyright 1875 and 1889, Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs Copyright 1899, Henry A. Jacobs and Charles E. Hay This text was converted to ascii format for Project Wittenberg by William Alan Larson and is in the public domain. You may freely distribute, copy or print this text. Please direct any comments or suggestions to: Rev. Robert E. Smith of the Walther Library at Concordia Theological Seminary. Preface, table of contents, index and formatting added by Daniel North. E-mail: [1]smithre@mail.ctsfw.edu Surface Mail: 6600 N. Clinton St., Ft. Wayne, IN 46825 USA Phone: (260) 452-3149 Fax: (260) 452-2126 This reprint edition has been prepared by permission of the United Lutheran Publication House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA __________________________________________________________________ Prefatory Material __________________________________________________________________ Preface to Reprint Edition The title page identifies the translators of this volume. The worth of their labor is attested by the appearance of this reprint in response to requests from seminary professors and students some sixty years after the last previous editions. The title page also indicates the nature of the original work. It is not a dogmatic text so much as it is a compilation of theological statements drawn from the writings of fourteen prominent Lutheran theologians who lived during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These quotations are employed to support and clarify the Christian faith after the pattern of presentation developed in the early Lutheran tradition. In their own preface the translators point out that, "The aim of the compiler was of a purely historical character . . . not to afford a summary of absolutely final definitions of Lutheran Theology, but to exhibit the teaching that had been current up to the time of Rationalism." Notwithstanding the present emphasis on "back to Luther," the great systematizers who followed him will remain important. A frank recognition of their limitations does not weaken respect for their contribution. It is this respect, and the fact that so small a part of the voluminous writings of these theologians is available in English, which underlies the decision to reissue this volume. An element of grateful commemoration also upholds the publication of this work. The English edition of Hay and Jacob's translation of Schmid's The Doctrinal Theology of the Lutheran Church, in 1875, ranks with the translation of The Book of Concord, and Charles Porterfield Krauth's The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology, as a significant contribution to the restoration of true Lutheranism in America. While a reprint does not permit it, the desirability of revision is recognized. Both the author and translators have reckoned with this need. From the Preface to the Third and Fourth Editions we quote, "The second edition of this translation published in 1889, aimed at a faithful reproduction of the Fifth Edition of the original, the last published in the life of its author, together with such additions from the same authorities from which Dr. Schmid had compiled, as would render the work more serviceable to American students. In the present edition, we have followed in general the same plan, but have taken the liberty of dispensing with a few of the quotations from the old theologians, which no one will miss, as, e.g., the long discussion on demoniacal possession. Dr. Schmid's own statements are unchanged and unabbreviated; but his compilations have been edited and enriched. A similar attempt was made in Germany about five years ago, by Professor Dr. Franck, of Erlangen, Dr. Schmid's son-in-law." Finally, a report that Professor Ratchow of the University of Münster is planning a German revision of Schmid points to the general recognition of the enduring worth of the work. THOMAS P. SOLEM Luther Theological Seminary Saskatoon, Saskatchewan January 1961 __________________________________________________________________ ABBREVIATIONS. Ap. Conf., Apology of the Augsburg Confession. Art. Smalcald, Smalcald Articles. Behm., Bechmann. Br., Baier. Brchm., Brochmann. Cal., Calovius. Cat. Maj., Luther's Large Catechism. Cat. Min., Luther's Small Catechism. Chmn., Chemnitz. Chmn. ex. c. Trid., Chemnitz on the Council of Trent. Chmn. d. c. D., Chemnitz on the Lord's Supper. Conf. Aug., Augsburg Confession. Form. Conc., The Formula of Concord. Grh., Gerhard. Hfrffr., Hafenreffer. Holl., Hollazius. Hutt., Hutterus. Kg., Koenig. Mel., Melanchthon. Quen., Quenstedt. Schrzr., Scherzer. Seln., Selnecker. Symb. Nic., Nicene Creed. __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION § 1. Of Theology in General, etc. THE Introduction treats: 1. Of Theology in general; 2. Of the Subject of Theology, Religion; 3. Of the Source of Theology, Revelation in general (with an appendix, on the Use of Reason in Theology); 4. Of the Holy Scriptures, in which Revelation is contained; 5. Of the Articles of Faith, which comprise the contents of the Holy Scripture; and of the Symbolical Books, which contain the Confession of the Church. __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I. OF THEOLOGY IN GENERAL __________________________________________________________________ § 2. Meaning of the terms, Natural and Revealed By Theology we understand, according to the etymology of the term, the knowledge of doctrine of God and of divine things [1]. Such a knowledge we gain, partly in a natural way, by the use of reason alone, partly in a supernatural way, by special revelation; and hence Theology is divided into Natural and Revealed. [2] In both cases, however, Theology is not a mere outward knowledge, by which the understanding alone is enriched, but is of such a nature as to make man truly wise, and show him the way to be saved; hence Theology, strictly so-called, must be defined: "Eminently practical wisdom, teaching from the revealed Word of God all things which sinful man, who is to be saved, needs to know and to do, in order to attain true faith in Christ and holiness of life."[3] (HOLL.1.) If however, we leave out of view the influence which Theology exerts upon man, and consider only its subject-matter, Theology may be defined as the doctrine concerning God and all religious truths, the province of which is to instruct men concerning the means by which they may be saved. "Theology, viewed as a system and in a secondary sense, is the doctrine concerning God, which teaches man, from the divine Word, as to the true method of worshiping God in Christ, unto eternal life."(HOLL.7.)[4] [1] QUEN. (I, 1); "Theology, if you consider the force and usage of the word is nothing else than logos peri tou theon, what is said about God and divine things, as pneumatologia is what is said about spirits, and astrologia, what is said about the stars." The word is sometimes employed in a wider and sometimes in a narrower sense. The different significations are thus stated by HOLL. (3): "The word Theology is employed in a fourfold sense; (a) most comprehensively, for every doctrine concerning God, whether true or mixed with errors; (b) comprehensively, for true Theology, either in itself considered, or as communicated; either of men on earth or of saints in heaven; either natural or revealed; (c) specially, of revealed Theology, that guides mortal man to eternal life; (d) most specifically, of the doctrine concerning the one and triune God." In all these significations, reference is had merely to the Theology of the creature, i.e., to the knowledge which creatures have of God, and not to that which God has of Himself. Theologians distinguish also between these, and call the former theologia ektupos (derived Theology), and the latter theologia archetupos (original Theology), by which they mean to say that our knowledge of God, although derived and not original, is, nevertheless, absolutely correct, because derived from God, and only the faithful copy of His own knowledge. HOLL. (3 and 4): "Archtypal Theology is the knowledge which God has of Himself, and which in Him is the model of another Theology, which is communicated to intelligent creatures. Ectypal Theology is the science of God and divine things communicated to intelligent creatures by God, after His own Theology, as a pattern. We thus prove our assertion: (1.) Man was made complete, in the image of God. But the image of God consisted in a knowledge of God conformed to the divine wisdom. Therefore its archetype was the infinite wisdom of God. (2.) Fallen man "is renewed in knowledge after the image of God," Col. 3:10. Therefore his prototype is the divine self-knowledge. For the knowledge of God and of divine things, which divine revelation communicates to the minds of men, is called by the Apostle knowledge after the image of God, for no other reason than because it is expressed in imitation of the knowledge which God has of Himself and of all divine things." Considered in its relation to Christ: "Archetypal Theology belongs to Christ essentially, and through His nature, inasmuch as He is eternal God; it belongs to Him, as to His human nature, personally, and through the communicatio idiomatum, by virtue of the personal union." Concerning Ectypal Theology, QUEN. further adds (I, 5): "We have one Ectypal Theology in Christ, viewed as to His human nature, another in angels, and a third in men. (I, 6.) The Ectypal Theology of mere man is either that of the Way, i.e., of this life, viz., of mortals, or that of the Home, [1] i.e., of the other and happy life, viz., of the finally saved. The Theology of the Way, or of mortals, is twofold, viz., that before and that after the Fall. That which describes man before the Fall, in the state of integrity, is called also the paradisaical, from the place in which man was placed." But, in reference to all these divisions, BAIER remarks (4): "As the usus loquendi does not allow us to call either God, or Christ, or men in heaven, or angels, theologians, it readily appears that the meaning must here be rejected, which obtains elsewhere when we add to the definition, the theology of the way.'" [2] HOLL. (5): "The Theology of the Way is twofold, natural and revealed (supernatural). The former is that according to which God is known both by innate ideas, and by the inspection of created things. The latter is the knowledge of God and of divine things, which God communicates to man upon earth, either by immediate revelation or inspiration (to prophets and apostles), or by mediate revelation or the divine Word, committed to writing." [3] Still more frequently Theology is called a practical habit. As it appeared to the theological writers that the expression science gave too much prominence to the mere acquaintance with the subjects concerned, they therefore sought a definition in which it should be distinctly expressed that by Theology there was meant a divinely-wrought knowledge, such as urged its possessor to put to practice what he learned. [By dogmaticians follow the mediaeval mystics and some scholastics, in defining Theology as "wisdom" rather than "science," thus emphasizing the need of spiritual illumination for the apprehension of the truths. Scotus taught that Theology could be a science only to the glorified; to others, it could only be a matter of faith. On this, GRHD. (II, 4): "To believe and know are particularly unlike; for scientific certainty depends upon internal and inherent principles, but that of faith, upon external, viz., upon the authority of the Revealer. Besides, the subject of Theology is Christ, the knowledge of whom cannot be acquired in a scientific way, but from divine revelation. Matt. 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:7. In Theology, the intellect is not the source, but the end. We believe, that we may know; we do not know, in order that we may believe.' Cf. Is. 7:9."] QUEN. (I, 11): "We are here speaking of Theology, not as to what it signifies in a book, but as to what it is, subjectively in the mind." GRH. thus defines (II, 13): "Theology, viewed as a discipline and concretely, is a divinely-given discipline, bestowed upon man by the Holy Spirit through the Word, whereby he is not only instructed in the knowledge of divine mysteries, by the illumination of the mind, so that what he understands produces a salutary effect upon the disposition of his heart and the actions of his life, but so that he is also qualified to inform others concerning these divine mysteries and the way of salvation, and to vindicate heavenly truth from the aspersions of its foes; so that men, abounding in true faith and good works, are led to the kingdom of heaven." QUEN. (I, 16): "A distinction is made between theoretical habits, which consist wholly in the mere contemplation of the truth, and practical habits, which, indeed, require a knowledge of whatever is to be done, but which do not end in this, nor have it as their aim, but which lead to practice and action. Theology, we refer, not to the theoretical, but to the practical habits." HOLL. (8) thus states the reasons for this distinction: "(1) Because the immediate aim of Theology is true faith in Christ, the operation of which is twofold, viz.: internal, which embraces Christ with His benefits, and external, which produces good works, the fruit of righteousness. The ultimate end of Theology is eternal happiness, which consists not only in the intuitive knowledge of God, but also in the enjoyment of God. (2) Because Theology treats of man, not theoretically, as the subject of its description, as certain qualities are ascribed to man in Physiology, but as the subject of its operation, or how he, as a sinner, is to be freed from his misery and transferred into a state of blessedness . . . (3) Because Paul himself defines Theology to be the knowledge of the truth which is after godliness.' Tit. 1:1" [4] QUEN. (I, 11): "The term Theology is taken either essentially, absolutely, and as a mental habitude, for the knowledge which the mind holds and to which it clings, or in as far as it is a habit of the human mind; [2] or accidentally, relatively, systematically, in so far as it is the doctrine or branch of learning which is taught and learned, or contained in books. The former is the primary, the latter the secondary application of the term." As to the subject-matter of Theology, systematically considered, out of which it is drawn, HOLL. (11) states: "It consists of theological truth, i.e., of facts or conclusions known or deduced from the supernatural revelation of God." In regard to the subject-matter concerning which it treats: "Theology in general discusses God and divine things, in so far as they have been truly revealed through the divine Word to sinful man, to be believed and practiced. Specifically, it teaches by what ways and means mortal man, corrupted by sin, is to be introduced into eternal life." Theology is divided, according to KG., (3) into: "Catechetical, or simple, such as is required of all Christians, and acroamatic, or more accurate, which is the province of the learned and ministers of the Word. The latter is divided, according to the method of treating it, into exegetical, which is employed in the exhibition of the sacred text; didactic strictly so-called, which discusses theological subjects in order and systematically; polemic, which treats of theological controversies; homiletic, which teaches the method of preaching to the people; casuistic, which solves doubtful cases of conscience; ecclesiastical, which treats of church discipline, visitations, synods, etc., etc. Corresponding to the two definitions of Theology, we have (HOLL. 13 seq.): "The Theologian properly and strictly so-called; a regenerated man, firmly believing in the divine Word, that reveals the mysteries of faith, adhering to it with unshaken confidence, apt in teaching others and confuting opponents. A Theologian, in the general sense of the term, is a man well instructed in the department of Theology, whereby he is rendered prompt in expounding and defending heavenly truth. The Theologian in a wider sense may be one who while rightly discharging the office of a Theologian by expounding, confirming and defending theological truths, is, nevertheless, destitute of sincere holiness of disposition." The "theological knowledge of a truly regenerated and renewed man" is described as "spiritual knowledge, by which the literal sense of the Biblical language is applied according to the use designed by the Holy Spirit and produces spiritual and godly emotions of the heart;" the "knowledge of an unregenerate Theologian," on the other hand as "a merely literal knowledge, which is applied to the investigation, development, and apprehension of the sense of Scripture, and not to the use designed by the Holy Spirit." Concerning this spiritual knowledge, we have the remark: "Far be it from us that we should assert, with the fanatics, that spiritual theological knowledge is derived either from the immediate illumination of the Holy Spirit, or from the internal light or mnemonic power of the soul, through introversion into the hidden recesses of the soul, or that it comprehends only the mystical sense! We know that the literal sense of the Biblical language is primarily and immediately set forth in the words inspired by the Holy Spirit." Literal theological knowledge is, moreover, distinguished as "external, by which one treats the words of Scripture, in so far as they are analogous to human words, according to the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and searches out and extracts some meaning from them; and internal, by which one properly estimates the word of Scripture as the truly divine receptacles or vehicles of the mysteries of the faith, and apprehends with firm assent, their true literal sense, conformed to the mind of the Holy Spirit." And, with an illusion to QUEN., he adds: "To understand the internal literal sense, which is spiritual and divine, the illumination of the Holy Spirit is needed; the illumination may be imperfect, of which the unregenerate are capable, or perfect, such as the regenerate enjoy." This internal, literal knowledge is, therefore, not natural or carnal, but supernatural. "It is supernatural (a) by virtue of its origin, for it is derived from the light of supernatural revelation; (b) by virtue of its object, . . . for the mysteries of the faith are the object of literal knowledge (But what is a mystery other than a doctrine transcending the grasp of unaided reason?) (c) in view of the impotence of the intellectual subject, 1 Cor. 2:14; (d) on account of the intimate connection between the Holy Spirit and the Scriptures. For, if the literal internal knowledge of believers be not supernatural, the Holy Spirit is not perpetually and inseparably united with the Holy Scriptures. But the Holy Spirit is perpetually and inseparably united with the Holy Scriptures; therefore," etc. __________________________________________________________________ [1] 1 This distinction is founded upon 1 Cor 9:24; 2 Cor. 5:6, 8. It is made as early as Thomas Aquinas. [2] See explanation of scholastic terms, Appendix II. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II. OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF THEOLOGY, VIZ., RELIGION. __________________________________________________________________ § 3. Religion, True and False THE subject of Theology is accordingly, Religion.[1] Religion is the way and manner in which God is worshiped. That is a false religion in which God is worshiped in a manner that does not accord with His nature and will; that is the true and right religion in which this is done in the manner which He regards as right and which He prescribes,[2] so that hereby man, estranged from God, is brought back again to Him, and secures his salvation. This proper manner is taught in the Holy Scriptures; and thus the true religion, more accurately defined, is that in which God is worshiped in the manner therein prescribed, and therefore the Christian Religion is the true one.[3] The proper manner of worshiping God must, accordingly, first of all, manifest itself in that disposition of soul towards God which is agreeable to Him, and secondly, in love toward our neighbor and the practice of all the virtues enjoined by God.[4] In the widest sense, therefore, Religion embraces all that God commands to be believed and to be done.[5] [1] HOLL. (32): "Some suppose the term Religion to be derived from religando (Lactantius), others from relegendo (Cicero). According to the former derivation, religion signified the obligation rightly to worship God, or, that which imposes upon man obligations and duties. According to the latter etymology, religion is diligent attention to those things which pertain to the worship of God. The former derivation is more generally received." -- QUEN. "Synonymous are threskeia, James 1:26; eusebeia, 1 Tim. 4.8; logike latreia, Rom. 12:1." [2] QUEN. (I, 19): "The Christian religion is the method of worshiping God prescribed in the Word, by which man, separated from God by sin, is led back to God, through faith in Jesus Christ (who is both God and man), so that he is reunited with God, and enjoys Him eternally." HOLL. (33): "Religion, improperly speaking, signified the false, properly speaking, the true method of worshiping God." HOLL. (60): "As opposed to the true Religion, we have not only false religion, but also atheism or irreligion. A false religion is that in which either false gods are worshiped, or the true God is improperly worshiped. Irreligion is that in which impious men regard all religion with contempt, so that, denying the providence and punitive justice of God, they boldly and recklessly do as they please." [3] HOLL. (34): "The true Religion is that which is conformed to the Divine Word." That the Christian religion is the true one is proved by CAL. 1: 152 sqq.: "(1) From the requisites of a true religion. A religion which is true and proceeded from God, must have these characteristics: (a) Not to teach false, corrupt or absurd things. (b) Not to be new but to have existed since the creation of man as an institution for communicating salvation. (c) Not to have perished or hereafter to perish. (d) Not to leave men in their former errors, much less to sink them the more deeply, but to lead them to holiness. All these characteristics pertain to no other than the Christian religion; since every other religion teaches false, absurd, base things, has originated since men, etc. (2) From the truth of Scripture. For since the Christian religion is comprised in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, its truth will be proved from the truth of these Scriptures, as elsewhere set forth. (3) From the religion of the Hebrews. For the religion of the Christians and of the ancient patriarchs is one and the same. (4) From the supreme dignity of its rewards. For the excellence of the Christian religion is displayed by the fact that in all ages and nations, none can be produced either more excellent in its rewards, more perfect in its precepts, more sublime in its mysteries or more admirable in the method in which it is to be propagated. For while among the Greeks some entertained the hope of life after the end of the present life, nevertheless they spoke with great hesitancy concerning it (Socrates in Plato's Phaedo, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, Seneca's Epistles). Philosophers were divided into diverse opinions concerning the end of man, some making virtue the reward, others contending that pleasure is the highest good; the Christian religion, however, offers the true knowledge of this end, promising, after this life, a happy existence not only for the soul, but also for the body; nor are the joys it promises vile, as the banquets for which the Jews hope, or the licentious indulgence which Mohammedans expect, but true, solid, perennial. Lactantius has well said (Institutes, 1. iii., cap. xii.): Virtue is not happy of itself, since all its force is expended in the endurance of evil.' (5) From the supreme holiness of its precepts. The sacred rites of the heathen, throughout almost the whole world, were full of cruelty. The mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus abounded in obscenity. How profane and unworthy of God is Mohammedanism, the Koran can testify. The Christian religion requires an absolutely holy worship of God, holy trust in Him, and all that is most worthy of God; and of like nature are the duties towards our neighbor which it enjoins. Mohammedanism was born in war, breathes nothing but war, is propagated everywhere by war, while Christianity prohibits every injury, and wishes good to all. Many of the most eminent Greek philosophers praised a community of women, and even did not disapprove of sodomy, which was commended by the example of the gods. But the Christian religion teaches that marriage must be held most holy. . . . In short, nothing excellent can be found in any nation which is not taught in the Christian religion with still greater purity, and under sanction of divine authority, as modesty, temperance, prudence, the duties of magistrates and subjects, of parents and children, of husbands and wives, the avoidance of sin, etc.; so that the sum of all its precepts is, to love God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves. (6) From the sublimity of its mysteries. For whatever mystery other religions seem to have easily brings to those better informed the suspicion of vanity. Only the mysteries of the Christian religion are entirely placed beyond the reach of man's understanding, and can be convicted of no falsity or superstition. (7) From the propagation of the Christian religion. For there is no religion so widely diffused. If Paganism be mentioned, you mention one name, but not one religion. (8) From the mode of its propagation. For the Christian religion made such progress, not by violence or arms, or the example of kings and the powerful. The first teachers of Christianity were of humble rank, and yet, through their agency, within thirty years it not only pervaded all parts of the Roman Empire, but was extended to the Parthians and inhabitants of India, Rom. 15:19. Nor only in the beginning, but for about three centuries, it was advanced without threats of violence, and even with the power of the empire arrayed against it, so that before Constantine professed Christianity it had conquered almost the greater part of the Roman world. Nor was this done by any elaborate preparation, whether of eloquence or the various arts whereby philosophers rendered themselves commendable to the Gentiles. (9) From the multitude of its miracles. For, as the faith of the Old Testament was attested by most remarkable miracles, performed at various times but especially on the departure from Egypt and the entrance into Canaan, whereby its fame was spread abroad among the Gentiles, so far more numerous and more illustrious miracles proclaim the authority of the New Testament. (10) From the magnanimity of its martyrs. (11) From testimony of other religions. The Jews,' says Augustine (De Civitate Dei, 1. xviii., c. 45), are dispersed throughout the earth, and by their scriptures give a testimony that we have not invented the prophecies concerning Christ. The Mohammedans acknowledge Christ as the greatest prophet; and among the heathen many things occur corroborating its testimony in historical matters.' (12) From the efficacy and power of Christian doctrine, in arousing, swaying, and soothing souls, attested not only by Scripture, but by innumerable examples of those converted to faith in Christ." [4] QUEN. (I, 20): "The Christian religion may be viewed either merikos (in part), or olikos (as a whole). Taken in the former sense it signifies, first and principally, the immediate worship of God, viz., euoebeia, or the piety which has regard to the worship of God according to the first table of the Law; secondarily, it signifies those other duties by which God is mediately worshiped, which have respect to the second table of the Law. The love of our neighbor presupposes love to God; hence, secondarily and by analogy, the duty of love to our neighbor comes under the name of religion." BR. (16): "The term Religion signifies, in a stricter sense, either the habit of the will by which we are inclined to the love, honor and worship due God, on account of His excellence; or, the acts themselves, of honoring or worshiping God on account of His excellence; and, at the same time, it signifies, on the part of the intellect, the true knowledge of God; on the part of the will, the other virtues (or virtuous acts) which aim at the honor and worship of God. But, in a wider sense, it denotes the whole circle of virtues or acts, that pertain to the worship of God." [5] HOLL. (43): "Under the name of the Christian Religion is comprehended whatever is to be believed and to be done by sinful man, in order to attain eternal life. As God is religiously worshiped by true faith and the sincere effort to perform good works, so religion, which is the form or method of worshiping God, embraces within its compass things to be believed and things to be done. In a general sense, the things to be believed are all things revealed in the written Word of God; in a more limited sense, those which are revealed in the Word of God in regard to the salvation of man; in the most specific sense, they are mysteries, above the comprehension of reason, and to be learned alone from the divine revelation for our salvation." Hence, "the subject-matter of Religion is faith, and love to God and our neighbor." We observe further, that GRH. and BR. do not treat of Religion as a separate topic. BR. has, under the head of "The Nature and Constituent Elements of Theology," only the following proposition (14): "In Natural Theology the means of attaining happiness are the acts of the mind and will directed towards God, by which God is rightly known and worshiped. They are known by one name, Religion." This is explained by the definition which the theologians give of Theology, for in accordance with this there is little material left for a special section on the subject of Religion. __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER III. OF THE SOURCE OF THEOLOGY, VIZ., REVELATION. __________________________________________________________________ § 4. Revelation, -- not Reason, nor Tradition. In order to understand what is true and correct Theology, we must inquire for the Source from which we derive our knowledge of it. QUEN. 32: "The source (principium) is that from which anything, in some manner or other, proceeds." This is the Revelation given by God.[1] By this divine Revelation we understand here, not that which is given in nature, but that given in the Word (supernatural, as distinguished from natural revelation).[2] More accurately, therefore, we say: the source of theological knowledge is the revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures,[3] and this is, moreover, the only source of Theology,[4] and neither reason,[5] nor, at a later date, tradition, or the appeal to the consentaneous doctrine of the ancient church,[6] is to be ranked with it; nor are supplementary revelations now to be expected from any quarter.[7] [1] CAL. (I, 269); "Revelation is taken either in a formal sense, for the act of the divine communication, or objectively for that which is divinely revealed. The former sense is here intended." [2] HOLL. (61): "We speak here not of that general revelation or natural manifestation, by which God makes Himself known both by the innate light of nature and by the effects conspicuous in the kingdom of nature. But we speak of the special and supernatural revelation, which is twofold, immediate and mediate. The Holy Spirit immediately illuminated the prophets and apostles, and suggested to them conceptions of things and of words concerning doctrines of faith and moral precepts. At the present day God reveals Himself to men by means of the Word written by the prophets and apostles." Revelation is, therefore, defined as: "The external act of God, by which He makes Himself known to the human race by His Word, in order that they may have a saving knowledge of Him." -- QUEN. I,32. CAL. (I, 268) thus states the proof that this divine revelation exists: "It having been proved, if this should be denied, that God is, and that there must be some method in which God may be worshiped by men, we must teach, that it cannot be but that God has revealed that method, so that He may be worshiped properly; then, that God wishes men to be led to the enjoyment of Himself, and also, that He has revealed unto men the manner in which they are to be thus led; finally, the fact that God has revealed Himself, must be taught from history, which revelation God has seen fit abundantly to accompany with miracles and documents, by which we are rendered absolutely certain that it is truly divine. Rom. 1: 16; 2 Cor. 12: 12. But as one general revelation has been made in Nature, Rom. 1:19 sq., and another special one by verbal communication, it is first to be proved from nature that God is, inasmuch as God has revealed Himself unto all by His works, in the formation of this world; and subsequently it is to be shown that God has revealed Himself to the human race in a more perfect manner by the Word." [3] QUEN. (I, 32): "The source of Theology is the written, divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures." HOLL. (61) more accurately: "Christian Theology is derived from an infallible source of knowledge, viz., divine revelation, which, for the present state of the Church, is mediate, i.e., comprehended in the writings of the prophets and apostles." As proof, John 20:31; 2 Tim. 3:14,15; Rom. 15:4; 2 Tim. 3:16,17. With regard to the different modes of revelation in ancient times, BR. (62): "Formerly God employed many and various methods in revealing those things which pertain to the salvation of man, Heb. 1:1. Specifically: (1.) By articulate language, uttered in a supernatural way. Thus revelations were made to the patriarchs, Gen. 18:2; 19:1; 22:1; to Moses, Ex. 3:2; Num. 12:6; to the Israelites, Ex. 19:10. (2.) By dreams or visions, presented to the minds of the sleeping, Gen. 28:12; Dan. 2:19. (3.) By ecstatic visions of the waking, Ez. 1:4; Dan. 10:5; Acts 10:10; finally (4.) By the immediate illumination of the intellect, without the intervention of dreams and visions, 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Pet. 1:21. But now, since God has chosen to present, in certain books, those things which are necessary to be known with reference to revealed things, in order to salvation, and not to communicate any new revelations, the only source of Theology is to be found in those ancient revelations which were made immediately to the prophets and apostles and have been committed to writing." Inasmuch, however, as the religion of the Old and New Testaments is to be regarded as substantially the same, QUEN. (I, 32) adds the remark: "As the divine revelation became more full, in the course of time, so also did Theology, which was based upon it; and as the former, just so the latter, gathered up its own additions in the progress of time, God meanwhile imparting new revelations. These additions did not relate to those things which constitute the foundation of faith and salvation, but to other things which render the statement and comprehension of these more complete, or which relate to various circumstances, rites, and ceremonies, and to ecclesiastical order and discipline." If, therefore, the Holy Scriptures are thus the Source of Theology, we are authorized to draw the following conclusion: "Whatever the Holy Scriptures teach is infallibly true." Hence, the early divines speak of a twofold source, viz., the source indefinitely stated, i.e., by a single term; and the source more fully stated, i.e., by an entire proposition. The former is the Holy Scriptures. The latter, from which the doctrines of the Christian faith are deduced, and into which they are again merged, is this proposition: "Whatever God has revealed in His Word, that is infallibly true, and must be reverently believed and embraced." From the Holy Scriptures, then, as this source, are drawn all doctrinal truths. "The source, whence theological conclusions are drawn, is but one, viz., the Word of God, or, Thus saith the Lord.' Theological conclusions are nothing else than truths concerning the faith, elicited and deduced from the Word of God. [4] QUEN. (I, 33): "The sole, proper, adequate, and ordinary source of Theology and of the Christian Religion is the divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or, what is the same thing, that the canonical Scriptures alone are the absolute source of Theology, so that out of them alone, are the articles of faith to be deduced and proved." Further (I, 36): "Divine revelation is the first and last source of sacred Theology, beyond which theological discussion among Christians dare not proceed. For every doubt concerning religion in the mind of a true Christian is removed by divine revelation, and by this the faith of the believer grows so strong, and is so firmly established, that it frees his mind from all fear and suspicion of deception, and imparts to him a firm assurance." [5] QUEN. (I, 38): "Human or natural reason is not the source of Theology and supernatural things." [6] CAL. (I, 304): "We contend that, over and above the written Word of God, there is at present no unwritten Word of God concerning any doctrine necessary to the Christian faith and life, not comprehended in the Scriptures, that ever came forth from the apostles, was handed down by tradition, was preserved by the Church, and is to be received with equal reverence." QUEN. (I, 44): "The consent of the Primitive Church, or of the Fathers of the first centuries after Christ, is not a source of Christian faith, either primary or secondary, nor does it produce a divine, but merely a human or probable belief." In reference to this latter clause, HOLL. (71): "The consent of the Fathers is not to be esteemed of little, but of great importance, as a ground of credibility, as a secondary source of theological conclusions (viz., because it furnishes opinions or conceptions that are probably true), and as a demonstrative and invaluable testimony that the early bishops of the Catholic Church understood and expounded passages of the Holy Scriptures in the same sense in which the Evangelical Church of the present day understands them." [7] HOLL. (63): "After the completion of the canon of Scripture, no new and immediate divine revelation was given to be a fundamental source of doctrine, 1 Cor. 4:6; Heb. 1:1." QUEN. (I, 48): "The opposite opinion is that of various fanatics who hold that the knowledge of God, and of all doctrines that are to be believed, is not to be sought from the written Word of God, but that a higher wisdom than that contained in the Holy Scriptures is to be sought from a revelation especially made to each individual, and from innate light, from ecstatic raptures, dreams, angelic communications, from an internal word, from the inspiration of the Father, from knowledge internally communicated by Christ, who is essentially united with them, and from the instruction of the Holy Spirit, speaking and teaching internally." [Cf. APOLOGY, 215,13; SMALCALD ARTICLES, 332:4; 333:9,10; LARGE CATECHISM, 499:13; FORMULA OF CONCORD, 552:4; 561:46.] __________________________________________________________________ § 5 Excursus. Concerning the Use of Reason in Theology By the term Reason, we may understand either, the capacity of intellectual apprehension in general -- and this is essential to man, for it is only by means of this capacity, which distinguishes him from irrational animals, that he can comprehend the truths of religion; [1] or, the capacity of acquiring knowledge and appropriating truths. [2] The knowledge, however, which one thus acquires is, even if true, still defective and unsatisfactory, [3] and therefore Reason is by no means the source from which man can draw the knowledge of saving truths, [4] but for these the revelation contained in Holy Scripture remains ever the only source. The question now arises, How is Reason related to this revelation, and what use can Theology make of Reason? Inasmuch as Reason also derives its knowledge from God, Reason and Revelation are, of course, not opposed to each other. [5] This hold true, however, only of Reason considered per se, of Reason as it was before the fall of man. This would have remained conscious of the limits of its sphere; would not have sought to measure divine things by the rule of natural knowledge; would have subordinated itself to Revelation, [6] and would have known that there are truths which, although not in antagonism with it, are yet far beyond its reach. [7] But the case if very different with Reason as it dwells now in fallen man; for we must concede that, by man's fall, such a change has occurred that Reason now often assumes a position of antagonism to revealed truth. [8] It still, indeed, possesses some knowledge of divine things, but this knowledge is obscured in proportion to the moral depravity of man, and it now, more easily than before, transcends the assigned limits. If now Reason, even before the fall of man, had to keep within modest limits, with respect to the truths of Revelation, much less dare it now, in the fallen condition of man, assume to judge in regard to divine things, or subject the truths of Revelation to its tests; still less dare it reject that which does not seem to agree with its knowledge: its duty rather is to subject itself to Revelation and learn therefrom. If this be done, however, much will again become intelligible that previously appeared contradictory, and Reason will again approach the condition occupied before the Fall. But this will be only an approach to that condition; for just as man, even through regeneration, never again becomes entirely sinless, so the Reason of the regenerate never attains its original power. [9] We may therefore say of Reason, even when enlightened, that it can have no decisive judgment in regard to matters of faith, and possesses in such matters no normative authority, all the more since this was true of Reason before the Fall. [10] As to the use, then, that is to be made of Reason in Theology, it follows, from what has been said, that Reason stands in the relation merely of a handmaid to the latter. [11] In so far as it is the capacity for intellectual apprehension in general, the use that is to be made of it will consist in this, that man, by its help, intellectually apprehends the truths of Theology, and accepts from it the means of refuting opponents. In so far, however, as it also conveys knowledge, one may also employ it in the demonstration of a divine truth; in such a case, Reason would contribute whatever of natural knowledge it has acquired. And just in the same proportion as Reason has suffered itself to be enlightened by divine Revelation, will it be able to demonstrate the harmony of divine truth with natural knowledge. [12] [1] Cal. (I, 358): "Human Reason denotes two things. On the one hand, it designates the intellect of man, that faculty of the rational soul that must be exercised in every kind of knowledge, since it is only by the reason or intellect that man can understand." . . . HOLL. (69): "Without the use of reason we cannot understand or prove theological doctrines, or defend them against the artful objections of opponents. Surely not to brutes, but to men using their sound reason, has God revealed the knowledge of eternal salvation in His Word, and upon them He has imposed the earnest injunction to read, hear, and meditate upon His Word. The intellect is therefore required, as the receiving subject or apprehending instrument. As we can see nothing without eyes, and hear nothing without ears, so we understand nothing without reason." [2] CAL. (ibid.): "On the other hand, Reason, denotes Philosophy itself, or the principles known from nature, and the discussion or ratiocination based upon these known principles." These principles are divided "into organic and philosophical (strictly so called). The former (organic) relate to the mediate disciplines, grammar, rhetoric, and logic." -- (QUEN. (I, 39): "These are to be employed in Theology, as the means of becoming acquainted with Theology, since without them, neither the sense nor significance of the words can be derived, nor the figures and modes of speech be properly weighed, nor the connection and consequences be perceived, nor discussions be instituted"). The latter (the philosophical) are again divided into "philosophical principles absolutely and unrestrictedly universal (general or transcendental), which consist of a combination of terms essential and simply necessary, so that they cannot be overthrown by any argument, not even by the Scripture; e.g., It is impossible for anything to be and not to be at the same time;'" and "philosophical principles restrictedly universal (special or particular), which are indeed true, to a certain extent, hypothetically, or so far as mere natural knowledge extends, but which, nevertheless, admit of limitation, and which may be invalidated by counter evidence drawn from revelation, if not from nature; e.g., As many as are the persons, so many are the essences,' etc." HOLL (68). Through these philosophical sources we can also gain a knowledge of God, for there is a natural knowledge of God, described elsewhere by the Theologians under the heads of the innate, and the acquired knowledge of God. [3] CAL. (II, 47): "Of the natural knowledge of God there is predicated, as to those things that are revealed in nature, imperfection; and as to the supernatural mysteries of faith, entire worthlessness [nullitas]. [4] HOLL. (69): "Meanwhile, nevertheless, human reason is not a fountain, or primordial element, from which the peculiar and fundamental principles of faith are derived." [5] FLACIUS, with his assertion, that "the knowledge of God, naturally implanted, is a light full of error, fallacious and deceptive," and subsequently, Daniel Hofmann ("Philosophy is hostile to Theology; what is true in Philosophy is false in Theology"), gave especial occasion to dispute the antagonism between Reason and Revelation. CAL. (I, 68): "That Philosophy is not opposed to Theology and is by no means to be rejected as brutish, terrene, impure, diabolical, we thus demonstrate: 1. Because the true agrees with the true, and does not antagonize it. But what is known by the light of nature is no less true than what is revealed in Scripture; 2. Because natural and philosophical knowledge has its origin from God; 3. Because Philosophy leads us to the knowledge of God." As the antagonism was still asserted, the Theologians endeavored to prove it to be only apparent. CAL. (I, 74): "We must distinguish between a real and an apparent contradiction. The maxims of Philosophy and the conclusions of Theology do not really contradict each other, but only appear to do so; for they either do not discuss the same subject, or they do not describe the same condition, mode, or relation to it; as when the philosopher says that the essence is multiplied with the multiplication of persons, he declares this of finite and created persons, not of divine, of which he knows nothing; concerning the latter, the theologian teaches that this is not true. When the philosopher says, Of nothing, nothing comes,' i.e., by way of generation, he does not contradict the theologian, who teaches that by the way of creation something does come from nothing. Let Philosophy remain within the limits of its own sphere, then it will not contradict Theology, for this treats of a different subject. But it is not wonderful that those who confound Philosophy and Theology should find contradictions between them, for they pervert both." QUEN. (I, 43): "We must distinguish between contrariety and diversity. Philosophy and the principles of Reason are not indeed contrary to Theology, nor the latter to the former; but there is a very great difference between those things that are divinely revealed in Scripture and those which are known by the light of nature." -- As the Theologians here opposed those who asserted a contradiction between Reason and Revelation, they also controverted those who claimed too much for Reason, as over against Revelation, by maintaining that, because Reason came from God, that which opposes it cannot be true. This charge was brought against the Calvinists, Socinians, and Arminians. It was admitted, in opposition to them, that Reason in itself does not contradict Revelation; an inference, however, which might have become derogatory to divine truth, was obviated by explaining any seeming contradiction on the ground that Reason, in such a case, had overstepped its proper limits. To the proposition: "In nowise can that be true which is repugnant to reason," GRH. (II, 371) replies: "Not human Reason, but divine Revelation, is the source of faith, nor are we to judge concerning the articles of faith according to the dictation of Reason, otherwise we should have no articles of faith, but only decisions of Reason. The cogitations and utterances of Reason are to be restricted and restrained within the sphere of those things which are subject to the decisions of Reason, and not to be extended to the sphere of those things which are placed entirely beyond the reach of Reason; otherwise, if they should be received as absolutely universal, and are found opposed to the mysteries of the faith, there arise oppositions of science falsely so called. To the objection: "As a smaller light to a greater, so Reason is not contrary to Scripture," GRH. (II, 372) answers: "This contrariety is not necessary, but accidental. Reason restricted to its proper sphere is not contrary to Scripture, but when it attempts to overleap and surpass this, and to pass judgment upon the highest mysteries of the faith by the aid of its own principles, then, by accident, it comes in conflict with Scripture which informs us in regard to the mysteries of faith. Just as the stronger light often reveals those things which were hidden in the weaker, so the light of grace, enkindled for us in the Word, makes manifest those things which were hidden in the light of nature. Just as any one, therefore, who would deny those things which are visible in the greater light because he had not seen them in the smaller, would fail to appreciate the design and benefit of the smaller, so also he who denies or impugns the mysteries of faith revealed in the light of grace, on the ground that they are incongruous with Reason and the light of nature, fails, at the same time, to make a proper use of the office and benefits of Reason and the light of nature." To the proposition: "What is true theologically cannot be false philosophically, for truth is one," GRH. (ibid.) answers: "In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no contradiction between Philosophy and Theology, because whatever things concerning the deepest mystery of the faith Theology propounds from Revelation, these a wiser and sincere Philosophy knows are not to be discussed and estimated according to the principles of Reason, lest there be a confusion of what pertains to entirely distinct departments. So when Theology teaches that Mary brought forth and yet remained a virgin, a truly sensible Philosophy does not say this assertion is contrary to its conclusion, that it is impossible for a virgin to bear a child, because it knows that that conclusion must necessarily be received with this limitation, that for a virgin to bring forth a child naturally and yet remain a virgin, is impossible. Nor does Theology assert the contrary of this, for it says, by supernatural and divine power it came to pass that a virgin brought forth a child. But when some philosophizer attempts to make his axioms and assertions so general that the highest mysteries of the faith are to be adjudged by them, and so invades other spheres, then it comes to pass, by way of accident, that what is true theologically is pronounced false philosophically; i.e., not according to the proper use of a sound Philosophy, but according to the miserable abuse of it. Thus, justice and the nature of law is everywhere the same, i.e., in its general conception, while, nevertheless, the law of this province is not the same as that of other provinces, but each government lives under its own special laws. So truth is one in its general conception, while each branch has its own axioms which are not to be dragged before another tribunal, but to be left in their own sphere." [6] GRH. (II, 372): "Sound reason is not opposed to the faith, if we accept as such that which is truly and properly so-called, namely that which does not transcend the limits of its sphere, and does not arrogate to itself decisions in regard to the mysteries of faith; or which, enlightened by the Word, and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, does not follow its own principles in the investigation of the mysteries of faith, but the light of the Word and the guidance of the Holy Spirit." [7] GRH. (II, 372): "The articles of faith are not in and of themselves contrary to Reason, but only above Reason. It may happen, by accident, that they be contrary to Reason, namely, when Reason assumes to decide concerning them upon its own principles, and does not follow the light of the Word, but denies and assails them. Hence the articles of faith are not contrary to, but merely above Reason, since Reason before the Fall was not yet corrupt and depraved; but since the Fall they are not only above but also contrary to corrupt Reason, for this, in so far as it is thus corrupt, cannot control itself, much less should it wish to judge articles of faith by its own principles." [8] GRH. (II, 371): "We must distinguish between Reason in man before and since the Fall. The former, as such, was never opposed to divine Revelation; the latter was very frequently thus opposed through the influence of corruption." GRH. (II, 362): "Natural human Reason since the Fall (1) is blind, darkened by the mist of error, inwrapped in the shades of ignorance, exposed to vanity and error, Rom. 1:21; 1 Cor. 3:1; Gal. 4:8; Eph. 4:17; (2) unskilled in perceiving divine mysteries and judging concerning them, Matt. 11.27; 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:14 sq; (3) opposed to them, Rom. 8:6; 1 Cor. 2:11 sq; 3:18 sq.; hence to be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ, 2 Cor. 10:4,5; (4) and we are commanded to beware of its seduction, Col. 2:8. Therefore natural human Reason cannot be a rule for judging in matters of faith, and any one pronouncing according to its dictation cannot be a judge in theological controversies." QUEN. (I, 43): "We must distinguish between Philosophy (i.e., Reason) considered abstractly and in view of its essence, and Philosophy considered concretely and in view of its existence in a subject corrupted by sin: viewed in the former light, it is never opposed to divine truth (for the truth is ever presented as uniform and in harmony with the nature of the objects successively subordinated to it), but viewed in the latter light, in consequence of the ignorance of the intellect and the perversion of the will, it is often preposterously applied by the philosopher to the purposes of perversion and hollow deception. Col. 2:8." [9] GRH. (II, 371): "We are to make a distinction between the reason of man unregenerate and regenerate. The former counts the mysteries of faith foolishness, but the latter, in so far as it is such, does not object to them. Then only, and only so long, is it regenerate as it follows the light of the Word, and judges concerning the mysteries of the faith, not by its own principles, but by the Scriptures. We do not reject Reason when regenerated, renewed, illuminated by the Word of God, restrained and brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ; this does not draw its opinions, in matters of faith, from its own sources, but from Scripture; this does not impugn the articles of belief as does Reason when corrupt, left to itself, etc. We must distinguish also between Reason partially rectified in this life, and that which is fully rectified in the life to come. The former is not yet so completely renewed, illuminated, and rectified that it would be impossible for it to oppose the articles of faith and impugn them, if it should follow its own guidance. Just as there remains in the regenerate a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, by which they are tempted to sin, so there remains in them a struggle between faith and Reason, in so far as it is not yet fully renewed; this, however, excludes all opposition between faith and Reason." [10] QUEN. (I, 43): "Reason is admissible as an instrument, but not as a rule and a judge: the formal principles of Reason no one rejects; its material principles, which constitute its rule for judging the mysteries, no wise man accepts. No material principle of Reason, as such, but only as it is at the same time a part of Revelation, produces faith theologically: that God is, we know from nature; we believe it, however, only through the Scriptures. It does not follow, because some parts of Scripture are axioms known by nature, that therefore Reason is the regulator of theological controversies." Id. (I, 43): "Theology does not condemn the use of Reason, but its abuse and its affectation of directorship, or its magisterial use, as normative and decisive in divine things." [11] HOLL. (71): "Reason is not a leader, but an humble follower of Theology. Hagar serves as the handmaid of her mistress, she does not command; when she affects to command she is banished from the sacred home." [12] QUEN. (I, 42): "A distinction must be made between the organic or instrumental use of Reason and its principles, when they are employed as instruments for the interpretation and exposition of the Holy Scriptures, in refuting the arguments of opponents, drawn from Nature and Reason, and discussing the signification and construction of words, and rhetorical figures and modes of speech; and the normal use of philosophical principles, when they are regarded as principles by which supernatural doctrines are to be tested. The former we admit, the latter we repudiate." The following from QUEN. explains and expands this idea: "It is one thing to employ in Theology the principles and axioms of Philosophy for the purpose of illustration, explanation, and as a secondary proof, when a matter is decided by the Scriptures; and another to employ them for the purpose of deciding and demonstrating, or to recognize philosophical principles, or the argumentation based upon them, as authoritative in Theology, or by means of them to decide matters of faith. The former we do, the latter we do not. There must be a distinction made between consequences deduced by the aid of reason from the Holy Scriptures, and conclusions collected from the sources of nature and reason. The former must not be confounded with the latter. For it is one thing to use legitimate, necessary consequences, and another to use the principles of Reason. It is one thing to draw a conclusion and deduce consequences from the declarations of Scripture, according to logical rules, and another to collect consequences from natural principles. A sort of illustration of heavenly matters can be sought for among those things which Reason supplies, but a demonstration can never be obtained from that source, since it is necessary that this should proceed from the same sphere to which the truth which is to be proved belongs, and not from a foreign one." This doctrine of the use of reason GRH. develops in a manner somewhat different, although substantially the same as follows, under the topic, "The Use of Reason in the Rule of Faith." (I, 76, sq.): (1) The organic use is the following: When our reason brings with it, to the work of drawing out the treasures of divine wisdom hidden in the Scriptures, knowledge of the grammatical force of words, logical observance of order, rhetorical elucidation of figures and acquaintance with the facts of nature, derived from the philosophical branches. This use we greatly commend, yea, we even declare it to be necessary. (2) As to the edificative use of Reason, it is to be thus maintained: There is a certain natural knowledge of God, Rom. 1:19,20, but his should be subordinate to that which is divinely revealed in the Word; so that, where there is a disagreement, the former should yield to the latter; and where they agree, the former confirms and strengthens the latter. In short, as a servant it should, with all due reverence, minister to the latter. (3) The destructive use, when legitimate, is the following: Errors in doctrine are first to be confuted by arguments drawn from the Holy Scriptures, as the only and proper source of Theology, but afterwards philosophical reasons may be added, so that it may be shown that the false dogma is repugnant, not only to the light of grace, but also to the light of Nature. But when the truth of any doctrine has been clearly proved by unanswerable scriptural arguments, we should never allow our confidence in it to be shaken by any philosophical reasons, however specious they may be." Id. (II, 9): "Although some things are taught in Theology, which can be learned in some measure by the light of Nature and Reason, yet human Reason cannot undertake to become thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of faith, properly so called, by means of its own powers; and as to such things as, already known from Nature, are taught in Theology, it need not seek for proof elsewhere than in their own proper source, the Word of God, which is abundantly able to prove them. . . . In this latter manner the Theologian becomes indebted, for some things to the philosopher; not, indeed, as though he were not able to know them without the aid of philosophical principles, from Scripture, as the proper and native source of his own science, but because, in the course of the investigation, he perceives the truth of the proposition according to the principles of philosophy." That to which GRH. here merely alludes, the later Theologians, such as QUEN., BR., and HOLL., develop at greater length when treating of the pure and mixed articles; by the former of which are understood those which contain truths that can be known only by Revelation, by the latter such as contain truths which may, at least in part, be otherwise known. HOLL. (68): "Mixed articles of faith may, in some measure, be known by the principles of Philosophy. But the pure articles of faith can be learned and proved only from Holy Scripture as the appropriate, fundamental, and original source." But the remark of QUEN. is well worthy of attention, that (I, 39) "in the mixed articles we grant that philosophical principles may be employed; not, indeed, for the purpose of decision or demonstration, but merely for illustration, or as a sort of secondary proof of that which has already been decided by the Scriptures." And here belongs also the statement of QUEN., concerning the formal and material principle of Reason, already quoted in the tenth note. This statement of QUEN. conveys the same idea as the last, quoted from GRH., and is designed to prevent the assignment of the right of decision in the mixed articles to Reason, although, it is to have something to do with them. Those Theologians who observe the distinction, described in note second, between organic and philosophical principles, admit also the use of the absolutely universal principles in Theology. It may be questioned, however, Whether these are so accurately distinguished from the restrictedly universal principles which are not admissible, that mistakes may not easily arise. In regard to this BR. (157) thus expresses himself: "The material principles of Reason are also with propriety employed; however, when they are particular or specific, they are subordinated to the universal principle of Theology; but the universal principles of Reason may be employed only when they are absolutely necessary, namely, when the demonstration of the opposite would imply a contradiction. For otherwise, if the principles of Reason were employed, not absolutely, but relatively, or, so to speak, universally and necessarily, it might easily happen that a conclusion would be reached repugnant to the mysteries or to the articles of faith, even to those of fundamental importance." __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER IV. OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. IN treating of the Holy Scriptures as the recorded revelation of God, we speak 1, of what is understood by the Holy Scriptures and Inspiration; 2, of the Attributes of the Holy Scriptures; 3, of the Canon. __________________________________________________________________ § 6. Of the terms, Holy Scriptures and Inspiration. God determined that His revelation should be committed to writing, so that it might be preserved pure and uncorrupted throughout all future time; [1] therefore He has deposited it in the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. [2] These are, therefore, defined to be the written Word of God. [3] GRH.: "The Holy Scripture is the Word of God recorded in the Holy Scriptures." Between these and the Word of God, there is, then, no real distinction, inasmuch as they contain nothing more than this very Word of God, which was also orally proclaimed; [4] and they contain it entire and complete so that, aside from them, no Word of God is anywhere to be found. [5] By being the Word of God, the Holy Scriptures are distinguished from all other books for, in consequence of this, they are, in respect of all their contents, entirely divine; and this by virtue of the fact that they were communicated by inspiration from God to the prophets and apostles. [6] God is therefore their author (causa principalis), and the prophets and apostles only the instruments (causa instrumentalis) which God employed in their production. [7] We are, therefore, to ascribe the origin of the Holy Scriptures to a peculiar agency of God, by means of which He impelled the prophets and apostles to the production of the Holy Scriptures, [8] and communicated to them both the matter and the form of that which was to be written. [9] This agency of God, by means of which the Holy Scriptures were produced, we call Inspiration. [10] BR: "Divine inspiration was that agency by which God supernaturally communicated to the intellect of those who wrote, not only the correct conception of all that was to be written, but also the conception of the words themselves and of everything by which they were to be expressed, and by which He also instigated their will to the act of writing." Hence it follows, that everything that is contained in the Holy Scriptures is altogether, and in every particular, true and free from all error. [11] [1] CHMN. (Exam. Conc. Trid. I,20): "We show . . . . why and wherefore the Holy Scriptures were written; because, viz., by tradition purity of doctrine was not preserved; but, under shelter of that term, many strange and false things were mingled with the true." GRH.(II, 26): "Why did God desire His Word, at first orally promulgated, to be committed to writing?' The principal causes appear to have been the following: 1. The shortness of human life. 2. The great number of men. 3. The unfaithfulness to be expected from the guardianship of tradition. 4. The weakness of human memory. 5. The stability of heavenly truth, Luke 1:4. 6. The wickedness of man. 7. In the New Testament, the perverseness of heretics, which was to be held in check." [2] GRH. (II, 13): "The scriptures have their designation from the formal, external act, viz., that of writing, by which the Word of God, at first orally promulgated, was, by the command of God, recorded. God himself made the grand and majestic beginning of this work when He inscribed His law on Mount Sinai, upon tablets of stone, which, on this account, are called the writing of God.' Ex. 32:16. To distinguish them from all other writings, they are called the Holy Scriptures, an appellation derived from Rom. 1:2 and 2 Tim. 3:15. The reasons of this designation are drawn, 1. From their original efficient cause, their Great Author, who is God most holy, yea holiness itself, Is. 6:3; Dan. 9:24. 2. From their instrumental cause, viz., holy men, 2 Pet. 1:21. 3. From their matter, for they contain holy and divine mysteries, precepts for holy living, Ps. 105:42. 4. From their design and effects, for the Holy Spirit sanctifies men through the reading and study of the Scriptures, John 17:17. 5. From the additional circumstance that they are widely different from all other writings, both ecclesiastical and profane, inasmuch as they are clothed with the sublime attribute of canonical authority, to which every believing and godly mind pays due deference." Terms synonymous with Holy Scripture are (Id. II,16): graphe or graphai, John 7:38 and 42; Acts 8:12; Rom. 4:3; graphai agiai, Rom. 1:2; iera grammata, 2 Tim. 3:15; graphe theupneustos, v. 16. Titles of honor which are attributed to the Word of God in Scripture, are the following: dkr yhvh logia tou theou. Rom. 3:2; zon o logos tou theou, Heb. 4:12; remata tas zoes aioniou, John 6:68. The whole collection is termed sphr htvrh Josh. 1:8; sphr yhvh Is. 34:16; mqr' Neh. 8:8. [3] GRH. (II, 427): "The Holy Scriptures are the Word of God reduced to writing, according to His will, by the prophets, evangelists, and apostles, perfectly and perspicuously setting forth the doctrine of the nature and will of God, that men may thereby be brought unto eternal life." HOLL. (77): "In the definition of the Holy Scriptures, the Word of God signified formally the purpose of God, or the conception of the divine mind, revealed for the salvation of men immediately to the prophets and apostles, and mediately, through their ministrations, to the whole race of man." For the sake of the greatest possible accuracy, the following distinctions are made. GRH. (II, 14): "By the term Scripture, we are not to understand so much the external form, or sign, i.e., the particular letters employed, the art of writing and the expressions by which the divine revelation is described, as the matter itself or the thing signified, just that which is marked and represented by the writing, viz., the Word of God itself, which instructs us concerning the nature and will of God. For, as in all writing, performed by an intelligent agent, so also in these prophetic and apostolic writings, two things are to be considered, viz., in the first place, the letters, syllables, and sentences which are written, and which are external symbols signifying and expressing conceptions of the mind; and secondly, those conceptions themselves, which are the thing signified, expressed by these external symbols of letters, syllables, and sentences; wherefore in the term Scriptures we embrace both of these, and the latter especially." According as the term is taken in one or the other of these significations, the relation of the Church to the Scriptures is differently expressed. GRH. (II, 15): "Whence we add, by way of corollary, that certain things are predicated of Scripture, with reference to its matter, as that it is more ancient than the Church, that it is the very Word of God itself, formerly preached orally by the apostles and prophets; and others in reference to its form, as that it is, in point of time, later than the Church, that at the last day it will perish, while, on the other hand, as to its matter, it can never be destroyed or perish, John 10:35." [4] GRH. (II, 15): "That there is no real difference between the Word of God and the Holy Scriptures, viewed in reference to the matter contained in them, is proved, 1. By the subject-matter of Scripture. The prophets and apostles wrote that, and nothing else than that, which, taught by divine inspiration, they had before preached orally, 1 Cor. 15:1; 2 Cor. 1:13; Phil. 3:1; 2 Thess. 2:15; 1 John 1:3. 2. By the identity of the spoken and written Word. Because the recorded predictions of the Old Testament are frequently quoted in the New, with these words: That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets,' Matt. 1:22, 2:15, 4:14, etc. Therefore, what the prophets said or predicted, is the same as that which they wrote. 3. By the rule of logic: The accident does not alter the essence.' It is a mere circumstance in regard to the Word of God, whether it be proclaimed orally or committed to writing. It is one and the same Word of God, whether it be presented to us in the form of spoken or of written language; since neither the original efficient cause, nor the matter, nor the internal form, nor the object, is thereby changed, but only the mode of presentation by the use of different organs. 4. By the demonstrative particle employed by the apostles. Paul speaks thus distinctively of the Mosaic writings and the other like books of the Old and New Testament: tout esti to rema tes pisteos,' this is the word of faith,' Rom. 10:8; Peter, in 1 Pet. 1:25." CAL. (I, 528): "The fanatical sects, especially, deny that the Scriptures are, strictly speaking, the Word of God, maintaining that the internal Word of God alone can properly be called the Word of God." (Schwenckfeld, Rathmann, Weigel.) [3] [5] GRH. (II, 16): 1. "This distinction of the Papists between the written and unwritten Word may, in a certain sense, be admitted, viz., if by the term unwritten Word' be understood the divine revelation proclaimed orally by the patriarchs before the Mosaic books were written, but after the publication of the Scripture Canon, there can be no unwritten Word of God, as distinct form Scripture." 2. "We must distinguish between the leading truths of divine revelation which are necessary, essential, etc., and their more full explanation. The prophets and apostles committed to writing the principal doctrines of revelation, which are necessary to be known by all, and which we do not deny that they explained orally at greater length." [6] QUEN. (I, 56): "The internal form, or that which gives existence to the Scriptures, so that they are indeed the Word of God, that, namely, which constitutes them and distinguishes them from all other writings, is the inspired sense of Scripture, which, in general, is the conception of the divine intellect concerning divine mysteries and our salvation, formed from eternity, and revealed in time and communicated in writing to us; or it is divine inspiration itself, 2 Tim. 3:16, by which, namely, it is constituted a divine, and is distinguished from a human word." [7] QUEN. (I, 55): "The efficient or principal cause of Scripture is the triune God, 2 Tim. 3:16 (the Father, Heb. 1:1; the Son, John 1:18, and the Holy Spirit, 2 Sam. 23:2; 1 Pet. 1:11; 2 Pet. 1:21); 1. By an original decree. 2. By subsequent inspiration, or by ordering that holy men of God should write, and by inspiring what was to be written." GRH. (II, 26): "The instrumental causes of Holy Scripture were holy men of God, 2 Pet. 1:21, i.e., men peculiarly and immediately elected and called by God for the purpose of committing to writing the divine revelations; such were the prophets of the Old Testament and the evangelists and apostles of the New Testament; whom, therefore, we properly call the amanuenses of God, the hand of Christ, and the scribes or notaries of the Holy Spirit, since they neither spoke nor wrote by their own human will, but, borne along by the Holy Spirit (pheromenoi upo tou pneumatos agiou), were acted upon, led, driven, inspired, and governed by the Holy Spirit. They wrote not as men, but as men of God, i.e., as servants of God and peculiar organs of the Holy Spirit. When, therefore, a canonical book is called a book of Moses, the psalms of David, an epistle of Paul, etc., this is merely a reference to the agent, not to the principal cause." QUEN. (I, 55): "God, therefore, alone, if we wish to speak accurately, is to be called the author of the Sacred Scriptures; the prophets and apostles cannot be called the authors, except by a kind of catachresis." To the remark that prophets and apostles may be called the amanuenses of God, QUEN. (I:52) adds: "And not as though these divine amanuenses wrote ignorantly and unwillingly, beyond the reach of and contrary to their own will; for they wrote cheerfully, willingly and intelligently. They are said to be pheromenoi, driven, moved, urged on by the Holy Spirit, not as though they were in a state of unconsciousness, as the Enthusiasts pretended to be, and as the heathen feigned that there was a certain enthousiasmos in their soothsayers; not, further, by any means, as though the prophets themselves did not understand their own prophecies or the things which they wrote, which was formerly. . . . the error of the Montanists; but, because they wrote nothing of their own accord, but everything at the dictation of the Holy Spirit." Inasmuch as it holds good of all the sacred writers, that they are inspired, those are also accounted such who were not, in the strictest sense, apostles. HOLL. (80): "By the name apostles we here designate those holy men of God, who, after the birth of Christ, wrote the Scriptures of the New Testament; although they did not all belong to the college of the apostles, chosen by Christ, before His ascension, to teach all nations; but who, after Christ's ascension, were numbered with the apostles; such were Matthias (whose writings, however, we do not possess) and Paul. But also those apostolic men, nearest to the apostles in office and dignity, are called apostles in a wider sense; such are Mark and Luke, the evangelists, cf. Rom. 16:7." [8] HOLL. (83): "Inspiration denotes as well the antecedent divine instigation or peculiar impulse of the will to engage in writing, as the immediate illumination by which the mind of the sacred writer is fully enlightened through the supernatural illumination of divine grace, and the conceptions of the things to be written are themselves suggested immediately by the Holy Spirit." The co-operation which here takes place on the part of God is described by QUEN. (I, 65) as "a most special and extraordinary concurrence, peculiar to the sacred writers," and to be carefully distinguished from "the general and common concurrence of God, by virtue of which He is present to all believers sincerely meditating upon, and writing about, sacred things." HOLL. (83) distinguishes between inspiration and divine governance. "For the latter merely guards against anything being written that is not true, becoming, congruous; whereas the former, through the Holy Spirit dictating, suggests the conception of the things to be written. The divine governance would warrant the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, but not their inspiration." If the impulse to engage in writing be embraced under the term inspiration, then it follows that all the Holy Scriptures were written by the command of God, because all are inspired. QUEN. (I, 65): "All the canonical books, of both the Old and New Testaments, were written by God, who peculiarly incited and impelled the sacred writers to engage in the work, and, therefore, the Scriptures of the New Testament were recorded according to the command and will of God by the evangelists and apostles." The opposite view is that held by the Papists, who foolishly assert that the evangelists and apostles did not write by any divine command, but were incidentally urged by some accidental circumstance originating elsewhere, or by necessity. It is, indeed, granted that we do not possess the proof of an express and outward command of God in the case of each of the sacred writings, but it is at the same time observed that the want of this is not felt where the impulse exists. GRH. (II, 30): "In the holy men of God, the external command and the internal impulse correspond to each other. For what else is that divine impulse than an internal and secret command of precisely the same authority and weight with one that is external and manifest?" The latter is proved (by HOLL. (81), but also in the same manner by all the earlier writers) to have existed in the case of all the books of Scripture: "1. By the general command of Christ, Matt. 28:19. (GRH. (II, 31): Those who were commanded to teach all nations, were also commanded to reduce their teachings to writing; for they could not teach all nations, even of the succeeding age, orally and without writing.) 2. By the impulse of the Holy Spirit, which Peter teaches, 2 Pet. 1:21. 3. By the divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, which Paul inculcated, 2 Tim. 3:16. 4. By the apostolic office, in which these holy men became the ambassadors of God, 2 Cor. 5:20. Ambassadors are restricted by the commands of their sovereign. Peter, as an ambassador of God, did not undertake to preach to the Gentiles without a divine command; therefore still less would he dare to write an epistle unless commanded by God." That, however, the external instigations alluded to in the antithesis of the Papists are not excluded, GRH. (II, 33) had already stated: "The inducements to engage in writing brought to bear upon the apostles from without, do not annul the internal command, but rather confirm it, since those circumstances were made to influence the apostles by the wonderful arrangement of divine Providence, and to them was subsequently added the interior impulse of the Holy Spirit, urged on by which they applied their hand to the work." [9] Hereby an inspiration both of subject-matter and of the words is asserted, from which it follows that there is absolutely nothing in the Holy Scriptures that is not inspired. These assertions are contained in the following two sentences (of HOLL., 83 and 85): "I. The conceptions of all that is contained in the Holy Scriptures were immediately communicated by the Holy Spirit to the prophets and apostles. "II. All the words, without exception, contained in the Holy Manuscript, were dictated by the Holy Spirit to the pen of the prophets and apostles." These two sentences we illustrate by the following remarks of QUEN. and HOLL. In reference to No. I: 1. "In inspiration, we recognize a divine assistance and direction, which includes the inspiration and dictation of the Holy Spirit; but we deny as insufficient such a bare divine assistance and direction as would simply prevent the sacred writers from departing from the truth in speaking and writing. . . . The Holy Spirit guides others also in writing, i.e., so that we observe here a difference in this respect, that the Holy Spirit so directed the inspired men, that He at the same time suggested and communicated all things to them in so far as they are recorded in Scripture." -- QUEN, I,68. 2. Inspiration embraces all that is contained in Scripture, and therefore also those things which could have been otherwise known to the apostles and prophets, because in this case it was necessary that these things should be said just at the particular time when the design which God had in view required it. HOLL. (84): "The things which were known to the sacred writers may be considered either absolutely and in themselves, or relatively, in so far as they were to be written by the purpose of God. In the former manner they were previously known by the sacred writers, but not in the latter. For, although the sacred amanuenses may have known certain things, which are described by them before the act of writing, yet it was not, in the nature of the case, known to them whether God desired these things to be described, or under what circumstances, in what order, and with what words they should be committed to writing." 3. In like manner inspiration embraces things that are not of a spiritual nature. HOLL. (83): "There are contained in Scripture historical, chronological, genealogical, astronomical, natural-historical, and political matters, which, although the knowledge of them is not actually necessary to salvation, are nevertheless divinely revealed, because an acquaintance with them assists not a little in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and in illustrating the doctrines and moral precepts. If only the mysteries of the faith, which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, depend upon divine inspiration, and all the rest, which may be known by the light of nature, depend merely upon the divine direction, then not all of Scripture is inspired. But Paul declares that the whole of Scripture is divinely inspired. Therefore not only the mysteries of the faith, but also the remaining truths that may be known by the light of nature, which are contained in Scripture, are divinely suggested and inspired;" therefore, 4. Even apparently unimportant matters are, none the less, to be regarded as also inspired. QUEN. (I, 71): "A matter may be of small moment, considered in itself and with reference to the estimation in which it is held by men, and yet of great importance if we regard the end and wise design which God has in view with regard to it. Many things in Scripture seem to be of small account (2 Tim. 4:13), in regard to which some suppose that our theory of inspiration derogates from the dignity of the Holy Spirit; but they are, nevertheless, of great moment, if we regard the end had in view (Rom. 15:4) and the all-wise design of God, in accordance with which these things were introduced into the Scriptures." CALIXTUS (in QUEN., I,69) is a prominent advocate of the opposite view, viz.: "Neither is it taught in Scripture, that it is necessary to ascribe all the particulars that are contained in it to a peculiar divine revelation, but that the principal topics, those which the Scripture is mainly and peculiarly designed to teach, viz., those which relate to the redemption and salvation of the human race, are to be ascribed solely to that particular divine revelation; while in writing concerning other things, known in some other way, either by experience or the light of nature, the writers were so directed by the divine assistance and by the Holy Spirit, that they wrote nothing but what was actual, true, becoming, and congruous." The proof of plenary inspiration is drawn 1. From 2 Tim. 3:16. (QUEN. (I, 71): "The word pasa may be taken distributively, of the single books or parts of Scripture, or collectively for those parts taken as a whole, so that pasa is the same as hole; in either case our opinion remains true, viz., that all Scripture is inspired.") Whence the following argument of CAL. (I, 555): "If all Scripture be inspired, then there can be nothing in the Holy Scriptures that was not divinely suggested and by inspiration communicated to those who wrote. For, if even a single particle of Scripture were derived from human knowledge and memory, or from human revelation, then it could not be asserted that all Scripture is divinely inspired." 2. From 2 Pet. 1:21 (although Peter does not allude particularly to writing, but speaking,. . . yet by lalian both speaking and writing are here implied, and both are comprehended under this term cf. Acts 2:31; 3:24; Rom. 3:19; for just as the holy men of God were incited and impelled by the Holy Spirit to speak, so were they also incited and impelled by Him to write). 3. By the promise of Christ, John 14:26. 4. From 1 Cor. 2:10. We add, from CAL. (I, 556), the following additional proofs: "From the originating cause of Scripture, if indeed the sacred writers were merely the pen, the hand, or the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit; from the nature of the direction of the Holy Spirit, which is usually described as such that the Scriptures were written by His direction, wherefore Gregory the Great declared that the whole of the Holy Scriptures were nothing more nor less than a letter from God the Creator to man His creature; from the equal authority of all that is contained in Scripture. For not merely those things which directly refer to the subjects of faith and salvation are the Word of God, but everything that is found in Scripture, Rom. 3:2, and, for the same reason that they are called by this name, they well deserve to be regarded as the immediate Word of God." In relation to No. II., HOLL. (87): "The divine inspiration of the words known by common usage, was necessary to the proper expression of the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the prophets and apostles were not at liberty to clothe the divine meaning in such words as they might of their own accord select; but it was their duty to adhere to, and depend upon, the oral dictation of the Holy Spirit, so that they might commit the Holy Scriptures to writing, in the order and connection so graciously and excellently given, and in which they would appear in perfect accordance with the mind of the Holy Spirit." QUEN. (I, 76) thus accounts for the variety of style: "There is a great diversity among the sacred writers in regard to style and mode of speaking, which appears to arise from the fact that the Holy Spirit accommodated Himself to the ordinary mode of speaking, leaving to each one his own manner; yet we do not thereby deny that the Holy Spirit suggested the particular words to these individuals." CAL., however (I, 574), remarks: "The Holy Spirit, Supreme Author of the Holy Scriptures, was not bound to the style of any one, but, as a perfectly free teacher of languages, could use, through any person soever, the character, style, and mode of speech that He chose, and could just as easily propose the divine oracles through Jeremiah in a highly ornate style, as through Isaiah in one of great simplicity. But He regarded not so much the ability of the writers to speak as the character of the subjects concerning which He wished them to speak; and, throughout the whole, He used His own authority (autexousia) under the guidance of His unlimited wisdom. So that we need not wonder that the same Spirit employed diversities of style. . . . The cause of this diversity of style is the fact that the Holy Spirit gave to each one to speak as He pleased." Yet CAL. adds also: "Although the style of Scripture is plain and very well suited, not only to the genius of the readers and hearers, but also to the old and customary style of speech of the sacred writers, yet there may be recognized in it a condescension, sunkatabasis, of the Holy Spirit; because He accommodated Himself sometimes to the ordinary method of speaking, leaving to the writers their own style of speech; but it must not be denied that the Holy Spirit breathed into them the words." The inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points was included in this theory; conf. GRH.'s argument ex absurdo (II, 272): "It would follow that the Scriptures were not communicated by God through the prophets, so far as the single words are concerned, since without the vowel-points the words cannot possibly exist; therefore not all Scripture is inspired." From the theory of verbal inspiration there arose also the assertion: "The style of the New Testament is free from every trace of barbarism and from solecisms." (QUEN., I, 82.) The proof of verbal inspiration was drawn, 1. From 2 Tim. 3:16. (All Scripture is wholly inspired; not only its meaning, or the thing signified, but also the words, as signs of things, were divinely inspired. Therefore, etc., etc. (HOLL., 85.)) 2. From 1 Cor. 2:13; Ex. 34:27,28; Matt. 5:18. [10] Inspiration is, therefore, a divine agency employed in connection with the recording of the truth, and, in several respects, it differs from Revelation. If we consider the latter as embracing the whole compass of Christian faith, it owes its very existence to inspiration. CAL. (I, 280): "Divine inspiration may be regarded either as the source and efficient cause of revelation, in which sense it is an act of God as inspiring, or as the form which revelation assumes, or the revealed Word." But if revelation be taken in its etymological sense, as the communication of that which was before unknown, then it differs from inspiration in the following respects: 1. The latter may contain also that which was before known, merely specifying the particular time and manner in which it is to be consummated, and, 2. The subject-matter of revelation may be communicated to man in various ways, but that of inspiration only by an immediate divine suggestion. QUEN. (I, 68): "Revelation, formally and etymologically viewed, is the manifestation of things unknown and hidden, and can be made in many and various ways, viz., by outward speech, or by dreams and visions. Inspiration is that act of the Holy Spirit by which an actual knowledge of things is supernaturally conveyed to an intelligent creature, or it is an internal suggestion or infusion of conceptions, whether the things conceived were previously known to the writer or not. The former could precede the commitment to writing; the latter was always associated with it and influenced the writing itself." Add to this the remarks: "With all this I do not deny that divine inspiration itself may be called revelation, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as it is a manifestation of certain circumstances, as also of the order and manner in which certain things are to be written. (We must distinguish between divine revelation when by it the subject-matter itself is made known, and when it refers to the peculiar circumstances and time and manner and order in which the subject-matter is to be reduced to writing." (I, 72) "And when, also, revelation concurs and coincides with divine inspiration, when, viz., the divine mysteries are revealed by inspiration and inspired by revelation, in the very act of writing. Thus CALOVIUS very properly remarks: That all the particulars contained in the Holy Scriptures are not, indeed, to be regarded as having been received by a peculiar and new revelation, but by the special dictation, inspiration, and suggestion of the Holy Spirit.'" [11] HOLL. (88): "Divine inspiration, by which the subject-matter and the words to be spoken, as well as those to be written, were immediately suggested to the prophets and apostles by the Holy Spirit, preserved them free from all error, as well in the preaching as in the writing of the divine Word." CAL. (I, 551): "No error, even in unimportant matters, no defect of memory, not to say untruth, can have any place in all the Holy Scriptures." QUEN. (I, 80): "We are to distinguish between the conversation of the apostles and their preaching and writing; or between infirmities in conduct and errors in doctrine. In doctrine the apostles never could err, after receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit, . . . but in their conduct and outward conversation they were not sinless, but, in consequence of innate original corruption, were still subject to infirmities and failings." The more accurate development of the doctrine of inspiration begins with GRH. HUT. (Loci Theologici (30)) still thus briefly expresses himself in regard to it: "Although God did not directly write the Scriptures, but used prophets and apostles as His pen and instrument, yet the Scripture is not, on that account, of any the less authority. For it is God, and indeed God alone, who inspired the prophets and apostles, not only as they spoke, but also as they wrote; and He made use of their lips, their tongues, their hands, their pen. Therefore, or in this respect, the Scriptures, as they are, were written by God Himself. For the prophets and apostles were merely instruments." This contains, however, essentially everything that we have adduced above from the later theologians. It was mainly the controversy with the Roman Catholics that gave occasion for detailed specifications; for these very well knew that they would rob the Protestant Church of all its weapons, without thereby injuring themselves, if they could cast suspicion upon the true inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Such discriminations were also called forth in part by the fanatics, who treated the written Word of God with little respect; partly by the Socinians and Arminians, who adhered to a merely partial inspiration of the Scriptures. In opposition to these, it became of great importance to the Lutheran theologians to defend with all earnestness the doctrine of the inspiration, not only of the matter, but of the very words. __________________________________________________________________ [3] Ample quotations from Schwenckfeld and Weigel in GRH. xiii:69 sqq.; for Rathmann, see WALCH's Streitigkeiten innerhalb d. Luth. Kirche, iv:577 sqq. __________________________________________________________________ § 7. The Attributes of the Holy Scriptures. If the Holy Scriptures are really the Word of God, then it follows that we are bound to yield to them implicit faith and obedience. As they are the only source of truth, they must contain this entirely and so clearly that we can really learn it from them. And they are, finally, as the Word of God, the only means by which we can attain unto faith, and, therefore, must also be able to awaken this faith in us. We ascribe to them, therefore, the attributes of authority, perfection or sufficiency, perspicuity and efficacy. [1] __________________________________________________________________ § 8. (1.) Authority BR.: "The authority of the Holy Scriptures is the manifest dignity that inclines the human understanding to assent to their instructions, and the will to yield obedience to their commands." We believe what the Holy Scriptures declare, simply because they declare it, and it is they that beget faith in us, and they are the only source from which we derive our faith. They are, at the same time, the only inspired book, and by this they are distinguished from all other writings. It is therefore only from them that we can learn what is true in divine things; and they furnish the means by which we can everywhere distinguish between truth and error. The authority of Holy Scripture is, accordingly, divided into: "(a) Causative authority, by which the Scriptures create and confirm in the mind of man assent to the truths to be believed. (b) Normative or canonical authority, by which authentic Scripture is distinguished from other writings and versions, and that which is true from that which is false." [2] HOLL. (104.) (a) Causative Authority. This rests upon the fact, that we acknowledge God as the author of the Holy Scriptures, [3] and this we prove by the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. [4] The proofs of inspiration are, it is true, derived in the first instance only from the Holy Scriptures themselves, and already presuppose faith in the Holy Scriptures themselves, on the part of those who admit them as evidence. But, for the Church and her members, there is no need of proof for the inspiration of Scripture, for her very existence depends upon this faith, and this faith precedes all proofs; [5] without this no article of faith could be based upon the Holy Scriptures. [6] Therefore, the proof that the Holy Scriptures are inspired, or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are of divine origin, and consequently possess full authority in matters of faith, is required only for those who are yet without the Church, or who, if within her pale, are not confirmed in the faith. But it lies in the nature of the case, that no proof can be given to those, which they cannot, in an unbelieving frame of mind, evade; for the only absolutely stringent proof lies in the fact, that the Holy Spirit bears witness in the heart of each individual, and thus convinces him of the divinity of the Word of God, by the mighty influence which it exerts upon him; [7] but that this may be the case, it is necessary that the individual do not resist the drawings of the Holy Spirit, and before this takes place the testimony of the Holy Spirit can have no probative power for him. [8] To this experience, therefore, the individual is referred, and through it alone will he attain to absolute certainty in regard to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. All other so-called proofs are rather to be considered as such evidences for the divinity of the Holy Scriptures as can make this probable to the individual, and invite him to give himself up to the influence of the Holy Spirit, in order to acquire for himself the same experience which the Church has gained. [9] Such evidences are of two kinds. The Holy Scriptures themselves testify in regard to this divinity, by their internal excellence and dignity (kriteria interna, internal proofs); and the effects which the Holy Scriptures have produced upon others, testify also to the same (kriteria externa, external proofs). [10] These evidences the Church holds out to each individual, and seeks by their means to induce him to yield his heart to the influence of the Holy Spirit, who will produce in him the full conviction of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. [11] (b) Normative or Canonical Authority. HOLL. (125): "The canonical authority of Scripture is its supreme dignity, by which, in virtue of its meaning, as well as of its divinely inspired style, it is the infallible and sufficient rule, by which all that is to be believed and done by man in order to secure eternal salvation, must be examined, all controversies in regard to matters of faith decided, and all other writings adjudged." [12] Accordingly, we must acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the only rule and guide of our life, by which alone all controversies in regard to divine things must be settled, [13] so that in no case is the addition of any other authority required, by which they may be decided. [14] But if the Holy Scriptures are thus the only judge of controversies, the question arises: How is this decision to be obtained from them? It lies in the nature of the case, that not every one can accomplish this with equal success, for certain previous conditions are required for this purpose, without which the Holy Scriptures cannot be understood and expounded; and besides, necessary ecclesiastical order demands that, at least for the public investigation and announcement of the decisions contained in the Holy Scriptures, there should be a regular calling. Hence, it pre-eminently belongs to the Church publicly to make known, by means of her representatives (the clergy), the decision discovered in the Holy Scriptures, in reference to a contested point, [15] whence, however, it does not yet follow, that every private individual within the pale of the Church does not possess the right of private judgment. [16] If then, in any given case, the adjustment of a controversy be not attained, the fault lies not in the Holy Scriptures, but in the fact that the Holy Scriptures were not properly interpreted, or the proper interpretation was not adopted. [17] But, in every case, when such a controversy is to be decided, resort must be had to the original text of the Holy Scriptures; for, although a good translation may enable us to secure the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is never so accurate, that we dare employ it in doubtful cases, in which often everything depends upon the most accurate investigation of the single words of the original text. [18] [1] The attributes are variously enumerated by the early divines. CAL. and QUEN. add to those we have mentioned, infallible truth, the power of interpreting itself, normative and judicial authority, which are again by others incorporated in those we have mentioned. Some theologians also add the following as secondary attributes: (1) "Necessity; or, that it was necessary for the Word of God to be committed to writing, in order to preserve the purity of the heavenly doctrine. (2) Integrity and perpetuity; or, that the Holy Scriptures have been preserved entire, and will be thus perpetually preserved. (3) Purity and uncorrupted state of its sources; or, that the Hebrew text in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New, have not suffered, in all copies, any corruption, either through malice or carelessness, but have been preserved by Divine Providence, free from all corruption. (4) Authentic dignity; or, that the Hebrew text alone of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, is to be regarded as authentic, nor is any version to be counted worthy of such supreme authority. (5) The liberty of all to read for themselves." -- CAL., I, 450. [2] BR. (82): "The authority of Scripture, so far as it regards the assent that is to be yielded to its declarations, may be viewed in a two-fold light: first, in a strict sense, in order to cause assent to the things that are to be believed, which right the Scriptures hold because they are the source of knowledge and the formal object of faith and revealed theology; secondly, in order to distinguish by the inspired Scriptures themselves, both the true Scriptures and those other teachings, which relate to matters of faith and practice; and this right they hold, inasmuch as they are canonical, or the rule and guide whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood. . . . For, although the authority of Scripture is one and the same, based upon the veracity of God and the dependence of the Scriptures upon God, through which it is appointed, both in a formal sense to produce faith and in a normal sense to examine and decide between certain Scriptures and other teachings; and as, further, the Scriptures are to be employed somewhat differently for the formal purpose of causing assent to the faith, and for the normal purpose of distinguishing truth from falsehood; thus, also, we must by all means treat distinctly of both these methods in discussing the authority of Scripture." HOLL. (105): "In the former method, they (the Holy Scriptures) are employed in every language for producing faith in the mind of an unbelieving man, and for confirming it in the mind of a believer; in which respect this authority is called causative or promotive of faith; in the latter method, they are employed only in the original text, to distinguish from the actually inspired Scripture the versions of the Hebrew and Greek originals, the Symbolical Books, and all writings that treat of matters of faith and practice." [3] BR. (80): "The authority of Scripture, viewed in itself and absolutely, or with reference to its contents, depends upon God, the sole Author of Scripture, and results from His veracity and great and infinite power." GRH. (II, 36): "Inasmuch, then, as the Holy Scriptures have God for their author, by whose immediate inspiration the prophets, evangelists, and apostles wrote, therefore they also possess divine authority; because they are inspired, they are in like manner self-commendatory, winning faith by virtue of their own inherent excellence." [4] BR. (81): "So far as we are concerned, or that we may be convinced that the Holy Scriptures are worthy to receive faith and obedience, not only these perfections of God must be known, but also the dependence of Scripture upon God, or its inspiration by Him." Our conviction, however, rests upon the two theses: "(1) Whatsoever Scripture is recorded by divine inspiration, that is certainly and infallibly true. (2) The Holy Scriptures were recorded by divine inspiration." [5] GRH. (I, 9): "Those who are within the Church do not inquire about the authority of Scripture, for this is their starting-point. How can they be true disciples of Christ if they pretend to call in question the doctrine of Christ? How can they be true members of the Church if they are in doubt concerning the foundation of the Church? How can they wish to prove that to themselves which they always employ to prove other things? How can they doubt concerning that whose efficacy they have experienced in their own hearts? The Holy Spirit testifies in their hearts that the Spirit is truth, i.e., that the doctrine derived from the Holy Spirit is absolute truth." [6] GRH. therefore very properly observes, that the doctrine of the authority of Scripture is no article of faith, but rather the fountain-head of the articles of faith. (I, 11): "The doctrine concerning the Canon is, properly speaking, not an article of faith, since Moses, the prophets, evangelists, and apostles did not fabricate in their writings a new article of faith superadded to the former, which they taught orally." [7] GRH. (II, 37): "The first (testimony) is the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, who, as He bears witness to the spirit of believers that they are the sons of God, Rom. 8:16, so, also, efficaciously convinces them, that in the Scriptures the voice of their Heavenly Father is contained; and God is the only fit and authentic witness. To this testimony belongs the lively sense of the godly in daily prayer and in the exercises of penitence and faith, the grace of consoling and strengthening the mind against all kinds of adversities, temptations, persecutions, etc., etc., which the godly daily experience in reading and meditating upon Scripture." QUEN. (I, 97): "The ultimate reason by and through which we are led to believe with a divine and unshaken faith that God's Word is God's Word, is the intrinsic power and efficacy of that Word itself, and the testimony and seal of the Holy Spirit, speaking in and through Scripture. Because the bestowment of faith, not only that by which we believe in the articles, but even that by which we believe in the Scriptures, that exhibit and propose the articles, is a work that emanates from the Holy Spirit, or the Supreme Cause." HOLL. (116): "By the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, is here understood the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, attentively read or heard (His own divine power being communicated to the Holy Scriptures), moving, opening, illuminating the heart of man, and inciting it to obedience unto the faith; so that man, thus illuminated by internal, spiritual influences, clearly perceives that the word proposed to him has indeed proceeded from God, and thus gives it unyielding assent." The Scripture proof for the testimony of the Holy Spirit is deduced from 1 John 5:6; 1 Thess. 1:5,6; 2:13. To the common objection, that Theology here reasons in a circle, the following answer is returned, HOLL. (119): "If I inquire, says the objector, How do you know that the Scriptures are divine? the Lutherans answer: Because the Holy Sprit in each one testifies and confirms this by the Scripture.' If I ask again: How do you prove that this Holy Sprit is divine?' the same persons will reply: Because the Scriptures testify that He is divine, and His testimony infallible.' To all of which we reply: We must distinguish between a sophistical circle and a demonstrative retrogression. In reasoning in a circle, one unknown thing is employed to prove another equally unknown; but in a demonstrative retrogression, we proceed from confused knowledge to that which is distinct. For the divine dignity of Scripture is proved by the supernatural effect of the Holy Spirit operating efficaciously through the Scriptures, illuminating, converting, regenerating, renewing. But, if you ask whether that spirit is divine or malignant, then we reason from the effect, which is divine and salutary, that the Spirit, who bears witness within concerning the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures, is divine, most holy, and excellent." QUEN. (I, 101) further adds: "The Papists, therefore, wrongly accuse us of reasoning in a circle, when we prove the Holy Scriptures from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit from the Holy Scriptures. Else would it be also reasoning in a circle when Moses and the prophets testify concerning Christ, and Christ concerning Moses and the prophets; or, when John the Baptist testifies that Christ is the Messiah, and again Christ that John the Baptist is a prophet." [8] Therefore GRH. (II, 36) distinguishes, among those who stand without the pale of the Church, two classes: "Some are curable, who come with minds tempered and desirous of learning; others are incurable, who come with minds unyielding and obstinate, and who contumaciously resist the truth, Acts 13:46; 19:28. The incurable, just as those who are past bodily recovery, are to be forsaken to their fate, Titus 3:10. The same applies to those who are within the pale of the Church, if, in the midst of temptation, they begin to doubt the authority of the Scripture." [9] QUEN. (I, 98): "Those arguments both of an internal and external nature, by which we are led to the belief of the authority of Scripture make the inspiration of Scripture probable, and produce a certainty not merely conjectural but moral, so that to call it in question were the work of a fool; but they do not make the divinity of Scripture infallible, and place it beyond all doubt, nor do they produce within the mind an immovable conviction, i.e., they beget not a divine, but merely a human faith, not an unshaken certainty, but a credibility, or a very probable opinion." [10] GRH. (II, 37): "I. The internal criteria inherent in the Scriptures themselves, some of which are found in the causes, others in the effects, some in the subject-matter, others in incidental circumstances. Such criteria are antiquity, the majesty of the subjects discussed, peculiarity of style, harmony of all parts, dignity of the predictions concerning future events, the reality of their fulfilment, divinity of the miracles by which their doctrine is confirmed, the violence of the diabolical opposition to it, the efficacy of Scripture itself in persuading and moving to action. II. The external testimonies (which can be drawn from all classes of men), among which is pre-eminent the testimony of the Church, to which we may add that of the martyrs, who sealed the doctrine taught in Scripture with their blood, and also, the punishment of blasphemers and persecutors, who contumaciously opposed this doctrine." The later divines present these proofs in substantially the same manner as HOLL. (106): "The external criteria (which are derived, not from Scripture, but from other sources) are (a) the antiquity of Scripture; (b) the singular clearness of the sacred writers, their desire after knowledge and truth; (c) the splendor of the miracles by which the heavenly doctrine is confirmed; (d) the harmonious testimony of the Church, spread over the whole earth, to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures; (e) the constancy of the martyrs; (f) the testimony of other nations to the doctrine contained in the Holy Scriptures; (g) the successful and rapid propagation of the Christian doctrine through the whole world, and its wonderful preservation during so many persecutions; (h) the extremely severe punishments inflicted upon the despisers and persecutors of the Divine Word." In reference to these, HOLL. remarks (109): "We premise these external criteria, in order to prepare the minds of the unbelieving for reading and meditating upon the Holy Scriptures with interest and desire . . . it is necessary that first of all unbelievers be led by external criteria to regard it as not improbable that the Holy Scriptures had their origin in God, and therefore begin to respect, read, and meditate upon them." The internal criteria ("drawn from the intrinsic nature and attributes of Scripture," BR.) are: "(a) the majesty of God, testifying concerning Himself in the Holy Scriptures; (b) the simplicity and dignity of the biblical style; (c) the sublimity of the divine mysteries which the Scriptures reveal; (d) the truth of all biblical assertions; (e) the sanctity of the precepts contained in the Holy Scriptures; (f) the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures to salvation." In regard to these, HOLL. further adds: "These internal criteria, taken together and conjointly, constitute a stronger argument than if taken successively or singly." [11] GRH. (I, 9): "Although the testimony of the Holy Spirit is of the very highest importance, yet we are not to make a beginning with it in the conversion of such men, i.e., they are not to be commanded to wait until the Holy Spirit bears witness immediately in their hearts concerning the authority of Scripture, but they are to be directed to the testimony of the Church, which, in this respect, performs the part of a preceptor to the unbelieving disciple. Just as, therefore, it is necessary for a pupil first to believe, until he afterwards becomes able to form an independent judgment concerning the things taught, so it is necessary for an unbeliever to yield assent to the testimony of the Church, which is the first step towards ascertaining the authority of Scripture; then the internal criteria of antiquity, prophecies, etc., are to be added. Yet the testimony of the Church alone is not sufficient to convince an unbeliever of the divine authority of the Scriptures, since he may, perhaps, still be in doubt whether this be really the true Church of God. Wherefore, as it is the duty of the preceptor, not only to propose precepts, but also to corroborate their truth; so it is not sufficient for the Church to declare that these are divine Scriptures, unless it accompany its declaration with reasons. Then at length it may follow that the Holy Spirit shall bear testimony in the heart of the inquirer, and prove the truth of His words." The testimony of the Church varies in weight, according as it is derived from the earlier or from the later Church. GRH. (I, 10): "The primitive Church, that heard the apostles themselves, excelled in being the original recipients of the sacred books, and in being favored with the living instruction of the apostles and with a number of miracles to prove the authority of the canon; the next age, in which the autographs of the apostles were still preserved, excelled the former in the more complete fulfilment of New Testament prophecies, in the abundance of versions of both Testaments into various languages, and in the testimony concerning the Holy Scriptures extracted from various writings of believers; and it excelled the age succeeding it, by possessing the autographs of the evangelists and apostles, the voice of the ancient Church, and a number of miracles. The latest age of the Church excels both the others (although the autographs of the apostles are no more), at least in the more perfect fulfilment of prophecy." Occasion is here taken to protest against the Romish axiom, "All the authority of Scripture depends upon the Church," and to guard against such an interpretation being put upon what has been above stated. HOLL. (120): "The authority of the Holy Scriptures neither depends upon the Church of the divine, pre-eminent dignity in which its power lies; nor, in order that it may be known, does it need the testimony of the Church either, as the grand and ultimate source of proof for the divine authority of Scripture, or as the only and absolutely necessary arguments." GRH. (II, 38) remarks (1): "It is one thing for the Church to bear witness to the Scriptures and their authority ministerially, and another to confer upon Scripture its authority dictatorially and judicially. From the ministry and testimony of the Church, we are led to acknowledge the authority of Scripture, but from this it by no means follows that the authority of Scripture, either in itself, or in respect to us, depends alone upon the authority of the Church; because, when we have once learned that the Scriptures are divine and contain the Word of God, we no longer believe the Scriptures on account of the Church, but on account of themselves; because, viz., they are the voice of God, which is autaletheia, and hence autopistos, which we know must be believed on its own account and immediately. (2) It is one thing for us to become acquainted with the authority of the Scriptures by the testimony of the Church, and another, for the whole authority of the Scripture, so far as we are concerned, to depend solely upon the testimony of the Church. The former we concede, the latter we deny; because, beside the testimony of the Church, we have two other classes of evidence for the authority of Scripture, and in the same class, that embraces the testimony of the Church, other external evidences derived from all kinds of men may be adduced; yet, at the same time, we do not deny, that the testimony of the Church is to be preferred to all others in this class. (3) It is one thing to speak of the testimony of the primitive Church, which received the autograph of the sacred books from the apostles, and handed down a credible testimony concerning them to posterity, and another, to speak of the authority of the present Church." QUEN. (I, 93) notices, in addition, the objection of the Papists, "The Church is more ancient than the Scriptures; therefore, it has greater authority;" to which he replies: "We must make a distinction between the Word of God contained in the Scriptures, and the act of writing itself, or, between the substance of Scripture, which is the Word of God, and its accident, which is the writing of it. The Church is prior to the Scriptures, if you regard the mere act of writing; but it is not prior to the Word of God itself, by means of which the Church itself was collected. Surely the Scriptures, or the Word of God, is the foundation of the Church, Eph. 2:20; but the foundation is older than the building." [12] HOLL. (125): "The Holy Scriptures exercise their highest canonical authority, when a controversy arises concerning the truth of a doctrine, and the truth is to be confirmed and falsehood to be confuted; but the Scriptures exert their faith-producing authority, as often as the unbelieving are to be converted to the Christian faith, or the weak faith of believers is to be strengthened." [13] GRH. (I, 28): "The Holy Scriptures are the rule of our faith and life; therefore, also, the judge of theological controversies." (I, 30): "Add to this, that all the qualities of a rule, properly so called, belong to Scripture. For a rule should be certain, fixed, invariable, fundamental, suited to meet every case, always self-consistent. But these qualities belong neither to tradition, nor to the teachings of human reason, nor to the writings of the fathers, nor to the Pope, nor to the decrees of councils, but to the Holy Scriptures alone." FORM. CONC. (Preface, 1): "We teach, that the only rule according to which all doctrines and all teachers are to be estimated and judged, is none other than the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testament." (Compare also the remarks of QUEN. (I, 150): "When we say that the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and of life conformed to the will of God, we do not speak of every age of the Church, for there was a time when the Church was instituted and governed without the written Word of God, the time, viz., before Moses; but we refer to that age in which the first written canon was prepared, and especially to the New Testament times, in which all things necessary to faith and the worship of God have been written down, and with great care collected into the canon.") HOLL. (125): "As a rule of knowledge, it performs a two-fold function, directive and corrective. For it directs the thoughts of the human mind, so that they abide within the bounds of truth; and it corrects errors, inasmuch as it is properly its own rule of right and wrong. Wherefore, the Holy Scriptures are called the Canon, or rule, partly on account of their directive character, because the true faith and pure morals are learned from them; partly on account of their corrective character, since controversies in regard to the faith are decided by them, and whatever is right and godly is retained, and what is erroneous and ungodly is rejected." Others, as CAL. and QUEN., express this by a separate attribute, viz., the normative and judicial authority. CAL. (I, 474): "The Holy Scriptures are a rule, according to which all controversies in regard to faith or life in the Church should, and can be, decided (Ps. 19:7; Gal. 6:16; Phil. 3:16); and as a rule they are not partial, but complete and adequate, because, beside the Scriptures, no other infallible rule in matters of faith can be given. All others beside the Word of God are fallible; and on this account we are referred to the Holy Scriptures as the only rule (Deut. 4:2; 12:28; Josh. 23:6; Is. 8:20; Luke 16:29; 2 Pet. 1:19); to which, alone, Christ and the apostles referred as a rule (Matt. 4:4; 22:29,31; Mark 9:12; John 5:45; Acts 3:20; 13:33; 18:28; 26:22)." [14] Hence, the two corollaries of QUEN. (I, 158, 167): "(1) It is therefore not necessary that there should be in the Church a supreme, regularly appointed and universal judge, who, seated upon a visible throne, is peremptorily to decide all strifes and controversies that arise among Christians concerning faith and religion, and orally and specifically to pronounce sentence in regard to them. We cannot acknowledge as such a judge either the Roman pontiff, or the fathers, or councils. (2) Nor is the decision concerning the mysteries and controversies of the faith to be granted to human reason, nor to an internal instinct or secret spirit." [15] CHMN. (Trid.): "The Church has the right and liberty of deciding." GRH. (II, 359): "If the Church is the pillar and the ground of the truth,' and we are commanded to hear it' (1 Tim. 3:15; Matt. 18:17), then all decisions in matters of faith belong to her." But the right which is hereby ascribed to the Church is carefully distinguished from that which belongs to the Holy Scriptures. This is usually done in the following manner: (1) The principal judge is the Holy Spirit; the instrumental judge, the Holy Scriptures; the ministerial (inferior) judge, the clergy. In regard to the latter, however ("whose duty it is to seek for the decision of the Supreme Judge as laid down in Scripture, and from this to teach what is to be done, to interpret this, and decide in accordance with it"), it is maintained that this judge should not pronounce sentence according to his own will, but according to the rule laid down by the Supreme Judge,' i.e., according to the Holy Scriptures, which we therefore call the decision of the Supreme Judge, the rule of the inferior judge, and the directive judge (GRH., II., 366). And QUEN. (I, 150): "An inferior decision, viz., of a teacher of the Church, is nothing else than the interpretation, declaration, or annunciation of a divine, decisive, and definitive judgment, and its application to particular persons and things." Whence it further follows: "We are able to decide by the decision of an inferior judge, not absolutely, but if he pronounce according to the prescriptions of the divine law or the Scriptures, and in so far as he shows that he decides according to the Word of God. (Deut. 17:10.) Wherefore, we may appeal from this inferior judge to the Supreme, but not conversely, from the Supreme to the inferior. The subordinate judge is, therefore, not absolute, but restricted and bound by the decisions of the Supreme Judge as recorded in Scripture. According to this distinction, the Holy Scriptures are called the judging Judge, or the Judge ad quem (to whom there is appeal), and the Church the Judge to be judged, or the Judge a quo (From whom there is an appeal)." The Church is, therefore, it is true, a visible judge, but merely discretive, who, in the exercise of sound judgment, distinguishes truth from falsehood. She is, however, "not a judge, specially and strictly so called, viz., authoritative and decisive, pronouncing sentence authoritatively, and by virtue of the authority belonging to her, compelling the disputants to acquiesce in the whole opinion she may propose without further investigation." (HOLL., 146.) [16] GRH. (II, 359): "Whatever pertains to a spiritual person, may be regarded as belonging to all children and members of the Church. The reason of this is, that by spiritual person, we understand not merely the clergy, according to the nomenclature of the Papists, but all the children of the Church, who are controlled by the Spirit of God. Rom. 8:9. For he that is spiritual judgeth all things.' 1 Cor. 2:15." QUEN. (I, 150): "We assert that every believer, according to the measure of the gift of God, can and ought to judge, not indeed, in all controversies, but concerning the doctrines necessary to salvation, and to mark the difference between brass and beans by his own discretive judgment. Not that every one should follow his own notions, as the Papists accuse our churches of doing, but that he should submit himself to the judgment of the Holy Spirit, recorded in the Scriptures, and examine all things according to the tenor of this decision, but leave to the learned the public decision of controversies. 1 Cor. 10:15; 11:31: 1 Thess. 5:19." In accordance with this, a distinction is made between "the public and the private ministerial (inferior) judge. The public judge is the clergy; the private, each member of the Church, or private person." [17] GRH. (II, 367): "We must distinguish between power and its exercise. The Holy Scriptures are indeed sufficient and adapted, by virtue of their authority, and the perfection and perspicuity of their character, to decide controversies; but, through the fault of human weakness and wickedness, it happens that this effect does not always, nor with all persons, follow their application; just as the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to all such as believe, Rom. 1:16, yet, at the same time, not all are actually converted and saved by the preaching of the Gospel." BR. (161): "Doubtless, all controversies that relate to matters of faith and practice, necessary to be decided and known, can, in this way, be adjudged and decided; only, when an occasion of controversy occurs, let those who are to engage in it, bring to the task minds that are pious, truth-loving, and learned. For thus, prejudice and partiality and evil feelings being laid aside, and the arguments of both sides being duly weighed, according to the rule of Scripture, it easily become apparent which is the true and which is the false opinion, on account of the perspicuity of Scripture, which acts in this case by virtue of its appointed office. But, as to other questions, either side of which may be held without injury to the faith, their decision ought not to be demanded, or expected, to be so clear." [18] HOLL. (125): "The causative authority of the faith differs from the canonical authority of Scripture, because the Scriptures beget divine faith, through the inspired sense, which sense of Scripture remains one and the same, whether expressed in the original idiom of Scripture, or in a translation conformed to the original text. So that the illuminating power, connected with the sense of Scripture, effectually manifests itself in the production of faith, not only by means of Scripture in the original tongues, but also through translations, provided the translations be perspicuous and conformed to the authentic text. Such is Luther's translation of the Bible, which is used in our churches by the faithful; which, when read, or heard, is as efficacious is causing assent to the faith, as if they should read the Hebrew text of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New, or hear it read and expounded by a teacher, although the words of that translation were not immediately inspired by God. But, that the Scriptures may have canonical authority, it is necessary, that not only the sense, but also the words, shall have been derived immediately from God. For to canonical and normal authority in matters of doctrine and practice, an absolute certainty and infallibility in the words themselves is necessary, which does not exist except in the original text of Scripture, for this depends immediately upon divine inspiration. Translations are the work of men, who, in translating the Scriptures, may have erred." __________________________________________________________________ § 9. (2.) Perfection, or Sufficiency. From the fact that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, it necessarily follows that all that is contained in them is perfectly true; from the fact that they are the only Word of God given to us, it further follows that, if we are at all to learn the way of life, it must be perfectly taught in the Holy Scriptures, [1] and this is what is meant by their perfection or sufficiency. GRH. (II, 286): "That the Scriptures fully and perfectly instruct us concerning all things necessary to salvation." [2] And, indeed, so perfectly must everything necessary to salvation be contained in the Holy Scriptures, whether declared in express words or to be learned inferentially, [3] that we never find occasion to make up deficiencies from another source; whence, all doctrines claiming to be derived from oral tradition are to be rejected. GRH. (I, 25): "Laying aside tradition, we are to adhere to Scripture alone." [4] [1] HOLL. (173) distinguishes: "the perfection of Scripture (a) in reference to the subject-matter; since no inspired book, received into the permanent canon of the faith, perishes. (b) In reference to the form; that no error has crept into the authentic text by the negligence or perfidy of transcribers. (c) In reference to the end to be attained; for it sufficiently teaches man all doctrines and moral precepts necessary to salvation." Of the latter, viz., perfection as to the end to be accomplished, we are here speaking. BR. (136): "We only assert that the Scriptures are perfect in reference to the accomplishment of their end, and in this opinion we all agree. Those things are said to be perfect in reference to their end which want nothing that is necessary for the attainment of that end. But the ultimate aim of Scripture is our salvation; the intermediate, faith in Christ." Of perfection in the second sense, we have already spoken, under the head of inspiration. In reference to perfection, in the first sense, BR. (135) remarks: "We do not so much refer to the number of the books that ever were written by the sacred penmen, of which some referred to by the names of their authors or titles in the remaining books of Scripture are supposed to have perished; but we refer to the perfection of the Scriptures that remain in regard to the accomplishment of their end. Moreover, also, as to those books which some suppose to have perished, it is to be observed that some of them have not really perished, but are still extant, though under different titles. . . . But, if some books written by the sacred penmen did really perish, yet we hold that (1) such were not written by Divine inspiration, but by human prompting; (2) they were also rather historical than doctrinal; at all events, or if it be (3) conceded that inspired books have perished, it must be maintained that the doctrines themselves are found with equal truth and fulness in the remaining books; certainly (4) that no book which once by the intention of the Holy Spirit formed a part of the canon or rule, has perished, to the detriment of the canonical Scriptures, so that they should cease to be the adequate source and rule of faith and practice." GRH. remarks, in addition, that the Holy Scriptures are not to be regarded as perfect only since the canon of the Old and New Testament has been closed. (II, 286): "The perfection of the Holy Scriptures is to be estimated not by the number of the books, but from the sufficiency of the doctrine necessary to be known, in order to salvation. That which was written at any particular age of the Church, constituted a perfect canon, since the divine revelation was perfectly developed, so far as that age required it, in those books. Thus, when only the books of Moses were extant, the Scriptures were perfect, i.e., with respect to that age of the Church, in which not many revelations had been made which God wished to be committed to writing." [2] QUEN. (I, 102): "The Holy Scriptures contain with perfect fulness and sufficiency all things necessary to be known in order to Christian faith and life, and therefore to the attainment of eternal salvation." This GRH. (II, 286, sq.): proves. "(1) From their plain designation and title, Ps. 19:7. (2) From their efficient original cause, viz., God, most wise and most perfect. (3) From the subject-matter. The inspired Holy Scriptures, comprehended in the prophetical and apostolical books, contain the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation, and unfold all the parts of Christianity in such a manner that nothing need be added or subtracted. This is proved by Acts 20:27; 26:22; 2 Tim. 3:16,17; Deut. 4:2; 12:32; Gal. 1:8; Rev. 22:18. (4) From their aim and effects." [3] CAL. (I, 610): "We assert, that the Holy Scriptures sufficiently and adequately contain all things necessary to faith and a Christian life, and we think that those other things also in the Scriptures should be clearly and sufficiently considered, which, both according to the words and according to the sense, are comprehended therein, or, as plain interferences, are drawn from those which are clearly written; so that there is no need of any unwritten tradition to supply the defects of Scripture, or to collect and deduce from it those things which are virtually contained in it; because without any tradition they may all be sufficiently obtained from Scripture alone." GRH. (II, 286): "We by no means say that the Scriptures are perfect in such a sense that all things which are necessary to be known for faith and practice are contained in the Scriptures, literally and in so many words, but some of them in substance, others literally; or, what is the same thing, that some are contained in them explicitly and others by implication, so that by legitimate and undeniable inference they can be deduced from them." QUEN. (I, 102) thus guards against the misapprehension of his remark: "We do not say, with the Papists, that the Scriptures are perfect by implication or contain all things necessary to faith, as in a root or germ, or common source, or, as it were, in outline. . . . so that they do not themselves really contain all things, but show whence and where they are to be sought, with a reference to the Church and her traditions, from which the defects of those doctrines which are wanting may be supplied." [4] Hereby the papal doctrine of tradition is rejected, which CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 110) thus describes: "They pretend that many things necessary to faith and practice were handed down by the apostles which are not comprehended in Scripture. To this claim they add another, viz., that those things which are handed down and observed in the Roman Church, and cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, are the very things which were orally transmitted by the Apostles and not comprehended in Scripture." Whence HOLL. (178): "Tradition is the instruction orally given by Christ and the Apostles, which is neither substantially nor literally contained in Scripture, but by continuous succession is preserved in the Church." To which is replied: "We infer from the perfection of Scripture that it needs in no way the aid of tradition in the articles of faith necessary to salvation." (GRH. II, 307.) Inasmuch as the word, tradition, was used in such different senses in the Holy Scriptures, and such various significations applied to it, the Dogmaticians take occasion accurately to designate the sense in which they reject tradition, and from this signification carefully to distinguish those which in a certain sense they admit. CHEMN. in Exam. Trid. I, 110 seq., marks eight different significations, viz.: "(1) Those things which Christ and the Apostles orally delivered, and which were afterwards committed to writing by the Evangelists and Apostles, are often called traditions. "(2) The books of Holy Scripture have been guarded by the Church during an uninterrupted series of ages and in a connected and sure succession, and they have been faithfully transmitted to posterity and handed down, as if from hand to hand, unto us. "(3) Irenaeus and Tertullian celebrate apostolical tradition . . . They do not, indeed, propose and prove any other doctrines of faith by tradition than those which are contained in Scripture; but they show, and prove also by tradition, those same doctrines which are contained in Scripture. "(4) There are traditions concerning the exposition, the true sense or native meaning, of Scripture. "(5) The fathers sometimes thus designate those doctrines which are not contained in so many words and syllables in Scripture, but are derived from clear Scripture testimony, by sound, certain, indisputable, and evident reasoning. "(6) The term is applied to the universal consent of the fathers. The phrase is common, by the tradition of the fathers' (patres ita tradiderunt). "(7) When the ancients made mention of unwritten tradition they did not understand by them doctrines of faith to be received without, over and above Scripture, even if they could not be proved by any Scripture testimony; but they spoke concerning certain rites and customs, which on account of their antiquity they ascribed to the Apostles. "(8) Traditions relating both to faith and practice, which cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, which nevertheless the Council of Trent commands to be received and venerated with the same reverence and pious feeling as the Scriptures themselves." HOLL. (178) accordingly divides the traditions of the Church into "ritual, historical, exegetical, evidential, and dogmatical." Only the latter class is here referred to. HOLL.: "We do not disapprove of all the ritual traditions of the Church, but the theological rule observed by CHEMN. in his Exam. Conc. Trid. must be adhered to, viz., Let the ceremonies in the Church be of an unessential nature, few in number, devout, and useful for edification, order, and decorum; let the observance of them be left free, so as to avoid giving offence,' and so that they may be instituted, changed, or abrogated with a reference to edification, to times, places, and persons. We admit historical tradition, concerning the canon of Scripture, not as an infallible, but as a probable argument. We receive with gratitude exegetical traditions, if namely the interpretation of the fathers present no discrepancy with the scriptural text, the proper use of the words, the context, and the analogy of faith. We hold in high esteem evidential tradition, and confess with Chemnitz that we differ from those who invent opinions that find no supporting testimony in any age of the Church. We think also that no doctrine that is new and at variance with all antiquity should be received in the Church." The Symbolical Books treat only of the ecclesiastical or ceremonial traditions. The AUG. CONF. XV, APOLOGY VIII, and FORM. CONC. X, discuss the questions: (1) Whether these are admissible, which they answer affirmatively; and (2) Whether in the Church nothing dare be taught, as nothing is believed, which is not proved by an express declaration of Scripture? which, in the light of Christian liberty, they deny. Syncretism then gave occasion to further specifications in regard to the idea of tradition. G. CALIXTUS has said: "It should not be doubted, that from the writings of the ancient Church, which are still extant, the common belief of antiquity can be sufficiently ascertained, and that should be regarded as apostolical, which they unanimously teach and declare that they receive as apostolical." To which CAL. (I, 327) replies: "Although some innovators differ from the Papists in this, that they do not recognize any article of faith that is merely traditional and not contained in the Scriptures, or receive any doctrine as taught by the Apostles, which is not written; yet they side with the Papists in this, that they accept as the Word of God something not written and handed down by the Apostles, and wish some apostolical tradition, I know not what, handed down to us through the writings of the fathers, to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God." And, page 330, the additional statement: "Although it is not to be doubted that the Apostles taught not only by writings but also viva voce, and that the Word which they preached, no less than what is comprehended in the Scriptures, is to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God, yet we neither can, nor ought to, gratify the Papists by teaching that there is still extant some additional Word of God communicated by the Apostles, and handed down from them to us, which should be received as infallible and indubitable, along with the prophetical and apostolical Holy Scriptures. __________________________________________________________________ § 10. (3.) Perspicuity. If the Holy Scriptures contain everything necessary to salvation, and if they alone contain it, they must necessarily exhibit it so clearly and plainly that it is accessible to the comprehension of every one; hence the attribute of Perspicuity is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. CAL. (I, 467): "Because in those things which are necessary to be known in order to salvation, the Scriptures are abundantly and admirably explicit, both by the intention of God their Author, and by the natural signification of the words, so that they need no external and adventitious light." [1] But while such perspicuity is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures, it is not meant that every particular that is contained in them is equally clear and plain to all, but only that all that is necessary to be known in order to salvation is clearly and plainly taught in them, [2] and that, if this be not expressed in all cases with equal clearness, it can nevertheless be gathered from a collocation of the passages bearing upon it. [3] It is also not maintained that the Holy Scriptures can be understood without the possession of certain prerequisites. On the other hand, such as the following are required, viz., proper maturity of judgment, the necessary philological attainments, an unprejudiced frame of mind in the investigation of the sacred truth, and a will inclined to embrace this truth in its purity. [4] Where these prerequisites are wanting, there can, as a matter of course, be no thorough understanding of the Holy Scriptures; but in such a case the fault does not lie in the Holy Scriptures. [5] Where these prerequisites exist, a clear and accurate comprehension of the saving truths contained in Scripture may be gained, which nevertheless, even in this case, is merely external and natural until, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, an internal apprehension of them is effected, [6] as well as the power of heartily appropriating, to one's self the saving truths contained in Scripture. [7] Finally, the perspicuity of the Holy Scriptures is not to be so understood as if the mysteries of the Christian faith were unveiled by it; on the other hand, these remain as they are, mysteries; perspicuity consists only in this, that the Scriptures make known to us the mysteries just as God wishes them to be made known. [8] From what has here been said, it naturally follows, further, that in all cases in which the interpretation of a passage is doubtful, the decision dare never be found anywhere else than in the Scriptures themselves, whereby the faculty of self-interpretation is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. [9] And, in this interpretation, it is a fundamental principle, that the doubtful passages are to be explained by those that are clear. [10] Inasmuch now as all doctrines necessary to be known in order to salvation, are clearly taught in Scripture, so that we gain from them the general substance of the Christian plan of salvation; and inasmuch, further, as we can safely presuppose that the Holy Scriptures will not contradict themselves, we need only take care that we do not derive from these doubtful passages a sense that would conflict with the clearly revealed truths; we must therefore interpret according to the analogy of faith. (CAL.: "The analogy of faith is the consistency of the doctrine clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures.") [11] To the interpretation of all Scripture, whether doubtful or plain, the general rule applies, that each passage contains but one original and proper sense, that, namely, which is derived immediately from the words employed (the literal sense), which is to be ascertained in every case by the use of the means above described. [12] [1] The fullest description of perspicuity we find in BR. (138): "Perspicuity, or that those things which are necessary to be believed and done by man in seeking to be saved, are taught in Scripture in words and phrases so clear and conformed to the usage of speech, that any man acquainted with the language, possessed of a common judgment, and paying due attention to the words, may learn the true sense of the words, so far as those things are concerned which must be known, and may embrace these fundamental doctrines by the simple grasp of his mind; according as the mind of man is led, by the Scriptures themselves and their supernatural light, or the divine energy conjoined with them, to yield the assent of faith to the word understood and the things signified." The proof, according to QUEN. (I, 121, 122): "(1) From Deut. 30:11, 12; Rom. 10:8; 2 Pet. 1:19; Ps. 19:8; 119:105; Prov. 6:23. (2) From the character of Scripture: (a) Because it has God for its Author, who can speak perspicuously, and does not wish to speak obscurely. He can speak perspicuously, for He formed speech and the voice. To say that He wished to speak obscurely, would be nothing short of blasphemy. (b) It gives wisdom to babes or the unskilled, Ps. 19:7; 2 Tim. 3:15. (c) It reveals hidden mysteries, Rom. 16:25; 1 Cor. 2:9, 10; Col. 1:26, 27. (d) It was given for the purpose that the will of God might here be learned, and men informed in regard to eternal life, John 20:31; Rom. 15:4. (e) Because its precepts are to be read by all, Deut. 17:19; John 5:39." [2] GRH. (I, 26): "It is to be observed that when we call the Scriptures perspicuous, we do not mean that every particular expression, anywhere contained in Scripture, is so constituted that at the first glance it must be plainly and fully understood by every one. On the other hand, we confess that certain things are obscurely expressed in Scripture and difficult to be understood . . . But this we do assert, and endeavor in every way to prove, that the perspicuity of the Scriptures is of such a nature that a certain and consistent opinion can be drawn from them concerning the doctrines whose knowledge is necessary to salvation." Whence it follows (II, 329) that "the knowledge of those things, which are nowhere plainly and perspicuously revealed in Scripture, is not absolutely necessary to salvation." QUEN. (I, 118): "We do not maintain that all Scripture, in every particular, is clear and perspicuous. For we grant that certain things are met with in the sacred books that are obscure and difficult to be understood, 2 Pet. 3:16, not only in respect to the sublimity of their subject-matter, but also as to the utterance of the Holy Spirit, that afford materials for calling into exercise the learning of the doctors during the course of a long life, and the full understanding of which is to be expected only in heaven; but that the doctrines of faith and moral precepts are taught so obscurely everywhere, that they can nowhere be found clearly and explicitly, it is this that we deny. But the articles of faith and the moral precepts are taught in Scripture in their proper places, not in obscure and ambiguous words, but in such as are fitted to them, and free from all ambiguity, so that every diligent reader of Scripture, who reads it devoutly and piously, can understand them." (BR. (140): "At least in those places where the writer professedly, as they say, treats of a particular precept of faith or morals, or where its seat is; so that there is no article of faith, or no moral precept, which is not taught in Scripture somewhere in literal, clear, and conspicuous language.") QUEN. (I, 18) distinguishes between "onomastic, chronological, topographical, allegorical, typical, prophetical (i.e., predictions, but unfulfilled) matters, and those which are historical, dogmatical, or moral. If in the former class, especially in points relating to style and order, there should occur some difficulty or obscurity, this would still not derogate from the perspicuity of Scripture in matters of the latter class. The Scriptures give us elementary truths, containing the supreme and necessary articles of our religion. They give us sublime, mystical, onomastic truths. God chose to teach most clearly in the sacred books the elementary truths, because what is taught by them is necessary to be known by all in order to salvation. Other matters are involved in some difficulty." [3] GRH. (II, 329): "Observe that some things in Scripture are clearer than others, and what is obscurely expressed in one passage is more clearly explained in another." QUEN. (I, 118): "It is one things that there should at times be some difficulty and obscurity in the statement of the mysteries of the faith and of those things that must be believed in order to salvation; and another, that this obscurity should be nowhere cleared up in the Scriptures themselves, if a comparison be instituted with parallel passages and the analogy of faith as contained in Scripture be called into requisition. Doubtless what is expressed in one place obscurely, appears perfectly clear in another; and what in one passage is hidden under tropes and figures, is elsewhere disclosed in plain and simple language; and thus upon many difficult passages of Scripture, light is thrown by others that are more clear." [4] GRH. (II, 329): "Observe that, is asserting perspicuity, we do not exclude the godly study of the Scriptures by reading and meditation, nor the use of the aids necessary to the interpretation of the Scriptures." QUEN. (I, 119): "We are to distinguish between men who, on account of their immature age and their want of familiarity with the language in which they read the Scriptures, meet with difficulty through unskillfulness or ignorance, or who are prejudiced by preconceived erroneous opinions, and those with whom this is not the case. . . . For we presuppose a sufficient knowledge of the language, maturity of age, a mind not filled with prejudice and erroneous opinions, and also a legitimate and good translation of the original text." BR. (146): "For he who does not attend to the words themselves, but follows his own prejudices and makes the words of Scripture conform to them, can err even in perspicuous passages and in investigating the true sense." Whence HOLL. (149): "The perspicuity of Scriptures is not absolute, but dependent upon the use of means, inasmuch as, in endeavoring to understand it, the divinely instituted method must be accurately observed. For there is required: (1) Prayer to God the Father of Lights. (2) A knowledge of the idiom in which the Holy Scriptures are expressed, whether it be the original or in a version. (3) The attentive consideration of the expressions, of the scope, of the previous and subsequent context. (4) The laying aside of preconceived opinions and of evil feelings, of ambition, hatred, envy, boldness, etc., etc." [5] Wherefore QUEN. (I, 118) distinguishes between "obscurity in the object contemplated and that which lies in the subject contemplating it. The Scriptures, especially in things necessary to salvation, are not obscure in and of themselves, or through a want of native clearness and plainness, but they are lucid and perspicuous. They may be obscure, however, accidentally, on account of the incapacity and blindness of the human mind, and through the malice of heretics and the heterodox who superadd to their natural blindness a voluntary one, and maliciously close the eyes of their mind against the clearest light of Scripture. (2 Cor. 4:3.)" As an instance of this, the controversy in regard to the Lord's Supper is cited (I, 124): "The words of the Testament are in themselves very perspicuous, but are variously interpreted; because many, neglecting the literal and proper sense, studiously seek a foreign one, and do not follow so much the teaching of Christ as the counsel and dictation of blind reason. A mistake as to the cause is therefore made when the discrepancy in the expositions is ascribed to the obscurity of Scriptures, since its cause is either the perverseness or imbecility of men. The obscurity which lies in the subject must not be transferred to the object . . . If nothing be perspicuously spoken except that which cannot be understood perversely and expounded in a bad sense, then nothing in the wide universe can be perspicuously and plainly uttered." [6] GRH. (I, 26): "The clearness of Scripture is twofold; as Luther says, One kind is external, lying in the ministry of the Word, the other in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the internal clearness, no man understands a single iota in the Scriptures by the natural powers of his own mind, unless he have the Spirit of God; all have obscure hearts. The Holy Spirit is required for the understanding of the whole of Scripture and of all its parts. If you allude to the external clearness, there is nothing left obscure and ambiguous, but all things brought to light by the Word are perfectly clear.'" GRH. (I, 52): "Some, who have not yet been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, may have a knowledge of the Scripture doctrines, and acquire an historic faith by the outward ministration of the Word; but an absolutely certain, firm, and saving knowledge they cannot have without the internal illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit." There is, therefore, a distinction made between the "grammatical (literal) and external" and the "spiritual, divine and internal sense." Perspicuity in the first sense consists, BR. (140), "in the proper selection of words, their correspondence with the things signified, and their mutual connection and arrangement, according to the common usage of language" (141): "For not only the regenerated and believers, but also the unregenerate and godless, through this clearness of the words in their natural signification, in which respect they are the same for all readers, can acquire a knowledge of the sense designed by the words. i.e., a merely literal or historical, not a saving or believing knowledge." Also (144), (from the Jena and Wittenberg Opinion, in answer to Rathmann's Reply, 1629): . . . "If the Reply means to infer that no unconverted person can understand the proper sense which is contained in the words of Scripture, and expressed by them, i.e., the grammatical and literal sense, unless the Holy Spirit assist with His gracious illumination, then we cannot agree with the Reply, but abide by our own opinion. . . . For the words, and whatever serves to interpret them, viz., the lexicons, dictionaries, and grammars of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, are human inventions, and belong to the gifts of nature and not to the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirit; for He was not appointed, nor was He poured out, that He might treat of grammatical rules and teach us to hunt up Hebrew roots, . . . but that He should teach us the articles of faith through the Scriptures and instruct us in the truth that maketh wise unto salvation. Many a one properly understands the words without possessing that saving knowledge of the mysteries which belongs to faith." CAL. (I, 657): "Although the external sense of Scripture may be understood by the unregenerate, yet the saving and internal sense, joined with hearty assent, cannot be attained without the illumination of the Holy Spirit." [7] GRH. (II, 338): "A literal acquaintance with the articles of the faith is not sufficient to salvation, but there must also be a spiritual knowledge, for the acquisition of which the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary; and this is to be obtained by humble prayer." BR. (150): "In order that man may properly understand the plan of salvation, two things are necessary: first, that by the natural powers of his mind he comprehend those things that necessarily must be known by him in order to his salvation; and secondly, that he embrace these, thus apprehended as true and divinely revealed, and yield to them the full assent of faith. The Scriptures, therefore, which in this matter should be as a bright and shining light, ought to accomplish these two ends: first, to represent to the mind the things that are to be known in language adapted to this end and clear, so that they may be simply and naturally apprehended; and secondly, that when the thing signified is of a more exalted nature and the mind too weak or corrupt to be able to judge correctly by the exercise of its own powers concerning that which is signified by the words, or to elicit or yield the assent that is due, the Scriptures themselves, by their own illuminative power, should enable the mind to accomplish this and bestow the faculty of apprehending and embracing the truth." The latter alone is referred to when HOLL. remarks (155): "An unregenerate man, opposing the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit, cannot understand the true sense of the sacred writings. But when an unregenerate man, in a teachable spirit, attentively reads the Holy Scriptures, or hears them expounded by the living teacher, the Holy Spirit illuminates him by the Scriptures, so that he may understand the true sense of the Divine Word and rightly apply it, thus understood, with saving effect." And although HOLL. claims "for the unregenerate but teachable and prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit, that they may acquire an external and literal knowledge of the Holy Scriptures," he does not thereby mean anything more than that such grace is needed in order that they may attain to a self-appropriation of the truth of salvation; for he elsewhere remarks (158): "The words of the Prophets and Apostles may be considered either out of their proper scriptural connection, or in it. In the former case, they are analogous to human words, and can be understood by the unregenerate without the grace of the Holy Spirit; but if they be considered in their proper connection, as they are accommodated to the mysteries of the faith, and are, as receptacles or vehicles of these, really Divine words, no correct conception, conformed to the mind of the Spirit, can be formed concerning them without the preceding prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit." [8] HOLL. (149): "The Scriptures are called clear, not in respect to the subject-matter, but to the words, for even subjects that are not clear may be expressed with clear and perspicuous words." QUEN. (I, 117): "We must make a distinction between the clearness of the subjects which are revealed in Scripture and the plainness of the words by which the revealed subjects are expressed. We refer not to the former but to the latter; for we acknowledge that many mysteries are contained in the Scriptures, abstruse and impenetrable by the human intellect, especially in this life; but we deny that they are taught in Scripture in an obscure style and with ambiguous words." Luther expresses it differently: "The things of God are obscure; . . . the things of Scripture are perspicuous. . . . The doctrines in themselves are obscure; but in so far as they are presented in Scripture they are manifest, if we are willing to be content with that knowledge which God communicates in the Scriptures to the Church." [9] QUEN. (I, 137): "From no other source than the Holy Scriptures themselves can a certain and infallible interpretation of Scripture be drawn. For Scripture itself, or rather the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture or through it, is the legitimate and independent (anupeuthunos) interpreter of itself." And further, QUEN. (I, 144): "We cannot, therefore, acknowledge the harmonious opinions of the ancient teachers of the Church or the decisions of councils as a certain and unquestionable rule and measure of scriptural interpretation, nor the Roman pontiff as the supreme, infallible interpreter of the Holy Scriptures." [10] QUEN. (I, 137): "The most obscure passages, which need explanation, can and should be explained by other passages that are more clear, and thus the Scripture itself furnishes an interpretation of the more obscure expressions when a comparison of these is made with those that are more clear; so that Scripture is explained by Scripture." [11] GRH. (I, 53): "From those perspicuous passages of Scripture a rule of faith is gathered, which is, so to speak, a summary of the heavenly doctrine extracted from the clearest passages of Scripture. Whatever, therefore, is necessary, is clearly expressed in the Holy Scriptures, says Chrysostom. If certain things in them are very obscure, the knowledge of these is not necessary to all for their salvation; and hence, although we may not always ascertain their true and genuine interpretation, it is sufficient if, in interpreting them, we propose nothing that conflicts with the rule of faith." (II, 424): "All interpretation of Scripture should be according to the analogy of faith. This canon is taught in Rom. 12:6, and signifies that the interpretation of Scripture should be instituted and carried on in such a manner as to accord with the usual line of thought which is conveyed in Scripture concerning each article of the heavenly doctrine. For, since all Scripture was given by the immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit, and is inspired, all things in it are harmonious and perfectly consistent with each other, so that no discrepancy or self-contradiction can occur. The article of faith, which the apostle here means by pistis, the knowledge of which is necessary for all in order to salvation, are taught in the Scriptures in clear and perspicuous language, of which a brief summary is contained in the Apostles' Creed, which the fathers often call "the rule of faith." Nothing is ever to be broached in the interpretation of Scripture that conflicts with this rule of faith; and hence, if we be not exactly able at times to ascertain the precise sense of any passage, as designed by the Holy Spirit, we should nevertheless beware of proposing anything that is contrary to the analogy of faith." GRH. (I, 54) thus states all the rules that apply to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures: "(1) Without the light of the Holy Spirit, our mind is blind so far as the understanding and interpreting of Scripture are concerned. (2) In addition to this blindness, natural to us all, some are blinded by peculiar wickedness and an unyielding obstinacy, whose eyes the Holy Spirit either has opened or has wished to open, but they have contumaciously resisted Him; neither of these kinds of blindness, however, makes or proves the Scriptures obscure. (3) Because our mind is blind, we are prayerfully to implore the light of the Holy Spirit. (4) But this illumination of the mind the Holy Spirit does not confer immediately, but by the light of the Word heard and meditated upon. (5) Inasmuch as the doctrines necessary to be known by every one in order to salvation are taught in Scripture in clear and perspicuous language, (6) the remaining passages of Scripture receive light from these. (7) For from the perspicuous passages of Scripture, a rule of faith is deduced to which the exposition of the remainder must be conformed. (8) And if we cannot ascertain the precisely literal sense of all passages, it is sufficient that in their interpretation we do not propose anything contrary to the analogy of faith. (9) Nevertheless, it is also of importance that we rightly and accurately interpret the more obscure passages of Scripture, which can be done if we apply the means adapted to remove the difficulties. (10) That we may discover these means, we must seek the causes of the obscurity. (11) Some Scripture passages are obscure in themselves, when singly considered, others when compared with other passages; if they merely seem to conflict with other passages, this obscurity may be removed by reconciling the passages. (12) Those that are obscure in themselves and singly are so either as to their subject-matter or as to their words. The obscurity in regard to the subjects discussed is removed by those settled axioms, in individual articles of belief, which are to be regarded as the unfailing guide. (13) The obscurity in regard to the words is dispelled by the grammatical analysis of sentences, by the rhetorical exposition of the tropes and figures, by the logical consideration of the order and circumstances, and finally by an acquaintance with physical science; but the greatest assistance in all these cases is afforded by a prudent and diligent collation of Scripture passages, whenever either the same or different words and phrases are employed to express the same or different things." He illustrates the manner of making deductions from the rule of faith by the example of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. [12] GRH. (I, 67): "There is but one proper and true sense of each passage, which the Holy Spirit thereby intends, and which is drawn from the proper signification of the words, and only from this literal sense available arguments may be derived." But this literal sense may be either strictly literal, which the Holy Spirit intends when the words are taken in their usual signification, e.g., God is a spirit (John 4:24), or figurative or tropical, which is the intention of the Holy Spirit when words are used figuratively, e.g., God is our shield (Gen. 15:1), (HOLL., 91). But in this case also the remark applies, GRH. (II, 425): "All interpretation of Scripture should be literal, and there should be no departure from the letter in matters of faith, unless the Scriptures themselves indicate the figurativeness and explain it." (I, 67): "Allegories, tropes, anagogies, are not different senses but different adaptations of the same sense and subject designated by the letter. The same historical narrative may be presented in a variety of ways, and treated either allegorically, or tropically, or analogically, while the true and literal sense of the words in which the history is described remains the same." The Dogmaticians therefore assume, it is true, such a spiritual sense in certain cases, but strictly speaking this is not understood as a second sense, co-ordinate with the first, but only that the natural signification of the words, which must always be the basis of the interpretation, admits also a special spiritual application, or contains at the same time a symbolical allusion. HOLL. (91): "That is called the mystical sense which is not immediately signified by the inspired words, but which proceeds and is deduced from the subject signified by the inspired words. It is, however, improperly and unauthorizedly called the sense of the biblical expression, since it is not the immediate sense of the inspired words, but inasmuch as God desire, by means of the subject or fact described by those words, to present some other subject or fact to the consideration of men. More properly, therefore, it is called the accommodation of the literal sense, or its mystical application, than the mystical sense of Scripture, e.g., Jonah 2:1. Here the prophet Jonah is said to have been three days and nights in the belly of the whale, and the literal sense it the one plainly designed by God, expressed and immediately implied by the words. When now this whole history or transaction is employed to signify the abode of Christ for three days and nights in the grave, no new sense here arises, but there is merely an accommodation and application of that historical narrative so as by it to express the fact that Christ was to be three days and nights in the grave." Hence the Dogmaticians declare against the assumption of a double sense in the prophecies of the Old Testament. Such a mystical sense may either be designed by God, or it may be engrafted upon the literal sense. Only in the former case dare it be employed in the interpretation of Scriptures. CAL. (I, 664): "The mystical accommodation may either be enngraphos (contained in the written Word) and divine, or agraphos (superadded to the written Word) and of human invention." (HOLL.: Either innate or introduced.) QUEN. (I, 131): "When our theological writers approve of the following scholastic axioms, viz.: Mystical theology can prove nothing, parabolic theology cannot be advanced in argument, solid and effective arguments for proving the doctrines of the faith and refuting errors can be drawn only from the literal sense of Scripture,' they do not exclude, but at the same time include, mystical applications of the literal sense of this or that biblical passage, made by the Holy Spirit Himself in the Holy Scriptures; yet they exclude allegorical and parabolical interpretations that men have devised and forced upon the Scriptures. For applications of the literal sense of this or that passage or sacred narrative, that are shown to exist and are explained in the Scriptures themselves, can be used in proof, just as other things that are literally expressed in the Scriptures. When, therefore, in any plain Scripture passage there is an accommodation of the literal sense to a spiritual subject, then its validity for proving or disapproving is just as great." "The mystical sense, as it may be loosely styled, is divided by the Lutheran theologians into the allegorical, typical, and parabolical. It is called the allegorical sense, when a Scriptural historical narrative of things that really occurred is applied to a certain mystery or spiritual doctrine by the intention of the Holy Spirit in an allegorical manner; it is called typical when, under external facts or prophetic visions, things hidden, either present or future, are prefigured, or especially matters relating to the New Testament are shadowed forth; and parabolical, when something is described as having really occurred, and yet applied to designate something else that is spiritual." (CAL. I, 665.) The Romanists distinguish between the allegorical sense, the tropological (when the words or facts under consideration refer to something that relates to morals), and the anagogical (when the words or facts are used with a reference to eternal life). __________________________________________________________________ § 11. (4.) Efficacy. CAL. (I, 478): "That the Holy Scriptures are living and efficacious, and a means of illumination, conversion, and salvation, prepared and vivified by Divine power." This subject will be treated of subsequently under the head of the Means of Grace. __________________________________________________________________ § 12. Of the Canon and the Apocryphal Books. The written Word of God consists of the Word of God of the Old and the Word of God of the New Testament. [1] In the collection, however, that contains both of these, we find also other writings, which we do not call the Word of God in the same sense. We distinguish these two kinds of writings in the following manner, viz.: we call the first class canonical books, i.e., such as, because they are inspired by God, [2] are the rule and guide of our faith; [3] the others, apocryphal books, i.e., such whose divine origin is either doubtful or has been disproved. [4] Although both kinds are found in the Bible, only those of the first class are admitted as a rule of faith, whence they are called the Canon (catalogue, or number, of the canonical books), while those of the other class may contribute their share to the edification of believers, but are not to be regarded as the Word of God, and from them, therefore, no proof for any doctrine of the faith is to be drawn. [5] Whether a book is canonical or not, we are then to ascertain by the signs whereby we recognize the Word of God in general as such, as of the divine origin, as inspired. [6] The testimony of the Holy Spirit is more conclusive evidence than anything else of the divine character of the contents of a book; next to this come all the other kinds of evidence which we have enumerated under the head of the Authority of Holy Scripture (§ 8, Note 10) as the external and internal criteria. [7] Among the latter, the testimony of the Church in the earliest ages in regard to the canonical character of a book is of special importance, for it is assuredly a matter of the highest moment if we know that a book was acknowledged as canonical already at a day when its origin could be most accurately ascertained. [8] More particularly do we need the testimony of the earliest ages of the Church in deciding historical questions, as to the name of the author of a book, as to the language in which it was originally composed; [9] for by the testimony of the Holy Spirit we may indeed become assured of the divinity of a book, experiencing its power in our own hearts, but He bears no testimony as to questions of this kind. As canonical books of the Old Testament we acknowledge: (1) Genesis; (2) Exodus; (3) Leviticus; (4) Numbers; (5) Deuteronomy; (6) Joshua; (7) Judges; (8) Ruth; (9) I and II Samuel; (10) I and II Kings; (11) I and II Chronicles; (12) Ezra and Nehemiah (or second Ezra); (13) Esther; (14) Job; (15) Psalms; (16) Proverbs; (17) Ecclesiastes; (18) Song of Solomon; (19) Isaiah; (20) Jeremiah; (21) Lamentations; (22) Ezekiel; (23) Daniel; (24) twelve minor prophets, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zachariah, Malachi. [10] As apocryphal: Tobias, Judith, Baruch, I, II, and III Maccabees, III and IV Ezra, Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus or Syracides. As appendices: Epistle of Jeremiah, annexed to Baruch, Appendix to Daniel, Supplement to Esther, Prayer of Manasseh.(GRH.) [11] In the New Testament we have no apocryphal books in the same sense as in the Old Testament; but still there are single books of the New Testament in regard to whose origin and authors the evidence is not in all cases equally consentaneous. A certain distinction must therefore be made between them and the others that are equally authenticated by every species of evidence; and yet this distinction, resting as it does merely upon the want of entire agreement in the evidence, whilst very important testimony of various kinds is at hand to prove their canonical authority, is not of so much importance as to prevent us from making a canonical use of these books. [12] The books of the New Testament authenticated by all the testimonies are the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, [13] and John, Acts of the Apostles, Paul's Epistle to the Romans, his two Epistles to the Corinthians, his Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, two Epistles to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, the Epistle to Titus, the Epistle to Philemon, the first Epistle of Peter, and the first of John. Those in regard to which doubts are entertained by some are the Epistle to the Hebrews, the second Epistle of Peter, the second and third of John, the Epistle of James, that of Jude, and the Apocalypse of John. [1] GRH. (II, 50): "The biblical books are distinguished into the books of the Old and New Testaments. The books of the Old Testament are those which were written before the appearance of Christ; the books of the New Testament, those which were written after the appearance of Christ, and addressed to the Church. It is to be observed, that the books of the Old Testament are called such, not because they do not manifestly contain anything of the substance, grace, and felicity of the New Testament promised through Christ to those believing in Him, but because they predict and prefigure that as future and to be fulfilled in due time, which in the New Testament is announced as complete. Rom. 3:21; 16:26." HOLL. (129), as to the relation between the Old and New Testaments: "The books of the Old Testament were committed to the Israelitic Church, those of the New Testament to the Christian Church, collected from all nations. Yet the Christian Church receives the canonical books of the Old Testament on account of the most admirable harmony of the prophetic and apostolic writings, on account of their great utility, and especially in obedience to the command of Christ, John 5:39. There is a disparity between the Old and New Testaments as to the degree of perspicuity, but not a diversity as to the object of revelation, as if in the one, things were explicitly taught as necessary to be believed, different from those so taught in the other, since faith is the same in both. Eph. 4:16." [2] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I,85): "The Canonical Scriptures derive their eminent authority mainly from the fact that they are divinely inspired, 2 Tim. 3:16; i.e., that they came not by the will of man, but the men of God both spake and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." [3] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I,81): "The Scriptures are called canonical, the canonical books, or the canon of Scripture, because they are a rule according to which the edifice of the faith of the Church is to be so constructed and framed that whatever agrees with this rule is to be regarded as right, sound, and apostolical; and that whatever does not quadrate with it, but varies either by excess or deficiency, is properly to be regarded as suppositious, adulterated, erroneous. This canon or rule is the doctrine divinely communicated from the beginning of the world to the human race through the patriarchs, prophets, Christ, and the apostles. And because this doctrine is by the will of God contained in the Scriptures, they are hence called canonical. A canon is an infallible rule or measure which by no means allows that anything be added to it or taken from it." [4] GRH. (II, 53): "The apocryphal books are so called apo tou apokruptein, which signifies concealed, either because their origin was not clearly ascertained by those by whose testimony the authority of the true Scriptures has been handed down to us (Augustine); or, because they are not read publicly in the churches as a source of proof for ecclesiastical doctrines, but merely as a means of moral improvement." HOLL. (131): "The apocryphal books are those which are found in the volume of Scripture, but do not belong to the canon, and were not written by immediate divine inspiration." This definition applies only to those which accompany the canonical Scriptures; another class consists of those "which contain fable, errors, and lies, and hence are not to be read in the churches." GRH. (II, 55): "The former kind are called apocryphal, in the sense of obscure (absconditi), i.e., uncertain and hidden as to their origin; the other class, in the sense that they deserve to be kept obscure (abscondendi) and ought not to be read in the churches." CAL. (I, 491): "The division of the books of Scripture into canonical and apocryphal is improper and equivocal, since only the former meet the definition of the Holy Scriptures, the latter merely having the name." [5] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 93): "Are then these books to be absolutely condemned and rejected? This we by no means demand. Of what use then is this whole discussion? We reply, That the rule of faith or sound doctrine in the Church may be certain. The fathers taught that authoritative proof of ecclesiastical doctrine was to be drawn only from the canonical books. . . . The authority of canonical Scripture alone was judged competent to decide in disputed questions; but the other books, which Cyprian calls ecclesiastical, Jerome apocryphal, they desired indeed to have read in the churches, merely however for the edification of the people, not as proof in matters of doctrine. No dogma is, therefore, to be deduced from these books which has not clear and indubitable support and evidence in the canonical books. No controverted topic can be decided by these books, if there be not other and conclusive evidence in the canonical books. But whatever is said in these books is to be expounded and understood according to the analogy of those truths which are plainly taught in the canonical books." CAL. (I, 492): "Two things are necessary to constitute a canonical book; first, inspiration, or the immediate divine impulse, which proves the document in question to be divine truth, or the very Word of God; secondly, the divine sanction (canonicatio divina), by which God constitutes His written Word the perpetual and universal rule of the Church." HOLL. (129): "The canonical books are those whose doctrines and single words were committed to writing by the prophets and apostles, by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and were communicated to the Church by God, and received by her as the infallible rule of faith and morals for man who is to be saved." [6] HOLL. (126): "We judge of the canonical authority of Scripture with reference to its doctrines, by the same proofs and arguments by which we decide in regard to its divine origin. For the Holy Scriptures are an infallible rule or canon of faith and morals, because they derive their origin immediately from God, and are designed by Him for canonical use. Wherefore, when the abovementioned criteria convince us that the meaning or doctrine of Scripture has proceeded immediately from God, there is no need of an extended demonstration of canonical authority, so far as the doctrine of the canon is concerned." [7] HOLL. (126): "The canonical authority of Scripture, considered as to its doctrines, is proved by external and internal criteria, but especially by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit illuminating the minds of men, through the Scriptures attentively read or heard from the mouth of a teacher." [8] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 85): "That this whole matter, in itself of such vast importance, might be perfectly secure against all imposture, God selected certain men to write, furnished them with many miracles and divine testimonials, that there might be no doubt that those things which they wrote were divinely inspired. Finally, these writings, divinely inspired, were at the time when they were written, by common consent, with public indorsement, presented, given, and intrusted to the Church, that she should, by all possible care and forethought, preserve them uncorrupted, transmit them thence from hand to hand, and intrust them to posterity. And as the ancient Church, in the time of Moses, Joshua, and the prophets, so also the primitive Church in the time of the apostles, could give certain testimony as to which writings were divinely inspired. For she knew the authors whom God commended to the Church by the peculiar evidence; she knew also what those things were that were written by them, and, from what she learned orally from the apostles, could decide that those things which were written were the very same doctrine which the apostles orally delivered. . . . The Scriptures, therefore, derive canonical authority principally from the Holy Spirit, by whose impulse and inspiration they were written; secondarily, from the writers themselves, to whom God gave clear and peculiar proofs of their truth; finally, from the primitive Church, as a witness, in whose day these writings were published and approved. Now this testimony of the primitive Church concerning the divine inspiration of the Scriptures has been handed down in perpetual succession to posterity, and carefully preserved in certain ancient historical records; so that the Church in subsequent ages is the guardian of the testimony of the primitive Church concerning the Scriptures. There is, therefore, the greatest difference between the testimony (1) of the primitive Church in the times of the apostles, that (2) of the Church in the first centuries, which received the testimony of the primitive Church, and (3) that of the present Church concerning the Scriptures; for if what now is and formerly was the Church, can show the testimony of those who received and knew the testimony of the early Church concerning the true Scriptures, we give our assent to her as to a witness proving her assertions. But she does not possess the power of determining or deciding anything concerning the sacred books of which she cannot adduce clear documentary proof from the testimony of the primitive Church." As to the manner in which the primitive Church proceeded in this matter, CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 87) thus expresses himself: "The testimony of the primitive Church, in the times of the apostles, concerning the genuine writings of the apostles, the immediately succeeding generations constantly and faithfully retained and preserved; so that when many others afterwards were brought forward, claiming to have been written by the apostles, they were tested and rejected as supposititious and adulterated, first, for this reason, that it could not be shown and proved by the testimony of the original Church either that they were written by the apostles, or approved by the living apostles, and transmitted and intrusted by them to the Church in the beginning; secondly, because they proposed strange doctrine not accordant with that which the Church received from the apostles, and was at that time still preserving fresh in the memory of all." [9] HOLL. (126): "But the canonical authority of Scripture, in reference to the original language, or the authentic Hebrew text of the Old and Greek of the New Testament, is indeed distinctly proved by the testimony of the primitive Church, but not by this alone." (127): "We add to the testimony of the primitive Church the testimony of Scripture, its continued preservation for the profitable use of men, and the character of its style." The intent of this passage and the one quoted in the eighth note is the following: The internal and external criteria may indeed beget in us a human faith, but not a divine; the latter can be produced only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And this must not necessarily be obtained by the use of the original text: a translation will answer quite as well, since the power of the Holy Spirit lies in the sense and not in the letter of the Word. Wherefore, also, we cannot become divinely assured, in regard to the idiom in which any of the sacred books has been written, by an internal experience. For information on this point we are therefore referred to historical evidence; and the state of the case thus appears to be, that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary to assure us of the divinity of the Scriptures, to which must be added historical proofs to satisfy us as to the language in which a sacred book was written, as to its author, etc. For BR. (112) thus expresses himself: "The internal illuminating power of the Scriptures is associated with the sense in every language, in such a manner, that it does not point out precisely the words of the original text as essentially different from other equivalent words of the same or any other language, text or version." But the other criteria, which prove the inspiration of the doctrine contained in Scripture, either do not at all relate to the material part, or the words, of Scripture, but only to the formal part, or the doctrine; or, when they do in some degree relate to the words and their connection, and are employed to prove in general that God is the author of the words of Scripture in any idiom, whatever it may be, they still cannot clearly indicate the precise words and letters in which each book of Scripture was originally committed to writing. There remains, therefore, the testimony of the Church, which does not, indeed, confer canonical or normative dignity upon the books of Scripture in any particular language, nor does it by its own authority induce that reception of the divine faith by which the inspiration of that idiom is believed; but notwithstanding this, inasmuch as it historically proves a certain idiom or writing to be the original of the books of Scripture, in which it received them as written by the sacred penman, thus producing a moral certainty in regard to it, it now joined with that which the Scriptures themselves teach, and with which the Holy Spirit intimately connects his own influence, holds a place in the discussion of the faith. As an example, HOLL. (127) adduces the following: "When it is asked, Was the Gospel of Matthew originally written in Greek or Hebrew? this is a question not of Dogmatics, but of history. . . . Of this fact the Primitive Church is a credible witness, for it fought upon earth under the banner of Christ, together with the writers then living in the flesh, and received their autographs from their own hands. . . . Thus we seek from the Jewish Church evidence for the Hebrew original of the Old Testament, and from the primitive Christian Church for the original Greek of the New." It is still worthy of remark that it cannot be clearly understood, from the passages quoted from Hollazius and Baier, whether these theologians supposed that, as each individual can attain only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit unto divine faith in the revelation by Christ, so in like manner each individual can be convinced of the divinity of each single book of Scripture by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The contrary might seem to be proved by the fact that the most of the theologians speak of the testimony of the Holy Spirit only when they are discussing the grounds upon which the authority of Scripture rests (so GRH.); for when it is asserted that each individual attains to divine assurance of the authority of Scripture only through the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this is still somewhat different from the assertion that the canonicity of each separate book must be proved in the case of each individual by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And Chemnitz, further, does not mention, in this connection, this testimony of the Holy Spirit; but, in order to prove the canonicity of the separate books, points only to the testimony of the earliest Church, which could appeal to the indorsement of the Apostles. And, finally, in all the investigations by the Dogmaticians, in regard to the canonicity of a single book, there is never any allusion to the testimony of the Holy Spirit (Luther's well-known expression of opinion, in regard to the Epistle of James, must not here be taken into the account), but they are all conducted upon the basis of historical evidence. The true state of the case appears most probably to be, that the question whether the proof of the canonicity of a particular book is to be distinguished from the proof of the divine authority of Scripture in general, was never clearly brought home to the consciousness of our theologians; so that the passage quoted in this note, and in Note 6, are designed merely to preclude the error of supposing that the historical testimony of the Church can establish divine faith in the Scriptures in general. [10] Many theologians divide the books of the Old Testament into legal, historical, dogmatical, and prophetical. QUEN. (I, 236): "All those books, therefore, of the Old Testament, and only those, are canonical, which (1) were written by the prophets and in the prophetic spirit, i.e., by immediate Divine inspiration (Luke 16:29; Rom. 1:2; Eph. 2:20; 2 Pet. 1:19, 21); (2) and written in the original Hebrew tongue, then vernacular to the Jews, with the exception of a few sections in Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Jeremiah, that are extant in Chaldee; (3) contain infallible truth, in all points most exactly self-consistent; (4) which were divinely committed to the Jewish Church for perpetual canonical use, received by it, regarded as canonical, preserved and faithfully handed down to the times of Christ; (5) a, approved, cited, and commended by Christ and the Apostles; and b, as a canon or rule of faith and morals, transmitted unto us by the primitive Church." [11] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 91): "The reason why those books have been denied canonical authority is obvious. For some of them were written after the time of the prophets, when the people of Israel no longer had prophets, such as the ancient ones were; and they were written by those who had not the divine testimonies, as the prophets had, concerning the truth and authority of their doctrine. Some of these books, indeed, bear the names of prophets, but do not possess certain proofs of having been written by those to whom they are attributed. This is the manifest reason why they have been removed from the canon of Scripture." The most extensive investigations in regard to the separate canonical and apocryphal books of the Old and New Testament are to be found in GRH., vol. ii, loc. i, c. vi-xi. [12] We find that the earliest Dogmaticians insist more than the later upon the difference between these and the other undoubtedly canonical books. The most strenuous of all is CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 192): "I have cited the testimony of the ancients, not only that the catalogue of those writings of the New Testament may be known which have not sufficiently sure, strong, and consentaneous proofs of their authority, but more especially that the reasons may be known why there should have been any doubt concerning them. (1) Because the ancients did not possess sure, strong, and consentaneous evidence that the original apostolic Church bore testimony that these books were approved by the apostles and recommended to the Church. (2) Because it does not certainly appear, by the testimony of the earliest and ancient Church, whether these books were written by those whose names they bear; but they have been regarded as published by others under the name of the apostles. (3) Since some of the ancients ascribe some of these books to the apostles and others advance a different opinion. This matter, then, inasmuch as it was not indubitably certain, has been left undetermined. This whole controversy depends upon the sure, strong, and consentaneous evidence of the earliest and ancient Church; for, when this is wanting, the Church in after times, without the aid of clear and positive documentary evidence, can no more create a certainty out of an uncertainty than it can make truth out of falsehood." Chemnitz therefore classes those writings of the New Testament, in regard to whose canonical authority some doubts are entertained, with the apocryphal books, and applies to them all, without exception, what was said concerning such parts of the Old and New Testaments in Note 5. It is, however, not hereby denied that there may be a certain difference in value between the apocryphal books of the Old and New Testaments, but it is only asserted that these writings are not to be placed in the same category with the canonical books. For, as we see, Chemnitz insists upon the principle that only those books are to be regarded as canonical in regard to which we possess the most specific and perfectly consentaneous evidence: (1) that they were recommended to the Church by apostles, and (2) that they really are the production of the authors whose names they bear. But the theologians who immediately succeeded him began, appealing to the voice of the Church in past ages, to regard these books as canonical, although they did make some distinction in regard to them. Thus the Magdeburg centuriators (GRH. II, 184) say: "There were some writings disseminated throughout the Church during this century in the name of the apostles or their disciples, of which some were not generally received, owing to doubts in regard to them, but were afterwards received among the number of the Catholic writings, and others which were altogether rejected as apocryphal. Of the former kind are the epistle of James, etc." And HUNNIUS (in GRH. ib.): "We nevertheless acknowledge that the apocryphal books of the New Testament merited more favor and approbation from the primitive Church than the apocrypha of the Old Testament. Wherefore many of the Fathers, who excluded from the canon certain books of the Old Testament, excluded no book of the New Testament, but made them all canonical." If we inquire into the reason why this was done, it appears to be the following (although we find it nowhere distinctly expressed), that an absolute agreement was no longer demanded, or this circumstance was ignored and reference had merely to the second requisite mentioned by Chemnitz; and even this was not regarded as absolutely necessary to establish the canonical authority of a book. For Mentzer already (in GRH. II, 185) says: "The books of the New Testament that are called ecclesiastical or apocryphal we receive as deserving to be regarded as canonical, and as having equal normative authority with the rest. We add, however, the qualifying term almost' for this reason, that in the primitive Church some persons occasionally objected to these books because it could not be certainly known by whom they were written or published." And SCHROEDER (also in GRH. II, 185): "There are certain books of the New Testament called by some apocryphal, but for scarcely any other reason than because it was doubted concerning them, not whether they were written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but whether they were published by the apostles to whom they are ascribed. But inasmuch as the doubt concerning them did not relate so much to their original Divine author, viz., the Holy Spirit, as to the writers or secondary authors, and as their authority, in the face of this doubt, was abundantly sustained by the principal and earlier fathers of the Church, they are received generally as of equal authority with the canonical. For, that a book may be regarded as canonical, it is not necessarily required that the secondary author, or writer, be manifest; it is sufficient if the prime author or dictator, viz., the Holy Spirit, be manifest; for the books of Judges, Ruth, and Esther are canonical and yet their writers are unknown" From this time, therefore, these books have been thus regarded by nearly all, as by GRH., e.g. (II, 186): "(1) There is, indeed, some difference to be made between the books that are contained in the New Testament. For it cannot be denied that some of them were, at times, objected to by some in the early Church. (2) These books are inappropriately called apocryphal, as we can show by a threefold argument: (a) Because the doubts concerning them in the primitive Church did not so much relate to their canonical authority as to their secondary author; (b) Because even this doubt was not entertained concerning them by all the churches or teachers, but only by some. Two manifest points of difference are therefore discernible between the apocrypha of the Old Testament and those books which some call the apocrypha of the New Testament. The authority of the former was rejected by the whole Church, but it was only some in the Church who doubted the authority of the latter; (c) The fathers who treated as such the apocrypha of the Old Testament did not exclude any book of the New Testament from the canon. (3) In teaching we may distinguish between the canonical books of the New Testament of the first and second rank. Canonical books of the first rank are those concerning whose authors or authority there never was any doubt in the Church, but which by common consent were always regarded as canonical and divine. Canonical books of the second rank are those concerning whose authors doubts have sometimes been entertained by some persons in the Church." Precisely in the same strain QUEN. (I, 235): "We call those books of the New Testament protocanonical, or of the first rank, concerning whose authority and secondary authors there never was any doubt in the Church; and those deuterocanonical, or of the second rank, concerning whose secondary authors (not their authority, however,) there were at times doubts entertained by some. There was doubt, I say, and discussion concerning these books, yet not among all, merely among a few; not at all times, only occasionally. And these doubts had not reference so much to their divine authority or primary author, the Holy Spirit, as to their secondary authors." And HOLL. (131) at last no longer finds this distinction necessary; "since at the present time all evangelical teachers assign divine authority to these deuterocanonical books, there seems to be no occasion any longer for that distinction." The assertion that the authority of these books had never been doubted is contradicted by BR. (120): "It cannot indeed be denied that some of the ancients did so doubt in regard to these writers, as to refuse to them the authority that belongs to inspired books;" but he also says concerning them: "They are not ignored when we are asked for the rule of faith, but they have authority in such case by common consent at the present day among Christians, especially those of our confession." He does not go into the special proof of this position, it is true, but probably for the reason that he did not regard the doubt raised by so few as of sufficient importance to make this necessary. [13] In reference to the gospels of Mark and Luke, CHEMN. (Eq. Trid., I, 87) remarks: "That Mark and Luke, who were not apostles, were divinely called to write the gospel, Augustine thus explains, lest namely it should be thought that, in reference to the preaching and reception of the Gospel, it made any difference whether those proclaimed it who followed the Lord while here in the flesh as disciples and servants, or those who believed what they clearly learned from these; and that it was providentially so arranged by the Holy Spirit, that to some of those who followed the apostles authority was given, not only for preaching, but also for writing the Gospel," etc. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE ARTICLES OF FAITH AND THE SYMBOLS OF THE CHURCH __________________________________________________________________ § 13. What are Articles of Faith? THE whole subject matter of revelation naturally divides itself into single propositions, which we call articles of faith. "An article of faith is a part of the doctrine, revealed in the written Word of God, concerning God and divine things, proposed to the sinner to be believed in order to his salvation." HOLL. (43) [1] Taken together, these articles form the sum of what the Christian is to believe, [2] and they are closely connected together, standing in the same relation to the general contents of revelation as the members of a body to the body itself. The articles of faith have their origin solely in the Holy Scriptures; [3] but, inasmuch as their contents embrace some truths which could not be known in any other way, and others of which some knowledge may be gained by the light of nature; and, inasmuch as all the truths contained in them are not of equal importance for our salvation, and do not stand in equally intimate connection with it, the articles of faith may be divided into, I. The pure articles (which are known only by divine revelation), and the mixed (which are manifest not merely from revelation, but also from the light of nature. BR. (43). [4] II. The fundamental and non-fundamental. HOLL. (46): "The fundamental articles are parts of the Christian doctrine so necessary to be known that, when they are not known, the foundation of the faith is not savingly apprehended or retained by man; and when they are denied by him, to that same extent it is overturned." [5] (53): "The non-fundamental articles are parts of the Christian doctrine which one may be ignorant of or deny, and yet be saved." [6] But the fundamental articles are again divided into "primary, without the knowledge of which no one can attain unto eternal salvation, or which must be known in order for any one to hold the foundation of the faith and secure salvation;" [7] and "the secondary, which one may be ignorant of, but dare not deny, much less oppose, without injury to the foundation of the faith." QUEN. (I, 243). [8] The whole of the articles of faith the Church has collected in the Symbols. These contain the confession of faith which the Church has put forth at different times, and are therefore divided into the symbols of earlier and later times. [9] [1] HOLL. (43): "The term, article, is derived from artus, and this from arcto. It properly signifies members of the body closely joined together, as the joints of the fingers closely cohere. Metaphorically, the word article is applied to the parts of the doctrine of faith, which are most intimately joined together." QUEN. (I, 241): "So that articles of faith are parts of the doctrine of faith, divinely revealed for our salvation, which are most intimately united to each other and to the whole, as the parts or joints of a finger, and into which the whole structure of the Christian religion may be resolved, as a finger into its joints. And their connection is so intimate that, when one is removed, the rest cannot continue sound and whole." The word is sometimes taken in a wider, and sometimes in a narrower sense. HOLL. (44): "Collectively, it signifies a whole head of doctrine; distributively, any assertion or enunciation which constitutes a part of Christian doctrine. The Christian doctrine is divided into heads or theological loci, and these again into certain theses. The heads of doctrine are called articles of faith, as well as the theses under the separate heads; e. g., the theological locus [general topic] concerning Christ is called an article of faith, and the proposition, Christ, in the flesh, sitteth at the right hand of God,' is also called an article of faith." Sometimes, merely the mysteries of the faith are meant by the articles of faith. BR. (42): "It is certain that the term, article of faith, is sometimes used in a stricter sense, as accurately denoting the mysteries of faith necessary to be believed in order to salvation, namely, the pure articles, and of these the fundamental alone." [2] QUEN. (I, 241): "The subjects with which the articles of faith are occupied are ta pista, the credenda, the things to be believed as such. For a distinction must here be made between the historical and the dogmatical, and between the moral doctrines, which teach what is to be done or avoided, and the doctrines of faith, which treat of what is to be believed or not believed. For although faith, generally viewed, may have respect to all that is contained in the Word of God, whether it be of an historical or moral or dogmatical character; yet it has nevertheless a special reference to the doctrines of faith or to the things to be believed, as such." GRH. (VII, 165): "Since those things which are propounded in the Scriptures as matters of faith, are not of one kind, but some pertain to the faith directly and per se, and other in certain respects and remotely, such as historical descriptions of deeds performed by the saints, so not all the matters contained in the Scriptures can be regarded as articles of faith, strictly and accurately speaking, but only those doctrines the knowledge of which is necessary to salvation.". . . . And, after an appeal to Thomas Aquinas: "If the Jesuits in the Ratisbon Colloquium had observed this principle of the teacher, they never would have blurted forth the assertion: It is an article of faith, that the dog of Tobias wagged his tail.'" If the Dogmaticians found it necessary, over against the Romanists, to guard against too wide a use of the term, "articles of faith," they found it equally necessary, at a later day, in opposition to Calixtus, to guard against a too narrow use of the same expression. After the example of Bonaventura, he divided the doctrines into antecedent, constituent, and consequent. In the first class he included everything that man can know by means of his reason, without the aid of revelation; in the second, all in the strict constituting the faith, and standing in special relation to the salvation provided by Christ, and that cannot remain unknown without peril to salvation. In the third class he included all those doctrines which are derived only by inference from the special doctrines of the faith. The term "articles of faith" he applied only to those of the second class. "The constituent articles of faith are those which, in themselves and their substance, so to speak, and as divinely declared, must be known and believed, from the necessity both of means and of the command. . . . The knowledge of the antecedents and consequents is not a matter for every one, but only for the more advanced.". . . . In opposition to him, therefore, the distinction was made, that everything contained in the Scriptures that refers to the faith is an article of faith. As Calixtus further maintained: "That the Apostles' Creed sufficiently comprehended all the articles of faith, so that the ignorance of other doctrines might be regarded as by no means harmful to salvation;" and: "That the Apostles' Creed was a mark for distinguishing not only Christians from the heathen, but also the orthodox or Catholics from heretics; so that whoever received the Apostles' Creed should be considered members of the Catholic Church and subjects of the kingdom of Christ, and were by no means to be condemned as heretics, whatever errors they might entertain," -- he is answered by the statement (QUEN. I, 30): "The Apostles' Creed is not an adequate test of the doctrines that must be believed in order to salvation, for many articles especially necessary are omitted, as: Of Original Sin, Redemption, the Personal Union, the Universality of the Grace and Merit of Christ, Justification by Faith, the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, etc." [3] HOLL. (44): "A true article of faith must be (a) revealed in the written Word of God; (b) have reference to the salvation of man; (c) be intimately connected with the remaining doctrines of the faith; and (d) be not apparent to unaided reason." QUEN. (I, 242): "For it is possible for doctrines to be perspicuously and plainly propounded in Scripture, while their subjects, peculiar to faith, may not be clearly apprehended, as the mystery of the Trinity, etc., etc., since by the light of nature they would never have been known; whence faith is said to be occupied with such things as are not seen. Heb. 11:1." In opposition to the assertion of the Socinians: "Whatever is absolutely necessary to salvation, must necessarily be with simple and entire literalness written in the Scriptures," we have the statement of CAL. (I, 804): "Although we acknowledge that those things which must be believed in order to salvation ought to be clearly taught and exhibited in the Holy Scriptures, so that they may be drawn thence by all, yet we do not admit that they are there expressed precisely, or literally, so that those things which are deduced by easy, ready, and obvious inference from the Holy Scriptures, are not to be considered as articles of faith and necessary to be believed." [4] QUEN. (I, 242): "There are some doctrines in Scripture which are simply pista (matters of faith), and cannot be at all learned from reason, but are infinitely above it; there are also some things to be believed which, although they are revealed in Scripture and necessary to be known, are nevertheless of such a nature that even reason by the use of her own principles could attain some sort of knowledge of them; hence arise the pure and mixed articles. The former are derived from the Word of God alone and are simply matters of faith, as the article concerning the Trinity, etc., etc.; the latter, although they may be known n some degree from the light of nature, are nevertheless purely matters of faith, in so far as they are known by divine revelation; e.g., that God is, etc., is known from evident proofs, and is believed on the authority of the divine revelation. Yet all such things as may be known to some extent by the light of nature, are not matters of faith so far as they are apprehended by the aid of the light of nature, but in as far as they are apprehended by the aid of divine revelation." In like manner, HOLL. (45): "No article of faith formally considered, so far as it is an article of faith, is mixed; inasmuch as all articles of faith are dependent on divine revelation, and therefore, with respect to their formal object, are not naturally apprehended." Of the pure articles of faith HOLL. (45) remarks: "They treat of the mysteries of faith that transcend the comprehension of unaided human reason. Mueisthai (mystery) is derived from muein, which signifies to have closed eyes, to compress the mouth, and consequently to be silent. From muein is formed mueein, which signifies to imbue any one with honest doctrine. Mueisthai is the same as to be initiated into sacred things. O mustes is a man initiated into sacred things, or who is imbued with such knowledge of sacred things, that he may teach them, and is to be heard with reverential silence. To musterion, in profane authors, signifies every secret matter that dare not be rashly mentioned, but especially the sacred Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres, guarded by the strictest silence. In sacred literature, mysteries are divine and supernatural matters, unknown to unaided reason, not intuitively perceived, but divinely revealed for the sake of our salvation." [5] QUEN. (I, 242): "The fundamental articles, or those that cannot be unknown, or at least not denied, consistently with faith and salvation, are those which are intimately connected with the foundation of the faith. A foundation, generally speaking is, as N. Hunnius defines it, that which is the first in any structure, which lies beneath the whole structure, and is not sustained by anything else.'" Thus the foundation of the faith is that upon which the faith, and, indeed, the whole of Christianity, as a house that is to be built and upheld, is based. And, inasmuch as a foundation is sometimes the same as a cause, a fundamental article is such a doctrine as serves to produce and establish faith and eternal salvation, or which explains some cause of faith and salvation. QUEN., according to the method of Hunnius, distinguishes a threefold foundation. "1. Substantial, the object upon which man rests his confidence, from the beneficial effect of which he expects eternal salvation; or, it is the proper object of faith, which is the triune God, to be embraced by faith in Christ, the Mediator. 2. Organic, the Word of God, which is as a seed, out of which Christians are born again; thus it is also called a foundation, inasmuch as it is a means of generating faith, and a source of doctrine which lies underneath faith, and thus is a foundation of faith. 3. Dogmatic, that first part of the heavenly doctrine which is not referable to any other doctrine, but revealed for its own sake, and to which all other doctrines, as if revealed for its sake, are referred, and from which, as a sufficient and immediate cause, faith results. Hence heresy is not any and every error, contrary to the Word of God, but one that undermines or overturns the foundation of the faith." HOLL. (46): "A foundation of the faith is either real, i.e. substantial, or dogmatic, i.e., doctrinal. The substantial foundation of the faith and salvation is Christ, since He is the meritorious cause of obtaining from God forgiveness of sins and eternal life. In 1 Cor. 3:11, Paul calls Christ the foundation of the building; for the whole Church rest upon Christ. . . . But since the Church is the assembly of all who believe and are to be saved, it may be legitimately concluded that Christ is the foundation of faith and salvation. The dogmatic foundation of the faith is the collection of doctrines divinely revealed, by which Christ, the substantial foundation of the faith, and the sources and means of salvation necessarily connected therewith, are set forth. By the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Paul means, in Eph. 2:20, the doctrine taught by them. Moreover, the apostle teaches that Christ is the cornerstone, indicating that the doctrine of the prophets and apostles is in such a sense the foundation, that it rests upon Christ Jesus, as the ultimate cornerstone and foundation. . . . The substantial and the dogmatic foundation of the faith are not two foundations essentially contradistinguished from each other, nor do they differ as to their subject-matter, but as to our method of conceiving of them, in consequence of their different connotation. For Christ is the foundation, as to the subject-matter; the doctrine concerning Christ is the foundation, as to our knowledge. But the doctrine concerning Christ is the foundation, as to our knowledge. But the doctrine concerning Christ is nothing else than Christ, known by the intellect, and exhibited in a written or preached form, that others may know Him." [6] BR. (56): "E.g., concerning the sin and eternal ruin of certain angels, concerning the immortality of the first man before the Fall, concerning Antichrist, concerning the origin of the soul, whether by creation or traduction." But he adds to this: "At the same time, moreover, we are to be careful in regard to this matter, lest by embracing or professing error we rashly sin against divine revelation and God Himself; especially, lest something be maintained, through the persuasion of others, contrary to conscience, whereby the foundation and the truth of one or more of the fundamental articles of the faith are overturned. For thus, as by a mortal sin, faith and the Holy Spirit may be and are entirely driven away." [7] QUEN. (I, 243): "Among these fundamental article of faith a certain order has been established in regard to the relation which they sustain to each other, and to an intermediate as well an ultimate end; so that some are called primary and others secondary fundamental articles, some are said to be of the first, others of the second rank." The primary articles are subdivided. 1. By some into constituitive and conservative articles. QUEN. (I, 243): "Constitutive fundamental articles, according to N. Hunnius, are those which constitute the very foundation of the faith, or are the immediate cause of faith, as God will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." The conservative are those which do not, indeed, immediately cause faith itself, but which are necessarily implied in the immediate cause faith itself, but which are necessarily implied in the immediate cause of faith; e.g., that God is true and omnipotent, etc.; where he further observes that, "for any doctrine to constitute a foundation of the faith, it is necessary to the production of faith, that none of them be wanting, nor any other doctrine admitted which may militate, directly or indirectly, against the doctrine in question, or render it in any wise inefficient in producing faith." 2. Others divide them "into (a) antecedent articles of faith, which do not, indeed, cause justifying and saving faith, nor are absolutely and immediately necessary to its existence, but which are, nevertheless, necessary to the complete and permanent establishment of those doctrines which produce and constitute the faith, which cannot be done when these are not taught or are unknown or denied (the doctrine of the existence of a divine revelation, of the existence of God, His power, etc., etc., of the divinity of the Mediator, the sinfulness of man, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment); (b), into constituent articles of faith, which immediately and most nearly relate to our salvation, and intrinsically constitute and cause faith (the Christian doctrines of the love which God bears to man, of the merit and universal atonement of Christ, and its application to individual cases); (c), into consequent articles of faith, which so necessarily follow established faith that, if they be not held, faith itself again is lost (the eternal duration of God, the executive justice of God, the efficacious sanctification of God, the intercommunication of attributes and operation in the person of Christ, the regal office of Christ, etc., etc.)." HULSEMAN (in QUEN. I, 243). [8] HOLL. (51): "The secondary fundamental articles are those, a simple want of acquaintance with which does not prevent our salvation, but the pertinacious denial of, and hostility to, which overturn the foundation of the faith. Such are the parts of the Christian doctrine in regard to the characteristic peculiarities of the Divine Persons, of the intercommunication of attributes in Christ, of original sin, of the decree of election in view of final faith, of the justification of the sinner by faith alone, meritorious good works being excluded." (The latter sentence is thus further illustrated (p. 52): "The justification of the converted sinner by faith in Christ, is a constitutive fundamental article of faith. But it may happen that a sinner, acknowledging and hating his sins, may repose entire confidence in Christ as a Mediator, and yet know nothing about the exclusion of good works. Who would condemn him? But he who denies that the sinner is justified alone by faith in Christ, violates the primary fundamental articles concerning the grace of God and the merits of Christ.") The comparison of Notes 7 and 8 shows, moreover, that the Dogmaticians do not similarly divide the single doctrines of the same class. From the distinctions made in the fundamental articles there results what HOLL. (53) remarks: "All the fundamental articles of faith must necessarily be known, but the grades of this necessity are different. For those articles of faith which not only enter into the very definition of saving faith, but are immediately operative in the production of faith, are the most necessary for man to believe in order to his salvation. Of the remaining articles, some are positively and directly, others negatively and indirectly, necessary to be believed. And, in reference to those who believe, the same measure of knowledge will not be required of all." The distinction between the articles of faith, as fundamental principal and less principal, is met with already in Gerhard, who took it from the Scholastics; but in the fully developed form above cited, it first appears in N. Hunnius. Reformed theologians, in order to bring about a union of the two confessions, had denied the existence of a fundamental difference between them, and for this purpose had generalized the definition of the term fundamental as much as possible. To guard against falsely irenic attempts, Hunnius then wrote his "Careful Examination of the Fundamental Doctrinal Difference between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Wittenberg, 1626." [9] QUEN. (I, 21): "A summary of true religion (and of the articles of faith) is contained in the Symbols, embracing the Christian faith; these are either ancient, or oecumenical, received throughout all Christendom" (Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, Ephesian, Chalcedonic, and Athanasian Creeds), or more recent and, by reason of their less solemn sanction, particular (the Unaltered Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Smalcald Articles, the Catechisms of Luther, and the Formula of Concord). In regard to the relation of the earlier to the later symbols, HOLL. remarks (Comp. 7): "Those which were approved by the unanimous consent of the whole Catholic Church, viz., the three oecumenical symbols, possess far greater authority than those which have received the sanction and approbation of only a few particular churches." As to the meaning of the word Symbol. -- CAL. (I, 101): "They are called symbols because they were the tokens of the ancient Church, by which the orthodox could be distinguished from the heterodox." HOLL. (54): "They are public confessions, drawn up after much deliberation and consultation, in the name of the Church, by orthodox men, with reference to certain articles of faith, so that the members of the orthodox Church might be removed from the ignorance and heretical wickedness of infidels, and be preserved in the proper profession of the faith." As there are a number of them, HUTT. (Comp. 6) remarks: "Our churches recognize many symbolical books, but only as the same kind of evidence for the doctrine of their day." In reference to the relation sustained by the Symbolical Books to the Scriptures, cf. the FORM CONC. (Of the Compendious Rule and Guide, 7): "There is thus a very clear distinction made between the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and all other writings; and the Holy Scriptures are acknowledged as the only judge, rule, and guide by which, as by a Lydian stone, all doctrines are to be tried and adjudged, whether they be godly or ungodly, true or false. But the other symbols and other writings. . . . do not possess decisive authority,. . . . but merely furnish testimony for our religion and explain it, and show in what manner at particular times the Holy Scriptures were understood and explained, in regard to controverted points, by the learned men who then lived in the Church." This relation was not discussed, however, in the works of the Dogmaticians until the time of Hutter; and the same was the case with the question as to the importance and necessity of the symbols. The relation, as it was regarded at the end of the orthodox period, is thus expressed by HOLL. (56): "The Holy Scriptures and the Symbolical Books differ; because: (1) The Holy Scriptures were communicated by immediate inspiration from God to holy men of God, led by the Holy Spirit. The Symbolical Books are sacred writings, composed by orthodox men, divinely endowed with the privilege of mediate illumination (in a strict sense no symbol of the church can be called inspired). For although these orthodox men conceived the symbol mentally and committed it to writing, by illumination of the Holy Spirit, yet they did not write by a special, extraordinary, and immediate inspiration of God, but were endowed and instructed by God through an ordinary and mediate illumination. Nor were the single words of the Symbolical Books actually dictated to them by the Holy Spirit, but by the assistance and direction of God they themselves discovered suitable words and applied them to the divine doctrines. (2) The Holy Scriptures are worthy of belief on their own account, and, to establish their authority, need no earlier source by which they may be proved. The Symbolical Books are worthy of belief because of their harmony with the revealed Word of God. (3) The Holy Scriptures, by virtue of their divine, canonical authority, constitute an infallible rule whereby true doctrines are distinguished from false. The Symbolical Books have ecclesiastical authority, and by virtue of this are called a rule, namely, with regard to the public profession of faith, by which we declare the unanimous consent of the Church in doctrine. (4) The Holy Scriptures adequately contain all that is to be believed and practiced; no Symbolical Book embraces fully all the doctrines and moral precepts (but, by reason of the time and occasion when and on account of which the Symbolical Books were written, those particular doctrines were discussed which were then controverted and chiefly assailed)." And, inasmuch as the Symbolical Books are called inspired by some theologians. HOLL. further remarks (58): "The Symbolical Books are, it is true, called by some authors inspired, (a) by virtue of their object, since they contain and expound the Word of God, formerly communicated by immediate inspiration to the prophets and apostles, and elicit something by legitimate inference from the Word of God; (b) in view of their mediate illumination, for we do not doubt that God exerted a special influence upon the minds of the godly, learned men who wrote the Symbols of the Church, illuminated their minds and inclined their wills, so that they conceived and wrote most true and wholesome doctrines." Of the necessity of the Symbolical Books (Id. 59): "The Symbolical Books are necessary, not absolutely but hypothetically, for the condition of the Church, which was induced by weighty reasons to their publication, (a) to establish solid, permanent, and firm concord in the Church of God, so that there may be a certain compendious form or type approved by universal consent, in which the common doctrine, which the churches of the purer doctrine profess, collected from the Word of God, may be contained; (b) to furnish an account of the Christian religion, if it be demanded by the civil authority; (c) to distinguish the true members of the Church from her enemies, the heretics, and schismatics." In regard to obligation to the Symbolical Books, HOLL. remarks (59): "He who is a living member of the Church, and designs to fill the office of public teacher in it, may be bound by the superior magistrate to subscribe under oath, the Symbolical Books; in order that, as he is publicly to teach in the Church, he may be required to adhere to the universally acknowledged profession, exposition and defence of the common doctrine." __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ PART I. OF GOD. § 14. Division of the Subject. The chief design of the creation of man, and that of revelation also, is, that God may be known. [1] Theology, therefore, must begin with the doctrine concerning God. [2] The doctrine concerning God may be divided into (1) The doctrine of the existence, the nature, and the attributes of God. (2) The doctrine of the particular manner in which God subsists, i.e., the doctrine of God as triune. (3) The doctrine of the works of God, i.e., of Creation. (4) The doctrine of the manner in which God preserves His works and cares for them, i.e., the doctrine of Providence. (5) The doctrine of the angels, as the ministering beings among the works of God. __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I. OF GOD. __________________________________________________________________ § 15. Preliminary Statement. The Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God. The full and saving knowledge of God we obtain, of course, only from revelation. But aside from this there exists a knowledge of God, for we find it even among the heathen. We can therefore distinguish a twofold source from which the knowledge of God may be derived, the one, the volume of Nature, and the other, the volume of the Scriptures; and the knowledge of God is accordingly both natural, and revealed or supernatural. [3] The natural knowledge is either innate or acquired, i.e., a certain knowledge of God is inborn, and this can be expanded and further confirmed by the contemplation of the works and ways of God in nature and history. [4] The knowledge thus arising, though in itself true, may nevertheless be corrupted and changed into error through the moral depravity existing in man; [5] it is at best very imperfect, making known indeed something concerning God, e.g., His existence and somewhat of His attributes and will, but this never in its entire extent, and never in such manner as to give to man an absolute certainty, so as to furnish a trustworthy guide for his faith and life; [6] much less does it suffice to secure his salvation. [7] The reason of this imperfection lies, however, in the depravity of human nature, which, since its fall, can no longer lift itself up to a perfect knowledge of God. All knowledge thus derived we must therefore regard as the remnant of a knowledge which, but for the Fall, we would have possessed in full measure. [8] It serves, accordingly, rather to awaken in us a longing after true and perfect knowledge (cognitio paedagogica), and in some measure to regulate our moral deportment, even before the knowledge communicated by revelation has reached us (cognitio paedeutica); and it can also be profitably employed along with the revealed knowledge (cognitio didactica). [9] We still need revelation, therefore, in order to acquire full and true knowledge. [10] [1] GRH. (III, 1): "That this doctrine concerning God is necessary, is proved (1) by the design for which man was created. Just as all things else were created on account of man, so man was brought into being in order rightly to know and worship, to love and honor God his Creator. . . . (2) By the design for which God reveals Himself. God, coming forth from the hidden seat of His majesty, not only in the creation of the world, but also and most of all in the revelation of His Word, out of His boundless goodness unto men reveals Himself, surely with no other aim than that men may rightly know God through this revelation, and may preserve and hand down to their posterity the true doctrine concerning God, free from any intermixture of error and in its integrity." [MEL. begins his Loci of 1542: "For this end man was created and redeemed, that he might be the image and temple of God, to proclaim God's praises."] [2] GRH. (ibid.): "As the Holy Scriptures are the only source of knowledge in Theology, so God, boundless in goodness, supreme in power, is the only and absolute source of existence, not only with reference to the Holy Scriptures themselves (in which the Word of God or the divine revelation is contained), but also with reference to the divine works concerning which Theology treats. The centre of all Scripture, the nucleus of Theology, the end and aim of our knowledge and desire, all these are one and the same. We pass, therefore, in convenient order, from the article concerning the Scriptures to the article concerning the Nature of God and the Divine Attributes." QUEN. (I, 250): "The chief end of man and of all Theology is God, and the knowledge, worship, and enjoyment of God; with the doctrine concerning Him, therefore, we properly begin, when Theology is teated after the manner of a practical discipline." HOLL. (187): "As Theology is a practical science, we are first of all to treat of its design. But as the aim of Theology is twofold, in part objective, that is, the infinitely perfect and supremely beneficent God, and partly formal, that is, the beholding and beatific fruition of God; so the objective end of Theology, namely, God, who thoroughly satisfies the desire of man, is first to be considered." [3] GRH. (I, 93): "Two things lead to the knowledge of God: the creature and the Scripture (Augustine)." HOLL. (188): "The knowledge of God is sought both by the light of Nature or Reason, and by the light of Revelation." [4] QUEN. (I, 251): "The natural knowledge of God is that by which man, without any special revelation, may know of himself, though very imperfectly, by the light of Nature and from the Book of Nature, that there is some supreme Divinity, that He, by His own wisdom and power, controls this whole universe, and that He has brought all things into being." GRH. (I, 93): "Innate knowledge is that common conception concerning God engraven and impressed upon the mind of every man by Nature, and hence from the womb, as though from principles born within us or koinais ennoiais (which are nothing else than certain remains and ereipia of the divine image, sparks and scintillations of that clear light which shone with full splendor in the mind of man before the fall), which also embrace some knowledge of God; as, that He is one, good, etc." (III, 42): "These scintillations therefore we refer to that internal Book of Nature, to which also belongs the book suneideseos, the internal testimony of conscience, which the scholastics call sunteresis; for from principles born within us there arises in the heart of every one this practical syllogism: He who leads an impious life shall experience the wrath and punishment of a divine judge.' The reason of this lies in that which is by nature engraven upon all, i.e., that there is a God, that God is to be worshiped, that God is the avenger of crimes. The conscience of the guilty adds: I have led a wicked life.'" (Id., III, 42): "Natural knowledge is acquired by the human mind from the external Book of Nature, i.e., from the contemplation of the divine effects and ways, by the exercise of its natural powers." As such effects of the divine agency, GRH. enumerates (I, 94): "(1) The creation of things visible. (2) The variety, beauty, and order of created things. (3) The supporting, governing, and preserving of created things. (4) The profuse bestowment of the various gifts which minister to the necessities of man and other living beings. (5) The notice and retribution of the avenging eye and hand of God. (5) The working of miracles. (7) The foretelling of future events. (8) The periodical overthrow of kingdoms. (9) The nature of the human mind. (10) The fragments of natural knowledge, and among these the distinction of good and evil. (11) The terrors, gnawings, and stings of conscience. (12) The series of efficient and final causes." [Mel. (Loci, 1542) cites as proofs of the Divine existence: 1. The order of Nature, which could not have arisen or be maintained by accident, or have arisen from matter. The perpetuity of species, e.g., that men are born of men, and cattle of cattle, is cited as one illustration. 2. The nature of the human mind. A senseless and irrational thing cannot be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3. Moral distinctions made universally by men. These could not have originated from matter. 4. The universality of the testimony to God's existence. 5. Terrors of conscience, implying a Supreme Judge. 7. Organization of political society, which could not have arisen accidentally, but points to a divine mind, implanting within man the capacity and laws of order. 7. The series of efficient causes implying a First Cause. If the series were infinite, there would be no order among the causes, and none would necessarily cohere. 8. Final causes prove a designing mind. Everything in Nature is arranged with reference to an end.] [GRH. (III, 4) recapitulates proofs of philosophers and scholastics: 1. The series of moving objects in this world implies a First Mover. 2. The order of efficient causes implies a First Cause. 3. The different degrees of good imply a Supreme Standard. 4. The direction of all things, even those that are irrational, towards a certain end. 5. The natural inclination of all men to believe that there is a Governor of the Universe, whom they call God. This is illustrated by the fact that, in sudden dangers, when men recognize the impotency of human aid, they instinctively resort to prayer.] QUEN. (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is twofold; partly emphutos, or by nature impressed upon the minds of men in their very origin, innate and implanted, by which men recognize God through certain principles born within them, as it were by certain fragments and remains of the divine image, without any research or operation of the mind; partly epiktetos, or acquired, because it is evolved through the inborn principles of nature through a process of reasoning and the accurate contemplation of created things, or gathered from the works of God in creation and those traces of divinity which are scattered throughout the universe. The former is called subjective; the latter, objective. The former all men, even infants, possess; but the latter is not found in all. The former is propagated by generation; the latter by the instruction of others, or also by personal culture and investigation. The former may be called constitutional knowledge, for it belongs to us after the manner of a constitutional tendency, even before the use and exercise of reason; the latter, actual, because it exerts itself and is obtained by reasoning and research." Compare also the remark of GRH. (III, 46): "Finally, we observe, that when Ostorodus says that men do not obtain whatever knowledge they have of God or of divinity from nature, or from the contemplation of created things, but alone by hearing and from the teaching of others, the word, "hearing," is ambiguous. For if Ostorodus means that for all knowledge of God there is required a special manifestation of God through the Word, this we totally deny; but, if by the word, hearing, be understood the doctrine and precepts derived from our ancestors, who followed nature alone as a teacher, then we say that this, no less than the principles connate with us, and also the contemplation of created things, belongs to natural knowledge. But, although the arguments are distinct by which we demonstrate as well the innate as the acquired natural knowledge of God; yet, when the Photinians deny both, it is sufficient for us to prove against them that there is some natural knowledge of God, from whatever source derived, whether from natural instinct, or intuition, or the instruction of others, who have followed Nature alone as a teacher." CAL., in opposition to the Socinians, thus sums up the propositions in regard to the natural knowledge of God: "(1) That man, destitute of the revealed Word of God, can attain, by the use of sound reason, to some knowledge concerning God, His being and His general will or providence. (II, 61) (2) That not only the faculty or the power of knowing God, but also a certain knowledge of God, belongs to us by nature. (II, 73) (3) Although there does not belong to man a knowledge of God before the use and exercise of reason, so far as concerns a distinct notion or mental conception, yet we think it cannot be denied that there exists in man a certain disposition, or a kind of constitutional tendency, a certain teleiosis of intellectual power left in man after the Fall, by the use of which man can, to some extent, recognize God without the help of a teacher. (II, 80.) (4) That it is known to man, not only naturally, but also per se, that there is a God." (II, 86.) The proof for the existence of an innate knowledge is drawn from Rom. 1:19, and 2:14, 15; also from the following reasons: "(1) From the connate distinction between good and evil that is stamped upon the minds of all; (2) From the dread of a supreme divinity naturally springing up in the hearts of men; (3) From the terrors of an evil conscience and the cheerfulness and security of a good conscience; (4) From the torments of conscience on account of a crime committed. . . . (5) From the unanimous consent of all nations; (6) From the secret inclination of all to some form of religion; (7) From moral precepts drawn from the light of nature." (QUEN. I, 253.) The acquired knowledge is proved from Rom. 1:20; Acts 17:27. [5] QUEN. (I, 253): "That the natural knowledge of God is true, is evident from this, that the apostle expressly calls it aletheia, Rom. 1:18 sq., and with the addition, aletheian tou theou, v. 25, as that which springs from the original truth; where, nevertheless, we must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, considered in and through itself, and in so far as it has united with it imperfection, corruption of reason, and a proclivity to various errors. Viewed in the former light it is true, viewed in the latter it is mingled through accident with falsehood." [6] CAL. (II, 47): "The imperfection of the natural knowledge of God as to those things which are revealed in nature, and its nullity as to the supernatural mysteries of faith." QUEN. (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is imperfect mainly in two respects: (1) as regards its object, this being either altogether unknown (and here belongs the Gospel, which is a mystery hidden from the ages), or not fully known (and here belongs the doctrine of the Law, which man knows from natural sources only in part); (2) As regards its subject, either not recognizing God with sufficient constancy, or sometimes doubting concerning Him in consequence of congenital corruption." CHMN. (Loci, I, 20): "The natural knowledge of God either amounts to nothing, or is imperfect, or languid. It amounts to nothing, since all philosophy knows nothing whatever of the gratuitous promise of the forgiveness of sins; for the Son of God has revealed this to the Church from the bosom of the Eternal Father, John 1:18; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 1:21; 2:7. It is imperfect, for the heathen know only a small portion of the Law; but of the inner worship of the First Table, reason neither knows not determines anything for certain. Heathen philosophers teach of only external and civil topics, mingling with them many foolish paradoxes, concerning which there is among them no agreement. It is languid, for although the fact that God exists and requires obedience is impressed upon men's minds, nevertheless, the assent to this is not only feeble, but is often shaken by horrid doubts. An apt illustration is found in the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero, discussing with Antony the immortality of the soul, says: Read diligently Plato's treatise concerning the immortality of the soul. Nothing will be left for you to desire.' This I have done frequently,' Antony replies; but, somehow or other, as long as I read I assent, but whenever I lay aside the volume and begin to reflect concerning the immortality of the soul, all my assent glides away.'" In regard to the substance of what is known by the light of nature, QUEN. (I, 255): "The controversy here is not whether man, naturally or without revelation, can recognize to ti esti, what and who is the true God, according to all the peculiarities of the divine nature; and whether he can naturally fully understand His providence and His special will in the government of the Church and in the eternal salvation of men: for all these things are to be sought only through the revealed Word. But the question is whether man can naturally know to uti, whether God be, and in general recognize what that Divine Being is, who is the cause of all things in nature, who is just, good, holy, is to be worshiped, etc.; and so, whether man without a revelation can have any adequate knowledge concerning the true God or any true conceptions concerning God, although in particular he may apply them improperly, as e.g., to that which is not truly God." With the last remark from Quenstedt compare the statement of Gerhard (I, 96): "We must distinguish between the conception of God, derived by the heathen mind from the contemplation of His creatures, and the application of that conception; the former is legitimate, the latter is far from being so. For, although they derive the conception of eternal power and divinity . . . from the Book of Nature, yet they do not rightly apply it to the one Jehovah, . . . but they ascribe the same to irrational animals, serpents, reptiles, etc.; and inasmuch as they of their own accord devise a method of worship, they thereby worship the imagination of their own hearts and not the true God." Through the light of nature man attains, therefore, only "a partial knowledge concerning the power, wisdom, goodness and providence of God." GRH. (III, 60): "Man has been deprived of the knowledge of God, so far as the integrity of natural knowledge is concerned, for the greater part of it has been obliterated from his mind by sin; so far as its purity is concerned, for the knowledge yet remaining is very much obscured; and, in view also of the peculiar wickedness of certain persons." [7] QUEN. (I, 261): "The natural knowledge of God is not adequate to secure everlasting life, nor has any mortal ever been redeemed, nor can any one ever be redeemed, by it alone. Acts 4:12; Rom. 10:18; Mark 16:16; Gal. 3:11; Eph. 4:18; Gal. 4:8; Eph. 2:12." MEL. (I, 9): "Although, in some way, the human mind comes to the knowledge of the fact that God punishes the guilty, nevertheless concerning reconciliation it knows nothing without the revelation of the divine promise." [8] QUEN. (I, 254): "We must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, viewed in its original integrity, and the same in its fragmentary remains; the former is a perfect theongnosia, constituting a part of the mental condition of our first parents, as graciously created; the latter, on the other hand, is a partial and imperfect knowledge of God, still inherent in our corrupt nature since the Fall. It is as it were a little spark of primeval light, a small drop from a vast ocean, or an atom of the ashes of a splendid house in ruins." [9] CHMN. (Loci, Part I, 21): "The reasons why God imparted the external knowledge of Himself to the minds of all men are: (1) For the sake of external discipline, which God wished to be exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) that God might be sought after (Acts 17:27-30); (3) that He might render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20)." CAL. (II, 40): "The use of the natural knowledge of God is (1) Paedagogical, for seeking after the true God, who has manifested Himself through the Scriptures in the Church; (2) Paedeutical, for directing morals and external discipline both within and without the Church; (3) Didactic, because it contributes to the exposition and illustration of the Scriptures, if it be rightly employed." (Also II, 51): "The use of this doctrine (i.e., the topic concerning the natural knowledge of God) is that we may understand whether we can by nature know anything of God, or what and how much we can thus know; lest we either deny those things which are naturally manifest, or ascribe too much importance to them: also, that we gratefully recognize this manifestation and cultivate this natural knowledge as the Book of Nature is daily unfolded, and do not suppress it, or abuse it, but duly unite the Book of Nature with the Book of Scripture, and finally be confirmed and stimulated by the teaching and example of those who have applied themselves to the study of truth and virtue as here exhibited and illustrated." [10] QUEN. (I, 268): "The supernatural or revealed knowledge of God is that saving knowledge of the triune God and of divine things, drawn from the written word of God, which has flourished from the beginning of the Church and was ordained for human salvation." CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 22): "The saving knowledge of God through which we obtain eternal life, is that revealed through the Word, in which God makes known Himself and His will. To this revelation, God has bound His Church, which knows, worships, and glorifies God only as He has revealed Himself in this Word, so that in this way the true and only Church of God may be distinguished from all heathen religions." __________________________________________________________________ § 16. (1). The Certainty of the Divine Existence. Although the divine existence is postulated in the natural human consciousness, which furnishes many proofs of it, [1] yet we become perfectly certain of it only through revelation. [2] __________________________________________________________________ § 17. (2.) The Essence of God. Our knowledge of the essence of God (quid sit Deus) is also mainly derived from revelation, for the Holy Scriptures give us in His names, attributes, and works a description of God Himself. [3] And with the knowledge thus derived we must be satisfied, for we know concerning the essence of God nothing more, and nothing more specific, than what the Holy Scriptures teach. We acquire, indeed, from this source no adequate and complete knowledge of the essence of God; for this transcends our powers of comprehension, and for this reason the Scriptures declare the incomprehensibility of the divine essence. (1 Tim. 6:16; 1 John 3:2; Rom. 11:33.) But we may very well be content with the knowledge imparted to us through the Holy Scripture, as we nevertheless learn therefrom as much about God and His essence as is needful for our salvation. [4] From what has been said, it is manifest in what sense God may be defined. He cannot be literally defined, i.e., we cannot express in words what God is as to His essence, what He is in Himself, because no adequate conception can be formed of Him; but a definition of God, in a wider sense, may nevertheless be given, in so far, namely, as, upon the authority of the Holy Scriptures, a description of God may be presented, according to which we can most clearly distinguish between Him and other essences. [5] Upon the authority of the description of God given in the Holy Scriptures, we can thus define Him as an Infinite Spiritual Essence. [6] [1] See above, § 15, Note 4. [2] GRH. (III, 40): "To some it may seem that this question in the Church is superfluous, since it is known and conceded by all that God exists, and there is no people, however barbarous, that denies that God exists, and that He is to be worshiped (though it may not know how to worship Him), and so the knowledge of God is naturally innate in all. . . . But, nevertheless, we must prove that God exists, (1) for the confutation of those who deny that there is a God; (2) for the confirmation of our faith (. . . in great and severe temptations, says Chemnitz, we are all either Epicureans or Stoics; our mind must therefore be established by the consideration of the arguments which prove that there is a God, and that He exercises a providential care over human affairs); (3) for the perfecting of natural knowledge (. . . since the natural knowledge of God is imperfect and languid, and so must be confirmed, widened, and deepened from the Word divinely revealed.") [3] CAL. (II, 110): "That God exists, special scriptural statements testify, especially those which communicate His names, words, and works." GRH. (III, 14): "To synonymics belong the names of God, in the exposition of which the principal part of the doctrine concerning God consists, because our theology in this life is almost wholly grammatical, whence whatever we may know concerning God is called a name of God. . . . The names of God are general or special. In a general and wide sense, a name of God is whatever is predicated of God; thus the term was employed by the ancients, who, under the designation of names, embraced also the attributes or characteristics." QUEN. (I, 268): "In determining the question what God is, we must first consider the divine names, some of which, either in view of their etymology or from the manner in which they are used in Scripture, indicate the essence of God and are commonly called essential, as Jehovah, Jah, Elohim; others are derived from the divine attributes, as when God is called omnipotent, just, wise; others from the divine works, as when He is called Creator, Preserver, etc." [4] CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 24): "As we are not to think of God otherwise than as He has revealed Himself in the Word He has given, these questions (concerning the essence and the will of God) have certain prescribed limits, within which the human mind, contemplating God, must confine itself. For dangerous errors have arisen on this subject, for no other reason than because the point of view was not rightly taken, or because human curiosity in this discussion wandered farther than was meet." . . . SELN. (I, 53): "It has been said that we ought to be content with the descriptions of God which are given by God Himself." ID. (I, 51): "Hilary says: We understand that only that is to be heartily believed concerning God, in reference to which He himself authoritatively testifies that it is to be believed concerning Him. What, therefore, God is absolutely, and what is His nature and substance, we know that no one can state, imagine, comprehend, or declare by an essential definition, either by any dialectic reasoning or by the keenness of the human intellect. For, since neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man the things which God has prepared for those that love Him, how much less can the dulness of the human mind grasp God Himself? Whence many are accustomed to say, that it is easier to define what God is not, than what He is." Thus GRH. says (III, 15) of the divine majesty: "The variety of divine names expresses the divine majesty. For since, in consequence of its infinite perfection, the divine majesty cannot be fully recognized by us, therefore so many divine names are given in the Scriptures, that from these we may be led to something like a suitable recognition of the divine majesty." BR. (173): "It must be confessed that in this life we may not have a specific, proper, and adequate conception, well-defined and clear, of the divine essence; for we know but in part." [5] Thus already CHMN. asks (Loc. Th., I, 25), after the example of the Scholastics: "If a definition must explain the nature of the thing defined so as to lead the mind, as it were, into the very thing itself, how then can God be defined?" -- and answers; "The reply is easy: It is indeed true, concerning our knowledge of God in this life (1 Cor. 13:12), that we see through a glass, darkly;' and so in the definition it is said, He is of immense wisdom and power,' i.e., God is greater than we can imagine or declare. . . . But, in examining the definition we do not scrutinize those mysteries of the essence and will of God which He wishes us to be ignorant of; but we gather a brief statement from what God has Himself revealed to us in His Word concerning His essence and will. And, since God surely wishes to be recognized and worshiped as He has revealed Himself, that description of God is to be held, to which the mind reverts in prayer; for adoration is nothing but a confession, whereby we ascribe to the essence addressed in prayer all the attributes comprised in the definition. There is, therefore, a name of God occult and hidden, which is not to be searched out. There is, however, also a name of God made known that He wishes to be recognized, spoken about, praised, and worshiped." GRH. (III, 70) therefore distinguishes: "(1) Between a perfect definition, which exactly conforms to the accuracy of logical rules, and a description drawn from the Scriptures. (2) Between knowledge and comprehension. That is comprehended which is perfectly known; that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. We know God, indeed, but we do not comprehend Him, i.e., we do not perfectly know Him, because He is infinite. Here we must note, however, that the knowledge of God derived from the Word is called perfect, as well by reason of its end, for it is sufficient for salvation, as by way of comparison with natural knowledge, which is very obscure and imperfect. (3) Between the knowledge of God in this and in another life. . . . The latter, or intuitive definition is the most perfect of all, for we shall then see God in the future life, face to face. . . . (4) A nominal definition may be given, but not an essential one." CAL. (II, 142) distinguishes in the same way between a definition rigidly taken and a definition broadly applied. GRH. (III, 68) proves the inadmissibility of a definition in the strict sense: "(1) From the want of a genus. That of which there is no true and proper logical genus cannot be defined, because the genus is an essential part of a definition. But God has no true and proper logical genus; because, if there were such a genus, that would be in the same terms essentially and equally predicated of God and of creatures, which cannot be done, because God as the Creator and the creature are separated from each other by an infinite interval, and there is nothing that can be equally predicated of both. (2) From the divine perfection. God is the supreme Being, so He has nothing beyond Him; but whatever is properly defined is defined through something going before . . . (3) From a sufficient enumeration. If God may be properly defined, that would be either an essential or a causal definition. Essential it could not be, because that consists in genus and specific differentia. But God has no name of the same genus with other beings, nor is His most simple essence composed of genus and differentia. Neither can it be a causal definition, since God is the cause of all things, but of God there is no cause." [6] This position is taken by Calovius, Quenstedt, Koenig; while others, as Baier (173), Hollazius (229), thus define: "God is a spiritual Being, subsisting of Himself; or, more concisely: God is an independent Spirit." The individual terms are explained as follow: (1) BR. (172): "By the term divine essence is meant that which is first thought of in God, and through which God is adequately distinguished from all other things, and which, in our mode of conception, is the root and source of all the perfections which, as attributes, are ascribed to God." (2) QUEN. (I, 284): "The term spiritual essence is a common conception. For the term essence is common to God and creatures, but belongs to God originally and independently, to creatures secondarily and by way of dependence. And the term spirit also is analogically predicated of God and angels, and also of the souls of men." (The difference that is observed when these two terms are predicated of God and of creatures respectively, is still more accurately indicated in the statement: "Essence, substance, spirit, and consequently the remaining attributes which are ascribed at the same time to God and to creatures, are predicated of God and of rational creatures not sunonumos, univocally, nor omonumos, equivocally, but analogos, analogically, so that they belong to God protos and absolutely, to creatures deuteros and by way of dependence, analogy being properly thus employed with reference to an intrinsic attribute. The term univocal, properly and strictly speaking, belongs to such things as have the name and the thing denoted by that name equally in common, no inequality interfering on account of the dependence of the one upon the other; equivocal, to such as have a common name but not the thing signified by the name; analogical, to such as have both the name and the thing designated by that name, but unequally, when the name and the thing belong to the one protos and absolutely, but to the deuteros and by way of dependence.") (Id., 293.) (3) "But the predicate infinite expresses the peculiar conception; for by this God, as an infinite Sprit, is distinguished from angels and the souls of men, or finite spirits, and by this infinity of His own, God transcends all the bounds of being, so that He cannot be limited by time or place or any other thing, but, considered simply in His own nature and essence, He is of Himself and absolutely infinite. Nor do we speak of God as compounded, when we form both a common and a peculiar conception concerning Him. For that is a distinction of the reason only, and not a real one. (God is infinite, not by virtue of quantitative extension, since He is devoid of all quantity, but by virtue of essence and perfection.)" The independence is thus explained by BR. (173): "For, as by this, God is adequately distinguished from all other things, so there is nothing that you can earlier conceive of in God, as a peculiar and specific conception, than this, that He is not from another, and so exists of Himself and necessarily. Proof-texts: Isaiah 44:6, compared with Isaiah 41:4; Rev. 1:17." The more popular definition of God (definitio Dei nominalis) is: "By the term, God, is understood the first Being, because He is of Himself and is the cause of all other things, and because He preserves and governs all things;" concerning which HOLL. remarks (187): "All men in the present life discover in themselves that they do not and cannot otherwise conceive of God than as related to created things, as the first Being, because from Him is the cause of all other beings, and He preserves and governs all; or as the Being most excellent of all, than whom nothing can be, or be thought of as being. better or more perfect." The earliest theologians, who did not as yet treat of the attributes as a special topic, embrace them all, together with a notice of the Trinity, in the definition of God. Thus MEL. (Loci Theol., I, 13): "God is a spiritual essence, intelligent, eternal, true, good, pure, just, merciful, most free, of vast power and wisdom, the eternal Father who begat the Son, His own image, from eternity, and the Son, the co-eternal image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son." Later theologians also regard it as necessary to incorporate at once the Trinity in the definition of God. Thus CAL. says (II, 282): "Those who do not include a statement of the three persons in the description of God do not present that doctrine in a form at all genuine or complete, since without these it does not yet appear what the true God is." Compare, per contra, § 19, preliminary note. __________________________________________________________________ § 18. (3.) The Attributes of God. The doctrine of the attributes of God comprises only the more specific description of the divine nature, as the same is set forth in the Holy Scripture. [1] The attributes are, therefore, not to be considered as something supplementary to the essence of God, which may be laid aside without detriment to the substance of God; [2] but in them we describe the divine essence only according to its special features, because we cannot otherwise conceive of it (they are thus variously characterized on account of the feebleness of our conception). Hence it also follows that the attributes are to be regarded as unchangeable and permanent. [3] We acquire our knowledge of the divine attributes, in general, only from the Holy Scriptures, as has been already said, and yet these are here taught, either only by way of popular representation, or without any design of aiding us in constructing a systematic doctrinal statement of the divine attributes. To accomplish this, we must have recourse to other expedients. A correct and exhaustive arrangement of the divine attributes we may, however, attain, if, starting out with the proposition that God is the Most Perfect Essence, we endeavor to enumerate all His perfections; inasmuch as the attributes of God are nothing else than the description of the most perfect Essence. These perfections we ascertain in a threefold way: 1. By ascribing to God, in the highest sense, all the perfections which we can discover in His creatures, inasmuch as no perfection can be wanting to God of which we find creatures possessed. 2. By removing from our conception of God all imperfections which we observe in creatures, as nothing in any wise imperfect can be ascribed to Him, and by attributing to Him all the opposite perfections. 3. By ascribing to Him all the perfections which necessarily must have belonged to one who was able to create and accomplish what God has done. It is, therefore, by the way of eminence, [4] of negation, [5] and causality, [6] that we arrive at a comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes. The attributes found in this way may be variously classified; usually they are divided either into negative and positive (HOLL. (237), "the former being those by which the imperfections found in creatures are removed from God; the latter, those by which perfections are simply affirmed concerning God;" or, into such as describe God as He is in Himself and such as describe Him in His relation to the world). Therefore, a. Attributes anenergeta, quiescent (which, viz., have no specific reference to certain acts), or immanent, which describe the divine essence absolutely and in itself, without reference to an operation, and so directed towards no act; b. Attributes energetika, or operative, and exerting themselves outwardly, having reference to other things, which describe the divine essence relatively, with reference to an operation, and so are recognized as ordained for certain acts. [7] We follow the former division, and arrange the attributes of God, therefore, in the following manner: BR. (174): I. The NEGATIVE are: unity, simplicity, immutability, infinity, immensity, eternity. 1. "Unity; the attribute of God, by which we conceive the divine essence to be absolutely single; not only undivided, but also indivisible and incommunicable by any multiplication of Himself." HOLL. (238) "Unity is ascribed to God, as well absolutely, i.e., that the divine essence is undivided; as exclusively, i.e., when we recognize God as one, beside whom there is none other. Deut. 6:4; 4:35; 2 Kings 19:19." BR (175). [8] 2. "Absolute Simplicity, by which God is truly and really uncompounded (not compounded of matter and form, of integral parts, of subject and accident, of nature and subsistence). Ex. 3:14." (Ibid.) ["Spirituality, John 4:24, is comprised in Simplicity." QUEN. I, 286.] 3. "Immutability consists in this, that God is liable to no change, either as to existence (inasmuch as He is immortal and incorruptible. Rom. 1:23; 1 Tim. 1:17, 6:16), or as to accidents (James 1:17), or as to place (Jer. 23:24), or us to will or purpose (Numb. 23:19; Prov. 19:21; Mal. 3:6)." BR. (176). [9] "Immutability is the perpetual identity of the divine essence and all its perfections, with the absolute negation of all motion, either physical or ethical." QUEN. (I, 288). 4. "Infinity, because the essence of God is contained within no bounds (either of time. of place, or of anything else). Ps. 145:3." BR. (177). 5. "The Immensity of God consists in this, that the divine essence cannot be measured by, or included within, any local limits. Jer. 23:24; 1 Kings 8:27." BR. (178). "Immensity is the interminable ubiety, by virtue of which God cannot but be everywhere, in His own essence, or it is the absolute interminability of the divine essence. It flows from infinity, which, with respect to time, is eternity, and, with respect to space, is immensity." QUEN. (I, 288). From this there follow: a, the power of being illocally present, absolutely everywhere; b, the (ubiety and) omnipresence, by virtue of which God is actually present to all His creatures." [10] 6. The Eternity of God, absolutely so called (for it does not signify merely a very long time), indicated that the existence or duration of God is permanent, without any beginning or end, without succession or change. Ps. 102:27; 90:2; Gen. 21:33; Isaiah 40:28; 1 Tim. 1:17; Rev. 1:4 and 8, 11:17; 16:5." BR. (185). II. THE POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. BR. (174): "Life, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, justice, truth, power, goodness, perfection." 1. Life. QUEN. (I, 289): "The attribute by which the divine essence always shows itself active." [11] 2. Knowledge. QUEN. (I, 289): "By which He, through one simple and eternal act of the intellect, knows all things whatever that have been, are, and shall be, or even in any way can be. Nor only absolutely, but also that which is conditionally future or possible. 1 Sam. 2:3; 1 John 3:20; 1 Kings 8:39; Ps. 7:9; 34:15; 139:1; Pr. 15:3." [12] 3. "The Wisdom of God signifies that most accurate judgment of God, by which He knows how to dispose and ordain all causes and effects in a most admirable manner for the attainment of His end. Job 12:13; 28:20; Rom. 11:33." BR. (191). [13] "The Omnisapience of God is that, by which He most thoroughly penetrates all those things which infinitely surpass the reach of human and angelic judgment." QUEN. (I, 290). 4. "Holiness, by which He, conformably to His own Law, desires all things that are right and good. Deut. 32:4; Ps. 92:15; Lev. 11:44; 1 Pet. 1:15." BR. (200). [14] "The holiness of God is the supreme purity in God, absolutely free from all stain or vice, and requiring due cleanliness and purity in creatures." QUEN. (I, 292). 5. Justice. "The supreme and immutable rectitude of the divine will, demanding from rational creatures that which is right and just." QUEN. (I, 292). "Justice is a divine attribute energetikon, by virtue of which God wishes and does all those things which are conformed to His eternal Law (Ps. 92:15), prescribes suitable laws to creatures (Ps. 19:7), fulfils promises made to men (Is. 45:23), rewards the good (Rom. 2:5-7; 2 Thess. 1:6, 7), and punishes the wicked (Ps. 119:137; Rom. 1:32; Acts 17:31; 2 Thess. 1:6; Rom. 3:8, 25)." HOLL. (268). 6. "Veracity, by which God is unfailing in speaking the truth and keeping His promises. Numb. 23:19; Heb. 6:18; Deut. 32:4." BR. (202). 7. Power. "The divine attribute by which God can accomplish everything that can possibly be done without implying an imperfection in God." HOLL. (272). "Power is that by which God independently, through the eternal activity of His own essence, can do absolutely everything that does not involve a contradiction. Matt. 19:26; Luke 1:37; 18:27; Eph. 3:20." QUEN. (I, 293). [15] 8 and 9. "Goodness belongs to God, not only absolutely and in itself, which is His very perfection, or the essence of God, since He contains within Himself all perfections (Matt. 5:48; Luke 18:19), either formally or by way of eminence; but also, respectively or in relation to creatures, to whom God is good, since He efficiently produces every created good (Acts 17:25, 28; James 1:17; 1 Cor. 4:7), and this according to His own perfection, as the ideal or pattern of created perfection; and it attracts also, and excites to the love and desire of Himself as the chief good." BR. (205). [16] [1] QUEN. (I, 284): "Attributes are nothing else than inadequate conceptions of the divine essence, involving in part the essence itself of the object, and inwardly designating the same. Inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot adequately conceive of the infinite and most simple essence of God by a single adequate conception, therefore it apprehends the same by distinct and inadequate conceptions, inadequately representing the divine essence which inadequate conceptions are called the affections and attributes of God; affections, because they designate the divine essence; attributes, because they are attributed to the same by our intellect." HOLL. (234): "The attributes of God are called perfections, because they most perfectly declare God's essence." [2] CHMN. (Loc. Th. I,29): "An accident does not belong to God. . . . By an accident, that is meant which can either be lost, or can be added to a substance before existing, or can depart while the substance itself remains." CAL. (II, 221): "The attributes are by no means accidental, but, on the part of the object, they are the essence of God itself, regarded under various modes or respects of consideration, since essentials are usually referred to by that name. For if they were accidents, they would add a new entity or perfection, and the essence of God would not of itself be complete. If they were to belong to God in the manner of accidents, God's essence would not be altogether immutable, because liable to accidents." QUEN. (I, 296): "Before any operation of our intellect, divine attributes are truly and properly in God; yet they are not accidents, nor are they predicated of God in the manner of inherence or composition." And this is further explained by the following: (I, 297): "The divine attributes do not denote anything superadded to the divine essence, but are only inadequate conceptions of an infinitely perfect essence. The divine essence is like a boundless ocean of all infinite perfections, which the human intellect has not the ability to exhaust, by one single conception, and, therefore, by means of various conceptions, draws drop by drop, as it were, something from that infinity." (Ibid.) "The divine attributes imply the divine essence itself, which we apprehend now with this and then with another perfection, as if we would distribute the essence itself into a number of conceptions, representing the same essence inadequately, inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot at the same time distinctly recognize its infinite perfections." Hence follow the proposition (GRH. III, 84): "The divine attributes, considered in and of themselves, are really and absolutely one with the divine essense." CAL. (II, 222): "IF they really differed from the essence after the manner of accidents, a composition in God would be predicated; and since, by nature, accidents come after essence, former and latter in the order of nature would have a place in God, both of which are contrary to the faith. If they were to be actually distinguished, they would not be predicated in the abstract of God, who in the abstract is said to be truth, life, love. If God's power were to differ from His essence, God would not be autexousios, i.e., powerful in Himself, but on account of the power superadded to His essence." There is, indeed, a certain difference between essence and attributes, otherwise they would not be separately treated. This distinction is thus stated by QUEN. (I, 300): "The essential attributes of God are distinguished neither from the divine essence nor from each other really, or from the nature of the object, as matters altogether diverse, or as two or more different objects or diverse modes of one and the same simple object, but they are so distinguished only to the reason." A distinction from the nature of the object, would occur if the objects were different, as body and soul; but a distinction from reason occurs, when anything is only conceived of as distinct, although it is not distinct in fact. HOLL. (235) expresses this distinction thus: "Divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence and from each other not nominally, nor really, but formally, according to our mode of conceiving, not without a certain foundation of distinction." To wit: not "nominally" because "divine attributes imply distinct conceptions, therefore they differ more than nominally" nor "really," because "the divine essence is most simple, destitute of all real composition" but "formally," etc., "because we form single conceptions of the operations of the single attributes, although they do not exist separately in the divine nature." [3] GRH. (III, 84): "The attributes exist inseparably in God; for, as it is impossible that the essence of an object be separated from the object itself, so also the attributes cannot be separated from God, since they are the very essence of God." [4] HOLL. (190): "By way of eminence, according to which whatever we discover in creatures to be especially perfect, we ascribe in the most eminent manner to God, by virtue of the very familiar principle in nature: Whatever exists in an effect, pre- exists in the cause.' From which we infer that all perfections which are in creatures, are in the Creator, either formally or by way of eminence. For indeed, in creatures, such perfections shine forth absolutely, as involve in their formal conception no imperfection, but are better than the creatures themselves. Thus we notice in men, the most eminent of visible creatures, the power to understand and to will, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc. These perfections exist formally, and, indeed, in the most excellent manner, in God." While here perfections are ascribed to God which in a certain sense can be predicated also of a creature, GRH. (III, 86) appends the twofold remark: (1) That we must be careful to observe that they belong to man only secondarily, but to God originally. . . . "Of God they are predicated essentially, exochikos, and, therefore, altogether in a peculiar way; of certain creatures only accidentally and through a participation and resemblance: of God they are predicated in the abstract; of creatures, only in the concrete. The goodness of God not only belongs to God essentially, and is itself the essence of God, but also in the cause and rule of goodness in man." (2) That those attributes which in the case of man express an affection, when ascribed also to God do not indicate a weakness or mutability like that of the creature, in accordance with the principle (ibid): "Whatever things are transferred from creatures to God must first be freed from all imperfections, and then only, as that which is perfect, are they to be ascribed to God." (I, 110): "Nor do those affections which Scripture ascribes to God prove any mutability of the divine essence; for those things which are spoken of anthropopathos, must be understood theoprepos." CHMN. (Loc. Th., 29): "It is objected that some things are affirmed of God with respect to time: as, the Word was made flesh,' and became for us a Creator, an aid in times of trouble, and a refuge. Therefore, all this is predicated of God accidentally. Cyril replies: With respect to creatures, some things are affirmed of God under the limitations of time; and these are affirmed accidentally,' not because anything happens, with change, to God's substance, but as an accident of the creature in which the change occurs." [5] HOLL. (191): "By way of negation, according to which we remove from God whatever implies imperfection in creatures, and ascribe to Him an opposite perfection, according to the self-evident principle of nature, that there is no defect in that which is supremely perfect. Relying upon this principle of nature, we call God independent, infinite, incorporeal, immense, immortal, incomprehensible." [6] HOLL. (190): "By way of causality, according to which we recognize from the effects an efficient First Cause; from creatures, a Creator; and from the most beautiful and wise government of this universe, a most excellent, most powerful, and most wise Preserver and Governor. Here an argument is derived from the very evident axiom: An effect is proved from the cause, and its perfection." N.B. Except in the writings of GRH., we find the method adopted after the time of Dionysius only incidentally noticed, it is true; and HOLL. mentions it barely as that by which we can acquire a natural knowledge of God: but we may with good reason assign it this place; for, although it is not questioned that we obtain a clearer and more comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes from revelation than natural knowledge teaches, yet we cannot believe ourselves limited, with regard to the divine attributes, to the Holy Scriptures in such a way as only to have the single attributes enumerated for us out of the Scriptures, but we must rather be able from them to form for ourselves such a conception of the Divine Essence that we may from it deduce the attributes; and thus, from the standpoint of revelation itself, this threefold way of eminence can be evolved. [7] GRH. (III, 85) enumerates still other distributions: "(1) Some attributes are predicated at the same time of God and of creatures, such as those by which things are signified which in creatures are accidents, but in God are substances, as when God is said to be good, wise; but others are predicated of God alone, as those by which things which belong to God alone are explained, as when He is said to be eternal, infinite. (2) Some attributes are attributes to God properly, as that He is good, wise, etc.; others improperly and figuratively, when, by anthropopathy, human members and affections are ascribed to Him. (3) Some are affirmed of God in the abstract, as when He is said to be life, goodness, truth; others in the concrete, as when He is said to be living, good, and true. (4) Some are internal, as infinity, eternity, spirituality; others are external, and these are either inimitable, as omnipotence, etc., or imitable. (5) Some belong to God from eternity, as that He is infinite; others belong to Him in time, as that He is the Creator and Preserver, yet these, as relative terms, do not prove any change made in God Himself in time, but denote that a new work has been produced by Him, and that a change has been made in creatures." Those Dogmaticians who divide the attributes into immanent and externally operative, usually cite a greater number. CALOV. (II, 233, seq.) thus enumerates them: "I. The immanent attributes pertain either to essence, or infinity, or spirituality. To the essence belong God's perfection (and thence, majesty and happiness), unity (and thence, simplicity), truth (and thence, immutability), goodness, holiness. To infinity belong immensity, eternity. To spirituality, immortality, life (intellect, will). II. To the attributes exerting themselves outwardly belong omnipotence, omniscience, grace, justice, truth, omnipresence." [8] HOLL. (238): "God is said to be one, not in kind, but in number, since He is a being entirely alone, not only in Himself undivided, but also indivisible, because of the entire simplicity of the divine essence, as there is no composition in God." GRH. is the only one of the Dogmaticians who considers unity as not an attribute, but as a characteristic, of the divine essence. For the relation of the unity of God to the Trinity, see § 19. [9] GRH. (I, 124): "But did the work of creation change God, or make Him changeable? By no means; for in time He did that which, from eternity, He had decreed in His immutable will." [10] GRH. (III, 122): "The immensity and essential omnipresence of God is thus to be understood (1), that God is present to all things, not only by virtue and efficacy, nor only by sight and knowledge, but also in His entire and individual essence, for He is immense and infinite, not only in power and knowledge, but also in essence; (2), that God is everywhere present, not sunektos, so as to be comprehended, but sunektikos, so as to comprehend and contain all things; not periektos and perigraptos, but periektikos. The Scholastics say that God is everywhere, not locally or by way of circumscription, . . . nor definitively, . . . but repletively; [4] yet this must not be understood in a gross and corporeal manner, that God fills all places just as a body which fills its own place in such a manner as to hinder another body from being located in the place which it occupies, but in a divine manner, that God, being confined to no place because of the immensity of His essence, contains all places; (3), that God is everywhere present, not by the multiplication of His essence, for He is olos olon ti, a most simple being, and, therefore, whatever He is He is entire, neither by the division of His essence, . . . nor by extension and rarefaction, . . . nor by commingling; . . . (4), that God is, by His essence, everywhere present, not subjectively, as an accident inheres in a subject, because God is neither composite, nor can He admit of composition, . . . but that He is effectively present as the source and cause of the thing which He effects; for God is not contained in a place, but rather gives to place and the things that are in place their own existence. The presence is (a), illocal; (b), indivisible; (c), incomprehensible to our reason; (d), effective and operative; (e), containing within itself all things, like a most minute point. HOLL. (275): "God's omnipresence is a divine energptikon attribute, by virtue of which God is present to all creatures, not only by the nearness of His substance, but also by His efficacious working. The divine presence, according to the Scriptural idiom and its complex meaning, implies two things (1), adiastasia, or the substantial presence of God with creatures; (2), energeia, or effectual operation. Therefore, two things are here to be proved: (a), that God, with respect to His substance, is everywhere present; (b), to a full and accurate definition of the divine presence, the effectual operation also of God as a definitive part is required by the light of the Holy Scripture." [11] QUEN. (I, 289): "God is life (1), essentially, for He is autozoos, having life en eauto (John 5:26), i.e., in Himself and of Himself, by His own nature and essence; (2), energetikos, effectively, because He is to all the cause and origin of life, or He is the life of all that live, not formally, but causally. (Acts 17:28; Deut. 32:39.)" This is negatively expressed by immortality. 1 Tim. 6:16, and incorruptibility, Rom. 1:23; 1 Tim. 1:17. [12] QUEN. (I, 289): "Although the knowledge of God is one and simple, and cannot be separated into parts or species, yet, with respect to objects, a manifold distinction is generally observed. This distinction is (1) into natural, or that of simple intelligence, and free, or that of sight. The former, which is called also abstract and indefinite, is that by which God knows Himself, and not only those things which are, which have been, or are about to be, but also all possible things, viz., those which can happen and exist, although they never will happen or exist; yea, He is acquainted even with those things which are impossible. The latter, viz., the knowledge of free vision, which is called both intuitive and definite, is that by which God regards all things as present, sees Himself in Himself, and all other things which at any time have existed, or now exist, or will truly exist, both in Himself, as in the universal cause, and in their proximate causes and in themselves. The Scholastics add a third, and name it mediate, according to which they say that God is acquainted with those things which can exist, with the condition interposed that it is limited to that which the creatures, if created with certain conditions, would be free to do, or would be allowed to effect. Natural knowledge precedes every free act of the will. Free knowledge is said to follow a free act of the will. Mediate knowledge is said indeed to precede an act of the will, yet in such a manner that it sees something as future only on the hypothesis of such will. [13] BR. (191 and 192) discusses the topic of the will of God, not as a separate attribute, as many Dogmaticians do, but as supplementary to the attribute of wisdom; and from the will of God deduces the attributes of holiness, justice and truth. HOLL. (261): "The will of God is the divine essence itself, conceived of under the mode of power, seeking the good and shunning the evil that is known by the intellect." The name of the divine will is more particularly described as follows: BR. (193): "The will of God is distinguished into natural and free. According to the former, God is said to will that which He is not able not to will. According to the latter, He is said to will that which He was able also not to will, or to will the opposite. According to the former manner, He is said to will Himself; according to the latter manner, created things." HOLL. (262): "You say: The necessity to will and love Himself seems to be an imperfection in God, both because it is like the mode of operation of natural agents, which is imperfect, and also because freedom is a greater perfection than necessity. Reply: Necessity in acting is threefold. One kind is violent, which is from without. A second is natural, which is, indeed, from within, yet is inanimate or at least irrational. Both are imperfect. A third is natural, vital, and in the highest degree voluntary. This is a great perfection, and such a necessity to will and love exists in God in respect to that which is a supreme and infinite good. Yea, this necessity is more perfect than the freedom to which it is opposed." BR. (194): "The free will of God is distinguished as: (1) efficacious and inefficacious. That is efficacious by which God wills something to be effected. Inefficacious is that by which something in itself please God, although He does not intend to effect it. The efficacious will again is divided into absolute, by which God wills something without a condition; and conditional, by which He wills something under a condition; (2) absolute, by which He wills that something be effected by His own absolute power, or by His power as not bound by second causes; and ordinate, by which He wills that something be effected by His own ordinate power, or by His power as bound to second causes and to a certain order of means appointed by Himself; (3) first or antecedent, by which He wills something from Himself alone, or entirely from His own inclination, without any regard being had to the circumstances; and second or consequent, by which He wills something with a consideration of the circumstances, or in consideration of a cause or condition, regarded with respect to the creature for which He wills something." BR. (198): "A distinction of the divine will also occurs, into a will of the sign and of the purpose. The former is meant when the name, will, is ascribed to an effect or object of the divine will, namely as a sign of the will in God. [5] The latter denotes the act itself of the divine will, by which it wills anything. Whence it is manifest that the distinction is analogical. But we must take care not to imagine such a will of the sign as to conflict with the will of the purpose which the sign, according to the plan, ought to signify." [14] HOLL. (246): "God is holy, (1) independently and by His essence: creatures dependently and through a quality superadded to the essence; (2) immutably, inasmuch as the holiness of God cannot fail, or undergo a change like that of a creature, James 1:17; (3) efficiently, because He is the author of all holiness, 1 Thess. 5:23; (4) by way of example, since the holiness of God is the model of all holiness, which the holy sons of God perpetually contemplate and imitate. This imitation the Heavenly Father demands of them, Lev. 11:44; cf. Lev. 19:2; 1 Pet. 1:17; (5) objectively, because the holiness of God must be sacredly recognized and celebrated by us, Is. 6:3." [15] QUEN. (I, 293): "The objects of the divine omnipotence are not only such things as God wills to do, but also such as are in any way possible, and therefore, all those things which do not involve contradiction, as (1) such as have no mode of existence. Thus God is unable to render a deed undone; (2) such as imply a fault or defect, as to be able to lie, to sin, to die. For to do such things is not a proof of power, but of impotence. The potentia of God is not separated from divine potestas, dunamis, from exousia, [6] as the Calvinists wish; for, although these can be distinctly conceived of, and among other things outside of God have frequently been separated, yet in God they are most intimately joined, and are one and the same thing." "Although divine power is unique, yet because of its different relations, it can be distinguished into absolute, by which God can most absolutely effect whatever can exist; and ordinate, which the accustomed government of the universe displays. By the former, God can frame a new world, from the stones raise up children to Abraham (Matt. 3:9); the latter preserves the order established in nature. By this absolute power God can do many things, which, nevertheless, He does not do by His ordinary power." [16] HOLL. (245): "The goodness of God is the conformity of the divine essence to the divine will." It has been distinguished into essential goodness, or perfection, and moral goodness, or holiness. __________________________________________________________________ [4] See Appendix II, under Circumscriptio. [5] As illustrations, he cites Matt. 6:15; 12:50, and especially 1 Thess. 4:3. [6] "Potentia denotes a merely factitious power, which can be exerted at will, like dunamis; potestas, a just and lawful power, with which a person is intrusted, like exousia." -- Doederlein's Latin Synonyms. __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II. OF THE HOLY TRINITY. [1] __________________________________________________________________ § 19. The Doctrine is a Mystery. THE Holy Scriptures declare that God is but one, and yet they also ascribe Divinity to three, viz., Father, Son, and Spirit; and thus we learn from them that there is one God, but that this one God is Father, Son, and Spirit. Here a proposition is stated which is altogether beyond the grasp of reason; the doctrine it contains belongs therefore to those we designate as mysteries. [2] Concerning this mystery the Holy Scriptures alone can give us any information, therefore upon them alone this doctrine is based. [3] But the Holy Scriptures do not unveil for us this mystery; they rather reveal the doctrine as a mystery, and it is therefore to so great an extent a mystery, that we here upon earth can never attain to a perfectly correct conception or comprehension of it, [4] and at best can only approximate this by analogies drawn from the sphere of human knowledge. [5] Therefore the Church desists from any attempt to fathom this mystery, but applies in this case most rigidly her rule of extracting the substance of her faith alone from the Holy Scriptures. She simply assigns to herself the task of most carefully collecting and arranging the subject-matter of what the Scriptures teach in regard to this mystery, and is the more urgently impelled to do this, because the matter in hand is one of no less importance than to learn what conceptions God wishes us to form concerning Himself. [6] Therefore she demands of every one, who wishes to belong to the Church, that he believingly accept this revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures. [7] The Church, when she sets forth this doctrine, is moreover fully justified in the use of such terms as do not occur in the Holy Scriptures; for, inasmuch as the opponents of this doctrine, when it was stated only in the terms employed in the Holy Scriptures, perverted the meaning of these and gave them a different interpretation, the Church was compelled more specifically to explain in what sense these scriptural expressions, taken in their connection, are to be understood; and this, of course, had to be done in terms which were not contained in the Scriptures, for their very purpose was to explain the sense in which the Church understands the statement of the Scriptures. [8] And this explains why it is that the doctrine of the Trinity only gradually assumed the form in which the Church now sets it forth, and how ungrounded is the inference that the doctrine is not fully indorsed by the Holy Scriptures, and that it was not from the first believed by the Church. [9] And, finally, the Church, in using these terms, neither presumes that she has unfolded the mystery, nor does she intend that these expressions are to be taken precisely in the sense in which they are generally used; for, inasmuch as we have here to do with a doctrine that is entirely beyond the reach of reason, the terms that are applicable to other things are inadequate, and the Church therefore still always thus explains the particular sense in which she wishes these expressions to be understood. [10] The Church arrives at the doctrine of the Trinity by observing that in the Holy Scriptures, on the one hand, the unity of God is taught; and on the other, Divinity is ascribed to three, Father, Son, and Spirit; that, accordingly, a certain distinction is recognized in God, and a plurality in Him is indicated. [11] These predicates concerning God, contained in the Holy Scriptures, of unity, plurality, and diversity, the Church combines in the formula: The one divine essence subsists in three persons; or (what is the same thing), In the Deity there are three persons and one essence; or, God is one in essence, but the same God, one in essence, is threefold in person. The doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, is that in which a peculiar and incomprehensible application of the term three to the divine persons is taught, but in such a manner that not anything composed of three, but three persons of one essence are postulated. God is triune, therefore, because, in essence one, He has three modes of subsistence. [11] The meaning of this formula is further explained by the Church as follow: (1) The unity therein expressed is that of the divine essence. [13] This unity of essence is, more specifically, a numerical unity, i.e., it is of such a nature that it can be predicated only of one. Hence, it follows that when it is said that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one, these three are not to be designated as three Gods, each having a special divine essence (Symb. Athanas.: Non tres Dii, set unus Deus); and that we are not to associate with the word being [Wesen, essentia] exactly the same signification that it has when applied to man (essentia hominis), for that is just the difference between the essential nature of God and that of man, i.e., that God's nature in one numerically, and that of man is one in kind. [14] Father, Son, and Spirit are, therefore, God in such a sense, that entire divinity is predicated of each of the three; the one and undivided essentia is ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The one and undivided divine essence is entire in each [14] (tota in singulis), whence it further follows that, as in God there is no objective distinction between nature and attributes, divinity as well as all its attributes must be ascribed to each of these three. [16] (2) A plurality in God, and, therefore, a certain distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit, is indeed clearly taught in the Holy Scriptures, but this is (a) no plurality of essence (pluralitas essentialis), as has already been shown; further, it is (b) no plurality of accidents (pluralitas accidentalis), i.e., personality is not something added to the being of God, as a special peculiarity or characteristic, for the principle applies to God In Deum nulla accidentia cadunt. [17] (§ 18, note 2.) Plurality may perhaps be best described as a pluralitas hypostatica seu personarum, [18] i.e., as one, according to which each of the three persons is to be conceived of as a self-subsistent subject; which statement, however, must be at once qualified by the remark that we are to stop with this, and dare not press the analogy of the word any further. For there is always this difference in the word person when used with reference to God or man, respectively, that in the latter case it signifies a self-subsistent subject, which has its own essence, while in the Trinity there is only one undivided essence, of which all the three persons of the Godhead partake. [19] In this sense, therefore, we are to distinguish in the one divine essence three persons, and the distinction between them is to be described as a true and real one. [20] Hence it follows, however, that to each of these there belong certain peculiarities distinguishing it from the others (a hypostatical character or personal peculiarity (nota, notio, relatio), showing a distinction of persons in a common identity of essence). Such peculiarities we recognize in the various statements made in the Holy Scriptures concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These statements are of a twofold character; they either indicate the inner differences that exist in the persons themselves, and describe, in this case, the special mode of subsistence of the single person (tropos uparxeos, the peculiar method of subsisting, through which and by reason of which each person is distinguished from the other), or they describe the special relation which the single persons hold to the world. Hence we have to distinguish the internal and external peculiarities (proprietates, notiones), to which there are also corresponding acts by which the individual persons are related to themselves or to the world (opera da intra, internal acts, which God performs without any creature, within himself -- opera ad extra, external acts, when God effects something in creatures, without his own essence). [21] Through these declarations of the Holy Scriptures we learn the peculiarities that constitute the distinction between the several persons. Yet we must not fail to observe that it is the internal characteristics and the internal acts corresponding to them, as described in the divine Word, that reveal to us more clearly the distinction of persons; for only the internal works (opera ad intra) are to be regarded as such acts as proceed from one particular person, to the exclusion of the others, while the outward works (opera ad extra) are those from which, although predicated directly of one person, the others are still not absolutely excluded. The reason of this, however, lies in the fact, that the opera ad extra are outward operations, which must always be considered as proceeding from the essence of God; hence, also, in every such operation all the three persons must participate, at least in some way, as the essence of God, which is common to all three, is only one. Whence follow the propositions: "The opera ad intra are divided, [22] the opera ad extra are undivided." [23] CHEMN. (Loc. Th., I, 40). The personal peculiarities, moreover, according to the Holy Scriptures, are five: agennesia (the not having been begotten) and paternity in the Father -- active procession (spiratio) in the Father and the Son -- sonship, in the Son -- passive procession in the Holy Spirit. [24] The personal acts, or inward operations, are two: (of the Father) generation (of the Father and Son), spiration. The opera ad extra are three: of the Father, creation; of the Son, redemption; of the Holy Spirit, sanctification. From the peculiarities and acts mentioned in Scripture, according to which the begetting of the Son is ascribed to the Father, and the sending of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, it follows, finally, that we are to assign the first place to the Father, the second to the Son, and the third to the Holy Ghost. [25] The Church indicates both, viz., the unity and the distinction, by the term omoousia, which it predicates of the three persons. [26] From this unity there is just as legitimately derived the perichoresis (immanentia, immeatio, circumincessio, inexistentia mutua et singularissima) [the mutual and most peculiar inherence], by which one person in virtue of the unity of essence is within another (John 14:11; 17:21), through which term the error is precluded, of regarding the three persons as subsisting separately alongside of one another; as also the equality (so that no one person is greater or less than another, and that the Father cannot properly be called God, by way of eminence (kat echochen), or be said to be greater than the Son by reason of the mode of subsistence). [27] The predicates which are to be ascribed to the three persons may accordingly be thus classified: Holl. (301): "I. God the Father [28] is the First Person of the Godhead, neither begotten nor proceeding, but from eternity begetting the Son, the substantial image of Himself, and with the Son from eternity breathing forth the Holy Spirit, creating, preserving and governing all things, [29] sending His Son as the Redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as the Sanctifier of the human race." "II. The Son of God [30] is the Second Person of the Godhead, begotten of the Father from eternity, [31] of the same essence and majesty with the Father, who with the Father from eternity breathes forth the Holy Spirit, and in the fulness of time assumed human nature in His own person, that He might redeem and save the human race." Id. (305). "III. The Holy Spirit is the Third Person of the Godhead, of the same essence with the Father and the Son, who from eternity proceeds from the Father and the Son, [32] and in time is sent forth [33] by both, to sanctify the hearts of those who are to be saved." [34] Id. (329). [1] The doctrine concerning the Trinity can properly be treated of as distinct from that concerning God in general, for we should first discuss the essence and attributes of God in themselves, and then the particular manner in which this essence subsists and thus becomes common to three. QUEN. (I, 284): "The consideration of God is twofold, one absolute, another relative. The former is occupied with God considered essentially, without respect to the three persons of the Godhead; the latter, with God considered personally. The former explains both the essence and the essential attributes of God; the latter describes the persons of the Holy Trinity, and the personal attributes of each one." CAL. (III, 1): "The doctrine of the divine persons follows the doctrine of the divine attributes. This doctrine explains the mystery of the Holy Trinity, in order that we may know who is the one, true, and eternal God, whether, as He is one in essence, He is so also in person, or not; and who these divine persons are, who are to be regarded as the one, true God; namely, that according to the Catholic faith, they are Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." [2] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 33): "The things that are declared concerning the Trinity of persons in the most holy Godhead are wonderful and far above all comprehension of creatures." GRH. (III, 220): "The mystery of the Trinity can in no way be clearly proved a priori from natural reason, nor ought such an attempt to be made." . . . (III, 221): "To learn a doctrine that has been placed far above all comprehension of human reason, human reason cannot be led, from its own principles; for otherwise it would not be above reason. But such is the doctrine of the Trinity, as is inferred from Matt. 11:27; 16:17; John 1:18, etc." . . . (Ibid.): "The question concerning the one and triune God is, What is God, in Himself? To this man cannot rise by the strength of His own reason." KG. (30): "Its sublimity is such that it is uper noun, uper logon, kai uper pasan katalepsin (above thought, above speech, and above all comprehension), and therefore, from reason, it neither can nor ought to be attacked, or refuted, or demonstrated, whether a priori or a posteriori." QUEN. (I, 318): "Yea, not even the possibility of this mystery can be obtained from the light of nature, since to reason, consulting its own principles, it seems absurd and impossible." GRH. (III, 229): "Such is the nature and character of the mystery of the Trinity, and of other mysteries properly so called, that they transcend the comprehension of reason, i.e., that reason, without the revelation of the Word, cannot attain to the knowledge of them, and that even when the revelation of the Word has been given, reason cannot and ought not to affirm, from its own principles, anything whatever concerning them. Therefore also, in these mysteries, it ought not to oppose its own reasonings to the heavenly truth." The question, How, then, must the testimonies be judged which have been produced from heathen writers, for constructing the mystery of the Trinity? is thus answered (GRH., III, 227): "(1) In some there are only similar things, but not the same with Christian doctrine. They agree with us in words; they differ from us in the explanation and meaning of the words. (2) Others teach the same things, but have derived them (a) partly from the reading of the Holy Scriptures; (b) partly from conversation with Hebrews; (c) partly from the revelations of oracles and the Sibyls." [3] GRH. (III, 217): "From the proper and only source of theology, viz., from the Word of God, the confirmation of this mystery must be derived." KG.: "The source (principium), therefore, through which this mystery becomes known, and ought to be framed, is divine revelation alone, communicated to us in the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament." [4] This is implied already in the statement contained in Note 2, viz., that this doctrine cannot be proved from reason by an a posteriori argument. GRH. (III, 233): "The mysteries of faith are above reason, not only in such a sense and respect that reason, without the revelation of the Word, cannot aspire to their knowledge, but also that even with the revelation of the Word, reason still cannot, in any manner, comprehend the same; because in 1 Cor. 2:14, not only the knowing, but also the receiving, of spiritual things is denied the natural man, and if reason were to judge concerning these things, it could judge only that they are folly." [5] HFRFFR. (44): "Is it possible, nevertheless, for this plurality of unity to be, in any wise, adumbrated by certain analogies or most rude outlines? In the entire universe, nothing can be found to express the mystery of the adorable Godhead. For God, the Creator, surpasses creatures by immense intervals of degrees; yet, in order that we may be able even to stammer something concerning so great a mystery as this, and to raise up and excite our thoughts to the adorable sublimity of the same, pious antiquity has attempted to illustrate so great a matter by analogies derived from creatures." (47): "Yet, in all these analogies, the points of unlikeness are greater than those of likeness; for there is nothing in heaven or in earth which can express the nature of the infinite God, nor is there any voice or reason that can adequately explain so great a mystery." GRH. (I, 209): "We must make a distinction between a class of a posteriori declarations and proofs, by which this mystery, first revealed in the Scriptures, is in a manner explained and shown to be not absurd; and, on the other hand, accurate a priori demonstrations, according to which we absolutely deny that this can be investigated or proved by us." The Church Fathers sought for traces of the Trinity in the creature, and found what they regarded as reflections of it (imagines), in intellectual and rational creatures, and traces of it (vestigia), in irrational creatures. As to the arguments thence derived, GRH. says (III, 224): "(a) They only illustrate, they do not prove; (b) there is in them more unlikeness than likeness; (c) they are derived a posteriori, not a priori; they are not the parents, but the offspring of thought; (d) we must use them prudently and cautiously; (e) they cannot be presented against an adversary, they can delight a believer." Accordingly, the question "Whether Thomas Aquinas was right in saying that what the Christian faith declares of the Trinity could be proved from natural reason to be not impossible," is thus answered, "Among Christians, instructed in the Word of God, and embracing by faith the mystery of the Trinity, this can be proved by means of natural reasons; but among the heathen, ignorant of the Trinity, and among heretics, obstinately denying it, it can scarcely be proved; for the fact that they pronounce it absurd and impossible, occurs because they presume to judge of this mystery from the principles of reason, without the light of the heavenly Word." QUEN. (I, 318): "These natural agreements, and the analogy of created things to this mystery of faith, do not generate faith, but only human opinion." [6] CHMN. (I, 33): . . . "Because we must think of God as He has revealed Himself, we believe, acknowledge, confess, and call upon three persons." . . . Although the Trinity is a mystery beyond the reach of reason, yet we learn through it what conceptions God wishes us to form concerning Him. MEL. (Loc. Th., I, 19): "The Church acknowledges God as such an eternal and omnipotent Creator as He has revealed Himself to be, and, although we cannot thoroughly understand these mysteries, yet in this life, God wishes this our knowledge and worship of Him to be begun and to be distinguished from that which is false; and in His Word He has propounded, by infallible testimonies, a revelation, in which we, as the unborn infant in the maternal womb, drawing nutriment from the umbilical vessels, might sit inclosed and draw the knowledge of God and life from the Word of God, in order to worship Him as He has made Himself known." [7] KG. (30): "The necessity of believing this doctrine is such that it not only cannot be denied, but even cannot be ignored by anyone without a loss of salvation. John 17:3; John 5:11, 12; 1 John 2:23; John 5:23; 2 Thess. 1:8." More detailed, GRH. (III, 209): "It is necessary for all who are to be saved, to know and believe the mystery of the Trinity: (a) we exclude from men who are to be saved, not only those who deny, but also those who are ignorant of the Trinity . . . (b) we do not require of all members of the Church an equal degree of knowledge, since the light of spiritual knowledge and faith is brighter in some and more obscure in others; (c) nor do we require of those who are to be saved a perfect and full comprehension and an intuitive knowledge of this mystery, since we cannot attain this in this life . . . but we assert only this, that for the catholic faith, necessary to all who are to be saved, not a confused and implied, but a distinct and explicit knowledge of the three persons of the Godhead is required." The reason (III, 210: "Whoever is ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity does not acknowledge God as He has revealed Himself in His Word, and is ignorant of the definition of God given in the Scriptures. The mystery of the Trinity being ignored or denied, the entire economy of salvation is ignored or denied." (211.) [8] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 36): "Even in ancient times it offended many that the Church, in speaking of the article of the Trinity, was not content with the simple peculiar phraseology which the Son of God Himself employed when revealing the doctrine concerning God, and which the Holy Ghost followed in the prophets and apostles; but that it introduced into the Church foreign appellations from the irreligious schools of the heathen . . . and the orthodox fathers were oppressed with great hatred by the heretics on this specious pretext, viz., that the Church ought not to believe concerning the inaccessible light of the Godhead otherwise than as the Godhead Himself, coming forth from the hidden abode of His majesty, has manifested Himself; neither ought it [the Church] to speak otherwise, but that it should imitate the language of the Holy Ghost, and, therefore, express also the very words in just so many syllables and letters. For neither ought the weakness of the human mind to assume this to itself, viz., in regard to these mysteries placed above and beyond the sight of human intelligence, to hope to be able to speak more becomingly and skilfully than the Son of God Himself, who alone knows the Father, and has revealed to us what we know of God, or the Holy Ghost, who alone knows the things which are of God (1 Cor. 2:10), and searches also the very depths of God. . . . Both Arius and Sabellius had a specious pretext: We speak of divine mysteries in no other way than God Himself speaks in Scripture. Moreover, we have been cast out of the Church for no other reason than that we were not willing to mingle philosophy with the doctrine of the Church, i.e., we are not willing to confess one essence and three persons, because Scripture is ignorant of these heathenish appellations.' We must consider whence, with what purpose, and for what reasons, these foreign terms were received; and, in order that we may understand the entire matter better, let us observe two things: 1. What Cyril says with very great force, that, although these terms are not found in Scripture, with such a meaning, yet that the things themselves, which the Church understands and signifies by these terms, have been expressly laid down and revealed in Scripture. 2. That the Church departed from the simple usage of Scriptural words, not from any wanton affectation of novelty, but as Augustine elegantly and truly says, that,, by the necessity of speech, these terms were acquired from the Greeks and Latins, because of the errors and snares of heretics. . . . The Church would have preferred to use such simplicity of speech, so that, as it believes, so it might also speak, viz., that there is one God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. But contests of heretics arose, attacking partly the unity of God, and partly the Trinity, yet so artfully that when they confessed that there is one God, they understood it as though there were a plurality of gods, nevertheless called one God, just as the heart of believers is called one, Acts 4:12 . . . Because, therefore, the heretics spake with the Church, and yet believed differently, and by means of forms of expression, resembling the truth, as Nazianzen says, spread poison secretly among the inexperienced, who suspected no evil when they heard these men speak in the very same words which the Church uses; the men of the Church endeavored to find in Scripture terms by which they might draw forth from ambush the lurking heretics, so as to prevent them from deceiving by ambiguous phrases the unwary. And because Scripture thus speaks, 2 Peter 1:4; Gal. 4:8, they said that there is one divine nature. But this term they corrupted by sophistries, and by distinguishing between God and nature, as when it is said that God and nature have done nothing in vain. Likewise, in 1 John 5:7, it is written: There are three,' etc. And because in the words of Baptism it is said: Baptizing them in the name of the Father,' etc., they said that there are three names . . . Sabellius received this, but understood that one and the same person is trionumos [possessed of three names], just as one and the same man has a praenomen, a nomen, and a cognomen . . . Afterwards it began to be said that there were not only three names, but also three peculiar significations of the names. Sabellius conceded also this, but in this sense, viz., just as the soul has three powers, each one of which has its own peculiarities, and yet there is only one soul. And thus, the heretics who certainly did not believe aright concerning these articles of faith, spake in the very same words in which the Church spake, and, by this deception, instilled their poison into many unwary ones, who feared no evil, because they heard the same words that are recorded in Scripture, and are proclaimed in the Church. What was the Church to do under these circumstances? It is very certain that it was her plain duty to defend against heretics that faith concerning the article of the Trinity which the Holy Ghost revealed in the Scriptures. But this could not be done in the words of Scripture, because of the petulance of heretics, who cunningly evaded all the words of Scripture, so that they could not be convicted and held fast, and who meanwhile led captive, by this artifice, the minds of the simple. Therefore, it was necessary to seek for such terms as might express, in some other manner, the facts delivered concerning this article, in Scripture; so that heretics might not be able, by a deceitful interpretation, to elude them . . . Because, therefore, in God there is a divine nature, common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost and entire in each, and nevertheless, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are distinguished by certain properties, in such a manner that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, and the Holy Ghost is neither Father nor Son, etc.; the Church, on the maturest consideration, has transferred these terms (ousia: upostasis) from the common usage of speech to the article of the Trinity, on account of, as Augustine says, the artifices and errors of heretics, in order that thus even the more simple might be able to observe the rule of Athanasius: Neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance.'" [9] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 33): "Neither is it something new, devised by the Council of Nice (as some blasphemously assert that the doctrine of the Trinity was first framed in the Councils of Nice and Constantinople), while, before that, the Church piously believed that there was one God. But we solemnly declare that it is the most ancient and constant harmonious testimony of the Church from the very beginning." [10] GRH. (III, 236): "Do terms derived from the ordinary usage of language, and adapted to this mystery, retain in this application in every respect the same signification? Reply: By no means, but the Church presents them with the right to its citizenship, and uses them in a peculiar signification." CHEM. (Loc. Th., I, 38): "As the Church speaks of subjects of which reason is ignorant, it also employs these terms in a sense somewhat different from that in which they have commonly been used." [11] A general survey of the doctrine is presented by Baier (208) under the following heads: "I. That the Father differs really from the Son, the Son from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both; so that one is in fact Father, another Son, and another Holy Ghost. (Christ says that the Father is other than Himself, John 5:32, 37, and that the Holy Ghost is other than Himself and the Father, John 14:16. The same is manifest from the names of the Father and the Son, and that the former is described as begetting, and the latter as begotten, Ps. 2:7; John 1:14, 18; 3:16. The Son was sent from the Father, John 16:36; Gal. 4:4. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, John 15:26; is sent by the Father, John 14:26, and by the Son, 15:26.) "II. That not only the Father, but also the Son and Holy Ghost, are true and eternal God." "III. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not three gods, but one God." GRH. (I, 194): "The general theory will be comprised under the following heads: (1) That there is one undivided essence of these three persons. (2) That these three persons are truly and really distinct from each other. (3) That they are distinguished by their own personal properties." [12] We must carefully distinguish triune from threefold, which signifies: composed of three. GRH. (III, 254): "We say that God is triune, but we are forbidden, by the Christian religion, to say that He is threefold." [13] Essence: ousia, also substance, phusis, nature. GRH. (III, 251): "Moreover, they preferred to use the name essence rather than substance (a) to indicate that God is an ousia uperousios [an essence superior to essence], not included in the categories among which substance is first; (b) because God, unlike the essences of created things, does not exist beneath (substat) accidents, but His attributes are His very essence; (c) because the name substance is ambiguous, for it is sometimes put for ousia, and sometimes for upostasis." HOLL. (284): "The word essence, ousia, is not indeed found in Holy Scripture in just so many letters, but nevertheless is derived from it by easy inference. For (a) in the Old Testament God is called yhvh essentiator; therefore he has an essence, and that, too an independent essence, etc.; (b) in the New Testament God is named o on, Rev. 1:8, from which ousia, or essence, is derived; (c) a synonym of divine essence is phusis theia, divine nature, 2 Pet. 1:4." [14] GRH. (III, 239): "A great, yea an infinite distinction presents itself in the predicates, when I predicate of three human individuals, humanity, or human nature, and when I predicate of the three persons of the Godhead, a divine nature, or essence. The essence of men is a universal term which does not actually exist per se, but is only inferred in thought and conceived of by the intellect. But essence, in that which is divine, is not an imaginary something, as genus or species, but actually exists, although it is communicable." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 39): "Therefore the Church understands by the term essence not a universal term, as philosophers name human essence, but a divine nature truly existing, which is communicable and common to three persons, and is entire in each. But what this is with respect to the definition of the matter, I say is not known, unless we say that the attributes given in the definition of God are the very essence of God." "The essence with respect to divine persons (a) is not a species, because the persons of the Trinity do not share essence in the manner that individuals share a common nature, which diffuses itself in no way beyond that of which it is a part, as it were; as, man is a species of animal, and Peter is an individual of the human species. (b) It is not predicated of many individual differing in numerical essence, as three men are said to differ in number. (g) It is not predicated in the plural form of individuals, for the first three persons are not three gods or three divine essences, as Peter, Paul, etc. (d) Neither does it belong to either more or less than three persons; while human essence is not restricted to a determinate number of persons. Of a man I cannot say that all humanity is in him, but of a person of the Godhead I can correctly affirm that all the fulness of the Godhead is in Him. The reason rests upon the infinity of the divine essence. In three human individuals the essence is one, not in number, but one only in species; but in the three persons of the Godhead, there is an essence one in number and absolutely undivided. Human person are distinguished by substance, time, will, accidents of mind and body, etc. Thus, the substance of Peter is different from that of Paul; . . . but in the Trinity persons are not thus distinguished, for the Son is omoousios, omoionias, sunaidios with the Father. . . . Of human persons it cannot be said that the one is in the other; but of Himself and His Father, Christ says (John 14:10): I am in the Father,' etc. Of human persons it cannot be said that, because of their common nature, where the one persons is, there also is the other; because they are locally distinct: but of Himself and the Father, Christ declares (John 8:29): The Father hath not left me alone.' Of human persons it cannot be said that, because of their common nature, he who honors the one honors also the other, nay rather one can be honored while the other is treated with contempt; but of Himself and the Father, Christ says (John 5:23): He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father that hath sent Him.'" [15] GRH. (I, 194): "The essence of the three persons of the Godhead is one and undivided. . . . For, if there are three persons of the Godhead, and, nevertheless, the true God is only one, it follows thence that there is one essence of the three persons of the Godhead. If there were one essence of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost, one of the two alternatives would undoubtedly follow, viz.: either that there is not one true God, or that the Son and Holy Ghost are excluded from the true Godhead." GRH. (III, 238): "The word (ousia), used of God, signifies an essence common to the three persons of the Godhead, one in number and undivided, which does not exist partially in the three persons, so that a part of it is in the Father, a part in the Son, and a part in the Holy Ghost; but, because of infinity and immateriality, is entire in the Father, entire in the Son, and entire in the Holy Ghost." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 43) cites as different modes of expression employed with reference to the unity of God, the following: "One and indistinguishable nature; one and the same substance; simple, one and undivided divinity; one and indifferent essence; in essence there is unity; there are three persons, co-eternal and co-equal; three persons, of one substance and inseparable equality, one God; the divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is one; their glory, equal; their majesty, co-eternal; in this Trinity nothing is before, nothing after, nothing greater or less, but the entire three persons are co-equal and co-eternal to each other. . . . John 10:30: I and my Father are one,' viz., in essence, will, power, and work." On the other hand, he notes as false, the expressions: "In essence, He is singular; there are three, eternal, immense, etc.; three Gods, three Lords; essence is distinguished into Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: in divinity, there is before and after, that is greater and less." [16] GRH. (III, 257): "There are three, to each of whom belongs the name of Jehovah and God, and likewise, truly divine attributes, works, and glory, viz., the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Therefore, essence is thus defined: BR. (217): "By the name, essence or ousia, there is meant the divine nature, as it is absolutely in itself, all of which, with its attributes, is most simply one and singular, and, thus, also of the three persons the essence is only one; so, indeed, that there is also one intellect of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, by which they understand; one will of the three, by which they wish; and one power, by which they operate outside of the divine essence." QUEN. (I, 321): "The divine essence itself is that pertaining to God, by which God is what He is." HOLL. (284): "The essence of God is God's spiritual and independent nature, common to the three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." [17] HFRFFR. (48): "Plurality in the unity of divinity is not accidental, for God is most absolute and simple, and no accidents occur in Him. Therefore, since there are no accidents, no plurality can arise hence." [18] HFRFFR. (48): "Plurality in unity of the divinity is hypostatic, i.e., of persons, for the essence, indeed, of the divinity is one, but the persons are plural; and, therefore, in the mystery of the divinity there are, indeed, distinct persons, but not distinct things. For the person of the Father is one, and the person of the Son, another, and the person of the Holy Ghost, another; yet they are not different things, but the essence of all the persons is one." By person, upostasis, there is understood, "an individual, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which is not sustained, either upon another or from another." Thus CHMN., (Loc. Th., I, 39). This definition is thus explained by SELN. (I, 76): "A substance is said to be individual and peculiar, in order to distinguish it from accident, and to remove the error of those who have thought that person signifies only a distinction of employments. It is said to be incommunicable, on account of the distinction of persons, because the Father does not communicate His hypostasis to the Son, or Holy Ghost, but each person has His own peculiar subsistence and being; although essence itself is said to be communicable" ("the subsistence of one persons cannot be communicated to another person, for the reason that each person possesses a peculiar and ultimate act of subsistence, so that it cannot be farther determined by another person.") HOLL. (284): "Not sustained by another, excludes the opinion of those who think that as there are two natures in Christ, so also there are two persons." HOLL. (284): "An intelligent suppositum: a stone, a tree, a horse, are, indeed, called supposita, but not persons, because they are without intellect." A still more accurate distinction is made between persons, regarded materially, or in the concrete, and person, considered formally, or in the abstract. HOLL. (ib.): "A person, considered materially, is an intelligent suppositum. But a suppositum is a uphistamenon, or a subsistence, singular, incommunicable, not sustained by another (a singular subsistence, not a singular substance; for persons, considered in the concrete sense, is not a substance, but a uphistamenon, a singular subsistence, which consists of substance and an ultimate mode of subsisting. We call a person a singular uphistamenon, and not an individual; because the latter implies a logical reference to a particular species, which is predicated of the individual. But God is not predicated of the divine persons, under the mode of species, nor do these differ in essences, diverse in number, just as do individuals). But formally or abstractly considered, a person is an independent and communicable subsistence of singular, complete, and intelligent substance." The meaning of this distinction will be more clearly apparent from the definitions of upostasis that we shall presently cite from QUEN.: In the latter case, that is made particularly prominent which constitutes the one person a person, in distinction from the other; while, in the former case, the intention is not so much to indicate this distinction as rather to assert the personality of the Divine Essence. The term, person, is employed abstractively, if I say the Father is agennetos, for then I mention that which distinguishes Him from the other persons; it is employed concretively, if I say the Father is almighty; for in that case it is, indeed, also asserted that God is a person, and the hypostatical character of the person is asserted also in the word Father, yet in the statement I am more concerned to assert something concerning the Divine Essence, and not so much concerned to give prominence to the personal distinction. The term upostasis is employed in doctrinal writings as synonymous with person, but strictly speaking there is still a difference between them. HOLL. (285): "According to the testimony of Damascenus, the Fathers called the same thing hypostasis and person. Nevertheless, person differs from hypostasis, in this, that hypostasis is common to an intellectual nature, and to one destitute of reason; but person is affirmed only of an intellectual nature." QUEN. (I, 320): "upostasis is received either in the concrete, or materially, when it implies, at the same time, an object itself and the mode of the object, and marks an essence, distinguished by a hypostatic character, i.e., a person, in the sense in which Christ is said to be charakter tes upostaseos, Heb. 1:3; or, abstractly and formally, when it designates personality or substance itself, which is an act, mode, or ultimate degree, in which an intelligent nature subsists completely and incommunicably. In this signification the word upostasis is not employed in Scripture, yet can be correctly inferred from its material signification; but, in this mystery, uparxis is the same as upostasis." The Greek and Latin Fathers did not at once agree in the usage of the terms here employed and in the distinction between upostasis and ousia. It was only from the time of Athanasius that the expressions were uniformly used in the sense above given. BR. (216): "Although the Greeks and Latins contended for awhile with each other (for the former thought that by the name, person, there was designated among the Latins an occupation or external habit, and on this account, three persons did not imply or express the real distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but the Latins thought that upostasis, in the nominative case, denoted the essence itself, so that if three upostasis are admitted, three essences must be affirmed), nevertheless, afterwards, when they understood each other better, it came to pass that the Greeks spoke of tria prosopa, and the Latins of three hypostases." [19] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 39): "Thus, in the Church, the term upostasis, or person, is used in a different sense from the usage of common speech. Among men we know what a person is; among angels we understand what it is. Peter, Paul, and John are three persons to whom one human nature is common. But they differ very much, (1) in substance, because one entirety is distinct from another (totus a toto), (2) in time, (3) in will, (4) in power, (5) in work. . . . But in the Trinity Persons are not thus distinguished, as an angel from an angel, and a man from a man (nor do they differ in time, will, power, work; but, in the persons of the Trinity, there is co-eternity, one will, one power, one working). Likewise in creatures, it does not follow that where one person is, there, because of their common nature, the others also are. And this distinction must necessarily be observed; for the mystery at which even the angels are astonished, would not be so great, if the one essence were three persons, in the manner that Michael, Gabriel, Raphael are three persons, to whom one angelic nature is common and equally belongs." In reference to the two terms, "essence" and "persons," CHMN. remarks (Loc. Th., I, 39): "These are grammatical observations, not idle exhibitions of acuteness; but if they have no other, they yet have this use, that, with the foundations thoroughly known, we can speak very cheerfully with the Church for the sake of harmony. But, if any one would cavil that the terms essence and person are not sufficiently peculiar to designate this hidden mystery of unity and Trinity, he has this reply that Augustine gives: Human language labors from its absolutely great poverty. Nevertheless the term, "three persons," has been adopted not for the purpose of expressing this, but so as not to keep altogether silent concerning it. For, by this term, the eminence of the ineffable matter cannot be expressed.'" [20] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 39). "The persons of the divinity do not differ essentially as in creatures, where each one has his own peculiarity, nor is there only a distinction of reason therein as Sabellius wished; but they are really distinguished, nevertheless in a manner incomprehensible and unknown to us." QUEN. (I, 326): "They are distinguished really, i.e., they are distinct from each other, even when all operation of the human intellect ceases." [21] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 42): "The persons are distinguished, not only by interior, but also by exterior marks, derived especially from revelation and their benevolent works in behalf of the Church." [22] QUEN. (I, 414): "Personal divine actions ad intra are those which are limited to God Himself, in such a manner that they, nevertheless, as a source of action, pertain to the divine essence, not in so far as it is common to all three persons, but as it has been determined by certain hypostatic characters and properties. Hence, these personal works ad intra have been divided, i.e., they are not common to three divine persons, but are peculiar to only one person or to two persons." As, in Note 20 above, the question was concerning the distinction between the single persons, so here the question is concerning the distinction between essence and person. QUEN. (I, 326) answers: "A divine person is distinguished in one way from essence, and in another way from another person; from the former not in fact but in thought, with its foundation in fact; but from the latter actually, even when all operation of the human intellect ceases." The former distinction is a distinction "not actually, or from the nature of the thing itself, nor modally, but in thought, which is proved as follows: for, if the relation of paternity, filiation, and procession were really distinguished from the divine essence, then something real would be superadded to it, and in the divine persons which are constituted by these relations, and, therefore, in God Himself, there would be a real compounding." (I, 327) . . . "Thus divine essence and relations are actually one thing, and the former is separated from the latter in thought and the apprehension of the mind alone; or, in other words, by our mode of conception, yet in such a manner that the foundation and occasion of the distinction exists in fact." (Id.) (328): "The true and real distinction of the divine persons does not introduce a division or multiplication of the divine essence. For God is not divided into three persons, but the three persons, distinct from each other, undividedly share the essence, one in number undivided and infinite, in such a manner that each persons has the same essence, without its multiplication or division. For, in this mystery, several persons are considered hypostatically, not several things essentially. But these three really distinct persons are and remain omoousioi." [23] QUEN. (I, 415): "External actions ad extra, or emanent and transient actions, are those which both relate to an object outside of God, and are performed outside of God, producing or leaving an effect outside of God." GRH. (I, 199): "These works are undivided, because in them the three persons are together and work together. . . . In God there is so great unity, and so great power of one and the same essence, that to individual persons individual and peculiar works, which are wrought separately in creatures, ought by no means to be assigned;" whence follows the statement: "By one person named in works ad extra, the entire Trinity is meant." QUEN. (I, 328): "The reason of this rule is the unity of the divine essence, the common participation in the power to act, the equality of the operations, and the identity of the works of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and, hence, there then follows an equality of denomination. Nevertheless, this clause must be added to the rule of Augustine: The order and distinction of persons being preserved;' for, inasmuch as the Father has an essence from Himself, therefore He also acts of Himself, the Son acts and works from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. John 5:19." By the addition of this clause: "the order and distinction of persons being preserved," the canon, "the works ad extra are undivided," is more accurately defined; for the Dogmaticians do not wish directly to call in question the statement that even in the works ad extra the distinction of persons may be recognized. Not without reason, do they believe that in the Scriptures a work ad extra is ascribed to the one person and not to another; and the difference which, notwithstanding all the oneness of essence, is yet indicated in the order which is assigned in the Scriptures to the single persons, and in accordance with which the Father is placed first, the Son second, etc., seems to them to indicate also a difference in the order and in the manner in which the single persons work. So CHMN. already states (Loc. Th., I, 42): "Works ad extra are considered, as Luther has remarked, in a twofold manner: First, absolutely, and thus they are without distinction, and are called works of the three persons in common. Secondly, relatively, when they are considered in the order in which the persons act, or with reference to what is the property of each person, and which person acts immediately." The order in working and the relation in which the three persons stand to a work ad extra, the Dogmaticians find most clearly stated in Rom. 11:36, where they refer the ex to the Father, the dia to the Son, and the en to the Holy Ghost. CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 42): "For, as the apostle speaks of works ad extra, he makes mention of one eternal essence; to Him be honor, not to them. And, nevertheless, as the essence is one, without confusion of persons, it performs works ad extra, common to the three persons, without confusion, but implying a distinction of persons, of Him, and through Him, and to Him.' . . . In fine, as we believe that there is unity of essence, and, nevertheless, ought not to admit a confusion of persons, we must understand also the rule, that works ad extra are common to the three persons, yet in such a manner that the distinctions and properties of the persons be not confounded." The Dogmaticians remark, in general, that sometimes in the Scriptures there is predicated of one person an attribute or an act, from which, however, the other persons are by no means to be excluded, inasmuch as this attribute or act pertains to the Divine Essence and does not peculiarly belong to the one person. Whence they draw the inference that nevertheless this attribute must pertain to the one or to the other person in a more eminent sense, either because it belongs more especially to the one or the other person, in accordance with the order which we assign to the three persons, or because in a certain sense it more especially belongs to the mode of existence (tropos uparxeos) of a particular person. The Dogmaticians say, in this case, that this occurs through appropriation. GRH. (I, 203). "Hence certain essential attributes are appropriated by the ecclesiastical writers to each person, although, because of the identity of essence, the essential attributes are common to the three persons." Thus there is specially appropriated to the Father, power; to the Son, love; to the Holy Spirit, wisdom. Still another case is mentioned by QUEN. (I, 415): "Personal actions ad extra are, in a certain respect and manner, also essential or common to all three persons, viz., by reason of efficiency or source, and inchoatively; but they are personal or peculiar to any one divine person by reason of their end, or terminatively, because they are terminated in a certain person. Thus, the Spirit appeared only in the visible form of a dove. The voice from heaven, This is my beloved Son,' belonged to the person of the Father alone, and the Son of God alone appeared under the form and habit of man, in the time of the Old Testament, and in that of the New Testament was born of the Virgin Mary, and was made flesh. But, nevertheless, the entire Trinity was operative, with regard to that flesh of the Son alone, and that voice of the Father alone, and that form of a dove of the Holy Ghost alone." [24] The Dogmaticians in part distinguish also between the hypostatical characteristics or personal qualities and the personal notations. By the former, they understand those peculiarities which one person possesses having distinct reference to another, and by the latter, the marks by which, in general, one person can be recognized as distinct from another. Thus QUEN. (I, 330): "Some personal properties are absolute, which have no relation to another person; such a property is agennesia, and the not being born (innascibilitas), with respect to the Father, likewise the not being breathed (inspirabilitas), with respect to Father and Son. Other personal properties are relative, which have respect to another person, and constitute an order of things producing and being produced, of which there are only three; paternity, filiation, and procession." HOLL. (285) distinguishes: "Personal properties, i.e., relations founded upon a personal act, constituting a person in the being (esse) of a certain person, and, by relative opposition, introducing a distinction from another person" (of such he enumerates three: paternity, filiation, and procession), and "personal notations, i.e., modes of recognizing the divine persons and distinguishing them ad intra." These, taken in a wider sense, and constitutively of each person, in the being (esse) of such person, comprehend the personal properties, and as such are regarded the five enumerated in the text. More strictly taken, however, or significatively, i.e., such as do indeed describe the divine persons and indicate the distinction between them, but still do not constitute a person, in the being of such person, they are distinct from the personal properties. Of these there are two, viz., agennesia and spiratio activa. [25] QUEN. (I, 327): "From the real distinction of persons, arises their order, both in subsisting and in operating. Nevertheless, we must distinguish between the order of nature, of time, of dignity, of origin, and of relation. Among the divine persons, there is not an order of nature, because, they are omoousioi [consubstantial]; nor of time, because they are co-eternal; nor of dignity, because they have the same honor. But there is among them an order of origin and relation, because the Father is of no one, the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Ghost is of both. An order among the divine persons in subsisting is proved from the procession or emanation of one person from the other. For if the Father proceeds from no one, but has His essence of Himself, as the fountain and source of the Holy Trinity, and the Son has His essence of the Father by eternal generation, and the Holy Ghost has the same of the Father and the Son, by eternal procession, it follows that the Father is the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third person, and this order, both fixed in nature itself and unchangeable, is clearly shown in the formula of baptism. Matt. 28:19." Concerning the order in working, which is recognized in the use of the diacritical particles ex, dia, en, we have already spoken in Note 23. [26] GRH. (III, 243): "The term omoousios embraces both ideas, viz., that the Son is of a distinct person from the Father, and that He is of the same essence with the Father." (Id.): "For the Father and the Son are not eterousioi of different or diverse essence; they are not sunousioi, as men who have one common essence, nor only omoiousios, of like substance, but omoousios, having the same essence, eternity, will, work, power, and glory." [CHEMN. (I, 43): "By this term, the unity of the essence is signified, viz., that there is one eternity, one will, a common operation, and equal glory, and, at the same time, the distinction of persons is indicated."] [27] QUEN. (I, 328) further adds, as a consequence of omoousia: "The most perfect communion of all essential perfections, and the identity both of the divine works ad extra and the mode of action, so that they do the same things and in like manner; John 5:19, although not in the same order." Concerning the latter, see below. In the perichoresis the Dogmaticians usually also distinguish "p. essentialis, the absolutely unique immanence of one divine person in the other," and "p. personalis, that inmost and ineffable permeation, by which the divinity of the logos intimately permeates, inhabits, and perfects the assumed human nature." The discussion of the latter does not belong here. [28] HOLL. (301): "The name, Father,' is received here not ousiodos, or essentially, but upostatikos, or personally. The name, Father, essentially taken, belongs not to the first person alone of the Godhead, but to all the divine persons equally; inasmuch as, received in this sense, it introduces a relation to creatures, of whom God is said to be the Father, both on account of creation, as the angels are regarded sons of God, Job 38:7, and on account of regeneration and adoption, as converted and regenerate men, by means of the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith, have obtained this exousia, power or dignity, to become the sons of God, John 1:12. But personally received, the name, Father, is peculiar to the first divine person, and introduces a relation to the consubstantial Son, whom He begat from His essence, as His image, whose idios pater, own Father, He is called, John 5:18." [29] QUEN. (I, 332): "The characteristic of the Father ad extra is manifested in the work of creation, preservation, and of the government of the universe. For the work of creation is ascribed to the Father, in a peculiar manner, in the Holy Scriptures and the Apostles' Creed, i.e., not exclusively, nor exochikos, or only particularly, much less as a principal cause, so that the Son is only an instrument, but on account of personal order, because the Father, through the Son and Holy Ghost, has created, preserves, and governs all things, Gen. 1:1, 2; Ps. 33:6; John 1:3, and because to God the Father power is ascribed, which especially shines forth in creation." [30] QUEN. (I, 332): "The second person is the Son of God, not by uiothesia, or gracious adoption; nor on account of gracious and glorious union with God, and love -- for thus all the pious, the blessed, and the holy angels are sons of God; nor on account of His wonderful conception by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, as the Socinians wish, but through and on account of a true, peculiar, essential, most singular [unparalleled] and inexplicable eternal generation, and thus is the Son of God properly, incommunicably, and alone. In a few words: He is the Son of God, not chariti, or by grace, but phusei, or by nature, John 1:14, 18." HOLL. (305): "Hence, the Son of God is called His own, Rom. 8:32; the only begotten, John 1:14; existing in the bosom of His Father, John 1:18; the image of the invisible God, and the firstborn of every creature, Col. 1:15; the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person, Heb. 1:3." [31] For this reason, according to HOLL. (322), there is ascribed to the Father, as a hypostatical characteristic, eternal active generation, and to the Son, filiation, or passive generation, "by which the Son of God is produced by the Father, as His substantial image, really and literally, yet in a manner hyperphysical and inexplicable, by an eternal communication of one and the same essence." More detailed description of generation. HOLL. (322-325): "The generation of the Son of God is not improper, metaphorical, or accidental (as is the regeneration of sinful men), but proper, true, and substantial. Proof: a. He would not be God's own Son, if His generation were improper or metaphorical; b. God the Father, in producing His Son, communicated to Him His essence in such a manner that He is His image; not physical (which occurs, in matter and out of matter, in time, having relation to that which is before and after, and is an essential change from that which has no being into a being.' QUEN. I, 385), but hyperphysical (which occurs from eternity, without any succession of time, matter, and change, and which consists alone in the communication of essence.' QUEN. I, 385); not temporal, but eternal. Proof: a. From passages of Scripture which testify that the Son is eternal; b. From the relation between the Father and the Son. The first person is the eternal Father, therefore the second person also is the eternal Son; c. Because, otherwise, the essence of the Father would be affirmed to be changeable, if, in time, He had begun to beget the Son. Furthermore, from Ps. 2:7: The act of generation is described by the to-day,' which is employed concerning an internal divine act, a generation such as is only during a divine to-day,' and, therefore, excludes the flow of time, separates from the past and future, and denotes a perpetual now, or a day of immutable eternity; not external, but innermost (because God the Father produced His own Son, not ad extra, but begot Him within His essence; nor is the Son separated from the Father, as happens otherwise, but remains in His Father's bosom, John 1:18; nor is the Son only in the Father, but the Father is also in the Son by the inmost communion and mutual perichoresis); not voluntary, but natural and necessary, (but, if the generation of the Son of God were called forth by an act of the will, and were free, and were not necessary or natural, the Son would not be equal and omoousioß to the Father, for He exists necessarily and cannot not be. Here it is well to observe that God the Father, not being constrained, and, nevertheless, not by the purpose of His free will preceding generation, but from the necessity of His nature, which is yet entirely removed from all constraint, begat His Son by the most perfect generation . . . )." Concerning the eternity of generation, QUEN. (I, 330) says further: "This generation of the Son does not occur by derivation or transfusion, nor by an action which may begin or cease, but it occurs by an unceasing emanation, like which there is nothing to be found in nature. For God the Father from eternity begat, and always begets, and never will cease to beget His Son. For, if the generation of the Son should have an end, it would also have a beginning, and this would not be eternal. Nevertheless, this generation cannot be said, for this reason, to be imperfect and successive, for the act of generation in the Father and the Son is considered perfect in work and constant in operation." The consequence of passive generation, is the passive sending forth. QUEN. (I, 338): "The consequence of this passive generation is the passive sending of the Son of God into the flesh, which is not accurately the incarnation of the same, for they differ as former and latter, He having been first sent and, afterwards, made of a woman, Gal. 4:4." Note -- "The sending forth of the Son of God (1) is not a local and separative removal, as though He had been locally removed from the highest heaven to the lowest earth, and had been separated from His Heavenly Father. For this conflicts with the infinite and intimate identity of the persons of the Father and the Son; (2) it is not an imperious sending forth, but one of free consent, and therefore proves, between the one sending and the one sent, no inequality, such as the Arians once attempted to derive thence, and as the Socinians at the present day maintain. In divine things a sending forth does not remove equality of persons, but only presupposes an order of origin. (3) The sending forth is not constrained, but is spontaneous, John 4:34: 5:30; (4) it is not accurately incarnation itself. For the sending forth preceded incarnation, and the latter is the goal of the former, since the Son was sent forth in order to become man." According to GRH. (I, 288), the difference between to beget and to create is: "To beget is, from one's own substance, to produce something similar according to essence. To create is to make, out of nothing, something different from the substance of the Creator." QUEN. (I, 330) says, indeed: "Although this generation is most peculiar and most true, yet the mode itself of generation is unknown to us and ineffable," and yet he attempts, as follows, to form at least an approximate conception of it: "This divine generation, however, can be adumbrated by the similitude of rays of the sun, flowing from the solar body with a perpetual dependence. For, as the sun is not older than its rays, nor the one begetting prior, in time, to the one begotten; so, the eternal Father, from eternity, generated the Son; and, just as the sun has, from the beginning, generated its own rays, and even now begets them, and will continue to generate them, and nevertheless, it cannot be inferred thence that the generation of the rays of the sun is not yet perfect, so also, from eternity, God has begotten, and always begets, and will never cease to beget His own Wisdom, and, nevertheless, it cannot on that account be said that the generation of the Son is not yet perfect. The Holy Ghost, Ps. 2:7, seems to intimate this. In these words, the generation of the Son is expressed in the preterite in such a manner that, nevertheless, it is said to occur today, because the generation of the Son is present, and will never cease. Yet there is this great distinction between the two: the sun is a substance, but the rays are an accident; whereas the substance of the Son is the same with the substance of the Father." [32] The hypostatic character of the Holy Ghost is "passive spiration, or the proceeding of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, i.e., the eternal origin of the Holy Ghost, by which He is sent forth, within the bosom of the Godhead, by the Father and the Son, by the communication of an essence numerically one and the same, as the common breath of both." HOLL. (337.) QUEN. (I, 343): "The origin of the Holy Ghost, by which, within the Godhead, He received, through an ineffable procession, from the Father and the Son, an essence the same in number." HOLL. (337): "It is called passive spiration, not physically, as though it implied passive power or imperfection, but grammatically, because the Holy Ghost is said not to breathe, but to be breathed. Nor are active and passive spiration two spirations, but the spiration is one and the same, which, with respect to the source breathing and producing, is called active spiration, and with respect to the end attained, is called passive. In other respects, the emanation of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is most absolute." "The spiration here understood is not external, like the breathing of Christ upon His disciples, John 20:22, but internal and immanent, since it occurs within the very bosom of the Godhead; not transitory and evanescent, as is that of breathing men, but eternal and permanent, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from eternity, as the breath of the Almighty, Job 33:4, and the spirit of the mouth of the Lord, Ps. 33:6; not an accidental but a substantial spiration, for in God there is no accident, nor can the Holy Ghost, as a divine person and substance, be produced by an accidental act." An analogy for the conception of the procession was sought by some of the Dogmaticians in the going forth of the word from the mouth, and in our spirit. GRH. says, however, concerning the former (I, 321): "Our word proceeds in such a manner from the heart, that there is an evanescent sound, but the Holy Ghost so proceeds that there is a subsisting person." Of the latter (ibid.): "The spirit of God is asomatos, of altogether the same nature and essence with Himself, but our spirit is corporeal, because an exhalation from the most refined and subtle portion of the blood, and not at all the same nature with the soul." Proof of the procession from Father and Son, HOLL. (337): "Holy Scripture teaches in express words, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from God the Father. John 15:26. That He proceeds from the Son of God is correctly inferred from the name, the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4:6), from the omoousia of Father and Son (John 16:15), and His reception of omniscience from the Son (John 16:13, 14), from the apocalyptic vision of the river proceeding from the throne of the Lamb (Rev 22:1), from the sending of the Holy Ghost from the Son (John 15:26), from the breathing of Christ upon His disciples (John 20:22), and from the order and distinction of the divine persons." [33] The consequence of the procession is the temporal sending forth of the Holy Ghost. QUEN. (I, 331): "The sending forth, in time, of the Holy Ghost upon and to the apostles and other believers, is the manifestation, or consequence and effect, of the eternal procession. The latter is eternal and necessary; the former is gracious, intermitted, and free, and likewise conditionate; nevertheless this sending forth is not local, and does not introduce an inferiority; because it is not ministerial and servile." [34] The scriptural proof we give partly according to GRH., and partly according to QUEN. and HOLL. In the Old Testament GRH. finds indicated: "Where God is spoken of, I. a plurality of persons, and II. when by name, a Trinity of persons." I. The plurality is shown (I, 186 seq.): (a) By those passages which employ the plural term Elohim, concerning God . . . Gen. 20:13; 35:7; Deut. 5:26; Josh. 24:19; 2 Sam. 7:23; Job 35:10; Ps. 149:2; Is. 44:2; 54:5; Jer. 10:10; 23:36, where observe that this plural word is not only construed with a singular verb in very many passages of Scripture (to denote the unity of the divine essence), but even is sometimes joined with a plural verb and adjective (to make known more clearly the plurality of persons). (b) By the passages in which God speaks of Himself in the plural number, Gen. 1:26; 3:22; 11:7; Is. 6:8. (c) By the passages in which God speaks of God, and the Lord of the Lord; for there, in like manner, plurality of persons is signified. Gen. 19:24; Ex. 16:7; 34:5, 6; Numb. 14:21; 2 Sam. 5:24; 7:11; Ps. 45:7; 110:1; Jer. 23:5, 6, 33.15; Dan. 9:17; Hos. 1:7; Zach. 2:8, 9. (d) By the passages in which mention is made of the Son of God; for it is necessary that He be also true God. Ps. 2:7; 72:17; Prov. 30:4. Finally, there are to be referred hither all the testimonies of the Old Testament in which Jehovah is said to send an angel, to whom the name Jehovah or divine works are ascribed; for then by the name angel is meant the Son of God, who, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, is true God. Ex. 23:20, 21. II. The three persons in one essence, are proved (I, 190 sq.): (a) From the passages in which three persons of the Godhead are distinctly enumerated, Gen. 1:1, 2; Ex. 31:1, 3; 2 Sam. 23:2; Ps 33:6; Is. 42:1; 48:16; 61:1; 63:7; Hagg. 2:5. (b) From the passages in which the name of Jehovah and God is thrice repeated in one connection; for there, according to the corresponding mode of revelation of the Old Testament, three persons of the Godhead are implied. Numb. 6:23-26; Deut. 6:4; Ps. 42:1, 2; 67:6, 7; Is. 33:22; Jer. 33:2; Dan. 9:19. (c) From the Trisagion of the angels. Is. 6:3. (d) From the passages in which God speaks concerning God, and the Lord concerning the Lord, as above. I, c. But of the Old Testament proof-passages for the Trinity, GRH. (III, 218) says in general: "1. We do not say that in the Old Testament and the New Testament there is the same clearness and evidence of the testimonies concerning the Trinity; because the clearer revelation of this mystery was reserved for the New Testament. 2. Nor do we wish that, in a discussion with an obstinate adversary, a beginning be made with the more obscure statements of the Old Testament. But we only assert that from the Old Testament some testimonies, in constructing the doctrine of the Trinity, both can and ought to be cited, since God always from the beginning revealed Himself thus, in order that the Church at all times might, in this manner, acknowledge, worship, and praise Him, namely, as three distinct persons in one essence." In the New Testament there is shown, I. The Trinity of persons in God; and, II. The true divinity of each person. I. The Trinity of persons. QUEN. (I, 324 seq ): "The Holy Trinity is proved in three ways: (1) From 1 John 5:7. (2) From the wonderful theophany at the baptism of Christ, where three persons of the Godhead are manifested. Matt. 3:16,17. (3) From the solemn formula of baptism given by Christ. Matt. 28:19. But we cannot be baptized eis onoma of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, unless the name of these three, as equal in authority, dignity, and essence, be invoked over us. Hence, we argue: He to whose faith, religion, worship, and obedience we are bound, is true God." II. The true divinity of each person. 1. (QUEN. I, 329): "The Deity of the Father is proved (1) by the names peculiar to the true God alone; (2) by attributes, e.g., eternity, infinity, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.; (3) by works truly and purely divine; (4) by the truly divine worship." 2. (I, 332 sq.): "The Deity of the Son is proved: I. From His names. Some names are essential, others personal. Those are essential which express the divine nature and essence of Christ. Personal names are those which designate His person. (1) Divine essential names: In the Old Testament, Christ, the branch of David, is called Jehovah, our righteousness. Jer. 23:6. He is called Jehovah, whom Jehovah anointed, Is. 61:1, 8; Adonai, Is. 6:1-3, cf John 12:41. In the New Testament, the Son of God. (a) He is called God absolutely, without any limiting or alienating condition. John 1:1; 20:28. (b) To the divine names, the words are added, by which the incarnate Son of God is designated. Thus Paul, Acts 20:28. The same apostle, 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14; John 1:14; 1 John 4:2,3. (c) To the divine names, epithets are annexed, by which He is declared to be supreme God. For (a) Christ is named by St. John the true God and eternal life, 1 John 5:20. (b) By St. Paul, the Son of God is called the great God. Tit. 2:13. (g) By the same apostle, Christ is named God over all, blessed forever, Rom. 9:5. He is called the Lord from heaven, 1 Cor. 15:47; He is said to be Lord of all, Acts 10:36, and therefore Lord of heaven and earth, which is the description of the true God, Matt. 11:25; Lord of lords and King of kings. Rev. 17:14; 19:16. (2) Divine personal names: Christ is called in Holy Scriptures, (a) God's own Son, Rom. 8:32; having God as His own Father, John 5:18. (b) The only-begotten Son of the Father, John 1:14. (c) The Son existing in the bosom of the Father, John 1:18. (d) The first-begotten Son, Heb. 1:6. (e) The Son above angels, Heb. 1:5. (f) The Son equal to God the Father, John 15:17,18. II. From Divine Attributes For the Son of God is: (1) Eternal, Col. 1:17; Heb. 13:8; John 1:1, 14; Rev. 1:8. (2) Infinite and omnipresent, John 1:48; Matt. 18:20; 28:20. (3) Immutable, Ps. 102:27; Heb. 1:12. (4) Most holy, Dan. 9:24. (5) Omnipotent, Rev. 1:8; John 10:28. (6) Omniscient, John 21:17; 2:25. (7) Most happy and autarkestatos [perfectly self-contented], John 16:15. (8) Most glorious, 1 Cor. 2:8; John 17:5. III. The Divine Works of the Son, proving His deity, are either ad intra, as the active procession of the Holy Ghost, and the sending of the same (elsewhere discussed); or ad extra, since in the Scripture divine works ad extra are ascribed to Christ, the Son of God. From them His true deity is effectually proved. Moreover, there is ascribed to Him: (1) The creation of the world, Gen. 1:2; Ps 33:6; 102:25; Prov. 8:30; John 1:3; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:10. (2) The preservation and governing of all things, John 5:17; 1 Cor. 8:6; Heb. 1:3. (3) The working of miracles, Ps. 72:18. (4) The redemption of the human race, Hos. 13:14; Zach. 9:11. (5) The preservation and protection of the Church, Matt. 16:18. (6) The raising of the dead, Job 19:25; John 6:39, 40; 11:25. (7) Salvation, Matt. 1:21. IV. The final argument for the deity of Christ is derived from His divine worship and honor. These are ascribed to Him (1) in general, John 5:23; (2) specifically, Is. 45:23; Phil. 2:10; John 14:1; Matt. 28:19." (3) (I, 340): "The Deity of the Holy Ghost is proved: I. From His divine names. For He is distinctly called Jehovah, 2 Sam. 23:2, rvch yhvh the Spirit of the Lord spake by me, cf. v. 2, and Acts 1:16; Is. 1:21; Ez. 1:3, etc., with Zech. 7:12; Luke 1:70; with 1 Pet. 1:11; 2 Pet. 1:21; Is. 6:8, 10, with Acts 28:25, sq., etc., etc., theos, Acts 5:3, 4; 1 John 5:7, 9, etc., etc., kurios, 2 Cor. 3:17; 1 Cor. 13:4, 5. II. From essential divine attributes ascribed to Him; namely, Eternity, Heb. 9:14. Omnipotence, Is. 11:2. Luke 11:20; 1 Cor. 12:11. Omniscience, 1 Cor. 2:10-12. Goodness and mercy, Neh. 9:20; Ps. 103:11. Omnipresence, Ps. 139:7. III. From divine works, such as the creation of the universe, Gen. 1:2; Job. 26:13; Ps. 33:6. Preservation, Job 33:4. The working of miracles, Acts 10:38. Add to these, works of grace and justice, of which Scripture speaks frequently. IV. From divine worship, such as (a) Adoration, Is. 6:3; Acts 28:25 and 26. (b) Invocation, 2 Cor. 13:13; Rev. 1:4. (c) Faith in the Holy Ghost, Matt. 28:19." __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER III. OF CREATION. __________________________________________________________________ § 20. Creation a Divine Work. THE doctrine of the Divine works follows next in order to that of the existence, essence, and attributes of the triune God. The first outward work of God (opus ad extra) is the creation of the world. [1] Concerning this creation the Holy Scriptures teach us: (1) That it is a work of God, which He accomplished without the cooperation or assistance of any creature, [2] of His own free will, [3] and solely by means of His omnipotent creative Word; [4] a work of the one true God, and, therefore, of the Triune God. [5] (2) As God is, in the true sense of the word, Creator of the world, this fact excludes every conception of a material existing from eternity out of which God only made, prepared, or fashioned the world; on the contrary, the material itself, of which the world consists, was created by God. This is expressed in the proposition, that the world was created from nothing, which is intended to mean that there was nothing in existence which God made use of in forming the world, but that everything that exists was first called into being by Him. (2 Macc. 7:28; Rom. 4:17; Heb. 11:3; Is. 41:24; Prov. 8:22.)[6] (3) As a specific beginning of creation is taught in the first chapter of Genesis, this at once excludes the conception of a world existing from eternity. [7] (4) The world, if we mean by this term its entire construction and arrangement as existing at the end of the six days of creation, came into being, according to the narrative in Genesis, not at once, but gradually ("during a period of six days God made all things which He created and made, observing an admirable order"). The manner of their production (ordo creationis) is described in the first chapter of Genesis, and from this account we can distinguish: (a) The creation of matter; (b) The separation of the different kinds of materials created from nothing; (c) The arrangement of the rude masses and their construction into the form in which they appeared at the end of the days of creation. [8] We can thus also distinguish between immediate and mediate creation; the former being the creation from nothing, and the latter the arrangement of the previously created materials. [9] (5) The first and highest aim of creation is the glory of God, for God wishes to be recognized and revered as the great God that He is. (Ps. 19:1; Prov. 16:4.) But, among all the creatures that have been called into being, man holds the highest place, and for his sake everything else in the world has been created; therefore, as the intermediate aim of creation, we are to regard the use and benefit of man. (Gen. 1:28.) [10] (6) If the world is thus entirely the creature of God, it follows, finally, as is indeed expressly stated, Gen. 1:31, that everything in the world was very good, and that, therefore, everything evil that is now in it must be regarded as having entered subsequently. [11] This is all comprehended in the definition: "Creation is an act of God, who is one and alone, and an undivided work of the three persons of the Godhead, by which the Father, through the co-eternal Son, in the co-eternal Holy Spirit, of his own free will, in six distinct days, formed all things, visible and invisible, not out of some materials co-existing with Himself from eternity, but from nothing, for the glory of His own name and the benefit of man; and all things that God made are very good." (GRH. IV, 51.) [12] [1] The distinction between works ad intra and ad extra, which we discussed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, is not introduced by some of the Dogmaticians until they treat of the present topic. QUEN. (I, 415) divides divine actions ad extra into: "actions of power, as the creation and preservation of the world;" "actions of mercy, as the redemption, calling, regeneration, conversion, and salvation of the human race;" and "actions of justice, as the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, and the damnation of devils and the wicked." Concerning the connection of the doctrine of the creation with that of the Trinity, CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 112): "Thus far, in the article of the Trinity, God has been described as He is in His secret nature, and mention has, indeed, been also made of the works of God, but, especially, of those which divinity works within itself, apart from every creature. But God, who has made darkness His hiding-place, and who dwells in inaccessible light, coming forth from His secret abode, has manifested Himself, also, in works ad extra, . . . and, because the first manifestation ad extra was made in the work of creation, the article concerning the creation immediately follows." [2] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "Creation is an action of the one God. This is said, because of those who have proposed a number of sources; It is, likewise, an action of God alone, which neither ought to be, nor can be, ascribed to any creature (Mal. 2:10; Job 31:15; 1 Cor. 8:6; Is. 45:6, 7; Job 9:8.)" This statement, at the same time, excludes the opinion of those "who add to God, in the work of creation, the co-operation of nature, in accordance with what occurs in things already framed and set in order" (CHMN. (I, 116)), as well as the view of those, also, "who have divided the work of creation between God and the angels" (GRH. IV, 7). CALOV. (III, 897): "In the primeval creation there was no instrumental cause or means, because God created all things by the Word." [3] QUEN. (I, 417): "Neither was there any antecedent cause, except the purpose of God alone, communicating Himself, not from the necessity of nature, but from the freedom of His will." CALOV. (III, 896): "The impelling cause of creation is the immense goodness of God, prompted by which, as He wished to communicate the highest good, He most freely communicated Himself." HOLL. (357): "Creation is a free, divine action, because God framed the universe, not induced thereto by necessity, as though He needed the service of creatures (since He is absolutely independent, autarkestatos), but freely, as He was able to create or not to create and to frame sooner or later, in this or in another manner." [4] Hence creation is also described as "not successive, but, with respect to every individual being created, instantaneous, for God framed everything, not by any movement or laborious exertion, but when He said, Let there be light,' immediately there was light." -- HOLL. (ib.). CALOV. (III, 900): "The action is not properly successive, but instantaneous, for the individuals, which God created, He created in as instant, without movement or succession, although, if these be regarded collectively, the creation was completed in six days (nuchthemera); not that He devoted those entire days to creation, but that He created something in the moments of each day." [5] CALOV. (III, 889): "The efficient cause of creation is God, one and alone." GRH. (IV, 4): "But that one true God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; therefore, in Scripture, the work of creation is ascribed to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Of the Father it is affirmed, 1 Cor. 8:6. Of the Son, John 1:3; Col. 1:16. Of the Holy Ghost, Job. 26:13; 33:4; Ps. 104:30. We conclude, therefore, that creation is an undivided action of the one and true God alone, viz., of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." If nevertheless creation, in a special sense, is called the work ad extra of God the Father (compare the section on the Trinity, note 29), this is done only by way of appropriation (same section, note 23). HOLL. (352): "In Holy Scripture and the Apostles' Creed the work of creation is ascribed, in a peculiar manner, to God the Father: (a) Because of the order of working; for this reason, that what the Father has of Himself to do and to create, the Son of God and the Holy Ghost have of the Father. (b) Because, in the works of creation, God the Father, by His most efficacious word of command, manifested His own omnipotence, Gen. 1:3. (c) Creation is the first divine work ad extra, and therefore, by appropriation, is affirmed of the First Person of the Godhead." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "We must not dispute too curiously concerning the distinction of persons in the work of creation, but let us be content with the revelation, that all things were created by the eternal Father, through the Son, while the Holy Ghost hovered over them, Rom. 11:36. But these things are not to be construed into an inequality of persons, as the Arians blasphemously assert that the Son was God's instrument in creation, just as the workman uses an axe. For the prepositions (apo, dia, en) do not divide the nature, but express the properties of a nature that is one and unconfused." See also HOLL. (353): "The three persons of the Godhead are not three associated causes, not three authors of creation, but one cause, one author of creation, one Creator. Although they are three distinct persons, yet they influence the work of creation with one power. If they were to influence it with a diverse power of working, they would be associated causes." [6] QUEN. (I, 417): "There was no material of creation out of which (materia ex qua), with respect to things created on the first day. For they were created on the first day, not from any pre-existing material, whether eternal or created before, but were made from purely negative nothing. When it is said that the works of the first day were created from noting,' the particle from' does not designate the material out of which, but excludes it. For, by from nothing,' there is nothing else denoted than the starting-point (terminus a quo); i.e., the nothing, from which all things are said to have been made, has respect not to the material, but only to the starting-point, and ought to be understood of the order of creation; and the particle from' can be correctly translated by after,' so that the sense may be: After nothing, as the starting-point, something was made." CHEMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "That the material from which' was not from eternity, but all things were created from nothing; i.e., although things did not exist, they began to be when God spake . . . Moreover, it is said that they were created from nothing, not as we commonly say, they contend about nothing,' i.e., about a trifling matter; but as when something is made, springs up, and comes into being, and there is not anything out of which it may be made." GRH. (IV, 7): "They occasion the madness of the Stoics, who devised two eternal principles, nous kai ule, mind, or God, and matter, which they imagined was, during the ages of eternity, a confused chaos, and, at a certain time, was at length brought into form by mind." In connection with this doctrine, the Dogmaticians call attention also to the difference in the meaning of the words create, beget, and make. See above, § 19, note 31. From the distinction between create and beget, arises the proposition (HOLL. (356)): "God did not create this visible world from His own essence, nor did He, as it were, diffuse this into parts, so that every creature may be said to be a particle of God." CALOV. (III, 899): "Creation does not consist in emanation from the essence of God, nor in generation, nor in motion, or natural change, . . . but in outward action, by which, by means of infinite power, things are produced from nothing." [7] QUEN. (I, 421): "The world neither has been from eternity nor could it have been created from eternity." Proof (ibid. 422): "(a) From the history of creation; (b) from the end and destruction of the world; (c) from the eternity peculiar to God alone; (d) from the manner of its production, viz.: because all things were created from nothing, it follows that the material from which (materia ex qua) was not from eternity." While it is thus asserted that the world could not have been created from eternity, we still dare not express ourselves in such a manner as though the world had been created at a particular time, since we cannot conceive of a time as having existed before the world. Concerning this point, the Dogmaticians usually express themselves as follows: HFRFFR. (67): "Moses (Gen. 1) replies, saying: That this mechanism of the world was not always, or from eternity; but that, in its coming forth, it depended upon a certain beginning of time; so that, since, in the infinite ages of past eternity, there was no world, God caused the world to come forth in that definite beginning of time." CALOV. (III, 901): "The creation of things did not occur from eternity, but in that beginning in which all time began to flow. Hence, creation began, not properly in time, but in the first instant and beginning of time. This is called the beginning of the way of the Lord, Prov. 8:22, before which, as there was no way, no outward action, no work, so also there was no time, no period, no age; for as the ages began to be framed by the Word, Heb. 11:3, so also the creation of all ages began, 1:2." The question, "Why God did not create the world sooner, and what He did whilst alone and unemployed in that eternity," is repulsed as "a question of madmen curiously inquiring into such things as have no profit." (HFRFFR. (69.) [8] HFRFFR. (72): "From Gen. 1:1, sq., it appears that, in the creation of the world, there was a three-fold operation of the Creator: (1) First, indeed, He created; i.e., although there was no matter before, He produced from nothing that crude and confused corporeal mass which Moses has designated by the names, heaven, earth, and water; (2) Then, during the three days, He divided these three bodies; (3) At length, during the second period of three days, He completed everything with its garniture." QUEN. (I, 417): "The action of creation comprises three steps: (1) The production, on the first day, of the crude material, which was the germinal source, as it were, of the entire universe; (2) The distinction and disposition of simple creatures during the first three days: for, on the first day, He separated light form darkness; on the second, by interposing the firmament, the waters beneath from those above; and, on the third, the earth from the waters; (3) The furnishing and completion of the world, which was brought to perfection in the second period of three days; for, on the fourth day, He furnished the heavens with luminaries; on the fifth, the water with fishes, and the atmosphere with winged creatures; and, finally, on the sixth, the earth with animals, and, at last, with the chief of all animate beings, viz., with man." The later Dogmaticians usually treat of man, as the last of created beings, in a separate section, which they place before that of Providence. But we think we can appropriately here insert the essential features of the topic in the following propositions: (a) As to his position in the world, the remark of QUEN. (I, 511): "God, to give, as it were, the last touch to the work of creation, framed the most noble of creatures, for whose sake he had produced all the rest, viz., man." (b) Definition, HOLL. (406): "Man is an animal, consisting of a rational soul and an organic body, framed by God, and endowed at the first creation with God's own image, in order that he might sincerely worship the Creator, live a godly life, and attain eternal happiness." (c) The first man was Adam. QUEN. (I, 543): "Adam, framed by God on the sixth day of the first hexahemeron, is the first of all men, and the parent of the entire human race, throughout the whole globe, 1 Cor. 15:45, 47; Gen. 2:5. (The antithesis of Is. Peyrere, the founder of the Pre-adamites (1655), who says that: The Gentiles are diverse from the Jews in race and origin; the Jews were formed by God in Adam, the Gentiles were created before, on the same day as other animate beings. The origin of the latter is described in Gen. 1, that of the former in Gen. 2 . . . The Gentiles are many ages before the Jewish nation, and, by race and nature, diverse from the same, and survivors of the Noachian flood of the Jews.' Likewise, that the epoch of the creation of the world should not be dated from that beginning which is commonly imagined in Adam, but must be sought for still further back, and from ages very remote in the past.')" BR. (239): "Moreover, in the beginning, God framed only one individual, namely a male; woman He afterwards produced from the rib of her sleeping husband, Gen. 2:22." (d) Of the mode of production, QUEN. (I, 512): "It consists in this, that God made man (a) with singular deliberation, taken concerning this work, Gen. 1:26; (b) immediately, with His own hands, so to say; (g) ornately and elegantly; (d) successively (Gen. 2:7, 21:22), first (with respect to Adam) forming the body, and then breathing into it a soul." (e) Of the internal, constitutive principles of man. QUEN. (I, 513): "They are the material and the physical form. The material is an animate organic body, before the Fall impassible, and not mortal. Gen. 1:26; Wis. 2:23. The physical form is the soul before the Fall illumined with great light of concreated wisdom and knowledge, Col. 3:10. Therefore, it is pure, and entirely destitute of any sinful stain, Eph. 4:24." The spirit is thus not enumerated as the third essential part of man. In reference to the passages cited as favoring that view, it is remarked by QUEN. (I, 518): "(1) In such passages Holy Scripture does not understand by spirit, a spirit differing substantially from the human soul, but a superior part of the soul. (2) It distinguishes between, on the one hand, spirit taken for an essential part of man, which thus used is the same as soul, and is not distinguished from it; and, on the other, as employed for spiritual gifts and those of sanctification, which are conferred by the Holy Ghost upon believers, or for the grace of the Holy Ghost and His operation, viz., the qualities and gifts of the Holy Ghost in regenerate man." [GRH. XVII, 80. "That there are but two parts of man, is proved by (1) Man's creation, Gen. 2:7. (2) His redemption. For Christ's redemption had to do with man in his entire being, consisting only of soul and body, Gal. 3:13; 4:5; Luke 19:10. (3) His renewal and sanctification. (4) The Incarnation of the Son; for He assumed soul and body. (5) The death of man, Ecc. 12:7; Acts 7:59. (6) The resurrection of the dead, 1 Kings 17:21. Opponents of our view urge passages of Scripture in which the spirit is distinguished from the soul, Luke 1:46; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 4:12. We reply that the term spirit is sometimes put exegetically for the soul itself, since the soul is a spirit, Gen. 2:7; 46:27. Some understand by spirit, 1 Thess. 5:23, the mind or intellect, by soul, the will and affections.] (f) The question, "Whether human souls are created daily by God, or are propagated per traducem," is answered thus by QUEN. (I, 519): "The soul of the first man was immediately created by God; but the soul of Eve was produced by propagation, and the souls of the rest of men are created, not daily, nor begotten of their parents as the body or souls of brutes, but, by virtue of the divine blessing, are propagated, per traducem, by their parents." QUEN. (I, 520, sq.) adduces the proof: "(1) from the primeval blessing of God; Gen. 1:28, cf. 8:17; 9:1. (2) From God's rest and cessation on the seventh day from all work, Gen. 2:2. (3) From the production of the soul of Eve, Gen. 2:21,22. (4) From the description of generation, Gen. 5:3. Just as after the Fall Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, not only with respect to body, but also with respect to soul, so also the rest of men. (5) From Gen. 46:26. (6) From the following absurdities, (a) if it be affirmed that souls are created immediately by God, either original sin would be altogether denied or God could not be vindicated from injustice, both of which are absurd; (b) it follows that man does not beget an entire man, or an entire composite being, but only that part of it which does not give form [7] to man; that He does not beget man, for man without form, i.e., soul, is not man. . . . (7) From Ps. 51:7." Cf. also the following observations of QUEN. (I, 519): "(1) We distinguish between the simultaneous creation of all souls, at the origin of the world, and the daily creation which occurs now, as often as men are begotten. (2) As human reason, not enlightened by Holy Scripture, knows little that is certain concerning the departure of the human soul from the body, and its condition after its departure, so also it can define nothing certain concerning the origin of the human soul in or with the body. (3) We distinguish between traduction, or the propagation itself of the soul, and the mode of traduction or propagation. That the soul is propagated by parents procreating children, and that souls are not immediately created or infused by God, is sufficiently manifest from the Holy Scriptures; but the mode has not been defined, and, therefore, we refrain from its determination and definition." GRH. IV. 278: "1. Since the image of God, which was the righteousness, holiness and perfection of the concreated human soul, was propagated by generation, the soul itself must be thus propagated. 2. Original sin. . . . 3. The force of the words. Gen. 1:28. That this was not destroyed by the Fall is proved by Gen. 5:3. Adam begat a son,' etc., i.e., flesh of flesh,' John 3:6, by which term not only the body is meant, Ga. 5:20. The corrupt image of Adam, therefore, is to be sought not in the body alone of his sons, but in the entire man. . . . 5. God did not create a soul for Eve, but transferred it from Adam to Eve, and thus Eve derived her soul from Adam. For as the entire soul is in the entire body, and is entire in every part thereof, the rib of which Eve was formed was animated, and therefore she received a soul, not by inspiration or new creation, but by propagation from Adam. Eve's posterity, as animated, are begotten of animated parents," etc. . . . The explanation of the mode of propagation is most difficult. 1. Some say that the souls of children are enkindled from those of parents as a torch from a torch, flame from flame. 2. Some, that the soul of the child is propagated from that of the parent, not separately, but that the whole is begotten of the whole; the seed being animated, but not that of either parent separately, but only in the union ordained of God for this purpose. 3. Some, that besides its form, prepared for an organic body, it has a divinely implanted force whereby it can produce a soul. 4. Some, that the soul of the mother can produce the soul of her offspring by growth, in the same way in which she produces new matter for nourishment. 5. Others attempt to reduce the contrary opinions of creation and propagation to harmony in this way; There is a two-fold production: one with respect to the power of nature, called generation; another, with respect to the absolute power of God, called creation. Creation, thus taken, is divided into that which proceeds from nothing, and is creation, properly so-called, and that which proceeds from a substance, yet neither necessarily nor with natural power, but in obedience to command. This presupposed, they maintain that God creates a new soul not of the souls of the parents, which, since it thus derives its material from Adam, participates in his guilt. . . . We leave the mode to be investigated by philosophers; but, meanwhile, the propagation itself must not be denied, because the mode of the propagation is not manifest. Of the body, HOLL. says further (411): "(a) The body is a true part of man, without which he is not a true and entire man." (412): "(b) The human soul has not been cast by God into the body as into a foul prison, by which it is hindered from being able to elevate itself and fly upward to the knowledge, love, and worship of God." (The antithesis of the Mystics.) Of the soul, HOLL. (409): "The soul is said to have been breathed into man by God, but not from God. For God did not, from His own substance, breathe into man a soul." (417): "The human soul neither emanated from the divine essence, nor by spiritual regeneration and mystic union with the triune God does it return or flow back to the divine essence." Hence, BR. (237): "God created man, producing his body from the earth, but his soul from nothing, and joining it to the body." [9] QUEN. (I, 417): "All things were created from nothing, nevertheless some immediately, viz., the works of the first day, and others mediately, viz., by means of the material which God had before created from absolutely negative nothing, viz., the works of the succeeding five days." (Ibid. 418): "The former is of the highest order, and is creation, primarily or properly so-called, through which God, without the intervention of another, acted immediately upon nothing, by calling forth from it that which has a real and positive essence; but the latter is creation of the second order, secondarily and less principally, yet properly so-called, by which God produced something from a material pre-existing, but crude and altogether confused." [10] QUEN. (I, 418): "The ultimate end of creation is the glory of God. For in and through creation God manifested (a) the glory of His goodness by sharing His goodness with creatures; (b) the glory of His power, by creating all things from nothing; by His will and Word alone; (c) the glory of wisdom, which shines forth from the multitude, variety, order, and harmony of things created, Ps. 19:1." GRH. (IV, 4): "In order that God, who is invisible by nature, might be known also from things visible, a work was wrought by Him, to manifest the workman by its visibility." QUEN. (I, 418): "The intermediate end of creation is the advantage of men. For God made all things for the sake of man, but man He made for His own sake, Ps. 115:16." [11] CHEMN. (Loch. Th., I, 116): "To the definition of creation this also belongs: that all things which God made are very good, Gen. 1:31; Wis. 1:13,14." QUEN. (I, 418): "From this statement we exclude the defects of nature, which began only after man's fall." CALOV. (III, 902): "Well-pleasing to God are the consequences of creation, the rest from the work of creation, as well as the power and dominion exercised over creatures." [12] QUEN. (I, 415): "Creation is an external action of the triune God, whereby, to the praise of His name and the advantage of men, in the space of six days, by the command alone of His most free will, He omnipotently and wisely produced from nothing all things visible and invisible." BR. (248): "Creation is defined as an action ad extra of the triune God, whereby God, impelled by His goodness, produced this world and all things that are therein, first, indeed, as simple bodies, from no pre-existing material; then out of simple bodies, as a crude and confused material, He produced mixed bodies; nay, even independently of all material, He produced immaterial substances, so as, by the direction alone of His will, to frame with power each of these, according to the idea of His mind, and in the space of six days to complete the entire work, to the glory of His wisdom, power, and goodness, and to the advantage of men." __________________________________________________________________ [7] [The word "form" in this connection is used in the scholastic sense of the term, viz.: "Form is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its other qualities." (Fleming's Vocabulary.) See also Glossary at the end of this volume.] __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER IV. OF PROVIDENCE. __________________________________________________________________ § 21. The Doctrine taught by both Reason and Revelation. GOD is not a workman who, when he has completed his work leaves it to itself and goes his way" [Augustine]; but, having created the world, He sustains it and continually cares for it. [1] Therefore the Holy Scriptures never speak of the creation without at the same time alluding to the superintending care that is exercised over the world; and in this very fact the Christian finds the highest consolation, that he is permitted to regard God as continually present in the world, caring for the greatest just as for the least, and hindered by nothing in the exercise of His care. This consolation we may, indeed, in part derive from the contemplation of the world by the light of Nature, and from observing the course of its affairs; but it is only the certainty which Revelation communicates that establishes us immovably in this confidence. [2] The Providence of God [3] specially manifests itself: I, in His preserving what has been created in the world; II, in His cooperating with all that occurs; and III, in His leading and directing everything in the world. The doctrine of Providence is accordingly divided into the doctrines of Preservation, Concurrence, and Government [4] (Conservatio, concursus, gubernatio.) I. "Preservation is the act of Divine Providence whereby God sustains all things created by Him, so that they continue in being with the properties implanted in their nature and the powers receive in creation" (HOLL., 441). The world would fall back again into nothing if God did not continually uphold, not only the various species of creatures and the individuals in them, but also the existing order of arrangement and cooperation which He has assigned the whole; [5] for created things have no power of subsistence in themselves, but have it only so long as God imparts it to them. [6] We distinguish, therefore, between creation and preservation only in our conception; in God we must regard one as implying the other: therefore, preservation is also designated as continued creation. [7] II. Concurrence. [8] The doctrine of Divine Providence implies far more than merely that God creates and uphold the world. If this were all, then we would have to refer all the changes and transactions that occur in the world entirely to creatures, and God would have no further share in all this than merely to give to His creatures the ability thus to act. But God is to be regarded as, in a far higher sense than this, present in the world. The Holy Scriptures teach us that He is an active participant in all that transpires in the world; that nothing that occurs could take place without Him and His active co-operation; that, therefore, ever single effect, change, or transaction in the world comes to pass only through the influence of God. In this, God is not, indeed, as in creation and preservation, the sole cause of that which happens; for God has given to living creatures a will that is to be employed in actions, and has imparted even to inanimate things a power which we are to regard as the efficient cause of changes. God's Providence can, therefore, by no means be so regarded, as if He alone were the author of all that is done; for, in that case, this will, which we must assume in the case of living creatures, would not have justice done to it, and the power that belongs to inanimate things would not be called into exercise: yet God is nevertheless the cooperative cause of all that occurs. In all transactions, therefore, that proceed from a creature, the creature itself is just as much a cause as God is; He, on the other hand, is always to be regarded as co-operating: every change, effect, or transaction that occurs is, accordingly, to be referred at the same time to both, to the creature and to God. [9] This is expressed in the doctrine of the concurrence. Concurrence, or the co-operation of God, is the act of Divine Providence whereby God, by a general and immediate influence, proportioned to the need and capacity of every creature, graciously takes part with second causes in their actions and effect. (HOLL. 442.) [10] While it is certain that God is to be regarded as co-operating in everything that occurs, [11] it is no less certain that the manner of His co-operation differs very greatly, varying with the nature of the co-operating causes (the causae secundae) and with the necessities of the case. God co-operates, for instance, in one way when the action is to proceed from inanimate nature, and in a very different way when the second cause, with which He co-operates, is one endowed with freedom. [12] Also, God has one way of cooperating with good deeds and another with those that are evil. [13] The general co-operation of God is, moreover, always to be regarded as immediate, [14] but at the same time also as of such a kind that the effect is not already predetermined (not a previous but a simultaneous concurrence, not predeterminating but mildly disposing), since in that case the effectual participation of the second cause would be excluded and its liberty infringed. [15] III. "Government is the act of Divine Providence by which God most excellently orders, regulates, and directs the affairs and actions of creatures according to His own wisdom, justice, and goodness, for the glory of His name and the welfare of men." (CAL., III, 1194.) [16] God actively participates in actions for the express purpose of directing the whole world according to His own purposes. As, therefore, preservation has reference to the existence and continuance of created things, government has reference to the actions that proceed from these creatures. God inclines and leads them according to His will so as to accomplish His designs: and this government of God extends over the whole as well as over each single part, over the great as well as over the small. [17] Inasmuch as God, however allows men in their freedom to have their own way, as we have already seen under the doctrine of concurrence, this marks distinctly the character of His government; for He governs in such a manner that this liberty is not restricted. Hence, much is done that would not be done if so wide a range were not allowed to human liberty; and, according to the different conduct of men, whom God will not hinder in the exercise of their liberty, God is determined in employing different methods of directing the world for the accomplishment of His designs. This different method is described in the expressions, permission, hinderance, direction, and determination. (1) Much is done that cannot at all be said to meet the special approbation of God; but God permits it, suffers it to occur, because He does not choose to enforce His own preference by doing violence to or prohibiting human liberty, and therefore seeks to accomplish His aims in some other way (permission). [18] (2) Thus God often is content with merely hindering the accomplishment of what would be contrary to His purposes (hinderance). [19] (3) He knows, too, how to sway the freely performed actions of men, after they have been permitted by Him to occur (whether they be good or evil), in such a way that they must be subservient to and in accordance with His own purposes (direction). [20] (4) As, finally, He is Himself the source from which proceeds all power and ability to act, so He knows also how to attain His own ends by withholding the necessary power, or by holding this within certain limits which it dare not transcend, when men are about to act contrary to His will (determination). [21] Of Providence in general, as comprehending preservation, concurrence, and government, we have yet to remark: (1) That it affects everything, but not uniformly; on the other hand, everything is affected by it just in proportion to the relative importance of its position in the world. And, as man occupies the highest place in the world, Providence has special reference to him; most specifically, however, it is exercised with reference to the godly, as God's chief purpose in regard to man is his salvation. [22] (2) The providence of God ordinarily employs second causes, and thus accomplishes its designs; but God is by no means restricted to the use of these second causes, for He often exercises His providence without regard to them, and operates thus contrary to what we call the course of nature, and hence arises the difference between ordinary and extraordinary providence. [23] (3) Finally, divine providence is exercised differently with reference to that which is evil and that which is good. [24] "Providence is the external action of the entire Trinity, [25] whereby (a) God most efficaciously upholds the things created, both as an entirety and singly, both in species and in individuals; (b) concurs in their actions and results; and (c) freely and wisely governs all things to its own glory and the welfare and safety of the universe, and especially of the godly." [1] GRH. (IV, 52): "God, the Creator of all, did not desert the work which He framed; but, by His omnipotence, up to the present time preserves it; and, by His wisdom, rules and controls all things in it." [2] GRH. (IV, 52): "Scripture joins both, viz., that the faithful heart must believe that God is both Creator and Provider, Job 12:9, 10; Acts 17:24, 25, 28; Ps. 121:2. The perverse imagination, that God has left creatures to only their own governing, covers human minds with great darkness, and produces horrible doubts. The very object which is preserved and governed as Nature, is a witness to Divine Providence. If you be a disciple of Nature, you will find that provision is made for the most trifling and insignificant objects, as well as for the most noble; that upon all are conferred those things which are necessary for attaining their end; that all continue steadfastly in a fixed and wonderful order; that those things which act without sense or thought nevertheless attain their end; that objects conflicting with each other are so governed that, by breaking the strength of one another, they profit the world by their opposition. But the knowledge of Divine Providence, sought from the Book of Nature, is weak and imperfect, not from the fault of Nature itself, but from that of our mind; but more certain and perfect is the knowledge of Divine Providence which is sought from Scripture." [The arguments from Nature are thus enumerated by HUTT. (218): "1. The order and perpetual effect of Nature, as the fixed and perpetual movement of heavenly bodies, the fertility of the earth, the constant flow of streams, the perpetuation of distinct species of animals and plants. 2. The condition of the intelligent human mind. For what is irrational can never be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3. The distinction between what is honorable and dishonorable, which could not originate from accident or from matter. 4. Natural knowledge, which even in its obscurity, since the Fall, convinces man that there is a Divinity who controls and governs all things. 5. Terrors of conscience in the minds of the guilty on account of crimes they have committed, even when there are no human courts for them to fear. 6. The wonderful preservation of civil society, and especially the Church, amidst the rage of the world and the devil. 7. The series of efficient causes proceeding not ad infinitum, but to a First Cause, upon which all depend. For if the progress were infinite, there would be no order of causes, and they would not necessarily cohere. 8. The most useful ends of all things. 9. The prophecy of future events. The force of all these arguments is to prove not so much that there is a God, as that, by His command, the world was established in the beginning and that even now all its parts are ever administered by Him."] [3] QUEN. (I, 527): "Providence is so named from providere, and denotes the act of foreseeing and cherishing anxious care concerning objects pertaining to self." "The term Providence (pronoia) does not occur in the canonical books in the sense in which it is here employed, but only in Wis. 14:3. But synonymous with it are the expressions: Seeing, Gen. 22:8; 1 Sam. 16:1; Ez. 20:6; ordination, Ps. 119:91; preservation, Ps. 36:7; dioikesis, Wis. 12:18; diakubernesis, Wis. 14:3; protaxis, Acts 17:26." Scriptural Proof. HOLL. (424): "All Scripture is nothing else than a brilliant mirror, from which, in whatever direction you turn, the ever watchful eye of providential direction clearly shines forth." Hence, in Ps. 121:4, God is called the Keeper of Israel. (a) Preserving Providence is proved from Ps. 36:6; (b) Co-operating Providence from Acts 17: 27, 28; (c) Governing Providence from Jer. 10:23; Prov. 20:24. [4] Providence is divided into these three parts, so far as it is a work of God ad extra. Before it becomes such, however, certain acts must have taken place in God Himself, viz., a foreknowledge of that upon which His providential care is to be exercised, and a purpose to exercise this care. If we take both of these into the account, Providence may be divided, HOLL. (424): "(a) into prognosis (foresight or foreknowledge): (b) prothesis (the purpose or decree of God); and (c) dioikesis (the actual preservation, co-operation, or concurrence and governing, with respect to things created)." BR. (303): "Opinions vary, inasmuch as some contend that, by the name, Providence, there is meant not so much the immanent acts of the divine mind and will, as the outward act of preserving and governing. Some indeed teach that, by this name, an immanent act is denoted, and they believe that it pertains formally to the intellect, and, by way of consequence, to the will; others vice versa. Nevertheless, it is easily perceived that this entire controversy is not so much concerning the thing itself, as concerning the terms employed. For all concede that to Providence, regarded in its wide sense, there belongs both prognosis, or an intellectual act, by which God sees beforehand what will be beneficial to creatures; and prothesis, or the act of the will, by which He wills to ordain and dispose the things which He foresees to be advantageous; as well as dioikesis, or the preservation itself (concurrence), and the government of creatures. Meanwhile, if we pay attention to the force of the words, Providence seems to denote not so much external acts of executive power, as God's care of His creatures, and, therefore, acts of His intellect and will, whence these outward acts proceed: but the order of internal acts is undoubtedly this, that the act of intellect precedes, and the act of the will, or the purpose to confer, according to the suggestion of the intellect, those things which are profitable to creatures, follows; although it does not follow Providence itself so as, together with the previous act of the intellect, to intrinsically constitute it. But if the usus loquendi be considered, it must be acknowledged that, to the acts of preservation (concurrence) and governing, which are the effects, signs, and marks of Providence, the name of Providence itself, according to an ordinary metonymy, is not unfrequently ascribed." HOLL. (421 and 422): "The providence of God, with respect to prognosis kai prothesis, is an internal act [8] of the divine intellect and will; with respect to dioikesis, an external action Strictly speaking, the providence of God is a divine action ad extra; for it is occupied with creatures, and thus is directed to that which is outside of God. In this stricter sense, the actual providence of God is only the preservation, co-operation with, and government of creatures; but foreknowledge, and the decree concerning the preservation and governing of things, are presupposed as acts of the divine intellect directing, and of the will commanding." With reference to foreknowledge it is remarked: (a) That the expression to know beforehand only inaccurately describes God's knowledge of everything, since the knowledge of God is not mediated by a succession of time and of thought, as ours is, but is rather intuitive, by virtue of which He sees everything, the past, the present, and the future at once, as it were in a mirror. GRH. (IV, 66): "In our knowledge there is a two-fold activity of thought. In the first place, only according to succession, since, when we understand anything in an act, we turn from it to understand something else; secondly, there is another activity of thought, according to causality, since, by means of premises, we come to the knowledge of conclusions. Neither of these belongs to God: not the first, because He sees all things in one, i.e., in Himself, just as we see many things at the same time in a mirror; nor the second, because this presupposes a first, and because such a process is from that which is known to that which is unknown, whereas God already sees the effects in Himself as a cause." QUEN. (I, 539): "Prognosis, or foreknowledge, is ascribed to God only anthropopathically, since it is properly the foreknowledge of future things; but to God there is nothing future, but all things are present, not indeed actually by way of existence, but objectively, and therefore He foresees nothing, but sees all things most absolutely in a perpetual, abiding, and immutable now, so that in God there is rather pantepopsia than prognosis." (b) The question, "Whether foreknowledge bring necessity to things foreknown, or whether it be certain that things are foreknown by God in such a manner, that now, by some necessity, they cannot occur otherwise?" HUTT. (Loc. Comm., 256) answers thus: Neither harmonizes with the truth. For every object is foreseen or foreknown by God as it is in its own nature, and according to its results, so that this foreknowledge depends upon the event, but the event does not depend upon the foreknowledge. As Jerome infers: The foreknowledge of future things does not make that which God knew would take place immutable; for, because of God's knowledge of future things, it is not necessary for us to do that which He foreknew, but what we will do according to our own will He knows as future.' Thus a solar or lunar eclipse does not occur because foreknown and predicted long before by mathematicians, since it would have occurred from natural causes, even though no mathematician should have foreknown or predicted it; so, also, what God has foreknown or foreseen is not immutable, or of fatal necessity, for the reason that He has foreknown or foreseen it, but it is immutable because man's will, freely doing this or that, has not changed, since if it would change, this also God would foreknow." . . . Still further: "It is one thing when I say that with respect to divine foreknowledge, something is immutable or occurs necessarily; but another thing, when I say that a thing is immutable because of God's foreknowledge, or, what is the same, that foreknowledge brings necessity to things foreknown. The former assertion is orthodox, but the latter is not; inasmuch as the latter expression names a cause, on account of which the matter cannot be otherwise, but the former denotes only the truth and certainty of the divine foreknowledge, and means nothing else than that God, as omniscient, knows already from all eternity what issue everything would have. In this respect it is said correctly: Things foreknown occur in that manner in which they have been foreknown, and not causally with respect to foreknowledge, as though this caused things foreknown to occur in this manner and no other,' but only conditionally, in so far as God knew matters in no other way than as they would occur from their own causes, and indeed freely. Therefore, when something occurs now in this manner, it is correctly said, with respect to divine foreknowledge, that it could not have occurred in another manner, according to the well-known rule: Everything that exists, exists necessarily, when it exists.'" [HUTT. illustrates: "I see that Peter is limping. As I see it, it must be so, for my vision is not deceived; and since it is actually occurring, it cannot be otherwise, but must be. Nevertheless, my seeing Peter limp cannot be said to cause him to limp, for he is not impelled by my vision, and no necessity of limping is imposed upon him, since he would limp even though not seen by me, and he would be able not to limp, if the natural cause were otherwise: but if this were otherwise, I would also see it. In the same way, we do nothing that God has not foreseen, and yet this foreknowledge of God is not the cause of our actions."] GRH. (IV, 69): "If you do not yet fully perceive the subject, thus regard it: The foreknowledge of God does not bring immutability to objects a priori, but only a posteriori; i.e., when God knows that a thing is, it is necessary for it to be. Nevertheless, in the meanwhile, a thing by its own nature, and with respect to its own cause, could be otherwise, and then God would have foreknown it otherwise. Things either present, or past, or future, do not depend upon knowledge; but knowledge depends upon the thing and event which is foreknown as just such as it is, so that if it would not have been, that fact also would have been foreseen by God." Related thereto is the question: "Whether the divine foreknowledge rests upon a previous decree?" which HOLL. (432) answers thus: "The foreknowledge and decree of God concerning future things are eternal and simultaneous on the part of God; but, according to our mode of conception, the foreknowledge of God precedes the divine decree." [5] HOLL. (442): "God preserves species and individual. Species He preserves by keeping the essences of objects from destruction, and imparting to them constancy. Individuals He preserves, by substituting new individuals in the place of those that perish, so that the essence of species may remain constant." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 125): "It is the office of Providence to watch over and aid the order which it has given to nature, so that every substance has its becoming strength, motions, and actions." [6] GRH. (IV, 83): "Created things subsist not of themselves, and from their own strength, but God upholds all things by the word of His power, Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:17; Acts 17:28." HOLL. (441): "Divine preservation is an act not merely negative or indirect, for it does not consist in the fact that God does not wish to destroy or annihilate the things that He has framed, but to leave to them their strength, as long as they can flourish and endure from the energy given to them by creation; but it is a positive and direct act, by which God, through a true and real influence, enters in a general way into the efficient causes of the objects that are to be preserved, so that in their nature, properties, and strength, they continue and remain." [7] QUEN. (I, 531): "God preserves all things by the continuance of the action by which He first produced them. For the preservation of a thing is, properly speaking, nothing else than a continued production of it, nor do they differ except by a designation derived from without." HOLL. (441): (Creation and preservation) "are distinguished by different connotatives. For creation connotes that the object had not existed before; preservation supposes that the object had existed before. Creation gives a beginning of being; preservation, a continuance of being." [8] The Dogmaticians do not all assign this place to the doctrine of the divine concurrence; the earlier, as GRH. and CAL., and among the later BAIER, following CAL., divide the subject of Providence into only preservation and governing, and discuss the doctrine of the concurrence only in a supplementary way. HOLL. (440): "Some theologians think that the acts, to the exercising of which, with respect to creatures, Divine Providence is limited, are two, preservation and governing, which latter is said to signify both the general concurrence with second causes, Acts 17:25, 26; and the special direction of the action of created things." 1 Kings 18:44; Judges 16:28, 29; Gen. 17:16, 17, 19; Deut. 28:23. From the time of QUEN., it became customary to enumerate three acts of providence. Practically it matters little what division is adopted, yet the latter division has this in its favor, that the manner in which God exercises providence is at once included in the doctrine of providence. It is then declared: 1. That the world cannot exist without God's upholding activity. 2. That God is present in the world in such a manner, that nothing, either great or small, happens without His active co-operation. 3. That He is present in the world in such a manner, in order that He may direct everything in it according to His own purposes." [9] QUEN. (I, 531): "God not only gives and preserves to second causes the power to act, but immediately influences the action and effect of the creature, so that the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the creature, but at the same time by God and the creature, as one and the same total efficiency, viz., by God as the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause." The action of God and the action of man are simultaneous actions. QUEN. (I, 545): "In reality, the influence of God is not one action, and the operation of the creature another; but the action is one and indivisible respecting both, and dependent upon both, upon God as the universal cause, upon the creature as the particular cause. As an act of writing, the same in number, depends upon the hand and the pen, and one part does not depend upon the hand and the other upon the pen, but each part entirely upon the hand and entirely upon the pen; so God's concurrence is not prior to the creature's own action by the priority of causality, since it is, in fact, entirely the same action. Hence God, just as also the second cause, produces the entire effect, which comes to pass by an exterior action of God, inwardly included in the action of the creature, one and the same with it." As scriptural proof, the following passages are cited: Job 10:8; 38:28; Is. 26:12; Phil. 2:13; especially Acts 17:28: "In Him we live and move, and have our being." QUEN. (I, 532): "'We have our being' in God as the one preserving; in Him we move,' i.e., all our actions and movements we perform by His concurrence, so that without His concurrence we can neither raise a finger, nor produce even the least movement." If, thus, every change, effect, or act which comes to pass is ascribed at the same time both to God and to the creature, the Dogmaticians inquire whether we do not encroach upon the doctrine of Providence; or whether, if we maintain the integrity of this doctrine, we do not exclude the co-operation of the creature and all its free movements. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 228) thus states the objection: "If all things are subject to divine government, they either can occur otherwise than God decreed from eternity to govern them or they cannot occur otherwise; if the former, Divine Providence will be deceived; but if the latter, Divine Providence will certainly bring necessity to things foreseen, and, in consequence, all contingency will be removed. But both are absurd; therefore, the universal, and, indeed, effectual, Providence or government of all things will scarcely be able to stand firm." The very purpose of the term contingency is to designate the free movement of the creature. "That," says HUTT. (256), "is defined as contingent which, when it comes to pass, is neither impossible nor necessary, but has a cause which, from its own nature, could act otherwise, such as the human will; or, as others . . . define it, that is contingent which, by its own nature, can either be or not be, which can be constituted either in this or in another manner, or which can happen or not happen, and, before it happens, can be prevented from happening; when, indeed, it does happen, it has a cause which, by its own nature, could act otherwise, and whose contradictory would not be impossible.' As an example . . . the betrayal by Judas was a contingent event, for Judas could have abstained from that crime, and not have betrayed his Master; so that when he actually betrayed Him, there was, nevertheless, in him a cause, which, by its own nature, could have acted otherwise, i.e., it could have restrained him from that deed." The answer to the above objection he then introduces by means of two distinctions (228): "The first distinction is this: Everything mutable and immutable is described in two modes: in one mode, when anything by its own nature, per se, absolutely has been so composed, that it either can or cannot be constituted otherwise; in another mode, when something is either mutable or immutable, not per se, but by way of accident -- not absolutely, but conditionally. As an example: God is immutably good and wise, per se and absolutely. Angels, likewise, are also immutably good and wise, but not per se or absolutely, but by way of accident; in so far as, without doubt, they have already been so confirmed in good as no longer to be able to fall. So, too, as an example of mutability: Adam was mutably good before the Fall, for if he had not been such, he would not have been able to fall; but because he could have remained good if he had wished, this mutability in him is very correctly stated to have existed not absolutely and per se, but only from the condition of his will. Since the Fall, all believers are in like manner mutably good, not absolutely and per se. For in the state of corruption it could not occur otherwise, because their goodness is mutable. The second distinction is of that which is necessary, or, in other words, of necessity. For in our theology . . . there is a twofold necessity constituted, of which the one is absolute or simple, i.e., necessity of consequence (consequentis), or constraint (coactionis), the opposite of which is undoubtedly simply impossible. The other is conditionate, i.e., necessity of the consequent (consequentiae), or conditions. [9] That is absolute by which objects are so constituted that nothing whatever in them can be changed, as are those things which are predicated of the essence of God and His attributes. But that is conditionate by which any object indeed has a cause, on account of which it cannot now be changed or be otherwise constituted, but by its nature, nevertheless, is mutable and could be changed or be constituted altogether differently." Then HUTT. answers the first question, "May Divine Providence be deceived?" as follows: "These two distinctions being presupposed, to the latter member of the disjunctive, the categorical and affirmative answer is given, that those things which have been foreseen by God cannot be otherwise constituted, or, as is the same, they are not mutable, except relatively and with this condition, namely, that these things are constituted immutably, not absolutely or per se, or, in other words, by absolute necessity, but only by accident, or from the condition of the objects foreseen. For God foresaw how everything would be and would result, from its own causes, whether natural or voluntary, and in this respect the Providence of God cannot be deceived. But if from their nature they would have been otherwise, God would have foreseen this also, and thus His Providence would not have been deceived. In this respect it is most correctly denied that things foreseen could be constituted otherwise than as they have been foreseen." The second question, "Does Providence, therefore, bring necessity to the things foreseen, and, as a consequence, is contingency removed?" HUTT. thus answers: "A reply is most correctly made by another distinction. But if, indeed, pure or absolute necessity, or necessitas consequentis, be understood, it is absolutely denied that Providence brings necessity to things foreseen. For thus no place would be left any longer for natural causes, nor any liberty of the human will. Nevertheless, that both are subordinate to the Providence of God, and can exist, together with it, without contradiction, we have clearly demonstrated in the question immediately preceding. But if the other necessity be understood, which is that of condition, or necessitas consequentiae, we very freely concede that things foreseen by God's Providence are in necessary dependence; because, namely, God foresees these things not otherwise than as they would result from their causes, therefore they result also just as God has foreseen them. Nor, on the other hand, does it conflict with that which by way of consequence is inferred; therefore all contingency is removed. For inasmuch as this necessity of consequence belongs to such things as are, by their own nature, mutable, and could be changed and be otherwise constituted, this necessity and contingency can undoubtedly exist at the same time as subordinates, although in a different respect; viz., a necessity, in so far as a thing has a cause, because of which it can no longer be changed or be otherwise constituted, but a contingency, in so far as the thing itself by its own nature so exists that it could be otherwise constituted. Thus, the betrayal of Judas, with respect to Divine Providence, is said to be necessary by necessity of consequence, because God undoubtedly foresaw from eternity that Judas, from intended malice and with fixed purpose, would betray Christ; but contingent, in so far as he was able to resist the wicked desires of his will and not to betray Christ. Nevertheless, if Judas would have resisted the temptation, God would also have foreseen this from eternity, and thus (by his not betraying) the Providence of God could not have been deceived." The proposition, therefore, stands thus: "A contingency of human affairs and actions can exist most surely, without impairing or diminishing the Providence of God, for the reason that this contingency is not opposed to Divine Providence, but is subject or subordinate to it. For, as the Providence of God governs and determines things one and all, so also does it govern and determine contingent actions. For hence it comes to pass that God does not suffer the wicked to rush on whither they would otherwise tend according to their free will, but He fixes limits to the extent to which He will slacken the reins to their lust. Hence, also, God frequently, by the power exercised through His Providence, casts chains and restraints upon the wicked, in order that they may be forced to desist from their undertakings, and altogether abandon the deeds which their unbridled lust would otherwise perpetrate. Esau, the brother of Jacob, who had taken measures to slay his brother, etc., can be given as an example. But even when there is no such hindrance, and God permits those things to occur which the will of the wicked devises, yet there nevertheless shines forth even thence the singular skill of Divine Providence, which derives even thence the means to inflict deserved punishments upon the wicked, and to subvert them, and knows how to change even their worst designs to the advantage and welfare of the godly. Of this, the history of Joseph and that of the passion of Christ supply us with examples most worthy of note." [10] [10] QUEN. (I, 544): "The question in this place is not whether God communicates and preserves to second causes the power to operate, for this mode of concurrence ascribes to God no more than that He preserves the existence of objects and their power to act, which He gave them in the beginning; but the question here is, whether God immediately influences according to the requirement of each, the action, and with the action the effect, as such, of the second causes." QUEN. (I, 544) thus defines the terms causa prima et secunda: "The first cause is that which is entirely independent, but upon it all other things, if there be any, depend; this is God. A second cause is that which recognizes another cause prior to itself, upon which it depends; such are the efficient created causes, which, although they operate through primary and relative virtue, nevertheless depend upon the first cause, as for their existence, so also for their operation. For existence, I say, because without His preservation they could exist in operating not even for a moment, and because without the co-operation of the same they could neither operate nor, in operating, produce their effects." QUEN. (I, 532) justly remarks: "With the divine concurrence with respect to the object there coincide the divine omnipresence, which is an act of Divine Providence, and formally and definitely, viz., in the Biblical sense, denotes both the substantial, illocal, incommunicable, illimitable presence with creatures, which the Scholastics, in the description of the concurrence of God with creature, call the immediatio suppositi, [11] and His efficacious and omnipotent working, which they here call the immediatio virtutis, Gen. 1:2; Ps. 139:7; Jer. 23:23, 24; Wis. 1:6, 7, 8; Acts 17:27, 28; Col. 1:17." [11] QUEN. (I, 531): "The objects of the concurrence are all the actions and effects, as such, of second causes. It is only the general and indeterminate concurrence that is here discussed, i.e., it is here merely in general asserted that no action is accomplished without the co-operation of God; but the character of this concurrence is not here taken into the account. It is, therefore, indeed, readily granted, but not here specially developed, and the concurrence may be a special or gracious concurrence, by which God is present to all believers meditating, writing, and doing holy, honorable, and useful things, by supplying the occasion, inciting, moving, aiding, approving, etc.;' also a most special and extraordinary concurrence, peculiar alone to the holy writers of the Old and New Testaments, which embraces a supernatural and extraordinary illumination of the mind, and likewise a peculiar movement, suggestion, inspiration, impulse, and dictation of the Holy Ghost for writing or speaking such a thing and not something else.'" (Ib. 543.) Thus HOLL. (443) distinguishes also between "natural actions" and "supernatural actions' of man: "Some can be elicited by man in his natural strength; others transcend man's natural strength." The latter he does not here discuss. In relation to the natural acts, however, he remarks: "With natural acts God concurs, indeed, by a general concurrence, but not exclusively; for extraordinarily, under that general influence, there is also a peculiar influence contained, conferring a more intense strength to act and a more powerful movement upon one creature rather than another." [12] QUEN. (I, 545): "With second causes, God concurs according to the need and requirement of each, i.e., when, as often as, and in the manner that, the cause, according to the condition of its nature, demands this concurrence. For God does not change the nature of the agents or the manner and order of their action, but He permits natural agents to act naturally, free agents to act freely. . . . With second causes God concurs according to their nature, by operating conformably to His most sympathetic, universal disposition, freely with the free, necessarily with the necessary, feebly with the feeble, vigorously with the vigorous." HOLL. (444): "With necessary agents God concurs uniformly, e.g., with fire, in order for it to burn, with the sun, in order for it to shine. With free agents God concurs variously, leaving to them their free decision and the free power to choose this or that; for the order that God has once established He does not easily change, Ps. 119:90." [13] The most difficult problem in the science of Theology is that of exhibiting the method of the divine concurrence in the evil actions of men, without at the same time in any wise throwing the blame of the evil upon the first cause, i.e., upon God. The Dogmaticians employ for this purpose the two formulae: "God concurs in producing the effect, not the defect; God concurs as to the materials, not as to the form." The former of these is intended to teach that God has indeed furnished the power through which the action could have become a good one; but that, if on the part of man this has not been employed for such purpose, the blame for that does not fall upon God. The other formula is intended to teach that the power, the ability in itself considered, with which an action can be accomplished, is indeed to be ascribed to the divine co-operation, while the application of it, and the direction which is given to this power, is allotted to human freedom, and is accordingly to be imputed alone to man. One of these formulae we find employed by QUEN., the other by HOLL. QUEN. (I, 545): "We distinguish between the action and the ataxia of the action; between the effect and the defect. The Supreme Being concurs with the actions and the effects, but not with the ataxia of the actions; for, although the universal cause influences the entire action of the particular causes, yet indeed, of the ataxia and evil, as such, if it inhere in an action, there is no other cause than a creature, inasmuch as in acting it departs from its own rule and the order of the First Agent, viz., God, and applies the divine concurrence otherwise than it should. Hence we say in the thesis that God influences the actions and effects, as such, of second causes, i.e., as the actions and effects are, in their entity or essence, to the exclusion of the idea of the defects and faults, which have no entity, and originate from a deficiency of action in the causes. In short, God enters into sinful actions, with respect to their entity and natural form (species naturae), and not with respect to their deformity and moral form (species moris). He also concurs in disgraceful acts, and is inwardly present to them, yet in such a manner as not to be defiled, inasmuch as spiritual substance is liable to pollution no more than is the sun." (HUTT. (234): "God, as the universal cause, affords only this, viz., that you are able to act, but the fact that you act wickedly proceeds from a particular cause, viz., your perverse will.") HOLL. (443): "With the formal anomia or ataxia of actions morally evil, God undoubtedly does not concur by any positive influence, because wickedness is a defect and privation, not proceeding from God the Most Perfect, in whom no defect can occur, but from a human will failing in its action. But God concurs with the remote, not with the proximate material of actions morally evil. The former is an indeterminate act; the latter is an act determinate and applied to a prohibited thing. When, for example, Eve extended her hand to the forbidden fruit, two acts were present: (1) the extension of the hand; (2) the extension applied to the forbidden fruit. The former act is said to be the remote material; the latter, the proximate material. With the latter, God does not concur, because His concurrence is general and indeterminate; and, therefore, the determination to this or that object is not from God as from the first and universal cause, but from the second and particular cause." With respect to the concurrence of God with actions morally good, HOLL. (443) distinguishes between the physical and moral concurrence. "Physically (God) affords a general concurrence with moral actions, by sustaining strength of mind and body, adapted to act. Morally, He concurs, by commanding and promising." [14] HOLL. (443): "God concurs with the actions of creatures by the immediateness of His power and being. He concurs by the immediateness of His being (immediatione suppositi), because God, by His substance, is especially near to creatures operating, inasmuch as He fills all in all. Jer. 23:24. He concurs, also, by the immediateness of His power (immediatione virtutis), by His efficacious influence on the action of the creature, and by immediately and proximately affecting the result, in that He worketh all in all.' 1 Cor. 12:6. A person is said to act immediately, either exclusively or inclusively. Exclusively, when he acts alone; inclusively, when any one attains proximately an action and result by the cooperation of others with him. God's immediate influence upon the actions of creatures is not exclusive, as though creatures were excluded from the action, or were inoperative. Every creature does its own part: but God, together with the creatures acting, affects the action and result immediately and proximately by His own influence." [15] HOLL. (445): "Those who teach a previous concurrence, are guilty of a contradiction with respect to what succeeds. For if God concur, He does not precur; if He co-operate, He does not pre-operate. A premotion is an antecedent act; but concurrence is not antecedent, but occurs when the action itself is produced. If divine concurrence were to predetermine free agents to action, they would act necessarily, not freely." QUEN. (I, 544): "Second causes or agents, whether natural or free, have not, for the eliciting of an action, the need to be excited by a previous impulse, in the manner in which a pick, a hammer, or an axe receives a previous motion from the workman, as they either have a power for operating that is peculiar to themselves and innate, as fire, or they are the power itself of action, as heat; yea, if created things could in no way exert themselves without that previous excitation, it would follow that their will is excited also to vicious actions." [16] QUEN. (I, 533): "Governing is an act of Divine Providence, by which God symmetrically arranges each and every creature, in its peculiar strength, actions, and suffering, to the glory of the Creator and the good of this universe, and especially to the salvation of the godly." [17] CALOV. (III, 1196): "As Preservation is most particularly occupied with the essences, strength, and faculties of men, and of other objects, especially those that are permanent, so Governing is occupied pre-eminently with the actions and sufferings of all men and things. . . . But this governing is not only universal, but extends also to the individual actions, and moderates and directs them all. Prov. 24:12; Jer. 16:9." The difference between the Christian and the ante-Christian doctrine of Providence is stated by CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 129) as follows: "It is well known of what nature the dogma of Epicurus was, who altogether did away with Providence, viz., that God, who is supremely happy, is not affected with the care of governing inferior things, because such an occupation would interfere with His happiness, and would not be worthy of His divine excellence. Therefore, he concedes that in second causes there is a certain strength, according to which, when an application of an agent to that which is passive occurs, an action and change ensue; but he denies that this action is controlled and governed by God. Yea, he says that God does not care; but, just as atoms floating in the sun are turned about without order, and by chance, so that the same atom which has been before in the upper part is now in the middle, and afterwhile will be at the bottom, if the chance should so carry it, so Epicurus imagines that second causes fluctuate, by chance and without order, and that results are indeed produced from the application of sufficient causes, but says that the application itself of the causes does not occur by means of the government and control of God, but as the chance may have happened." The Christian doctrine of Providence, therefore, excludes every conception of a blind necessity as well as of a mere chance. HOLL. (437): "We are not to maintain a stoical fate, by which all things occur from absolute and inevitable necessity; nor the more rigid astrological fate, [12] by which even the free acts of the human will depend upon the influence of the stars, and are determined thereby." But he nevertheless admits "a Christian fate, which is the necessary connection of causes and effects, of extrinsic necessity, in so far as it has been infallibly foreknown by God, established by an absolute or conditionate decree, and governed by divine direction agreeably disposing it." In Christian fate there is therefore admitted a necessary connection of cause and effect, but one of such a character that the influence of God upon the effect that is to be produced is not thereby excluded. (Id. 440): "Fortune, which is an accidental event, accompanying a result intended by a cause acting freely, does not exist with respect to the omniscient and most wise God (Wis. 14:3), but only with respect to ignorant man." [18] QUEN. (I, 533): "Permission is an act of governing Providence, by which God does not employ hindrances which no finite agent can overcome, or knows how to overcome, in order to restrain rational creatures, inclining of their own accord to sin, from an evil forbidden by the Law, but, for just reasons, permits them to rush into sins, Ps. 81:12; Acts 14:16; Rom. 1:24, 28." HOLL. (449): "Divine permission is not (1) kind indulgence, as though God simply does not care when men commit crimes; nor is it (2) a mitigation of the Law, as if to grant men license to sin; nor (3) is it weakness in God, or a defect of knowledge, as though He willed or approved evil, or a defect of power, as though He could not check sin; nor (4) does it make God an unconcerned witness of sins, who neither forbids sins, nor fixes a limit to wickedness, nor restrains crimes by punishment. But it is (5) a negative act, consisting of the denial or suspension of an insuperable hindrance. God, indeed, could check or restrain the sinner by means of the interposition of a forcible or insuperable obstacle; but the most holy Divinity has the very best reasons for permitting sin. Meanwhile (God), by a legal impediment, restrains the will of man sinning, and continually invites the sinner to repentance by exhibiting rewards and penalties." Also the following discriminations. QUEN. (I, 533): "God indeed permits, but He does not will, that which is permitted, which occurs not, indeed, while God absolutely wills that it should not be, i.e., while He restrains and hinders, yet, nevertheless, while He does not will it, Ps. 5:4; 1 John 3:8. God's not hindering is not willing, but is His permitting, and, at the same time, also, His being averse to, those things which He permits, in so far as they seriously displease Him." GRH. (IV, 88): "God does not will sin, and yet does not prevent it, which is permission. But, although He may permit sin willingly and not reluctantly, nevertheless His permission and His will have respect to diverse objects; the permission is occupied with the sin itself, but the will with the useful end, which God, in His wisdom, knows how to bring forth from it." [19] QUEN. (I, 534): "Hindrance is an act of governing Providence, by which God limits the action of creatures according to His judgment, so that they do not produce the result, which otherwise they would effect, either by a natural or a free power to act." [20] QUEN. (I, 534): "Direction is an act of governing Providence, by which God so regulates the good actions of creatures, that they tend and are led to the object intended by God (Acts 4:28), but directs the evil actions to a certain end prescribed by Himself, yet not considered by those who sin, and frequently contrary to their intention. Thus 1 Sam 9:17; 10:21; Gen. 37:7; 50:20." [21] QUEN. (I, 534): "Determination is an act of governing Providence, by which God has appointed to the strength, actions, and sufferings of creatures, certain limits within which they are restrained, both with respect to time and with respect to greatness and degree, Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 124:2." [22] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 127): "Although the Providence of God extends to all creatures, yet it has its grades. For it is especially intrusted with the government of the human race, 1 Cor. 9:9; Matt. 10:31; Rom. 8:20. In the second place, although the Providence of God maketh the sun to rise, and sendeth rain upon the just and unjust, nevertheless there is a peculiar and preeminent relation of a special Providence towards those who are members of the Church, 1 Tim. 4:10; Ps. 33:13, 18, 19; 100:3." BR. (308): "Divine Providence has also, with respect to the acts towards which it is directed, its own grades, and, above other creatures, relates to men, but, in the human race, especially to believers, Rom. 8:28." Hence the division "into general and special Providence. The former is that by which God preserves and governs the entire earth, and whatever is contained in its circuit. The latter is that by which God most kindly regards, most tenderly cherishes, and most agreeably rules both the Church Militant, or the assembly of believing men, and the Church Triumphant, or the choir of angels and elect men." HOLL. (448). QUEN. (I, 529) distinguishes between the general and the special object of Providence. The general object consists of all things in general which exist, Heb. 1:3; Wis. 8:1; 12:13, 15. The special object is partly primary, and partly secondary. The primary object consists of angels and men, and, indeed, all of these in general, Acts 17:28; Matt. 5:45 (p. 530). Its object, in the most special sense, consists of godly and believing men, Deut. 32:9: Ps. 4:3; 33:18; 37:18, 25; 73:24; 77:20; 91:11; Heb. 1:14; Matt. 10:31. All other created things, without even the least exception, are secondary objects. Deut. 25:4; 1 Cor. 9:9; Job 39:1; Ps. 147:9; Prov. 6:8; Matt. 6:30; 8:31; 10:29, 30; Luke 12:6. As man is the centre of the entire creation, and thus also of Divine Providence, the Dogmaticians discuss at length the relation in which Providence stands to the origin, the progress, and the end of human life. QUEN. (I, 529): "God controls the life of men partly in its entrance, by forming and preserving men in the maternal womb (Job 10:3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Ps. 139:13, 15, 16; Acts 17:25); and by bringing them forth from the womb (Job 10:18; Ps. 22:9, 10; 71:6); partly in its progress (Deut. 30:20; Job 10: 12; Ps. 56:8; 37:23, 24; Job 34:21; Prov. 16:3; 21:1; Ps. 139:2; Matt. 6:25; 10:30); partly in its termination (Job 24:5), so that the appointed course of life is either attained (Gen. 47:29; 2 Sam. 7:12), or shortened (Ps. 55:23), or prolonged (Isa. 38:5), or doubles (renewed after death) (1 Kings 17:22; 2 Kings 13:21; Matt. 9:25; Luke 7:15; John 11:44; Acts 9:40; 20;12)." Concerning (1) HOLL. (427): The entrance of human life embraces both its formation and preservation in the womb of the mother, and its being brought forth from the womb." Thereupon BR. remarks (309): "For this reason it is correctly stated that God has respect not only to the universal, but also to the particular cause, and supplies the defect of second causes, or, at least, directs and governs them in acting. This, indeed, some explain so as to affirm, on the one hand, that when the wonderful variety, and connection, and structure of the members of the body are considered, an efficient particular cause acting with knowledge is required; and, therefore, that another and more sublime virtue than that which is in the seed (commonly called dunamis plastike), and which cannot be conceived of unless as belonging to God Himself, concurs with a special influence. On the other hand, also, when the immateriality of the soul is considered, and the fact, therefore, that it must be produced independently of the subject, or from nothing; and that such a production demands an infinite power of action, and is, therefore, peculiar to God alone; they infer that, for the production of the human soul, God affords a special and determinate influence. But others, although they believe that the human body and soul are alike produced by the parents themselves as second causes, with the concurrence of God as the universal cause, nevertheless regard the acts of protection afforded in the production and the birth of man, against various calamities and dangers, as many eminent proofs of peculiar divine care and favor; in addition to universal, they ascribe to God also a special or particular concurrence, and refer thither the passage, Job 10:8-11." Concerning (2) HOLL. (427): "God controls the progress of life, by granting the means of supporting life, Ps. 145:16; directing our steps, i.e., by leading our designs, which have been begun and performed, to their desired results, Ps. 37:23; by bringing to nought the snares or repelling the open violence of enemies, Ps. 3:7, 8; by fitting and calling us to a certain mode of life, Jer. 1:5-7." Concerning (3) BR. (312): "Divine Providence respects the termination of human life, not only so far as by a common law there is given to every one his own constitution, by virtue of which he can, with the general concurrence of God, attain a certain space of life (the natural limit of life, Ps. 90:10); but also as to some men life is prolonged beyond that boundary (2 Kings 20:1, 6) to which they would come by the strength of nature: others the end of life threatens sooner (Ps. 55:23; 102:24) than it should according to the course of nature (terminus abbreviabilis)." (Id. 313): "Divine providence, moreover, changes the natural limit of human life (the preternatural or hyperphysical limit of life), both with respect to the godly (the limit of grace), and with respect to wicked men (the limit of wrath)." (Id. 314): "To the godly God prolongs life, either as a reward of their obedience (Ex. 20:12; Prov. 3:1, 2; 4:10), or for the public good (2 Cor. 1:8; Phil. 2:27, 30). To the same class He shortens life, partly to prevent them from being corrupted by the wicked examples of others (Wis. 4:10, 11), partly that they may not see the coming evils, and be distressed (2 Chron. 34:28; Is. 26:20; 57:2)." "God, by a just judgment prematurely breaks the thread of life of the wicked, when He either Himself sends deadly disease or death upon them (Deut. 28:21, 22; Gen. 38:7, 10; 1 Sam. 25:38; Jer. 28:15, 16), or gives the command to inflict death (Gen. 9:6; Ex. 21:12, 14; 22:18; Lev. 18 and 20), or allows them to suffer disease or suffer violent death by intemperance (2 Kings 8:15), or other crimes (2 Sam. 18:14; 17:23)." (Id. 315): "And thus it is also evident, that it is not absolutely necessary that every man should die at that very time, and by that kind of death by which he does die; or, in other words, that this has not been absolutely and immutably decreed by God, apart from or previous to any regard to causes or circumstances to be found outside of God. For, otherwise, the prayers and vows of the godly, and divine promises and threatenings, would be vain. The hyperphysical or divine limit is always hypothetical, including the condition of piety or impiety, or of the contempt of means." [23] CHMN. (Loc Th., I, 128): "That God has not been bound to second causes in such a manner as to do nothing else than as second causes excite Him, but that, beyond the customary order of second causes, and contrary to the common course of nature, He wills and is able to aid the Church, and to punish the wicked, so as either to hinder, change, mitigate, or intensify second causes." QUEN. (I, 535): "Providence is extraordinary when God operates either without means, or beyond or above means, or contrary to means and their nature, or, what is the same, above and beyond the order instituted by Himself, e.g., Ex. 34:28; 1 Kings 19:8; Is. 38:8; 2 Kings 6:6, etc. (all miracles are effects of the extraordinary providence of God). Providence is ordinary where God carries on His works through ordinary means, viz., through the established and accustomed course of nature." [24] HOLL. (448): "Providence with reference to good, is that which by preservation maintains, by co-operation promotes, and by governing directs the good of creatures to the praise of the divine glory. Providence with reference to evil, is that by which God is occupied with moral evil, not as an indifferent observer, but as the most just Judge, and, therefore, by acts preceding, attending, and following sin, exercises justice tempered by grace." In the discrimination here made, the different relation in which God stands to the good and the evil is explained essentially in the same manner as in the doctrine of the divine government (comp. notes 18-21). The difference consists only in this, that here the more general conception of Providence is assumed, which embraces both government and preservation. As acts of Providence preceding sin, HOLL. (448-450) has enumerated: "Foresight, aversion to the sin foreseen, and hindering." As acts attending: "Support of the nature acting wickedly, concurrence with the remote material of a vicious action, permission of the ataxia adhering to the sinful action, limiting determination of the sin, direction to a good end." As acts following: "Imposing of the divine penalties, Isa. 34:8, remission of sins." [25] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 125): "Providence is a general action of God, by which He is present with His creature, sustaining and preserving it, as long as He wishes it to be preserved, and preserves the order of His work appointed by Himself, not by any fatal necessity, but as a most free agent; so that, for the sake of men, He controls all things, and moderates, changes, and hinders many things with respect to second causes." GRH. (IV, 136) thus summarily states the whole doctrine of Providence: "The action of Divine Providence is either eternal, viz., prognosis kai prothesis, or of time, viz., the preservation and governing of things created; and this, too, either ordinary, through means, or extraordinary, without means, or contrary to means. Both are occupied with all things, especially with human nature, in the preservation and governing of which the life and actions of men come forth. Either the entrance, or the progress, or the termination of life, is regarded. Some actions are good, and that, too, either civilly or spiritually; others are evil. How the action of Divine Providence concurs in all these, we have explained by certain aphorisms." __________________________________________________________________ [8] ["Action and act are not synonymous. Act does not necessarily imply an external result, action does. We may speak of repentance as an act; we could not call it an action." -- Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy.] [9] ["The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of necessity, necessitas consequentiae, and another, necessitas consequentis. The former is an ideal or formal necessity, the inevitable dependence of one thought upon another by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a real or material necessity, the inevitable dependence of one thing upon another because of its own nature. The former is a logical necessity, common to all legitimate consequence, whatever be the material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical necessity, . . . wholly dependent upon the modality of the consequent." (Sir William Hamilton's Discussions, etc., p.144.)] [10] [Compare a chapter from Gerhard, translated in Evangelical Review, vol. xviii. 310.] [11] [See list of Scholastico-Dogmatic terms in Appendix, under Subsistentia.] [12] ["Astrological fate is either the more rigid or the milder . . . The milder is that which occurs without impairing human liberty." (HOLL., 443.) -- TR.] __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER V. OF ANGELS. [13] __________________________________________________________________ § 22. When were they created? CERTAINTY in regard to the existence of angels we attain only through revelation; for reason can at best make their existence only possible or probable. [1] They are, indeed, not referred to in the history of the creation; nevertheless we know that they are beings created by God, and we have reason to believe that they were not created before, nor after, but within the six days of creation; yet we know nothing further as to the day upon which they were created. [2] The Holy Scriptures furnish us with more specific information, both in regard to the nature of the angels and their moral condition. I. THE NATURE OF ANGELS. The Holy Scriptures represent the angels as, indeed, finite, because created, but intelligent and spiritual, therefore incorporeal beings, which, without needing a body, nevertheless have a personal subsistence. (QUEN. I, 444): "The angels are spiritual substances (Ps. 104:4; Heb. 1:14), i.e., without any bodily form (whether gross or refined), finite, complete, and thus real persons [hypostases]. [3] Angels are, further, intelligent substances, and very capable of becoming well acquainted both with themselves and with other things." They were originally created by God in order to promote His glory and to serve Him. [4] From this description of their nature, and of the design of their creation, as given in the Holy Scriptures, there follows the series of attributes which we are to ascribe to them, and whereby we become better acquainted with their nature. [5] From the nature of angels as spiritual beings, there follow: 1. The attributes of indivisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, eternal duration, illocality, definitive ubiety, and agility. For purely spiritual beings can neither be divisible nor visible (indivisibilitas -- invisibilitas); [6] not physically changeable, for only that which is material is subject to such a physical alteration and development (immutabilitas); [7] not mortal, for only that which is corporeal is perishable; they, however, in duration are imperishable (immortalitas -- duratio aeviterna.) [8] Further, they are not present at any particular place in such a manner as to occupy there a portion of space; and yet they are not everywhere present as God is, but are always present only at one particular place, yet in such a manner that they can be at any place they may choose, even the smallest, because they have no body that can occupy space (illocalitas -- ubietas definitiva). [9] Finally, as they are not restricted in their movements by space and time, they can move with amazing celerity (agilitas). [10] 2. As intelligent beings, the angels possess the attributes of knowledge and freedom of the will, and, in view of the service for which they are designed, the attribute of power. God has therefore bestowed upon them reason, [11] and free will, [12] and great, though not unlimited, might and power. [13] II. THE MORAL CONDITION OF THE ANGELS. The Holy Scriptures divide angels into good and evil, assuming thus a difference in their moral condition. This could not, however, have existed from the beginning; for, as everything that at the creation proceeded from the hand of God was good, the angels must have been good also; at that time, therefore, we must assume that the moral condition of all of them was equally good. The difference in this respect must have arisen subsequently. We must distinguish, therefore, the original condition and that which was consequent upon this (status originalis et originalem secutus). The original condition was one in which all the angels were equally good, righteous, and holy, endowed by God with wisdom and with the ability perfectly to perform the will of God, [14] yet with such freedom of the will, also, that the possibility of disobedience towards God and of apostasy was not excluded. [15] With these gracious gifts the angels were endowed by God, in order that by the proper use of the same they might attain to the end for which they were created, namely, the beatific sight and enjoyment of God; the original condition is therefore called the state of grace. [16] As, however, some of the angels made a bad use of the liberty that had been granted to them, the original condition ceased, and there arose that difference of moral condition in consequence of which the angels became divided into two classes, the good and the evil, the former entering into the state of glory, and the latter into the state of misery. [17] A. THE GOOD ANGELS. From the time when the angels separated into two classes, a change took place also in those who did not become disobedient towards God. For, because they remained faithful to God and true to that which is good, they have, as a reward for this, been so confirmed in that which is good that they can no longer be in danger of falling, and that even the possibility of their sinning no longer exists. BR. (267): "Those are called good (angels) who have persevered in the goodness or righteousness and holiness in which they were created, and have been confirmed by God in that which is good, as a gracious reward for their obedience, so that they can no longer lose this goodness, or sin, or become evil." [18] Thus the good angels have, at the same time, reached the goal for which they were originally created by God, for they have attained to the enjoyment of beholding God, and so have entered upon the state of glory. [19] The enlargement of all the powers originally bestowed upon them is merely a consequence of this condition. [20] If they were wise before (in the state of grace), they are now still more so, because they now see God; [21] if they were holy before, they are now still more so, in such a sense that there is not now even a possibility of their sinning. Their liberty is, however, not hereby lessened, but increased, for they do right not by compulsion, but from an inner free impulse. [22] And so, too, their power has been magnified; for they are now able to overcome the evil angels who were formerly as mighty as they. [23] The employment of good angels consists (a) in worshiping God and (b) serving Him in the world by protecting and watching over the pious, as well as by punishing and restraining the wicked. QUEN. (I, 450): "The duties and works of the good angels are to worship and praise God, Ps. 103:20; 148:2; Is. 6:3; and to execute His commands, Dan. 7:10; as well by punishing the wicked, Gen. 19:13; 2 Kings 19:35, as by guarding and protecting the godly, Ps. 34:7; 91:11, 12; Heb. 1:14." [24] For these services, which they render to men, they deserve our gratitude, but ever species of worship or adoration addressed to them is wicked and superstitious. [25] The Scriptures give us some intimation of a diversity of rank among the angels, without, however, giving any specific information on the subject. [26] B. THE EVIL ANGELS. They are thus designated on account of their disobedience toward God, and the evil disposition remaining in them since the Fall. [27] HOLL. (396): "The evil angels are those who did not persevere in concreated wisdom and righteousness, but of their own free will turned away from God and the rule of right, and became the perpetual enemies of God and men, to be plagued with eternal torments." In what this disobedience toward God consisted, cannot with certainty be learned from the Scriptures, but it is highly probable that pride was the sin through which they fell away from God. [28] The cause for this sin lay entirely in their will, with which they of their own accord turned away from God, and it was in no sense owing to any outward necessity or any defect in their nature. [29] How many of them thus apostatized from God, at what time, and whether all at once -- concerning all this we have no certain information in the Scriptures. We know only this, that their apostasy preceded the fall of man, and that one evil angel stands at their head, as their leader and chief. [30] As, however, the obedience of the good angels was followed by a reward, so the fall of the wicked angels was followed by a punishment on the part of God, namely this, that those who once apostatized from God remained forever rejected by Him, and accordingly have been transferred from the state of grace in which they hitherto stood, into a condition of the greatest misery (status miseriae); but they have to expect still heavier punishments at the judgment day. [31] And as, in the case of the good angels, their transfer into the state of glory was followed by an enlargement of the powers originally conferred upon them, so the transfer of the wicked angels was likewise followed by a diminution of the powers originally conferred. They retain, indeed, those gifts and powers that are inseparable from their nature, but their knowledge is no longer, as in the state of grace, a source of blessing, but greatly obscured, and hence they think perversely about God and divine things. [32] But the wicked angels make it their work to detract to the utmost from the glory of God and to hinder men in their attempts to secure their temporal and eternal welfare. [33] Yet they cannot, even in this way, with all their malice, entirely avoid serving God, for He makes use of them to punish the wicked and to chasten the godly for their own good. [34] Definition. -- QUEN. (I, 455): "Angels are finite spirits, complete, intelligent, endowed with great power and originally created by God in righteousness and holiness, for the glory of God and the service of man; of whom some by their own free will fell from their Creator and from concreated perfection, and were consequently deprived not only of the favor and felicity which they had, but also of the beatific vision of God which they might have been able to enjoy, and were cast into infernal fire for perpetual torment without any hope of pardon. The rest, however, continued in their original condition, and were so established by God in that which is good that they neither wish nor are able ever to lose it or fall away from it, and are enjoying God eternally." [1] QUEN. (I, 443): "That angels really exist is taught both by express declarations of Scripture, Ps. 104:4; Heb. 1:14, and by the description of various apparitions, Gen. 18:2; 19:1, sq. The existence of angels is demonstrated, not so much by probable arguments derived from philosophy, whether by the graduation of existences and the link needed for the completion of the universe (because there are creatures (1) merely corporeal, such as stars, stones, etc.; (2) partly corporeal and partly spiritual, as man; (3) purely spiritual, as angels), or by human testimony, or by various experiences, as by one indisputable argument, namely, the clear and oft-repeated assertion of the Scriptures." BR. (251): "It is scarcely possible that the existence of angels can be clearly demonstrated from the light of nature, although probable reasons may be assigned for it." As to the meaning of the word, QUEN. (I, 442): "The name angel does not describe the nature of the being, but its office, and signifies one sent, a legate, a messenger. Hence Augustine: Do you ask for the name of their nature? It is spirit. Do you inquire concerning the name of their office? It is angel.' The word angel etymologically signifies messenger. But by the universally received usage and style of Scripture language it designates a nature and a specific creature." Yet because the word is originally nothing more than a designation of office, it is used in the Scriptures with reference also to the Son of God, as the uncreated Angel. Is. 63:9; Mal. 3:1; Gen. 48:16, seq. Also with reference to men, Mal. 2:7; Rev. 1:20; Mal. 3:1; Mark 1:2; Matt. 11:10; Luke 7:27. [2] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 122): "Since Moses does not describe the creation of angels, many curious inquiries have arisen, as, e.g., When were they created? . . . But, as the Scriptures do not state the precise time and day of the creation of angels, we gladly remain in ignorance of that which we neither can nor ought to know. It is enough, therefore, for us to know (1) that the angels did not come into existence of their own accord, nor were begotten from the substance of God, but were created; (2) that the angels did not exist from eternity, nor indeed before that beginning when all things which are in heaven and earth, visible and invisible, began to be. For to have been in the beginning can be said of Him alone through whom all things were made, and who is eternal. John 1:1-3." QUEN. (I, 459): "The angels were created by God (Col. 1:16; Ps. 104:4; 103:20) in time, along with this visible world, or within the period of the original six days; but on what day or at what time they were produced, we confess that we are willingly ignorant." The proof is thus stated by Br. (252): "They were not created before the heavens and the earth, for these were created in the beginning, and so were the first among all created things; see Gen. 1:1. And besides it is well known that the eternity of God is described by His existing before the foundation of the world. See Ps. 90:2; Is. 48:13. Moreover, they were created not after but within the six days, for after that interval God rested from the ordinary work of creation. That the angels were created before man is usually proved from Job 38:7. And some believe that we are to understand also from this passage that the angels were created upon the first day; namely, because when God founded the earth then the angels are said to have praised God. But these matters are not altogether clear; although we do not deny that the angels are intended by the term sons of God' in chapter 1, v. 6, and we say that their beginning was contemporaneous with the origin of other creatures. Perhaps, also, as we know that man was created after the other creatures that were intended for his advantage, so also it may be correctly inferred that the angels who were to minister unto man (according to Heb. 1:14) were created before man. Yet it is not necessary that we understand the angels to be intended by the term heaven or light, in Gen. 1, metaphorically interpreted." [3] The angels are called "complete substances, or substances subsisting per se," because they do not need a body in order that in conjunction with it they may constitute a person. HOLL. (378): "The human soul is an incomplete spirit, designed in itself and by its very nature to enter into the composition of an entire man. Hence also a separated soul has a natural propensity and inclination towards a body, with which as a component part it constitutes a complete man; but angels are not naturally designed to constitute a unit in themselves, along with a component part, but they have an essence terminating in itself. Wherefore the soul is an incomplete spirit, and angels are complete spirits." Thus the following distinction can be made between angels and men, that the former are complete spirits and the latter incomplete spirits; while the difference between God and the angels is, that He is an uncreated and infinite spirit, while they are created and finite spirits. BR. (254): "As the angels have a spiritual essence in common with God and the human soul, so they differ from God in that their essence is not infinite, but finite, and from the soul of man in that their substance is complete." The proof that angels are complete substances is drawn by QUEN. (I, 444): "(1) From their names, for they are called guardians, Dan. 6:22; principalities, powers, Col. 1:16; gods, Ps. 82:6; sons of God, Job 2:1; men of God, Judges 13:6. (2) From their personal actions, such as to minister, to stand before the Lord, to appear, to speak, etc., which surely cannot be attributed to the inspired movements of men or to the mere actions of God. (3) From the fall or ruin of some angels, and the perseverance of the good ones in the truth. (4) From what is ascribed to them, viz., knowledge, desire, power." From proof is regarded by the Dogmaticians as highly important, over against those who deny the personality of the angels. QUEN. (I, 444): "This ground is to be held against the Sadducees of old, who thought that angels were certain movements or affections excited in men; also against the Anabaptists, who foolishly imagined that angels were merely the actions of God, punishing crimes or rewarding good deeds; also against David George, the heresiarch of the last century, who confounded angels with the thoughts of the human mind." [4] CAL. (IV, 23): "The purpose for which angels were created was, with respect to God, His praise and the execution of the divine will (Job 38:7; Ps. 103:20; 104:4); with respect to themselves, the eternal enjoyment of God; with respect to man, service, for which they were specially and divinely destined, inasmuch as God created all things for man, and made the angels His servants at their very creation, Ps. 104, in order to use their ministry especially, for man and his salvation. Heb. 1:14." [5] The most of the Dogmaticians divide the attributes of angels into negative and affirmative. As the former class, they enumerate indivisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, illocality. As the latter, knowledge, freedom of the will, power, eternal duration, definitive ubiety, agility. Instead of following this merely external method of arrangement, we prefer treating these attributes, after the example of CAL., BR., and others, in the order corresponding to the nature of angels; but we enumerate them, nevertheless, after QUEN. and HOLL., as they are less extensively treated by CAL. and BR. [6] QUEN. (I, 445): "The indivisibility of an angelic substance is owing to its incorporeity or immateriality, for what is not made of matter, is no quantity, nor has it parts outside of parts, and consequently is not divisible into quantitative parts." Id. (I, 446): "Invisibility is a consequence of spirituality; for a spirit cannot be seen by bodily eyes, hence also the angels are enumerated among invisible beings (aorata). Col 1:16." [7] The immutability of angels is restricted, as one that is not such absolutely, but comparatively and relatively. HOLL. (382): "God alone is absolutely immutable, the angels are immutable only relatively; because they are not subject to physical mutations, which are peculiar to natural bodies. For the angels do not beget, nor are they begotten; they are neither increased nor diminished; they neither grow old, nor decay; nor do they proceed upon foot from one place to another. Yet they are not beyond the reach of every kind of change, for they vary the where of their presence (suum ubi), they rejoice, are sad, love, or hate; these are moral changes." [8] (a) When immortality is ascribed to angels, this is intended to express that there is nothing in them, as incorporeal beings, who for this reason are not subject to change or decay, that could occasion their death; but it is not meant thereby to deny that God has power over their life also. CAL. (IV, 24): "Although they may be remanded again into nothing by God, through His absolute power, by whom they were created from nothing, and may thus be called corruptible, as God alone is incorruptible, and as He alone has immortality, 1 Tim. 6:16; yet they are free from physical corruption, nor have they any internal principles of corruption, because they are altogether destitute of matter, and so by nature are incorruptible and immortal." HOLL. expresses this by means of the distinction between incorruptibility in a physical and in a metaphysical sense: "Inwardly (ab intra), they are physically incorruptible, because they have not in themselves an internal principle of change or corruption, which is matter. Nor has any physical body such power as to corrupt a spirit or an angel outwardly (ab extra). But if corruptible be used in a metaphysical sense, of something that can be reduced to nothing by absolute divine power, then the angels are corruptible, because if God would so command they could return to the nothing from which they arose." Wherefore, other Dogmaticians suggest, instead of the term corruptibility, the expression annihilability. Further, the angels do not possess the principle of immortality of themselves, but it has been graciously given to them by God; whence HOLL. (382) thus further distinguishes: "The angels are immortal and incorruptible not independently, originally, and in consequence of an eternal essence, for thus God alone is immortal; but they are immortal dependently, participatively, and through the grace of God, who creates and preserves them." (b) QUEN. (I, 446): "Endless duration is attributed to angels, as the mean between eternity and time. Eternity is that which belongs to God alone, and is without beginning or end. Time, which belongs to corporeal creatures, has both beginning and end. But endless duration has a beginning, yet is without end." CAL. (IV, 28): "The created duration of things indestructible in their nature is distinguished from time, and is called endless duration [sempiternity] (aevum) by philosophers." Endless duration then practically expresses no more than immortality; the difference seems to consist only in this, that the same conception, viz., that of continuing forever, is deduced in the one case by the negation of matter, and in the other by the negation of time. The angels are immortal, for they have no matter which is subject to change or decay; they are imperishable as to their duration, for their existence is not measured by time. [9] The angels, as incorporeal beings, occupy no space, and hence are illocal. QUEN. (I, 446): "The angels are not in a place by circumscription, as natural bodies, because they are spirits, but they rather co-exist with a corporeal place or with a body." Yet they are not omnipresent, but always present only at a particular place. This latter idea is expressed by the attribute of alicubitas (being somewhere). QUEN. (I, 446): "There is attributed to them pou or ubi (a somewhere), in which an angel definitively is. For angels are in a certain space by designation, or definitively, i.e., their substantial, not merely virtual, presence is limited (definitur) in a certain space, so that they are there, and not in other spaces, and much less everywhere; and, because an angel is devoid of parts, the whole angel is not only in the whole place, but the whole angel can exist in every part of the place, even the very least, yea, in a point." The manner in which the being somewhere (das Irgendwosein) is predicated of angels, of God, or of physical bodies, is described by the following distinctions: Of the angels, it is said that "they are somewhere definitively (in ubi definitivo), since they at their own pleasure limit a certain space for themselves, in the whole of which they wholly are, and wholly in each part of the space, because their essence is indivisible." Of God, it is said that "He is somewhere repletively (in ubi repletivo), since He fills all in all." Of physical bodies, it is said that "they are somewhere circumscriptively or occupatively (in ubi circumscriptivo seu occupativo), because they occupy a space commensurate with themselves, and are circumscribed by the surrounding air." HOLL. (384): "But the angels are not somewhere repletively, because they are not everywhere, like God; nor are they somewhere occupatively since they do not occupy a space commensurate with the peculiarity of their spiritual nature. For measure depends upon quantity, and an angel is devoid of that." [10] HOLL. (384): "Wonderful is the agility and velocity of angels, so that without local motion, which is a quality of bodies, and thus also without a succession of parts, which they do not have, they are able to change the where of their presence with extreme celerity. Yet it does not appear that angels are entirely devoid of motion, since they are sometimes here and sometimes elsewhere. And, although the motion of angels is extremely rapid, yet it is not instantaneous, because space, in which they move, is extended and continuous, and cannot be traversed by any creature in an instant. [11] "That the knowledge of angels is great and superior to that of all men, because joined with the knowledge of the Son of God; and yet that it is not infinite, since they are ignorant of the day of judgment," is deduced from 2 Sam. 14:20; Mark 13:32. In imitation of the Scholastics, some of the Dogmaticians attempt more particularly to describe the kind and the measure of the knowledge possessed by the angels. Thus QUEN. (I, 445): "The angels do not know all things at once by one intellection, but as distinct and through different conceptions; not merely by a simple apprehension, but also by synthesis and analysis; and also by reasoning and inferring one thing from another. They know God, but they do not comprehend Him, because of the infinity of the divine essence, and the finitude of the angelic intellect." (BR. (255, 256): "They know God only abstractively, i.e., a posteriori, and from created things: yet more perfectly than our abstractive knowledge.) "They know the thoughts of men, not a priori and distinctly, but a posteriori and confusedly, by signs, effects, and mental conditions. As to future contingencies, they can infer future events by the consideration of causes, and this with the greatest quickness, yet only with probability and in the main." The knowledge of angels is described as "a natural knowledge, which is common to both good and evil angels on account of their identity of nature; a revealed knowledge, which was common to them all before the fall of some of them; a beatific knowledge, which belongs only to the angels that are confirmed in that which is good." (BR. (255).) Many of the Dogmaticians, however, refrain from all specific distinctions in regard to the kind and the degree of this knowledge. GRH. (IV, 22): "For what can we, mere worms creeping upon the earth, assert, in this darkness of our mind, concerning the understanding of the celestial spirits, when we cannot so much as exactly comprehend our own understanding? It is better therefore to render devout thanks to God for the ministry of angels, which He daily grants us, than curiously to scrutinize beyond the limits of the Word these mysteries and unrevealed matters." [12] HOLL. (382): "The will accompanies the intellect; liberty accompanies the will. The angelic will is free, as well with respect to immanent acts, of choosing or refusing this or that object, as with respect to different external effects, while it freely does now this, now that." [13] HOLL. (382): "The power of angels is great, but finite. (1) It is great, for they are called mighty in strength' [R. V.] Ps. 103:20; strong men armed, Luke 11; 21. They are able (a) to move bodies by transferring them from place to place, Matt. 4:5, 8; Acts 8:39; (b) to destroy bodies, 2 Kings 19:35; (c) to assume bodies and to join them, not essentially indeed or personally, but accidentally, to themselves, and to guide them as a helmsman guides a ship; (d) to speak with God, with angels, and with men. They speak with God, by directing their thoughts to God, while they adore and praise Him; they speak with angels, freely impressing upon them intelligible conceptions; they speak with men, by means of an audible and distinct sound formed in the air in imitation of the human voice." (QUEN., I, 446: "That speaking is done by means of a sound formed in the assumed bodies." But he prudently adds: "Here to be willing not to know, what the best Master does not wish to teach, is learned ignorance.") "(2) It is finite; angelic power is not infinite. For, since infinite power is peculiar to the Creator, it is not communicable to a mere creature. Whence it happens that angels are not able (a) to create; (b) to beget; (c) to change substances; (d) to perform true miracles, Ps. 72:18; (e) to cure all diseases; (f) to raise the dead." [14] QUEN. (I, 446): "As to their original state, all angels were in the beginning created by God equally righteous, good and holy, to glorify God and render Him a holy service." This is proved: (a) By the general statement appended to the narrative of the creation, Gen. 1:31. (b) From John 8:44. (c) From Jude 6, where the fall of the angels is described both negatively and affirmatively. (d) From 2 Pet. 2:4." HOLL. (385): "The grace spoken of bestowed (1) on the part of the intellect, a certain habitual intellectual light or concreated knowledge for the recognition of God and of His will; (2) an habitual holiness of the will, by which the angels were able in the state of probation to begin and to end all their actions conformably to the eternal law of God." NOTE. -- It is further remarked that they were created in great numbers; how great these were is not known by us. QUEN. (I, 446): "Because the angels were not to be multiplied as men by procreation, but were created at once by God, so there was a certain number of them from the beginning, which, as it was not increased in the course of time, nor will be increased, so also it will never be diminished. But how great that number is the Scriptures do not teach, and there is nothing further revealed concerning it to us than that it is great, Dan. 7:10; Matt. 25:31; Heb. 12:22." [15] HOLL. (385): "Perfect righteousness was concreated with the angels, but it was not inamissible or incapable of being lost. For the will of the angels in the state of grace was not fully fixed upon perpetually loving and choosing the good; but God granted to them liberty of will and a concreated propensity towards the good, so that there was in them, not a very near, but a very remote capacity to sin, consisting in the negation both of impeccability and of the inamissibility of the concreated blessings." QUEN. (I, 447): "The fall of certain angels did not occur in consequence of any concreated inclination or proclivity to evil, but through the abuse of internal liberty, i.e., certain angels fell while no intrinsic principle was inclining or determining them to a fall, while no external motive for falling was constraining or necessitating them; but because they had not yet been confirmed in the Good, and were indifferent to good and evil, they abused their liberty, and with perfect freedom left their own place." N. B. -- The whole context shows that QUEN.'s phrase, "indifferent to good and evil," is not meant to express indecision in regard to good or evil, but only the capacity to choose the one as well as the other; and that the phrase is selected with special reference to the subsequent condition in which the good angels are described as confirmed in that which is good. [16] HOLL. (384): "The original state is the state of grace, which all the angels possessed in the original creation through the grace of the omnipotent Creator, and in which they were created equally wise and holy, and were placed upon the way to eternal happiness." CAL. (IV, 57): "Before they were confirmed in the Good, they were on the way to happiness; but they had not yet reached the goal itself, namely, happiness." [17] QUEN. (I, 447): "With regard to their subsequent condition, some of the angels continued in their concreated goodness, truth, and holiness, and were confirmed in it by God; but others, by sinning through their own free will, fell away from their Creator. And hence arose the distinction between the good and the evil angels." The condition of the good angels, after that period, is called the state of glory, and that of the evil angels the state of misery. HOLL. (384): "The state of glory is that in which the angels who continued in concreated wisdom and holiness, having been admitted to the unobscured vision of God, perpetually enjoy His boundless goodness. Matt. 18:10; Ps. 16:11. The state of misery (2 Pet. 2:4) is the most lamentable condition of those angels who of their own accord fell away from God." [18] HOLL. (386): "The good angels are those who continued in concreated true wisdom and holiness, and are so illumined by God with the light of glory and so confirmed in the Good that, free from the danger of sinning, they clearly behold God and the perpetually enjoy His goodness." QUEN. (I, 447): "They are called good angels, not so much on account of their entitative, metaphysical, or transcendental goodness, which belongs to all angels, even the evil (for, in as far as they have existence, in so far also they are good); nor only on account of their concreated good habit, for in this respect also they were just like the evil angels, who also equally had the same at first; but also on account of their good deeds, or their obedience yielded to God and their perseverance in the Good, and, finally, on account of their confirmation in the Good. The formal reason, therefore, why they are denominated good angels is, because they persevered in the truth and goodness in which they have been created, and are now so confirmed in it that they never will either wish or be able to fall from it." [19] Three things, therefore, according to CAL. (IV, 55), are to be predicated of the good angels: "(1) Persistence and continuance in concreated truth and holiness. (2) Divine confirmation in the Good, which signifies an eternal, immutable persistence in the blessings bestowed in creation, strength in the Good, or the gift of absolute perseverance, and the great increase of those blessings. Hence arises impeccability." QUEN. (I, 448): "Good angels are so confirmed in the Good that, as before they were only able not to sin, now they are altogether unable to sin. Matt. 18:10; 6:10; 1 Tim. 5:21; Luke 20:36; Gal. 1:8." HOLL. (386): "In the state of the way [when upon trial] the angels were able not to sin, i.e., there was not in them a very ready capacity or propensity to sin, yet there was in them a remote capacity to come short of their duty. In the state of glory the angels are not able to sin, i.e., there is in them neither a near nor a remote capacity for coming short, but a sinlessness (anamartesia); their impeccability is immutable and their holiness inamissible. (3) The external judgment of God, which properly is the state of glory, for which ultimately, or as a final goal, all the angels had been created. For they were all originally created alike. But when some fell away from God and deprived themselves of that glory, forsaking their own habitation (Jude 6), the rest, who remained in the truth, alone enjoyed the beatific vision of God, or the state of eternal happiness, who always behold the face of God the Father in heaven,' Matt. 18:10, and are thus called angels of light, 2 Cor. 11:14; elect angels, 1 Tim. 5:21; whence also holy men who are to be in the state of glory are called isanngeloi, equal to the angels. Luke 20:36." The Dogmaticians usually represent the confirmation in the Good as a consequence of the reception into the state of glory. BR. (269): "After they (the good angels) had steadfastly exhibited to God their obedience in the state of probation, while other angels had fallen away, it pleased God to fill them with the light of glory, so that they were able clearly and intuitively to recognize God (for this is to see the face of the heavenly Father). But this vision of God was followed by a most intense love, by which the will of the angels cleaves to God in such a manner that it cannot be turned away from Him. And thus was effected their confirmation in the Good, or the determination of their will towards the Good; so that, whatsoever they do, they do with reference to God as the infinitely perfect and perfectly known Good, without any blemish, without any defect." HOLL. (386): "He who clearly beholds God, the chief Good, cannot but burn with perpetual love towards Him for he beholds nothing in Him but what is good and to be loved; but he who perpetually loves God cannot sin." Id.: "The good angels, then, are confirmed in the Good when the light of glory is infused into them by God, so that their confirmation in the Good is practically nothing else than the infusion of the light of glory, in which they intuitively recognize God." That the angels, after having once been admitted into the state of glory, cannot possibly sin, is inferred principally from Luke 20:36. QUEN. (I, 448): "Those who are to be blessed in eternal life are called equal unto the angels.' Now, we are sure we shall never lose that celestial felicity; therefore, much more are the angels thus assured, to whom we shall be like." QUEN. (I, 448) appears to regard the confirmation in the Good not so much a consequence of the enjoyment of God, as rather to be assumed at once along with it: "The angels always behold the face of the Father in heaven, which beatific vision of God presupposes the confirmation in the Good, excludes all sin, and introduces impeccability, i.e., it makes angels and men happy, confirmed in the Good and impeccable." This introduction to the state of glory is described, indeed, as a reward which the good angels receive from God, but yet only as one that proceeded from the free grace of God; at the same time it is described as having been determined upon from eternity, but not by an absolute decree. HOLL. (387): "The glory of the angels who are confirmed in the Good is to be attributed not to an absolute divine decree, nor to the merit of Christ, nor to angelic merit, but to the most liberal goodness of God, who remunerates the persevering obedience of the angels far beyond their desert." [20] QUEN. (I, 448): "It is to be observed in general, that now, in consequence of and after this confirmation, there are greater excellences and perfection in angels than before the confirmation." HOLL. (388): "The angels acquired through the gift of confirmation more excellent knowledge, more perfect holiness, more perfect freedom, greater power, more complete concord." [21] QUEN. (I, 448): "As to the intellect of the angels, it shines no doubt with more illustrious radiance, since they have reached the goal and are enjoying the beatific vision of God, in which there is fulness of joy, Ps. 16:11; and hence they are called angels of light, on account of the greater light of knowledge, 2 Cor. 11:14." But here also the limitation is appended: "Although the intellectual power of the good angels is very great, it is nevertheless finite (Mark 13:32; 1 Pet. 1:12), and circumscribed within its own limits. Their intellection is capable of grasping very much (multiscia) but it is not omniscient; neither is it able to anticipate future events, nor has it an a priori consciousness of the recesses of the heart or of human thoughts." [22] CAL. (IV, 60): "(1) Holiness, not only that by which they were marked as holy when in the state of grace; but being more perfect now in holiness, they are confirmed in the Good and established in the state of glory. From the more perfect knowledge of God there has resulted a more perfect love of God, and so also a more perfect holiness; and, since they are always (dia pantos) illuminated by the most glorious light of the knowledge and holiness of God, Matt. 18:10; 2 Cor. 11:14, they rejoice in perfect holiness as that of the finally blessed. . . . But this holiness of theirs is not essential; for God alone is essentially holy; but it is accidental, because they were able to lose it. Job 4:18." (2) QUEN. (I, 449): "This confirmation in their original state did not deprive the good angels of their freedom, nor did they cease for this reason to have a free will; but they rather attained in this way to greater freedom. For they have (a) freedom from compulsion, as they do not perform good works compulsorily, but freely and of their own accord. They praise God and serve Him freely, not by compulsion, although they are not able not to praise Him and do His will; (b) freedom of exercise, which is sometimes called freedom of contradiction, which signifies that when any one has an object proposed to him, he can choose it or not choose it, can act or not act. The good angels have also (c) the freedom of a certain specification; that, namely, which consists in freely choosing or not choosing between this or that good thing in particular. For, although the freedom of specification, which is called also the freedom of contrariety, implies indifference as to one of two opposite things, a good and an evil, yet the good angels do not have freedom as to contrary acts, so as to be able to do good and evil, but they are able to will and to do only good, and thus the freedom of contrariety does not belong to good angels; nevertheless they have the freedom of contradictio, by which although they necessarily choose the good, as to the quality of the act, yet they are able freely to choose this good, and not to choose another good, to do this good and not to do another good. Yea, the freedom, not to be able to sin, not to be able to refrain from doing good, is the very highest kind, which very highest grade of freedom God, the most free of all, enjoys." [23] QUEN. (I, 449): "The power of the good angels is very great. For, though they were endowed with great strength at their creation, they have acquired still more, since they have been advanced into the state of glory, and by it are enabled to overcome the power of the devils. Hence they are called those that excel in strength.' Ps. 103:20." But here also the limitation: "Although the power of the good angels is great, it is yet finite and subordinate and subject to the divine power and will." [24] AP. CONF., p 224, 8. Comp. also p 117. HOLL. (390): "The holy angels perform their works and duties by standing before God (with a most joyful psalmody (psalmodia) they sing the praises of God; with the most humble worship (latreia) they revere and adore God; with the most prompt service (leitourgia) they execute the will of God), by assisting godly men, and by resisting devils and wicked men." More specifically BR. (272) (in imitation of the earliest Dogmaticians, viz., CHMN., GRH.): "The good angels perform various functions in their happy life, some of which pertain to their own happiness (for their happiness does not consist in idleness, but in part itself signifies a certain activity (energeia): in part, besides, admits various functions, to be performed by those who are happy): others are ministerial, by which the angels serve God and Christ, the God-man (Heb. 1:6; Matt. 4:11), and promote human salvation." Id. (274): "The functions of the latter kind have respect partly to individual godly men, partly to guardianship of the hierarchical estates and the promotion of their advantage. The angels minister to godly individuals when they sustain them in the beginning of life and in infancy (Matt. 18:10); when they render service to those of maturer years in any honest calling (Ps. 34:7; 91:11, 12; Matt. 1:19, 20; 2:13, 19; Acts 10:3, 7; Rev. 1:1; 22:6, 16; Dan. 6.22; Acts 12:7; 5:18, 19; Luke 1:13, 30, etc.); and, finally, when they are present with the dying, Luke 16:22." AP. CONF. Art. xxi, 8: . . . "We freely grant that the angels pray for us. For we have the testimony of Zech. 1:12, where the angel prays, O Lord of hosts, how long wilt thou not have mercy on Jerusalem, etc.?'" BR. (276): "It belongs to the office of the angels, with reference to the ecclesiastical estate, to promote the ministry of the Word; and especially, to this end, they were present as servants at the promulgation of the Mosaic Law (Deut. 33:2; Gal. 3:19); they announced the incarnation of Christ (Luke 1:26; 2:9); they resisted the introduction of idolatry into the Church (Jude 9); and likewise are present in sacred assemblies (1 Cor. 11:10; 1 Tim. 5:21)." (Ib.): "The political estate the angels serve by preventing the bonds of the government from being sundered (Dan. 10:13), by assisting and defending the magistracy and its officers (Dan. 6:22), by warding off dangers and destroying wicked enemies (2 Kings 19:35; Is. 37:36)." Id. (277): "The domestic estate they serve by promoting the marriage of the godly (Gen. 24:7), by keeping watch over the household (Job 1:10; Ps. 34:7), by guarding the pledges of domestic love, the children (Matt. 18:10)." (Ib.): "Finally, there will be a special duty of the angels, which they will perform on the last day, when they will accompany Christ coming to judgment, and announce His arrival with the sound of trumpets (Matt. 25:31; 1 Thess. 4:16). They will collect human beings from all parts of the world (Matt. 24:31; Mark 13:27), and will separate the godly from the wicked (Matt. 13:41); they will place the former at the right hand of Christ (Matt. 25:43), taking them up to meet Him in the air (1 Thess. 4:17), and the latter, placed at the left hand of the Judge (Matt. 25:33), they will then quickly cast into hell (Matt. 13:42, 50)." The Dogmaticians acknowledge that they have no definite answer to the question, whether every one have his own so-called guardian angel. BR. (274): "This is certain, that the guardianship of any man is not in such a way assigned to a particular angel that he is deprived of the aid of the rest. But it still may be asserted with probability, that one angel is appointed for the protection of each godly person, and that in extraordinary cases many angels are sent to the help of single individuals." [25] AP. CONF. P. II, Art. II: "Although the angels in heaven pray for us, . . . yet it does not hence follow that they are to be invoked, adored, etc., by us." BR. (278): "On account of these perfections which we discover the angels to possess, and because they favor and assist us very greatly, it is also becoming that we praise and love them, and take heed lest we offend them by evil actions. But it is not becoming in us to direct our prayers to the angels. For that is either impious and idolatrous (namely, if we address religious prayers to them with the belief that they can bestow upon us spiritual gifts), or it is at least useless and ill-advised." HOLL. (392): "Angels are not to be religiously adored or invoked." [26] HOLL. (392): "THere is no doubt as to the existence of a certain order among the good angels, but what or what manner of angelic order that is, we think no one can know in this life. Proof: (a) From the general rule, according to which God wishes everything in the Church Militant to be done decently and in order, 1 Cor. 14:40. There is no doubt, therefore, that there is a certain order among the blessed angels, and that the more perfect as the Church Triumphant is more splendid than the Church Militant. (b) From the different designations of the celestial spirits, Eph. 1:21; Col. 1:16; 1 Thess. 4:16, and Jude 9. The different names imply a distinction among the angels. (c) from analogy. There is an order among the wicked angels; therefore also among the good. The former is proved by Luke 11:15, where Beelzebub is called the chief of devils, and Matt. 25:41, where mention is made of the devil and his angels." [27] QUEN. (I, 450): "Angels are called evil, not because of their essence, for in respect to their essence they are good, and were created along with the rest of the angels in truth, holiness, and righteousness; but (1) in respect to their evil conduct, viz., their malicious defection and apostasy from God; (2) in respect to the habitual wickedness, or the horrible depravity of their nature, which was consequent upon that conduct; (3) in respect to their perseverance and persistence in incorrigible wickedness; and (4) on account of their evil doings, for they perpetrate only evil." [28] QUEN. (I, 452): "It does not appear what exactly was the first sin of the evil angels. The temptation, however, with which Satan attacked and overcame our first parents, Gen. 3:5, and his character and his perpetual effort to transfer the glory of God to himself, Matt. 4:9 [1 Tim. 3:6], render probable the opinion of those who think that it was an affected resemblance to the Deity (deiformitas) or an affectation of superior pre-eminence (uperoches)." [29] QUEN. (I, 452): "The generic form of the diabolical fall consisted in the free and spontaneous turning away from God and the rule of right. For they were able to persevere in truth and concreated holiness and not fall away from it; they were able by the grace of creation to keep the rule of right; of their own accord, therefore, and freely they sinned, by the abuse of the freedom that was bestowed upon them. For they did not sin through any defect or impotence of nature, but from pure malice and contumacy, and by the spontaneous abuse of the will conferred upon them." [30] QUEN. (I, 452): "Those who fell were individual angels, whose number is not mentioned in the Scriptures; that they were many, however, we infer from the multitude of demons, Mark 5:9; Luke 8:30." Id. (I, 453): "In what order the wicked angels sinned, whether all at once, whether one after another, or whether first one fell and by his example and persuasion induced others to apostasy and the fall, concerning this the Scholastics dispute, but ater graphes, with no scriptural ground for their opinions." HOLL. (300): "It is probable that the wicked angels fell under the guidance of a certain leader or chief, whom the Scriptures call Satan and the devil, John 8:44; Luke 11:15, who by his example or persuasion drew many angels into the fellowship of his crime. Rev. 12:4." As to the time of the fall: HOLL. (Ib.): "They fell, not within the six days of creation, but after they were ended (Gen. 1:31); before the fall of our first parents, in the second week of the foundation of the world, but upon what day it is uncertain." [31] BR. (280): "The crime having been committed, all those angels lost the grace that had been concreated with them, and so fell into the most horrible misery without hope of restoration." CAL. (IV, 318): "The punishment of the wicked angels is partly the eternal desertion of God, whence they can never be converted; partly, rejection to infernal torments to be endured forever." HOLL. (403) more specifically distinguishes the punishment of loss from the punishment of the senses: "The punishment of loss, which is also designated as privative, is the most lamentable casting away of grace and glory. The punishment of sense consists of the positive torments which the demons have been keenly enduring ever since the fall, and the still greater ones which they will undergo on the day of final judgment. (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6.)" BR. (288): "The punishments which are inflicted upon the wicked angels will be eternal. Matt. 25:41-46; Mark 9:43." To the question, "Why may not the wicked angels be restored to favor?" GRH. (IV, 34) answers: "It is better to proclaim the wonderful philanthropy and mercy of the Son of God towards the fallen race of man, by which on our account and for our salvation He descended from heaven and became man, not taking on Him the nature of angels but the seed of Abraham (Heb. 2:16), than to scrutinize beyond due limits the causes of that most just judgment, by which God delivered the angels who had fallen away from Him to be cast in chains of darkness into hell, to be reserved for judgment." The reason for their eternal rejection is usually found in the greatness of their crime. HOLL. (398) indicates the atrocity of their crime: "(a) From the person offended, who is God, the most kind and mighty Creator of the angels. (b) From the helps, by the aid of which they were able to turn aside the evil. For the intellect of the angels was resplendent with an extraordinary light of knowledge, and their will was distinguished by perfect holiness. (c) From the mode of sinning. For the angels sinned, not through infirmity or inadvertence, but in the full possession of their intellect, with deliberate design and the voluntary abuse of their free will, no one instigating them." [32] QUEN. (I, 454): "The evil angels did not lose, through their fall, their natural knowledge, or that which they had by the light of nature; for they know God and other supernatural things after a certain manner. But that knowledge of supernatural things is joined, 1, with great hatred and murmuring against God; 2, with jealousy, envy, and rage against good angels, godly men and saints in heaven; 3, with ignorance, doubt, error, and forgetfulness. Matt. 4:6; John 13:2; 1 Cor. 2:8. Yet they have altogether lost the knowledge derived from the light of grace." HOLL. (399): "The evil angels know God, but they dreadfully shudder at this divine knowledge." BR. (280): "Their intellect is deprived, not only of the light of grace, but also of the light of glory; and, being fixed upon the contemplation of the divine wrath and their own misery, it is as it were blunted, and wants a sound judgment concerning the doing of that which is good. (Besides, the corruption of the diabolic intellect can be shown from the fact that Satan so studiously sought to accomplish the death of Christ, not thinking that he was thereby bringing the greatest adversity upon himself. But the natural knowledge that remains in the wicked angels adds no happiness to them, rejected as they are by God.)" Their further gifts are thus described, HOLL. (399): "Their will, inclined to evil, does not rejoice in that liberty which implies indifference to good or evil, or to many things that are good, but their freedom is exercised with reference to particular evils. Their power is, indeed, more than human, but is restrained by the divine power, so that without the permission of God they can accomplish nothing." QUEN. (I, 454): "From divine revelation they sometimes certainly know future contingencies, Job 1:12; 2:6; 1 Kings 22:22. And some things they know with a measure of probability by their natural sagacity." [33] HOLL. (400): "The doings of the wicked angels are of various kinds, but they are all directed to the injury of the divine glory (Rev. 12:7), and to the temporal as well as eternal ruin of individual men, and of the ecclesiastical estates." Specifically (403): "The evil demons are assiduously plotting to disturb, overturn, and totally destroy the ecclesiastical estate (by scattering heresies, Matt. 13:27 and 28; by hindering the efforts of godly ministers of the Church, 1 Thess. 2:18; by averting the minds of hearers from the meditation and practice of the divine Word, Luke 8:12; by exciting persecutions against the kingdom of Christ, Rev. 12:7), the political estate (1 Kings 22:21; 1 Chron. 22:1), and the domestic estate (by alienating the minds of married persons, as the devil was a murderer from the beginning, who delighted in sowing contentions, John 8:44; by lying in wait for the children and possessions of parents, Job 1:11-19)." Among the evils that are inflicted upon individual persons by the evil spirits is to be especially reckoned corporeal and spiritual possession. The general description of this we cite from QUEN. (I, 456): "It is an action of the devil, by which, through the permission of God, he instigates men to sin, and occupies and torments their bodies, that they may throw away their eternal salvation. Through the former, viz., the instigation to sin, there originates the spiritual possession; through the latter, viz., his occupation of human bodies, there originates the corporeal possession. The former is meant when it is said that the devil possesses and fills the minds and hearts of the wicked, enters into them, and works in them, Acts 5:3; Luke 22:3; John 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:9; Eph. 2:2. The latter is meant when the devil immediately and locally exists and operates in a body, and controls it for the time being. Matt. 4:24; 8:16 and 28; Mark 7:25; 9:17; Matt. 12:22; 15:22; Luke 4:33; Acts 8:7; 19:13." [34] BR.: "Meanwhile God Himself uses the ministry of evil spirits for chastening the godly in this world (e.g., Job), and for punishing the wicked, as well in life (Ps. 78:49) as after death. (Matt. 18:34.)" __________________________________________________________________ [13] The doctrinal writers differ from one another in assigning a place for this topic. Some, as QUEN. and HOLL., place it next in order to that of Creation, others to that of Providence. CAL. (IV, 2) thus expresses himself in regard to the place which should be assigned to it: "The discussion concerning angels may be presented either in connection with the works of creation, as is commonly done, when it prefaces the doctrine of Divine Providence; or, it may be presented in connection with the topic of Divine Providence, inasmuch as this embraces also the angels, and besides, employs them, as its ministers, in the government of men, both to bless and to punish them. The latter place seems the more appropriate since, under the head of the creation by God, one cannot so suitably treat of the apostasy of angels, or of the establishment of the good angels in truth and concreated holiness: these matters more appropriately belong to the topic concerning the Providence of God." __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ PART II. OF MAN. § 23. General Statement. IN the first part we treated of God in general, and of the works that He has made; we now proceed to treat of Man, for whose sake the world was made, and for whose redemption Christ appeared. Here we are to describe his moral condition, i.e., the condition in which he now is, and because of which he needs redemption. [1] Inasmuch, however, as his present moral condition cannot be described without first explaining how it came to be, since it is no longer the original condition in which he was created, the description of the moral condition in which man now is must be preceded by the description of his original condition. [2] The second part, therefore, falls into two divisions: I. THE STATE OF INTEGRITY; II. THE STATE OF CORRUPTION. __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I. OF THE STATE OF INTEGRITY. __________________________________________________________________ § 24. State of Integrity Defined. The state of integrity is the original condition of man created after the image of God, in goodness and rectitude." QUEN. (II, 2.) The first condition of man is thus designated, because in it he was entirely uninjured and incorrupt in all his endowments, powers, and attributes. [3] This condition is more specifically described by the expression, "the image of God in which man was created," Gen. 1:26, 27; 5:1; for man is distinguished from all other creatures in this, that he was made after the image of God. [4] This expression denotes, in general, a resemblance to God, which has its ground in this, that God took Himself, so to speak, as a pattern and archetype according to which He created man. [5] The passages, Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24, teach in what particulars that resemblance to God consists, by which man's original condition is described. [6] In these, the apostle states that mankind, whom he presupposes to have lost the image of God, must be renewed again in the same; and, inasmuch as he describes the new condition as that in which mankind are renewed by the power of the Holy Ghost, in true righteousness and holiness, we see that he means by the image of God (Gen. 1 and 5) the peculiar spiritual and moral perfection of man's original condition. [7] QUEN. (II, 9): "The image of God is a natural perfection, consisting in an entire conformity with the wisdom, justice, immortality, and majesty of God, which was divinely concreated in the first man, in order that he might perfectly know, love, and glorify God, his Creator." [8] Accordingly, man in his original condition possessed: (1) Wisdom and the power to understand perfectly, according to the measure of his necessities, things divine, human and natural. [9] (2) Holiness and freedom of the will, according to which man loved God and that which is good, and possessed the power to live, in all respects, in conformity with the will of God. [10] (3) Purity of the natural affections, and the perfect harmony of all his powers and impulses. [11] HOLL. (470): "The perfections constituting the image of God were an intellect excelling in knowledge, perfect holiness and freedom of the will, absolute purity of the sensuous appetites, and the most harmonious agreement of the affections with the decision of the intellect and guidance of the will, in conformity with the wisdom, holiness, and purity of God, as far as was consistent with the capacity of the first man." These spiritual and moral excellences, thus described, are the true reason why man is called the image of God. [12] They are also summed up in the expression "original righteousness." [13] With these there are yet connected, as a natural consequence from them, corporeal excellences, and a peculiarly exalted position in relation to the external world, [14] viz., (a) corporeal impassibility and immortality, for neither suffering nor death could touch man thus spiritually and morally endowed; and (b) external dominion over the other animals (Gen. 1:26-28), for in this also does the exalted dignity of the likeness to God manifest itself. HOLL. (475): "The less principal perfections included in the image of God are the immunity of body, infected with no stain of sin, from passions, its immortality, and complete control over sublunary creatures, especially beasts." [15] Man, thus created, could not but rejoice in unalloyed happiness, to which also his residence in Paradise, "a most pleasant habitation," contributed its share. [16] All these excellences we must designate as natural to man in his original state, not indeed in the sense that if he lost them he would no longer be the same being; but yet in this sense, that they were created along with him, and that they cannot be separated from him without making his whole condition different from what it formerly was. This is expressed in the statement, that the image of God is a natural perfection, and not an external, supernatural, and supplementary gift. [17] This condition, with all its excellences, man would also have propagated to his posterity (by natural generation, Gen. 5:3; Rom. 5:12), had he not fallen. If we inquire concerning supernatural gifts, of which man, in his original condition, was a partaker, they can be more easily enumerated, viz.: "The supernatural favor of God, the gracious indwelling of the most holy Trinity, and the enjoyment and delight thence derived;" for these gifts are to be regarded, in a certain sense, as peculiar additions and consequences, flowing from man's happy and morally good condition. [18] [1] QUEN. (II, 1): "The subject of Theology is man, who fell into misery from his original happy state, and who is to be brought back to God and eternal salvation. The discussion here is not of man as to his essence, and as he is a creature, . . . but as he is such or such a creature; and in regard to his state, which before the Fall was innocent and most happy, but after the Fall corrupt and most miserable." [2] HOLL. (461): "Concerning the Fall of man, the condition from which (terminus a quo) as well as the condition into which he fell (terminus ad quem) is to be considered. The condition from which he fell, is the state of innocence or integrity. The misery of fallen man cannot be accurately measured, unless the happiness which preceded it, and of which man, alienated from God, deprived himself, can be exactly estimated. For the loss of anything is understood from previous possession of it, and the magnitude of an evil is estimated by the good which has been lost." The various conditions of man, CAL. (IV, 385) enumerates in the following order: "The states of man, which come to be considered in Theology, are diverse. One before the Fall, which is called the state of innocence; one after the Fall, which again is divided into a state of sin without grace, which they call a state of sin or corruption, and a state of sin under grace, through a gracious renovation commenced in this life, and to be completed in the next: whence the state of grace in this life is called the state of renovation, to which the state of glory succeeds in another life. . . . Moreover, although God desires the renovation of all men, and the Scriptures and Theology have been directed to this point, yet many are not renewed, and these, consequently, after this life, are compelled to undergo another state, viz., that of eternal condemnation. Thus, if all the conditions of man are to be regarded, five states may be assigned to him, viz., of nature innocent, corrupt, renewed, glorified, and condemned; or a state of innocence, of misery, of grace, of eternal glory, and of eternal shame. The Papists err, who invent yet another state, which they call that of the purely natural (purorum naturalium); which is nothing more than a mere figment of the Scholastics; since, indeed, a man never did exist, nor could exist, with the simple negation both of innocence and grace and of sin and misery, who was neither just nor unjust, and who neither pleased nor offended God." In the topic which is under discussion by us, only the first two states are considered, for the subject of Theology is only "man in a state of sin, who is to be restored to salvation." [3] CAL. (IV, 389): "It is called a state of integrity, because man in it was upright and uncorrupt (Eccl. 7:29) in intellect, will, the corporeal affections and endowments, and in all things was perfect. They call it also the state of innocence, because he was innocent and holy, free from sin and pollution." [4] BR. (289): "It is evident that there are other creatures which are called very good, and, though created according to a certain form, agreeably to the divine intellect, yet not in the image of God." [5] HOLL. (462): "The formal requisites of an image, generically considered, are: (a) Resemblance, or agreement with the model or prototype; because it is the property of an image to represent that of which it is an image; but this cannot be done without resemblance; (2) Origin, or the process by which the image is made after the model, because the image was made to imitate the prototype, for the sake of representing it." The difference, according to HOLL. (Ib.), between a vestige (vestigium) and an image, is expressed in the following manner: "An image clearly represents that of which it is an image; a vestige obscurely points to that of which it is a vestige. In all creatures are seen the vestiges of divine power, wisdom, and goodness; but in unfallen man the image of God shone forth with full splendor." HOLL. (464): "dmvt is the archetype, like which anything is made, as is indicated by the prefix k. But tslm is the ectype in which the express resemblance is seen. Hence the meaning of the words: Let us make man in a condition which may be determined according to our perfections and bear our likeness.' Cf. Dan. 10:16. But in another passage, Gen. 5:3, dmvt denotes the ectype, and tslm the archetype, as the former is connected by the v, and the latter by the k." Yet BR. (290) remarks concerning this general definition of image: "The image of God in man ought not to be referred to all things which are in God; neither can it be so referred; nor is it in man in the same degree of perfection in which it is in God." Concerning the meaning of the words tslm and dmvt HOLL. (463) further says: "In the original (Gen. 1:26) two words are employed, viz., tslm image, and dmvt likeness, not that they are expressions for different things and that image denotes the very substance of the human soul and likeness its accidental perfections or attributes (as some of the Papists say), but that the latter may be exegetical of the former, and that image may be designated as most like or very similar." [TELLER adds the following note to HOLL. (462): "An image, properly so called, is that in which there is seen an agreement with another, from which it so derives its origin that the properties of the former appear in the latter. Hence there are three things, properly speaking, which are required in an image: (1) An archetype. (2) An ectype. (3) An agreement between the two. An agreement alone is therefore insufficient, but origin is especially necessary, and that in such way that express properties of the archetype are conspicuous."] [6] It is well known that the expression, "image of God," is employed in a variety of significations, and therefore we must ascertain from other passages in what respect man can be said to be like God. In the following passages, CAL. (IV, 572) furnishes the proper rule according to which we can discover the resemblance which we are considering: "Inasmuch as the conformity of man to God, as an archetype, is found to be manifold, and, in respect to this conformity, the image of God is variously defined by different persons, the following rule should be particularly observed, lest we should here depart from the proper sense of the Scriptures: That the conformity of man to God refers to the image of God, which, having been impressed upon our first parents in creation, and having been almost entirely lost through transgression is to be restored by renovation in this life, and, chiefly, in blessed regeneration for the life to come." This rule points to the passages, Col. 3 and Eph. 4, from which we learn that the likeness of God, which we are here discussing, must consist of spiritual and moral attributes. Therefore, the image of God, which is ascribed to man in his original state, is described as "accidental, the accidental (mutable and amissible) perfections of which are conformed to the infinite perfections of God, according to the measure of human capacity." HOLL. (462). Through this definition the accidental image of God is distinguished (1) from the substantial image of God, which is Christ, according to 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3; and by which the sameness of the essence of the Father and the Son is pointed out. HOLL. (462): "The substantial image is the eternal Son of God, because He exhibits in Himself the entire essence of the Father, being distinguished from Him by the mode of His subsistence." (2) This definition shows that the advantages of man's original condition, whether of the body or of the soul, do not make up his being itself, but that they consist of attributes which are, indeed, intimately united with it, but yet, when they are removed, the being of man remains unaltered. According to the position above assumed, CAL. proceeds: "Whence it is clear that the conformity to God which is found in the substance of the soul, or of the body, does not belong to the image of God, which is described in the language of the Scriptures: because the substance of the soul, or of the body, was not destroyed by the Fall, neither is it restored by renovation." QUEN. (II, 17): "We must distinguish between the substance of man, or the matter itself of which he is composed, and that which, as if something following, adheres most closely to the substance of man, and nevertheless, as to its accidents, perfects it internally; or, we must distinguish between nature itself and its qualities, or perfections in the qualities: the image of God indicates the latter, not the former. In short, the image of God is not man, but in man, i.e., it is not substantial or essential to man, but accidental. In opposition to the views of the followers of Flacius, who maintain that the image of God was the substantial form itself of the first man, and the very essence of the rational soul, which was entirely lost in the fall of Adam." A distinction is made, also, in the "accidental" image of God "understood generically and figuratively, or specifically and literally." In the former sense, the resemblance of man to God is asserted "on account of a certain analogy or similarity to God." (HOLL. (463): "The substance itself of the human soul, exhibits certain things that are qeia or divine, and stands related to the Divinity as to a model. For God is a spirit, immaterial, intelligent, acting with a free will, etc. These predicates can, in a certain manner, be affirmed of the human soul.") In this sense, however, man did not lose it through the Fall, and, therefore, it can be affirmed of him also after the Fall, Gen. 9:6; James 3:9. Only in this latter sense, is the term employed while we treat of the state of integrity. QUEN (II, 17): "The image of God, specifically understood, is not to be sought for in those things which yet remain in man since the Fall, and which are truly in man unregenerate. Because the image of God, having been lost through the disobedience of the first Adam, must be restored by a new creation, through the obedience of the Second Adam." Consequently, in the topic now under discussion, we understand by the image of God "only those gifts and graces granted to man in his first creation and lost by the Fall, i.e., the integrity and rectitude of all the powers concreated with the first man." [7] GRH. (IV, 242): "In the following passages (Col. 3 and Eph. 4) the phrases after the image of God,' and after God' are synonymous. There is exhibited in these a description of the new man, who is called new, not by reason of a change of essence, but on account of new qualities, the knowledge of God, righteousness, and true holiness. The image of God consists in that in respect of which man was made after God, and is renewed after the image of God; but he is renewed in respect of the knowledge of God, righteousness, and holiness, etc., and in these particulars he is made like God, in the image of God. Therefore, the primeval image of God in man consists of these things. [8] BR. (293): "The divine image, in the special acceptation of the term, implies certain accidental perfections, created in the intellect and will of the first man, conformable to the perfections which are in God, and bestowed upon men for the purpose of directing aright, and perfecting their actions, in order that they may attain the ultimate end." GRH. (IV, 248): "This is the description of the image of God in the first man, given in the Scriptures, namely, that it was righteousness and true holiness, by which are meant the highest rectitude, integrity, and conformity to the divine Law, of all the powers of soul and body -- the highest perfection, innocence, and purity of the whole man, which his nakedness and his dwelling in Paradise prove." [9] BR. (293): "In respect of intellect, God bestowed upon the first men, in imitation of Himself, as of a model, a certain wisdom, i.e., a certain habitual enlightenment or perfection of intellect, so that they attained a high degree of knowledge in things divine, human, and natural, and that which was sufficient for their primeval state." The proof of this, according to QUEN. (II, 5) appears: "(1) from Col. 3:9, 10; (2) from the acts of Adam, which are: (a) an appropriate application of names, Gen. 2:19, which was not only grammatical as to the nomenclature of the animals, but even highly logical as the most correct definition; (b) his recognition of Eve, Gen. 2:23; (c) prophecy, or a prediction concerning the perpetuity of the conjugal relation, Gen. 2:24." The nature and extent of this wisdom are more particularly defined in the following, BR. (294): "The intellect of man understood the essence and will of God, so far as it was necessary to attain this end, viz., that the intellect might prescribe the worship that should be rendered to God, or so far as was essential to right and holy living." This wisdom is described as "of such a nature that it could still be increased in the course of time, and not as so perfect and comprehensive that it could extend to the knowledge of the free decrees of God, or that it implied a perfectly accurate knowledge of all natural things." QUEN. (II, 6): "This knowledge of Adam was excellent, full, perfect, and such as no man since the Fall can acquire, either from the volume of Nature or from that of Scripture. When, therefore, the inquiry is made, whether the intellect of the apostles, after the reception of the Holy Ghost, was superior to that of Adam before the Fall -- the reply is: We must distinguish between the knowledge of divine things and the mysteries of faith, and the perfect and complete knowledge of all things natural and useful to man. In reference to the former, we can believe that the apostles possessed greater knowledge than Adam, because, after the advent of Christ, these things were known more fully and distinctly than before. In reference to the latter, Adam excelled all men, and therefore also the apostles, both extensively or in compass, and intensively or in mode or depth of knowledge; and that too, derived, not from probable reason or inferences, but from the proper cause of each thing, and also by the tenacity and unchangeableness of his knowledge. Hence it is evident that the knowledge of Adam was finite and limited, because he knew not the secret decrees of God, nor the thoughts of the heart, nor future contingencies, nor the number of the stars. This knowledge also, which was concreate with Adam, could have been perfected more and more, and admitted of augmentation, if you regard the perfection of the degree of knowledge, both by revelation, or a more extended knowledge of God in supernatural things, and by his own experience and observation in things natural." HOLL. (471): "The knowledge of Adam was truly excellent, and sufficient for his primeval state; but it was not the intuitive knowledge of God. For the clear vision of God is not given on earth, but is promised to be given in heaven. 1 Cor. 13:12; 1 John 3:2." [10] BR. (294): "In regard to the will, spiritual strength was bestowed by God upon man, or an habitual inclination and prompting to love God above all things, and to do all things according to the direction of an intellect rightly illuminated; but to avoid what it judged should be avoided, and to govern the lower powers of his nature, lest they should in some way break forth into inordinate and sinful acts." QUEN. (II, 6): "The perfection of the will of the first man, therefore, consisted (1) in a natural inclination to that which is good, which altogether excluded every proximate power of erring; (2) in a free and unhindered volition of good, and the execution of that volition: and thus there was in him a holy freedom of the will, and a free holiness which excluded all sin. But his will was free in such a way that it inclined only to good, and was not prone to the choice of evil or the neglect of good; whatever occurred afterwards, happened through an unfortunate abuse of the freedom of the will." But "holiness in the first man did not introduce absolute impeccability, but only a relative freedom from sin in his will." [11] HOLL. (474): "There were in the first man the most exact harmony and wonderful agreement of all the higher and lower powers of his nature. For reason most promptly obeyed the divine law, the will reason, the sensuous appetite the will, the affections the appetite, and the members of the body the affections." BR. (295): "For this reason it is that our first parents, in the state of integrity, knew not that they were naked, neither blushed; i.e., their sensuous appetites (although an object were present which could entice them) were not influenced, even in the least degree, by any inordinate affection. Gen. 2:25." HOLL. (474): "There is an antithesis of the Papists and Socinians, ascribing to our first parents a concreated rebellion of the sensuous appetite against the judgment of sound reason." [12] BR. (296): "This wisdom, righteousness, and holiness of the first men so express the idea of the divine image, that it is from them only, speaking in the abstract, that man can be called the image of God." [13] The expression, "original righteousness," was the one more frequently employed, in the earliest systems of divinity, to point out man's original condition. AP. CONF. (I, 17): "Original righteousness implies not only an equable temperament of the bodily qualities, but also these gifts, viz., a more certain knowledge of God, fear of God, confidence in God, or a certain rectitude and power of attaining them. And this is proved by the Scriptures, when they say (Gen. 1:27) that man was made in the image and likeness of God, which is nothing else than this wisdom and righteousness embodied in man, which might apprehend God, and in which God might be reflected, i.e., these gifts were bestowed upon man, viz., the knowledge of God, the fear of God, confidence in God, and like blessings. Paul also (Col. 3, Eph. 4) shows that the image of God consists in the knowledge of God, righteousness, and truth." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 227): "Original righteousness was not only the receiving, but also the rectitude and soundness, of all the powers." It consisted not only in an equable temperament of the body, but especially in the rectitude of the powers of the soul. It comprehended not only the second table of the Law, but also the first. Nor did it consist only in external actions, or the inferior powers of man. This is, in substance, all that the earliest divines say concerning the state of integrity. The view which has been given in the text belongs to a later period. Concerning the expression, original righteousness, CALOV. remarks in addition (IV, 598): "It is called righteousness, not as this virtue is distinguished from others (which is called particular righteousness), but as general righteousness, in the common acceptation, which, however, is here understood in a higher sense, comprehending not only all moral, but also spiritual virtues, not merely those which relate to the will, but those also which have respect to the intellectual powers; for by this term is now meant, according to the use of theological writers, that universal and exceedingly delightful agreement, sumphonia, in the first man, of mind, will, and heart, with the intellect, will, and heart of God. Nor is this term improperly used; for that original perfection of nature is called righteousness, both in respect of its essence, because we are indeed accustomed to call that righteous, which by its own nature is true, perfect, right, sound, and incorrupt, and also in respect of its efficiency, because it made man righteous in the sight of God, i.e., innocent, acceptable, and holy. Righteousness is called original, because it was first of all in man, and because from the beginning he possessed it after the manner of a concreated habit; also, in order that the righteousness of man's original and first state may be distinguished from moral, imputed, and imperfect righteousness, from that which is perfected in another life, and from every other kind whatsoever; and, finally, because it must needs be transmitted to posterity by natural generation, inasmuch as in a state of innocence men would obtain this natural perfection with their origin, just as now, in a state of sin, original sin is propagated, and from that very propagation is called original." CALOV. (IV, 597) defines original righteousness to be "a habit of wisdom created in the mind, and of perfect holiness and purity in the natural desires and heart, in virtue of which our first parents, by natural illumination, knew the truth, even that which was spiritual, without error and doubt, and were freely inclined, by natural propensity, to that which is good, and promptly, without any struggle of internal affections, accomplished what they wished." [14] Many divines include these excellences in their definition of image; yet they make a distinction between "the image partly received (merikos), which denotes knowledge and original righteousness, and the image wholly received (olikos) which embraces all things that complete the image of God." The excellences of the first class they call "the principal perfections, whose seat is the soul;" those of the second class are called "the less principal, whose seat is the body." The latter class QUEN. (II, 7) divides into those which are within man and those which are without him. If these excellences are included in the definition of the image of God, then the following is of value in reference to the difference between the image of God and original righteousness, QUEN. (II, 3): "The image of God and original righteousness differ as the whole and a part. The image of God includes as well the principal as the secondary conformity with God; but original righteousness is ordinarily received as embracing only the principal conformity." [15] (a) HOLL. (475) proves impassibility in the following manner: "Painful and destructive sufferings are the punishment of sin (Gen. 3:16; Sirach 38:15); wherefore the first man, being without sin, was free from its bitter suffering." QUEN. (II, 7) remarks on this point: "The first men in the state of innocency had a body incapable of suffering, inasmuch as it was not exposed to those things which could have injured their natural disposition and contributed to the death and corruption of the body. Such things were: a freedom from all injuries arising from pain and trouble, special protection against rains, winds, heat, diseases, etc., and other inconveniences, which now, since the Fall, are innumerable (Gen. 2:25). Meanwhile, however, if man had remained in his integrity, physical changes would not have been wanting, such as generation, nutrition, etc., and he would have needed food and drink for his sustentation." (b) Immortality. QUEN. (II, 7): "It is proved from Gen. 2:17; Rom. 5:12; 6:23." We must distinguish (1) between the immortality which denotes absolute freedom from the power and act of dying (and thus God is immortal, and angels, our souls, and the bodies of the redeemed and the damned), and (2) the immortality which denotes a freedom from the proximate power of dying and the natural tendency to death, and, at the same time, from the act of dying, in such a manner, however, that death could happen upon a certain proposed condition; and such was man's immortality in his state of integrity. We must make a distinction between absolute freedom from death, which will exist in another life, and a conditional or decreed freedom, which existed in the first state of man (viz., as long as he should not sin), and which did not exclude but included the use of food and drink, and especially the eating of the tree of life, by which means our first parents were enabled, in a natural way, to perpetuate life. It is one thing not to be able to die, and another to be able not to die, and still another not to be able not to die. The last belongs to all sinners, the second to Adam in his state of integrity, and the first to the blessed." (II, 8.) (c) Dominion. HOLL. (475): "(a) God granted to the first man dominion over sublunary things, extending over seas and lands, but not over the stars of heaven, except as far as he converted their influence to his own advantage. (b) That dominion was not absolute and direct, but relative and useful, which denotes the inhabiting of the earth, with the use of its fruits. (c) Dominion is received either in its etymological signification for the right and power of ruling, or formally for actual ruling. In the former sense, it is the less principal part of the image of God; in the latter it was an external accident, or addition, to that image." BR. (297) cites some more corporeal excellences, viz.: "But God bestowed upon man in respect of his body also a certain image of Himself, inasmuch as not only the perfections of the soul expressed themselves through the external acts of the body, but, in addition, the members themselves, of the organic body, have a certain analogy to the divine attributes, viz.: the countenance, erect towards heaven, furnishes a semblance of the divine majesty; but particularly the immortal body, or that which could endure forever and remain free from every corruption, bears, according to the intention of God, a resemblance to the divine immortality." Yet Baier perceives that not all these excellences were lost by the Fall, and reckons them in part, therefore, as belonging to the image of God generically received. [16] Therefore the original condition of man is called a most happy one. QUEN. (II, 2): "The happiness of it appeared (1) from the condition of the soul, which was wise and holy; (2) from the condition of the body, which was beautiful, not susceptible of suffering, and immortal; (3) from the condition of life, which was happy and blessed; (4) from the condition of his habitation, which was most pleasant, truly a garden of pleasure, called Paradise." GRH. (IV, 247): "Hence it happened that man, joyful, blessed, and contented, delighted in God, his Creator, there being in him neither fear, nor terror, nor sadness." [17] BR. (296): "Therefore also this divine image was a natural endowment, or it belonged naturally to man, so that he might rightly perform his connatural acts; since, in the absence of this, his nature would not have been pure, but impure." HOLL. (477): "The image of God did not, indeed, constitute the nature of the first man, after the manner of an essential part; nor did it emanate from his nature, per se and necessarily, as if properly inseparable from it: yet it was natural to the first man, because by creation it began to exist with his very nature, and thus both belonged to him and was deeply impressed in him, and also thoroughly perfected his nature in the state of integrity, so that he could attain his end; it could be propagated, also, to posterity by natural generation." The different significations in which the word natural is used are, according to QUEN. (II, 9), the following: "Anything is said to be natural (1) by constitution (constitutive), viz., that which constitutes a nature itself, and is either the nature itself, or an essential part of it, as soul and body; (2) by sequence (consecutive), viz., that which follows nature, and flows essentially from its form, as the faculties of the soul, teachableness, etc.; (3) subjectively (subjective), viz., that which adheres most closely to nature as a natural property; (4) by way of perfecting (perfective), viz., that which perfects and adorns it internally; (5) by way of transfer (transitive), viz., that which is propagated naturally along with the nature to others. When we say that primeval righteousness was natural or connatural to Adam, we do not understand the word natural in the first or second sense, but only in the third, fourth, and fifth, viz., on account of a natural inhesion, perfection, and propagation." Original Righteousness is, therefore, not a supernatural gift, for "that is supernatural which does not belong to nature from its origin, but by special grace is superadded by God to supply its imperfection." If original righteousness, then, were said to be a superadded gift, that would conflict with Gen. 1:31. HOLL. (478): "Antithesis of the Papists, who maintain that the image of God was a supernatural gift superadded to man for the purpose of supplementing his connatural imperfection, as a wreath or garment adorns a man externally, and as the rein restrains the horse. But as the nature of man and of the horse remains incorrupt when the garment and the rein are removed, thus they suppose that the nature of man was not corrupted by the Fall, the image of God having been removed, but that it remained upright." Together with this assertion is also rejected the other concerning the status purorum naturalium. (See Note 2.) [18] On this point the Dogmaticians are not agreed. GRH., CAL., QUEN., and other call the gracious indwelling of the Trinity, etc., a supernatural gift; others, as HOLL., understand this also as a natural gift. HOLL. (484): "There are, indeed, some theologians of great reputation who think that the grace of God and the indwelling of the most Holy Trinity were supernatural to the first man. Yet, if we consider (1) that the nature of the first man never was nor ever could be upright without the indwelling and sanctification of the Holy Spirit, and (2) that original sin, which came into the place of the divine image after the fall of Adam, introduced into fallen man not only corporeal but also spiritual death (which consists in the deprivation of the mystical union of the soul with God) we agree with those authors who decide that divine grace and the indwelling of the most Holy Trinity were not supernatural, but natural, to the first man." On the other hand, HOLL. (ib.) points out as supernatural gifts "extraordinary revelation and that which is connected with it (viz., positive law and supernatural strength to fulfil it)." __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II. OF THE STATE OF CORRUPTION. "The State of Corruption is that condition into which man voluntarily precipitated himself by his own departure from the chief good, thus becoming both wicked and miserable. QUEN. (II, 48). THIS state was brought about by sin, and we have, therefore, here to treat: (1) Of sin in general. (2) Of the particular sin by which this state was brought about, as well as of the state itself. (3) Of the actual sins proceeding form it; and finally, (4) Of the powers yet remaining in man after the Fall, or, of the question to what extent man yet possesses freedom of the will. __________________________________________________________________ § 25. Of Sin in General. According to 1 John 3:4, sin is every deviation from a law of God (HOLL., 488: "Sin is a deviation from the divine Law"), whether that law be written in our hearts, or be communicated externally by positive precept. [1] It can proceed only from a being endowed with reason and free will. But from this general conception of sin it does not, therefore, necessarily follow, that every such act as may be a deviation from the Law of God must be performed with the consciousness and purpose that such a deviation from the Law of God shall take place. [2] God is in no sense the author of sin; He did not create sin in man, since of all that was created, it is said that it was good (Gen. 1:31): neither did He decree that at any particular time man should become a sinner. He has neither urged man on to that which is sinful (James 1:13), nor did He approve of sin when it entered. Much rather does He hate it at all times (Ps. 5:5; Zach. 8:17; 1 John 2:16.) [3] The origin of sin lies, therefore, only in the will of the creature who, of his own accord, departed from God, and acted in opposition to the divine command. [4] And here Satan made the beginning, and then led man also astray to sin. [5] The immediate consequence of sin is that the sinner, who broke the commandment which he was bound to obey, incurred guilt which deserves punishment. HOLL. (502): "The consequence of sin is responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment." [6] The punishment is partly temporal, partly eternal. [1] BR. (388 sq.): "By the Law is to be understood the eternal and immutable wisdom and decision of God concerning those things which belong or do not belong to a rational creature, as such, united with His will, that they may or may not be done." [2] HOLL. (497): "A sinner is a rational creature, endowed with a free will, and subject to the divine Law, who departs from it, by doing what it forbids, and neglecting what it enjoins." (501): "That which is voluntary (to ekousion), does not enter into the definition of sin generically considered. Sin is called voluntary, either subjectively, as far as it inheres in the will, or effectively, according as it proceeds from a deliberate volition. Not every sin is voluntary in the latter mode. Sin is called voluntary, either formally, which is committed by one's own volition, or virtually, which was voluntary in the root and stock of the human race, from which it has been propagated to posterity, whose will would have been the same as that in Adam, had they lived at the same time with him" [i.e., sin may be voluntary, when not volitionary] [3] MEL. (Loc. Th., 56): "God is not the cause of sin, nor is sin a thing contrived or ordained by Him, but it is a horrible destruction of the divine work and order." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 146): "The explanation also must be noted, of what is intended when it is said that God is not the cause of sin, viz., that He neither desires or approves of sin, neither does He influence the will to sin. For some understand that He is not the author of sin in such a sense, as in the beginning to create it, or to have it in Himself, or to produce it through Himself, but that men sin nevertheless by the will of God, and that God produces sins not only permissively, but also efficiently, in men and by men; yet He is not, in their view, therefore to be called the author of sin. Therefore is added, as if for the sake of explanation: author and cause of sin.'" QUEN. (II, 49): "God is in no manner the efficient cause of sin. Neither in part nor in whole, neither directly nor indirectly, neither accidentally nor per se, whether in the form of Adam's transgression or in that of any other sin, is God or can He be called, the cause or author of sin. God is not the cause of sin, (1) physically and per se, because thus the evil or sin has no cause; (2) not morally, by commanding, persuading, or approving because He does not desire sin, but hates it; nor (3) by way of accident, because nothing can happen to God either by chance or fortuitously. This conflicts with the divine wisdom, prescience, goodness, holiness, and independence, as is proved from Ps. 5:5; 45:7; Is. 65:12; Zach. 8:17; 1 John 1:5; James 1:13, 17." How God stands related to sin was shown in the discussion on the doctrine of concurrence. [4] QUEN. (II, 49): "Whatever want of conformity to Law (anomia) there ever is in a rational agent must be ascribed to the free will of the creature itself, as being spontaneously deficient in acting. Ps. 5:5; Hos. 13:9; Matt. 23:37. A rational agent, or creature, which possesses reason, and the power of knowing those things which the Law given either commands or forbids, is properly said to be the cause of sin, viz., the will of the devil and of man. But this rational agent ought to be viewed, not in respect of any real influence, but in respect of a deficiency; for sin has rather a deficient than an efficient cause." [14] [5] CONF. AUG. (19): "Concerning the cause of sin, they teach that, although God creates and preserves nature, yet the cause of sin is the will of the wicked, namely, the devil and impious men, which without the assistance of God turns itself away from God." CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 148): "The devil is the first author of sin: (1) because by his own free will he himself turned away from God; (2) because he is the cause of sin in the human race in this way, that he deceived and seduced Eve in the state of integrity, so that she departed from God." [6] HOLL. (502): "Guilt is a moral foulness or deformity, resulting from an act inconsistent with the Law and unworthy of a rational creature, and inhering in the sinner as a shameful stain. Responsibility for guilt (reatus culpae) is an obligation, by which man, on account of an act inconsistent with the moral Law, is held, as if bound, under sin and its blemish, so that in consequence of this act, the sinner is regarded and pronounced detestable." "The divine punishment is a grievous evil by which God, the offended Judge, punishes the guilt before incurred and not yet forgiven, so as to display His justice and majesty, and vindicate from contempt the authority of the Law. Liability to punishment (reatus poenae), is an obligation by which the sinner is held bound, by God, the offended Judge, to endure the punishment of the unforgiven guilt. Guilt differs from punishment. The former precedes, the latter follows. Guilt deserves punishment; punishment is due to guilt, and is, as it were, its wages. Rom. 6:23. Guilt proceeds from the will; the will of the sinner revolts from punishment. The sinner contracts guilt by his acts; he endures punishment by suffering." __________________________________________________________________ [14] Cf. Chap. IV, Note 13. __________________________________________________________________ § 26. Man's First Transgression, and the State thereby produced. viz., Original Sin. It was the first of the human family who committed the first sin. These, seduced by Satan under the form of a serpent, of their own free will, transgressed the prohibition of God (Gen. 1:16, 17) to eat of the tree of knowledge. [1] HOLL. (507): "The first sin of men is the transgression of the Law of Paradise, by which our first parents, having been persuaded by the devil, and having abused the freedom of the will, violated the divine prohibition concerning the not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and brought down upon themselves and their posterity, the divine image having been lost, a great guilt, and the liability to temporal and eternal punishment." [2] In consequence of this transgression, our first parents burdened themselves with a guilt which deserved punishment; therefore also God immediately inflicted upon them (Gen. 2:17) the punishment threatened in the event of transgression. [3] The consequence of their sin then was, that their whole relation to God, and their corporeal, spiritual, and moral state, were changed. The state of righteousness, above described, ceased to exist, and, in its place, was introduced a state of moral depravity, [4] which must therefore be transmitted to all their posterity, since they who are begotten after the common course of nature cannot be introduced into a different state from that of their parents at the time when they beget them; so that the first sin, in its results, affects not only our first parents, but also all their posterity. [5] Since, therefore, they incurred the divine wrath by reason of sin, so also are all mankind, descended from them, in a similar state; and that, too, for two reasons: first, because the state of depravity, which they have derived from their first parents, renders its subjects the objects of God's wrath; [6] secondly, because all the descendants of Adam are represented and contained in him, as the representative of the human family -- therefore, that which was done by Adam can be regarded as the act of all, the consequences of which also must be borne by all, so that Adam's sin also is imputed to his posterity, i.e., it is regarded as their own sin, because they are all represented in Adam. [7] The state of depravity which followed Adam's transgression, and which now belongs to our first parents, as well as to all their posterity, is designated by the expression Original Sin. [8] HOLL. (518): "Original Sin is the thorough corruption of human nature, which, by the Fall of our first parents, is deprived of original righteousness, and is prone to every evil." [9] According to its single parts, it is described, (1) as the lack of the Original Righteousness, which ought to exist in man; (2) as carnal concupiscence, or inclination to evil. [10] In the place of original holiness and purity, there came directly the opposite, a state thoroughly sinful and desirous of that which is evil, which in itself is sin, so that, in consequence of this constant propensity to evil, and not originally an account of actual transgressions proceeding from it, man is an object of the divine displeasure. [11] This depraved state, then, is not only the foundation and fountain of all actual transgressions, but also has, as its consequence, the wrath of God and temporal and eternal punishment. [12] Concerning this state, finally, it must be asserted, that it is natural to us in that sense in which this is said of original righteousness in the state of integrity. Were this state different, man would not cease to be man, and hence it does not constitute man's essence, but is connected with the essence, or the nature of man as he is now born, and that too in the most intimate and inseparable manner; and as no man is now born, except in that depraved state, so also this state can never be lost by man, as long as he lives on the earth. Man, when he becomes a partaker of the Holy Ghost, can indeed refuse obedience to his evil propensity; and, when redemption through Christ is apprehended by faith, he is also freed from the consequences of sin, i.e., the wrath of God and punishment; but yet the evil inclination to sin always remains in him. All this is expressed in the adjuncts of original sin, which QUEN. thus enumerates (II, 62): 1. Natural Inherence, Heb. 12:1; Rom. 7:21, which, therefore, is not a substance, but an accident. [13] 2. Natural transmissibility, Gen. 5:3; Job 14:4; Ps. 51:6; John 3:6; Eph. 2:3. [14] 3. Duration (a tenacity or obstinate inherence during life, Rom. 7:17; Heb. 12:1). [15] [1] QUEN. (II, 51): "The first sin in the human race is the voluntary apostasy of our first parents from God their Creator, by which, having been seduced by the devil, they transgressed, of their own accord, both the general divine and internal law impressed upon their mind, and the particular external prohibition concerning the not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Concerning the existence of this sin, the history contained in Gen. 3, does not permit us to doubt. By Paul it is called the transgression of Adam, Rom. 5:14, because he transgressed the divine precept by eating of the forbidden fruit. The Fall is ascribed to Adam by way of eminence, both because he was the head of the woman, and also because he was the beginning and root of the human race, from whom, as the source, sin descended to posterity. For a like reason it is called a transgression by one, Rom. 5:15, 17, and 18, where by one man the Apostle understands Adam particularly, so, however, as not entirely to exclude Eve." [HUTT. (312): "It is noteworthy that the Apostle does not say of (ex) one man,' but by (per) one man,' thus implying that the principal efficient cause was Satan."] Hence arise the following definitions: QUEN. (II, 51): (a) "The external first and principal (but remote) cause of this sin is Satan, acting here, not by internal impulse, nor by external violence (for each is repugnant to the integrity of the state in which man was originally created), but by mere external moral suasion. John 8:44; 2 Cor. 11:3; Rev. 12:9. (b) "The instrumental cause is a true and natural serpent, but possessed by the devil, Gen. 3:1, 14 (not a mere serpent, but one possessed by the devil, as is manifest from the conversation and discourse with Eve, and also from the punishment, Gen. 3:15. For the bruising of the serpent's head by the seed of the woman, which was to follow, has respect, not to a natural, but to the infernal serpent)." (c) "The internal and directly efficient cause is the intellect and will of the first man, not from any internal defect therein, which could not exist in an unfallen state, but by way of accident, in consequence of his wandering and departure from God, through seduction from without. (Man did not fall in consequence of any absence or denial of any special grace, nor from the presence of any internal languor and natural defect, but through the accidental abuse of his liberty, while his will yielded to the external persuasion and seduction of the devil, and interrupted the gracious influence of God.)" (d) The order and mode of the seduction are the following: HOLL. (511): "Eve was first and immediately seduced by the devil (HOLL. (505): Eve sinned first, not because she was more feeble in intellect than Adam, but because she was more yielding in will), while Adam was drawn mediately, and by the persuasion of the woman, into the same sin, and thus the fall of Adam is referred also to the devil, as the first author of sin." In reference to the passage, 1 Tim. 2:14, QUEN. remarks (II, 53): "These words are not to be understood of the seduction simply, but of the mode and order of the seduction; seduction is either external, through the address of the serpent from without, or internal, through the suggestion of Satan from within. In the former sense Eve only, and not Adam, was seduced." (e) The particular sinful acts which the transgression involves are: HOLL. (510): "(a) on the part of the intellect, a want of faith (incredulitas), (Eve hesitated between the Word of God, Gen. 2:17, and the word of the devil, Gen. 3:4); (b) on the part of the will, selfishness and pride, Gen. 3:5; (c) on the part of the sensuous appetite, an inordinate desire for the forbidden fruit, Gen. 3:6, from which came forth the external act forbidden by the law of Paradise." [2] HOLL. (509): "Our first parents, in their Fall, immediately violated the positive law given in Paradise, forbidding to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; mediately and really by their disobedience they broke through the restraints of the entire moral Law. The intention of the positive Law was a trial or test of obedience, which, as due to God, the whole moral Law demands. But he who fears not to transgress one precept of the Law, will not blush to violate the remainder, since they have the same author and the same obligatory force." [3] HOLL. (512, 513): "The consequences of Adam's fall are guilt and punishment. Punishment, like an inseparable companion, follows closely upon guilt. God, in His holiness, has threatened death to man, if he transgresses the Law which was given him. Gen. 2:17. By death was meant spiritual, corporeal, and eternal death. Spiritual death, the root of all evil, is the immediate consequence of the first sin. For, as soon as man turned his heart away from the divine Law, he deprived himself of spiritual union with God, who is the life of the soul, and thus, having been deserted by God, he died spiritually. This spiritual death brought with it the loss of the divine image, the entire corruption of the whole human nature, and the loss of free will in spiritual things. The death of the body follows spiritual death, or the death of the soul, including all the diseases and miseries by which man is surrounded from without. Whether also are to be referred the severe and burdensome labor which must be constantly endured by the man, Gen. 3:17, and the painful throes of parturition in the woman, Gen. 3:16. Although our first parents did not suffer the death of the body as soon as they fell, nevertheless from that time they became subject to death, since this is the wages of sin, Rom. 6:23. Eternal death is a perpetual exclusion from the beatific enjoyment of God, united with constant and most excruciating torments, which, by the force of the threatening annexed to the divine Law, Adam and all his posterity must have suffered, unless Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the human race and the Restorer of the lost image of God, had interposed." [4] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 227): "For this, too, is the misery of Original Sin, that not only the image itself of God was lost, but also the knowledge of God was nearly extinguished." KG. (80): "The effects of the first-sin, in respect of our first parents, are: the total loss of the divine image, some fragments, indeed, or vestiges remaining; the most profound depravity of the whole nature; exposure to punishment expressed in the penalty annexed to the law of Paradise; the griefs and miseries of this life; and finally death itself." [5] GRH. (IV, 315): "We must not regard the sin of our first parents and its consequences, as if they had respect only to them, and did not in any way affect us; because afterwards Adam begat a son, in his own image and likeness, Gen. 5:3. As he was, such also did he beget his children, despoiled of the image of God, destitute of original righteousness, subject to sin, to the wrath of God, to death and damnation. Adam lived, and we all lived in him. Adam perished, and we all perished in him. As when parents lose the possession of a feudal benefit, the male children also lose it, because the parents received it not only for themselves, but also for their children; so also our first parents, having been created in the image of God, had received those gifts which were bestowed by the goodness of God, like a deposit, to be faithfully guarded for themselves and their posterity; thus also, by sinning, they lost them, not only for themselves, but for all their posterity." HOLL. (523): "Our first parents are the proximate cause of this original blemish, from whose impure nature the original stain has flowed into our hearts. Everything follows the seeds of its own nature. No black crow ever produces a white dove, nor ferocious lion a gentle lamb; and no man polluted with inborn sin ever begets a holy child." [6] BR. (403) says, referring to Rom 5:12: "Therefore we must say that all sinned in one, inasmuch as, he having sinned, it came to pass that all who should be naturally descended from him would necessarily be born with sin, and thus every one on account of his own sin would become, in his very birth, liable to death, see Eph. 2:3; so that, when all men are said to be children of wrath, the cause of this guilt is taken for granted, namely, because all by nature are sinners. For to be a son of wrath is the same as to be liable to divine wrath, and worthy of punishment, on account of the violation of the Law, to be inflicted by God, the vindicator of the Law. Therefore, one could not be by nature a child of wrath, unless he were polluted by sin in his own nature or by the corruption of his nature." But BR. also adds (414): "It is not necessary, neither, perhaps, is it wise, that we should pryingly inquire how God could so impute the sin of our first parents to their posterity, not yet in existence, that they should for this reason necessarily be born destitute of original righteousness, and sinners. For it is enough that the fact (to oti) is revealed, although the explanation of it (to pwß) be unknown." GRH. (IV, 316): "Therefore that sin (of Adam) is not in all respects foreign to us, because Adam did not sin as a private man, but as the head of the whole human race; and as human nature was communicated through him, so also natural corruption was similarly propagated" . . . (327): "Because, therefore, all who are born in the natural and common course of generation are under sin, so also all are by nature children of wrath, liable to death and damnation; for it is not possible that God should not be angry at sin." [7] HOLL. (513): "The first sin of Adam, since he is regarded as the common parent, head, root, and representative of the whole race, is truly and justly imputed by God, for guilt and punishment, to all his posterity." By the sin that is imputed to us is understood (QUEN., II, 111): "That disobedience by which the first parents of the human race turned themselves away from God," etc. Therefore, also, it is said (II, 53): "Not only our first parents were the subject of the first sin, but also all their posterity to be propagated by natural generation. For Adam and Eve were substitutes for the whole human race, inasmuch as they ought to be regarded as both the natural (i.e., seminal) and also the moral source of the human race, namely, of the entire progeny in nature and grace. Hence the apostle properly says, Rom. 5:12, ef w, in whom, viz., in the first man, all sinned, or in that, because that, one sinned, all sinned, viz., in Adam, who represented the persons of all his posterity; and v. 19, by one man's disobedience many were made sinners.' That is to say, we have been made sinners through the sin of Adam, not by mere interpretation, nor even by limitation, but by the imputation of real guilt, and the propagation of natural depravity, and the participation of an actual crime. And thus the proximate cause why, when the first man sinned, all his posterity sinned, is the existence of the whole human species in the person of our first parent, Rom. 5:12. For our first parents were then considered not only as the first individuals of the human race, but also, as the true root, stock, and source of the whole human race, which in them could both stand and fall. Hence we are said to have been in the loins of our first parents." Id. (II, 111): "The first sin is considered -- I. With regard to Adam himself, who by one transgression involved all his posterity in crime, in guilt, in punishment; in so far, namely, as his will was the interpreter of the wills of all of them who, as the Scriptures say, were in his loins, whose own act the sin interpretatively is, so that they are born with the absence of the perfection that should exist. The will, I say, of Adam, as the source and root of the human race, was considered as ours, not formally, but interpretatively. For the first man had the wills of all his posterity gathered up, as it were, in his own will; whence, for himself and all his posterity, he declared his will and that of his posterity against the Law that had been given. II. With regard to God, as the Judge who, according to His mighty power, justly punishes the crime against the divine majesty also in the posterity, namely, those fallen in Adam, by the want, in so far, of original righteousness, and thus most justly imputes to them the sin of Adam unto condemnation." QUEN., however, distinguishes between immediate and mediate imputation (II, 114): "The first Adamitic sin is immediately imputed to us so far as we existed already in Adam. But the sin of Adam is mediately imputed to us, viz., as original sin is mediately inherent in us, so far as we are regarded in our own persons and individually. For no one is considered as a sinner by God and to no one is that first act imputed, except to him who descends contaminated with original sin, from the same Adam." The word to impute, QUEN. explains thus (II, 111): "The word imputation in this place is received not physically, for implanting or inserting, but relatively, for estimating. In the Hebrew language it is explained by bvj, in the Greek by logizesqai, and in the German by zurechnen; as if you would say, in computing, that you set something over to some one, or in counting or calculating, that you assign something." Imputation is proved from Rom. 5:12, 14, 19. The common explanation of the first passage is: "in whom, viz., Adam, all have sinned." But QUEN. remarks (II, 58) that "it makes little difference whether you translate ef w, in whom, or on which account. For, if it is retained as causal, it confirms our view. For thus we argue: They who die, die because they have sinned. But all mankind die, even infants and those not yet born. Therefore, they die, because they have sinned." "But infants and those not yet born, die either on account of some fault (delictum) of their own or of an actual transgression; therefore, on account of the actual transgression of another, scil., of Adam, who tainted them with his own stain. But if the other signification be received, i.e., (in quo) relatively in Adam, as root, fountain, cause, head, it is again proved that Adam's sin is imputed to all." In reference to Rom. 5:19, QUEN. remarks (II, 113): "As we are made righteous by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, so were we made unrighteous by the disobedience of Adam." In order to express himself with entire accuracy, QUEN. remarks, in addition (II, 53), that the phrase, "the fall of Adam," is taken in different senses. The one sense is, "Specifically a transgression in relation to the forbidden tree," and therefore it is, "Formally considered, the sin of the individual Adam;" in this case we say, "The Fall becomes ours by imputation only." The other sense is, "That also which flowed from this transgression, viz., the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature;" and then we must say, "It passes over to posterity, not only by imputation, but also by natural generation." We remark, in addition, that the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt and punishment of our first parents was fully developed only by the later Theologians, from about the time of CALOVIUS, but an intimation of it appears in the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., I, 9): "That fault or liability, whereby it comes to pass that we all, because of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, are under God's abhorrence and are by nature children of wrath." [8] The Scholastics distinguished "original sin originating," from "original sin originated." QUEN. (II, 115): "Active, or originating original sin, is that vicious act which our first parents committed, by transgressing the paradisaic Law, which act, indeed, has not passed over to their posterity, nor is it found in them, except by imputation only. However, it gave origin to the deep corruption of man, which is called passive or originated original sin, which is a vicious habit, contracted by Adam through that actual transgression of the divine Law, and propagated to his posterity." The word is here used in the latter sense. HOLL. (518): "In ecclesiastical phraseology, not biblical, this sin, derived from the fall of Adam is called original, and indeed, not in respect to the origin of the world or of man, but (1) because derived from Adam, the root and beginning of the human race; (2) because it is connected with the origin of the descendants of Adam; (3) because it is the origin and fountain of actual transgressions." "In the language of Scripture, this connate depravity is called: (1) indwelling sin, Rom. 7:17, because after the Fall it fixed its seat firmly in man, nor departs from him until the habitation of soul and body is dissolved; (2) besetting sin, because it surrounds us on all sides, like a long garment impeding a runner, Heb. 12:1; (3) a law in the members, Rom. 7:23, since, as a law rules and governs an agent, thus original sin directs the members of the body to the perpetration of wicked deeds; (4) an evil lying near, Rom. 7:21, because like a chain it clings to a man who wishes to do good." [9] More extended definitions. HOLL. (518): "Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, connected with a depraved inclination, corrupting in the most inward parts the whole human nature, derived from the fall of our first parents, and propagated to all men by natural generation, rendering them indisposed to spiritual good, but inclined to evil, and making them the objects of divine wrath, and eternal condemnation." QUEN. (II, 52): "Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, derived from the sin of Adam and propagated to all men who are begotten in the ordinary mode of generation, including the dreadful corruption and depravity of human nature and all its powers, excluding all from the grace of God and eternal life, and subjecting them to temporal and eternal punishments, unless they be born again of water and the Spirit, or obtain the remission of their sins through Christ." The proofs of the existence of Original Sin are drawn from Gen. 6:5; 8:21; Job 14:4; Ps. 14:2, 3; 58:3; Isaiah 48:8; John 3:5, 6; Eph. 2:3. Especially from Ps. 51:5; Rom. 5:12-14; Gen. 5:3. CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 230) thus comments on the important passage, Rom. 5:12: "(1) The efficient cause of Original Sin is shown to be the first man. (2) The subject affected by Original Sin is pointed out, i.e., that it not only adhered in Adam, but has passed into the world, i.e., into all men who come into the world. (3) The punishment is described, which is not only the death of the body, but the reign of death and the sentence of condemnation. . . . (4) Lest the guilt should be understood only as for the sin of another, without any personal fault, Paul affirms that the whole world is guilty, both in consequence of the one sin of the first man, and because all have sinned, i.e., have been constituted sinners. (5) He indicates what kind of sin it was, when he says that even they have original sin who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. (6) He describes the manner in which original sin is propagated -- he says, by one man." [GRH., IV, 322: "The chief arguments of the Pelagians are: 1. Ez. 18:20, The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.' Answer: The passage treats not of original, but of actual sins, whose penalty the son does not bear, if he desist from the sins of the guilty parent, and be converted. We invert the argument. Infants are punished by disease and death; therefore, they have sin of their own, because of which they are punished, viz., original sin propagated in them by their parents, which is no longer foreign to them, but transmitted to them, by the contagion of propagation. 2. Ps. 106:38, Infants are pronounced innocent. John 4:11; Rom. 9:11. Answer. This is to be understood relatively with respect to actual sins, and not with respect to original sin. 3. Rom. 4:15: Where there is no law, there is no transgression.' Answer: Infants are both without the Law, i.e., they are ignorant of the Law, Rom. 2:12, and yet are not without Law, i.e., they are not free from the accusation whereby the Law reproves and condemns all lawlessness. 4. If there be Original Sin, sin must be attributed to God forming infants in the womb; therefore, marriage is to be condemned.' Answer: The fault in a nature must be discriminated from the kindness of God in forming the nature. Both nature and the fault or defect of the nature are propagated: of which, the former is good; the latter, evil. 5. If the sins of godly parents are forgiven in baptism, how then do they propagate sin to their children? Answer: Carnal generation is not according to grace, but according to nature. Augustine: In begetting, he does not give that whence one is regenerated, but whence one is generated.' That which is born of flesh is flesh.' Do you ask how an unrighteous man is born of a righteous, when you see that one could not be righteous, unless he were regenerate? A grain of wheat, though freed from chaff, produces grains with chaff. Circumcised Israelites beget uncircumcised children."] [10] QUEN. (II, 59): "In form, it is an habitual want of original righteousness, Ps. 14:3; 53:3; Rom. 3:10, 11, 12, 23, united with a contrary form, i.e., the most complete corruption of the whole nature, Rom. 7:17, 20, 21; Heb. 12:1." See Symbolical Books, and especially Ap. Conf., II, 26; Form. Conc., I, 11. In reference to the former (viz., the lack of original righteousness), BR. (404) remarks: "Here belongs that death, or the want of spiritual life, and of all the active powers which are required for the exercise of vital acts in conformity with the divine Law. And this death is ascribed to men, because they are by nature children of wrath, Eph. 2:1, 5; Col. 2:13. For, as original righteousness had inhered in the faculties of the soul of the first men, and had, as it were, animated and prepared them to live a life of godliness, and to elicit and exercise among themselves actions and motions spiritually good; so, this primeval righteousness having been lost, a man is like a dead body which has been deprived, by the separation of the soul from the body, of all power to call forth in itself and to exercise vital acts and motions, because he is destitute of strength for the performance of spiritual actions and motions." In reference to the latter (viz., concupiscence), BR. (404): "For the same carnal man who, in consequence of the want of spiritual life, is like one dead, in another respect is said to be living and very active, but it is a life alien from the life of God, Eph. 4:18; 2:3. The faculties of the soul are, indeed, essentially vital faculties; and, when they are deprived of original righteousness, although they lack the powers necessary to conduct the life in a manner agreeable to God, nevertheless those powers are not lost or destroyed, as far as there is in them vitality and strength to call forth vital acts and motions. Therefore, they pursue another course of life, manifestly different from the former." Concupiscence is, therefore, predicated along with the want of original righteousness; and the following position is taken as opposed to the Papists: QUEN. (II, 135): "Original Sin, formally considered, consists not in a mere want of rectitude which should exist, or a want of concreated righteousness, but also in a state of illegality, or an approach, contrary to the divine Law, to a forbidden object; which, in one word, is called a depraved concupiscence." "Original Sin is, therefore, a depravity negative and positive: negative, without the good which should exist; positive, desirous of the evil which should not exist, i.e., concupiscence itself." The positive depravity is thus more particularly defined. QUEN. (II, 136): "Original Sin is called a positive depravity, not accurately and according to philosophical abstraction, according to which every positive entity is a good created by God, but according to the latitude used by theologians, and that (1) denominatively, as far as it includes a subjective positive act; (2) formally, as far as, besides the act in which the privation is inherent, and besides the want of that original righteousness which ought to exist, it involves also an inclination, and a wickedness directly opposite to original righteousness." The particular parts of Original Sin are then more specifically thus described by BR. (406-408): "In respect of the intellect, Original Sin implies a total want of spiritual light, so that it cannot know God aright, nor perfectly prescribe in what way He should be worshiped, nor embrace with a firm assent the things which have been divinely revealed; at the same time, also, there is a proneness of the intellect to form rash and false judgments concerning spiritual things; even also in those things which lie open to the light of nature, there is a certain impotency in the knowledge of God and the government of life. In respect of the will, Original Sin consists in a want of original holiness, or the ability to love God above all things, to perform what the intellect has dictated aright, and to restrain the appetite in a proper manner; also, on the contrary, in that the will is inclined to sinful acts. In respect of the sensuous appetite, there is a want of the obedience that is due to the higher faculties, and a rushing, as if by some impulse, contrary to them, into those things which are agreeable to the senses, although prohibited by the divine Law; the decision of reason either not having been waited for, or having been rejected." [11] CONF. AUG. II. "They teach that, since the fall of Adam, all men who are begotten in the natural way are born with sin (i.e.) without the fear of God, or faith in God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease, or original fault, is truly sin, condemning and causing now, also eternal death to those who are not born again by Baptism and the Holy Spirit." See AP. CONF. II, 38, 41. FORM. CONC., Sol. Decl. I, 6. "This evil Dr. Luther was accustomed sometimes to call the sin of our nature or person; by which he meant that, although a man should not think, speak, or do any evil (which, indeed, since the fall of our first parents, is impossible for human nature, in this life), nevertheless, the nature and person of man are sinful (i.e.) that they are wholly and completely infected, poisoned, and corrupted before God, by original sin, in their very inmost parts, and the most profound recesses of the heart; and in consequence of this corruption and fall of our first parents, the nature and person of man are accused and condemned by the Law of God, so that we are by nature the children of wrath, the slaves of death and damnation, unless we be liberated from these evils, and be preserved through the benefits which flow from the merits of Christ." QUEN. (II, 60): "This concupiscence, denoting the propensity to evil which is implanted in the depraved nature, even as it remains in the regenerate, is truly sin, because the definition of sin suits it. Therefore Paul, Rom. 7, calls it sin fourteen times, not by metonymy, that it is only the punishment of the first sin, and the cause of subsequent actual transgression, as the Papists teach, but properly and formally, because it is truly sin, whence also the Apostle names it the law of sin warring against the law of the mind, an evil, a sinning sin." [12] BR. (420): "The consequences of Original Sin are various evils: In respect of the soul, a want of freedom of the will in spiritual things, and an infirmity of the will in things natural; actual transgressions, multiplied both in kind and number; a want of grace, and, on the contrary, the anger of God. In respect of the body, diseases and other troubles, with temporal death; finally, also, eternal death or damnation." It having been urged that Original Sin in itself is not an adequate cause of eternal death, CAL. (XII, 229, sqq.) answers: "That not all infected with Original Sin are condemned, is due not to the fact that original sin is not of itself an adequate or sufficient cause of condemnation, but that by faith some obtain forgiveness, as of actual, so also of Original Sin." The passage John 3:18 being cited to show that unbelief is the only damning sin, he answers: "Unbelief condemns formally; but sins condemn materially. Unbelief is the cause of our not being freed from the condemnation, from which by faith we can be freed. ** Luther's marginal gloss on John 15:22 does not teach the contrary. For he says that Original Sin has not been blotted out except by Christ's acquiring for it expiation through His merit; aye, he adds that original sin even now condemns those who do not believe." Cf. GERHARD VIII, 26 sqq. Quen. II, 62: "Original Sin is in itself, and of its own nature, deserving of divine wrath and eternal death, although in fact accidentally, viz., through and because of Christ's merit, apprehended by faith, it does not condemn the regenerate. That is: In itself, it is always a damnable sin, although in the regenerate, it has lost, because of Christ's merit, the power to damn, Rom. 8:1. Here the Apostle does not say that there is nothing damnable in the regenerate, or those who are in Christ Jesus, but that there is no katakrima, i.e., nothing which would actually bring damnation." [13] When it is asserted, concerning Original Sin, that it is inherent naturally, two things are hereby intended: (1) QUEN. (II, 62): "That it is not a mere accident, lightly and externally attached, but internally and intimately inhering, and therefore called, Heb. 12:1, the easily besetting sin (euperistatoß); that it is an accident connate (sunemfutoß) and natural; that although it does not arise from the nature as such, yet it is produced together with it, or is connate with it; that it is not any temporary and transient accident, but is fixed and permanent." In order to keep aloof from such a view (the Pelagian), the Dogmaticians express themselves in forcible language concerning human depravity. Thus CHMN. (Doc. Th., I. 259): "There are not a few who so extenuate Original Sin, that they pretend that it is a corruption of certain accidents only, and that the substance itself of man, and especially of the soul, exists after the Fall, and remains upright, uninjured, and pure: so that this quasi impediment having been removed, the substance itself of man, after the Fall, and before the renewing of the Spirit, by, in, or of itself, has certain spiritual powers or faculties which it employs of itself to begin to complete spiritual actions. . . . The true and constant sentiment of the Church must be opposed to, clearly explained and keenly defended against, these philosophical and Pelagian vagaries, . . . viz., that the nature or substance in man, since the Fall and before regeneration, is by no means upright, pure, or sound; but that the very nature or substance of man, and especially of the human soul, is truly corrupt, vitiated, and depraved, and that not lightly or only superficially, or even in some part only; but that the whole mass (if I may so speak) of the substance, or of the human nature, and especially of the soul, is corrupted and vitiated with the deepest and extreme depravity. . . . This corruption or depravity is nothing abstract, nor an idea outside of the substance or nature of man, but is inherent in our very nature or substance, and like a spiritual poison has infected, pervaded, and diffused itself far and wide throughout all the members of our whole substance or human nature." The position of Flacius, viz., "That Original Sin is the very substance itself of man or the human soul," arose from a misapprehension or an overstraining of these views. Therefore the expression, "inherent in our nature," signifies -- (2) QUEN. (II, 62): "That Original Sin is not the very substance of man . . . but that which inheres in it after the manner of an accident; for it is distinguished in the Scriptures, Rom. 7:20, from the essence itself of man, and is called indwelling sin; now, as an inhabitant or guest is not the same as the house, so neither is sin the same as man." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. 1:33): "Although Original Sin has infected and corrupted the whole nature of man, like some spiritual poison and horrible leprosy, so that now, in our corrupt nature, these two, viz., Nature alone and Original Sin alone, cannot be distinctly pointed out to view; yet the corrupt nature or the substance of corrupt man, body and soul, or man himself created by God, in whom original sin dwells (by reason of which the nature, substance, and indeed the whole man is corrupted), and original sin itself, which dwells in the nature or essence of man and corrupts it, are not one and the same. . . . The distinction, therefore, between our nature, as it was created by God and is preserved to this day, in which Original Sin dwells, and Original Sin, which dwells in our nature, must be retained." And this is the reason why Original Sin is called accidental. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. I, 57): "Since therefore, this is an unchangeable truth, that whatever is, is either a substance or an accident, namely, either something subsisting by itself, or something elsewhere derived and adhering in a substance, . . . we must assuredly admit . . . that sin is not a substance, but an accident." To this the FORM. adds (I, 60): "When it is inquired what kind of an accident Original Sin is, that is another question. No philosopher, no papist, no sophist, yea, no human reason, can exhibit a true solution of this question; its explication is to be sought from the Holy Scriptures alone." The expressions which have been employed by CHMN. are sustained by the following distinction (Sol. Dec. I, 51): "In order to avoid logomachies, terms of an equivocal signification should be carefully and clearly explained. When, e.g., it is said: God creates the nature of man,' by the term, nature, the very substance, body and soul is meant. But often a property or condition of anything (whether it be taken in good part or bad) is called the nature of that thing; as when it is said, it is the nature of the serpent to strike and to infect with poison (here not the substance, but the badness of the serpent is expressed); in this sense Dr. Luther uses the term nature, when he says that sin and to sin is the nature of corrupt man.'" [14] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. I, 7): "And at the present time, even in this corruption of nature, God does not create sin in us, but, together with the nature which God creates and effects in men, original sin is propagated by natural generation, by seed corrupted by sin, from father and mother." Here the question naturally presents itself, in what manner this corrupt nature perpetuates itself, and "Whether the soul is propagated by traduction (ex traduce), i.e., whether, as in natural generation, the flesh of the offspring is substantially transmitted from the seed of the parent, the soul of the child is, in like manner, also transmitted from the soul of the parent?" On this subject CHMN. (Loc. Th. I, 236) says: "Luther, in his discussions, concludes that he wishes to affirm nothing publicly concerning that question, but that he privately held the opinion of traduction. It is sufficient for us to know concerning the efficient cause, that our first parents by their Fall merited that, such as they were after the Fall, both in body and mind, such also all their posterity should be procreated. But how the soul contracts that sin we need not know, since the Holy Spirit has not been pleased to disclose this in certain and clear Scripture testimonies." HUTT. also (328) says: "In consequence of this disagreement among the Dogmaticians, it has come to pass, even in our day, that there are not wanting theologians even of the highest rank who, in regard to this very question, would rather keep silent altogether (epecein) than to assert anything positively either within or beyond the express authority of Scripture." But he adds, also: "If any of our brethren should ask which opinion we think most accordant with truth, we fearlessly answer that we precisely accord with the opinion of Luther, and hold it to be consonant with Scripture, namely, that the human soul is propagated by traduction; so that, just as everything else produces its like, a lion begetting a lion, a horse begetting a horse, so also man begets man, and not alone the flesh, or the body, but also the soul is propagated essentially from its parents." (319). . . . QUEN. (II, 62): "As the soul was the first to exhibit sin (prwton deiktikon), so original sin itself, through the medium of the soul, in which it most deeply inheres, is propagated per traducem." (For a fuller discussion of this subject see § 20, Note 8.) [HUTT. (329) further shows that as soon as the opinion of a new creation of souls is admitted, one of three things follows, viz., either that the soul, as immediately created by God, is free from sin, or that it is polluted by sin, or that it is defiled by union with the body. But if God creates it sinful, or unites it with a body where the inevitable consequence is that it contracts sin, He becomes the author of sin. On the other hand, the entrance of the soul into the world in a state of integrity is contradicted by the express testimony of Scripture concerning natural depravity.] [15] It is more specifically described as follows. QUEN. (II, 62): "In Original Sin there are four things worthy of attention, to each of which a certain limit of duration has been prefixed. (1) An inflammable material (fomes, tinder) habitually inhering, or a root. (2) The sense of this tendency or root. (3) The dominion of it; and, finally, (4) Guilt. The last is removed in regeneration and justification; dominion in sanctification (not at once, but gradually and successively, because sanctification is not complete in this life); the sense of it is removed in death; the material itself, not in the incineration (since not the body, but the soul, is the first and immediate subject of sin), but in the dissolution of the soul and body." AP. CONF. (II, 35): "Luther always wrote that Baptism removes the guilt of Original Sin, although the material of sin, as they call it, viz., concupiscence, remains. He added, also, concerning its material character, that the Holy Spirit, being given in Baptism, begins to mortify the propensity to sin, and creates new motions in man. Augustine also speaks in the same manner, and says that sin is remitted in Baptism, not that it may not exist, but that it may not be imputed. He openly confesses that it exists, that is, that sin remains, although it is not imputed." [On the other hand, the Council of Trent maintained that concupiscence, in the regenerate, is not properly sin. CHEMNITZ answers (Ex. Conc. Trid., Pr. Ed., 108): "It is not a good thing, as Paul shows in Rom. 7, in many words. Nor is it an adiaphoron, or indifferent matter, Rom. 7:21. It is certain, therefore, that it is an evil. . . . This original concupiscence is forgiven, weakened and diminished in Baptism: yet not so as to be suddenly removed and altogether extinguished, as no longer to exist; for as long as the regenerate live here there must be a law of sin in their members. But the remaining concupiscence does not hinder them from pleasing God, and being heirs of everlasting life. Nevertheless this is not because this concupiscence in the regenerate has been rendered holy or indifferent by means of Baptism. But it is of God's grace, that such an evil dwelling in the flesh of the regenerate is, for Christ's sake, not imputed to them for condemnation."] __________________________________________________________________ § 27. Of Actual Sins. Original Sin is the ground and source of all actual transgressions. By these we are to understand, however, not only sins which manifest themselves in outward acts, but also those which depend upon purely internal acts of man. HUTT. (Loc. c. Th., 346): "Actual transgression is every act, whether external or internal, which conflicts with the Law of God." [1] They are numerous and diversified, and are divided, according to QUEN. (II, 65), in the following manner: I. "In respect of an internal defective cause in the agents, into voluntary and involuntary. A voluntary sin is an act by which man transgresses the divine Law, by a deliberate volition, contrary to the dictates of conscience. Involuntary sin is an act inconsistent with the Law, committed without sure knowledge or a deliberate purpose of the will." Involuntary sin is accordingly divided into sins of ignorance and of infirmity. [2] II. "In respect of the person sinning, 1, into our own sins and the sins of others. Our own sins are those which we ourselves contract, either by doing what has been prohibited, or by omitting to do what has been commanded. Those are called the sins of others, which are indeed perpetrated by others, but in which we share or participate; [3] 2, into venial and mortal. Venial sins are those which, as soon as they are committed, and at the very moment when they are perpetrated, have pardon connected with them by an indissoluble bond. Mortal sins are those which produce spiritual death at the very moment when they are committed." [4] III. "In respect of the material in which (in qua) they are committed, they are divided into internal and external. Internal are those of the heart; external are those of word and deed." [5] IV. "In respect of the material about which (circa quam) they are committed; into sins against the first table immediately and directly, and those against the second table, i.e., against God, against a neighbor, and against the person of the transgressor himself." V. "In respect of the sinful act itself: into sins of commission and of omission. Sins of commission are those which consist in positive acts which come into conflict with a negative precept. Sins of omission consist in the refusal or omission of acts which are prescribed by a positive precept." (BR. 440.) [6] VI. "In respect of the effect: into sins which cry out for punishment, and those which do not. Of the former kind are vicious acts which provoke God to vengeance, although men are silent or only connive at them. The latter are those which God endures through His longsuffering, and either postpones the punishment, or, if they have been committed by the regenerate, forgives." [7] VII. "In respect of their adjuncts, sins are divided into, 1, more or less grievous (on account of the greater or less fault or wickedness connected with them); [8] 2, into secret and manifest; [9] 3, into dead and living. Dead sins are those which indeed remain in us, but are not known as sins, or certainly not considered as great as they really are. Living sins are those which are known to be such, and rage even after the knowledge of the Law, Rom. 7:8, 9; 4, into remaining and remitted sins. A remaining sin is that which yet oppresses the sinner by its guilt and weight. A remitted sin is that whose guilt has been removed from the sinner, by the grace of God, for the sake of the merit of Christ; 5, into sins connected with hardness of heart and blindness of mind, and those unconnected with these; [10] 6, into pardonable and unpardonable sins. Of the latter class there is only the sin against the Holy Ghost. [11] This sin consists in a malicious denial of, a hostile attack upon, and a horrid blasphemy of divine truth, evidently known and approved by conscience, and an obstinate and finally persevering rejection of all the means of salvation. HOLL. (556), Matt. 12:31, 32; Mark 3:28, 29; Luke 12:10; Heb. 6:4-6; 10:26, 29." [1] CAL. (V, 311): "Actual sin is a departure from the Law, by which human thoughts and actions proceeding from the flesh transgress the divine Law given by Moses, and thus it exposes the transgressor to temporal and eternal punishment." HOLL. (537): "Actual sin is a turning away, by a human act either of commission or omission, from the rule of the divine Law, incurring responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment." QUEN. (II, 63): "The words act' and actual' in this place are used not strictly for external acts only, and sins of commission, but with such latitude that they embrace also internal vicious emotions, both primary and secondary, and also sins of omission." "In the Holy Scriptures, actual sins are called works of the flesh, Gal. 5:19; unfruitful works of darkness, Eph. 5:11; deeds of the old man, Col. 3:9; dead works, Heb. 6:1; 9:14; unlawful deeds, 2 Peter 2:8." [2] Here these further remarks are to be added: (a) QUEN. (II, 67): "Sin is here called voluntary, not because it is with the will or in the will, for thus also involuntary violations of duty would be voluntary; but it is understood here as opposed to that which is done through ignorance and inconsiderately (aproairetwß)." (b) HOLL. (542): "Voluntary sin is viewed both in respect of conscience, and in respect of the purpose of the will." Sin against conscience is fourfold. For it is committed either against a correct conscience, when a man, either by action or omission, does not follow, but despises the dictate of conscience when it agrees with the divine Law; or against an erroneous conscience, when a man, either by action or omission, turns away from the dictate of conscience imbued in error; or against a probable conscience, when any one is delinquent contrary to the dictate of the intellect, which urges, for probable reasons, that something should be done or omitted now at this place; or against a doubtful conscience, when any one does or omits that, concerning which he is in doubt whether it should be done or omitted. Voluntary sin, viewed in respect of the purpose of the will, is twofold. The one kind is that which is committed from mere malice and a will altogether free. The other is that which is committed under the power of a will influenced by force or fear, and by surrounding dangers. Matt. 26:70, 72, 74; Mark 14:68, 70, 71; Luke 22:57, 58, 60; John 18:25, 27." (c) Involuntary sins are [QUEN., II, 70): "1. Sins of ignorance, which overtake the unwilling regenerate, in consequence of the darkness of the mind, which has not been yet entirely removed by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. 2. Sins of infirmity, which overtake the regenerate without any certain purpose of sinning. Such are sinful emotions of the mind, which have suddenly arisen without their will, and whatever unlawful words or deeds are the result of inadvertence or precipitancy, and contrary to the purpose of the will, Gen. 9:21; 16:5; 18:12; Numbers 20:11, 12; Acts 15:39; Rom. 7:15; Gal. 2:12, 13, 14; 6:1." [3] HOLL. (552): "Our own sin is a vicious act, produced by a real influence of our own: the sin of another imputed to us, is an unlawful act, to the production of which we concur indeed by no real influence, yet by an efficacious intention, so that it can be justly imputed to us. (He concurs, by efficacious intention, in the sin of another, who commands, consults, consents, connives at, does not oppose, or give information, and thus is the moral cause of the sin of another), Eph. 5:7 and 11; 1 Tim. 5:22; 2 John 11; Rev. 18:4." [4] HOLL. (547): (a) "Venial sin is every involuntary sin in the regenerate, which neither removes the indwelling grace of the Holy Spirit, nor extinguishes faith, but, in the moment in which it is committed, has pardon connected with it by an indissoluble bond. The distinction of sin into mortal and venial does not arise from the desert of sin, for every sin, of itself, and by its own nature, in a court of law is damnable; but (1) From the different conditions of the subject, or the person sinning. For a venial sin exists in the regenerate, a mortal sin in those who either never were regenerated, or, having been overcome by the predominating power of the flesh, fell from a state of grace. (2) From the estimate which God has made in the Gospel; because God, a reconciled and gracious Father, does not impute to the regenerate sins of infirmity and ignorance for guilt and punishment. (3) From the event. A mortal sin precipitates the sinner into a state of wrath, death, and condemnation, so that, if he should die in this state, and without repentance, he would be certainly condemned; but a venial sin, because it has pardon as an inseparable attendant, can consist with the grace of God and saving faith." (Id. 551): "The causes of forgiveness or non-imputation are: the compassion of God, the satisfaction and intercession of Christ (1 John 2:1, 2; Rom. 8:1), the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, and the daily penitence of the regenerate." (Id. 547): (b) "A mortal sin is that by which the regenerate, having been overcome by the flesh, and thus not remaining in a regenerate state, transgress the divine Law by a deliberate purpose of the will, contrary to the dictates of conscience, and thereby lose saving faith, reject the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, and cast themselves into a state of wrath, death and condemnation." [5] HOLL. (552): "Sins of the heart are depraved thoughts and desires which are cherished within the human breast; sins of the lips are wicked words and gestures expressed by the lips; sins of deed are actions which are performed contrary to the divine Law, by an external effort of the members. Matt. 5:21, 22." [6] HOLL. (552): "Sins of commission are positive acts, by which the negative precepts of God are violated. Sins of omission are the neglect of acts prescribed by the affirmative precepts of God, James 4:16, 17. Note. Although there is oftentimes, in a sin of omission, a certain illicit positive act, either an internal act of the will, as, for example, to will to omit what had been commanded, or an external act, as an operation by which any one is hindered from that which he ought to do; yet such a positive act is not always or necessarily required, but the mere fact that one does not do what is commanded is sin." [7] HOLL. (553): "Outcrying sins are the following, the Scriptures being witness: 1. The fratricide committed by Cain, Gen. 4:10. 2. The sins of the Sodomites, Gen. 18:20. 3. The oppression of the Israelites in Egypt, Exod. 3:9; of widows and orphans, Exod. 22:22. 4. The denial of wages due to hirelings, James 5:4." [8] HOLL. (454): "One sin is more grievous than another: 1. In respect to the efficient cause or person sinning. A Christian sins more grievously than a heathen, though he commit the same crime. 2. In respect of the impelling cause. He who commits adultery with his neighbor's wife, for the sake of gratifying his lust, sins more grievously than he who steals when impelled by hunger. 3. In respect of the object. He is more guilty who slays his father than he who slays an enemy. 4. In respect of the Law. He sins more grievously who violates the first table of the Law, than he who violates the second. 5. In respect to the effect. That sin is regarded as the more grievous which is attended with the greater injury." [9] HOLL. (554): "A secret sin is that which is either unknown to the person himself who sins, or which is known only to him who sins, and a few others who wish it suppressed. An open sin is that which has become known to many, and, if it be connected with offence to others, is called a scandal. A scandal is an open sin which furnishes an occasion of sinning to those who know it. It is usually divided into given or active scandal, and received or passive. The former is an open sin which is the occasion of sinning to others; the latter is a word or deed of another, not in itself evil, by which others are offended, or take occasion to sin." [10] HOLL. (555): "Sin, connected with hardness of heart, is the most atrocious of all, by which the mind of man, having been polluted, remains averse to the Word of God and blind; the will, confirmed in wickedness, resists the Holy Spirit; the appetite indulges in beastly pleasures; and therefore the sinner, being with difficulty or not at all corrigible, brings upon himself temporal and eternal punishments. The cause of this hardness is not God, but partly the devil, who multiplies evils, blind the mind, and fills the heart with wickedness, 2 Cor. 4:4; Acts 5:3; Eph. 2:2; partly man, who rejects the ordinary means of salvation, and is continually selling himself to the desire and practice of sin, Matt. 13:15." In reference to Exod. 7:3, HOLL (492) remarks: "God does not harden men causally or effectively, by sending hardness into their hearts, but judicially, permissively, and by forsaking them. For the act of hardening is a judicial act, by which, on account of antecedent, voluntary, and inevitable wickedness, God justly permits a man habitually wicked to rush into greater crimes, and withdraws His grace from him, and finally delivers him up to the power of Satan, by whom he is afterwards driven on into greater sins, until He finally cuts him off from the right of the heavenly inheritance." [11] QUEN. (II, 74): "The word, Spirit, is not used here with respect to essence, as the term is common to the three persons of the God-head, but it is used personally, for the third person of the Godhead; yet respect being had, not so much to the person itself of the Holy Spirit, as if this sin were committed immediately against Him, as to His office and blessings, for example, as far as He strives to illuminate men through the doctrines of the Gospel. . . . Therefore, the Holy Spirit must here be viewed in relation to His office, and the sin is said to be against the Holy Spirit, partly in respect of His ministry, and partly in respect of His testimony. Rom. 8:16." GRH. (V, 85): "The Sin against the Holy Ghost, therefore, is an intentional denial of evangelical truth, which has been acknowledged and approved by conscience, connected with a bold attack upon it, and voluntary blasphemy of it. For we must observe that this kind of sin was proved against the Pharisees by Christ; for, although they were constrained by the force of the truth uttered by Him, and were convicted in their consciences by its illumination, yet they raged against Him by their wicked impiety, to such a degree that they blushed not to ascribe His doctrines and miracles to Satan. The epistle to the Hebrews thus describes those who sin against the Holy Ghost, that they, having been previously illuminated, have also tasted the heavenly gift and been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have tasted also the good Word of God, and the powers of the world to come, yet afterwards fall away, and thus crucify to themselves afresh the Son of God, and put Him to an open shame; also that, by voluntary apostasy, they trample under foot the Son of God, and esteem His blood, by which they were sanctified, an unholy thing, and do despite unto the spirit of grace." QUEN. (II, 82): "The form of the Sin against the Holy Ghost consists, (1) In a denial, by a full, free, and unimpeded exercise of the will, of evangelical truth, after the latter has been evidently and sufficiently acknowledged and approved. Heb. 6:4; 10:26, 29. (2) In a hostile attack upon the same. Matt. 12:31, 32. (3) In voluntary and atrocious blasphemy. Heb. 10:26, 29." To this the remark is added, however (Ib., p. 83): "That these essential requisites of this sin must always be taken conjointly, and never separately, and that then that must be called the sin against the Holy Ghost, concerning which all these can be conjointly verified." The following additional description flows from the nature of the subject: "Not infants, but adults, commit this sin, who are not destitute of the knowledge of the revealed Word of God, but who have been illuminated and convicted by conscience of the certainty of divine truth, and have fallen from the desire and love of it into bitter hatred against it." (HOLL., 561.) To which BR. adds (444): "Whether the doctrine had been once approved by the assent of divine faith and a public profession, or only so clearly perceived that the mind, having been convicted, had nothing which it could oppose to it. In the former mode, those apostates sin against the Holy Ghost who deny the truth once acknowledged and believed, and utter reproaches against it, as Paul describes them, Heb. 6:4. The Pharisees and Scribes belong to the latter class, who never, by their confession, approved of the doctrines of Christ. In the meantime, they were so convinced of their truth, from the Scriptures and the miracles of Christ, that they could oppose nothing but reproaches." As adjuncts of this sin, QUEN. (II, 83) adds: "(1) Final impenitence, Heb. 6:4-6; (2) Absolute irremissibility, Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28, 29; Luke 12:10; (3) Exclusion from the prayers of believers, 1 John 5:16." HOLL. (564): "It is irremissible, not through any want of divine grace, or inadequacy of the atonement of Christ, or any want of the efficacious influence of the Holy Ghost, but on account of a wicked rejection of all the means of grace, and by reason of final impenitence." On the other hand, the sin against the Son of man is remissible. Matt. 12:32; Luke 12:10. QUEN. (II, 87): "The sin against the Son of man is either a denial of the truth of the Gospel already acknowledged concerning the Son of God, who became man, resulting from infirmity of the flesh and fear of danger, but not united with a hostile attack and blasphemy, or an attack or blasphemy through ignorance of the truth not acknowledged." __________________________________________________________________ § 28. The Freedom of the Will. Since so great a change has taken place in man through the Fall, the question remains to be discussed, What powers to act does he still retain? [1] For, since all these powers are dependent upon knowledge and will, it is natural that, so far as knowledge and will are weakened or lost, these powers to act should also thereby suffer. But the question, as to the powers retained by man, is identical with that as to how far freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) in regard to his actions pertains to him [2] As, however, various opinions have often been entertained in reference to this liberum arbitrium, it is necessary, first of all, that we definitely determine the proper significance of this term. If we understand by it the will itself, then it cannot be questioned that since the Fall this still belongs to man, for without this he would cease to be man. [3] In like manner it belongs also to the nature of man that neither in his will nor in his acts, neither externally nor internally (by instinct), can he be determined by irresistible necessity. [4] All this is therefore to be predicated of man after the Fall, no less than before it, for all this belongs strictly to the essential nature of man, which suffered no change through the Fall. But, if we understand by liberum arbitrium that power of willing, in virtue of which man can act in everything, in good as well as in evil, entirely without hindrance, just as he pleases ("the liberum arbirium is that power of the will which, following the judgment of reason, enables man most freely to embrace the good and resist the evil" (HUTT., Loc. c. Th., 269)), [5] then it follows, from the change that has occurred in man through the Fall, that this cannot now be predicated of him. If this change consists in the loss of the divine image, it at once follows that man can no longer freely choose between good and evil, but has lost the power to will and to do that which is good. [6] If, then, we would describe more particularly the liberum arbitrium, as it exists in fallen man, we must say, that man, in consequence of the evil disposition that dwells within him since the Fall, is no longer able to will or to do anything really good and acceptable to God, viz., nothing of all that the Holy Scriptures designate and prescribe as such, because all of this can be accomplished only under the special influence of the Spirit of God. He is therefore so completely destitute of the liberum arbitrium in rebus spiritualibus, [7] that he cannot of his own accord even cherish a desire for salvation and a change of his present depraved condition. [8] And in this condition all that remains to him is liberum arbirium in malis (liberty of choice in regard to what is evil), [9] and liberum arbitrium in rebus externis, [10] namely, in all those things which being recognizable by the light of reason, are within the reach of the natural powers, without needing the aid of a truly good disposition. [11] [1] GRH. (V, 87): "Connection with the preceding. We have seen above in what wonderful and miserable ways original sin, like poison, has pervaded all the powers of man, how intimately the corruption arising from it has adhered to human nature, what pestilential fruits that envenomed seed has produced. It remains for us to inquire, what there is yet of strength in man." CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 179): "This is the question, What human powers are there after the Fall to produce obedience to the Law, when darkness is in the mind, aversion to God in the will, and in the heart rebellion against the Law of God? And, because not only external civil acts are demanded by the Law of God, but a perfect and perpetual obedience of the whole human nature, what, and how much can the will of man accomplish? Therefore the caption of this section would have been more clearly stated, concerning man's powers, than concerning the freedom of the will." [2] QUEN. (II, 170): "These powers remaining in man after the Fall are otherwise called the freedom of the will." GRH. (V, 87), thus explains the term liberum arbitrium, or freedom of the will: "These powers of man are best judged of from the rational soul by which he is distinguished from the brutes, and is constituted a distinct species. Two faculties belong to the rational soul, viz., mind and will: the former performs its office by knowing, discriminating, reflecting, judging; the latter by choosing and rejecting. From the concurrence of both, that is produced which is commonly called the free determination, which is a faculty of the mind and will, so that the determination belongs to the mind and the free belongs to the will." Therefore HOLL. (573): "The proper and adequate seat of free determination is the will. But the intellect concurs antecedently, and by way of preparation (paraskeuastikwß), in the execution of the free determination." QUEN. (II, 170): "The term free determination' is not given in so many words in the Scriptures; yet is found for substance, and in equivalent terms, in Deut. 30:19; Josh. 24:15; 1 Cor. 7:37; Phil. 5:14; Heb. 10:26; 1 Pet. 5:2." [3] CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 182): "There is great diversity among ecclesiastical writers, some affirming, others denying the freedom of the will. Even the same writer, in different places, seems oftentimes to express opposite sentiments on this subject, sometimes affirming and sometimes denying it. This diversity cannot be more readily settled than by a grammatical explanation of the word. For, if the term, free will, be used in the most common acceptation, it signifies nothing more than, (1) that the man who possesses it is rational, or has mind and choice; (2) that besides natural emotions and actions, concerning which there is no deliberation of mind or choice of will, a man has voluntary emotions, to the exercise of which the judgment of the mind and the inclination of the will concur; (3) and that in virtues and vices, in order that actions may be called either good or bad, an intelligent mind is required and a will which either yields to or resists the judgment." HUTT. (Loc. c. Th., 267): "Sometimes the term will,' or choice' is employed to designate the other faculty of the soul, indeed the very substance of the will itself, whose function is simply that of willing. Thus regarded, scarcely any one will deny free will to man, unless he dare assert that man is totally destitute of this faculty of the soul. The absurdity of this is, indeed, deservedly repudiated by all, inasmuch as no faculty or power of the soul can be ignored without ignoring the whole substance of the soul itself; for this is itself nothing else than what its faculties are, and when one faculty perishes it must itself expire." GRH. (V, 100): "The question is not whether the essence of the will itself has survived the Fall, for this we emphatically maintain, viz., that man has lost not his will, but the soundness of it." [4] GRH. (V, 87): "Liberty is assigned to choice in the first place, in respect of its mode of action, because it is such that the will as far as it is such, acts freely, i.e., it is not forced or violently hurried along by an external motion, nor does it act alone by natural instinct, but either embraces, or rejects something of its own accord, or from an inner principle of movement. In this sense, free and voluntary are synonymous; and to say that the will is not free, is the same as if any one would say, that that which is warm is without warmth. That is called freedom from compulsion, according to which it happens that the will cannot be forced to do anything contrary to its inclination. Also freedom from necessity, as far as necessity is employed in the sense of force and violence. Others call it interior liberty, by which the will of man is moved voluntarily, freely, without coercion, by a power implanted and with capacity to choose, and has within itself the principle of its own motion. By others it is called liberty in the subject. This liberty, since it is a natural and essential property, given to the will by God, has not been lost by the Fall. The substance of man has not perished; therefore, neither has the rational soul; therefore neither the will, nor the essential liberty of the will. The will is an essential power of the soul, and the soul is nothing else than the powers or essential faculties themselves. Therefore while the soul remains, its essential powers, intellect and will, also remain. On the other hand, the power of free and uncoerced volition is essential to the will; therefore, as long as the will remains, this power also remains. In this sense and respect we firmly believe, and emphatically declare, that the will of man has remained free even after the Fall." QUEN. (II, 171) makes a distinction between freedom from violence and constraint, and freedom from inward necessity, and remarks: "Freedom from violence is common to man with the brutes; but man has freedom from necessity in common with God and angels." The following distinction also deserves a place here: "An intelligent nature, that is at the same time infinite and divine, possesses freedom of the will in the most excellent and perfect manner; finite, or angelic and human nature, in a more imperfect manner." [5] HUTT. (Loc. c., 268): "Sometimes the term will,' or choice,' is understood to signify the capacity of determining freely to choose that which is good and freely to avoid that which is evil." In this respect, it is very properly denied that free will has remained in man since the Fall. GRH. (V, 98): "Free will in man before the Fall was that faculty of the reason and will by virtue of which he was able either to sin or not to sin." QUEN. (II, 175): "The form of free choice consists in the indifference of the will, both that which has respect to specification as well as that which has respect to the exercise of the act; that is, it consists in such indifference and freedom that the will is not necessarily determined to one thing, but, all the requisites to action being placed before it in accordance with its own liberty, it can do either this or that, can choose one and reject the other, which is freedom of specification (or specific freedom); can either act or not act, which is freedom of action (or active freedom). This liberty is also called liberty of action from the necessity of immutability,' which is exercised when one acts without being controlled by violence or coercion, at the prompting of an internal impulse that holds itself immovably to its purpose." [6] GRH. (V, 98): "If the question be concerning the liberty of rectitude, or the power of deciding either way, of choosing or rejecting either good or evil, we maintain that this has perished. For, after through sin the image of God was lost, at the same time also the power to choose the good was lost (for it was part of the divine image): and, because through sin man was not only despoiled but also miserably corrupted, therefore, in the place of that liberty, there succeeded the unbridled impulse to evil, so that since the Fall, in men corrupt and not yet regenerate (either corrupt by their own will, as our first parents, or born from corrupt parents, as all their posterity), the will is free only towards that which is evil, since such corrupt and not yet regenerate men are able to do nothing but sin." (ID., V, 100): "Understanding the term liberty' as describing the free power and faculty of choosing the good and rejecting the evil, that was possessed by Adam, we maintain that Luther was perfectly correct in saying, Free will is a title without the thing itself, or a thing with nothing but a title.'" [7] QUEN. (II, 177): "By spiritual things are understood such emotions and actions as are prescribed by the Law and the Gospel, and can be produced only by the motion and action of the Spirit of God, so that they are the true knowledge of God, according to the measure of written revelation, detestation of sin committed, or sorrow for sins, the fear of God, faith in Christ, the new obedience, the love of God and of our neighbor." CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 190): "The human will cannot, by its own powers, without the Holy Spirit, either begin interior and spiritual movements, or produce interior obedience of the heart, or persevere unto the end in the course commenced and perfect it. They are called spiritual acts because (Rom. 7:14) the Law is spiritual,' that is, it is not satisfied by any external civil actions which the unregenerate can perform; but it demands such movements and actions (1) as cannot be performed except by the agency of the Holy Spirit; (2) as unrenewed nature not only cannot perform, but even hinders the Holy Spirit in performing." The FORM. CONC. thus defines (Sol. Dec., II, 20): "Spiritual or divine things are those which have respect to the salvation of the soul." Concerning these says QUEN. (II, 178): "We assert that the powers of the unrenewed man, both in intellect and will, whether for the beginning, or continuing, or completing these entirely spiritual acts which have just now been mentioned, are not only bound, impeded, or even weakened or broken, but altogether destroyed, lost, extinct and a nullity. For, in knowing and seeking an object spiritually good, the old powers in man are not renewed, the drowsy are not awakened, the infirm strengthened, nor the bound loosed; but altogether other and new powers and faculties are bestowed and put on." The proof of this position, as to the intellect, QUEN. (II, 178) derives from Eph. 5:8; 1 Cor. 2:14; 2 Cor. 3:5; Rom. 1:21, 22. as to the will, from Gen. 6:5; Rom. 8:7; Ezek. 11:19; 36:26; Rom. 2:5; 6:17, 20; John 8:34; Eph. 2:1, 2; Col. 2:13; Ps. 14:2, 3; Matt. 7:18. This want of freedom extends so far that QUEN. (II, 178) proceeds: "To this category also we refer the going to church for the sake of receiving information from the preached Word, the reading and hearing of the Word of God with the desire of profit, the being controlled by the desire of information from the Word, all which are the operations of antecedent and receptive grace. Here belongs also the external and historical knowledge of the biblical propositions, which transmit the mysteries of faith, 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18; 5:8." In the Symbolical Books the principal passages are in the FORM. CONC. II. [8] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. II, 7): "We believe that man is entirely corrupt and dead to that which is good, so that there has not remained, neither can remain, in the nature of man since the Fall, and before regeneration, even a scintillation of spiritual power, by which he can, of himself, prepare himself for the grace of God, or apprehend offered grace, or be capable, in and of himself, of receiving that grace, or of applying or accommodating himself to grace, or by his own powers contributing anything, either in whole or in half, or in the smallest part, to his own conversion, or of acting, operating, or co-operating, as of himself, or of his own accord." The FORM. CONC. (II, 77) therefore rejects the dogma of the Synergists, "who pretend that in spiritual things man is not absolutely dead to that which is good, but only deeply wounded and half dead. And although the free will is too weak to begin and, by its own powers, convert itself to God and obey with the whole heart the Law of God, yet, if the Holy Spirit make a beginning, call us by the Gospel and offer to us His grace, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life, then that free will could by its own peculiar powers, meet God, in some way contribute (something, at least, although little and languidly) to its own conversion, aid it, co-operate, prepare itself for grace, and apply it, apprehend it, embrace it, believe the Gospel, and co-operate together with the Holy Spirit to continuing and preserving its own operations." The following positions taken by Melanchthon, in the Examen Ordinandorum: "Three causes concur in conversion, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and the Son send that He may enkindle our hearts, and our own will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God;" as also in Article XVIII of the altered Augs. Conf.: "A state of spiritual justification is effected when we are assisted by the Holy Spirit," and "Human nature cannot produce the interior emotions, true fear, etc., unless the Holy Spirit govern and assist our hearts," are therefore regarded as synergistic. CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 201) clearly comments upon the first of these proposition: "The human will does not concur in such a manner as to aid spiritual acts by its own powers. . . . But the human will is numbered among the causes of a good act, because it can resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51) and destroy the work of God (Rom. 14:20). The children of God are led by the Holy Spirit, not that they should believe or do good ignorantly and unwillingly, . . . but grace makes them willing from being unwilling, because it works to will, Rom. 7:22." [9] QUEN. (II, 176): "In the state of corruption, liberty in the will of man is not only that of contradiction or action, but that also of contrariety or specification; not, indeed, that which is employed between spiritual good and evil, for this was lost by the Fall, but that which is employed between this and that spiritual evil in particular." "By liberty of contradiction, we are to understand that liberty which is employed about one and the same object, within opposing limits, as to will and not to will, to do and not to do; by liberty of contrariety, that liberty which is employed either about diverse objects or about diverse acts of the same object." HOLL. (570). GRH. (V, 99): "There exists in man, therefore, freedom of will, along with the servitude of sin, for he both sins and is unable to refrain from sinning, while he nevertheless sins freely and delights to sin; although he is not moved except to evil, yet he chooses it freely, i.e., willingly and spontaneously, not unwillingly or under coercion, and is moved to it with all his energy. Add to this, that in the very choice of evils he exercises a certain liberty." HUTT. (Loc. c., 272): "Even in evil and vicious actions, freedom of the will is very readily conceded, inasmuch as the will, not yet regenerate, most freely, i.e., not by coercion, but spontaneously, wills, chooses, approves, and does that which is evil. Whence it happens that that which is voluntary enters into the definition of sin, so that that cannot properly be called sin which is not voluntary. . . . But it is here asked why this propensity to evil is said to be free, aye, freedom itself, since it is rather a sad and horrid service. But it is very properly replied that both assertions are true in a different respect; for this propensity of our will is properly described as both enslaved and free. Enslaved it is with respect to the lost image of God; for, since by the Fall the faculty of choosing the good and avoiding the evil was taken away, there was afterwards left a will which is so held captive under the tyranny of sin that it is not moved, except to the choosing of evil and avoiding the good. Gen. 8:21; Rom. 8:7. But, though the will be such a slave, yet it nevertheless is very properly called free, if we only have regard to the proper seat of sin, which is in the will of man. But if any one wish to assign to it also another cause, as when the Church sets the bounds of liberty concerning evil actions, that it may assign limits to human curiosity, so that the latter may not seek the cause of sin, without itself, but rather examine and discover it in itself; to this assuredly we will not object." [10] CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 183): "Augustine calls the works of the present life external things.' Because in spiritual acts there is no liberty, the will not being free, therefore, in order that freedom may not be entirely taken away from the will even in external things, this doctrine is taught concerning the freedom of the will in external discipline. But discipline is diligence in governing external actions and restraining external members in accordance with the precepts of the Decalogue; although the interior movements either may not be present or may not consent. . . . But in external things, Paul (Rom. 1:20) ascribed even to the unregenerate mind thoughts, knowledge, truth, etc. It is very evident that the mind was not despoiled of all intellect by the Fall, but that there is remaining, even in unregenerate men, some power of mind in perceiving and judging those things which have been subjected to reason and the senses, as in inventing and learning the various arts, in domestic life, politics, ethics, in counsel, prudence, etc. For this faculty makes the difference between rational man and irrational animals." MEL. (Loci. Th., 68): "Since there remains, in the nature of man, a certain judgment and choice of things which are objects of reason or sense, there remains also a choice of external civil works; wherefore the human will is able, by its own powers, without renovation, to perform in some way the external duties of the Law. This is the freedom of the will which philosophers properly attribute to man. For even Paul, discriminating between carnal and spiritual righteousness, admits that the unregenerate have a certain power of choice, and perform certain external deeds of the Law, such as to abstain from murder, theft, robbery; and this he calls carnal righteousness." HUTT. (272): "Reason and will in man are so inseparably united that neither can exist without the other, but they mutually presuppose each other; so that any concession of the existence of reason since the Fall necessarily carries with it the concession of the faculty of the will, unless any one should wish to assert that the reason could choose or refuse anything without the will, which would be supremely absurd." CONF. AUG. XVIII: "Concerning free will, they teach that the human will has some liberty to attain civil righteousness and to choose in regard to things subject to reason. But it has no power without the Holy Spirit, to attain righteousness before God or spiritual righteousness." The expression Civil Righteousness' is more fully explained in the AP. of the CONF., XVIII, 70: "We do not strip the human will of liberty. The human will has liberty of choice in works and things which reason by itself comprehends. It can in some measure attain to civil righteousness, or the righteousness of works, it can speak about God, it can offer to God a certain external worship, obey magistrates and parents; in choosing external acts it can withhold its hand from murder, adultery, and theft. Since there remains in the nature of man reason and judgment concerning things subject to sense, there remains also the choice concerning such things and the power of attaining civil righteousness. For it is this that the Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh, which the carnal nature, i.e., reason, by itself effects without the Holy Spirit. Although the power of concupiscence is so great that men more frequently obey their evil affections than their sound judgment. And the devil, who worketh in the children of disobedience,' as Paul says (Eph. 2:2), does not cease to incite this imbecile nature to various sins. These are the reasons why civil righteousness also is so rare among men." For proof, CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 185): "(1) Because Paul affirms that there is a certain carnal righteousness, Rom. 2:14; 10:3; Phil. 3:6. (2) Because Paul says that the Law is the object of free will, even among the unjust, 1 Tim. 1:9, i.e., the Law was given to the unregenerate to restrain the will, the affections of the heart and locomotion in externals." The later divines point out, as "the objects about which the will of man in the state of corruption is occupied, two hemispheres, one of which is called the lower and the other the higher." To the latter belong the things purely spiritual or sacred (sacrae internae) of which we have been speaking. To the former are referred HOLL. (577): "All things and actions, physical, ethical, political, domestic, artificial, pedagogic, and divine, as far as they can be known by the light of reason and can be produced by the powers of nature aided by the general concurrence of God." GRH. (V, 101): "For we confess that some liberty remained as far as acts are concerned which are just, in the sense of moral, political, and domestic justice, which, according to Luther, belong to the lower hemisphere. For example, an unregenerate man can control his external locomotion as he will, he can govern the members of his body by the dictate of right reason; he can, in some degree, attain civil justice, and avoid the more heinous external sins that are in conflict with external discipline. Much more can he also hear with the outward ear, and meditate upon the words of God." Yet his cannot be admitted without some limitation. HOLL. (583): "The will of regenerate and unregenerate men since the Fall has the power, in regard to different things which are subject ot reason, of choosing or embracing one rather than another, although that power is languid and infirm." This weakness arises from impediments both external and internal. Among internal impediments are reckoned the following, viz., "blindness of the intellect, which causes error in deliberations, disinclination of the will to pursue the good, and a proclivity to embrace the evil, vehemence of the affections, often so great that like a torrent it carries away with it the will and disturbs the judgment. The external impediments are the cunning of the devil, the blandishments and terrors of the world, the control of God, subverting plans and diminishing or cutting off the ability to act." HUTT. (269) divides all the actions of men into: "evil, viz., those forbidden by the Moral Law; mediate or indifferent; and good." Concerning the mediate he says: "These again are threefold, according as they pertain to the condition of our nature, such as to stand, sit, sleep, eat, drink, and such like, most of which are common to man and brutes, having mainly respect to the vegetative, positive, appetitive, and locomotive powers of the soul; or, as they pertain to our civil and domestic conduct, such as to buy, sell, go to law, go to war, to follow a trade, and whatever pertains to civil or domestic life; or, finally, such as pertain to the external government and discipline of the Church, such as to teach and hear the Word of God, to observe certain ceremonies, to give and receive the sacraments, and similar external works, affecting the external senses. We call the actions of this second class mediate or indifferent, because by their nature, or in themselves, they are neither good nor bad; but whatever of good or evil belongs to them, this they derive from other accidental causes." Concerning good actions he says: "They are twofold, either morally good, such as to live honestly, to give every one his due, not to injure another; or spiritually good, such as to have proper regard for the worship of God, for true religion, and the eternal salvation of souls." It is only the latter that he denies to the unregenerate. Of the others he says (273): "It is clear that some liberty of the will must be conceded to the unregenerate, not only as to the despotic (despotikwn) kind of actions, when, namely, the movement of the members is controlled by the command of the will, whether the affections inwardly consent or not, but also as to the freely chosen (proairetikon), when the will, in accordance with a good affection, prefers honest actions." [11] This description of free will applies to man in the state of corruption. The Dogmaticians distinguish, however, a threefold condition, "the state before the Fall, the state of corruption, the state of reparation," and in each of these conditions free will is a different thing. QUEN. (II, 176): "In the state before the Fall man was free (1) from physical necessity; (2) from compulsory necessity; (3) from the servitude of sin; (4) from misery; (5) from the necessity of immutability; not, however (6) from the necessity of obligation" ("which is the determinative direction of the will for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, according to the rule of a higher law," HOLL. (571).)." QUEN. (II, 183): "In the state of reparation. The restoration of the integrity lost by the Fall is either that commenced in conversion or that completed in glorification; the former occurs in this life, the latter in the life to come. In the state of incipient restoration there exists in man, when converted, or after his conversion, a freedom in relation to an object supernatural or purely spiritual, not only from physical necessity, but also from the necessity of immutability, because his will is no longer determined to evil, as before his conversion, but it can freely choose good, by the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting and co-operating; it can also choose spiritual evil in consequence of the remains of a carnal disposition still adhering to him. In the state of consummated restoration, or in eternal life, there will succeed a full and perfect freedom of the human will, not only from compulsion and from the servitude of sin, but also from misery, and from the root and sense of sin; and also a liberty from internal necessity or immutability, as well that of contrariety (or, as to what relates to the kind of sin) as that of contradiction (or, as to whether the power to sin shall be exercised or not)." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. II, 67): "There is a great difference between the baptized and the unbaptized. For since, according to the teaching of Paul (Gal. 3:27), all who are baptized put on Christ, and are truly born again, these now have free will, i.e., have again been made free, as Christ testifies (John 8:36). Whence, also, they not only hear the Word of God, but also, though not without much infirmity, can assent to it and believingly embrace it." __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ PART III. OF THE SOURCES OF SALVATION. § 29. Sources of Salvation. If man is to be redeemed from the lost condition in which he lies since the Fall, this can be accomplished only through divine grace. This exhibits itself in three acts, one of which proceeds from the Father, another from the Son, and the third from the Holy Ghost. The Father is moved with compassion towards fallen man, and this impels Him to the gracious determination to effect redemption by the sending of the Son. The Son accomplishes this redemption, and the Holy Spirit offers to man the means whereby he can appropriate it to himself. The third part of our work therefore treats: I. Of the benevolence of God the Father towards fallen man, who is to be delivered and blessed; II. Of the fraternal redemption of Christ; III. Of the grace of the Holy Spirit in the application of redemption15 1 5 HOLL. (585): "The sources of salvation are the acts of divine grace, upon which the eternal salvation of men depends. The Saviour Himself, John 3:16, points to these three sources of salvation. God, by loving the world, and giving His Son as Mediator, manifests His benevolence. The Son was given to rescue from destruction the world, i.e., the entire human race inhabiting this earth, and thus to become its Redeemer. The means of enjoying the redemption of Christ is true faith, fixed in Christ's merit, which the Holy Spirit (inasmuch as He is called the spirit of faith, 2 Cor. 4:13) enkindles by His efficacious working through the Word and Sacraments." QUEN. (III, 1): All three persons of the Godhead have been occupied in the procuring of human salvation. The Father loves those who have fallen, the Son redeems those who have been loved, and the Holy Ghost calls and teaches those who have been redeemed." __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I. OF THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD TOWARDS FALLEN MAN. [1] __________________________________________________________________ § 30. Benevolence of God. The gracious will of God, to deliver fallen men from their ruined condition, is the first thing we have to consider, for it is this that originates the sending of the Son, who accomplishes the redemption, and the sending of the Holy Spirit, who applies it to individual persons. This, His gracious will, God at once announced in His promise (recorded in Gen. 3:15). But God did not then, for the first time, form this purpose of redeeming man; for, as He foresaw from eternity that he would fall, He determined at the same time both to create and to redeem him. [2] This purpose of God, however, will, in time, be accomplished only in the case of those who fulfil the condition upon which redemption is to be applied. Therefore we distinguish this gracious will of God into general and special benevolence. I. The gracious will of God is called the universal or general will (benevolence) when it is considered in itself, as it refers to all men alike miserable, and it is exhibited in preparing the means of redemption for all, and effectually offering the same to them, without for the present considering the manner in which men treat the grace thus offered to them. [3] HOLL. (586): "The universal benevolence of God is that act of divine grace by which God, having witnessed the common misery of fallen men, is moved not only earnestly to desire the salvation of them all, but also to give Christ as Mediator for its accomplishment, and to appoint appropriate and efficacious means with the intention that all men should use them, attain through them true faith in Christ, and possess and enjoy eternal salvation, procured through Him, to the praise of the divine goodness." This will is also called antecedent, inasmuch as, in the nature of the case, it antedates all question as to the manner in which man may treat the offered grace. [4] It refers to all men alike (universally to all, without a single exception. John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:4; Rom. 11:32; Acts 17:30, 31; Tit. 2:11; 2 Pet. 3:9; Ezek 33:11), [5] depends alone upon God's compassion for the wretched condition of man, and has in no sense been called forth by any merit or worthiness of man. [6] This will of God, moreover, earnestly and sincerely proposes that all men obtain salvation through Christ, [7] and God offers unto all the necessary means, and is ready to render these available for them. [8] Meanwhile this will of God is still not as absolute and unconditional as is the compassion of God towards man, from which the plan of salvation has proceeded; that is, this will of God aims at saving men through the merits of Christ and the appropriation of the means of redemption as furnished to them. [9] The statements concerning the universal will of God may accordingly be summed up under the following characteristics: It is (1) gratuitous and free (Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32; 8:32); (2) impartial (Rom. 3:22); (3) sincere and earnest (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11): (4) efficacious (Rom. 2:4); (5) not absolute, but ordinate and conditioned (John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:6; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 1:4, 9, 10. [10] The universal will of God is distinguished from -- II. The Special Will of God. -- Thus this same [11] will of God in reference to the salvation of men is designated, when we view it in connection with the divinely foreseen conduct of men towards the offered grace, as the condition upon which they are to be saved. HOLL. (586): "This special benevolence of God is that which induced Him to bestow eternal salvation upon sinners who embrace the means of salvation offered to them." Although the will of God is general, inasmuch as God's disposition is equally gracious toward all men, and inasmuch as for their salvation He has prepared a plan of redemption in the sending of His Son, available equally for all; yet it already follows from the above distinction, according to which the general will of God is not absolute, but ordinate and conditioned, that the accomplishment of this gracious will is conditioned by the conduct of man towards the offered grace. If the aim of the will of God, considered in itself, without regard to this conduct of men, be that all are to be saved by the plan of redemption through Christ, yet its aim, more specifically described, is that only those shall be saved who accept of the salvation offered and persevere therein, and it refers only to these. This will of God, thus more specifically described (the special will of God), is also called consequent, because the divine foreknowledge of the proper conduct on the part of man precedes it; and it is also designated as particular, because it refers not to all men, but only to those to whom God foreknows that they will properly treat the offered grace. [12] (Eph. 1:1; James 2:5; Rev. 2:10; 1 Tim. 1:16; John 17:20.) From this special benevolence of God, which is based upon the universal benevolence of God, and proceeds from it, there comes forth the purpose of God, [13] which is called predestination [14] or election; [15] the purpose, namely, to save through the merits of Christ the definite number of those whose right treatment of the offered grace God had foreseen. HOLL. (604): "Predestination is the eternal decree of God to bestow eternal salvation upon all of whom God foresaw that they would finally believe in Christ." [16] In virtue of the universal benevolence, salvation is provided for and offered to all, but the purpose of redemption is accomplished not with all, but only in the case of a definite number of men; the reason of this, however, lies in the special benevolence, in virtue of which only those really are to be saved who truly accept by faith the offered salvation, and persevere in this faith. [17] But God, by His foreknowledge, eternally foresees who these will be, and this foreknowledge is the ground upon which the purpose of God, embracing only a definite number of men, is eternal. [18] The decree of God is still further defined as (1), not absolute, but ordinate (determined by a certain order of means) and relative (1 Cor. 1:21), [19] i.e., there is no arbitrariness on the part of God, if He include a number of persons among the elect, and exclude others, for His purpose depends upon the observance of the order to which salvation is bound ("The apostle does not say that God absolutely wills to save all, in whatsoever manner they may conduct themselves, but that God wills that all may be saved, that is, by certain means." QUEN.), and He has respect, therefore, in forming His purpose, to man's conduct towards this appointed order of salvation. But this decree is also (2), not conditional, but categorical and simple, i.e., God does not allow it to be still doubtful, in time, whether He will bestow salvation upon this or that man, as though His purpose were only to save this or that man, if or after he may have laid hold upon the merit of Christ; but, by virtue of His foreknowledge, He recognizes in advance those who will lay hold upon the merit of Christ, and only to these does His purpose refer, and thus it is simple and categorical. [20] Hence it follows, therefore, also (3), that the election (taken in its strictest sense), because it rests upon an eternal decree of God, is immutable and irrevocable (so that an elect person cannot become a reprobate, Matt. 25:34; James 2:5; Matt. 24:24; 1 Pet. 1:2, 4; John 10:28; Dan 12:1; Rom. 8:29, 30); for God would not have correctly foreseen if His purpose would have to suffer change (election is immutable, because based upon an ordinate decree and because of the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge). Though the elect may for a while fall into sin and from grace, this cannot continue forever, and they cannot fail of eternal salvation. [21] The attributes or adjuncts of election and of the elect may be thus compendiously stated (QUEN., III, 20): "I. The attributes of election: (a) Eternity (Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2 Thess. 2:13; Matt. 25:34); (b) Particularity (Matt. 20:16); (c) Immutability (2 Tim. 2:19; Matt. 24:24; 1 Pet. 1:4; Rom. 8:29, 30). "II. The attributes of the elect: (a) Paucity (Matt. 20:16: 22:14; (b) Possibility of totally losing, for a while, indwelling grace (Ps. 51:12; 1 Cor. 10:12); (c) The certainty of election [22] (Luke 10:20; Rom. 8:38; 2 Tim. 4:8: Phil. 2:12); (d) Final perseverance in the faith (Matt. 10:22; Rev. 2:10)." In contrast with predestination stands reprobation. [23] As God foreknows those who will preseveringly believe in Christ; and as, in view of this, He forms His purpose to save these, so also, in the same way, His purpose of condemnation embraces the definite number of those who are lost; and therefore reprobation is "that act of the consequent divine will by which God (before the foundation of the world) through His vindicative justice, and for its perpetual glory, adjudged to eternal condemnation all contumacious sinners, of whom He foresaw that they would finally reject the proffered grace of the call and of justification, and would depart this life without faith in Christ." (HOLL. 643.) All the specifications referring to this topic correspond to those given concerning Predestination. The "internal exciting cause is the vindicative or punitive justice of God (Rom. 2:8); the external exciting cause is the rejection of the merit of Christ, i.e., the foreseen apistia or final incredulity (Mark 16:16; John 3:36)." [24] The form of reprobation, however, consists in "exclusion from the inheritance of eternal salvation, and in adjudication to eternal punishment according to the purpose and foreknowledge of God (Matt. 25:41)." Thus the attributes of reprobation and of the reprobate correspond to those of election and the elect. The attributes of reprobation are: (a) Eternity (Matt. 25:41; Jude 5:4); (b) Immutability (Numb. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Mal. 3:6)." The attributes of the reprobate are: "(a) Plurality (Matt. 7:13); (b) Possibility of being for awhile in the state of the truly regenerate; (c) Perseverance in final unbelief." OBSERVATION I. -- The foregoing representation, as here developed, belongs to the later period. GRH. is the first who, with special reference to earlier scholastic distinctions, presented the doctrine in this form; while the earlier theologians, in their statement of this doctrine, adhered to the definition which in Note 14 we designate as the second. That is as follows: "God determined from eternity to save those who would believe upon Christ." Thus the FORM. CONC. When, however, the later theologians undertook systematically to present what can be said concerning predestination, the statement of the FORM. CONC. did not seem to them sufficient, because the purpose of God to save all who would believe on Christ could not be so indefinite in His own mind as was expressed by the words, "all those who would believe." This purpose of God, they supposed, must rather be so positive that the definite number of those who should be saved must be known to Him, as otherwise it might be maintained that God would allow it to remain undecided until in the course of time which persons are to be saved; which would be inconsistent with the assumed eternity of the purpose. From this effort to express themselves accurately originated the definition of predestination in the strictest sense, as also the distinction between proqesiß and proorismoß. But to avoid the error of assuming that, if the number of the elect was fixed from eternity, their reception among that number in time was for that reason no longer conditioned by the conduct of men with reference to the offered grace, but depended upon an absolute and hidden decree of God, the further specification was added, that God, by virtue of His foreknowledge, antedating the purpose itself, from eternity foresaw who those would be who would accept the offered grace. (A specification which, indeed, is not unknown to the FORM. CONC., cf. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, but which was not then introduced into the definition of predestination.) And then there was added by the later theologians the distinction between the general and special will of God, which was meant to show that the will of God to save was, indeed, in itself considered, and without reference to the conduct of men, general and applicable to all; but that, as the actual conferring of salvation was dependent upon the conduct of men with reference to it, as soon as reference was had to this, it then became special, and referred then only to those who conducted themselves properly with reference to the offered salvation. By all these further specifications, however, the doctrine of predestination was only more accurately stated, and not in any wise altered. OBSERVATION II. -- The question, whether the foreknowledge of God does not necessarily determine the fate of men, so that human freedom is thereby abolished, is not discussed by any of the theologians in this connection. CHMN. (Loc. c., I, 162) endeavors, in the discussion of the cause of sin, to meet the above objection by remarking that the foreknowledge is no act of the will, and that therefore the future is not determined by it. "The fact, whether past or future, does not depend upon knowledge, but knowledge upon the fact, . . . and it was rightly said by Origen, yet we judge by common consent concerning foreknowledge, not that anything will happen because God knows that it will, but that, because it will happen, God already knows it.'" And so also the later Dogmaticians. QUEN. (I, 539): "That same divine foreknowledge or foresight does not depend upon any divine decree, nor does it of itself impose any necessity upon things foreseen, nor remove their contingency, although in itself it is certain and infallible." (Compare the specific statements in § 21, Note 4.) The FORM. CONC. appears to regard this question as belonging to the domain of the inexplicable and mysterious, the prying into which constitutes no part of human duty. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, 55. [1] HUTT. (l. c., 768, sq.) introduces the doctrine with the following words: "The apostle in his golden epistle to the Romans, having treated the subject of Divine Predestination very extensively and accurately, at length, as though having passed into a stupor, as he surveys somewhat more deeply the exhaustless abyss of the divine mysteries about this article, breaks forth in the almost unaccustomed exclamation: O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out.' Rom. 11:33. This exclamation has caused most of the orthodox Fathers to treat the article of Predestination too cautiously and briefly; and even to-day there are some who regard its consideration imprudent and useless, nay, rather troublesome and painful; who affirm that it cannot be presented, in an assembly of hearers, without great danger; and who apply to this the trite proverb, Noli me tangere. While we, indeed, think that the modesty and care of the ancient Fathers deserve praise, we, at the same time, neither can nor ought, in any way, to approve the excessively severe judgment of some later teachers. For if the consideration of this article ought to be regarded imprudent, certainly Christ and the apostles can scarcely be defended from the suspicion of temerity, since they often, and indeed accurately and publicly, presented and explained to their hearers the subject of Predestination. If you except the one article of Justification, there is scarcely any other theological topic which the Holy Spirit has so fully unfolded in the Scriptures of the New Testament, Matt. 28:22, 31; Mark 13;20, 22, 27; Luke 18:7; Job 13:18; 15:16; Rom. 8:30; and almost the entire ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters; 1 Cor. 1:27, 28; Eph. 1:4, 5; Col. 3:42; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2:10; Tit. 1:1; 1 Pet. 1:2; Rev. 17:14. As, therefore, those things which God has wished to be secret are not to be investigated, so those things which He has revealed are not to be denied or concealed; in order that we may not be found unlawfully curious in regard to the former, or culpably ungrateful in regard to the latter. . . . These matters being considered in such a manner that we can be occupied, profitably and with a good conscience, in the explanation of the mystery of eternal predestination, we are thoroughly convinced, nevertheless, that, just as we confine ourselves within the bounds and limits of the Divine Word, we will err neither in excess nor defect. But here we must especially observe the caution, to attend well to the source whence judgment concerning this article can and should be sought and framed. Moreover, the Book of Christian Concord teaches correctly, that outside of and beyond the Word of God no place for weighing this mystery should be left for human reason. . . . Furthermore, neither is Predestination to be sought immediately in God Himself, whom no one has ever seen. But it is the Word of God alone from which the entire treatment of this mystery is to be solely sought; as, in it, nothing has been omitted that at all pertains to the mystery of our salvation and election: nay, rather, according to the testimony of the apostle, the whole counsel of God has been revealed in it to us. Acts 20:27. . . . This Word is nothing else than the Gospel of Christ. As, therefore, we have the will of God revealed in the Word of the Gospel, we declare that this itself must be considered the eternal and immutable decree; and the counsel and purpose of God is the ground both of our eternal election and salvation, because in God there are not contradictory wills." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. XI, 9, sq.): "Still this eternal election or ordination of God to life eternal must be considered not merely in that secret, heavenly, and inscrutable counsel of God, as though the election comprehended or required nothing more, and in thinking upon it nothing more required to be taken into account than the fact that God has foreseen what men and how many will attain salvation, and who and how many will perish eternally, or as though the Lord would make a military review, and would say or determine, This one is to be saved, but that one is to be damned; this one shall persevere steadfast in faith to the end, but that one shall not persevere.' For, from this opinion, many derive absurd, dangerous, and pernicious thoughts, which produce and strengthen, in the minds of men, either security and impenitence or distress and despair. . . . (13) Wherefore, as we wish to think or speak correctly and with profit concerning the eternal election or predestination and ordination of the sons of God to eternal life, let us accustom ourselves not to endeavor, by our reason, to investigate the mere, secret foreknowledge of God, which no man has explored and learned to know. But let us meditate upon the divine election according to the manner in which the counsel, purpose, and ordination of God are revealed to us, through the Word, in Christ Jesus (who is the true Book of Life). Therefore, let us comprehend at the same time, in thought, the whole doctrine concerning the purpose, counsel, will, and ordination of God (namely, all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation)." [2] GRH. (IV, 146): "After Adam with all his descendants had been ensnared, by the Fall, in the toils of eternal death, and no other remedy could be found for this evil, by the wisdom either of men or angels; God, coming forth from the secret seat of His majesty, revealed the adorable mystery concerning the restoration of the human race, through His Son, Gen. 3:15. From the fact, therefore, that God, in fulfillment of this first promise, sent in the fulness of time His own Son, born of a woman, Gal. 4:4, we infer that God from eternity had made a decree concerning sending His Son into the flesh, that, by His obedience and satisfaction, the wounds might be healed, which the infernal serpent had inflicted upon man, and the blessings lost by the Fall might be restored." [3] QUEN. (III, 1): "The most kind and merciful, universal will of God the Father towards fallen men embraces within its bounds all men in general who have been placed in misery, and has, according to our method of conception, two acts; of which the first is the pity of God, by which He inwardly and sincerely lamented that the human race, and indeed the whole of it, had been deceived so basely by the fraud of the devil, and, through the Fall, had been cast into instant, and that, too, eternal ruin; and by which He willed to deliver it from evil, and, provided it could be done without any injury to His justice, to recover for the same its lost salvation. The second act is that by which God, moved by this pity and love to man, made a decree concerning the liberation of the human race, through the sending of His Son, and the revelation of the same through the Gospel, to the end that all might believe in Him and thus be saved. For upon the interposition of His Son, offering and promising a most perfect satisfaction, God mercifully ordained from eternity in His Son to restore all, and give them eternal life." [4] GRH. (IV, 169): "The antecedent will is so named, because it precedes the consideration of the obedience and disobedience of men, and consists simply in that aspect of the divine will in which we regard the beneficent will of God as disposing itself equally towards all." HOLL. (586): "The antecedent will is that by which God wills the salvation of all fallen and wretched men, and for attaining this has given Christ as a mediator, and has ordained those means by which the salvation acquired through Christ, and the strength for believing, are offered to all men with the sincere intention of conferring such salvation and faith." [5] HUTT. (Loc. c., 792): "In this antecedent will of love and mercy in God, not even a single individual of the entire human race has been neglected or passed by, even the son of perdition not being excepted, John 17:12. The full force of this assertion is, that God desired the salvation of all mortals,; that he destined His Son as the Redeemer for the whole world equally; that He willed to offer these blessings to all in common, even to those who indeed do not actually hear this Word, who do not actually believe, who are not actually saved; yea, even to those who God foreknew would not hear His Word, would never believe, and also never be saved." The passages which ordinarily are quoted against the universality of grace, are Rom. 9:18, 19; 9:11-13, 22. In reference to Rom. 9:19, QUEN. (III, 12): "From this passage the Calvinists frame an argument like this: The will of which Paul speaks is absolute. But it is the will to save and to destroy, of which Paul speaks. Therefore, the will to save and to destroy is absolute.' Reply: The minor premise is false. For, indeed, it is the same will in both cases; yet there is a difference between willing the same absolutely, and with a condition." In reference to Rom. 9:28, HOLL. (594): "(a) THe apostle speaks not of the general, or universal, but of the special mercy of God, by which He justifies those believing in Christ (v. 30), and therefore he does not treat of the antecedent but of the consequent will of God. (b) The mercy of God is indeed free, but it is not absolute. . . . (c) God hardens whom He wills by sending upon them hardness, not causatively but judicially." . . . In reference to Rom. 9:11-13 (QUEN. III, 12): "(a) The text does not speak of Esau and Jacob, in their persons, but of their descendants. . . . (b) It does not give this testimony with reference to eternal predestination to salvation, or reprobation to destruction. Therefore, the Calvinists are inconsiderate in assuming that the love for Jacob, and the hatred towards Esau, relate to love of the former for life, eternal and absolute, and the reprobation of the latter to death eternal and absolute; but the apostle treats, Rom. 9:10, 11, of the rejection of the Jews from the outward superiority which they enjoyed in the course of so many ages, and the reception by the Gentiles of those prerogatives which the Jews claimed for themselves alone. If the discussion had been concerning election, from the opinion of the Calvinists this absurdity would follow, viz., that all the descendants of Jacob have been saved, and, on the other hand, all the descendants of Esau have been condemned. Therefore the sense of the passage is: I have not brought or granted as much blessing to the descendants of Esau as I have to the descendants of Jacob, and thus I have preferred the latter to the former; I have loved them less (the word hatred is thus employed, Luke 14:27; Matt. 10:37)." In reference to Rom. 9:22, "From these words it is clear that God has indeed prepared vessels of mercy for glory, but vessels of wrath are not said to have been prepared by God, but to have been tolerated by God with much long suffering. Wherefore, men hardened not by God, but by themselves, and by their own wickedness and voluntary perversity, have become vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, because they despise the counsel of God against themselves, Luke 7:30." [6] HOLL. (599): "The mercy of God has been called forth by no merits, Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32. Pity for the sinner does not move God causally, but only affords an occasion, and presents an object for pity, towards which, while He is able, yet He is under no obligation, to exercise filanqropia. For in man there is no impelling cause whatever." [7] HOLL. (599): "The benevolence of God towards the fallen human race has not been feigned or counterfeited, but is earnest and sincere; because, in the caring for human salvation, the will of the sign conspires most harmoniously with the will of the divine purpose, the precept and promise with the divine intention. He acts the hypocrite who promises one thing with his mouth and another with his heart; to think this of God is a crime." HUTT. (Loc. c., 792): "The truth of this statement is evident from clear testimonies of Scripture, 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9; Matt. 23:37; Ez. 18:32. Finally, the same is manifest from the use of the oath in most solemn attestation, Ez. 33:11." [8] HOLL. (599): "The benevolence of God is not an empty vow, a fruitless wish, an indifferent complacency, by which one does not long to effect or obtain the thing which pleases him and which in itself he loves, and, therefore, is not willing to employ the means leading to that end; but it is an efficacious desire, by which God seriously intends, through sufficient and efficacious means, to effect and obtain the salvation of men, in which He is most ardently delighted, Rom. 2:4. The antithesis of the Calvinists states that God indeed, by His will, manifested in Scripture, or that of the sign (signi), wishes all to be saved; but by His secret will, which they call that of His purpose (beneplaciti), that He wishes to save the elect alone." (QUEN., III, 7.) CF. __________________________________________________________________ § 18, Note 13. [9] HOLL. (600): "Although the first compassion of God, by which He pitied the human race that had fallen into sin, and in fact the appointment of a Mediator, and the administration of the means of salvation, are absolute, yet the merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but relative and limited by justice, because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied." QUEN. (III, 5): "It is founded in Christ, and is limited to the ends and means by which He is moved." In regard to the will of God, in general (HUTT., Loc. c., 782): "The will of God, in this mystery, is not considered according to its own most simple essence; it is distinguished only according to our understanding, and access to it does not lie open to our mind; but by reason of His act, with respect to things created, God goes forth beyond His own essence. According to the former method of consideration the will in God is just as indivisible as it is impossible for the essence of God itself to be divided into parts. But, according to the latter method of consideration, namely, as the will of God goes forth beyond its essence to creatures, it is twofold. For, whatever God wills to take place in created things, He wills either simply or with a determined mode or condition. The former will is commonly called, in the schools, absolute, and is joined with the immutable necessity of the event; according to this He calls those things which are not, as though they were, Rom. 4:17. . . . The latter will if fulfilled in no other way than by the fulfilment of the predetermined mode or precise condition; when this is not fulfilled, it likewise comes to pass that that does not occur which God has notwithstanding especially willed should occur. The former is to be altogether separated from this mystery, and to be relegated to the schools of the Stoics and Calvinists . . . but the latter, namely, the modified or limited will of God, enters into the act of the present mystery." [10] HOLL. (600): "The benevolence of God is ordinate, because God from His most profound counsel established a fixed taxiß or series of means, to which, in the conferring of blessedness upon sinners, He has regard. These means are the Word of God and the Sacraments, by which God seriously intends to call sinners to the kingdom of grace, and convert, regenerate, justify, and save them. By this ordinate will God wishes not only that all men be saved, but also that all men come to the knowledge of the truth. The will is called conditionate, not as though God wills only the end, and does not will the means, or wills the end under a condition which He Himself from His mere purpose is unwilling should be fulfilled in many; but as God, willing that men should be saved, does not will that they should be saved without regard to the fulfilment of any satisfaction or condition, but should be led to salvation under the condition of determined means." Hence the proposition concerning the universality of grace is more specifically expressed thus: "God wills, through ordinary means, to confer saving faith upon all men." (Ib.) [11] GRH. (IV, 169): "Moreover this division (into antecedent and consequent will) distinguishes not the will by itself, which in God is one and undivided, just as the essence also is one; but its twofold relation. In the antecedent will, regard is had to the means of salvation, in so far as, on the part of God, they have been appointed and are offered to all. In the consequent will, regard is had to the same means, but in so far as they are accepted or neglected by men." HUTT. (l. c., 783): "This distinction was introduced into the Church because of those passages of Scripture which bear witness that the will of God is not always done or fulfilled, e.g., Matt. 23:37; 1 Tim. 2:4." [12] HOLL. (586): "The consequent will is that by which God, from the fallen human race, elects those to eternal life who He foresees will use the ordinary means, and will persevere to the end of life in faith in Christ." More specific definitions. HOLL. (587): "The will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent. (1) Not with regard to time, as though the antecedent will preceded the consequent in time; for, as God is free from any limitations of time, He does not have any will which anticipates another in time. (2) Neither with regard to the divine will itself, as though two actually distinct wills in God were affirmed; for the divine will is the essence itself of God, and a connoted object, conceived under the mode of an act of volition. (3) But the will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent, from the order of our reason, distinguishing the diverse acts of volition in God, according to a diverse consideration of the objects, and regarding one act before the other, so that it is only indicated that the antecedent will precedes the consequent in that which is the image of the divine reason: because, according to our mode of conception, God's willing eternal salvation to men, and His providing the means of grace, are anterior to the will of the same to confer in act eternal salvation upon those who would to the end believe in Christ, or to assign eternal condemnation to the impenitent." QUEN. (III, 2): "The antecedent will relates to man, in so far as he is wretched, no regard being had to circumstances in the object; but the consequent will is occupied with certain circumstances in reference to man, namely, as he is believing or unbelieving." [HOLL. (588): "Wherefore the antecedent and consequent wills of God are not opposed to each other in a contrary or contradictory manner, but are subordinated to one another. The latter is materially contained in the former, and passes into it when the condition is assumed. This I prove thus: By His antecedent will, God wills that all men be saved if they believe to the end. But those using aright the ordinary means of salvation, are those who finally believe. Therefore the antecedent will of God is not overthrown, abolished, or removed by the consequent, but rather passes into the same when the condition is fulfilled."] "The antecedent respects the giving, and the consequent, the receiving of salvation on the part of man. The former is universal; the latter, particular. The former precedes. the latter follows, a purified condition. In the former, salvation is regarded with reference to the means, as on the part of God, these have been established and offered equally to all men. In the latter, the same salvation is regarded with respect to the means, but in so far as these are either accepted or neglected by men. The will of God, pertaining to that which is antecedent (antecedanea), defines what men ought to do, viz., to hear the word of God, through its hearing to receive faith, to apply to themselves the merit of Christ, and by means of this faith to be saved. The consequent will considers what men in fact do or do not, whether they obey the antecedent will or not, i.e., it considers who in fact use the means of salvation established by God and who do not, who hear the Word of God and believe in Christ and who do not." HUTT. (l. c., 794): "In the antecedent will (prohgoumenh) faith is considered as a part of the order which God, so far as it pertains to Himself, desires should be observed. In the consequent will (epomeuh) the same is considered not only in the manner in which God desires His own order to be observed by men, but, in so far as that order either is in fact observed by believing, or is not observed by not believing. Although, indeed, this occurs in time with regard to men; yet, by reason of His prescience, it was especially present to God, inasmuch as, by the nature of eternity, nothing is future to Him, but all things are from eternity especially present to Him in the most simple now (tw nun). By reason of the ultimate difference, the consequent will always attains its end, either for salvation or condemnation; but the antecedent will, not in like manner." Concerning the necessity of this distinction, HOLL. (587): "This distinction (between the general and special will) is necessary, on account of the wonderful combination of divine justice and mercy, which are to be reconciled with each other. For there are expressions in the Holy Scriptures that show that the mercy of God is inclined towards all sinners, 1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Pet. 3:9. There are other expressions which indicate the justice of God, and exclude from the inheritance of salvation those who resist the divine order, John 3:18; Mark 16:16. Finally, there are biblical passages in which both the mercy and justice of God are declared, Matt. 23:37. Christ, by His antecedent will, as far as it pertained to Himself, willed that the children of Israel be gathered together; but, by His consequent will, because they were unwilling to be gathered, He willed that their house be left to them desolate, cf. Acts 13:46. This distinction is implied in the parables of Christ, Matt. 22:1; Luke 14:16." [13] QUEN. (III, 14): "From the admitted universal benevolence of God, in the establishment and presenting of means, whereby He has determined to convert, regenerate, justify, and save men, though His own efficacy, there arises a special benevolence conspicuous in the predestination to eternal life." . . . [14] The Dogmaticians observe that the word predestination' has been employed in the Church in various senses: sometimes in a wider sense, according to which it denotes the purpose of God, referring equally to the saving of believers and the condemnation of unbelievers; sometimes in a narrower sense, according to which it refers alone to the former. In the latter sense they understand it to be employed in Biblical usage. Rom 8:30; Eph. 1:5. HOLL. (607): "Some Fathers and teachers have employed the word predestination improperly (aknrwß), inappropriately, and in a wider sense than is lawful, to denote the divine purpose both for saving believing men and condemning unbelievers. But in Biblical usage the term predestination is always taken in a good sense, to denote the divine decree concerning the salvation of fallen men." But, even then, there is still a threefold distinction to be observed in the definition of predestination; and the more the Dogmaticians appropriate at one time the one, and again the other, so much the more is this distinction to be considered, in order that the thought may not hence arise, that the Dogmaticians stood in opposition to each other in regard to the subject itself. Sometimes they understood by predestination, in the most general manner, the purpose of God to establish a scheme of redemption whereby all might be saved. BR. (711): "The decree refers to the entire work of leading man to salvation." Thus the notion is defined by the Formula Concordiae (Sol. Dec. XI, 14): "Therefore we embrace in mind, at the same time, the entire doctrine of the design, counsel, will, and ordination of God (viz., all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation, cf. sq.)," and, after it, HUTT. and others. HOLL. (609) gives the following definition: "Predestination, taken in a wider sense, can be defined as the eternal, divine decree, by which God, from His immense mercy, determined to give His Son as Mediator, and, through universal preaching, to offer Him for reception to all men who from eternity He foresaw would fall into sin; also through the Word and Sacraments to confer faith upon all who would not resist; to justify all believers, and besides to renew those using the means of grace; to preserve faith in them until the end of life, and, in a word, to save those believing to the end." Sometimes those are more particularly described in whose case the decree of redemption is really to be accomplished; they are those concerning whom God knows that they will believe. HOLL. (608): "In the special or stricter sense, it signifies the ordination of believers to salvation, combined with proqesiß and prognwsiß. The proqesiß (the divine, general and undefined decree concerning the communicating of eternal salvation to all sinful men who, to the end, will believe in Christ) is therefore more specifically defined through the prognwsiß (the foreknowledge of certain human persons or individuals, who will retain true faith in Christ to the last breath of life)." In the latter case, however, by predestination (taken in the strictest sense) only that decree is understood which was really based upon the general proqesiß in accordance with the antecedent prognwsiß, in so far as it embraces the specific number of men who are to be saved, which decree is called proorismoß. HOLL. (608): "In the most special and strict sense, by which proorismoß is distinguished from proqesiß and prognwsiß, and denotes the eternal purpose of God, determinate or applied to certain men as individuals, whom God from the common mass of corruption elects to eternal life, because He distinctly foresees that they will believe to the end in Christ." The meaning of the last two distinctions is this: that, when we come to speak very accurately, the conceptions of the proqesiß and prognwsiß, contained in the latter statement, are merely the antecedent factors of the true and actual purpose (the proorismoß), which factors, therefore, are not to be connected with the conception of predestination itself, when that is defined as an act or decree. Whence these two factors, viz., the proqesiß and prognwsiß are also defined as the normative or directive sources from which election proceeds; the proqesiß being regarded as the primary or mediate normative source, and the prognwsiß as the immediate and proximate source. QUEN. (III, 18): "The proqesiß is the primary directing principle of election; yet not immediate, but mediate, for it concurs with the intervening prognwsiß, or the foreseeing for election of individuals who would to the end believe in Christ." [15] Concerning the relation between predestination and election. QUEN. (III, 16): "Election is a synonym of predestination, yet predestination and election are not logical synonyms, so as to have the relation of genus and species, as the Calvinists state (contending that the divine predestination as a genus contains, within its bounds, two species, viz., election and reprobation; or, as others say, it contains two decrees, the one of election, the other of reprobation)." HUTT. (773): "But, according to the tenor of Scripture, they are grammatical synonyms, and of the same breadth. And, although they differ somewhat with respect to formal signification, yet materially, and in relation to the subject, they are not distinguished; whence in Eph. 1:4 and 5, both terms, election and predestination, are received in the same sense, nor is there an unlike example given in Scripture." HOLL. (605): "Predestination and election agree with respect to the subject, because no man has been predestined to eternal salvation who has not been elected to the same, nor has nay one been elected who has not been predestinated." But "they differ with respect to formal signification. Election, according to is formal notion, relates to the objects which are to be elected; and predestination, to the end and order of means, which lead to the end of election, or eternal life. For the particle pre, in the word predestination, connotes the priority and eternity of the divine ordination; but the particle e, in the word election, connotes the common aggregate of men, from which there is a separation of some men, and therefore the divine election is the separation of some men from the common mass of corruption, and their adoption into the inheritance of eternal salvation. Predestination (1) presupposes prognwsiß, the foreknowledge of certain persons believing to the end, Rom. 8:29; (2) it formally denotes the ordination to eternal life of those men who, according to the divine foreknowledge, receive and continue to employ the means of grace. Acts 13:48. But election (1) presupposes the love of God, Eph. 1:6; (2) it formally denotes the separation, from the common mass of perdition, of those men who He foresees will perseveringly believe in Christ, John 15:19." "Another expression for predestination is, according to Phil. 4:3; Rev. 3:5, the writing in the Book of Life." [16] (a) Full Definition. HOLL. (604): "Predestination is an act of the consequent divine will, by which God (moved by gratuitous mercy, because of the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith) separated from the fallen human race, and ordained to the obtaining eternal salvation for the praise of His glorious grace, those men alone and individually who He foresaw would believe in Christ to the end." QUEN. (III, 19): "Predestination is an act of the divine will, by which, before the foundations of the earth were laid, not according to our works, but out of pure mercy, according to His purpose and design, which He purposed in Himself in consideration of the merit of Christ to be apprehended by faith, God ordained to eternal life for the praise of His glorious grace such men as, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the Gospel, would perseveringly and to the end believe in Christ." QUEN. (III, 14): "The peculiar and chief foundation of this fundamental article is Eph. 1:4-7." (b) The form of election is then thus described by QUEN. (III, 18): "It consists in the entire taxiß, or order, which God, in ordaining the eternal decree of election, had as His design, and according to which, for the sake of His own mercy, because of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, He elects those believing and persevering in faith to the end of life, or, according to which He fulfils in time the election decreed from eternity." From the fact that election has its ground in the preceding proqesiß and prognwsiß, which are related as major and minor premises to the conclusion, viz., the proorismoß, the syllogism of Predestination arises: "Every one who will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life. "But Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life. "Therefore, Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life." (HOLL., 630.) (c) The causes of election are then stated thus: "The efficient cause of election is the will of the Triune God, freely decreeing (Rom. 8:28; Eph. 1:4; John 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:13); the impulsive or moving internal cause is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:5; 2:8, 9; Rom. 11:5, 6); the moving external cause is the merit of Christ, regarded with respect to foreseen final application (Eph. 1:4-7)." As the external less principal cause, some state, "Faith in Christ, and this final." [17] HUTT. (795): "Concerning the question (whether the eternal election of those who are to be saved is to be assigned to the antecedent or the consequent will), a twofold way presents itself, some turning too much to the right, others too far to the left, and both from the path of truth, although in a diverse mode, relation, and end. For those who follow the side of Calvin affirm that the decree of election should be sought in the antecedent will of God alone, but in such a way, as thence to derive both the absolute and the particular will, and indeed also the absolute election of few men. Huber, on the other hand, likewise placed election in the antecedent will alone; and, although contending aright, against the Calvinists, that this will is universal, yet erroneously and falsely constructed thence, against the orthodox, the opinion that election is universal and entirely unlimited. Therefore, just as Calvin removes and eliminates from the decree of election all reference to faith, so Huber does the very act of faith. Each of these errors, deviating from the analogy of faith, violates it in this, that it altogether substitutes election from every consideration of righteousness, imputed through faith on account of Christ. In this way, indeed, it is lawful to infer no election at all, rather than either the absolute election of a few, or the universal election of all. For in all Scripture the name of the elect is never ascribed except to those alone who actually believe and absolutely persevere in faith. In the second place, even the very sound of the terms, election and elect, and their peculiar relation, intimate and prove a distinction or dissimilarity with respect to men. For the elect are so called in distinction from the non-elect; and yet, in fact, Christian piety and faith forbid us making any distinction among men in the antecedent will. Therefore, the orthodox Church, making a separation from each of these errors, places election not in the sole and merely simple antecedent will of God, but rather in the consequent will." [18] HOLL. (633): "Those elected by God in Christ are wretched sinful men; yet not all promiscuously, but those whom God from eternity distinctly foresaw as those who would believe in Christ to the end." THerefore (619), "The election to eternal life of men corrupted by sin was made by the most merciful God, in consideration of faith in Christ remaining steadfast to the end of life." To guard the expression, in consideration of faith (intuitu fidei), from misunderstanding, it was still farther observed by QUEN. (III, 36): "(a) Faith, and that, too, as persevering or final faith, enters into the sphere of eternal election, not as already afforded, but as foreknown. For we are elected to eternal life from faith divinely foreseen, apprehending, to the end, the merit of Christ; (b) Faith enters into election not by reason of any meritorious worth, but with respect to its correlate, or so far as it is the only means of apprehending the merit of Christ; or, in other words, faith is not a meritorious cause of election, but only a prerequisite condition, or a part of the entire order divinely appointed in election;" others express themselves so as to mark faith as the less principal external cause. Concerning the different expressions through which the relation of faith to predestination is stated, BR. (725): "Some of our theologians, indeed, have said that faith in Christ is the instrumental cause of the decree of election; others, that it is its condition; some that it is the condition on the part of the object of election; others that it is a part of the order of predestination. These all practically agree with each other, and with those who call it the impulsive less principal cause. For all acknowledge that faith is not a mere condition which exercises no causality; but, as it is constituted for the act of saving, so is it for the act of decreeing salvation (virtually causing salvation), as that in consideration of which we have been elected, and yet not as a principal cause, of itself able to influence God to elect us. Whence, when faith is otherwise regarded under the figure of a hand or organ, by which, as a cause of salvation, the grace of God electing and the merit of Christ are apprehended, and, in this manner, is usually called an instrument; yet here the relation of faith to the decree of election itself must be shown: where our theologians do not say that it is of the manner of an instrument, which the efficient principal cause, God, in electing, employs to produce the act of election by a real influx. But those who have spoken of an instrumental moral cause cannot understand anything else than an impulsive less principal cause. . . . Therefore, then, this formula of speaking remains, by which faith is called the impulsive cause or reason, yet not the chief or principal; but with the addition, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, of less principal." BAIER commends the following from MEISSNER: "It seems more fitting that faith be considered not separately as a peculiar cause of election, distinct from the merit of Christ, but joined with that merit as apprehended, so as to render both united the one impelling cause of election. For neither does faith merit without the application, nor does it itself move God to elect, but both combined in the divine foreknowledge, i.e., the merit apprehended by faith, or faith apprehending the merit." Concerning the relation of prescience and predestination, HUTT. (Loc. c., 803): "I. The word Prescience is received in this place, not in a general, indefinite, and loose sense, concerning the knowledge of all future things; in which sense the prescience of bad things, as well as of good, belongs to God, and presupposes, at the same time, predestination: but restrictedly and determinatively to a certain matter and subject, namely, to prescience of faith in Christ, which is peculiar to the elect. This determinative distinguishing of prescience always presupposes predestination, according to Rom. 8:29, whom He foreknew, viz., according to the interpretation of Augustine, those who would believe in His Son, He also did predestinate; and He indeed predestinated them to be conformed to the image of His Son. For in this passage the Apostle does not treat of the antecedent will of God, by reason of which He wishes all men to be conformed to the image of His Son, but he treats of those who already, in the very decree of God, are conformed to this image. II. This prescience is not the predestination itself of God, or the decree of election, as Calvin affirms. . . . For the Apostle, in the words just cited, expressly considers prescience and predestination as two distinct things; saying, whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate; otherwise, a most senseless notion, such as this, would appear: Whom He predestinated, He predestinated.' . . . Therefore, it is decided aright that the word prescience in this passage denotes, according to the Hebrew idiom, not the simple knowledge of God, but that which is joined with approbation and delight, because determined to an object pleasing to God, viz., to Christ apprehended by faith, or, what amounts to the same thing, to faith apprehending the merit of Christ. III. This prescience, which we have said enters into the decree of election, is not regarded as a cause, on account of, or because of, which election takes place, or salvation itself is conferred upon the elect; because it is not an essential part, constituting election itself, but is added to predestination only as an adjunct, and that, too, inseparable. For although prescience, since it is placed in a lower grade, can be sometimes unaccompanied by predestination, as happens in regard to the sins and wicked actions of men, yet, with predestination determined because of a higher grade, it is necessary that the lower should always be included. Hence the Apostle says: The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, "The Lord knoweth them that are His,"' 2 Tim. 2:19. Moreover, He knew this not only in time, but foreknew it from all eternity. This knowledge or foreknowledge is therefore an eye, as it were, of the eternal election; for he who would destroy this would render our election blind and destroy it." [19] HOLL. (631): "The decree is relative, because when God predestined certain fallen men to eternal life, and, indeed, some rather than others, He regarded something outside of Himself as an impulsive external cause, viz., the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith." QUEN. (III, 31): "Predestination to eternal life is not absolute, but is founded upon Christ as Mediator. The antithesis of the Calvinists, who exclude the merit of Christ from the causes of election, and refer to means of accomplishing it furnished in time, and, therefore deny that Christ is the meritorious cause of our election." The doctrine of Calvin, is accordingly distinguished from that of the Lutheran Church, in that, according to the former, predestination rests upon an absolute decree of God ("by which God absolutely of Himself, without a prerequisite condition or without outward respect to any other cause or intervening reason, wills and does something, according to the manner in which He absolutely willed to create and preserve it." QUEN.); and hence, likewise, it is not the earnestly intended will of God that all men should be saved unto whom the Gospel is preached, and, accordingly, a distinction is made between the manifest will, or that of the sign, and the secret will, or that of the purpose. [20] HOLL. (631): "God indeed decreed absolutely and unconditionally to save this or that one, because He certainly foresaw his persevering faith in Christ." If it be asserted of the decree that it is not conditioned, it appears to contradict the former assertion that it is not absolute. HOLL. (632) explains the apparent contradiction by the following: "When the decree of predestination is said to be not absolute, it must not be regarded on that account conditional. For the idea is not, that God from eternity would elect this or that one to salvation, if he would believe in Christ, and depart hence in the true faith, but because he would believe and would persevere. Faith regarded in the will of God, before the act of predestination, is therefore indeed a condition, under which He desires the salvation of all; yet in the decree itself it is not a condition under which the election was made, but a reason by which God was moved to elect. Therefore, the decree should not be denied to be absolute, when considered with respect to that which is conditional; yet not in such a manner as to exclude the consideration of the a priori reason outside of God, as a part in the order of predestination, which is, without doubt, faith in Christ foreseen from eternity, or, what amounts to the same thing, the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith. For the decree must not be confounded with the antecedent will of God, which, we affirm, from the Word of God, does not exclude a condition, but appoints it, Rom. 11:23." [21] QUEN. (III, 21): "Through mortal sins the elect may altogether lose and banish the Holy Ghost, faith and the grace of God, and thus for a time become subjects of condemnation, yet they cannot be wanting to the end, and perish eternally. Total loss of grace is one thing, final loss of grace is another. That is total, by which any one is entirely deprived of the grace of God; that is final, by which any one, shortly before death, departs from the faith, and dies in unbelief." [22] HOLL. (642): "A regenerate man in the midst of the course of his life is certain of his election conditionally (Phil. 2:12); but at the end of life, he rejoices in the absolute certainty of his predestination." [23] HOLL. (644): "The word reprobation' (apodokimasia) is not found in just so many syllables in Holy Scripture. The word adokimoß is used, 1 Cor. 9:27; 2 Cor. 13:5; Heb. 6:8." QUEN. (III, 21): "It is otherwise called prografh eiß to krima, Jude 4." [24] BRCHM.: "When the case of reprobation is considered, there is need of pious caution. We must avoid considering God the cause of reprobation in the same manner as He is the cause of election. For He is the cause of election, but with regard to His effecting it and with regard to the end; both with regard to the decrees and to all the means leading to the end. But the matter is different in reprobation. For, since reprobation is eternal perdition, to which there is no direct way except through sin, and especially unbelief, every one must see that reprobation cannot be ascribed to God as effecting it, inasmuch as it is either damnation itself or sin, the means leading thither. The true cause of reprobation is in man himself, and is undoubtedly the obstinate contempt of the grace offered in the Gospel. . . . God, meanwhile, is not the indifferent witness of reprobation, but, as the just avenger of crimes and of despised grace, is occupied with certain special acts concerning the wicked and unbelieving, who, although they have been for a long time admonished, invited, and punished, yet out of pure malice have continued to despise and resist the Gospel." __________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II. OF THE FRATERNAL REDEMPTION BY CHRIST, AS THE SECOND SOURCE OF SALVATION. __________________________________________________________________ § 31. Statement of the Subject. THE redemption designed by God from eternity was accomplished in time by His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, [1] and of this we are now to treat. The subject will be discussed under three heads: I. The Person of the Redeemer. II. The Work by which He accomplished Redemption. III. The several States in which He appeared from the time of His incarnation. [1] HOLL. (650): "The Redeemer of the human race is Jesus Christ. The Redeemer is called Jesus, i.e., Saviour, because He was to save His people from their sins, Matt. 1:21." (655): "He is called Christ, i.e., anointed, because He was anointed by the Holy Ghost as our king, priest, and prophet, John 1:41." The Dogmaticians prove that Jesus Christ is the true Messiah, in whom all the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the Messiah are exactly fulfilled. HOLL. (675): "Proof. (1) Whoever is God and man is the true Messiah. But Jesus, etc. The major premise is evident from 2 Sam 7:12, 13; Ps. 110:1; Micah 5:1; Jer. 23:5 . . . (2) Whoever was born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the royal branch of David, and of a pure virgin, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Gen. 22:18; 49:10; 2 Sam. 7:12; Is. 5:14. The minor, from Luke 3:23; 1:34. (3) Whatever ruler of Israel, as God, was begotten from eternity, and as man was born in the fulness of time at Bethlehem, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Micah 5:2. The minor, from Matt. 2:6. . . . (4) He is the true Messiah, for whose approach a divinely-appointed herald prepared the way. The major, from Is. 40:3; Mal. 3:1. The minor, from Mark 1:2, 3. . . . (5) Whatever king of Zion entered Jerusalem poor and humble, riding upon an ass, is the true Messiah, Zach. 9:9. . . . (6) Whoever is the Goel, or Redeemer, according to the law of consanguinity, Job 19:25; the prophet like Moses, Deut. 13:15; a universal king, Zach. 9:9; Ps. 72:8; a priest according to the order of Melchizedek, Ps. 110:4; a priest interceding for sinners, Is. 53:12; who is to pass through the extremity of suffering, Ps. 22; Is. 53; who is to die, Dan. 9:26; who is to be buried, Is. 53:9; who is to be free from corruption; to descend to the dead and to rise again, Ps. 16:10; to ascend to heaven, Ps. 68:18; to sit at the right hand of God the Father, Ps. 110:1, is the promised Messiah. All these things the New Testament declare of Jesus of Nazareth." A. -- OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. __________________________________________________________________ § 32. Of the Personal Union. In Christ the Redeemer we recognize a duality of natures and a unity of person, as expressed in the statement: "In Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, are two natures, a divine, that of the Word (ho logoß), and a human nature, so united that Christ is one person." (CHMN., Loc. Th., I, 75.) We are to treat, therefore, in succession, first, of the two natures in Christ, and secondly, of the person of Christ. I. Of the Two Natures in Christ. -- Christ is God and man. This is otherwise thus expressed: He exists in two natures, the divine and the human. [1] The divine nature He has of God the Father, and from eternity; the human nature He assumed in time from the Virgin Mary. [2] Each of these natures is to be regarded as truly genuine and entire, [3] for Christ is true God and true man. [4] As true man He participates in all the natural weaknesses to which human nature is subject since the Fall -- He participates therein, however, not in consequence of a natural necessity, but in consequence of His own free will, for the accomplishment of His mediatorial work; for, as He was born of a human being, the Virgin Mary, but not begotten of a human father, His human nature did not inherit any of the consequences of Adam's sin. [5] This does not prevent us from ascribing to Christ a true, complete human nature, like our own, as this is, indeed, predicated of Adam when not yet fallen, inasmuch as original sin, that we have inherited in consequence of the sin of Adam, has not given man another nature. It does, however, follow from the peculiar circumstances connected with the birth of Christ, and from the peculiar relation which the divine logoß sustains to this human nature, that certain peculiarities must be predicated of the human nature of Christ which distinguish it from that of other men. These are (1) the anupostasia [i.e., want of personality]; (2) the anamarthsia [i.e., sinlessness]; (3) the singularis animae et corporis excellentia [i.e., the peculiar excellence of soul and body.] [6] The first results from the peculiar relation which the divine logoß entered into with the human nature; for this latter is not to be regarded as at any time subsisting by itself and constituting a person by itself, since the logoß did not assume a human person, but only a human nature. Therefore there is negatively predicated of the human nature the anupostasia, inasmuch as the human nature has no personality of its own; and there is positively predicated of it the anupostasia, inasmuch as this human nature has become possessed of another hypostasis, that of the divine nature. The anamarthsia (sinlessness) is expressly taught in many passages of the Scriptures (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 1 Peter 1:19; 2:22), and follows also from the supernatural birth of Christ. The singular excellence of soul and body is a consequence of His sinlessness. II. Of the Person Of Christ. -- The person of the Redeemer is constituted, when the logoß, the Second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God, unites Himself with human nature, and this so firmly and intimately that the two natures now united constitute One Person, which is that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [7] The act itself by which this is accomplished is called unitio personalis. HOLL. (665): "The divine action by which the Son of God assumed human nature, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, into the unity of His own person." [8] This act is chosen and determined upon by the entire holy Trinity, by whom the substance that constitutes the human nature is prepared, and by whom this is united with the divine nature; but this act is accomplished in the second person of the Godhead, who alone has become man. [9] This Second Person of the Godhead, the logoß, in the act of uniting holds such a relation to the human nature that He, the logoß, imparts the personality, [10] and is in general the efficient agent through which the union is accomplished; for it is He that sustains an active relation to the human nature, which He assumes, whilst the human nature stands in a passive relation to Him. [11] This firm union of the divine and human natures, regarded as a condition, is then called unio personalis seu hypostatica [i.e., personal or hypostatic union]. HOLL. (679): "The personal union is a conjunction of the two natures, divine and human, subsisting in one hypostasis of the Son of God, producing a mutual and an indissoluble communion of both natures." [12] And the result of this activity of the logoß is, that the hypostasis of the divine nature now has become also the hypostasis of the human nature, i.e., both natures have now one hypostasis, that of the logoß, and together form one person, that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [13] In consequence thereof the union of the two natures is so close and inseparable [14] that the one can no longer be conceived of as without or away from the other, but both are to be regarded as in all respects united, [15] yet in such a way that each of the two natures in this union retains its own essential character and peculiarities as before, and remains unmingled with the other. [16] So the Scriptures teach. But it is impossible to form a correct conception of the way and manner in which these two natures are united in the One Person, because the Scriptures teach us only the union itself, and not the mode in which it is effected. We shall have to content ourselves, therefore, with guarding against false conceptions that might be entertained in regard to this union. [17] Accordingly, we say that the union is "(1) not an essential one, by which two natures coalesce in one essence (against the Eutychians); (2) not a natural one, such as that of the soul and body in man; (3) not an accidental one, such as (a) between two or more different qualities united in one subject (as whiteness and sweetness are united in milk); (b) between a quality and a substance (as we find in a learned man); (c) between two substances that are accidentally united (as between beams that happen to be fastened together); (4) not a merely verbal one, arising either from a sinecure title (as when a man is called a counselor of his sovereign, which title was never bestowed upon him because of counsels he had given) or from the use of figurative language (as when Herod is called a fox); finally, (4) not an habitual or relative one, which may exist, although the parties to this union may be separated and far apart. (There are many varieties of this relative union, such as moral, between friends; domestic, between husband and wife; political, between citizens; ecclesiastical, between members of the Church.)" [18] HOLL. (679). On the other hand, we may predicate of this union, positively, that "(1) It is true and real, because it exists between extremes that really adhere, there being no separation or distance between them; "(2) It is a personal one (but not a union of persons), and interpenetrative (perichoristica);16 "(3) It is a perpetually enduring one." (See Notes 6, 7, 8.) [1] HFRFFR. (260): "By the natures, the two sources or parts, so to speak, are understood, of which the person of Christ has been constituted, namely, a Divine nature and a human nature." Of Person it is remarked: "The Person of our Redeemer is here considered, not as asarkoß, or such as it was from eternity before the incarnation, but as ensarkoß, or such as it began to be in the fulness of time, through the taking of our human nature into His own divine person." (HOLL., 656.) General Definition of Nature and Person. CHMN. (de duab. nat., 10: "Essence, or substance, or nature, is that which of itself is common to many individuals of the same species, and which embraces the entire essential perfection of each of them." "Person or individual is something peculiar, possessing indeed the entire and perfect substance of the same species, but determined and limited by a characteristic and personal peculiarity, and thus subsists of itself, separated or distinguished from the other individuals of the same species, not in essence, but in number. For a person is an indivisible, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which neither is a part of another, nor is sustained in another, nor has dependence upon another object such as the separated soul has upon the body that is to be raised up. Therefore, the names of the essence or natures are qeothß, anqrwpothß, divinity, humanity, divine nature, human nature, divine essence, human substance. The designations of the person are God, man." Concerning the difference of signification, in which the term nature or essence is employed with reference to God and to man, cf. chapter, "Of the Holy Trinity," note 14, p.141. QUEN. (Of the Divine Nature of Christ (III, 75)): "The divine nature otherwise signifies the divine essence, one in number, common 1 6 Perichoristica. See § 33, Note 2. to all three Persons, and entire in each; but, in the article Of the Person of Christ,' this is not considered absolutely, in so far as it is common to the three persons of the Godhead, but relatively, so far as it subsists in the person of the Son of God, and, as by the manner of its existence, it is limited to the Second Person of the Trinity. Whence it is true that the entire divine essence is united to human nature, but only in one of its persons, viz., the second." [2] QUEN. (III, 75): "The incarnate Person consists of two natures, divine and human. The divine nature He possesses from eternity, from God the Father, through eternal, true, and properly named generation of substance; whence Christ is also the true, natural, and eternal God, the Son of God. A true and pure human nature He received in time, of the Virgin Mary." A twofold generation is, therefore, distinguished in Christ: one "an eternal generation, through which He is the Son of God;" and another, "a generation in time through which He is man, or the Son of man. Gal. 4:4." (Br., 457.) [3] HOLL. (659): "The Council of Chalcedon: We confess that He is true God and true man, the latter consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead, and co-essential with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, sin only excepted.'" SCHRZR. (177): "The antithesis of the Eutychians, who indeed admit two natures prior to the act of union, but affirm that from that time the human nature has been altogether absorbed by the Godhead." QUEN. (III, 75): "With regard to the human nature we must consider: 1, its truth; 2, its completeness; 3, its omoousia (identity of essence). The first excludes a mere appearance; the second, incompleteness; the third, contrariety of essence (eterousia)." GRH. (III, 373): "In Christ there is a true and perfect divine nature, and hence Christ is also true, natural, and eternal God. We say that in Christ there are not only divine gifts, but also a true and perfect divine nature; nor do we simply say that He is and is called God, but that He is true, natural, and eternal God, in order, by this means, to separate our confession the more distinctly from the blasphemies of the Photinians, and all opponents of the divine nature." (Id. III, 400): "In Christ there is a true, complete, and perfect human nature, and for this reason Christ is also true, perfect, and natural man. By truth of human nature is meant that the Word took upon Himself not an appearance, or mere outward form of human nature, but in reality became a man. By completeness of human nature is meant that He took, into the unity of His person, all the essential parts of human nature, not only a body, but also a rational soul; since His flesh was flesh pervaded by soul. Nor is it said only that He was, but that He still is, a man: because He never has laid aside, nor ever will lay aside, what He has once assumed." These expressions are directed against the Monotheletes, "who acknowledged a human mind in Christ, but denied to Christ a human will." (BRCHM.) [4] HOLL. (656): "1. The true and eternal divine nature is proved by the most complete arguments, derived (a) from the divine names (arg. onomastikoiß); (b) from the attributes peculiar to the true God alone (arg. vidiomatikoiß); (c) from the personal and essential acts of God (arg. energhtikoiß); (d) from the religious worship due God alone (arg. latreutikoiß);" cf. chapter on the Trinity, note 34. "II. That Christ is true man, is shown (a) from human names (John 8:40; 1 Tim. 2:5); (b) from the essential parts of a man (John 2:21; Heb. 2:14; Luke 24:39; John 10:15; Matt. 26:38; Luke 2:52; John 5:21; Matt. 26:39); (c) from the attributes peculiar to a true man (Matt. 4:2; John 19:28; Matt. 25:37; Luke 19:41; John 11:33); (d) from human works (Luke 2:46, 48; Matt. 4:1; 26:55); (e) from the genealogy of Christ as a man (in the ascending line, Luke 3:23; in the descending line, Matt. 1:1)." [5] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 11): . . . "Christ, conceived of the Holy Ghost, took upon Himself a human nature without sin, pure. Therefore the infirmities, which as punishments accompany sin, would not have been in the flesh of Christ by necessity of the condition, but His body could have been kept clear and exempt from these infirmities. Sinful flesh was not necessary to His being true man, as Adam, before the Fall, without the infirmities which are punishments, was true man. But for our sakes, and for our salvation, the incarnate Christ, to commend His love to us, willingly took upon Himself these infirmities, that thus He might bear the punishment transferred from us to Himself, and might free us from it." HUTT. (l. c., 125): "That He took upon Himself these, not so far as they have reference to any guilt, but only as they have the condition of punishment; neither, indeed, these individually and collectively, but only such as the work of Redemption rendered it necessary for Him to take upon Himself, and which detract nothing from the dignity of His nature." But a distinction is made between natural and personal infirmities. HOLL. (657): "The natural infirmities common to men are those which, since the Fall, exist in all men, e.g., to hunger, to thirst, to be wearied, to suffer cold and heat, to be grieved, to be angry, to be troubled, to weep. Since they are without guilt, Christ, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, took them upon Himself, not by constraint, but freely; not for His own sake, but for our sake" (QUEN. (III, 76): "that He might perform the work of a mediator, and become a victim for our sins"), "not forever, but for a time, namely, in the state of humiliation, and not retaining the same in the state of exaltation. . . . Personal infirmities are those which proceed from particular causes, and derive their origin either from an imperfection of formative power in the one begetting, as consumption, gout; or from a particular crime, as intemperance in eating and drinking, such as fever, dropsy, etc.; or from a special divine judgment, as the diseases of the family of Job (2 Sam. 3:29). These are altogether remote from the most holy humanity of Christ, because to have assumed these would not have been of advantage to the human race, and would have detracted from human dignity." [6] HOLL. (657): "To the human nature of Christ there belong certain individual designations, by which, as by certain distinctive characteristics or prerogatives, He excels other men; such are (a) anupostasia, the being without a peculiar subsistence, since this is replaced by the divine person (upostasiß) of the Son of God, as one far more exalted. If the human nature of Christ had retained its peculiar subsistence, there would have been in Christ two persons, and therefore two mediators, contrary to 1 Tim. 2:5. The reason is, because a person is formally constituted in its being by a subsistence altogether complete, and therefore unity of person is to be determined from unity of subsistence. Therefore, one or the other nature, of those which unite in one person, must be without its own peculiar subsistence; and, since the divine nature, which is really the same as its subsistence, cannot really be without the same, it is evident that the absence of a peculiar subsistence must be ascribed to the human nature." Still, a distinction must be made between anupostasia and enupostasia. QUEN. (III, 77): "That is anupostaton which does not subsist of itself and according to its peculiar personality; but that is enupostaton which subsists in another, and becomes the partaker of the hypostasis of another. When, therefore, the human nature of Christ is said to be anupostatoß, nothing else is meant than that it does not subsist of itself, and according to itself, in a peculiar personality; moreover, it is called enupostatoß, because it has become a partaker of the hypostasis of another, and subsists in the logoß." HOLL. (658) considers the following objections: "You say, If the human nature is without a peculiar subsistence, the same will be more imperfect than our nature, which is auqupostatoß, or subsisting of itself.' Reply: The perfection of an object is to be determined from its essence, and not from its subsistence'" The observation of GRH. (III, 421) is also of importance: "Anupostaton has a twofold meaning. Absolutely, that is said to be anupostaton, which subsists neither in its own upostasiß, nor in that of another, which has neither essence nor subsistence, is neither in itself, nor in another, but is purely negative. In this sense, the human nature of Christ cannot be said to be anupostaton. Relatively, that is said to be anupostaton, which does not subsist in its own, but in the upostasiß of another; which indeed has essence, but not personality and subsistence peculiar to itself. In this sense, the flesh of Christ is said to be anupostatoß, because it is enupostatoß, subsisting in the logoß." "The statement of some, that the starting-point of the incarnation is the anupostasia of the flesh intervening between that subsistence, on the one hand, by which the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed subsisted as a part of the Virgin, not by its own subsistence and that of the Virgin; and the subsistence, on the other hand, whereby the human nature, formed from the sanctified mass by the operation of the Holy Ghost in the first moment of incarnation, began to subsist with the very subsistence of the logoß, communicated to it, is not to be received in such a sense as though the flesh of Christ was at any time entirely anupostatoß; but, because in our thought, such an anupostasia is regarded prior to its reception into the subsistence of the logoß, not with regard to the order of time, but to that of nature. The flesh and soul were not first united into one person; but the formation of the flesh, by the Holy Ghost, from the separated and sanctified mass, the giving of a soul to this flesh as formed, the taking up of the formed and animated flesh into the subsistence of the logoß, and the conception of the formed, animated, and subsisting flesh in the womb of the virgin, were simultaneous." (b) anamarthsia. CHEMN. (de duab. nat., 13, 14): "For this reason Gabriel says to Mary, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, so that what shall be born of thee will be holy.' Therefore, the working of the Holy Ghost caused the Virgin Mary without male seed to conceive and be with child. And the Holy Ghost so sanctified, and cleansed from every spot of sin, the mass which the Son of God, in the conception, assumed from the flesh and blood of Mary, that that which is born of Mary was holy, Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; 1 Pet. 1:19; 2:22." (QUEN. (III, 77): "I say inherent, not imputative, sinlessness; for our sins were really imputed to Him, and He was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21.") SCHRZR. (189): "Christ never sinned, nor was He even able to sin. We prove the statement that He was not even able to sin, or that He was impeccable, as follows: (a) He who is like men, sin only excepted, cannot be peccable. For, since all men are peccable, Christ would be like them also with regard to sin and peccability, which contradicts the apostle, Heb. 7:26. (b) He who is both holy by His origin, and is exempt from original sin, who can never have a depraved will, and constitutes one person with God Himself, is clearly impeccable. (g) He who is higher than the angels is altogether impeccable. (d) He to whom the Holy Ghost has been given without measure, is also holy and just without measure, and therefore cannot sin." (c) An eminent excellence of soul and body. QUEN. (III, 78): "A threefold perfection of soul, viz., of intellect, will, and desire." (HOLL. (658): "The soul of Christ contains excellences of wisdom, Luke 2:47; John 7:46, and of holiness.") "The perfection of body: (a) THe highest eukrasia, a healthful and uniform temperament of body. (b) aqanasia, or immortality" (HOLL. (ib.) "which belongs to Him, both because of the soundness of an im- peccable nature, Rom. 6:23, and through the indissoluble bond of the personal union. Christ, therefore, is immortal, by reason of an intrinsic principle, and the fact that He died arose from an extrinsic principle, and according to a voluntary arrangement, John 10:17, 18. Yet, in the death which was voluntarily submitted to, the body of Christ remained afqarton, or exempt from corruption, Ps. 16:10; Acts 2:31.") (g) "The greatest elegance and beauty of form, Ps. 45:2." (HOLL. (ib.): "The beauty of Christ's body is inferred from the excellence of the soul inhabiting it, . . . and from the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, by whose efficacious presence the most glorious temple of Christ's body was formed." QUEN. (III, 78): "The passage, He was despised and rejected of men,' Is. 53:3, refers to the deformity arising from the wounds of the passion.") [7] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 18): "It is not sufficient to know and to believe that in Christ there are, in some way or other, two natures, divine and human, but we must add to this that, in the hypostatic union, they are so closely joined, that there is one and the same subsistence consisting of these two natures, and subsisting in two natures." HOLL. (668): "The divine and human natures existing in the one united person of the Son of God have one and the same hypostasis, yet have it in a diverse mode. For the divine nature has this primarily, of itself and independently; but the human nature has this secondarily, because of the personal union, and therefore by partaking of it from another (Lat. participative)." [8] BR. (461): "The union of the human nature with the divine consists in this, that the natures are so joined that they become one person." Expressions of like import are sarkwsiß, ensarkwsiß, sarkogennhsia, incarnation, becoming man, becoming body (incorporatio, enanqrwphsiß and enswmatwsiß), assumption (proslhyiß). QUEN. (III, 80): "The basis of this mystery is found in John 1:14; Gal. 4:4; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14, 16; Rom. 9:5." Definition -- HOLL. (665): "The incarnation is a divine act, by which the Son of God, in the womb of His mother, the Virgin Mary, took into the unity of His person a human nature, consubstantial with us, but without sin, and destitute of a subsistence of its own, and communicated to the same both His divine person and nature, so that Christ now subsists forever, as the God-man, in two natures, divine and human, most intimately united." [9] GRH. (III, 413): "The question is asked, How is the work of incarnation ascribed to the Father and Holy Ghost, so that, nevertheless, the Son alone is said to be incarnate?' We distinguish between (1) the sanctification of the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed, which cleansed it from every stain of sin, and (2) the formation of the body of Christ from the sanctified mass by divine power, which twofold action is common to the entire Trinity, and (3) the assumption of that body into the person of the logos, which is peculiar to the Son of God. Whence the work of incarnation, so far as the act is concerned, is said to be common to the entire Trinity; but, so far as the end of the assumed flesh, which is the person of the logoß, is concerned, it is peculiar to the Son. So far as the effecting or production of the act is concerned, it is said to be a work ad extra and essential, or common to the entire Trinity. So far as its termination or relation is concerned, it is a work ad extra and personal, or peculiar to the Son.17 The act of assumption proceeds from the divine virtue common to the three persons; the end of the assumption is the person peculiar to the Son. The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Ghost, coming upon the drops of blood from which the body of Christ was formed, sanctified and cleansed them from all sin, in order that that which would be born of Mary should be holy, and by divine power 1 7 Compare chapter on the Trinity, note 22. so wrought in the blessed Virgin that, contrary to the order of nature, she conceived offspring without male seed. The Son descended from heaven, overshadowed the Virgin, came into flesh, and became flesh by partaking of the same, by manifesting Himself in the same, and by taking it into the unity of His persons." (In Luke 1:35, "The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee," is generally understood as referring to the Son.) HOLL. (661): "Overshadowing denotes the mysterious and wonderful filling of the temple of the body, formed by the Holy Ghost. For the Son of God overshadowed the Virgin Mary, while He descended in an inscrutable manner into the womb of the Virgin, and by a peculiar assimilation filled and united to Himself a particle of the Virgin's blood excited by the Holy Spirit, so that He dwelt in it bodily, as in His own temple." (Id. 661 and 662): "The conception of the God-man is referred to the Holy Ghost, Luke 1:35: (a) because the entire work of fructifying is ascribed to Him, Gen 1:2; (b) in order that the purity of the particle of blood, from which the flesh of Christ grew, might be the more evident; (c) that thus the cause of the generation of Christ as a man, and of our regeneration, might be the same, viz., the Holy Ghost. The material source, and that the entire source, of the conception and production of Christ, the man, is Mary, the pure Virgin (Is. 7:14), born of the royal pedigree of David, and therefore of the tribe of Judah (Luke 3; Acts 2:30). The material, partial and proximate source is the quickened seed of the Virgin (Heb. 2:14, 16)." Against the above, Vorstius, following the Socinians, asserts: "That the Holy Ghost in forming Christ, the man, supplied the place of male seed, yea, even of man himself, and that nothing was absent from the generation of Christ except the agency and seed of a male." GERHARD, in reply, asks (III, 417): "Whether, because of the peculiar work of the Holy Ghost in the conception of Christ, it is right to call Him the father of Christ?" and answers: "By no means; for none of those acts which are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, in this work, confers upon Him the right and title of father. The devout old authors confine this action to three points. The first is the immediate energy which gave the Virgin the power of conceiving offspring, contrary to the order of nature, without male seed. The second is the miraculous sanctification, which sanctified, i.e., cleansed from sin, the mass of which the body of the Son of God was formed. The third is the mysterious union, which joined the human and divine natures into one person. The Holy Ghost was not the spermatic, but (a) the formative (dhmiourgikh), (b) the sanctifying (agiastikh), (c) the completing (teleiwtikh) cause of conception . . . But, because of none of these operations can the Holy Ghost be called the father of Christ, because the flesh of Christ was not begotten of the essence of the Holy Ghost, but of the substance of the Virgin Mary. Of the Holy Ghost,' does not denote the material, but the efficient cause and operation. . . . When we say, Of the Holy Ghost,' the of' is potential." [10] CHEM. (de duab. nat., 23): "The human nature did not assume the divine, nor did man assume God, nor did the divine person assume a human person; but the divine nature of the logoß, or God the logoß, or the person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine nature, assumed in the fulness of time a certain mass of human nature, so that in Christ there is an assuming nature, viz., the divine, and an assumed nature, viz., the human. In other cases, human nature is always the nature of a certain individual, whose peculiarity it is to subsist in a certain hypostasis, which is distinguished by a characteristic property from the other hypostases of the same nature. Thus each man has a soul of his own. But in the incarnate Christ, the divine nature subsisted of itself before this union, and indeed from eternity. Yet the mass of the assumed nature did not thus subsist of itself before this union, so that before this union there was a body and soul belonging to a certain and distinct individual, i.e., a peculiar person subsisting in itself, which afterwards the Son of God assumed. But in the very act of conception, the Son of God assumed this mass of human nature into the unity of His person, to subsist and be sustained therein, and, by assuming it, made it His own, so that this body is not that of another individual or another person, but the body is peculiar to the Son of God Himself, and the soul is the peculiar soul of the Son of God Himself." (Id. Loc. c. Th., I, 76): "Since in the incarnate Christ there are two intelligent, individual natures, and yet only one person, because there is one Christ, we say that these two natures are united, not in such a manner that the human nature of Christ was conceived and formed in the womb of Mary, before the divine nature was united to it. For if, before the union, the humanity of Christ had ever by itself had a subsistence, there would then be in Christ two persons also, just as there are two intelligent individual natures." The communication of person or subsistence, therefore, proceeds from the logoß. HOLL. (668): "The communication of person is that by which the Son of God truly and actually conferred upon His assumed human nature, destitute of proper personality, His own divine person, for communion and participation, so that the same might reach a terminus, be perfected in subsisting, and be established in a final hypostatic existence." [11] QUEN. (III, 83): "Of these two extremes (the divine and the human nature), one has the relation of an agent or of one perfecting, and the other the relation of one passive and able to be perfected. The former is the Son of God, or the simple person of the logoß, or, what is the same thing, the divine nature determined by the person of the logoß; the latter is the human nature. . . . The former extreme is the active principle of pericwrhsiß, which acts and perfects; the latter the passive principle of the same pericwrhsiß, which is perfected or receives the perfections." KG. (126): "Pericwrhsiß (immission, active intermingling) is that by which the divine nature of the logoß, in perfecting, pervades inwardly and all around, so to speak, the human nature, and imparts to all of it its entire self, i.e., in the totality and perfection of its essence, Col. 2:9." Moreover its effect is, that the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the human nature, and both natures are, in the highest degree, present to each other. [12] GRH. (III, 412): "The state of the union is properly and specifically called union, hypostatic union, and is the most intimate pericwrhsiß, or unmixed and unconfused pervasion in one person of two distinct natures, mutually present in the highest degree to each other, because of which one nature is not outside of the other, neither can it be without impairing the unity of the person. Such a distinction is made between the state and the act of the union, that the act is transient and the state is permanent; that the act is that of a simple person, i.e., of the logoß, who before His incarnation was a simple person, upon a human nature, but the state exists between two natures, divine and human, in a complex person; that the act consists in the assumption of humanity, made in the first moment of incarnation, but the state, in the most intimate and enduring cohesion of natures." QUEN. (III, 86): "The form of this personal union implies: (a) The participation or communion of one and the same person, 1 Tim. 2:5; (b) the intimate personal and constant mutual presence of the nature, John 1:14; Col. 2:9." [13] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 6): "Although the Son of God is Himself an entire and distinct person of the eternal God-head, and therefore from eternity has been, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, true, essential, and perfect God; yet that He assumed human nature into the unity of His person, not as though there resulted in Christ two persons, or two Christs, but that now Jesus Christ, in one person, is at the same time true eternal God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and true man." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 25): "To the specific difference of the hypostatic union belongs the fact that these two natures are joined and united, in order to constitute one personality in the incarnate Christ, i.e., the nature inseparably assumed in the union became so peculiar to the person of the Word assuming it, that although there are and remain in Christ two natures, without change and mixture, with the distinction between the natures and essential attributes unimpaired, yet there are not two Christs, but only one Christ." Hence, since the act of union, Christ is called a complex person. GRH. (III, 427): "The hypostasis is called complex, not because it became composite, by suffering in and of itself an alteration and loss of its simplicity, but because, since the incarnation, it is an hypostasis of two natures, while before it was an hypostasis of the divine nature alone. Before the incarnation the person of the logoß was self-determined and simple, subsisting only in the divine nature; by the incarnation the hypostasis became complex, consisting, at the same time, of the divine and human nature, and thus not only His divine, but also His assumed human nature, belongs to the entireness of the person of Christ now incarnate. Because the hypostasis of the logoß became an hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the hypostasis of the logoß was imparted to the flesh," and hence there follows the impartation of personality to the human nature. [14] HFRFFR. (263): "These two natures in Christ are united (1) inconvertibly. For He became the Son of God, not by the change of His divine nature into flesh; (2) unconfusedly. For the two natures are one, not by a mingling, through which a third object (tertium quiddam) comes into being, preserving in no respect the entireness of the simple natures; (3) inseparably and uninterruptedly. For the two natures in Christ are so united that they are never separated by any intervals, either of time or place. Therefore this union has not been dissolved in death, and the logoß cannot be shown at any place without the assumed human nature. For the Son of God took upon Himself human nature, not as a garment which He again would lay aside. Neither did the Son of God appear, as angels sometimes have appeared, in human form to men, but He made the assumed flesh His own, and since He has assumed it, never leaves it. For, according to the Council of Chalcedon: We confess one and the same Jesus Christ, the Son and Lord only-begotten, in two natures, without mixture, change, division, or separation (en duo fusein, asugcutwß, atreptwß, adiairetwß, acwristwß).'" [15] GRH. (III, 428): "For neither has a part been united to a part, but the entire logoß to the entire flesh, and the entire flesh to the entire logoß; therefore, because of the identity of person and the pervasion of the natures by each other, the logoß is so present to the flesh, and the flesh is so present to the logoß, that neither the logoß is without the flesh, nor the flesh without the logoß, but wherever the logoß is, there He has the flesh present in the highest degree with Himself, because He has taken this into the unity of His person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the logos in the highest degree present to itself, because the flesh has been taken into His person. As the logoß is not without the divine nature, to which the person belongs, so also is He not without His flesh, finite indeed in essence, yet personally subsisting in the logoß. For as, by eternal generation from the Father, His own divine nature is peculiar to the logoß, so through the personal union, flesh became peculiar to the same logoß." FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., VIII, 11. [16] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 7): "We believe that now, in this undivided person of Christ, there are two distinct natures, namely, the divine, which is from eternity, and the human, which in time was taken into the unity of the person of the Son of God. And these two natures in the person of Christ are never either separated, or commingled, or changed the one into the other, but each remains in its nature and substance, or essence, in the person of Christ to all eternity. We believe . . . that as each nature in its nature and essence remains unmingled, and never ceases to exist, so each nature retains its natural essential properties, and to all eternity does not lay them aside." [17] GRH. (III, 422): "The mode of this union is wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful, transcending the comprehension not only of all men, but even of angels, whence it is called without controversy, a great mystery.' There are various and diverse modes of union which are to be excluded from the mode of the personal union. For, as devout old writers say that it is better to know and be able to express what God is not, than what He is, so also of the divine and supernatural union of the two natures in Christ, we can truly affirm that it is easier to tell what is not, than what is its mode." From the Holy Scriptures, GRH. (ib.) justifies the above-mentioned presentation of this doctrine as follows: "The more prominent passages of Scripture which speak of the union of the two natures in Christ are: John 1:14; Col. 2:9; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14-16. As these are all parallel, they must be constantly connected in the explanation of the union. John says: The Word was made flesh;' but, lest any one think that the Word was made flesh in the same sense that the water was made wine, Paul says that God, i.e., the Son of God, was manifest in the flesh,' and that He took part of flesh and blood' (kekoinwnhke). But now communion is between at least two distinct things, otherwise it would be interchange and coalescence. God is said by the apostle to have been manifest in the flesh;' but, lest any one might think that it was such a manifestation as there was in the Old Testament, when either God Himself or angels appeared in outward forms, John says that the logoß became flesh,' i.e., that He so took flesh into His person as never afterwards to lay it aside. The Son of God is said to have taken on Him the seed of Abraham; but, lest any one might think that it was an assumption such as that was when angels for a time took upon them corporeal forms, it is said that, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same.' But now it is evident that children partake of flesh and blood in such a manner that, by birth, flesh and blood, or human nature, is imparted to them by their parents. The apostle described the union by the dwelling of the logoß in assumed flesh; but, lest any one might think that the Son of God dwelt in assumed flesh in the manner in which God dwells, through grace, in the hearts of believers, he adds significantly that all the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the assumed flesh, and that, too, bodily, to denote the dwelling-place, or personally, to express the mode of union." [18] The negative properties are enumerated very differently by the Dogmaticians. Besides those specified in the text, the most prominent are these: "The union occurred (a) asugcutwß, unconfusedly; (b) atreptwß, inconvertibly; (c) adiairetwß, indivisibly; (d) acwristwß, inseparably; (e) analloiwtwß, uninterchangeably; (f) adialutwß, indissolubly; (g) adiastatwß, uninterruptedly." Or, "Not by reason of place (topikwß), as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem; not by reason of power (energhtikwß), as in creatures; not by reason of grace (carientwß), as in saints; not by reason of glory (doxastikwß), as in the blessed and the angels." __________________________________________________________________ § 33. Continuation. The hypostasis of the divine nature having thus, through the personal union, become at the same time that of the human nature, and thus no longer only a divine but a divine and human nature being now predicated of the person of the Redeemer, a real communion of both natures is thereby asserted, in consequence of which the two natures sustain no merely outward relation to each other; for, as the hypostasis of the divine nature is not essentially different from this nature itself, and this hypostasis has imparted itself to the human nature, it therefore follows that there exists between the divine and human nature a true and real impartation and communion. [1] The first effect of the personal union is, therefore, the "communion (also communication) of natures." QUEN. (III, 87): "The communion of natures is that most intimate participation (koinwnia) and combination (sunduasiß) of the divine nature of the logoß and of the assumed human nature, by which the logoß, through a most intimate and profound perichoresis, so permeates, perfect, inhabits, and appropriates to Himself the human nature that is personally united to Him, that from both, mutually inter-communicating, there arises the one incommunicable subject, viz., one person." As, however, in the act of union, the divine nature is regarded as the active one, and the divine logoß as that which assumed the human nature, so the intercommunion of the two natures must be so understood as that, between the two natures, the active movement proceeds from the divine nature, and it is this that permeates the human. [2] It is, indeed, just as difficult for us to form an adequate conception of this as in the case of the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which furnish us with at least an approximate conception of it. Such we may find, e.g., in the union of soul and body; in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand towards each other; or in the relation between iron and fire in red-hot iron. Just as the soul and body do not stand outwardly related to each other, as a man to the clothing that he has put on, or as an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the union between soul and body is a real, intimate and perfect one, so is also the union and communion of the two natures. As body and soul are inseparably united, and constitute the one man, so are also the human and divine natures most inseparably united. As the soul acts upon the body and is united with it, without there being any mingling of the two, the soul remaining soul and the body remaining body, so are we also to regard the communion of the two natures in such a light, that each abides in its integrity. As, finally, the soul is never without the body, so also the logoß is to be regarded as always in the flesh and never without it. [3] If, now, there really exists such a communion of natures, it follows -- I. That the personal designations derived from the two natures must be mutually predicable of each other; that we must therefore just as well be able to say, "The man (Christ Jesus) is God," as "God is man," which expressions, of course, do not signify that God, having become man, has ceased to be God, but rather, that the same Christ, who is God, is at the same time man (HOLL. (686): "The Son of God, personally, is the same as the Son of man: and the Son of man, personally, is the same as the Son of God"); whence the predicate "man" belongs just as much to the subject God as the predicate "God" belongs to the subject man. [4] For, if we refuse to say this, we would betray the fact that we conceive, not of two natures in Christ, but rather of two persons, each remaining as it originally was, which would be Nestorianism. From the communion of natures are, therefore, deduced the personal designations, i.e., statements in which the concrete of one nature (as united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature; i.e., the two essences really (alehqwß) different, the divine and the human, are in the concrete reciprocally predicated of one another, really and truly, yet in a manner very singular and unusual, in order to express the personal union. [5] To guard against a misunderstanding of these personal designations, it may be more particularly stated that they are (1) not merely verbal, i.e., they are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says of the son of Mary, He was the Son of God, ascribing to the subject a title, as it were, but altogether refusing to acknowledge that He who was the son of Mary was also really the Son of God; (2) not identical (when the same thing is predicated of itself); i.e., the predicates that are ascribed to the subject dare not be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to the nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. The proposition, "The Son of God is the son of Mary," dare not, therefore, be interpreted, "The man who is united with the Son of God is the son of Mary;" (3) not metaphorical, figurative, or tropical; as when, in the predicate that is applied to a subject, not the essential nature itself of the subject is ascribed to it, but only particular qualities of this predicate are appropriated to the subject, so that it might be said, in a figurative sense, God is man, as we understand the expression when it is applied to a picture: "This is a man," "a woman;" or, when it is said of Herod, "He is a fox;" (4) not essential and univocal; as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it (the expression, "God is man," would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man). The personal designations are rather -- (1) Real; i.e., that which is ascribed to the subject really and truly belongs to it. (2) Unusual and singular; for, as there is no other example of the personal union, so there are no other examples of the personal designations. But from the communion of natures it follows also -- II. That there is a participation of the natures in the person as well as of the natures with each other. [6] This is set forth in the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. BR. (467): "The communicatio idiomatum is that by which it comes to pass that those things which, when the two natures are compared together, belong to one of them per se and formally, are to be truly predicated, also, of the other nature (either as regards concretes, or for that which is peculiar to it.)" [7] According to this doctrine, therefore, it is neither possible to ascribe a quality to one of the two natures, which is not a quality of the whole person, nor is it possible to predicate an act or operation of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not participate (not, however, in such a way as if along with the qualities or the acts proceeding from them, their underlying essence were transferred to the other nature). [8] There exists, therefore, a communicatio idiomatum between the natures and the person, and between the natures reciprocally. [9] The communicatio idiomatum is, therefore, of several genera, of which we enumerate three (for so many are distinctly mentioned in the Scriptures), [10] the idiomatic, majestatic, and apotelesmatic. I. THE IDIOMATIC GENUS. If the two natures are really united in one person, then every idioma (peculiarity) that originally belongs to one of the two natures must be predicated of the entire person; the idiomata (peculiarities) of the divine nature, as well as those of the human nature, must belong to the person of the Redeemer. If, therefore, to be born or to suffer is an idioma of the human nature, then we must just as well be able to say, "Christ, the God-man, was born, suffered," as it is said of Him, "by Him were all things created," although creation is an idioma of the divine nature. [11] For, if we will not say this, but maintain that an idioma of the human nature can be predicated only of the concrete of the human nature, and an idioma of the divine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that we would say: "The man, Jesus Christ, was born," "by Christ, who is God, all things were created;" then the personal union would be set aside, and it would appear that two persons and not two natures are recognized. [12] But it is just in this that the personal union shows itself to be real, that all the idiomata which belong to the one or the other nature are equally idiomata of the person. As, further, in virtue of the communion of natures, and of the personal designations resulting therefrom, it is all the same whether we designate Christ by both of His natures or only by one of them, an idioma of one of the two natures can be just as readily predicated of the concrete of the one as of the other; we can, therefore, just as well say, "God is dead," as, "the man, Jesus Christ, is Almighty." [13] While, however, the idiomata of the two natures are attributed to the concrete of both natures (to Christ, the God-man) or to the concrete of one of the two natures (God -- the man, Christ Jesus), it by no means follows from this that therefore the idiomata of the one nature becomes those of the other; for the two natures are not in substance changed by the personal union, but each of them retains the idiomata essential and natural to itself. Therefore it is only to the person that, without further distinctions, the idiomata of the one or of the other nature can be ascribed; but this can in no wise happen between the natures themselves, in such a sense as though each of them did not retain the idiomata essential to itself. [14] To avoid such a misunderstanding in statements of this kind, it is usual to designate particularly from which nature the idiomata predicated of the person are derived. [15] General Definition. -- HOLL. (693): "The first genus of communicatio idiomatum is this, when such things as are peculiar to the divine or to the human nature are truly and really ascribed to the entire person of Christ, designated by either nature or by both natures." [16] This genus the later Dogmaticians divide into three species, according as the different idiomata are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are "(a) idiopoihsiß (appropriation), or oikeiwsiß (indwelling), when human idiomata are ascribed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts 3:15; 20:28; 1 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 2:20. (b) koinwnia twn qeiwn (participation of the divine), when the divine idiomata are predicated of the person of the incarnate Word, designated from His human nature. John 6:62; 8:58; 1 Cor. 15:47, (c) antidosiß or sunamfoterismoß, alteration, or reciprocation, in which as well the divine as the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the person, or concerning Christ, designated from both natures. Heb. 13:8; Rom. 9:5; 2 Cor. 13:4; 1 Pet. 3:18." (HOLL. 694) II. THE MAJESTATIC GENUS. As the divine logoß has assumed human nature, so that by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has become also that of the human nature, a further and natural consequence of this is, that thereby the human nature has become partaker of the attributes of the divine nature, and therefore of its entire glory and majesty: [17] for, by the personal union, not only the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature; and the participation in the divine attributes by the human nature occurs at the very moment in which the logoß unites itself with the human nature. [18] But there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata essential to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained, because the divine nature in its essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase. [19] The attributes, finally, which, by virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures, are communicated to the human nature, are truly divine, and are therefore to be distinguished from the special human excellences possessed by the human nature which the logos assumed, over and above those of other human natures. [20] Definition. -- (HOLL. 699): "The second genus of communicatio idiomatum is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates the idiomata of His own divine nature to the assumed human nature, in consequence of the personal union, for common possession, use and designation." [21] III. THE APOSTELESMATIC GENUS. The whole design of the incarnation of Christ is none other than that the logoß, united with the human nature, may accomplish the work of redemption. From the communion of the two natures, resulting from the personal union, it follows that none of the influences proceeding from Christ can be attributed to one only of the two natures. [22] The influence may, in deed, proceed from one of the two natures, and each of the two natures exerts the influence peculiar to itself, but in such a way that, while such an influence is being exerted on the part of one of the natures, the other is not idle, but at the same time active; that, therefore, while the human nature suffers, the divine, which indeed cannot also suffer, yet in so far participates in the suffering of the human nature that it wills this suffering, permits it, stands by the human nature in its suffering, and strengthens and supports it for enduring the imposed burden; [23] further, that the human nature is to be regarded as active, not alone by means of the attributes essentially its own, but that to these are added, by virtue of the second genus of the communicatio idiomatum, the divine attributes imparted to it, with which it operates. [24] For the divine nature could not of itself, alone, have offered a ransom for the redemption of the world; to do this it had to be united with the human nature, which, consisting of soul and body, could be offered up for the salvation of men. Again, the human nature could not have accomplished many of the deeds performed (miracles, etc.), had not its attributes been increased by the addition of the divine. [25] Definition -- GRH. III, 555): "The third genus of the communicatio idiomatum is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs what is peculiar to itself, with the participation of the other. 1 Cor. 15:3; Gal. 1:4; Eph. 5:2." [26] If we now contemplate the entire doctrine of the Person of Christ, its supreme importance at once becomes manifest. Only because in Christ the divine and human natures were joined together in one person, could He accomplish the work of redemption. [27] In order clearly to exhibit this truth, it has been necessary for us to develop the present doctrine at such length. [28] [1] QUEN. (III, 87): "IF the hypostasis of the logoß has been truly and really imparted to the assumed flesh, undoubtedly there is a true and real participation between the divine and the human nature, since the hypostasis of the logoß and the divine nature of the logoß do not really differ. But as the former is true, so also must be the latter." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 14): "But we must not regard this hypostatic union as though the two natures, divine and human, are united in the manner in which two pieces of wood are glued together, so as really, or actually and truly, to have no participation whatever with each other. For this is the error and heresy of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, who thought and taught heretically that the two natures are altogether separate or apart from one another, and are incapable of any participation whatever. By this false dogma, the natures are separated, and two Christs are invented, one of whom is Christ, but the other God, the logoß, dwelling in Christ." QUEN. (III, 143): "THe antithesis of the Calvinists, some of whom teach that it is only the person of the logoß, and not, at the same time, His divine nature that has been united to human nature, unless by way of consequence and accompaniment, because of its identity with personality, which alone was at first united. Thus they invent a double union, mediate and immediate; that the natures are united, not immediately, but through the medium of the person of the logoß." [2] HOLL. (680): "The communion of natures in the person of Christ is the mutual participation of the divine and human nature of Christ, through which the divine nature of the logoß, having become participant of the human nature, pervades, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates this to itself; but the human, having become participant of the divine nature, is pervaded, perfected, and inhabited by it." BR. (463): "From the personal union proceeds the participation of natures, through which it comes to pass that the human nature belongs to the Son of God, and the divine nature to the Son of man. For marking this, the word pericwrhsiß, which, according to its original meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be employed, so that the divine nature might indeed be said actively to penetrate, and the human nature passively to be penetrated. Yet this must be understood in such a manner as to remove all imperfection. For the divine nature does not penetrate the human so as to occupy successively one part of it after another, and to diffuse itself extensively through it; but, because it is spiritual and indivisible as a whole, it energizes and perfects at the same time every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it. Here belongs the passage, Col. 2:9. HOLL. (681): "Pericwrhsiß is not indeed a biblical term; nevertheless it is an ecclesiastical term, and began especially to be employed when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not understand pericwrhsiß as local and quantitative, as an urn is said to contain (cwrein) water, but as illocal and metaphorically used." [3] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 18, 19): "Learned antiquity has indeed declared this personal union and communion of natures by the similitude of the soul and body, and likewise, in another manner, by that of glowing iron. For the soul and body (and so also fire and iron) have a participation with each other, not merely nominally or verbally, but truly and really; yet in such a manner that no mingling or equalizing of the natures is introduced, as when honey-water is made of honey and water, for such drink is no longer either pure water or pure honey, but a drink composed of both. Far otherwise is it in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, for the union and participation of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is far more exalted, and is altogether inexpressible." HOLL. (681): "The fathers have seen fit to describe the personal pericwrhsiß (a) from the essential pericwrhsiß of the persons of the Holy Trinity; (b) from the natural pericwrhsiß of body and soul; (c) from the accidental pericwrhsiß of fire and iron. For, as one person of the Trinity is in another, as the soul pervades the body, as fire penetrates all the pores of iron, so the divinity of Christ is in the humanity, which it completely fills and pervades. From this it is easy to infer that pericwrhsiß denotes (1) that the personal union is an inner one and most complete. A union is outward and incomplete when an angel assumes a body, a pilot stands by a ship, a garment hangs on a man. The teachers of the Church, to separate from it the idea of such an outward union, were in the habit of calling the union a personal union, and the communion proceeding from it pericwrhsiß. For, as the soul does not outwardly stand by the body, nor merely direct its movement, but enters, moves into, and fashions it, by imparting to the body its own essence, life, and faculties; so the logoß enters the flesh, and inwardly communicates to it its own divine nature. (2) That the communion of natures is mutual, yet in such a manner that the divine nature, as actual being (enteleceia), i.e., as a most absolute act, permeates and perfects and assumed human nature, and the assumed flesh is permeated and perfected. (3) That the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is inseparable (acwriston). The rational soul so enters the body that it could in no way have been separated from it, if, by the divine judgment, the violence of death had not followed from the Fall accidentally intervening. It is true that the natural union of soul and body was dissolved during the three days of Christ's death; but the divine nature of the logos was not separated from the assumed humanity, but was, in the highest degree, present to it. (4) That the natural union and communion is without mingling, mixture, or change (asugcuton, amikton, kai atrepton). As the persons of the Trinity permeate each other without mixture; as the soul fashions the body without any disturbance, mingling, or change of either; so the logoß pervades His own flesh in such manner that in essentials there is in no respect a giving way by either, and neither is mingled or mixed with the other. (5) That the natures of Christ have been united continuously (adiastatouß), or are mutually present to each other. The persons of the Trinity enter each other so mutually that neither is outside of nor beyond the other. In like manner the rational soul is in the body so as never to be outside of or beyond it; the logoß also is in the flesh, so as never to be beyond, and never to be outside of it." [4] GRH. (III, 453): "The source and foundation of the personal designations consist solely and alone in the personal union and participation of natures, from which they alone and immediately proceed, from which alone, also, they are to be judged and explained. For God is man, and man is God, because the human and divine natures in Christ are personally united, and because an inner pericwrhsiß exists between these two natures personally united, so that the divine nature of the logoß does not subsist outside of the assumed human nature, and the assumed human nature does not subsist outside of the divine. God is and is called man, because the hypostasis of the logoß is the hypostasis not only of His divine, but also of His human nature." Scriptural examples: Jer. 23:5, 6; 33:17; Matt. 22:42-45; Luke 20:44; Ps. 110:1; 2 Sam. 7:19; Is. 9:6; Matt. 1:21-23; 16:13, 16; Luke 1:35; 2:11; 1 Cor. 15:47. [5] a. The expression "concrete" was employed when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one who is of two natures. If the personal designation was derived from one of His two natures, the same was called the concrete of that nature; and, therefore, since Christ is of two natures, the concrete of the divine nature, when the designation was derived from the divine nature; the concrete of the human nature, when the designation was derived from the human nature. To the former class belong the designations, "God," "Son of God," etc.; to the latter, "man," "Son of man," "Son of Mary." HOLL. (685): "The concrete of a nature is a term whereby the nature is expressed with a connotation of the hypostasis." BR. (465): "By the concrete, a term is understood which, in the direct sense, denotes a suppositum, but in an indirect sense a nature. Thus God denotes a suppositum, having a divine nature; man denotes a suppositum, having a human nature. Still, a distinction must be made between the concrete of the nature, and the concrete of the person; the latter expression is employed where the personal designation has not been derived so much from one of the two natures, as where it rather serves to designate, through an expression elsewhere derived, the particular person in whom the two natures are united as one person." BR. (466): "The concrete of a person is such a term or name, as formally signifies the person consisting of both natures, e.g., Christ, Messiah, Immanuel; which names, in the nominative case, denote the suppositum, and, in an oblique case, neither nature alone, but rather both." In the present case, only the concrete of the nature comes into use; for the question is only in reference to the cases in which the communion of natures shall also express itself in their personal designations. To personal designations, in the proper sense, such designations do not belong, in which a concrete of the nature is predicated of a concrete of the person, as occurs in the sentences: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. GRH. (III, 453): "For this designations accurately and formally express, not so much the unity of person, as the duality of natures in Christ; for Christ is and is called man, because in Him there is a human nature; and He is and is called God, because in Him there is a divine nature; and He is and is called the God-man, because in Him there is not only a human, but also a divine nature." It is furthermore self-evident that these designations can be employed only upon the presupposition of the personal union, and that they are not universally applicable. Hence, HOLL. (685): "If the divine and human natures, or man and God, be regarded outside of the personal union, they are disparate, neither can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say: a lion is a horse, so also I cannot say: God is man. But if a union exists between God and man, and that too a real union, such as exists in Christ, between the divine and human natures, they can be correctly predicated of each other in the concrete. The reason is, because, through the union, the two natures constitute one person, and every concrete of the nature denotes the person itself. Since, therefore, Christ the man is the same person who is God, or this person who is God is that very person who is man, it is also said correctly: man is God, and God is man." b. To the abstracts of nature ("an abstract is that by which a nature is considered, yet not with respect to its union, but in itself, and withdrawn from its union or the concrete, nevertheless not actually, but only in the mind." HFRFFR. (283)) the like does not apply, as to the concretes of nature; therefore it cannot be said that deity is humanity, and humanity is deity. QUEN. (III, 88): "The reason is, because the union was not made to one nature, but to one complex person, with the difference of natures unimpaired, and therefore, one nature in the abstract is not predicated of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature." [6] GRH. (III, 466): "Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the union, that also comes under the participation. But now the properties come under the union, because no nature is destitute of its own properties, since a nature without properties is also without existence, and the two natures are united in Christ, not as alone, or stripped of their properties, but entire, without incompleteness, having suffered no loss of peculiarities. Therefore, the properties also come under the participation." HOLL. (691): "No union can be perfect and permeant (perichoristic) without a participation of properties, as the examples of animated body show. We readily grant that a parastatic (adjacent) union of two pieces of wood may occur without a participation of properties, because that grade of union is low and imperfect. But, according to the definition of Scripture, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is most absolute, perfect and permeant (perichoristic); therefore it cannot be without a participation of properties." In like manner, proof can be produced from the communion of natures, which, just as the union, has the participation of properties (commun. idiom.) as a necessary consequence. [7] HOLL. (690): "The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, who is denominated from either or both natures." Explanation of the individual notations of the Communicatio and Idioma. -- (a) GRH. (III, 465): "Communicatio (communication) is the distribution of one thing which is common to many, to the many which have it in common." QUEN. (III, 91): "Not that the properties become common, idiwmata koina, but that through and because of the personal union they become communicable (koinwnhta)." (b) idiwma, proprium, property. QUEN. (III, 92): "By idiwmata are understood the properties and differences of natures, by which, as by certain marks and characteristics, the two natures (in unity of person) are mutually distinguished and known apart. The term idiwmata is received either in a narrow sense, for the natural properties themselves, or in a wide sense, so that it comprehends the operations also, through which these properties properly so called exert themselves; in this place, properties or idiomata are received in a wider sense, so that, in addition to the properties strictly so called, they embrace within their compass actions and results, energhmata kai apotelesmata, because properties exert themselves through operations and results." GRH. (III, 466): "Observe, that the notion of the divine properties is one thing and that of the human properties another. The properties of the divine nature belong to the very essence of the logoß, and are not really distinguished from it. The properties of the human nature do not constitute but proceed from the essence." In regard to the authority for this doctrine, HOLL. (690): "The expression, communicatio idiomatum, is not found in the Holy Scriptures word for word, yet the matter itself has the firmest scriptural foundation. For as often as Scripture attributes to the flesh of Christ actions and works of divine omnipotence, so often, by consequence, is omnipotence ascribed, as an immediate act, to Him, from whom the divine operation (energeia) proceeds, as a mediate act. But, although the communicatio idiomatum was first so named by the Scholastics, yet orthodox antiquity employed equivalent forms of speech in the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches." The first complete elaboration of this doctrine among the Dogmaticians is given by Chemnitz, in his book, De Duabus Naturis in Christo, 1580. [8] Therefore the more specific caution with regard to the communicatio, according to which it is said that it is not a "communicatio kata meqexin, or according to the essence, by which one passes into the essence and within the definition of the other; but a commuinicatio kata sunduasin (not essential or accidental, but) personal, i.e., a participation of the two natures, whereby one of those united is so connected with the other that, the essence remaining distinct, the one, without any mingling, truly receives and partakes of the peculiar nature, power, and efficacy of the other, through and because of the communion that has occurred." (QUEN., III, 102.) So, also, still more extended definitions have been given, just as of the personal union. GRH. (III, 466): "As the union is not essential, nor merely verbal, neither through mingling, or change, or mixture, or adjacence, neither is it personal or sacramental; so also the communicatio is not such." [9] GRH. (III, 465): "The communicatio idiomatum is of a nature to a person, or of a nature to a nature." HFRFFR. (286): "The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, because of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, not only the idomata of both natures of the person (who is at the same time God and man), but also the properties of each one of the natures, are ascribed to the other, i.e., the human nature to the logoß, and the divine nature to the assumed man. And because of the same communion, each nature works with a communication of the other, yet with their natures and properties preserved unimpaired." QUEN. (III, 155): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) state that the communicatio idiomatum is indeed real with respect to the person, designated by Deity or humanity, but that with respect to natures it is only verbal, i.e., that it is a communicatio of words and terms and not of properties. (2) They say that those are only verbal designations when human things are declared of God, or divine things of man." [10] QUEN. (III, 92): "Definite and distinct degrees of the communicatio idiomatum are given; but, inasmuch as the question of the number of degrees or genera of the communicatio idiomatum does not pertain to faith and its nature, but to the method of teaching, some define two, others three, and others four genera of properties. Yet the number three pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as in the holy volume this is discussed according to a threefold method of expression. I say that Holy Scripture distinctly presents three genera, although it does not enumerate them." A few Dogmaticians assume four genera of communicatio idiomatum, since they distinguish the declarations in which the properties of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God, from the declarations in which the properties of one of the two natures are affirmed in reference to the entire person of Christ; and, therefore, the proposition, "Christ suffered," they assign to a different genus from the proposition, "God suffered." Still, the most of the Dogmaticians express themselves against this classification. But the order also in which the three genera are given, is not the same in all the Dogmaticians. QUEN. (ib.): "Some follow the order of doctrine; others the order of nature. The former (Form. Conc., Chmn., Aegid. Hunn.) place the communication of the official actions, since this is more easily explained and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is especially controverted and must be explained more fully. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of the official actions, because the former by nature precedes the latter." [11] GRH. (III, 472): "The foundation of this communicatio idiomatum is unity of person. For, inasmuch as, since the incarnation, the one person of Christ subsists in two and of two natures, each of which has been clothed, as it were, with its own properties, the properties of both natures, the divine as well as the human, are affirmed of the one complex (sunqetw) person of Christ." FORM CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 36): "Since there are in Christ two distinct natures, which in their essences and properties are neither changed nor mixed, and yet the two natures are but one person, those properties which belong only to one nature are not ascribed to it, apart from the other nature, as if separated, but to the entire person (which at the same time is God and man), whether He be called God or man." [12] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): "Nestorius taught such a participation as to ascribe divine properties to Christ only as God, and human properties to Christ only as man; such as that man, not God, was born of Mary, was crucified, etc. Likewise, that God, not man, healed the sick and brought to life the dead. But thus, Christ as God would be one person, and Christ as man would be another, and there would be two persons and two Christs." [13] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): "In order to show this most complete unity of the person, those things which are properties, whether of the divine, or human, or both natures, are ascribed to the one hypostasis, or are designated by the concrete derived from the divine, or from the human, or from both natures." (Id., 68): "Because the union of natures occurred in the hypostasis of the Word, so that there is now one and the same person of both natures subsisting at the same time in both natures, when the concrete terms derived from the divine nature, as God the logoß, the Son of God, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the designation is derived from the divine nature, yet they signify not only the divine nature, but a person now subsisting in two natures, divine and human. And when the concrete terms derived from the human nature, as man and Son of man, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, they designate not a merely human nature, or a human nature alone, but an hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human nature, or which consists, at the same time, of both a divine and a human nature, and to which both natures belong. Hence it occurs that all the properties are correctly ascribed to concrete terms, denoting the person of Christ, whether named from both or only from one of the two natures." [14] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): "But it" (i.e., true faith) "does not, with Eutyches and the Monotheletes, confound that communication between the natures with a change and mixture both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or the essential property of one nature becomes the substantial property of the other nature, considered in the abstract, whether, on the one hand, beyond the union or in itself, or, on the other, by itself in the union. But a property belonging to one nature is imparted or ascribed to the person in the concrete." Hence HOLL. (696): "(1) The subject is not the abstract, but the concrete, of the nature or person." (It cannot, therefore, be said that Deity was crucified.) "(2) The predicate" (namely, that which is affirmed of the subject, i.e., of the incarnate (complex) person) "does not mark a divine or human substance itself, but a property of one of the two natures." GRH. (III, 485): "In this genus, are the abstract expressions to be employed, Deity suffered, Divinity died?'" He adds, "that they have indeed been employed by some with the limitation, Divinity suffered in the flesh;'" but is of the opinion "that it would be better to abstain from this mode of expression;" and he proves this "(1) From the silence of Scripture. (2) From the nature of Deity. Deity is incapable of suffering, or of change, and interchange; therefore, suffering cannot be ascribed to it. Deity pertains to the entire Trinity; . . . but if, therefore, Deity in itself were said to have suffered, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be reproduced in the Church. . . . (3) From the condition of the union. Through the union, the distinction of natures has not been removed, but the hypostasis of the logoß became the hypostasis of the flesh, so as to constitute one complex person; therefore, something can be predicated of the entire person, according to the human nature, and yet it by no means follows that the same should be ascribed to the divine nature. As works and sufferings belong to the person, and not to the nature, I am correct in saying, God suffered in the flesh;' but I cannot say, the divinity of the logoß suffered in the flesh.'" [15] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 37): "BUt in this class of expressions it does not follow that those things which are ascribed to the whole person are, at the same time, properties of both natures, but it is to be distinctly declared according to which nature anything is ascribed to the entire person." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): "Yet, lest the natures may be thought to be mingled, from the example of Scripture there is generally added a declaration to which nature a property belongs that is ascribed to the person, or, according to which nature of the person it is ascribed. For the properties of one nature do not hinder the presence also of the other nature with its properties. Nor do they hinder the properties of one nature from being ascribed to the person subsisting in both natures. Nor is it necessary that what, in this genus, is predicated of the person should be applicable to both natures. But it is sufficient that it pertain to the person according to one or the other nature, whether the divine or the human. QUEN. (III, 94): "Particles used for this purpose are en, ex, dia, kata, 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18; 4:1; Rom. 1:3; 9:5; Acts 20:28." By this additional more specific statement, it is furthermore shown how the predicate, applied to the subject, properly belongs only to one of the two natures, although, by virtue of the union of persons, it belongs also to both natures. (HOLL. (696): "The mode of expression is true and peculiar by which divine or human properties are declared to belong to the entire theanthropic person (for the properties of humanity, because of the personal union, are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, and vice versa), yet in such a way that, by means of discretive particles, they are claimed for the nature to which they formally belong, while they are appropriated by the other nature to which they belong, not formally, but because of the personal union.") The mode of expression is illustrated by the following examples. (HOLL. (697): "The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, Rom. 1:3. The subject of this idiomatic proposition is the Son of God, by which the entire person of Christ, designated from the divine nature, is denoted. The predicate is, that He was born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which it does not by itself belong, but through something else, because of the unity of the theanthropic person; whence, by the restrictive particle, kata, according to the flesh,' the human property of the human nature is asserted, to which a birth in time formally applies; yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from the participation in the nativity, inasmuch as the being born of the seed of David belongs to it by way of appropriation.") The proposition, "God suffered," is thus explained: "The Son of God suffered according to His human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted upon the flesh of Peter, not alone the flesh of Peter is said to have been wounded, but Peter, or the person of Peter, has been truly wounded, although his soul cannot be wounded; so, when the Son of God suffers, according to the flesh, the flesh or his human nature does not suffer alone, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature is impassible." (Id., 698): "The sentence, God has suffered,' is not then to be explained away with Zwingli into The man, Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suffered,' in which case the mode of expression would be no real and peculiar one." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 39): "Zwingli names it an allaeosis when anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ, which, nevertheless, is a property of the human nature, and the reverse; For example, where it is said in Scripture, Luke 24:28, Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?' there Zwingli triflingly declares that the term Christ, in this passage, refers to His human nature. Beware! beware! I say of that allaeosis; . . . for if I permit myself to be persuaded to believe that the human nature alone suffered for me, Christ will not be to me a Saviour of great worth, but He Himself stands in need of a Saviour." . . . QUEN. (III, 155): "They" (the Calvinists) "explain the designations of the first genus of communicatio idiomatum either with Zwingli by allaeosis, by which they state that the name of the person, or of one of the two natures, is put in the place of the subject only for the other nature which is expressed in the predicate; or with Piscator by synecdoche, of a part for the whole, i.e., that while the entire is put in the place of the subject, yet that it is in such a manner that the passion is restricted and limited to only a part of it, i.e., to the flesh alone. For example, they explain the proposition, God suffered,' in this way: Man alone, although united to God, suffered.'" [16] As appellations of this first genus the following were quoted, and their origin traced back to the old Church Fathers: antidosiß, alternation, tropoß antidosewß (Damascenus), enallagh kai koinwnia onomatwn, exchange and participation of names (Theodoret), idiopoiia kai idiopoihsiß appropriation (Cyril), alloiwsiß (but used in a different sense from that of Zwingli), oikeiwsiß, sunamfoterismoß. Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. 13:8; 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 7:55; Ps. 24:7, 8; Acts 3:15; John 8:58. [17] GRH. (III, 499): "That which is communicated, the holy matter of communication, is the divine majesty, glory, and power, and on this account gifts truly infinite and divine." QUEN. (III, 102): "The foundation of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis, and of the divine nature of the logoß. For, inasmuch as the human nature was taken into the union, and through the union became a partaker of the person and divine nature of the logoß, it became truly and really a partaker of the divine properties; for these really do not differ from the divine essence." CHMN. (de duab. nat., 97): "If the dwelling of God in the saints by grace confers, in addition to and beyond natural endowments, many free divine gifts, and works many wonders in them, what impiety is it to be willing to acknowledge in the mass of human nature, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, only physical endowments, and to be willing to believe of that nothing which surpasses and exceeds the natural conditions of human nature considered by or in itself, outside of the hypostatic union?" QUEN. (III, 158) concerning the nature of the mode: "We deny that this communication is merely verbal and nominal, as the Reformed contend" (p. 160, "who altogether deny this second genus of communicatio idiomatum. The propositions: The flesh of Christ quickens, the Son of man is omnipotent,' the Zwinglians explain by allaeosis thus: The Son of God who assumed flesh, quickens,' etc."); "but we maintain that it is true, peculiar, and real. Yet we do not say that there is any transfusion of divine properties into the human nature of Christ (whereby the reproach of Eutychianism is repelled), or that there is any change of the human nature into the divine, or that there is an equalization or abolition of natures, but that there is a personal communication." [18] QUEN. (III, 101): "For the communication of majesty occurred in that very moment in which the personal union occurred. For, from the very beginning of incarnation, the divine nature, with its entire fulness, united and communicated itself to the assumed flesh." With reference to the subsequent doctrine of the states of Christ, QUEN. however still adds: "We must here distinguish between the communication, with reference to possession, and the communication, with reference to use. So far as possession and the first act are concerned, the divine properties were communicated to the human nature at one and the same time with the very moment or the very act of the union, and new ones have not been superadded. And although the second act, and the full use of the imparted majesty, were withheld during the state of humiliation, yet rays of omnipotence, omniscience, etc., frequently appeared, as often as seemed good to divine wisdom. But the full exercise of this majesty began not until His exaltation to the right hand of God." [19] QUEN. (III, 159): "Reciprocation, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus; for there cannot be a humiliation, emptying or lessening of the divine nature (tapeinwsiß, kenwsiß, elattwsiß), as there is an advancement or exaltation (beltiwsiß or uperuywsiß) of human nature. The divine nature is unchangeable, and, therefore, cannot be perfected or diminished, exalted or depressed. The object of the reciprocation is a nature in want of and liable to a change, and such the divine nature is not. The promotion belongs to the nature that is assumed, not to the one that assumes it." THe ground on which only the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human and not the reverse, arises from the mode of the act of union. BR. (472): "It amounts to this, that, as on the part of the nature, although the divine is personally united to the human, and the human to the divine, yet this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature inwardly penetrates and perfects the human, but the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the communicatio idiomatum, this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature, penetrating the human, also makes the same, abstractly considered, in its own way, partaker of its divine perfections; but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot in a like manner render this, abstractly considered, the partaker of its own properties." [20] GRH. (III, 499): "We do not deny that, in addition to the essential properties of human nature, certain gifts pertaining to this condition inhere subjectively in Christ as a man, which although they surpass, by a great distance, the most excellent gifts of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite; but we add, that, in addition to these gifts which pertain to the condition and are finite, gifts truly infinite and immeasurable have been imparted to Christ the man, through the personal union, and His exaltation to the right hand of the Father." HOLL. (702): "Through and because of the personal union, there have been given to Christ, according to His human nature, gifts that are truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable." And, although it may be said in general "all the divine attributes have been imparted to the flesh of Christ, still a distinction should be made between attributes anenerghta and energhtika." As is well known, the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum forms a main point of difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. But of most significance is the difference concerning this second genus of properties, since the doctrine set forth under this head is decisive in regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper; for here the discussion has special reference to the attribute of omnipresence. We give, therefore, in this place, first, a summary of the difference between the two churches, and then a more specific statement of the doctrine of omnipresence. COTTA (in GRH., Loci, IV, Diss., I, 50), in the first place, groups together the points in reference to the doctrine of the person of Christ, on which both sides generally agree. "They agree (1) that in Christ there is only one person, but two natures, namely, a divine and a human; (2) that these two natures have been joined in the closest and most intimate union, which is generally called personal; (3) that by this union, a more intimate one than which cannot be conceived, the natures are neither mingled, as has been condemned in the Eutychians, nor the person divided, as has been condemned in the Nestorians; but (4) that this union must be regarded as without change, mixture, division, and interruption (atreptwß, asungcutwß, adiairetwß, acwristwß); and therefore (5) that by this union neither the difference of natures nor the peculiar conditions of either have been removed: for the human nature of Christ is always human, nor has it ever, by its own natural act, ceased to be finite, extended, circumscribed, passible; but the divine nature is and always remains infinite, immeasurable, impassible; (6) that nevertheless by the power of the personal union the properties of both natures have become common to the person of Christ, so that the person of Christ, the God-man, possesses divine properties, uses them, and is named by them; that in addition to this (7) by means of the hypostatic union there have been imparted to the human nature of Christ the very highest gifts of acquired condition (habitualia), for example, the greatest power, the highest wisdom, although finite; but that (8) to the mediatorial acts of Christ each nature contributed its own part, and that the divine nature conferred upon the acts of the human nature infinite power to redeem and save the human race. In a word (9) that the intimate union of God and man in Christ is so wonderful and sublime that it surpasses, in the highest degree, the comprehension of our mind." But "they" (the Reformed) "differ from us when the question is stated concerning the impartation abstractly considered, or of a nature to a nature; because they deny that, by the hypostatic union, the properties of the divine nature have been truly and really imparted to the human nature of Christ, and that, too, for common possession, use, and designation, so that the human nature of our Saviour is truly Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and Omniscient." The controversy between the Lutherans and Reformed had mainly reference, therefore, to the possession and use of the divine attributes which were ascribed to the human nature of Christ; among these the following were made especially prominent, viz., omnipotence, omniscience (which He used, however, in the state of humiliation, not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where it pleased Him), omnipresence, vivific power, and the worship of religious adoration, which also were ascribed to the humanity of Christ (so that the flesh of Christ should be worshiped and adored with the same adoration as that due to the divine nature of the logoß). Among these attributes, however, none was more zealously controverted than that of omnipresence, because this was the chief point in dispute between the Lutherans and Reformed with regard to ta presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. The chief objection against the real presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, Carlstadt, and after him Zwingli, had derived from the statement that Christ is sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, and therefore cannot be at the same time upon earth, in the elements of bread and wine. In opposition to this, Luther appealed to the personal union; from this, and the consequent communion of natures, he inferred the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, and proved thereby the possibility of a real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. Thus the doctrine of the omnipresence, or, as the Reformed expressed it, the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, became very important, and the Lutheran theologians are very accurate in its presentation. QUEN. thus states the question here at issue (III, 185): "Whether Christ, according to the humanity united with His divine and infinite person, and exalted at the Right Hand of the divine majesty, in this glorious state of exaltation is present to all creatures in the universe with a true, real, substantial, and efficacious omnipresence?" From this question the others, viz., whether omnipresence is to be ascribed to Christ, according to His divine nature, and whether it is to be at all ascribed to the person of Christ, are carefully distinguished. The first follows, as a matter of course; and also in regard to the other question, both parties were agreed in this, namely, that "omnipresence is properly ascribed to the entire person, in the concrete, or in the divine person of Christ, in which human nature subsists, wherever it is; or, what is the same thing, that Christ is everywhere, by reason of His person." And, from the question stated above, they further distinguished the one with reference to the personal or intimate presence, which is mutual between the logoß and the flesh (by which the logoß has the assumed nature most intimately present with itself, without regard to place, so that the logoß never and nowhere is without or beyond His flesh, or this without or beyond Him, but, where you place the logoß, there you also place the flesh, lest there be introduced a Nestorian disruption of the person subsisting of both natures). The controversy had rather to do with the outward presence, viz., that relating to creatures, and the most of the Dogmaticians understood by this omnipresence, "the most near and powerful dominion of Christ in His human nature." Accordingly, the thesis of the Dogmaticians concerning the question is the following: "The majesty of the omnipresence of the logoß was communicated to the human nature of Christ in the first moment of the personal union, in consequence of which, along with the divine nature, it is now omnipresent, in the state of exaltation, in a true, real, substantial, and efficacious presence. And so there is given to Christ, according to His human nature, a most near and powerful dominion, by which Christ as man, exalted at the Right Hand of God, preserves and governs all things in heaven and earth by the full use of His divine majesty." QUEN. (III, 185). "And, finally, it was protested that this omnipresence was not physical, diffusive, expansive, gross, local, corporeal, and divisible (as the Calvinists pretend that we hold), and it was described as majestatic, divine, spiritual, indivisible, which did not imply any locality, or inclusion, or expansion, or diffusion." (Id. III, 186.) And it was not thereby asserted that the body of Christ had lost its natural properties in such a manner that He had now ceased to be at any particular place. (HOLL. (712): "We must distinguish between a natural and personal act of the flesh of Christ. The flesh of Christ, by an act of nature, when Christ dwelt upon earth, was in a certain place, in the womb of His mother, upon the cross, etc., circumscribedly, or by way of occupying it; and now also in the state of glory, in accordance with the manner of glorified bodies, it is in a certain celestial somewhere, not circumscribedly, however, but definitively. But to this natural act that personal act is not opposed, by which it is illocally in the logoß, from which presence all local ideas or conceptions are to be abstracted.") To the proofs for the second genus of idiomata, the Dogmaticians add also, for the omnipresence especially, that derived from the sitting at the right hand of God. (HOLL. (714): "Christ rules with omnipresence according to the same nature according to which He sits at the right hand of God. But, according to His human nature, etc. Therefore, to sit at the Right Hand of God is explained by ruling. Just as, therefore, the Right Hand of God is everywhere and rules, for by this is designated in Holy Scripture the immense and infinite power and might of God, nowhere excluded, nowhere inoperative; thus, to sit at the Right Hand of God is, in virtue of the exaltation, to rule everywhere with divine power, truly immeasurable, and this cannot be conceived of without omnipresence, for surely the divine dominion is not over the absent, but over the present.") The opposite statement of the Reformed was this: "Just as the body of Christ, while He moved upon earth, was not present in heaven, so now that same body, after the ascension, is not present on earth; and, exalted above the heavens, we believe it is held there." Their main arguments against the omnipresence were these: "Because thereby the reality of the body of Christ, of His death and ascension to heaven would be disproved, inasmuch as a true human nature cannot be extended infinitely; because He who is omnipresent cannot die; because He who is, by virtue of His omnipresence, already in heaven, cannot still ascend thither." To these objections HOLL. (718) answers: "1. The doctrine concerning the reality of the flesh of Christ is not overthrown by the ascription of omnipresence to it, for it is not omnipresent by a physical and extensive, but by a hyperphysical, divine, and illocal presence, which belongs to it not formally and per se, but by way of participation, and by virtue of the personal union. 2. The doctrine concerning the death of Christ is not overturned by it, for the natural union of body and soul was indeed dissolved by death, but without disturbing the permanent hypostatic union of the divine and human natures. 3. The doctrine of the ascension of Christ is not disproved by it, for before the ascension the flesh of Christ was present in heaven by an uninterrupted presence as a personal act, but He ascended visibly to heaven in a glorified body according to the divine economy (kat oikonomian), so that He might fill all things with the omnipresence of His dominion. For Christ, by virtue of His divine omnipotence, can make Himself present in various ways." Notwithstanding these precise statements concerning the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, there still was no uniform and, in all its features, settled doctrinal statement concerning it prevalent among the Lutheran Dogmaticians. The reason of this lies in the fact, that until the time of the FORM. CONC. the only aim had in view, in the development of this doctrine, was the practical one of showing through it the possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. So far as this was necessary, all the Lutheran Dogmaticians are agreed. But this is no longer the case to such an extent, when, without reference to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, they had to do merely with the dogmatic development of the doctrine of omnipresence. As, however, the Dogmaticians were led by the right tact, to attribute no great importance to a difference which led to no practical result, they had no controversy about it, and the different views stood unassailed alongside of each other. There was still room enough for different views. The question, e.g., could arise: 1. Whether the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ was to be conceived of as only one by virtue of which Christ, according to His human nature, could be omnipresent when and where He wished; or, as one by virtue of which, in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, He was always, without exception, actually omnipresent from the state of exaltation onward, and only refrained from exercising this omnipresence, during the state of humiliation, in consequence of the mediatorial work He had undertaken? 2. How the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ should be defined; whether only as one by virtue of which the human nature participates in the dominion which is exercised by the divine nature; or as one by virtue of which it is present to all creatures in such a manner as Christ is present to them by virtue of His divine nature? In regard to these questions, the views of the Dogmaticians, already before the FORM. CONC., were not alike, and the FORM. itself is so variable in its utterances on this subject that a satisfactory answer to the questions above stated cannot be elicited from it. Hence it happens that later Dogmaticians of different views believed themselves authorized to appeal to the FORM. CONC. in vindication of their several opinions. After the completion of the FORM. CONC., therefore, the Dogmaticians were divided in opinion, about as follows, viz.: the majority mentioning the omnipresence only as "a most powerful and present dominion over creatures," either not entering at all upon the questions of the absolute presence, or rejecting that doctrine entirely. This omnipresence was then called also modified omnipresence. Thus QUEN., BR., the latter of whom appeals to the FORM. CONC. (475): "(They (the authors of the Form. Conc.) manifestly describe that omnipresence not as absolute, as a mere close proximity to all creatures and without any efficacious influence, but as modified, or joined with an efficacious influence, and according to the needs of the universal dominion which Christ exercises according to both His natures.") At the same time they assert that, from the time of the exaltation onward, Christ is to be regarded as constantly omnipresent according to His human nature, i.e., as always exercising the "most powerful dominion." Others, on the other hand, as the majority of the Swabian theologians, but beside these also, HOLL., asserted, that no only the "most powerful dominion" belonged to the human nature of Christ from the time of the exaltation onward, but also the true presence, and the latter, indeed, from the time of the conception. A short-lived controversy arose at the time when the theologians of Helmstadt and Brunswick refused to accept the FORM. CONC., mainly because, as they asserted, a doctrine of the omnipresence was taught in it with which they could not coincide. They admitted, indeed, that Christ, according to His human nature, can be present where He will; but they maintained that He actually willed to be present only there where it has been expressly promised concerning Him, namely, in the Holy Supper and in the Church. Besides, they characterized this presence not as an effect of omnipresence, but of omnipotence. The omnipresence maintained by them they designated the relative omnipresence. This view (which Calixtus, also, at a later date, adopted) was opposed by both classes of Dogmaticians, mainly because they wished to have the possibility of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper deduced from His omnipresence, and this from the communicatio idiomatum, without agreeing among themselves as to the mode of stating it. This point, therefore, has remained unsettled. Another question that arose was, concerning the time in which Christ, according to His human nature, assumed the exercise of the divine majesty. Cf., on that subject, the topic of the "States of Christ." [21] Scriptural Proofs -- Majesty is imparted to the human nature: Matt. 11:27; Luke 1:33; John 3:13; 6:62; Phil. 2:6; Heb. 2: 7. The sitting of Christ, the man, at the right hand of Majesty, Matt. 26:64; Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69; Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Heb. 7:26; 8:1. Omnipotence, Matt. 28:18; Phil. 3:21. Omniscience, Col. 1:19; 2:3, 9. Omnipresence, Matt. 18:20; 28;20; Eph. 1:23; 4:10. Power to quicken, John 6:51; 1 Cor. 15:21, 45. Power to judge, Matt. 16:27; John 5:27; Acts 17:31. [22] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 46): "With respect to the functions of Christ's office, the person does not act and operate in, or with one, or through one nature alone, but rather in, with, according to and through both natures; or, as the Council of Chalcedon declares, one nature effects and works, with impartation of the other, that which is peculiar to each. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, Redeemer, King, etc., not merely according to one nature, whether the divine or the human, but according to both natures." GRH. (III, 555): "The Son of God took upon Himself human nature, for the purpose of performing in, with, and through it, the work of redemption, and the functions of the mediatorial office, 1 John 3:8, etc. Hence in the works of His office, He acts not only as God, nor only as man, but as God-man; and, what is the same, the two natures in Christ, in the works of the office, do not act separately, but conjointly. From unity of person follows unity in official act." HOLL. (726): "The remote basis of this impartation is unity of person, and the intimate communion of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate basis is the communicatio idiomatum of the first and second genus." [23] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): "When one nature in Christ does that which is peculiar to it, or, when Christ does anything, according to the property of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not unemployed, so as to do either nothing or something else; but, what is a peculiarity of the one nature is effected and performed in Christ with impartation of the other nature, that difference being observed which is peculiar to each. Therefore, when Christ, according to His human nature, suffers and dies, this also occurs with impartation to the other nature, not so that the divine nature in Him also suffers and dies, for this is peculiar to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is personally present with the nature suffering, and wills the suffering of its human nature, does not avert it, but permits its humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it so that it can bear the immense weight of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders these sufferings precious to God and saving to the world." [24] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): "Because the offices and blessings of Christ as Saviour are such that, in many or most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate with its natural or essential properties or operations alone, numberless attributes uperfusika kai parafusika [supernatural and extraordinary] were delivered and imparted to the human nature from its hypostatic union with divinity." HOLL. (726): "The mode of impartation and mutual confluence consists in this, that the divine nature of the logoß not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the assumed flesh; but the human nature, in the office of the Mediator, acts, not only according to its natural strength, but also according to the divine power which it has communicated to it from the personal union." QUEN. (III, 106): "I say that by means of His person, He appropriates to Himself actions and sufferings of humanity, for it must not be said the divine nature sheds blood, suffers, dies, just as it is said that the human nature quickens, works miracles, governs all things, but God sheds His blood, suffers, dies." [25] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 86): "The testimonies of Scripture clearly show that the union of the two natures in Christ occurred in order that the work of redemption, atonement, and salvation might be accomplished in, with, and through both natures of Christ. For if redemption, atonement, etc., could have been accomplished by the divine nature alone, or by the human nature alone, the logoß would have in vain descended from Heaven for us men, and for our salvation, and become incarnate man." GRH. (III, 556): "The human nature indeed could have suffered, died, shed its blood. But the sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have been without a saving result, if the divine nature had not added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us." Accordingly, the work of redemption, as well as every individual action of Christ, is considered as one in which both natures in Christ participate. The technical term for this is apotelesma ("a common work, resulting form a communicative and intimate confluence of natures, where the operations of both natures concur to produce this, or the work is divinely-human, because both natures here act unitedly." QUEN. (III, 105)). Yet as each individual action proceeds, first of all, from one of the two natures, namely, from that one to whose original properties it belongs, the technical term for this is energhma (a result peculiar to one nature'). Thus, the shedding of Christ's blood is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has shed blood; the infinite merit which belongs to this blood is an operation of the divine nature. But the atonement for our sins, which has been wrought by means of the shed blood only in view of the fact that both natures have contributed their part thereto, the human nature by shedding it, and the divine nature by giving to the blood its infinite merit, is the work (apotelesma) of both natures. HOLL. (728) further describes the apotelesmata of Christ, as of a twofold order. "The divine nature of the logoß cannot effect some things except by a union with flesh (for example, suffering as a satisfaction, a life-giving death); other things, from His free good pleasure or purpose, He does not will to effect without flesh (for example, miracles)." [26] BR. (478): "The third genus of communicatio idiomatum consists in this, that actions pertaining to the office of Christ do not belong to a nature singly and alone; but they are common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them that which is its own, and thus each acts with the communication of the other." QUEN. (III, 209): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) deny that the communication of the apotelesmata or of official actions can be referred to the communicatio idiomatum. . . . (2) who teach that both natures act their parts by themselves alone, each without participation of the other, and thus that the human nature of Christ is the works of the office only performs human works from its own natural properties, but must altogether be excluded from divine actions. . . . (3) who affirm that the flesh of Christ contributed to the miracles only as a mere and passive (aergon) instrument." [27] CHMN. (de duab. nat.): "This union of the kingship and priesthood of Messiah was made for the work of redemption, for the sake of us and our salvation. But as redemption had to be made by means of suffering and death, there was need of a human nature. And it pleased God that, for our comfort, in the offices of the kingship, priesthood, and lordship of Christ, our assumed nature should also be employed, and thus the acts (apotelesmata) of Christ's offices should be accomplished in, with, and through both." [28] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 81): "For let not exactness be regarded as idle, just as also accurate care in speaking. But let the question, What is the true use of this doctrine? be always in sight. For thus we will be the more inclined to cultivate care in speaking properly, and will be the more easily able to avoid falling into logomachies and quibbles." . . . B. -- OF THE OFFICE OF CHRIST. __________________________________________________________________ § 34. The Threefold Office of Christ. [15] The doctrine of the Person of Christ is followed by that of the Work that He performed; for to accomplish this was the 1 8 GRH. was the first to treat of this entire doctrine under a separate head; before his day it was discussed in connection with other doctrines, usually under the head of Justification; and the form, too, in which the doctrine is now set forth, appears for the first time complete (though in brief outlines) in GRH. MEL. is the first to use the expression, Kingdom of Christ; he does this, however, in the doctrine of the resurrection. STRIGEL then annexed the Priesthood of Christ, which afterwards was developed into the sacerdotal and prophetic offices. We cannot ignore the fact, that this topic has failed to receive anything like as thorough a discussion and development as many others. very design of His incarnation. This Work is the redemption of the human race. CONF. AUG., III: "They teach, that the Word, i.e., the Son of God, assumed human nature . . . that He might reconcile the Father to us and become a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all the actual sins of men." To accomplish this work of redemption was the work assigned to Christ upon earth, and the undertaking that He assumed. We designate it as His mediatorial work, and understand by it all that Christ did to effect a redemption, and all that He is still doing to make it available to men. "The mediatorial office is the function, belonging to the whole person of the God-man, originating theanthropic actions, by which function Christ, in, with, and through both natures, [1] perfectly executed, and is even now accomplishing, by way of acquisition and application, all things that are necessary for our salvation." QUEN. (III, 212) [2] This work Christ undertook in its whole extent, i.e. (1) While upon earth, He Himself announces to men the divine purpose of redemption, and provides that after His departure it shall be further announced to men. (2) He Himself accomplishes the redemption, by paying the ransom through which our reconciliation with God is effected. (3) After His departure He preserves, increases, guides, and protects the Church of the Redeemed thus established. As these three functions correspond to those of the Old Testament prophets, priests, and kings, the mediatorial office of Christ is accordingly divided into the Prophetic, Sacerdotal, and Regal offices. [3] [1] The Dogmaticians say here, expressly, that Christ is Mediator according to both natures, as would indeed naturally and properly follow from the topic just discussed. Erroneous opinions upon this subject, that arose even in the bosom of the Evangelical Church itself, furnished the occasion of giving prominence to it, and so we see the FORM. CONC. already denouncing existing errors upon this subject (Epit., Art. III, 2 sq.: Concerning the righteousness of faith before God): "For one side (Osiander) thought that Christ is our righteousness only according to the divine nature. . . . In opposition to this opinion, some others (Stancar, the Papists) asserted that Christ is our righteousness before God only according to the human nature. To refute both errors, we believe . . . that Christ is truly our righteousness, but yet neither according to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but the whole Christ, according to both natures." . . . QUEN. (III, 212): "For both natures concur for the mediatorial office, not by being mingled, but distinctly and with the properties of both remaining unimpaired, and yet not separately, but each with impartation of the other." [2] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ consists in the work of mediation between God and man, which is the end of incarnation, 1 Tim. 2:5." HOLL. (729): "If the mediatorial office of Christ be taken in a narrower sense, it seems to coincide with His sacerdotal office, 1 Tim. 2:5, 6. Yet this does not prevent us from receiving it in a wider sense, so as to embrace His office as prophet and king. For Moses, the prophet, is likewise called mediator and it escapes the observation of no one that kings not unfrequently bear the part of mediators." [3] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ is ordinarily stated as threefold, that of a prophet, a priest, and a king; yet this can be reduced to two members" (thus Hutter), "so that the office of Christ is stated as twofold, that of a priest and of a king. For the priest's office is not only to sacrifice, pray, intercede, and bless, but also to teach, which is a work that they refer to His office as a prophet." QUEN. (III, 212): "Yet, by most, the tripartite distinction is retained." "THe appropriateness of this distribution is proved according to GRH. (ib.): (1) From the co-ordination of Scripture passages. It is correct to ascribe just as many parts to the office of Christ, as there are classes to which those designations can be referred which are ascribed to Christ with respect to His office, and passages of Scripture which speak of the office of Christ. But now there are three classes to which the designations which are ascribed to Christ, with respect to office, can be referred. Therefore, etc. (2) From the enumeration of the benefits coming from Christ. Christ atones before God for the guilt of our sins . . . which is a work peculiar to a priest. Christ publishes to us God's counsel concerning our redemption and salvation, which is the work of a prophet. Christ efficaciously applies to us the benefit of redemption and salvation, and rules us by the sceptre of His Word and Holy Ghost, which is the work of a king." . . . § 35. The Prophetic Office. By the Prophetic Office we understand the work of Christ, in so far as He proclaims to men the divine purpose of redemption, and urges them to accept the offered salvation. [1] This work Christ performed as long as He was upon the earth; He thereby acted as a prophet, for it was the business of prophets to teach and to declare the will of God; [2] and, in consequence of the greater dignity and power that belonged to Him as the God-man, He performed this work in a much more perfect and effective manner than all the prophets that preceded Him. [3] But this did not cease with His departure from the earth; on the other hand, by the establishment of the sacred office of the ministry, Christ made provision that this work should still be performed, and that, too, with the same efficiency as before, inasmuch as He imparted to the Word and the Sacraments, the dispensation of which constitutes the work of the ministry, the same indwelling power and efficiency that belong to Himself by virtue of His divine nature; and thus, in them and through them, He is still effectively working since His departure. [4] His prophetic office is, therefore, to be regarded as one still perpetuated, and we are to distinguish only between its immediate and mediate exercise. [5] "The prophetic office is the function of Christ the God-man, by which, according to the purpose of the most holy Trinity, He fully revealed to us the divine will concerning the redemption and salvation of men, with the earnest intention that all the world should come to the knowledge of the heavenly truth." (QUEN., III, 212) [6] From this prophetic office Christ is called a Prophet, Deut. 18:18; Matt. 21:11; John 6:14; Luke 7:16; 24:19; an Evangelist, Is. 41:27; a Master, Is. 50:4; 55:4; 63:1; Rabbi or Teacher, Matt. 23:8, 10; Bishop of Souls, 1 Pet. 2:25; Shepherd, Ezek. 34:23; 37:24; John 10:11; Heb. 13:20. [1] GRH. (III, 578): "The function of teaching is that by which Christ instructs His Church in those things necessary to be known and to be believed for salvation." QUEN. (III, 217): "The will of God, to reveal which Christ from eternity was chosen, and in time was sent forth as the great Prophet, embraces primarily and principally the doctrine of the Gospel, but secondarily the Law, just as also the revealed Word of God itself is divided into Law and Gospel. Specifically considered, this office consists: (a) in the full explanation of the doctrine of the Gospel, before enveloped by the shadows and types of the Law, or in the proclamation of the gratuitous promise of the remission of sins, of righteousness and life eternal, by and on account of Christ; . . . (b) in the declaration and true interpretation of the Law." Concerning the relation of Christ to the Law, HOLL. (760): "The old Moral Law Christ neither annulled, nor abated, nor perfected, since it is most perfect (Ps. 19:7), yet He delivered the same from the corruptions of the Pharisees, and fully interpreted it (Matt. 5:21, seq.). Therefore, Christ is not a new legislator, but the interpreter and maintainer of the old Law." [2] HOLL. (756): "THe office of the prophets of the Old Testament was to teach the Word of God, to hand down the true worship of God, to make known secret and predict future things. As Christ also did these things, He discharged the functions of the office of prophet." Yet no stress is placed upon the latter, viz., prophecy concerning the future. Therefore, QUEN. (III, 218): "The office of prophet does not consist simply and exclusively in the revelation of future things, but generally in the announcement of the divine will." [3] HOLL. (756): "Christ is the greatest prophet (Luke 7:16; Deut. 18:18; Acts 3:22; John 1:45; 6:14; Heb. 3:5, 6); a universal prophet (John 1:9; Matt. 28:19); the most enlightened prophet (Ps. 45:7; John 3:34; Col. 2:3; John 1:18); the prophet having the most seals of authority (John 6:27; Matt. 3:17; 17:5; John 12:28); the most powerful and exemplary (Luke 24:19)." GRH. (III, 578): "THe efficacy of the doctrine is that divine power by which Christ, through the Holy Ghost, effectually moves the hearts of men to embrace the doctrine of faith (Ps. 68:35; John 6:45)." [4] HOLL. (759): "According to His divine nature, He has united the highest power, efficacy, and influence with the Word and Sacraments. Whence the Lord co-worked everywhere with the preaching of the apostles." [5] QUEN. (III, 218): "He revealed this divine will immediately, when He himself, in His own person, for three years and a half during the time of His ministry, taught and instructed and trained His disciples to be the teachers of the Church Universal. Mediately, when He employed the vicarious labor of the apostles and their successors, through whom He perpetuated, still perpetuates, and will perpetuate to the end of the world, the office of teaching. John 20:21; Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:15; Eph. 4:11." GRH. (III, 578): "To this office of Christ, therefore, belong the publication, in the Gospel, of the divine counsel concerning the redemption of the human race, the appointment and preservation of the office of the ministry, the appointment of the Sacraments, the giving of the Holy Ghost, and, through Him, the effectual change, illumination, regeneration, renewal, sanctification, etc., of human hearts." [6] QUEN. (III, 219): "The end designed by Christ, the greatest prophet, is, in itself, the bringing of all men to the knowledge of heavenly truth. 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9. For all things are so arranged that the blind may be led into the way, and those who walk in darkness may be enlightened. Acts 26:18. For, although it happens with regard to some that they are thereby blinded and hardened, yet this happens not by the fault of this prophet, and His work, but through their own wickedness they bring this evil upon themselves. John 3:19; 12:39, 40." __________________________________________________________________ [15] 18 __________________________________________________________________ § 36. The Sacerdotal Office. The second office of Christ is to accomplish the redemption itself and reconciliation with God. [1] Christ thereby performed the work of a priest, for it was the office of priests to propitiate God by the sacrifices they offered, and therewith to remove the guilt which men had brought upon themselves. Christ, however, did not, like the priests of the Old Testament, bring something not His own as a sacrifice, but Himself, whence He is both priest and sacrifice in one person. [2] This part of His work is called the Sacerdotal Office. "The sacerdotal office consists in this, that Christ holds a middle ground between God and men, who are at variance with each other, so that He offers sacrifice and prayers that He may reconcile man with God." [3] (BR., 491.) Accordingly it is subdivided into two parts, corresponding to the two functions that belong to priests, i.e., the offering of sacrifice and intercessory prayer. [4] The work is, therefore, in part already accomplished, and in part is still being executed by Christ. The first part of it is called satisfaction, by which expression, at the same time, the reason is implied why reconciliation with God was possible only through a sacrifice; because thereby satisfaction was to be rendered to God, who had been offended by our sins, and therefore demanded punishment. [5] The other part is called intercession. I. SATISFACTION. -- If the wrath of God, which rests upon men on account of their sins, together with all its consequences, is just and holy, then it is not compatible with God's justice and holiness that He should forgive men their sins absolutely and without punishment, and lay aside all wrath together with its consequences; not compatible with His justice, for this demands that He hold a relation to sinners different from that He holds towards the godly, and that He decree punishment for the former; not with His holiness, for in virtue of this He hates the evil; finally, it is not compatible with His truth, for He has already declared that He will punish those who transgress His holy Law. [6] If God, therefore, under the impulse of His love to men, is still to assume once more a gracious relation to them, something must first occur that can enable Him to do this without derogating from His justice and holiness; [7] the guilt that men have brought upon themselves by their sins must be removed, a ransom must be paid, an equivalent must be rendered for the offence that has been committed against God, or, what amounts to the same thing, satisfaction must be rendered. [8] Now, as it is impossible for us men to render this, we must extol it as a special act of divine mercy [9] that God has made it possible through Christ, and that He for this end determined upon the incarnation of Christ, so that He might render this satisfaction in our stead. [10] In Him, namely, who is God and man, by virtue of this union of the two natures in one person, everything that He accomplishes in His human nature has infinite value; while every effort put forth by a mere man has only restricted and temporary value. Although, therefore, a mere man cannot accomplish anything of sufficient extent and value to remove the infinite guilt that rests upon the human race, and atone for past transgressions, yet Christ can do this, because everything that He does and suffers as man is not simply the doing and suffering of a mere man, but to what He does there is added the value and significance of a divine and therefore infinite work, [11] in virtue of the union of the divine and the human nature, and their consequent communion; so that, therefore, there can proceed from Him an act of infinite value which He can set over against the infinite guilt of man, and therewith remove this guilt. In Christ, the God-man, there is therefore entire ability to perform such a work, and in Him there is also the will to do it. But a twofold work, however, is to be accomplished. The first thing to be effected is, that God cease to regard men as those who have not complied with the demands of the holy Law. This is done, when He who is to render the satisfaction so fulfils the entire Law in the place of men that He has done that which man had failed to do. Then it must be brought about that guilt no longer rests upon men for which they deserve punishment, and this is accomplished when He who is rendering satisfaction for men takes the punishment upon Himself. Both of these things Christ has done; [12] the first by His active obedience (which consisted in the most perfect fulfilment of the Law), for thereby He, who in His own person was not subject to the Law, fulfilled the Law in the place of man; [13] the second by His passive obedience (which consisted in the all-sufficient payment of the penalties that were awaiting us), for thereby He suffered what men should have suffered, and so He took upon Himself their punishment, and atoned for their sins in their stead. [14] Through this manifestation of obedience to the divine decree in both these respects, Christ rendered, in the place of man, [15] a satisfaction fully sufficient [16] and available for all the sins of all men, which is designated as the former part of the sacerdotal office by which Christ, by divine decree, through a most complete obedience, active and passive, rendered satisfaction to divine justice, [17] infringed by the sins of men, to the praise of divine justice and mercy, and for the procurement of our justification and salvation." HOLL. (735). [18] But since Christ rendered satisfaction, as above stated, He thereby secured for us forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation, which we designate as His merit that is imputed to us. QUEN. (III, 225): "Merit flows from satisfaction rendered. Christ rendered satisfaction for our sins, and for the penalties due to them, and thus He merited for us the grace of God, forgiveness of sins, and eternal life." [19] II. INTERCESSION. -- For, after Christ had thus offered Himself as a sacrifice for men, the second part of His priestly office consists in His actively interceding with the Father, when He had been exalted to His right hand, upon the ground of His merit, so that men thus redeemed may have the benefit of all that He has secured for them by His sufferings and death, of everything, in fact, that can promote their bodily, and especially their spiritual welfare. "Intercession is the latter part of the sacerdotal office, by which Christ, the God-man, in virtue of His boundless merit intercedes truly and properly, and without any detriment to His majesty; intercedes for all men, but especially for His elect, that He may obtain for them whatsoever things He knows to be salutary for them, for the body, and especially for the soul (but chiefly those things which are useful and necessary for securing eternal life), 1 John 2:1; Rom. 8:34; Heb. 7:25; 9:24." (HOLL., 749.) [20] "This intercession has reference, therefore, it is true, to all men, as all men while upon earth may become partakers of salvation; but, inasmuch as Christ can give very differently and more freely to those who have by faith already become partakers of His merit than to those who still reject it, this is distinguished as to its comprehension into general intercession, in which Christ prays to the Father for all men, that the saving merit of His death may be applied to them (Rom. 8:34; Is. 53:12; Luke 23:34); and special intercession, in which He prays for the regenerate, that they may be preserved and grow in faith and holiness, John 17:9." (HOLL., 749.)[21] As to its nature, it is described as true, real, and peculiar, i.e., as such, that Christ is not content merely in silence to await the effect of His satisfaction, but that He actively, effectively, really avails Himself of His merit with the Father in such manner as becomes Him in His divine dignity. [22] Finally, as to its duration, it never ceases. [23] The effect accomplished by the priestly office, in its whole compass, is the redemption of men. [24] If they appropriate it in faith, their sins are no longer reckoned, nor is temporal or eternal punishment imposed, nor does the wrath of God any longer rest upon them; for, in the true and proper sense of the term, they are redeemed from all this by the ransom that Christ has paid for them. "The redemption of the human race is the spiritual, judicial, and most costly deliverance of all men, bound in the chains of sin, from guilt, from the wrath of God, and temporal and eternal punishment, accomplished by Christ, the God-man, through His active and passive obedience, which God, the most righteous judge, kindly accepted as a most perfect ransom (lutron), so that the human race, introduced into spiritual liberty, may live forever with God." HOLL. (752). [25] [1] KG. (I, 150): "The end of the office of priest is to reconcile men with God, Heb. 4:16; 9:26, 28; 1 John 2:2." More specifically, QUEN. (III, 222): "(1) The perfect reconciliation of man, the sinner, with God, or the restoration of the former friendship between the separated parties, God and men the sinners, Rom. 5:10; Col. 1:20, 21; 2 Cor. 5:18, 19; Heb. 7:27. (2) Deliverance from the captivity of the devil, Luke 1:74; Heb. 2:14, 15; 1 John 3:8. (3) From sin, as well in relation to its guilt, Col. 1:14; Eph. 1:7, as its slavery, 1 Pet. 1:18; Gal. 1:4, and its inherency, Rom. 8:23." [2] HOLL.: "The material of the sacrifice is Christ Himself, Eph. 5:2." BR. (493): "While, in other sacrifices, victims are offered different from the priests, Christ sacrificed Himself, when He voluntarily subjected Himself to suffering and death, and thus offered Himself to God as victim, for expiating not His own sins, but those of the entire human race." [3] HOLL. (731): "Christ's office as a priest is that according to which Christ, the only mediator and priest of the New Testament, by His most exact fulfillment of the Law and the sacrifice of His body, satisfied, on our behalf, the injured divine justice, and offers to God the most effectual prayers for our salvation." QUEN. (III, 220): "From this priestly office Christ is called a priest, Ps. 110:4 (Heb. 5:10; 6:20; 7:26; 9:11; 10:21); a great high priest, Heb. 4:14; a high priest, Heb. 4:15; 9:11; 3:1." The priesthood of Christ is adumbrated in the priesthood of Aaron and Melchisedek. The latter is related to the former, as the shadow to the very substance. APOL. CONF. (XII, 37): "As in the Old Testament, the shadow is seen, so, in the New Testament, the thing signified must be sought for, and not another type, as though sufficient for sacrifice." HOLL. (732): "As the shadow yields in eminence to the body, so does Aaron to Christ." QUEN. (III, 221): "Hebrews 7 diligently unfolds the type set forth in Melchisedek, and applies it to Christ. . . . This very comparison of Christ with Melchisedek is presented in the germ by Moses, Gen. 14:17, is formally declared by David, Ps. 110:4, and is specifically explained by Paul." [4] QUEN. (III, 225): "THe priestly office of Christ is composed of two parts, satisfaction and intercession; because, in the first place, He made the most perfect satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, and earned salvation. In the second place, He anxiously interceded and still intercedes and mediates, on behalf of all, for the application of the acquired salvation. That the Messiah would perform these functions of a priest, Is. 53:12 clearly predicted." [5] HOLL. (735): "Satisfaction is not a Scriptural but an ecclesiastical term, yet its synonyms exist in the holly volume, namely, ilasmoß, propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2; 4.10), (ilasthrion, Rom. 3:24, 25), katallagh, Rom. 5:10; 2 Cor. 5:18, apolitrwsiß, Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14, paying the ransom (ton lutron), Matt. 20:28. For this redemption denotes the payment of a sufficient price for the captive; and the reconciliation of God with men is described in Scripture in such a manner, that it is evident that it was made not without a ransom, which divine justice demanded of the Mediator." [6] HUTT. (Loc. Com., 418): "This threatening (Gen. 2:17) ought necessarily to have been fulfilled after the Fall of our first parents, because the truth and justice of God are immutable, and God cannot lie. But if God had remitted anything from this, His truth, as the Photinians say, i.e., from this Law, and, without any satisfaction, had embraced the human race in His mercy, then God would have lied, when He said: Thou shalt surely die.' This truth and justice of God, therefore, remaining unmoved, the human race must either perish eternally, or could be redeemed from this penalty only by the intervention of the most complete satisfaction. But this could be provided by no mortal. Therefore it was necessary to be provided by Christ, the Son of God, as Saviour." [7] Therefore the proposition (HUTT., Loc. Com., 406): "The mercy of God is not absolute, but in Christ, and founded only in Christ and in His merit and satisfaction. . . . God is not only supremely merciful but also supremely just. But this justice of God required, of the whole human race, such penalties as those with which God Himself in Paradise threatened our first parents, if they should transgress the Law that had been given them. . . . Therefore, there could not be a place for God's mercy until satisfaction should be rendered the divine justice. . . . Hence, the position remains, established, firm and immovable, that this mercy of God could have had no place, except with respect to, or in consideration of, the satisfaction of Christ." The love of God to men is therefore denoted accurately as ordinate, and not as absolute. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 415): "God indeed loved already from all eternity the whole human race, yet not absolutely and unconditionally, but ordinately; namely, in His beloved Son. This ordinate love includes and relates to the Son likewise not absolutely, or only in such a respect as that God willed that He should be the teacher of the human race; but also ordinately, so far as He took upon Himself the guilt of our sins, and made satisfaction on behalf of the whole human race to the divine wrath or justice. Therefore, this ordinate affection or love of God necessarily presupposes His wrath, so that this love in God could not have a place, unless, likewise from all eternity, satisfaction had been made to this divine wrath or justice through the Son, who from eternity, offered Himself as a mediator between God and men." [8] QUEN. (III, 227): "The object to which satisfaction has been afforded is the Triune God alone." (HOLL. (736): "Observe, that, in a certain respect, Christ made satisfaction to Himself. For, as far as Christ made satisfaction as a mediator, He is regarded as the God-man; but, in so far as He likewise demanded satisfaction, He must be regarded as the author and maintainer of the Law, who by His essence is just.") QUEN. (III, 227 sq.): "For the entire Holy Trinity, offended at sins, was angry with men, and, on account of the immutability of its justice (Rom. 1:18), the holiness of its nature, and the truth of its threatenings, could not with impunity forgive sins, and, without satisfaction, receive men into favor. But this Triune God has not the relation of a mere creditor, as the Socinians state, but of a most just judge, requiring, according to the rigor of His infinite justice, an infinite price of satisfaction. For redemption itself, made for the declaration of righteousness (Rom. 3:25), proves the necessity of requiring a penalty, either from the guilty one himself, i.e., man, or from his surety, namely, Christ. If God, without a satisfaction, could have forgiven man's offence, without impairing His infinite justice, there would not have been need of such an expense as that of His only Son." . . . The chief passages in the Symbolical Books are the following: AP. CONF. (III, 58): "THe Law condemns all men; but Christ, because without sin He submitted to the punishment of sin, and became a victim for us, removed from the Law the right of accusing and condemning those who believe in Him, since He is the propitiation for them for the sake of which we are now accounted righteous." Ibid. (XXI (IX), 19): "The second requirement, in a propitiator, is that his merits be presented in order to give satisfaction for others, to bestow upon others a divine imputation, that, through these, they may be regarded precisely as righteous as though by their own merits. As, if a friend should pay the debt of a friend, the debtor would be freed by another's merit just as though by his own. The merits of Christ are so presented to us that, when we believe in Him, we are accounted just as righteous, by our confidence in the merits of Christ, as though we had merits of our own." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 57): "Since this obedience of Christ is that not of one nature only, but of the entire person, most perfect is the satisfaction and expiation, on behalf of the human race, according to which satisfaction was made to the eternal and immutable divine justice revealed in the Law. This obedience is that righteousness of ours that avails before God." . . . Moreover, it was especially the Socinians against whom the Dogmaticians had to defend the doctrine above stated; and it was under the influence of the controversy with them that the doctrine assumed the form just presented. HUTT., who already in his Loc. TH. opposes the Socinian doctrine at great length, states it as follows: "That man is justified before God, not because of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, because neither the justice of God required this, nor did Christ by His death afford it, but because alone of the forgiveness of sins, which God, not on account of any merit of His Son, but from His most free will, grants those who believe in the Word of Christ, and pursue a life of innocence." In refutation of this doctrine, HUTT. makes a distinction between three controversies. (402): "The first is, concerning the mercy of God, which, the Photinians contend, (1) is not natural or essential, but accidental to God; (2) that in respect to men, as sinners, it is altogether absolute, and is not based upon any satisfaction whatever, whether of Christ or of ourselves. The second is, concerning the justice of God, as avenging or punishing the sins of men, of which the Photinians imagine that there neither is, nor ever has been, any such in God; just as though in the Scriptures God were nowhere read of as ever being or having been angry with sinners. The third is, concerning the satisfaction and merit of Christ our Saviour; for they absolutely deny both, contending very blasphemously, (1) that there was no necessity whatever for a satisfaction; . . . (2) that the suffering of Christ neither was nor could have been a satisfaction or merit for our sins; . . . (3) that the final cause of Christ's suffering was nothing else than that He might be able to show us the way of life, and that, by means of His doctrine, we might embrace salvation; . . . (4) that the remission of sins comes to us without the shedding of Christ's blood, solely by free, unconditional, and absolute will of God's mercy, according to which He is willing to forgive us our sins, and truly forgives them if we truly repent." [9] HOLL. 736): "The wisdom and mercy of God especially shines forth from the wonderful satisfaction of the Mediator, a most precious ransom having been most wisely found, and most mercifully determined and accepted." [10] HUTT. (Loc. Com., 408): "Wherefore, in order that the mercy of God might harmonize with His justice, it was necessary that a combination of divine justice and mercy should intervene; by reason of which, both His justice would press its right, and mercy, at the same time, would have a place. We are permitted to hold such a combination, and that, too, by far the most perfect, in one and the same work of our salvation, with respect to one and the same subject, namely, Christ our Saviour. For, when about to reconcile the world, and that, too, not without an unparalleled feeling of mercy, He saw that satisfaction must first be made to justice. Therefore, He turned upon Himself the penalties due our sins, He was made sin for us, He truly bore our griefs, and thus became obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross, satisfied divine justice to the exactest point, and thus reconciled the world, not only to God the Father, but also to Himself." But the price of redemption must be paid God, and to Him the satisfaction must be rendered. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 430): "Neither the devil, nor sin, nor death, nor hell, but God Himself, was the ruler holding the human race in captivity, as He delivered it to the infernal prison by this sentence, Thou shalt surely die.' The devil bore only the part of a lictor; sin was like chains; death and hell, like a prison. Therefore, the price of the redemption was to be paid not to the devil, [16] not to sin, not to death or hell, but to God, who had it in His power once again to declare the human race free, and to redeem it for grace; provided only a satisfaction to the exactest point be rendered His justice." [11] QUEN. (III, 228): "It was the infinite God that was offended by sin; and because sin is an offense, wrong, and crime against the infinite God, and, so to speak, is Deicide, it has an infinite evil, not indeed formally, . . . but objectively, and deserves infinite punishments, and, therefore, required an infinite price of satisfaction, which Christ alone could have afforded." GRH. (III, 579): "The guilt attending the sins of the entire human race was infinite, inasmuch as it was directed against the infinite justice of God. An infinite good had been injured, and, therefore, an infinite price was demanded. But the works and sufferings of Christ's human nature are finite, and belong to a determined time, i.e., are terminated by the period of His humiliation. In order, therefore, that the price of redemption might be proportionate to our debt and infinite guilt, it was necessary that the action or mediation not only of a finite, viz., a human, but also of an infinite, i.e., a divine nature, should concur, and that the suffering and death of Christ should acquire power of infinite price elsewhere, viz., from the most effectual working of the divine nature, and thus that an infinite good might be able to be presented against an infinite evil." Cf. the doctrine of the third genus of communicatio idiomatum. Christ, as the God-man, could afford such a satisfaction. QUEN. (III, 227): "The source from which" (Christ made satisfaction) "comprises both natures, the divine, as the original and formal source, and the human, as the organic source, acting from divine power communicated through the hypostatic union." Cf. FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., III, 56. NOTE. -- The passages cited prove that the Dogmaticians attached so much importance to the union of the divine and human natures for the special reason that, if the divine nature had not participated with the human in suffering, in the manner indicated in § 33, Note 23, this suffering would not have had an infinite value, and in this they follow the theory of Anselm. But this theory still further magnifies the importance of the union of the two natures in Christ by another consideration, stating that "if this service of infinite value had not been rendered by one who was at the same time man, it would have been of no avail for us men;" and without this addition the theory is confessedly incomplete. Although our Dogmaticians do not expressly mention this point, we may still assume that they silently included it. This assumption is justified by the self-consistency of the Anselmic theory, which they on this subject adopted. [12] QUEN. (III, 244): "The means by the intervention of which satisfaction was afforded is the price of Christ's entire obedience, which embraces (1) the most exact fulfilment of the Law; (2) the enduring, or most bitter suffering, of the penalties merited by us transgressors. For by His acts Christ expiated the crime which man had committed against justice, and by His sufferings He bore the penalty which, in accordance with justice, man was to endure. Hence the obedience of Christ, afforded in our place, is commonly said to be twofold, the active, which consists in the most perfect fulfilment of the Law, and the passive, which consists in the perfectly sufficient payment of penalties that awaited us. The distinction into active and passive obedience is not very accurate, as Dr. Mentzer well remarks, because the passive obedience does not exclude the active, but includes it, inasmuch as the latter was wonderfully active, even in the very midst of Christ's death. Hence Bernard correctly called Christ's action passive, and His passion active. From the Scriptures and with them we acknowledge only one obedience of Christ, and that the most perfect,' says the already quoted Mentzer, which, according to the will of His Father, He fulfilled with the greatest holiness and the highest perfection in His entire life, and by the action and suffering of death.' The active obedience is His conformity with the very Law. And therefore, properly and accurately, and by itself, it is called obedience. But what is ordinarily called passive obedience is the enduring of a penalty inflicted upon the violator of the Law. If this is to be named obedience, it will be so called in a broad sense, or from its result, for it is certain that alone and without the accompaniment of active obedience, it is not conformity with the very Law . . . . The obedience of Christ is with less accuracy called passive, because He voluntarily did and suffered all things for us and our salvation." [13] HOLL. (737): "By His active obedience, Christ most exactly fulfilled the divine Law in our stead, in order that penitent sinners, applying to themselves, by true faith, this vicarious fulfilment of the Law, might be accounted righteous before God, the judge, Gal. 4:4, 5; Rom. 10:4; Matt. 5:17." In the doctrine of the active obedience, the following points come into consideration: (1) That God could not forgive us if we could not be considered as having satisfied the demands of the divine Law. QUEN. (III, 244): "For, inasmuch as man was not only to be freed from the wrath of God as a just judge, but also, in order that he might stand before God, there was a necessity for righteousness which he could not attain except by the fulfilment of the Law, Christ took upon Himself both, and not only suffered for us, but also made satisfaction to the Law in all things, in order that this His fulfilment and obedience might be imputed to us. (2) That Christ was subject to the Law not for His own person." QUEN. (III, 246): "The cause on account of which the Son of God was subject to the Law was not His own obligation; for Christ not only as God, but also according to His human nature, was in no way subject to the Law . . . . For Christ, with respect to Himself, was the Lord of the entire Law, and not its servant, Mark 2:28. And, although He was and is the seed of Abraham, yet, because in the unity of His person He was and is the Son of God, He was not subject to the Law with respect to Himself." (3) That consequently as Christ has nevertheless fulfilled the Law, He has done it in our stead. GRH.: "Rom. 8:3. Here there is ascribed to the Son of God the fulfilment of the Law, which it was impossible for us to render, in order that the righteousness of the Law might be fulfilled in us through faith, viz., through Christ, cf. Rom. 5:8; Phil. 3:9. The Son of God, therefore, was sent to render that which, because of weakness, was impossible for us, and it was, therefore, necessary that the Son of God Himself should fulfil the Law for us, in order that the righteousness demanded by the Law and rendered by Him might become ours through the imputation of faith, and thus, in God's judgment, according to His reckoning, might be fulfilled or be able to be regarded as fulfilled by us." Christ engaged Himself to fulfill the Law on our account, as CALOV. (VII, 424) asserts, already through "circumcision, which to Him was not a means of regeneration or renewal, because He needed neither; wherefore, for no other reason, except for our sake, He submitted to circumcision, and through the same put Himself under obligation to render a fulfilment of the Law, that should be vicarious or in our place." Concerning the nature of the Law that Christ fulfilled, HOLL. (737): "The Law to which He was subject is understood both as the universal or moral, and the particular, i.e., the ceremonial and forensic." QUEN. (III, 245): "And the Law was thus fulfilled by the Lord: (1) the ceremonial, by showing its true end and scope, and fulfilling all the shadows and types which adumbrated either His person or office; (2) the judicial, both by fulfilling those things which in it belonged to common, natural, and perpetual law; (3) the moral, in so far as by His perfect obedience, and the conformity of all the actions of His life, He observed the Law without any sin and defect, reaffirmed its doctrine which had been corrupted by the Pharisees, and restored it to its native integrity and perfection." Andr. Osiander gave occasion to the supplementing of the passive by the active obedience. The doctrine was first developed by Flacius (in his work, "Concerning Righteousness vs. Osiander," 1552) in the following manner: "The justice of God, as revealed in the Law, demands of us, poor, unrighteous, disobedient men, two items of righteousness. The first is, that we render to God complete satisfaction for the transgression and sin already committed; the second, that we thenceforth be heartily and perfectly obedient to His Law if we wish to enter into life. If we do not thus accomplish this, it threatens us with eternal damnation. And therefore this essential justice of God includes us under sin and the wrath of God . . . . Now there are often two parts of this righteousness due to the Law: the former, the complete satisfaction of punishment for sin committed, for, since it is right and proper to punish a sinner, one part of righteousness is willingly to suffer the merited punishment; the other part is perfect obedience, which should then follow and be rendered. Therefore the righteousness of the obedience of Christ, which He rendered to the Law for us, consists in these two features, viz., in His suffering and in the perfection of His obedience to the commands of God." The FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 14) states the doctrine thus: "Therefore the righteousness which, out of pure grace, is imputed before God to faith or believers, is the obedience, the suffering, and the resurrection of Christ, by which, for our sake, He made satisfaction to the Law and expiated our sins. For since Christ is not only man, but God and man in one undivided person by reason of His own person, He was no more subject to the Law than He was to suffering and death, as He was the Lord of the Law. For this reason, His obedience (not only that by which in His entire passion and death He obeyed the Father, but also that by which, for our sake, He voluntarily subjected Himself to the Law and fulfilled it by His obedience) is imputed to us for righteousness, so that because of the entire obedience which, for our sake, Christ rendered His Heavenly Father, both by doing and suffering, God forgives us our sins." Cf. III, 57. Intimations of this doctrine occur, indeed, already in the writings of earlier theologians, even in those of Luther, but before the time of the FORM. CONC., the obedience of Christ was considered mainly with reference to His sufferings. Thus MEL. (Loc. c. Th., II, 212): "Since, therefore, men did not afford obedience, it was necessary either that they should perish as a punishment, or that another one pay the penalty or ransom; therefore by His wonderful and unerring counsel, the Son of God, by interceding for us, paid the ransom, and drew upon Himself the wrath which we ought to have borne; wherefore, God did not abate His Law without a compensation, but preserved His justice in demanding punishment. Christ therefore says, I am not come to destroy but to fulfil the Law,' namely, by undergoing punishment for the human race and by teaching and restoring the Law in believers." And at the time, and even after the time, of Osiander, many divines contented themselves with thus stating it, and to the passive added a further obedience only in this sense, viz., that the obedience of Christ manifested itself not only in suffering, but also throughout His entire holy life. Thus GRH. states it (VII, 60), who, however, in other passages, expresses himself as favoring the active obedience in the sense of the FORM. CONC.): "It remains for us to inquire by what means Christ merited the righteousness that avails before God. We reply, from the Scriptures, that the entire obedience of Christ, the active as well as the passive, that of His life as well as that of His death, concur in procuring this merit. For, although in many passages of Scripture the work of redemption is ascribed to Christ's death, and the shedding of His blood, yet this must be received by no means exclusively, as though by it the holy life of Christ were excluded from the work of redemption, but it must be regarded as occurring for the reason that nowhere does the fact that the Lord has loved and redeemed us, shine forth more clearly than in His passion, death, and wounds, as the devout old teachers say; and because the death of Christ is, as it were, the last line and completion, the telos, the end and perfection of the entire obedience, as the apostle says, Phil. 2:8. That it is altogether impossible in this merit to separate the active from the passive obedience, is evident, because even in the death of Christ the voluntary obedience and most ardent love concur, of which the former respects the Heavenly Father, and the latter us men, John 10:18; Gal. 2:20." Direct opposition to the distinction drawn by Osiander was first made among the Lutheran theologians by Parsimonius (1563), who soon, however, withdrew it. He said: "The Law binds to either obedience or punishment, not both at once. Therefore, because Christ endured the punishment for us, He thereby rendered obedience for Himself." Also: "What He rendered, that we dare not render, and are under no obligation to do it. But we must render obedience to the Law. Christ, therefore, did not render obedience to the Law for us, but for Himself, that He might be an offering unspotted and acceptable to God." (Arnold, "Kirchen und Ketzer Geschichte," vol. ii, pt. xvi, ch. xxx, § 12.) On the part of the Reformed, the chief opposition to this doctrine came from John Piscator, in Herborn. His arguments are answered at length by Grh., vii, 70, sqq.: "The suffering of penalties alone is not the righteousness of the Law, for then it would follow that the condemned most perfectly fulfill the Law; since they endure the most exquisite punishments for their sins . . . . The passion of Christ would not have profited had it not been combined with most full and perfect obedience to the Law . . . . The active obedience alone would not have been sufficient, because punishment was to be inflicted for the sins of the human race; the passive obedience alone would not have been sufficient, because if the sins were to be expiated, perfect obedience to each and every precept of the Law was required, i.e., the passive obedience had to be that of one who had most fully met every demand of active obedience . . . . Rational creatures not yet fallen into sin, the Law places under either punishment or obedience. The holy angels it obliges only to obedience, but in no way to punishment. Adam, in the state of innocency, it obliges only to obedience, but not at the same time, except conditionally, to punishment. For, where there is no transgression, there is no punishment. But rational creatures that have fallen into sin, it obliges to both punishment and obedience: to obedience, so far as they are rational creatures; to punishment, because they have fallen into sin. Thus, since the Fall, Adam and all his posterity are under obligation at the same time both of punishment and of obedience, because the obligation to obedience is in no way abated by a fall, but on the other hand, a new obligation has entered, viz., that of the endurance of punishment for sin." For the history of the doctrine of the active obedience, see Fr. H. R. Frank: "The Theology of the Form. Conc.," II, 1861. J. G. Thomasius: "The Person and Work of Christ," Part III, Division 1, second edition. 1863. [14] HOLL. 737): "By the passive obedience, Christ transferred to Himself the sins of the whole world (2 Cor. 5:31; Gal. 3:13), and besides this suffered the punishments due them, by shedding His most precious blood, and meeting for all sinners the most ignominous death (Is. 53:4; 1 Pet. 2:24; John 1:29; Rom. 4:25; Gal. 1:4; 1 Cor. 15:3; 1 Pet. 3:18; Heb. 10:12; Rom. 6:23; Heb. 9:28), in order that, to believers in Christ the Redeemer, sins might not be imputed for eternal punishment." To the satisfactory sufferings of Christ, there are referred (QUEN. III, 253): "All the acts of Christ, from the first moment of conception to the three days of His atoning death; as, His lying hid for nine months in the womb of the Virgin, His being born in poverty, His living in constant misery, His bearing hunger, thirst and cold. For He bore all these things for us and our sake." Nevertheless, the passive obedience is said to consist "especially of death, and the yielding up of the spirit." [15] The satisfaction which Christ has made is, therefore, a vicarious satisfaction. HOLL. (737): "To a vicarious penal satisfaction, (a) if it be formally regarded, there is required: 1. A surrogation, by which some one else is substituted in the place of a debtor, and there is a transfer of the crime, or an imputation of the charge made against another. 2. A payment of penalties, which the substituted bondsman or surety makes in the place of the debtor; (b) considered with regard to the end, the payment of the penalty, for obtaining the discharge of the debtor, occurs in such a way that he is declared free from the crime and penalty." The attacks of the Socinians against the vicarious satisfaction are refuted by GRH. (VII, 1. xvii, c. ii, § 37, sq.), and QUEN. (De officio Christi, pars polemica, qu. 6). The chief objection: "The action of one cannot be the action of another; the fulfilment of the Law is an action of Christ; therefore the fulfilment of the Law cannot be our action," HOLL. (734) refutes thus: "An action is considered either physically, as it is the motion of one acting, or morally, as it is good or evil. The action of one can be that of another by imputation, not physically, but morally." [The argument of GRH. is: 1. Christ is our mediator, 1 Tim. 2:5; Heb. 8:6; 9:15; 12:24. 2. Our redeemer, Ps. 111:9; Luke 1:68; 2:38; Rom. 3:24; 1 Cor. 1:30; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; 1 Tim. 2:7; Heb. 9:12, 15; 1 Pet. 1:18; Rev. 5:9. 3. The ilasmos, propitiation for our sins, 1 John 2:2; 4:10; Rom. 3:24, 25. 4. By Him we are reconciled to God, Is. 63:3; cf. Rev. 19:13; John 1:17; Rom. 5:10, 11; 2 Cor. 5:18, 19; Eph. 2:16; 5:2; Col. 1:20. 5. He gave His life a lutron kai antilutron for us, Matth. 20:28; Mark 10:45; 1 Tim. 2:5, 6, the latter meaning properly an equivalent compensation; and hence the benefit acquired is said to be lutrosis and apolutrosis, Luke 1:68; Tit. 2:14; 1 Pet. 1:18; Heb. 9:15. 6. He was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21; Rom. 8:3. 7. He became a curse for us, Gal. 3:13. 8. He took upon Himself our sins and their punishment, Ps. 69:4; Is. 43:24, 25; 53:4, 6, 8; John 1:29; 1 Pet. 2:24. Here belongs the scape-goat, Lev. 16:20, as a type of Christ, John 1:29. 9. He shed His blood for our sins, Matth. 26:28; 1 John 1:7; Heb. 9:13, 14. 10. He blotted out the indictment, Col. 2:14. 11. He freed us from the curse of the Law, Gal. 3:13; 4:5. 12. From the wrath of God, 1 Thess. 1:10; 13. From eternal condemnation, 1 Thess. 5:9, 11. 14. In Christ we are righteous and beloved, 2 Cor. 5:21. The counter-arguments of the Socinians are then examined: e.g., Against (1) they urge, that Moses was also a mediator. This is conceded. But there is more in the antitype than in the type. The manner in which Christ is said to be mediator is especially taught in Scripture, 1 Tim. 2:4, 5, 6; Heb. 9:15. Against (2) that redemption means only simple liberation without an intervening price of satisfaction. It is conceded that the word redeem is so used in some passages, but not in those which refer to Christ as our Redeemer, 1 Cor. 6:20; 1 Pet. 1:18, 19; Gal. 3:13; Eph. 1:7; Tit. 2:14; Heb. 9:12, 15; Rev. 5:9. Against (4) that the reconciliation is not of men with God, but of men with themselves, i.e., of Gentiles with Jews, and of men with angels. It is conceded that in Eph. 2, the apostle is speaking of the antagonism between Jews and Greeks, and in Col. 1, of that between angels and men; but from this it does not follow, that there is no reference to the removal of the dissent between men and God by Christ's satisfaction, for this is distinctly said, Eph. 2:16; therefore He reconciled the Gentiles not only to the Jews, but also to God Himself, vs. 13, 18, 19. So, according to Col. 1, angels are reconciled to men, because, through Christ, the human race is reconciled to God. That we are reconciled to God through Christ, Scripture clearly asserts; but from this, it neither can, nor should be inferred that God is not reconciled to us through Christ, but rather that the one follows from the other. As we could not be reconciled to God, unless God were reconciled to us, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): "When we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son," etc. Among the general objections of the Socinians, the chief is that any satisfaction conflicts with the gratuitous remission of sins; as a creditor cannot be said to remit a debt gratuitously, for which a satisfaction is rendered. GRH. answers that there is no opposition, but only a subordination, Rom. 3:24: Being justified freely by His grace' (gratuitous remission) through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus' (satisfaction), Eph. 1:7: In whom we have redemption through His blood' (satisfaction), the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace' (gratuitous remission). As the grace of God does not destroy the justice of God, so gratuitous reemission does not annul the merit and satisfaction of Christ which the Law demands. Nor was God a mere creditor, but also a most just judge and avenger of sins; nor were sins mere debts, but they conflict with the immutable justice of God revealed in the Law. In short, the particle freely excludes our worth, our merits, our satisfaction; but in no way the satisfaction of Christ. The mercy of God remitting sins is gratuitous; but not so absolute as to exclude the merit of Christ."] [16] QUEN. (III, 246): "The form or formal mode of the satisfaction consists in the most exact and sufficient payment of all those things which we owed . . . . Indeed this very payment of the entire debt of another, freely undertaken by Christ, and imputed to Him in the divine judgment, was sufficient, not merely because accepted of God. For in this satisfaction God did not, out of liberality, accept anything that was not such in itself, neither, in demanding a punishment due us and rendered by a surety, did He abate anything; but in this satisfaction Christ bore everything that the rigor of His justice demanded, so that He endured even the very punishments of hell, although not in hell, nor eternally . . . . Therefore the satisfaction of Christ is most sufficient and complete by itself, or from its own infinite, intrinsic value, which value arises from the facts, (1) that the person making the satisfaction is infinite God; (2) that the human nature, from the personal union, has become participant of divine and infinite majesty, and therefore its passion and death are regarded and esteemed as of such infinite value and price as though they belonged to the divine nature. Acts 20:28." If men have merited eternal punishment, and Christ suffered only for a short time, yet this was nevertheless still a sufficient atonement, inasmuch as the sufferings of Christ are of infinite value. HUTT. meets the objection of the Photinians (Loc. Com., 427): "That the curse of the Law was eternal death; but now, since Christ did not undergo eternal death, therefore He has not undergone or borne for us the curse of the Law," by saying: "The reasoning deceives through the sophism of non causa pro causa.' For it is not true, that the merit of Christ is not of infinite value, for the reason that Christ met a death that is not eternal; for, as the sins of our disobedience are actually finite, yet in guilt are infinite, since they are committed against the infinite justice of God; so the obedience and death of Christ were indeed finite in act, so far as they were circumscribed by a period of fixed time, namely, the days of humiliation, but they are infinite with respect to merit, inasmuch as they proceed from an infinite person, namely, from the only begotten Son of God Himself. Secondly, it is not unconditionally true, that the curse of the Law is to be defined only by eternal death. For if this were true, the Apostle's definition of the curse of the Law, by the declaration of Moses: Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree,' Deut. 21:23, would have been extremely inaccurate. Then, eternal death is defined not only by its perpetual continuance, or the enduring of the tortures of hell, but also by the feeling of the sorrows of hell, united with rejection or desertion by God; so that he who even but for a moment endures such sorrows, can be said to have experienced eternal death. Thus Christ, indeed, not for a moment, or a short space of time, but through the entire period of His humiliation, truly endured the feeling of those sorrows of hell, so that at length He was constrained to exclaim, My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' But the reason that He did not suffer death in the latter manner is, that He himself, as an innocent man, by dying satisfied the Law." HOLL. (742) remarks: "Christ endured a punishment equivalent to eternal punishment, inasmuch as He suffered the punishments of hell intensively as respects their power, weight, and substance, although not extensively, so far as their duration and the accidents pertaining to the subject's suffering are concerned; He bore the extremity, but not eternity of tortures." [The students of the history of the doctrine of the "Active Obedience," have occupied themselves too exclusively with polemical treatises. In practical works, its formulation is much earlier than 1553. It is distinctly taught in the Third Homily of the Church of England (Cranmer) of 1547, in the Articles for the Reformation of Cologne (Melanchton and Bucer) of 1543, and the Brandenburg-Nürnberg Articles of 1433. What is especially interesting is, that this earliest document was prepared by Andrew Osiander himself, with the assistance of Brentz. Its presentation is as follows: "This Mediator, treated thus with God: First, He directed His entire life to the will of the Father; did for us what we were under obligation to do, and yet could not do; and fulfilled the Law and all righteousness for our good, Matt. 5:17; Gal. 4:4; 1 Cor. 1:30; Phil. 3:9" (Active). "Secondly, He took upon Himself all our sins, and bore and suffered all that was due us, John 1:29; Is. 53:4-6; Rom. 8:32;" Gal. 3:13 (Passive). Nowhere, in the whole range of Lutheran theology, are these two forms of the obedience more sharply discriminated than in the above] [17] QUEN. (III, 228): "The real [17] object for which satisfaction was rendered is one thing; the personal object is another. I. The real object comprises (1) all sins whatever, original as well as actual, past as well as future, venial as well as mortal, yea, even the very sin against the Holy Ghost, Is. 53:4 sq.; Tit. 2:14; 1 John 1:7; Heb. 1:3; 1 John 2:2. (2) All the penalties of our sins, temporal as well as eternal, Is. 53:5; Gal. 3:13; Rom. 5:8, 9; Heb. 2:14, 15; 1 Cor. 15:14." On the real object, GRH. VI, 306: "1. Scripture everywhere speaks indefinitely when it treats of the satisfaction rendered for sins by Christ. John 1:29: The sin of the world,' i.e., sin understood universally, everything having the nature of sin. 2. Not only indefinitely but also universally, Is. 53:6; Rom. 3:12; Tit. 2:14; 1 John 1:7. 3. Species of actual sins are specified, Is. 53:6; Rom. 3:12; Heb. 9:14. 4. Christ made satisfaction for every sin which the Law accuses and execrates. But the Law accuses and execrates all sins, not only original, but also actual, Gal. 3:13; Deut. 27:5. 5. Had Christ made satisfaction only for original sin, so that it would be left us to make satisfaction for actual sins, only one part of the work of redemption would be left to Christ, while the other, and that, too, the greater part, would be transferred to men. For Christ's satisfaction would be for but one sin, while men would have to render satisfaction for many sins. But Scripture ascribes the entire work of redemption to Christ, 1 Tim. 2:5; Is. 63:3; Heb. 10:14. Christ however made full satisfaction not only for actual sins, but also for the temporal and eternal punishments due our sins: 1. According to the nature of a perpetual relation, when the guilt is removed, the debt of punishment belonging to the guilt is also removed. But Christ took upon Himself our sins, Is. 53:6; John 1:29; 1 Pet. 2:24. Therefore, He also transferred to Himself the penalty due our sins, and consequently freed us from the debt of the penalty that was to be paid. 2. Scripture emphatically says that the punishment due our sins was imposed on Christ, Is. 53:5. 3. All punishments, temporal and eternal, corporeal and spiritual, are included under the name curse,' Gal. 3:13. One punishment of sin is the curse of the Law; but Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law.' Another punishment of sin is the dominion of Satan; but Christ has delivered us from the dominion of Satan, Heb. 2:14. Another punishment of sin is the wrath of God; but Christ has delivered us from the wrath to come, 1 Thess. 1:10. Another punishment is death; but Christ has delivered us from death, Hos. 13:14. Another is hell and eternal damnation; but Christ has delivered us from hell and eternal damnation, Rom. 8:1. 4. God's justice does not allow the same sin to be punished twice; and He has bruised' His most beloved Son for our offenses, Is. 53:4. Therefore He will not punish them in those who have become partakers of the satisfaction rendered by Christ. 5. If we had still to render satisfaction as to the penalties of sin, the satisfaction of Christ would not yet be perfect, the work of redemption would not yet be complete, all things would not yet be finished by Him. And yet He cried on the cross, It is finished,' from which Heb. 10:14 infers, etc. Had He made satisfaction for original sin alone, or for guilt alone, it would be better called emilutrosis than apolutrosis. That, by faith, men become partakers of the most perfect satisfaction rendered by Christ, we prove by the following arguments: 1. Scripture describes our reconciliation with God to be such that God no longer remembers our sins, Jer. 31:34, but casts them behind our backs, Is. 38:17, blots them out like a cloud, Is. 44:22, casts them into the depths of the sea, Mic. 7:19, does not impute, but covers them, Ps. 32:1. Therefore He does not hold the reconciled to the reckoning, or exact of them punishments. For were God still to punish, He would still impute; were He to avenge, He would still remember; were He to account, He could not keep covered; were He to examine, He could not cast away; were He to inspect, He could not blot out. 2. The complete forgiveness of sins is inconsistent with a debt of satisfaction yet to be rendered for the punishment. That for which a satisfaction is still exacted is not yet completely forgiven. No one would say that a creditor who still demands a satisfaction, had forgiven a debtor. When all the debt is forgiven, the obligation to pay even the least part is removed, etc. The contrary doctrines are the various opinions of the Scholastics and Papists: (a) That "we can make satisfaction for our guilt;" (b) that while "we cannot make satisfaction for our guilt, we can for the penalty;" (c) that "eternal punishment is, by the power of the keys, commuted to temporal punishment, so as to bring it within our ability;" (d) that "while eternal guilt and punishment are remitted, the obligation to some temporal punishment remains." Thus Bonaventura: "In sinning, the sinner binds himself to eternal punishment. Divine mercy, in justifying, remits all the guilt and subjection to eternal punishment. But since mercy cannot prejudice justice, whose office it is to punish what is wicked, it releases in such a way that he remains under subjection to only a relatively small amount of temporal punishment." In the controversy, the very practical question arose as to how then we are to regard the temporal afflictions of the justified. These, the Papists argued, were a fulfilment of the obligation of punishment, and thus satisfactions. The Lutherans, especially CHEMNITZ in his Examen, "De Satifactione," maintained that, properly speaking, they were not punishments, but chastisements. "What before forgiveness were punishments of sinners, after forgiveness became the contests and exercises of the justified" (Chrysostom in GERHARD). GERH. (VI, 319): "The former are indications, testifying that the person afflicted is under the wrath of God; the latter proceed not from an enraged, but from a propitious God, Lam. 3:33. The former are testimonies, aye, beginnings of eternal punishment; the latter look towards the reformation and salvation of the godly. Where there is remission of sins, there punishment properly so called cannot occur; for what else if remission of sins, but forgiveness from punishment?" II. (QUEN., III, 238): "The personal object comprises (not angels, but) each and every sinful man, without any exception whatever. For He suffered and died for all, according to the serious and sincere good pleasure and kind intention of Himself and God the Father, according to which He truly wills the salvation of each and every soul, even of those who fail of salvation; not kata doxan (in appearance), but kat aletheian (in truth, i.e., not in imagination or conjecture, but in very deed, and most truly, Is. 53:6; Matt. 20:28; 2 Cor. 5:14, 15; Heb. 2:9; 1 Tim. 2:6; John 1:29; 1 John 2:1, 2; Rom. 14:15; 1 Cor. 8:11; Heb. 6:4-6; 2 Pet. 2:1." On the personal object: GRH., IV, 178: "If the reprobate are condemned because they do not believe in the Son of God, it follows that to them also the passion and death of Christ pertain. For, otherwise, they could not be condemned for their contempt of that which, according to the divine decree, does not pertain to them. The former is distinctly affirmed, John 3:18, 36; 16:9. If Christ had not made satisfaction for the sins of unbelievers, it follows that they are condemned for the very reason that they are unwilling to believe that that pertains to them, which in truth, and according to God's immutable decree, does not pertain to them. I add also this argument: To whomsoever God offers benefits acquired by the passion and death of Christ, for them also Christ has died. For far be it from us to ascribe to God such dissembling as though by His Word, He would call the unbelieving to repentance and the kingdom of Christ, whom nevertheless He would exclude therefrom by an absolute decree. But both Scripture and experience testify that God has offered and still is offering His Word and Sacraments to some reprobate and condemned, and, in these means, also the blessings acquired by the passion and death of Christ." He next shows how the Calvinists have attached another sense to the Scholastic axiom, which they have adopted: "Christ died sufficiently, but not efficiently for all." The Scholastics meant by this, that Christ potentially saved all, and that the reason that all do not partake of His grace must be found in their own guilt, in not accepting Him by faith. The Calvinists, on the other hand, understand by it that Christ's death would not be without the power to expiate the sins of all, if it had been destined by God for this end, but that such was not His purpose. "The former refer the cause of the inefficiency to the men themselves; by the latter, it is referred to the decree of God." The chief arguments in opposition to the universality of the satisfaction are recounted: 1. "Christ says, that He lays down His life for His sheep, John 10:15; sanctifies Himself for those given Him of His Father, John 17:19; His blood is given for many, Matt. 26:28. Christ, therefore, has died only for the elect." But (a) the force of such argument is: Christ died for His sheep. Therefore, for His sheep alone. He died for the elect; therefore, only for the elect. (b) The particular is included in its universal, viz., that Christ died for all; hence the universal ought not to be limited by the particular, but the particular extended by its universal. (c) The word "many" is frequently used in Scripture for all, Ps. 97:1; Dan. 12:2; Rom. 5:19. Hence the argument: "Christ died for many; and, therefore, not for all," is invalid. (d) In these passages "many" must necessarily be understood of the whole multitude of men. This is shown by the opposition in the argument of Rom. 5:19. For all who were rendered sinners by Adam's fall, the benefit of righteousness has been acquired. Cf. Is. 53:12 with v. 6; also Matt. 20:28, with 1 Tim. 2:6. (e) Scripture speaks in accordance with the double relation of Christ's merit, it is universal, if considered apart from its application; but its application and actual enjoyment is, by man's fault, rendered particular. 2. "If Christ truly died for all, the effect and fruit of His death must pertain to all" But (a) that alms be received, there must be not only a hand to give, but also a hand to take. It is not enough that the benefits of Christ, acquired by His death, are offered; they must also be received by faith. (b) This faith God ordinarily enkindles in the heart through the Holy Spirit, working in Word and Sacraments; but they who repel the Word, and resist the Spirit, are, by their own fault, deprived of the benefits of Christ's death. (c) This is clearly shown from 2 Cor. 5:18, 19: "God hath reconciled us to Himself," etc., i.e., reconciliation has been made, viz., with respect to the acquiring of the benefit by Christ's death, and yet, v. 18: "God hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation;" v. 20: "We pray you, be ye reconciled," i.e., reconciliation is still to be made, viz., with respect to its application. (d) The argument rests on the hypothesis that the death of Christ does not belong to those who do not partake of its fruit. Were then Paul, the thief on the cross, and others, as long as they were unbelieving and impenitent, excluded from the number of those for whom Christ died? If this be denied, the universality of the proposition falls; if it be affirmed, it follows that in conversion, the justified are either without the death of Christ, or that only then does Christ die for them. (e) This may be illustrated by an example: A hundred Christian captives are in bondage to the Turkish Emperor. A Christian prince pays a certain sum for the ransom of all. If any afterwards prefer to remain longer in captivity rather than enjoy the liberty acquired and offered them, they should ascribe this to themselves. For the universality of the ransom is not thereby invalidated. 3. "Christ made no satisfaction for those for whom He does not pray. But for the reprobate He does not pray, John 17:9." But, while it is true, that the satisfaction of Christ is not for those, for whom He absolutely does not pray, this cannot be said of the reprobate, Is. 53:12; Luke 23:34. A distinction must be drawn between the general and the special intercession; also between the office of Christ, as a priest and as a prophet: as a priest, praying for all, when on the altar of the cross He offered His body as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; but as a prophet, proclaiming that sins are retained against sinners impenitent and resisting. 4. "That for which there could have been no use, we must not believe to have been done by God. But there would be no use of a universal merit, since some of the reprobate for whom Christ would have then suffered were already in hell." With equal reason we could conclude that Christ did not suffer for Abraham, Isaac, and the other saints of the Old Testament, since they had already attained that which is said to come through Christ's passion. We should rather say, according to Rev. 13:8, that the Lamb of God was slain from the foundation of the world, viz., with respect to the divine decree, the promise, the types in the sacrifices, and the efficacy; and that the fruit of Christ's passion is not to be restricted to the moment of time in which it occurred, but extended to both past and future, whence the ancients said that "Christ's passion was before it was." We, therefore, are right in saying that Christ suffered and died also for those who, while He was suffering, were in hell; not as though Christ, by His suffering, would liberate them from hell, but because while they were still living, the promises concerning the Messiah ought to have been embraced, and the merits of His passion thus received, as patriarchs, prophets, and the rest of the godly under the Old Testament, were saved by faith in Christ. [18] QUEN. (III, 253): "Satisfaction is an act of the sacerdotal office of Christ, the God-man, according to which, from the eternal decree of the triune God, out of His immense mercy, He cheerfully and voluntarily substituted Himself as the bondsman and surety for the entire human race, which, through sin, had been cast into incredible misery; and, having taken upon Himself each and every sin of the entire world, by His most perfect obedience and the suffering, in their place, of the penalties that men had merited, made satisfaction, on this earth, during the whole time of His humiliation, and especially in His last agony, to the Holy Trinity that had been most grievously offended; and, by thus making a satisfaction, acquired and earned for each and every man the remission of all sins, exemption from all penalties, grace and peace with God, eternal righteousness and salvation." [19] Concerning the relation of satisfaction and merit, HOLL. (736): "(1) Satisfaction precedes, merit follows; for Christ has merited righteousness and life eternal by rendering a satisfaction. (2) Satisfaction is made to God and His justice,; but Christ has merited salvation, not for God, but for us. (3) Merit precedes the payment of a price; satisfaction, the compensating of an injury. Therefore, by His satisfaction, Christ made a compensation for the injury offered to God, expiated iniquity, paid the debt, and freed us from eternal penalties; but, by His merit, He acquired for us eternal righteousness and salvation. (4) The satisfaction rendered by Christ is the payment of our debts, by which we were under obligations to God; but merit arises from the fulfilment of the Law and the suffering that is not due." The entire obedience which Christ rendered avails for us, and Christ did not need to merit anything for His own person. This the Dogmaticians express in the following manner: "Christ, as a man, merited nothing for Himself, by His obedience; because, through the personal union, Christ was given all the fullness of the Godhead (Col. 2:9), and was anointed with the oil of joy (the gifts of the Holy Ghost) above His fellows (Ps. 45:7). Therefore, it was not necessary that He should merit anything for Himself." (HOLL. (749)). [20] CONF. AUG. (XXI, 2): "The Scripture propoundeth unto us one Christ, the mediator, propitiator, high priest, and intercessor." AP. CONF. (III, 44): "Christ who sitteth at the Right Hand of the Father, and perpetually maketh intercession for us." QUEN. (III, 264): "Of this priestly act in the type, we may read in Lev. 16:17, 18; Ex. 28:29, 35. Christ, the God-man, is our only intercessor, 1 Tim. 2:5." (257): "The ground of this intercession is the satisfaction and universal merit of the interceder Himself; for by and through His bloody satisfaction, or, by the virtue of His merit, Christ, as a priest, intercedes for us with God the Father." A more specific explanation of intercession is given in the following (ib.): "By the virtue of His merit, Christ truly and formally intercedes for all men, not indeed by acquiring anew for them grace and divine favor, but only according to the mode of His present state, which is that of exaltation, by seeking that the acquired blessing may be applied to them for righteousness and salvation." GRH.: "Intercession is nothing else than the application and continual force, as it were, of redemption, perpetually winning favor with God." [21] QUEN. (III, 256): "He does not indeed intercede for those who, having died in impenitence, are in hell, suffering eternal punishments (for He is not their intercessor, but the judge condemning and punishing them), but in general for all those who still live in the world, and still have the gate of divine grace standing open before them, whether they be elect or reprobate. For He interceded for the transgressors, or His crucifiers, Is. 53:12; Luke 23:34." HOLL. (750): "How He prays for the elect, we read, John 17:11. From which is inferred that Christ intercedes for the regenerate and elect, that they may be preserved from evil, be kept in the unity of faith, and be sanctified more and more by the Word of truth." QUEN. (III, 257): "It is evident that Christ justly does not ask the peculiar blessings that have been recounted, the actual, saving enjoyment of which belongs to the faithful and godly alone, for the ungrateful, wicked and refractory world, in so far as it is and remains such, since it is incapable of these. These special blessings, Christ has not sought for such a world, by no means out of any absolute hatred against it, . . . but because of its wickedness, ingratitude, and contumacy . . . . The Saviour, therefore, in His prayers, does not commend to the Father the inflexible despisers and violent persecutors of the Gospel, but His own beloved disciples who received His Word; yet that this does not absolutely exclude the world either from His satisfaction or from His intercession, is evident from John 17:21." [22] HOLL. (749): "The intercession of Christ is not merely interpretative through the exhibition of His merits" ("as though Christ interceded for us not by prayers, but by His merit alone, and its eternal efficacy" (QUEN. III, 257)); "for the word, entunchanein, Rom. 8:34; Heb. 7:25, employed concerning the intercession of Christ, means more than the real yet silent presentation of merits. . . . Therefore, the intercession of Christ is not only real, but also, vocal and oral; not abject by submission" ("as though Christ, as a suppliant, with bent knees and outstretched hands, and a vocal lamentation, should entreat the Father as in the days of His flesh, for such an entreaty conflicts with Christ's glorious state; therefore we must regard it in a manner becoming God (John 17:24), and not after the manner of the flesh or of a servant" (QUEN. III, 257), "but is expiatory and effectual for obtaining saving blessings for men (because whatever He asks of His Father is pleasing and agreeable to the Father, John 11:22). The intercession of Christ is effectual to obtain for us salvation, although those who do not believe in Christ do not enjoy the effect. Hence, it is said to be effectual, by reason of the saving intention of Christ, and not by reason of the result in the unbelieving and wicked." But BR. observes, in regard to the verbal intercession (498): "Whether this intercession be verbal, consisting in words and prayers presented either mentally or vocally, or whether it be only real, consisting in this, that, by the virtue of His merit and satisfaction formerly rendered, and of His prayers formerly made, Christ moves God to remit our sins, it is not necessary to determine." [QUEN. (III, 271): "Elegantly has St. Augustine, on Ps. 85, said: He prays for us, as our Priest; He prays in us, as our Head; He is prayed to by us, as our God.' Let us, then, recognize our voices in Him and His voices in us."] [23] QUEN. (III, 258): "This intercession will not be terminated by the end of the world, but will continue to all eternity, Heb. 7:25; Ps. 110:4; Heb. 5:6; 7:17. For it must not be thought that after the end of the world, when the elect have passed into life eternal, intercession is superfluous; for He prays and intercedes, not that they may not by sin fall from eternal salvation, but that they may be kept in glory, which, as it must be regarded as having been received for merit, must also be regarded as having been received for Christ's meritorious intercession." As, in Rom. 8:26, mention is made of an intercession by the Holy Spirit also, some of the Dogmaticians inquire what is to be understood by this, and how it differs from the intercession that is offered by Christ. QUEN. (III, 259): "Some receive uperentunchanein by metalepsis and with respect to the result, so that He is said to pray and groan, because He causes us to pray and groan, shows and teaches us for what to pray and how to pray aright, and forms our prayers within us. But others also understand it literally as referring to the very person of the Holy Ghost, viz., that the Holy Ghost Himself, in His own person, prays and intercedes for us." QUEN. decides for the former interpretation. And he thus states the difference between the two kinds of intercession: "The one intercession (that of Christ) is theanthropike [that of the God-man]; the other is purely theike [divine]. The one is mediatorial; the other is not. The intercession of Christ is founded upon His suffering and death, which cannot be said of the intercession of the Holy Ghost." (Ib. 260). [24] HOLL. (751): "Redemption is not simple, absolute, and metaphorical, but precious, satisfactory, and literal, 1 Cor. 6:19, 20; 1 Pet. 1:18; Matt 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6." Id. (752): "The former is liberation without any intervening price from a penalty that has been decided; the latter is that by which a guilty person is redeemed from his crime and the punishment, by the payment of a price . . . . For, properly speaking, to redeem signifies to buy again, just as the Greek words lutroun, agorazein, exagorazein, and the Hebrew words, g'l prh, denote purchase or repurchase, which occurs through an intervening price. Therefore, when, in the present argument, where we treat of the redemption of the fallen human race accomplished by Christ, these Hebrew and Greek words from the holy volume are employed, we receive them in a literal sense, because no necessity appears to be imposed upon us of departing from the literal sense." The expressions used in Holy Scripture to denote redemption are (a) in the Old Testament g'lh. Lev. 25:24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 48, 51, 52; pdyvn, Ex. 21:30; Ps. 49:8; (b) in the New Testament, lutrosis, Luke 1:68; 2:38; Heb. 9:12; apolutrosis, Luke 21:28; Rom. 3:24; 8:23; 1 Cor. 1:30; Eph. 1:7, 14; 4:30; Col. 1:14; Heb. 9:15; 11:35; agorasis, 2 Pet. 2:1; Rev. 5:9; 14:3; exagorasis, Gal. 3:13; 4:5. [25] The Dogmaticians KG., QUEN., and HOLL., treat still more fully of redemption, distinguishing (1) the captive (the whole human race). (2) The one holding the captive (God, Rom. 11:32; Gal. 3:22, to whom the ransom must be paid; and the devil who holds the wicked in the snares of sins, 2 Tim. 2:26, to whom not a price, but punishment is due). (3) The one redeeming the captive (Christ, the only and the universal Redeemer of the whole human race, availing by the right, strength, and will to redeem, Rom. 3:24). (4) The chains from which Christ redeemed the human race (sins, offences against God, and temporal and eternal punishments). (5) The means of redemption. (6) The end of redemption (the final end, the glory of God; the intermediate, freedom from the guilt and dominion of sin). As, however, all the matters discussed under these heads have been included in the previous discussion their further citations could be dispensed with, and their presentation by the Dogmaticians above named is to be regarded as a mere recapitulation of what had been given before. __________________________________________________________________ [16] [Referring to the doctrine found in many of the early writers of the Church, (especially Origen, Gregory of Nyssa), and in Lombardus and other Scholastics, which represented the price of redemption as paid the devil. Men, they taught, because of sin, had been handed over to Satan's power. Christ offered Himself as man's substitute, and was gladly accepted by Satan, who overlooked Christ's omnipotence, and was thus not only defrauded of his prey, but even himself was destroyed, when the Son of God, brought within his realm, completely overthrew and ruined it. It was the work of Anselm to antagonize this perversion of Heb. 2:14, 15, and to define the doctrine that has since prevailed.] [17] In the sense of pertaining to things. __________________________________________________________________ § 37. The Regal Office. To Him, who announced to the world God's gracious purpose of redemption, and who Himself accomplishes the redemption, the dominion over the world is committed; and, in exercising this dominion, He performs a regal function. This regal dignity belongs to Christ, as God, from eternity; but from the moment of His incarnation His humanity also participated in it. [1] Yet, as long as He tarried here upon earth, He did not exercise this regal dominion in its full extent; but rather, as long as He was in the state of humiliation, refrained, for the most part, from its use and exercise, and not until the time of His exaltation did He enter upon the complete exercise of this, His regal dominion. [2] Inasmuch as Christ is thus King and Lord of the world, His dominion extends over everything that is in the world and belongs to it; and there appertains to Him not only the preservation and government of the world in general, but also the preservation and government of the Church in particular. At the same time, this His dominion extends not only over the present, but equally also over the future world. This kingdom of Christ is, in itself, only one, and embraces the whole world, the present and the future, with all that it contains. Yet this one kingdom can also be distinguished as a threefold one, in the same sense in which we distinguish at present the world and the Church, and in which we distinguish the citizens of this and of the future life, of heaven and of earth. Accordingly, the world and the Church, in this life, are regarded as each a special kingdom, over which Christ rules; and those who are in the life to come constitute the third kingdom. This threefold kingdom is designated as the kingdom of power, of grace, and of glory. The first is called the Kingdom of Power, because it is the kingdom in which Christ exercises His divine power by governing and upholding the world; the second is called the Kingdom of Grace, because in this Christ operates through His saving grace; the third is called the Kingdom of Glory, because He therein unfolds, in all its perfection, His divine glory before the eyes of all who are there assembled. [3] The regal office is accordingly defined as, "The theanthropic function of Christ, whereby He divinely controls and governs, according to both natures the divine and the human (and the latter, as exalted to the Right Hand of Majesty), all creatures whatever, in the kingdom of power, grace, and glory, by infinite majesty and power: as to the divinity, by virtue of eternal generation; as to the assumed humanity, by virtue of the personal union belonging to Him." (QUEN., III, 264.) [4] To the Kingdom of Power ("in which Christ powerfully rules over this universe, and upholds it and providentially governs it") belong all creatures in the world, visible and invisible; [5] Christ's dominion extends over them all, and all must be subject unto Him. By Him everything is upheld and governed. [6] To the Kingdom of Grace ("in which Christ collects the Church Militant upon earth, governs it, furnishes it with spiritual gifts, preserves and defends it, to the praise of the divine name, to the destruction of Satan's kingdom, and the salvation of believers," Jer. 23:5; 33:15; Zech. 9:9; HOLL., 763) belong those who believe in Christ, the members of His Church. To enlarge this Church, and to bestow upon its members all the blessings of the Gospel, is the regal function which Christ exercises in this kingdom, [7] and the Word and Sacraments are the means which He uses for that purpose. [8] This kingdom will, it is true, come to an end in this world, but only by passing over into the kingdom of glory. [9] To the Kingdom of Glory, finally ("in which Christ most gloriously rules the Church Triumphant in heaven, and fills it with eternal felicity, to the praise of the divine name and the eternal refreshment of the saved," Matt. 25:34; John 17:24; HOLL., 763), belong all the inhabitants of heaven, the good angels and redeemed men. They behold the Lord in His glory, as He shows Himself to the dead, when He awakens them to life. [10] This glory of the Lord begins with the time of His ascension to heaven, but will not be perfectly unfolded until, after the final judgment, believers also will enter into the kingdom of His glory, to share with Him its possession. Matt. 25:34. [11] [1] QUEN. (III, 260): "Just as Christ, in His prophetic and sacerdotal offices, acts and works according to both natures, so also, according to both natures, in this regal office He acts and performs His part; for He rules over all creatures, not only as God, according to His divinity, but also as man, according to His exalted humanity." The Holy Scriptures speak of a regal dignity in Ps. 2:6; 20:9; 45:1, 3, 5; 47:7; Heb. 2:7, 8; Ps. 8:6; 97; 5; 2 Sam. 23:3; 1 Tim. 6:15; Rev. 17:14; 19:16. QUEN. further remarks (III, 261): "One in number is that regal power which Christ, according to His divine nature, has, and according to His human nature, possesses. Only the mode of having it varies; for what, according to His divinity, He has by eternal generation from eternity, that, according to His humanity, through and because of the personal union, He has received in time, and fully exercises now in the state of exaltation." His power to rule, even according to His human nature, is evident from Ps. 8:6; Jer. 23:5; John 17:5. [2] HOLL. (764): "Christ immediately, in His very conception, was anointed to a regal dignity, and, during His visible intercourse upon the earth, possessed the power to rule, and sometimes exercised it according to His pleasure. But, in the state of humiliation, He voluntarily refrained from the most full and uninterrupted employment of His rule." Christ, therefore, "during that time in which He visibly dwelt on this earth, was a true King. Luke 2:11; 19:35; Mark 14:61. There is an antithesis of the Socinians, who say that Christ, before His resurrection, was not actually a King; although they do not deny that before His death, He was described as a King." (HOLL., 764.) QUEN. (III, 264): "A distinction must, therefore, be made here between the appointment to this regal office and the refraining from the full administration and use of the same. Christ, as man, was King and Lord even in the womb (Luke 1:43), in the manger (Luke 2:11), in bonds (John 18:37), on the cross (Luke 23:42); and yet did not actually exercise that dominion." That Christ also possessed regal power in the state of humiliation, the Dogmaticians regard as proved by His performing miracles. [3] HUTT. and HFRFFR. still account, as belonging to the regal office, only His dominion over believers; and GRH., who was contemporaneous with them, was the first to include under the regal office all the relations in which Christ is Lord and King, and in this they were imitated by all the later Dogmaticians. Of course, no doctrinal difference was hereby intended. The faith of the Church always was, that Christ was Lord and King of the world. Thus we have it stated, e.g., by CHMN. (De duab. naturis, 205): "Scripture clearly affirms that to Christ, even according to His humanity, as Lord, all things have been made subject, not only in the Church, but all things in general; . . . and distinct and express mention is made of the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fish of the sea, and all the works of God's hands, whether they be in heaven, or on earth, or under the earth, even of the enemies of Christ, and, therefore, the devil and death itself, as being in this subjection." The difference is only this, that GRH. was the first to introduce the method of arranging under one head all that is to be said concerning the dominion of Christ. As to the division itself. GRH. (III, 578): "The kingdom of Christ is considered either in this or in the future life. In this life, it is called the kingdom of power or grace; . . . in the life to come, it is called the kingdom of glory." BR. (498): "The regal office of Christ is threefold, according to the diverse nature of those whom He regards as His subjects, and governs diversely. For although, if you regard the words themselves, the kingdom of grace, as well as that of glory, may seem to be comprised under the kingdom of power, as both truly depend upon divine power imparted to the human nature of Christ, yet the usus loquendi requires it to be named the kingdom of grace, with respect to the spiritual blessings which are conferred in this world, and the kingdom of glory, with respect to the glory of the future world; while the kingdom of power signifies a universal government." QUEN. (III, 264): "Some say that Christ reigns in the world by power, in the Church by grace, in heaven by glory, and in hell by justice." In regard to the last, HOLL. observes (763): "You say, that also a fourth kingdom of Christ is mentioned, viz., the kingdom of justice over the wicked angels and condemned men. Reply: We refer the kingdom of justice to the kingdom of power." On the other hand, BR. (501): "Some, referring both (the kingdom of glory and the kingdom of justice) to the same kingdom of glory, say that the glorifying of the elect belongs by itself to the former; but the condemnation of the wicked . . . they refer to the latter in the manner in which under other circumstances opposites are wont to be referred to the same faculty." The threefold division is, accordingly, not to be understood as if there were three separate kingdoms over which Christ rules, but the reason of the division lies (1) partly in the different divine influences which Christ exerts. The same persons who are in the kingdom of grace are also in the kingdom of power; but in the one kingdom the divine saving grace, and in the other the divine power, is exercised; (2) partly in the difference of the places in which they are found, over which Christ rules, viz., in the one case upon earth, and in the other in heaven. QUEN. (III, 264): "The kingdom of grace includes, or rather presupposes, the kingdom of power; for the kingdom of power is required for the kingdom of grace, or the Church, which in this world is to be established, ruled, etc., through the ministry of the Spirit by means of the Word and Sacraments." [4] GRH. (III, 578): "The regal office is that according to which Christ as the God-man governs all things in heaven and earth, and especially protects His Church against enemies." On the other hand, HFRFFR. (353) (see note 3): "The regal office is that according to which, to the end of the world, through the ministry of the Word, He collects His citizens, and, having furnished them with eminent gifts, vigorously defends them against enemies (in whose midst He rules), and at length crowns them with eternal glory and honor." [5] QUEN. (III, 265): "The object or matter with which this government is occupied comprises all the works of God in general, or all creatures, visible, invisible, corporeal, incorporeal, animate, inanimate, rational, irrational. Ps. 8:6, 7, 8; 1 Cor. 15:27, 28; Heb. 2:7, 8; Eph. 1:21, 22; 1 Pet. 3:22." [6] GRH. (III, 578): "The kingdom of power is the general dominion over all things, or the governing of heaven and earth, Ps. 8:6; Dan. 7:14; Matt. 28:18; Eph. 1:21; the subjugation of all creatures, 1 Cor. 15:27; Eph. 1:20; Heb. 2:8; dominion in the midst of His enemies, whom He suppresses, restrains, and punishes, Ps. 2:9; 110:2; 1 Cor. 15:25." [7] HOLL. (763): "The subjects, in this kingdom of grace, are all believing men, who constitute the Church Militant. The regal acts are the collecting, governing, adorning, and preservation of the Church, His defense of it against the enemies of grace, and His ruling in their midst. John 3:5; 17:17; Eph. 5:26; Tit. 3:5; Matt. 28:20." When QUEN. (III, 268), on the other hand, says: "The object of the kingdom of grace, according to the antecedent will, comprises all men universally, but the godly and believing especially," he means to say only that participation in the blessings of the Church is intended for, and sincerely offered to all men, and, therefore, does not contradict the statement of HOLL. [8] QUEN. (III, 267): "The Word and Sacraments are the instrumental cause, for it pleased the King in Zion, Ps. 2:6, to act here ordinarily in no other way than by the Word and Sacraments, and by these means to collect, increase, and preserve on this earth a Church for Himself. Matt. 4:23; 9:35; 24:14." [9] QUEN. (III, 270): "The end of the world will indeed terminate the mode of the kingdom of grace, but not the essence of the kingdom. That which is said in 1 Cor. 15:24, concerning the giving up of this kingdom, is to be understood, not as applying to the government itself, but only to the mode of governing, and the form and quality of the government; because Christ will govern no longer through means, namely, through the word and Sacraments, through the cross and among enemies, but, all enemies being put down, the last enemy, viz., death, being destroyed, and the wicked being cast into hell, He will deliver the kingdom to God the Father, i.e., He will hand over the captive enemies and establish the elect, among whom He hold His spiritual kingdom. Therefore there will be a triumphal handing over of subjugated enemies, and a presentation of liberated believer. By this act of handing over, Christ will not lay aside the administration of His spiritual and heavenly kingdom, but will then only enter upon another mode of ruling." QUEN. then quotes approvingly Dorschaeus: "This handling over will be not actus depositionis, sed propositionis. Christ will not at the consummation, lay down the kingdom, which, up to the consummation, He has governed in grace and in glory; but He will present it to God the Father for His inspection and glory. Just as a general, after having destroyed all his enemies, presents to the king, who through him has waged the war, the victorious and triumphant army, the saved citizens, and the free people, and tenders them to him, that he may judge and approve his deeds, and nevertheless does not lay down the power which he had over the army; so, much more, when the world is ended, and all enemies have been suppressed, shall Christ, as the Son, place His immaculate (Eph. 5:27) ecclesiastical army in the presence of God the Father, before His tribunal, Rom. 14:10, and shall say: These are they who are not defiled, who have followed me, the Lamb, whithersoever I have gone, who are the first fruits to Thee, O God, the Father, and to me the Lamb, Rev. 14:4.'" [10] HOLL. (763): "The subjects in this kingdom of glory are both good angels and glorified men (who in faith continue in the kingdom of grace to the end. Matt. 24:13; Rev. 2:10). The regal acts are: the raising to life of the believing dead, their solemn introduction into life eternal, Matt. 25:34; Luke 22:29, 30, and the most happy and glorious rule over them." [11] QUEN. (III, 273): "Christ, the king of glory, indeed, even as a man, immediately from His first conception, was the possessor of all glory, but did not actually rule gloriously until after His exaltation, when His sufferings were finished. This very kingdom of glory will truly receive its final completion in the general resurrection of the dead, the assembling of all of the elect, and their translation to the possession of the heavenly inheritance, and thence will endure to eternity." C. -- OF THE STATES OF CHRIST. __________________________________________________________________ § 38. As the works of redemption, for whose accomplishment the logos became man, could be brought about only through suffering and death, it is altogether natural that we should see Christ, through all His earthly life, even until the completion of His work of redemption, going about in the form of a servant, subject to all the weaknesses and infirmities of human nature. Not until after His resurrection did He lay aside the form of a servant and appear in divine glory. Accordingly, from the time of the incarnation of Christ, we have to predicate of Him a two-fold condition, that of the form of a servant and that of glory. Inasmuch, however, as in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, resulting from the unio personalis, the human nature participated in all the attributes and glory of the divine nature; and, inasmuch as, in accordance with this, a condition of divine glory would naturally have been looked for from the moment of the incarnation; we cannot comprehend the antecedent condition in the form of a servant without assuming that Christ voluntarily refrained from a glory that belonged to Him. And this indeed is the teaching of the Scriptures in Phil. 2:5-9. Accordingly we designate the former condition the State of Humiliation, a condition of self-renunciation; the other, the State of Exaltation. This self-renunciation, however, that is followed by His being in the condition of a servant, does not lie in the act of incarnation; for, although it is a gracious condescension of the logos, that He assumed human nature, yet that cannot be the fact here referred to, as the condition of self-renunciation is designated as temporary, while the incarnation is permanent. [1] Neither the self-renunciation nor the exaltation, indeed, can be predicated of the logos, or of the divine nature; for this, remaining ever the same, is not susceptible of self-renunciation or of exaltation. It is only, therefore, of the human nature that the one or the other can be predicated, [2] and it is only to this that the self-renunciation and the exaltation here described refer. But, when self-renunciation is predicated of it, this is not to be so understood, as if in this condition of self-renunciation the human nature were entirely stripped of the divine glory and confined entirely to itself, and as if the divine glory, as such, were not associated with the human nature until in the condition of exaltation; for this is disproved already by the fact that Christ, even in the State of Humiliation, performed deeds that imply the possession of divine glory. [3] Finally, the self-renunciation is not to be so understood as if the human nature, in consequence of its inalienable possession of divine glory, really exercised the dominion thence accruing to it, but concealed this exercise from the eyes of men, which would have been no real self-renunciation at all: [4] but it must be assumed that the human nature, although, in itself considered, having full right to the divine glory, and being in possession of all the dominion resulting therefrom, here upon earth voluntarily renounced the use and exercise of the same out of regard for the work of redemption that was to be accomplished, [5] and instead thereof led a life of lowliness; that, therefore, the human nature of Christ, which in virtue of the Communicatio Idiomatum was entitled to all the majesty belonging to God, renounced the same, and instead thereof assumed poverty, lowliness, and all the natural (though sinless) weaknesses, infirmities, limitations, and wants of human nature. [6] The self-renunciation consists, therefore, in the real, though at times interrupted abnegation, by the human nature of Christ, of the glory due unto it, and the exaltation, in the assumption by this human nature, of the full use of this divine glory after the completion of the work of redemption. [7] The first state commences with the incarnation and continues until the last moment of His remaining in the tomb. The other begins with the re-animation and continues in eternity, but develops itself in several states. [8] (BR. (482): "The State of Humiliation consists in this, that Christ for a time renounced (truly and really, yet freely) the plenary exercise of the divine majesty, which His human nature had acquired in the personal union, and, as a lowly man, endured what was far beneath the divine majesty (that He might suffer and die for the life of the world)"). "The State of Exaltation is the state of Christ, the God-man, in which He, according to His human nature, having laid aside the infirmities of the flesh, received and assumed the plenary exercise of the divine majesty."[9] I. THE STATE OF HUMILIATION. -- The following are the principal aspects in which the humiliation of Christ reveals itself: HOLL. (759, sq.) [10] "1. Conception, Luke 1:31. A supernatural act, by which the flesh of Christ, produced from the mass of the blood of the Virgin Mary, received in her womb its original being, consubstantial with our own, through the supervention of the Holy Spirit." [11] 2. Nativity; which besides was accompanied with many humiliating circumstances. "Luke 2:7. The nativity of Christ is the going forth of God, as an infant, from the maternal womb into the light of day." [12] 3. Circumcision; by which Christ, at the same time, made Himself subject to the Law. "Luke 2:21. The circumcision is the bloody cutting off of the foreskin of the infant Jesus on the eighth day." [13] 4. Education; according to which Christ also subjected Himself to the laws of domestic life. "The education was His becoming accustomed, in boyhood, to the mode of life customary in Israel, and to a manual occupation." [14] 5. The visible intercourse of Christ in the world; by which He exposed Himself to all kinds of ill treatment from those who surrounded Him, and to all the discomforts of a lowly life. "The intercourse of Christ was His most holy association, in the days of His flesh, with all kinds of men, even the most contemptible, an association full of troubles, inconveniences, and dangers." [15] 6. The great suffering; the bodily and mental anguish which Christ endured in the last days of His earthly life. "The great suffering of Christ is the extreme anguish which our Redeemer suffered toward the end of His life, two days before His death, partly in His soul, partly in His body, by enduring to the end the most extreme and bitter sorrows." [16] 7. The Death of Christ. "The death of Christ is His loss of life through the dissolution of the natural union of body and soul." [17] 8. The Burial. "The burial of Christ was the placing of the body of our Redeemer, who had died upon the cross, in a new tomb, in demonstration of the truth of His death." II. THE STATE OF EXALTATION. -- This begins with the return of Christ to life, [18] and exhibits itself to the lower world by the descent, to this world by the resurrection and ascension, attaining its completion in the session at the Right Hand of God the Father. [19] 1. The Descent to the Lower World. After Christ had been again restored to life, and before He had given to men in His resurrection from the dead the proof that He was alive, [20] He descended to hell (1 Pet. 3:18-20; Col. 2:15), and exhibited Himself there to Satan and the condemned spirits as the victor over death and Satan, and as Lord over death and life. [21] This descent of Christ into hell is, accordingly, not to be understood in a figurative sense, as if thereby only the greatness of the pains which Christ endured for the sake of men were indicated; or, as if thereby merely the benefits which were secured for men by the sufferings and death of Christ were set forth, namely, that men were freed from hell by them; but it is to be understood literally as a real descent into hell. [22] We are therefore to regard the whole Christ as being for awhile in hell; the act of descending is, however, to be predicated only of the human nature, since the divine nature, as filling all things, is, aside from this, to be understood as entirely present everywhere. [23] (1 Pet. 3:18-20; Eph. 4:9.) HOLL. (777): "The Descent of Christ to the lower world is the true, real, and supernatural movement by which Christ, having been freed from the chains of death and restored to life, in His entire person betook Himself to the lower regions, that He might exhibit Himself to the evil spirits and to condemned men as the conqueror of death." [24] 2. The Resurrection. After His descent to hell, three days after His death, Christ appears again upon earth to a small circle of intimate friends. Along with death, however, He had laid aside also the weaknesses and infirmities of human nature, and this is now in a glorified condition. Through the resurrection He has proven Himself conqueror of death and the devil, and, without it, our faith would be vain. (1 Cor. 15:14.) HOLL. (779): "The resurrection is the act of glorious victory by which Christ, the God-man, through the same power as that of God the Father and the Holy Spirit, brought forth His body, reunited with the soul and glorified, from the tomb, and showed it alive to His disciples, by various proofs, for the confirmation of our peace, fellowship, joy, and hope in our own future resurrection." [25] 3. The Ascension. After Christ had shown Himself to His disciples as one raised from the dead, He ascended to heaven, i.e., His human nature also betook itself into heaven, where it had not yet been. (Acts 1:9; Luke 24:51.) HOLL. (784): "The ascension is the glorious act of Christ by which, after having been resuscitated, He betook Himself, according to His human nature, by a true, real, and local motion, according to His voluntary determination (per liberam oeconomiam), [18] and in a visible manner unto the clouds, and thence in an invisible manner into the common heaven of the blessed, and to the very throne of God; so that, having triumphed over His enemies, He might occupy the kingdom of God (Acts 3:21), reopen the closed Paradise (Rev. 3:7), and prepare a permanent inheritance for us in heaven (John 14:2)." [26] 4. The Sitting at the Right Hand of God. This expression signifies the assumption, on the part of the human nature of Christ, of the full divine glory and dominion; for not until His ascension did the human nature of Christ assume, in all its extent, the real exercise of all the divine glory from which it had refrained in the state of humiliation. (Heb. 1:13; Eph. 1:20-22; Mark 16:19; Rom. 8:34; Rev. 3:21.) HOLL. (786): "The sitting at the right hand of God is the highest degree of glory, in which Christ, the God-man, having been exalted, as to His human nature, to the throne of divine majesty, most powerfully and by His immediate presence governs all things which are in the kingdom of power, grace, and glory, for the glory of His own name, and for the solace and safety of the afflicted Church." [27] [1] HOLL. (765): "Although in an ecclesiastical and figurative sense the incarnation is sometimes said to be a self-renunciation (where it is employed in reference to the kind inclination by which the logos inclined Himself to pity and assist us, and, descending from heaven, deigned to assume human nature. This self-renunciation, figuratively and in an ecclesiastical sense so termed, is called the humiliation of incarnation, GRH., III, 562'), yet properly speaking, and in accordance with scriptural usage, the incarnation must not be called self-renunciation (exinanitio). For (1) self-renunciation is predicated of the incarnate (ensarkos) Son of God, or Christ, the God-man; incarnation, of the not yet incarnate (asarkos) Son of God; (2) when the self-renunciation is removed by exaltation, the state of incarnation remains." [2] HOLL. (767): "Christ was humbled (exinanitus est) according to His human nature considered in the personal union." Id.: "The subject (of the humiliation) is the human nature alone, but considered in the union; for (1) since the divine nature is immutable and most perfect, it cannot be exalted and humbled; (2) the self-renunciation extended even to the death of the cross, Phil. 2:8, and the divine nature neither died nor was crucified." [3] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 216): "Neither was it only after His resurrection that the entire fulness of the divine nature began to dwell bodily in Christ; as though, after the occurrence of the hypostatic union in conception and before the ascension, and sitting at the right hand, either any empty vacancy or partialness of divine nature dwelt bodily in Christ; or as though the hypostatic union or personal indwelling of the entire fulness of the Godhead, in the assumed nature of Christ, became in the process of years constantly greater, more intimate, fuller, and more complete: for, from the first moment of the hypostatic union, the entire fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, or, in other words, in the flesh, or assumed nature, of Christ." HOLL. (765): "The self-renunciation of Christ consists formally . . . not in the entire abdication or abandonment of divine majesty, . . . for (1) this could not have occurred without a dissolution of the personal union; for, since it is a perfect and inner union, it cannot exist without an impartation of natures and properties; (2) during the state of self-renunciation Christ sometimes produced remarkable proofs of the divine majesty dwelling in His flesh (John 2:1 sq.), although He exercised this majesty very rarely, and, as it were, extraordinarily." [4] HOLL. (765): "Self-renunciation does not consist in the mere concealment or hiding of divine majesty;" for, (1) self-renunciation does not pertain to Christ in His exaltation, although there pertains to Him in that state a hiding of majesty, 1 Cor. 1:7; (2) the hiding of gifts is not true self-renunciation, just as when the sun, when covered by clouds, has not been truly darkened; although we do not deny that Christ concealed the possession of communicated majesty and did not everywhere exert it." [GRH. III, 575; "1. If by krupsis, or hiding, there be understood a simulation, we deny that the self-renunciation should be thus described: because there was a true and real self-renunciation, embracing both arsis, i.e., abstaining from the use, not of just any, but of the plenary communicated, divine majesty and virtue, which the apostle calls kenosis; and thesis, i.e., the assumption of a servile form, and extreme humiliation, which the apostle joins to the kenosis. Just as, on the other hand, exaltation embraces both arsis, viz., the laying aside of the form of a servant and human infirmities, which Christ had spontaneously assumed, and thesis, viz., the full use and administration of dominion in the entire universe, all of which are ascribed to Christ not feignedly or kata phantasma, but truly. 2. krupsis can be referred both to the communication of majesty, and to the employment of communicated majesty. In the former respect it is rightly so-called, because the divine majesty was hid in the assumed flesh, but not separated from it; and all treasures of wisdom and knowledge are said to be hid in Him, Col. 2:3. In the latter respect, it was not only krupsis, but true and real kenosis, as the assumption of the servile form, which Christ afterwards laid aside in exaltation, shows."] [5] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 216): "Self-renunciation, therefore, does not signify a deprivation, removal, despoiling, putting off, casting aside, laying down, removal, want, absence, defect, destitution, or vacancy of the fulness of the Godhead, which, from the very moment of conception, dwelt in Christ bodily. But it respects its use or employment, because, being covered by weakness during the time of self-renunciation, it did not always shine in and through the human nature of Christ, and through it fully and clearly exercise itself; for, for a short time withdrawing and withholding from activity and divine virtue present and dwelling bodily in the human nature, and through the human nature of Christ, as Ambrose says, He permitted His natural properties and other assumed infirmities to prevail, predominate, and exercise themselves, as if alone in His human nature. Yet, lest any one, because of the self-renunciation of this employment, should imagine the absence and defect of the very fulness of the divine nature in the humanity of Christ, He, in the very time of self-renunciation, whenever He wished, showed that this fulness dwelt in His flesh; and, in the very time of His self-renunciation, whenever and as far as He wished, He exercised, manifested, and employed its use by means of His assumed nature. Thus in miracles He manifested His glory." . . . HOLL. (765): Self-renunciation "consists in the abdication of the full and uninterrupted use of divine majesty, the assumption of the form of a servant, likeness to other men, and the most humble obedience." The detailed description of the state of humiliation is given by HOLL. (766): "Four requisites must be combined in order to describe fully the self-renunciation of Christ: (1) kenois" ("intermission, withholding, restraining of the full activity, of the constant and universal divine majesty and excellence really imparted to Christ as a man," QUEN. (III, 334)); "(2) lepsis morphes doulou, the taking upon Himself the condition of a servant, for Christ was treated and sold in the manner of a servant, and endured a servant's punishment; (3) omoiosis anthropon, likeness to the lower and meaner class of men, especially to the Israelites, in His birth, circumcision, ablactation, His trade as a carpenter, His intercourse, and mode of life; (4) tareinosis upotaktike, most humble, active, and passive obedience." The Dogmaticians find the state of humiliation described in Phil. 2:5-8. The particular phrases occurring in this passage are thus explained by them: "Morphe theou formally and accurately denotes not the divine essence itself, but properly the glorious divine condition, or the glory and universal use of divine majesty, which cannot exist except with a true Godhead, but presuppose the same in the same person." (QUEN., III, 333.) CHMN. (de duab. nat., 133): "A morphe is when a nature or essence is considered as endowed, and clothes, and furnished as it were, with properties, attributes, and conditions, either divine or human." QUEN. (III, 333): "En morphe theou uparchon. The particle uparchon is here very emphatic, showing (1) that Christ did not take upon Himself the morphe theou (as it is said that He took upon Himself the morphe doulou), but that He existed in it; (2) that with the morphe theou, Christ is said to have truly possessed at the same time a divine essence and nature; . . . (3) that Christ Jesus, when He had taken upon Himself the morphe doulou, neither laid aside the divine nature itself, nor in any way resigned the morphe theou, but that He did not entirely and fully exercise it, and did not make an ostentatious display of it, but rather that in the form of a servant He ministered to other men, yet in such a way as always to remain uparchon en morphe theou." HOLL. (766): "Ouch orpagmou egesato to einai isa theo.' He did not judge that a public display of the majesty of the almighty and omnipresent God would have the form of robbery, but He held the same secretly, and only when it seemed good to Him sent forth some rays of His form as God. Isa theo,' to act as though equal in glory and majesty to God. Eauton enenose,' by not shedding forth His imparted majesty, but restraining and withholding its full and universal use. Morphe doulou' is not human nature, which Christ, the God-man, not only assumed but possessed, and which by His exaltation He did not lay aside; but it is the state of a servant and a humble condition." QUEN. (II, 335) explains the whole passage thus: "That Christ, from the very first moment of incarnation, could have exercised to its fullest extent the divine glory and majesty imparted to Him according to His human nature, and have acted as God, but that He withheld Himself from its full use, and showed Himself humble, and became obedient to His Heavenly Father, even to the death of the cross." [6] HOLL. (767): "Generally speaking, Christ in the state of self-renunciation abstained from the full, universal, and incessant use of eternal glory, imparted through the personal union to His assumed flesh. John 17:5." (Concerning this passage it is observed: "Glorification does not denote (a) the granting of the possession of glory, for Christ as man already possessed infinite glory before, John 1:14; nor (b) its special employment, which He manifested in certain miracles; (c) but it denotes the enthronization and introduction of Christ as man into His kingdom, which He is to administer with Almighty power.") "Specifically, He suspended and withheld the use of omnipotence (the exercise of which would have hindered Christ's suffering and death of satisfaction for our sins), of omniscience (for He was truly ignorant of the day of final judgment, Matt. 24:36, the barrenness of the figtree, Matt. 21:19, the burial place of Lazarus, John 11:34), of the most abundant wealth (inasmuch as He became poor for us, 2 Cor. 8:9; Matt. 8:20), of omnipresent dominion (John 11:21), and religious worship (inasmuch as He became less than the angels, Heb. 2:7)." GRH. (III, 575) develops the practical side of this doctrine, on the basis of 2 Cor. 8:9: "Christ was rich, because of the true and real communication of divine attributes to the flesh, Col. 2:9; He was rich, because given a name above every name, Heb. 1:4; He was rich, because of the power communicated to govern heaven and earth, Matt. 28:18; He was rich, because of His participation in infinite and divine knowledge, Col. 2:3, and because of the subjection of all things, Matt. 11:26; John 3:35. With these riches, Christ was endowed from the first moment of incarnation, as is shown by the personal union, the working of miracles, and every special demonstration of this majesty and power. But He became poor by His self-renunciation, humiliation, assumption of the form of a servant; hence, as a child of poverty, He is born in a stable, rest in the lap of a poor mother, lies in a poor hut, receives presents of gold from the magi, is presented to the Lord with the offering of doves -- gifts of the poor, is brought up in poverty in the home of His parents, is regarded the son of a poor carpenter, experiences poverty in fasting, is without a home of His own, is stripped of His vesture on the cross, and at length is laid in the sepulchre of another -- all of which pertain to the poverty and self-renunciation of Christ. But by this poverty, He has made us rich. Just as, by His death, He bought for us life, so by His poverty, He has restored to us heavenly riches; and hence, His poverty is described to us as a ground for our joy, Zech. 9:9. The poverty of Christ has earned for us our patrimony, our property in life, our passage money (viaticum) in death, heavenly riches." Then, on Phil. 2:5: "1. The example: Thou shouldst deign to be humble for God's sake, since God deigned to be humble for they sake.' (Augustine.) Christ, without whom nothing was made, humbled Himself, so as to seem almost nothing, while thou boastest immensely, and thinkest thyself something when thou art nothing. How absurd and preposterous it is for the highest sublimity to be humbled, and the lowest worthlessness to want to extol itself! 2. As Christ humbled Himself, God exalted Him; so thou wilt not attain to a lofty station, unless by the path of humility. ariste odos upsoseos e tapeinosis. (Bernard.) As Christ, by His divine nature, was incapable of growth, but by His descent, He found that whereby He could grow; so it is only by humility that an entrance to what is high shall open to thee." [7] HOLL. (775): "Exaltation (uperupsosis, Phil. 2:9; doxasis, John 17:5; stephanosis, Heb. 2:9; enthronismos, Heb. 8:1), actively taken, is defined as the solemn enthronization and inauguration of the revived Christ to the full and perfect employment of the heavenly government and the rule of heaven and earth, especially of the Church." QUEN. (III, 368): "The form of exaltation consists in the laying aside of the servile condition or the form of a servant, and in the full, universal, and uninterrupted employment of the divine majesty, received in the personal union and possessed during the period of self-renunciation. (For in exaltation there was not given to Christ new power, virtue, or majesty, which He did not have before, but there was only conferred upon Him the full power of administering His kingdom, which He had received through the union itself." The principal passage in which the State of Exaltation is described is (besides Ps. 8:6, 7; 110:4; Heb. 2:7; Acts 5:31) the same before referred to viz., Phil. 2:9-11. HOLL. (775): "(a) The particle dio does not denote a meritorious conferring, but a consequence in order. The dio being often cited to prove that by His humiliation, Christ procured merit for Himself, GRH., III, 584, argues that such doctrine would conflict with: 1. The dignity of Christ's person, since, at the very first moment of the incarnation, the human nature was brought into the very person of the Logos, than which nothing higher in glory and dignity can be imagined, Heb. 1:5. 2. The truth of the communication of truly divine gifts. 3. The quality of His merit. For whatever Christ merited in His office, He merited for us, Is. 45:24; Zech. 9:9; John 17:19; 1 Tim. 1:15; 1 Cor. 1:30. 4. The worship due Him in the days of the flesh. For if it were only after the exaltation that worship was due Him, then in the days of His flesh such was not due; and yet often He did not refuse such worship when offered Him. As to the meaning of dio: 1. The humiliation is not described as the meritorious cause of the exaltation, but the exaltation is described as the consequent profit attending the humiliation. For the particles dio and dia touto do not always and everywhere denote the meritorious cause of a thing, but sometimes also the final cause, and more frequently the consequence, whereby one thing is concluded from another. Cf. Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:5; Mark 7:29; Rom. 2:1; 2 Cor. 4:13; 6:17; Eph. 4:8, 25; Heb. 1:9. 2. Compare the parallel passage, Luke 24:29. The order, therefore, was divinely appointed, that Christ by His passion, and after His passion, should enter into glory. Heb. 2:9, 10, where dia to pathema, daa pathematon, cannot refer to a meritorious cause. The dio, compounded of the pronoun o and the proposition dia must be rendered wherefore, so that the order and consequence, but not the effect of the merit, are indicated. 4. Charizesai, "to give gratuitously," excludes the idea of merit. 5. The scope of the argument is not to inculcate confidence in merit, but to commend the pursuit of humility, so that we may expect from God the gratuitously bestowed advantages consequent upon humility. (b) The bestower of glory is God the Father, John 17:7; Rom. 6:4." (Yet only by way of pre-eminence, as the original source; otherwise, it is an act of the entire Trinity, and we can also say, "The Son raised Himself from the dead." John 2:19.) "(c) uperupsosis, following self-renunciation and humiliation, . . . implies, in place of the emptying of the form of God, the full employment of the form of God; in place of the hiding of those things which are equal with God, their public manifestation; in place of the assumption of the form of a servant, the laying aside of the same, and the administration of universal dominion. (d) The giving of a name above every name, marks the conferring of the highest glory, than which none that is more lofty can be named, and which, with respect to its fullest use, has been presented to Christ by means of exaltation. (e) The consequence of the glory bestowed is the subjection of all creatures, represented by the bowing of the knee. Ps. 97:7; Rev. 5:13; John 14:13; James 2:19; 10:17. What was said of the humiliation is equally true of the exaltation, viz.: "(1) That this term is not employed in an ecclesiastical sense, for the bringing up of humanity into the person of the logos, and therefore, as a consequence, the impartation of divine grounds of glorying (auchemata);" but "in a biblical sense, as it denotes the universal glorification of Christ, who has been freed from death;" (2) That the exaltation has reference only to the human nature of Christ. CHMN. (de duab. nat., 218) thus contrasts the terms, incarnation, humiliation, and exaltation: "Accordingly it is from this also manifest, that a confusion of articles of faith cannot occur, but that they are and remain distinct, and that each contains something peculiar to itself. For in incarnation there occurred a hypostatic union of the Godhead of the logos, with assumed humanity, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwelt personally from the first moment of conception. But by reason of self-renunciation, its employment and manifestation were for a time postponed, and, as it were, suspended, so that it did not exercise itself through the assumed humanity immediately and always. Moreover, by the ascension, infirmities being laid aside and self-renunciation removed, He left the mode of life according to the conditions of this world, and departed from the world. Moreover, by sitting at the Right Hand of God, He entered upon the full and public employment and display of the power, virtue, and glory of the Godhead, which, from the beginning of the union, dwelt personally in all its fulness in the assumed nature; so that He no longer, as in self-renunciation, withholds, withdraws, and, as it were, hides Himself, but clearly, manifestly, and gloriously exercises it in, with, and through the assumed human nature." [8] HOLL. (768): "The state of self-renunciation lasted from the first moment of conception to the last moment of rest in the sepulchre." QUEN. (III, 367): "The beginning of the exaltation (terminus a quo), and that through which it was attained, is the preceding passion and self-renunciation. The limit to which (terminus ad quem) is infinite glory and majesty (John 17:5; Eph. 1:20; Phil. 2:9, 10), here considered with reference to their employment and distinct degrees." [9] The doctrine, as here stated is not so clearly set forth in the FORM. CONC. This asserts, indeed, very decidedly, that Christ, already here upon earth, was in possession of the divine glory, even according to His human nature; but, along with passages in which it is said that Christ, during His life upon earth, renounced the exercise of this glory, there are also others in which a renunciation is not mentioned. To passages of the former kind belong the following: FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 26): "From this union and communion of natures, the human nature possesses, since the resurrection from the dead, that exaltation over all creatures in heaven and on earth, which is really nothing else than that Christ entirely laid aside the form of a servant, and yet did not lay aside the human nature, but retains it to all eternity, and that, according to His assumed human nature, He was raised to the full possession and use of divine majesty. Moreover, He had this majesty immediately at His conception, even in the womb of His mother; but, as the Apostle (Phil. 2:8) says, He humbled (exinanivit) Himself,' and, as Luther teaches, in the state of His humiliation He possessed it secretly, and did not always make use of it, but only so often as seemed good to Him. But now, since He has ascended to heaven, not in a common manner, as any other saint, but as the Apostle (Eph. 4:10) testifies, He ascended up far above all heavens," and really fills all things,' and, everywhere present, not only as God, but also as man, He rules and reigns from sea to sea and to the ends of the earth." FORM. CONC. (Ep. 16): "And this majesty, by reason of the personal union, Christ always possessed, but in the state of His humiliation He humbled (exinanivit) Himself, and, for this reason, truly grew in age, wisdom, and favor with God and men. Wherefore, He exercised this majesty not always, but as often as seemed good to Him, until, after His resurrection, He fully and entirely laid aside the form of a servant, but not human nature, and was invested with the full employment, manifestation, and declaration of divine majesty, and in this manner entered into His glory. (Phil. 2:6, sq.) Therefore, now, not only as God, but as man also, He knows all things, can do all things, is present to all creatures, and has under His feet and in His hand all things that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. (Matt. 28:18; John 13:3; Eph. 4:10.)" FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 65): "But, in the state of humiliation, this majesty of human nature was for the greater part concealed, and, as it were, kept secret." To the second class (Sol. Dec., VIII, 73): "But this certainly does not occur in such a manner, that as man He knows and can accomplish only some things; just as other saints, by the power of the Holy Ghost, know and can accomplish certain things. For, since Christ, by reason of His Divinity, is the Second Person in the Holy Trinity, and from Him, no less than from the Father, the Holy Ghost proceeds, . . . undoubtedly, through the hypostatic union, the entire fulness of the Spirit has been imparted to Christ, according to the flesh, which has been personally united to the Son of God. Moreover, this exerts its entire power most freely in and with the human nature of Christ, and through it; not in such a manner as that Christ, according to His human nature, knows only some things and is ignorant of others, and can accomplish certain things yet cannot accomplish others; but even now, according to His assumed human nature, He knows and can accomplish all things . . . 75. Moreover, it is manifest from history that there was a sect called Agnoetae, because they imagined that the Son, as the Word of the Father, indeed knew all things, but that His assumed nature was ignorant of many things. This heresy also Gregory the Great refuted." The FORM. CONC. was still undecided in regard to this topic, because the Dogmaticians of that day were not agreed upon it. Some, following BRENZ (De divina majestate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ad dextram Dei patris et de vera praesentia corporis et sanguinis ejus in coena, 1562) asserted that Christ, even in the state of humiliation, was not only in possession of the divine glory, but also exercised it here, only not openly. ("He lay dead in the sepulchre, in humiliation; living, He governed heaven and earth, in majesty; and this, indeed, during the time of His humiliation, before His resurrection.") The others followed CHMN. (De duabus naturis in Christo, 1570), who, it is true, also ascribed the possession of divine glory to Christ, but taught a partial renunciation of the use of it during His life upon earth. ("The human nature, in the first moment of the union, received and possessed the majesty, the fulness of the Deity, but during the time of the humiliation did not always exercise and use it.") The FORM. CONC. did not deem it necessary to express a decided judgment upon the question. Later (1619), the question was again started, and a controversy arose between the Theologians of Giessen and those of Tübingen. The starting point was the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ (comp. § 33, note 20, near the end). The Tübingen theologians (L. OSIANDER, NIKOLAI, and THUMMIUS) were of the opinion that the omnipresence of Christ was so strictly an immediate consequence of the personal union, that the flesh of Christ was to be regarded as omnipresent from the moment of His conception; and they defined the omnipresence as an absolute presence (nuda adessentia) or propinquity to creatures, by which He was closely present to all creatures. They assumed, therefore, an absolute omnipresence (in the sense in which BR. (com. § 33, note 20) had denied it). This opinion, then, had its influence upon the doctrine of the state of humiliation and exaltation. Omnipresence, considered as a mere nearness, was necessarily predicated also of the human nature of Christ, as it was an immediate consequence of the personal union, and there could be no question as to the use or renunciation of it; and then, too, dominion could not readily be denied to the same nature to which uninterrupted nearness was ascribed. Hence, they maintained that there was a difference only in the manner in which Christ exercised this dominion, in one way in the state of humiliation, and in another in the state of exaltation. The only difference between the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation they held to be, that in the former Christ exercised this dominion in the form of a servant, hidden from the eyes of the world, and in the latter, openly and in a form corresponding to His majesty. ("They taught, that Christ in His humiliation governed heaven and earth, in the same way that He exercises this government in the state of exaltation, sitting at the right hand of the Father; with only this difference, that in the state of humiliation He covered and concealed that government under the form of a servant, but now, having laid aside that servile condition, He declares and manifests the same gloriously and majestically." According to this theory of the Tübingen Theologians, there was, therefore, no kenosis (renunciation) in the proper sense of the word, but merely a krupsis (concealment); for the divine dominion, according to this view, was exercised also during the state of humiliation by the human nature, only in a secret manner, not perceptible to men (hence also from the statement: "That Christ, according to His human nature, already from the first moment of His conception sat at the Right Hand of the Father, not indeed in a gloriously majestic manner, but without that and in the form of a servant"); and the assumption of the form of a servant and of human infirmities on the part of Christ, could not be explained, though the Tübingen theologians wished to do so, as such a real kenosis, or self-renunciation. According to this theory, also, the same exaltation, which, according to the other, did not take place until after the resurrection of Christ, was assumed as existing at once from the moment of the incarnation ("That, most strictly speaking, there is one exaltation, and only one, most perfectly accomplished in the moment of the assumption, which (by reason of His essence) could not be greater and more exalted; but that the later meaning of the exaltation (i.e., the exaltation of Christ following His resurrection) was not the new addition of dignity and excellence, but the majesty previously given and communicated in the moment of the assumption and union, covered over in the state of humiliation, and veiled under the form of a servant, but in the state of exaltation abundantly revealed, uncovered, manifested, and demonstrated before the inhabitants of heaven and all other creatures"). And the only difference between the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation was this, that in the two the manner of the exercise of the divine majesty was different. ("That the exaltation, following upon the resurrection of Christ from the dead and His ascension into heaven, did not confer anything upon Christ, in His humanity, but only the mode of something, i.e., that Christ, restored to life as man, and exalted at the Right Hand of God, did not indeed attain the full use of the divine majesty in the government of the world, but merely received a new mode of government, viz., one majestically glorious and manifest; for, in the state of humiliation, He had been as to His person ignominious and obscure.") This view was opposed by the theologians of GIESSEN (MENZER and FEUERBORN), who adopted that of CHEMNITZ. The question at issue was this: "Whether the man Christ, having been taken into union with God, during the state of His humiliation governed, as a present king, all things, though in secret?" This question the Giessen theologians denied, and those of Tübingen affirmed. In the case of the former, the doctrine naturally assumed a different aspect in consequence of a different conception of omnipresence. They rejected absolute omnipresence; therefore they did not assume that Christ, according to His human nature, in the state of humiliation, was present to all creatures; but defined omnipresence as a divine work. ("They held that the idea of a work belongs to the definition of omnipresence and to its constitutive character, as they call it, and that the essential part is, that Christ, in His humiliation, did not exhibit Himself as present in the same sense as that held by the Tübingen theologians." COTTA, Diss. II, in GRH., Loc. IV, 62.) According to their view, there followed from the personal union only this, that the real possession of the divine attributes belonged to the human nature of Christ; but the use which the human nature made of them they inferred, not so much from the personal union as rather from the divine will. The personal union did not, therefore, seem to them as if dissolved, when the human nature made no use of these divine attributes; just as they also believed that, without detriment to the personal union, they could assume that the divine nature of Christ was intimately present to creatures at all times, but not so the human nature. QUEN. (III, 187): "Although, during the whole period of the humiliation, the divine nature of the Word was present to all creatures, so that meanwhile the human nature, taken into union with God was not present, but was very far removed, even in its substantial nearness, from those creatures to whom the logos was present; nevertheless, the union is not broken, the person is not divided, the natures are not separated." They also believed themselves, therefore, not to be hindered by the previously prevalent assumption, that Christ, according to His human nature, had for a season renounced the use and exercise of the divine dominion; and they maintained that Christ, according to His divine nature, exercised dominion over the world until the completion of His work of redemption, without His human nature taking any part therein. According to their theory, moreover, the exaltation was real (as indeed the positive statements of the Holy Scriptures seemed to them to demand) in such a sense that, not until it occurred, therefore not until the resurrection, did the human nature obtain the full use and the full exercise of the divine dominion; whereby, however, it was not meant to deny that the human nature partially, and by way of exception, as in the performance of miracles, made use of this dominion (which feature was made especially prominent by the Saxon theologians). The difference between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation they held to be this, that the human nature did not assume the full use of the divine dominion until the introduction of the latter. By this means, they thought to avoid the absurdities that followed from the views of the Tübingen theologians, according to whose theory it must be held that, at the time when Christ was lying in the cradle and in the grave, or hanging upon the cross, He was also, according to His human nature, filling all things and present everywhere and to all creatures. After the decision (1624) pronounced by the Saxon theologians, which in the main was favorable to the Giessen theologians, those of Tübingen modified their views in this direction, in this one point, that they also admitted a humiliation in a literal sense, with reference to the functions of the sacerdotal office, in accordance with which, therefore, Christ, in relation to these, renounced the use of the divine glory during His passion and death, and in connection with everything that He did in behalf of the work of redemption. But this difference still continued between the two parties, that the Tübingen theologians, adhering to their former opinion, so far as the prophetic and the regal offices are concerned, regarded the humiliation as a mere occultation, and characterized it as only exceptional, when Christ, during His life upon earth, in certain cases renounced the exercise of the dominion belonging to His human nature; while the Giessen divines, in direct opposition to this view, considered it exceptional, when Christ, during His life upon earth, made use, on the part of His human nature, of the right of divine majesty that belonged to Him. The controversy was interrupted by the Thirty Years' War, but the succeeding theologians adopted the views of the Giessen and Saxon theologians, as above stated, with the exception of some of those of Tübingen, who afterwards, indeed, attached no great importance to the controversy, but still favored the doctrinal tendency of their University (comp. COTTA, Diss. II, GRH., in Loc. Th., IV). A full discussion of this doctrine and description of the controversies connected with it may be found in QUEN. III, 389, sq. and THOMASIUS: "The Person and Work of Christ," Part II, second edition, 1857, p. 429. [10] QUEN. (III, 338): "The self-renunciation of Christ in general consists of two acts, viz., the abdication of the full and universal use of imparted majesty, and the assumption of the form of a servant. This form or condition of a servant, in turn, includes under it certain acts in which it was most clearly manifest." Other distributions than those given in the text are as follows: GRH. (I, 361): "Conception, the being borne about in the womb, birth, growth in age and wisdom, obedience in the form of a servant even to the death of the cross, which was followed by burial." KG. (161): "Conception, birth, suffering, abandonment, death, burial." QUEN., as KG., only he adds thereto: "Subjection to the Law in circumcision." BR., as HOLL., only he omits circumcision. [11] HOLL. (769): "We now are considering this not absolutely, with respect to itself, but in so far as it pertains to the state of self-renunciation, or, in so far as the flesh of Christ, although not of male seed, was nevertheless formed in the womb of woman; in connection with which it is certain that some infirmities occur." GRH. (I, 361): "From the fact which I have mentioned, that conception, and the being borne about in the womb, and birth from the womb of His mother, belong to the state of self-renunciation, if we reflect, it can be understood that Adam was a true man, who, nevertheless, was neither conceived in the womb nor born from the womb of a mother; therefore, in the same manner, the Son of God, without such a conception and birth, could have assumed human nature, but He wished in all things to be made like to His brethren, Heb. 2:17." [12] BR. (483): "In this" (birth) "the fact is especially considered that the fruit of Mary's womb, having passed through the accustomed months of gestation, was thus at length brought to light, in accordance with the common lot of men. But the opinion of some, that Mary brought forth her son while her womb was closed, is uncertain; more certain and manifest are the lowliness of His birth and the humble condition and poverty of His parents." [13] HOLL. (769): "Circumcision is an act of most humble obedience on the part of Christ, by which He not only lay in a very low state of self-renunciation beneath the knife of the circumciser, but also was made subject to the divine Law, although He was the Lord of the Law, Matt. 12:8; Mark 2:28." [14] HOLL. (770): "According to which, Christ voluntarily subjected Himself to the care of His father, Joseph, and the commands of His mother, Mary, Luke 2:51." [15] BR. (484): "He was made subject to the magistracy and regarded equal or inferior to others; for the purpose of satisfying hunger and thirst, He ate and drank ; being wearied, He slept, and endured the troubles of labors and journeys, dangers, temptations, sadness, poverty, reproaches, etc." [16] BR. (484): "Especially the aggregation of afflictions which Christ suffered during the period of two days before His death; in connection with which the forsaking, mentioned in Matt. 27:46, is especially to be regarded. Manifestly Christ was forsaken, not indeed as though either the bond of the personal union were broken, or He had been altogether rejected from the face of God, never to be taken back again into grace, nor that He, actually and properly speaking, despaired; but that, in that greatest accumulation of evils, because of the sins of men imputed to Him, He, while bearing the part of all sinners, so felt the wrath of God, or that God was estranged from Him, that He felt no comfort within Himself from the fulness of the indwelling "Godhead. In this manner, also, that must be understood which is elsewhere said, viz., that Christ bore the pains of hell." [17] QUEN. (III, 360): "Its formal nature consists in the true, voluntary and local separation of the soul from the body (Luke 23:43, 46), the bond of the personal union meanwhile remaining unimpaired. From the dissolution of the soul from the body the dissolution of the union of the two natures in Christ is not to be inferred. For, although the natural union between the soul and body was broken, yet the personal union existing between the logos and the assumed nature was not separated, but the divine nature in Christ remained truly united to the soul, which then was in heaven, and truly united to the body in the sepulchre. Even in death, the logos, I say, remained a suppositum [19] of parts physically separated, namely of body and soul. The entire divine nature was in the separated soul, and the entire divine nature was in the body left upon earth, without any division or distention, as either of these would conflict with a divine nature." HOLL. (772): "The passion and death of Christ were true, not imaginary; voluntary, not forced; undertaken not by accident, but according to a certain plan and purpose of God; bloody and ignominious; vicarious; meritorious, and satisfactory." [18] HOLL. (776): "Zoopoiesis, or quickening, is Christ's liberation from death and the reunion of soul and body, by which Christ, according to His flesh, began to come again to life. This is not a peculiar grade of exaltation, but a prerequisite condition for preparing the subject, namely, Christ, to receive the full and universal use of divine majesty." [19] HOLL. (776): "The revived Christ exercised His divine majesty through certain clearly marked grades: (1) by descending ad inferos, He exhibited Himself alive to the wicked spirits and condemned men as the conqueror of death; (2) by rising again, He declared to the apostles, and, through them, to the entire world, that through His death He had made satisfaction to divine justice; (3) by ascending to heaven, He showed angels and blessed men that He was the conqueror not only of death, but also of wicked spirits, and the Savior of men; (4) by sitting at the Right Hand of God, He exercises most full and universal dominion over all creatures that are in the kingdom of power, of grace, and of glory." As the exaltation was completed with the sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, HFRFFR. (339), instead of assuming degrees of exaltation, as others do, distinguishes (1) "the State of Glorification into which Christ entered after His resurrection, when, laying aside the infirmities of human nature, He was transferred to the condition of glorified bodies," and (2) "the State of Majesty of Christ as a man, into which, after His glorious ascension into heaven, He was transferred, being placed at the Right Hand of God the Father." [20] QUEN. (III, 373): "The moment of time of the descent is, according to 1 Peter 3:19, the time that intervened between the quickening and the resurrection of Christ, properly so called." To the assertion, that the descent preceded the resurrection, and therefore did not succeed the vivifying, HOLL. (668) replies: "A distinction must be made between an outward and an inner resurrection. The former is the going forth from the sepulchre, and the outward appearance to men, and is described in the Apostles' Creed; the latter is the quickening itself." [21] HOLL. (778): "Christ descended into hell, not for the purpose of suffering any evil from the demons (John 19:30; Luke 24:26), but to triumph over the demons (Rev. 1:18; Col. 2:15), and to convince condemned men that they were justly shut up in the infernal prison, 1 Peter 3:19. The preaching of Christ in hell was not evangelical, which is proclaimed to men only in the kingdom of grace; but legal, accusatory, terrible, and that too, both verbal, by which He convinced them that they had merited eternal punishments, and real, by which He struck frightful terror into them." To the question, "Why did Christ preach in hell to those alone who were unbelieving in the time of Noah?" HOLL. replies (ib.): "(1) Others are not excluded, but these are presented as monstrous examples of impenitence and unparalleled examples of divine judgment; (2) The Apostle especially named these to teach that even the antediluvians ought to have believed in Christ; . . . (3) That the Apostle might pass conveniently from the flood, as a type, to its antitype, baptism." [22] QUEN. (III, 371): "The descent of Christ ad inferos, figuratively taken, is understood either metaphorically, as denoting that most exquisite and truly infernal pain and anguish which, in the time of His passion, Christ felt and bore in His most holy soul, Ps. 16:10; or, by metonymy, as denoting the virtue and efficacy of Christ's passion and death, Zech. 9:11 (as though the sense were, Christ, by His passion and death, effected and purchased by His merit our deliverance and redemption from hell'). But neither signification pertains to this article." HOLL. (777): "But, taken literally, the descensus ad inferos denotes a true and real departure into the place of the damned, inasmuch as Peter (1 Pet. 3:19) calls it a poreia, or going, cf. Matt. 5:25; Rev. 18:2; 20:6; 2 Pet. 2:4." The observation is added: "Although the descent of Christ ad inferos was true and real, yet the motion was not physical or local, but supernatural. For physical and local motion is peculiar to natural bodies; but the revived body of Christ was a glorified body. Nor was the movement successive; it was made, en pneumati, i.e., by divine power, which knows nothing of tedious efforts." [23] QUEN. (III, 372): "Christ, the God-man, and therefore His entire person (and hence not only according to His soul, or only according to His body), after the reunion of soul and body, descended to the very place of the damned, and to the devils and the damned manifested Himself as conqueror. For the descent, since it is a personal action, cannot be ascribed otherwise than to the entire person of the God-man. And, as in the Apostles' Creed it is said of the entire God-man that He suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, so also it is said of the same that He descended into hell." The descent is very naturally, predicated of Christ, the God-man, i.e., it is taught that Christ, the God-man, was for a time in hell; but the descent itself is predicated only of the human nature of Christ. "Christ descended into hell, not according to His divine nature; for, according to this, He was in hell before, filling all things through His dominion . . . . Therefore, Christ descended, according to His human nature. For the predications thanatotheis sark and zoopoietheis, belong to the human nature alone." (QUEN., III, 373.) [24] The doctrine as here set forth belongs to the period of the later Dogmaticians. Until the time of the FORM. CONC., no explanation whatever was attempted of the phrase, "Descendit ad inferos," which was found already in the Apostles' Creed. The FORM. CONC., however, was led to make a statement concerning it, mainly in consequence of controversies originating with the Hamburg Superintendent, JOHN AEPIN (1549). According to him, the descent of Christ was "a part of that entire obedience which He rendered for our redemption." ("The simple and plain confession of AEPIN: I believe that the descent of the soul of Christ to hell was a part of Christ's passion, i.e., of the contests, dangers, difficulties, pains, and punishments, which, for our sake, He took upon Himself and bore; for the reason that, in the Scriptures, to descend into hell means to be involved in extreme and the deepest griefs, pains, and difficulties. I believe that the descent of Christ to hell was a part of His obedience, predicted in the prophets, and imposed upon Him because of our sin.") The descent of Christ is, therefore, "one act of His humiliation, and, indeed, its final stage." ("I believe that the descent of Christ belongs to His humiliation, not to His glorification and triumph . . . . The final grade of this humility and self-renunciation, and the extreme part of the obedience and satisfaction imposed upon Christ by the judgment of God, was His descent to hell.") While the body of Christ lay in the grave, His soul descended into hell; He did not descend with body and soul after their reunion, before the resurrection, but with the soul alone ("Peter clearly teaches, Acts 2, that the soul of Christ, while His body rested in the sepulchre, experienced the pains of death and hell"), and "the descent was not a public act of victory and triumph, but an act of suffering, to which Christ submitted in the same sense in which He subjected Himself to the condemnation of death." ("The testimonies of Scripture nowhere show, by even the least indication, that to descend to hell is to triumph, and that the descent itself is a joyful, glad, splendid, and manifest triumph. There is, therefore, nothing certain and well-established in the caviling of those who contend that the descent of Christ was nothing else than the fierceness, manifest force, and triumph of Christ, by which He utterly crushed, and, with violence, oppressed those in hell.") "Christ has, indeed, destroyed hell for us, and robbed the devil of his power, not, however, by violent destruction or suppression, but by righteousness and obedience; as He conquered and destroyed death by His dying, so also did He the same to hell by His descent into it." ("As Christ did not vanquish death by force and manifest violence, but in death by truly dying, so He overthrows those in hell, not by warlike or glorious