A
dissertation on divine justice:
or,
the claims of vindicatory justice vindicated;
wherein that essential property of the divine nature is demonstrated from the sacred writings, and defended against Socinians, particularly the authors of the Racovian Catechism, John Crellius, and F. Socinus himself;
likewise the necessary exercise thereof;
together with the indispensable necessity of the satisfaction of Christ for the salvation of sinners is established against the objections of certain very learned men, G. Twisse, G. Vossius, Samuel Rutherford, and others.
By John Owen,
Dean of Christ Church College, Oxford.
“Is God unrighteous who taketh
vengeance? God forbid: for then how shall God judge the world?” —
Oxford: Thomas
Robinson.
1653.
This work is
devoted to a refutation of the doctrine that sin could be pardoned by a
mere volition on the part of God, without any satisfaction to his justice;
or, to state the question in the abstract form which it chiefly assumes in
the reasonings of
The Diatriba was
published in Latin. We have compared
The numerous
and valuable writings of
Whoever makes himself master of the Doctor’s reasoning in the following treatise will be able to answer all the objections and cavils of the enemies of the truth therein contended for. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended to the attention and careful perusal of all who wish to obtain right ideas of God, the nature and extent of the divine law, the horrid nature and demerit of sin, etc., but especially to the attention of young divines. The translation, upon the whole, is faithful. If it have any fault, it is perhaps its being too literal.
That it may meet with that reception which it justly merits from the public, and which the importance of the subject demands, is the earnest prayer of the servants in the gospel of Christ,
Had it not been almost a crime for me, holding my present place in this most celebrated university, under your appointment and auspices, to have inscribed any literary production with a dedication to any other name, I would not have held in such poor account the weight of business you sustain as to make an endeavour to divert your thoughts and attention, so constantly directed to the welfare of the commonwealth, to a little by-work of this kind. But since, according to the nature of my office, I am under frequent necessity to address your Highness in the name of literature and of learned men, the affability of your nature will not suffer me to remain under any anxiety but that you will condescend to examine even this humble production of ours. Perhaps the dedication of books to you (amid prevailing “wars and rumours of wars,” and the fury and commotion of parties bent with eagerness on mutual destruction) will seem unseasonable, and not unlike the celebrated abstraction of him who, amid the destruction of his country and the sack of the city to which he belonged, neglecting all concern about his personal safety, was so obstinately bent on learned trifles as to be slain by a soldier while persisting in those pursuits on account of his skill in which the commander had resolved to spare his life. But even Christian authors have their polemics; and these, alas! too much fitted to excite, increase, and promote bloody strife; — such is the blindness, nay, the madness of most men. Even this small piece of ours is polemical, I confess; but it fights by means of weapons not offensive to peace, not imbued with hostility, but appropriate to truth, — namely, by the word of God and reason. In this arena, in this fortress, within this list and limit, if all controversies on divine things took place, no longer, on account of seditions and wars, would religion herself, over all Christendom, be so evil spoken of. The cause I maintain will not be esteemed by many of such consequence that I should contend for it so earnestly. But of how much importance it is in war (for it is a war in which we are engaged, and that a sacred one, with the enemies of truth) to secure a citadel or breast-work, your Excellency knows right well; that it is so to the army of the living God, redeemed and purified by the blood of Christ, whose truth we have undertaken, according to our ability, to defend, any man on serious reflection will easily perceive. Surely we may be permitted to contend for the truth. Some there are who, under pretence of zeal for the gospel, delight to mingle of their own accord in wars, tumults, strifes, and commotion, sufficiently skilled
We pretend, however, to no such eloquence, nor have we so
learned Christ. My
I bow before God, the best and greatest, beseeching him in Jesus Christ that he would continually direct, by his own Spirit, all the counsels, undertakings, and actions of your Highness; that he would turn all these to his own glory, and to the peace, honour, and advantage of the church, commonwealth, and university; and that he would preserve your spirit, in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be honour and glory for ever. This I write under ill health at Oxford, the last day of the year 1652.
The devoted Servant of your Illustrious Highness, and your Vice-Chancellor in this famous University,
As perhaps, learned reader, you will think it strange that
I, who have such abundance of various and laborious employment of another
kind, should think of publishing such a work as this, it may not be
improper to lay before you a summary account of the reasons that induced me
to this undertaking; and I do it the rather that this little production may
escape free from the injurious suspicions which the manners of the times
are but too apt to affix to works of this kind. It is now four months and
upwards since, in the usual course of duty, in defending certain
theological theses in our university, it fell to my lot to discourse and
dispute on the vindicatory justice of God, and the necessity of its
exercise, on the supposition of the existence of sin. Although these
observations were directed, to the best of my abilities, immediately
against the Socinians, yet it was understood that many very respectable
theologians entertained sentiments on this subject very different from
mine; and although the warmest opposers of what we then maintained were
obliged to acknowledge that our arguments are quite decisive against the
adversaries, yet there were not wanting some, who, not altogether agreeing
with us, employed themselves in strictures upon our opinion, and accused it
of error, while others continued wavering, and, in the diversity of
opinions, knew not on which to fix. Much controversy ensuing in
consequence of this, I agreed with some learned men to enter, both in
writings and conversation, upon an orderly and deliberate investigation of
the subject. And after the scruples of several had been removed by a more
full consideration of our opinion (to effect which the following
considerations chiefly contributed, namely, that they clearly saw this
doctrine conduced to the establishment of the necessity of the satisfaction
of Jesus Christ, a precious truth, which these worthy and good men,
partakers of the grace and gift of righteousness through means of the blood
of Christ, not only warmly favoured, but dearly venerated, as the most
honourable Ὑπερτίμιον,
invaluable, unspeakably precious. — Ed.
Besides; several of those who had before examined and were
acquainted with our sentiments, or to whom, in consequence of our short
discourse in the university on the subject, they began to be more
acceptable, — and these, too, considerable both for their number and rank,
— ceased not to urge me to a more close consideration and accurate review
of the controversy; for in that public dissertation, it being confined,
according to the general custom of such exercises in universities, within
the narrow limits of an hour, I could only slightly touch on the nature of
vindicatory justice, whereas the rules and limits of such exercises would
not permit me to enter on the chief point, the great hinge of the
controversy, — namely, concerning the necessary exercise of that justice.
This is the difficulty that requires the abilities of the most judicious
and acute to investigate and solve. In this situation of matters, not only
a more full view of the whole state of the controversy, but likewise of the
weight of those arguments on which the truth of that side of the question
which we have espoused depends, as also an explanation and confutation of
certain subtilties whereby the opponents had embarrassed the minds of some
inquirers after truth, became objects of general request. And, indeed,
such
Although, then, I was more than sufficiently full of employment already, yet, being excited by the encouragement of good men, and fully persuaded in my own mind that the truth which we embrace is so far from being of trivial consequence in our religion, that it is intimately connected with many, the most important articles of the Christian doctrine, concerning the attributes of God, the satisfaction of Christ, and the nature of sin, and of our obedience, and that it strikes its roots deep through almost the whole of theology, or the acknowledging of the truth which is according to godliness; — fully persuaded, I say, of these facts, I prevailed with myself, rather than this doctrine should remain any longer neglected or buried, and hardly even known by name, or be held captive by the reasonings of some enslaving the minds of mankind, “through philosophy and vain deceit,” to exert my best abilities in its declaration and defence.
Several things, however, which, with your good leave, reader, I shall now mention, almost deterred me from the task when begun. The first and chief was, the great difficulty of the subject itself, which, among the more abstruse points of truth, is by no means the least abstruse: for as every divine truth has a peculiar majesty and reverence belonging to it, which debars from the spiritual knowledge of it (as it is in Christ) the ignorant and unstable, — that is, those who are not taught of God, or become subject to the truth, — so those points which dwell in more intimate recesses, and approach nearer its immense fountain, the “Father of lights,” darting brighter rays, by their excess of light present a confounding darkness to the minds of the greatest men (and are as darkness to the eyes, breaking forth amidst so great light):—
For what we call darkness in divine subjects is nothing else than their celestial glory and splendour striking on the weak ball of our eyes, the rays of which we are not able in this life, which “is but a vapour” (and that not very clear), “which appeareth but for a little,” to bear. Hence God himself, who is “light, and in whom there is no darkness at all,” who “dwelleth in light inaccessible,” and who “clotheth himself with light as with a garment,” in respect of us, is said to have made “darkness his pavilion.”
Not, as the Roman Catholics say, that there is any reason
that we should blasphemously accuse the holy Scriptures of obscurity; for
“the law of the Lord is
perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise
the simple: the statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing
the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening
the eyes.” Nor is there reason to complain that any one part of the truth
hath been too sparingly or obscurely revealed: for even the smallest
portion of the divine word is, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, assisting
to dispose and frame either the subject or our hearts, so as to view the
bright object of divine truth in its proper and spiritual light, sufficient
to communicate the knowledge of truths of the last importance; for it is
owing to the nature of the doctrines themselves and their exceeding
splendour that there are some things hard to be conceived and interpreted,
and which surpass our capacity and comprehension. Whether this article of
divine truth which we are now inquiring into be not akin to those which we
have now mentioned, let the learned judge and determine, especially those
who shall reflect what a close connection there is between it and the whole
doctrine concerning the nature of God, the satisfaction of Christ, the
desert of sin, and every one of the dark and more abstruse heads of our
religion. I have, therefore, determined to place my chief dependence on
His aid “who giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth not.” For those
unhappy gentlemen only lose their labour, and may not improperly be
compared to the artists Thereby hastening their own destruction. — Tr. The meaning is, “But to make a most
elaborate display of their ignorance.” — Ed.
Setting aside, then, the consideration of some phrases, and even of some arguments, as to what relates to the principal point of the controversy, I hold myself bound, in conscience and in honour, not even to imagine that I have attained a proper knowledge of any one article of truth, much less to publish it, unless through the Holy Spirit I have had such a taste of it in its spiritual sense, as that I may be able from the heart to say with the psalmist, “I have believed, and therefore have I spoken.” He who, in the investigation of truth, makes it his chief care to have his mind and will rendered subject to the faith, and obedient to the “Father of lights,” and who with attention waits upon Him whose throne is in the heavens; he alone (since the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God) attains to true wisdom, — the others walk in a “vain show.” It has, then, been my principal object, in tracing the depths and secret nature of the subject in question, — while I, a poor worm, contemplated the majesty and glory of Him concerning whose perfections I was treating, — to attend and obey, with all humility and reverence, what the great God the Lord hath spoken in his word; not at all doubting but that, whatever way he should incline my heart, by the power of his Spirit and truth, I should be enabled, in a dependence on his aid, to bear the contradictions of a false knowledge, and all human and philosophical arguments.
And, to say the truth, as I have adopted the opinion which I defend in this dissertation from no regard to the arguments of either one or another learned man, and much less from any slavish attachment to authority, example, or traditionary prejudices, and from no confidence in the opinion or abilities of others, but, as I hope, from a most humble contemplation of the holiness, purity, justice, right, dominion, wisdom, and mercy of God; so by the guidance of his Spirit alone, and power of his heart-changing grace, filling my mind with all the fullness of truth, and striking me with a deep awe and admiration of it, I have been enabled to surmount the difficulty of the research. Theology is the “wisdom that is from above,” a habit of grace and spiritual gifts, the manifestation of the Spirit, reporting what is conducive to happiness. It is not a science to be learned from the precepts of man, or from the rules of arts, or method of other sciences, as those represent it who also maintain that a “natural man” may attain all that artificial and methodical theology, even though, in the matters of God and mysteries of the gospel, he be blinder than a mole. What a distinguished theologian must he be “who receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God!”
But again, having sailed through this sea of troubles Vado isto enavigato, “Having cleared these
shallows.” — Ed.
Having thus surmounted these difficulties, and begun the undertaking by devoting to it a few leisure hours stolen from other engagements, the work prospered beyond all expectation; and, by the favour of the “Father of lights,” who “worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure,” in a few days it was brought to a conclusion.
And now that the labour of composing was ended, I again entertained doubts, and continued for some time in suspense, whether, considering the manners of the times in which we live, it would not be more prudent to throw the papers, with some other kindred compositions on other subjects of divinity, into some secret coffers, there to be buried in eternal oblivion, than bring them forth to public discussion.
For even all know with what vain arrogance, malice, party
spirit, and eager lust of attacking the labours of others, the minds of
many are corrupted and infected. Not only, then, was it necessary that I
should anticipate and digest in my mind the contempt and scoffings which
these bantering, saucy, dull-witted, self-sufficient despisers of others,
or any of such a contemptible race, whose greatest pleasure it is to
disparage all kinds of exertions, however praiseworthy, might pour out
against me; but I likewise foresaw that I should have to contend with the
soured tempers and prejudiced opinions of others, who, being carried away
by party zeal, and roused by the unexpected state and condition of public
affairs, This treatise was written in the time of the
Commonwealth. — Tr.
Since, then, I not only have believed what I have spoken,
but as both my own heart and God, who is greater than my heart, are
witnesses that I have engaged in this labour for the truth under the
influence of the most sacred regard and
There are, no doubt, many other portions and subjects of
our religion, of that blessed trust committed to us for our instruction, on
which we might dwell with greater pleasure and satisfaction of mind. Such,
I mean, as afford a more free and wider scope of ranging through the most
pleasant meads of the holy Scripture and contemplating in these the
transparent fountains of life and rivers of consolation; subjects which,
unencumbered by the thickets of scholastic terms and distinctions,
unembarrassed by the impediments and sophisms of an enslaving philosophy or
false knowledge, sweetly and pleasantly lead into a pure, unmixed, and
delightful fellowship with the Father and with his Son, shedding abroad in
the heart the inmost loves of our Beloved, with the odour of his sweet
ointment poured forth. This truth, [however, which is under our
consideration], likewise has its uses, and such as are of the greatest
importance to those who are walking in the way of holiness and evangelical
obedience. A brief specimen and abstract [A few crumbs of these, by way of
specimen are] added, etc. “Abstract” conveys a widely different idea from
ἀποσπασμὰτα, — Ed.
There can be no doubt but that many points of doctrine still remain, on which the labours of the godly and learned may be usefully employed: for although many reverend and learned divines, both of the present and former age, [from the time, at least, when God vouchsafed to our fathers that glorious regeneration, or time of reformation, of a purer religion and of sound learning, after a long reign of darkness,] have composed from the sacred writings a synopsis, or methodical body, of doctrine or heavenly truth, and published their compositions under various titles; and although other theological writings, catechetical, dogmatical, exegetical, casuistical, and polemical, have increased to such a mass that the “world can hardly contain the books that have been written;” yet such is the nature of divine truth, so deep and inexhaustible the fountain of the sacred Scriptures, whence we draw it, so innumerable the salutary remedies and antidotes proposed in these to dispel all the poisons and temptations wherewith the adversary can ever attack either the minds of the pious or the peace of the church and the true doctrine, that serious and thinking men can entertain no doubt but that we perform a service praise-worthy and profitable to the church of Christ, when, under the direction of “the Spirit of wisdom and revelation, we bring forward, explain, and defend the most important and necessary articles of evangelical truth.
But to be more particular: how sparingly, for instance,
yea, how obscurely, how confusedly, is the whole economy of the Spirit
towards believers (one of the greatest mysteries of our religion, — a most
invaluable portion of the salvation brought about for us by Christ)
described by divines in general! or rather, by the most, is it not
altogether neglected? In their catechisms, common-place books, public and
private theses, systems, compends, etc., even in their commentaries,
harmonies, and
For almost from the very period in which they were capable
of judging even of the first principles of religion, “Ab ipsis ferè religionis nostræ cunis et
primordiis.” Surely the rendering above is a wide deviation from
The exertions of Satan against the truth of the gospel may be distinguished into two divisions. In the first, as the god of this world, he endeavours to darken the minds of unbelievers, “that the light of the glorious gospel of Christ may not shine unto them.” With what success he exercises this soul-destroying employment we cannot pretend to say; but there is reason to lament that he hath succeeded, and still succeeds, beyond his utmost hope. In the other, he carries on an implacable war, an unremitting strife; not, as formerly, with Michael about the body of Moses, but about the Spirit of Christ, about some of the more distinguished articles of the truth, and the application of each of them in order to cultivate communion with God the Father, and with his Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, — against the hearts of the godly and the new creature formed within them.
In this situation of affairs, most Christian writers have made it their study to oppose that first effort of the devil, whereby, through means of his instruments, he openly endeavours to suppress the light, both natural and revealed; but they have not been equally solicitous to succour the minds of believers when wrestling, “not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places,” and almost ready to sink under the contest. Hence, I say, a very minute investigation hath been set on foot by many of those articles of religion which he has openly, through the instrumentality of the slaves of error and darkness, attacked, and the vindication of them made clear and plain. But those which, both from their relation to practice and a holy communion, full of spiritual joy, to be cultivated with God, the old serpent hath reserved for his own attack in the hearts of believers, most writers, (partly either because they were ignorant of his wiles, or because they saw not much evil publicly arising thence, and partly because the arguments of the adversary were not founded on any general principle, but only to be deduced from the private and particular state and case of individuals,) have either passed over or very slightly touched upon.
For while they are warmly employed in disputing whether
theology be an art or a science, and whether it be a speculative or
practical art or science; and while they attempt to measure it exactly by
those rules, laws, and methods which human reason has devised for other
sciences, thus endeavouring to render it more plain and clear, — they find
themselves, to the grief and sorrow of many candidates for the truth,
entangled in inextricable difficulties, and left in possession only of a
human system of doctrines, having little or no connection at all with true
theology. The full sentence in the original runs in the following
terms:— “Not a few wooers of truth having followed their guidance, grieve
and lament how they have strayed in their whole course, after finding
themselves pushed into inextricable difficulties, (like that old man in
Terence who was directed by a villain of a slave backward and forward, by
steeps, and precipices, and obscure corners, to land at length in a narrow
alley with no thoroughfare,) and left in possession only of a human
system of doctrine, having scarcely any thing in common with true
theology.” — Ed. See
As to the work that I have now in hand, the first part of
the dissertation is concerning the cause of the death of Christ;
and in the execution of which I have the greatest pleasure and satisfaction
(though proudly defied by the adversaries, so conceited with themselves and
their productions are they), because “I have determined to know nothing but
Jesus Christ and him crucified,” — at least, nothing that could divert my
attention from that subject. This paragraph is neither correctly
rendered nor consistent with fact. The whole paragraph stands thus in the
original:— “As to the work now in hand it is the first part of a
dissertation concerning the causes of the death of Christ; to
which I willingly apply because I have determined to know nothing but Jesus
Christ, and him crucified: though sadly provoked to turn my thoughts in
another direction by the insolent haughtiness of adversaries, who cannot
think highly enough of themselves and their productions; — a sort of
persons than whom none are more silly, or held more cheap by wise and
thoughtful men.”
But now, learned reader, lest, as the saving is, “the gate should become wider than the city,” if you will bear with me while I say a few things of myself, however little worthy of your notice, I shall immediately conclude the preface.
About two years ago, the parliament of the commonwealth
promoted me, while diligently employed, according to the measure of the
gift of grace bestowed on me, in preaching the gospel, by their authority
and influence, though with reluctance on my part, to a chair in the very
celebrated university of Oxford. I mean not to relate what various
employments fell to my lot from that period; what frequent journeys I
became engaged in; not, indeed, expeditions of pleasure, or on my own or
private account, but such as the unavoidable necessities of the university,
and the commands of superiors, whose authority was not be gainsaid, imposed
upon me. And now I clearly found that I, who dreaded almost every
academical employment, as being unequal to the task (for what could be
expected from a man not far advanced in years, who had for several years
been very full of employment, and accustomed only to the popular mode of
speaking; who, being altogether devoted to the investigation and
explanation of the saving grace of God through Jesus Christ, had for some
time taken leave of all scholastic studies; whose genius is by no means
quick, and who had even forgot, in some measure, the portion of polite
learning that he might have formerly acquired, and at a time, too, when I
had
For, to mention first what certainly is most weighty and important, the task of lecturing in public was put upon me; which would, strictly and properly, require the whole time and attention even of the most grave and experienced divine; and in the discharge of which, unless I had been greatly assisted and encouraged by the candour, piety, submission, and self-denial of the auditors, and by their respect for the divine institution and their love of the truth, with every kind of indulgence and kind attention towards the earthen vessel, which distinguish most academicians, of every rank, age, and description, beyond mankind in general, I should have long ago lost all hope of discharging that province, either to the public advantage or my own private satisfaction and comfort.
And as most of them are endowed with a pious disposition and Christian temper, and well furnished with superior gifts, and instructed in learning of every kind, — which, in the present imperfect and depraved state of human nature, is apt to fill the minds of men with prejudices against “the foolishness of preaching,” and to disapprove “the simplicity that is in Christ,” — I should be the most ungrateful of mankind were I not to acknowledge that the humility, diligence, and alacrity with which they attended to and obeyed the words of the cross, indulging neither pride of heart, nor animosity of mind, nor itching of ears, though dispensed by a most unworthy servant of God in the gospel of his Son, have given, and still give me great courage in the discharge of the different duties of my office.
The most merciful Father of all things shall, in his
infinite wisdom and goodness, dispose of the affairs of our university.
Reports, however, are everywhere spread abroad concerning the abolition and
destruction of the colleges, and efforts for that purpose made by some who,
being entire strangers to every kind of literature, or at least ignorant of
every thing of greater antiquity than what their own memory or that of
their fathers can reach, and regardless of the future, imagine the whole
globe and bounds of human knowledge to be contained within the limits of
their own little cabins, ignorant whether the sun ever shone beyond their
own little island or not, — “neither knowing what they say nor whereof they
affirm;” and by others who are deeply sunk in the basest of crimes, and who
would, therefore, wish all light distinguishing between good and evil
entirely extinguished (for “evil doers hate the light, nor do they come to
the light, lest their deeds should be reproved”), that they (mean lurchers
hitherto) may “fill up the measure of their iniquity” with some kind of
eclat. With this faction are combined those who, never having become
candidates for literature themselves, yet, by pushing themselves forward,
have unseasonably thrust themselves into such services and offices as
necessarily require knowledge and learning. These, I say, like the fox
which had lost his tail, would wish all the world deprived of the means of
knowledge, lest their own shameful ignorance, despicable indolence, and
total unfitness for the offices which they solicit or hold, should appear
to all who have the least degree of understanding and sense. And lastly,
too, [the same reports are spread] by a despicable herd of prodigal, idle
fellows, eagerly gaping for the revenues of the university. I could not,
therefore, but give such a public testimony, as a regard to truth and duty
required from me, to these very respectable and learned men (however much
these treacherous calumniators and falsifying sycophants may rail and show
their teeth upon the occasion), the heads of the colleges, who have merited
so highly of the church [and of the commonwealth], for their distinguished
candour, great diligence, uncommon erudition, blameless politeness; “Inculpatæ πολιτείας,” — rather, “Blameless administration.” —
Ed.
Relying, then, on the humanity, piety, and candour of such
men (who may be “afflicted, but not straitened; persecuted, but not
forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed;” who carry about with them the life
and death of the Lord Jesus Christ), though destitute of all strength of my
own, and devoting myself entirely to Him “who furnisheth seed to the
sower,” and who “from the mouths of babes and sucklings ordaineth
strength,” who hath appointed Christ a perpetual source of help, and who
furnishes a seasonable aid to every pious effort, — I have, in conjunction
with my very learned colleague
But not on this account alone would I have been reluctant
to return, after so long an interval of time, to this darling university;
but another care, another office, and that by far the most weighty, was, by
the concurring voice of the senate of the university, and notwithstanding
my most earnest requests to the contrary, entrusted and assigned to me, and
by the undertaking of which I have knowingly and wittingly compounded with
the loss of my peace and all my studious pursuits. In the year 1651
Such, candid reader, is the account of the author of the following little treatise, and of his situation when composing it; a man not wise in the estimation of others, — in his own, very foolish; first called from rural retirement and the noise of arms to this university, and very lately again returned to it from excursions in the cause of the gospel, not only to the extremities of this island, but to coasts beyond the seas, and now again deeply engaged in the various and weighty duties of his station. Whether any thing exalted or refined can be expected from such a person is easy for any one to determine.
With regard to our manner of writing, or Latin diction, as some are wont to acquire great praise from their sublimity of expression, allow me but a word or two. Know, then, reader, that you have to do with a person who, provided his words but clearly express the sentiments of his mind, entertains a fixed and absolute disregard for all elegance and ornaments of speech; for, —
In my opinion, indeed, he who, in a theological contest, should please himself with the idea of displaying rhetorical flourishes, would derive no other advantage therefrom but that his head, adorned with magnificent verbose garlands and pellets, would fall a richer victim to the criticisms of the learned.
But whatever shall be the decision of the serious and judicious with respect to this treatise, if I shall any how stir up an emulation in others, on whom the grace of God may have bestowed more excellent gifts, to bring forward to public utility their pious, solid, and learned labours, and shall excite them, from their light, to confer light on the splendour of this university, I shall be abundantly gratified. Farewell, pious reader, and think not lightly of him who hath used his most zealous endeavours to serve thy interest in the cause of the gospel.
A dissertation on divine justice
This word commonly means a previous and concise view of a subject, or an anticipation of objections. In this treatise it means a natural or innate conception of divine justice. — Tr. [See note on page 517. — Ed.]
In this
treatise we are to discourse of God and of his justice, the most
illustrious of all the divine perfections, but especially of his
vindicatory justice; The Word in the original means either to claim and assert
a right, or to punish the violation of it. By “vindicatory justice,” then,
we are to understand that perfection of the Deity which disposes him to
vindicate his right by punishing its violators. It ought never to be
translated vindictive, or understood as meaning revengeful. — Tr. [Though Πολὺς ταραγμὸς ἔν τε τοῖς
θεοῖς ἔνι. —Eurip. Iphig. in Taur. 572. Or justice. — Tr.
In almost all ages there have existed some who have denied
the being of a God, although but very few, and these the most
abandoned. “Nullos unquam fuisse aut
esse posse ἀθέους proprie dictos et speculative, seu plene
persuasos, agnoscunt pene omnes.” — Vid. “Veritatis argumentum est omnibus aliquid videri tanquam
deos esse, quod omnibus de diis opinio insita sit, neque ulla gens usquam
est, adeo extra leges moresque posita ut non aliquos Deos credat.”
— A sudden, unconnected exclamation. — Tr.
But as “the judgments of God are unsearchable, and his ways
past finding out,”
Beyond any doubt, the audacity of those abandoned triflers,
who would wish to seem to act the mad part with a show of reason, is more
akin to the madness of atheism than to the folly of ascribing A slight
alteration seems needed to elicit the real meaning, — “than to folly, in
ascribing,” etc. “Cur
bonis mala fiant, cum sit providentia.” — “Illos qui nullum esse
Deum dixerunt non modo philosophos, sed ne homines quidem esse dixerim, qui
brutis simillimi solo corpere constiterunt, nihil omnino cernentes animo,
sed ad sensum corporis cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabunt esse nisi quod
oculis tuebuntur.” —
The philosopher
But he says that particular justice is a part thereof under
the same That which relates to
fair exchange. — Tr. Lombard., lib. iv. dist. 46; Thom. ii. 2, ti. 51; Analogy means a resemblance between things with regard to
some qualities or circumstances, properties or effects, though not in all.
— Tr.
but is understood as existing in God principally, as in the
first analogised That is, the first being whose perfections have been
explained by analogy, or by tracing a resemblance between these perfections
and something like them in ourselves, in kind or sort, though differing
infinitely with respect to manner and degree. — Tr.
But, farther, they assert that particular justice, in
respect of its exercise, consists either in what is said or in
what is done. That which is displayed in things said, in
commands, is equity; in declarations, truth; — both which the holy
Scriptures
I say, then, that the justice of God may be considered in a twofold manner:— First, Absolutely, and in itself. Secondly, In respect of its egress and exercise.
First, The justice of God, absolutely considered,
is the universal rectitude and perfection of the divine nature;
for such is the divine nature antecedent to all acts of his will and
suppositions of objects towards which it might operate. This excellence is
most universal; nor, from its own nature, as an excellence, can it
belong Or, have a respect to any other being. — Tr.
Secondly, It is to be viewed with respect to its egress
and exercise. And thus, in the order of nature, it is considered as
consequent, Conditional. — Tr.
That is to say, this rectitude, or universal justice, has certain egresses towards objects out of itself, in consequence of the divine will, and in a manner agreeable to the rule of his supreme right and wisdom, — namely, when some object of justice is supposed and appointed (which object must necessarily depend on the mere good pleasure of God, because it was possible it might never have existed at all, God, notwithstanding, continuing just and righteous to all eternity). And these egresses are twofold:—
1. They are absolute and perfectly free, — namely, in words.
2. They are necessary, — namely, in actions.
For the justice of God is neither altogether one of that kind of perfections which create and constitute an object to themselves, as power and wisdom do, nor of that kind which not only require an object for their exercise, but one peculiarly affected and circumstanced, as mercy, patience, and forbearance do; but may be considered in both points of view, as shall be more fully demonstrated hereafter.
1. For the first, it has absolute egresses in
words (constituting, and, as it were, creating an object to itself);
as, for instance, in words of legislation, and is then called
equity; or in words of declaration and narration, and is then
called truth. Both these Namely, the egresses in words of
legislation and in words of declaration and narration. — Tr.
2. There are respective egresses of this justice in
deeds, and according to the distinctions above mentioned; — that
is to say, it is exercised either in the government of all things according
to what is due to them by the counsel and will of God, or in judgments
rewarding or punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom;
which also is the rule of equity in legislation, and of truth in the
declarations annexed. In respect of these, Namely, the egresses
in the government of things according to what is due to them by the counsel
of his will; or in judgments rewarding or punishing, according to the rule
of his right and wisdom.. — Tr.
It now, then, appears that all these distinctions of divine
justice respect it not as considered in itself, but its egresses and
exercise only; to make which clear was the reason that I departed from the
beaten track. Nay, perhaps it would be a difficult matter to assign any
virtue to God but in the general, and not as having any specific ratio That is,
any distinguishing sort or quality. — Tr. In the general sparing mercy of God,
the particular quality of mercy, — namely, a disposition of assisting the
miserable, with a compassion of their misery, — is not wholly found,
because there are many of mankind towards whom this disposition of
assisting is never effectually exerted; but, in the pardoning mercy of God
to his people, it is fully and gloriously displayed. — Tr.
We are first,
then, briefly to treat of the universal justice of God, or of his justice
considered in itself and absolutely, which contains in it all the divine
excellencies. The schoolmen, treading in the steps of the philosophers,
who have acknowledged no kind of justice
For the Thomas, first page of quest. 21, and Cajetan, ii. 2, q. 61, a.
4. Ethics, book viii. chap. 8.
But the same On dist.
46. In
ii. 2, Thomas.
But A work to which he alludes. — Tr.
But what shall we say of these triflers? They resemble
those advocates in A kind of fencers who fought on
horseback hood-winked. — Tr.
Hence,
In his discourses concerning the justice of God, Sect.
5. Or quality. — Tr. That is, inducing to, or drawing forth,
the act of punishing. — Tr.
He farther maintains that this affection of punishing is
neither commutative nor distributive justice. His conclusions here I do
not oppose, though I cannot approve of many of his reasonings and
arguments. In fine, he contends that vindicatory justice in God is the
same with universal, or legal, or providential justice, which we call the
justice of government. But he makes a dishonourable and base conclusion
from a distinction about the persons punished, namely, into such as are
merely passive sufferers, and such as spontaneously submit themselves to
punishment, that they may satisfy the punitory justice of God; reasoning in
such a manner, that after he has forced the whole doctrine concerning the
commutative and distributive justice of God to become subservient to that
sacrilegious and proud error concerning the merits of man with God, and
even of one from the supererogation of another, In the original, “Immo etiam ex condigno,” “And that, too,
of condignity.” — Ed.
Dismissing these bunglers (who know not the righteousness
of God), then, from our dissertation, let us attend to the more sure word
of prophecy. That word everywhere asserts God to be just, and possessed of
such justice as denotes the universal rectitude and perfection of his
divine nature. His essence is most wise, most perfect, most excellent,
most merciful, most blessed; that, in fine, is the justice of God,
according to the Scriptures, namely, considered absolutely and in itself.
Nor would the holy Scriptures have us to understand
Hence it presides, as it were, in all the divine decrees,
actions, works, and words, of whatsoever kind they be. There is no egress
of the divine will, no work or exercise of providence, though immediately
and distinctly breathing clemency, mercy, anger, truth, or wisdom, but in
respect thereof God is eminently said to be just, and to execute justice.
Hence,
The more solemn egresses of this justice, to which all particular acts may be easily reduced, have been already pointed out; but equity in legislation, fidelity and truth in threatenings and promises annexed to it, in which God is often said to be just, and to execute justice, I think may be passed over, as being too remote from our purpose. But as it appears that some light may be thrown on this subject which we are now treating of, from the consideration of the relation of rectitude and divine wisdom, that is, of universal justice, to government and judgment, we must say a few words on that head.
But rectitude of government, to which that justice
analogically corresponds, is that which philosophers and civilians
unanimously agree to be the highest excellence, though they have variously
described it. Ethics, book v.
chap. 1. De
Finibus. Or class. — Tr.
But let them both unite in their sentiments as they please, neither the “habit” or “affection” of the philosophers, nor the “living honestly and hurting nobody” of the civilians, can be assigned to God; for in ascribing the perfection of excellencies to him, we exclude the ratio of habit or quality, properly so called, and every material and imperfect mode of operation. He must be a mortal man, and subject to a law, to whom these things apply.
Moreover, those (I speak of our own countrymen) who divide
this justice of government into commutative and
distributive rob God entirely of the commutative, which
consists in a mutual giving and receiving. For, “Who hath first given to
him?” “Who maketh thee to differ from another?” “He giveth not account of
any of his matters.” But distributive, which belongs to him as
the supreme governor of all things, who renders to every one his due, is
proper to himself alone. This we have above asserted to be the justice of
government or judgment. Of this justice of government frequent mention is
made in the sacred writings. It is that perfection of the Divine Being
whereby he directs all his actions in governing and administering created
things, according to the rule of his rectitude and wisdom. But this
excellence, or habitude for action, in no wise differs from universal
justice, unless in respect of its relation to another being. But what is a
law to us, in the administration of things, in God is his
right, in conjunction with his most wise and just will; for God,
as it is said, is a law unto himself. To this justice are these passages
to be referred,
The other egress of this justice is in judgment,
the last member of the divisions of which, above mentioned, — namely, that
by which
Here again, reader, I would wish to put you in mind that I by no means assert many species of universal justice, or, so to speak, particular or special justices, as distinct perfections in God, which others seem to do, but one only, — namely, the universal and essential rectitude of the divine nature variously exercised; and therefore I maintain that this vindicatory justice is the very rectitude and perfection of the Deity.
Some of the schoolmen, however, agree with me in opinion;
for Quest. 2,
2, quest. 108, a 2.
1. Then, they own, “That such a kind of justice is
applicable Competere,
“belongs.” — Ed.
2. “That he will not pardon any sins but those of the penitent.” Nor do they deny, so far as I know, —
3. “That God hath determined the punishment of sin by the rule of his right and wisdom.” But they deny, —
1. That perfection by which God punishes sins either to be
his justice or to be so called in Scripture, but only anger, fury, or
fierce indignation, — expressions denoting in the clearest manner the
freedom of the divine will in the act of punishing; although some of
2. That there is any such attribute in God as requires a
satisfaction for sins, which he is willing to forgive, but maintain that he
is
Such are the opinions of those concerning whom we are disputing at this present day, whether they be heretics because they are not Christians. Between their sentiments and ours on this point there is the widest difference; for we affirm the justice by which God punishes sin to be the very essential rectitude of Deity itself, exercised in the punishment of sins, according to the rule of his wisdom, and which is in itself no more free than the divine essence.
This kind of justice
But these are not the only adversaries we have to do with:
there are others, pious, worthy, and very learned divines, who, respecting
the point of Christ’s satisfaction, are most strictly orthodox, and who,
though they cannot find in their hearts directly to deny that such an
attribute or power is essential to God, yet maintain all its egresses and
its whole exercise respecting sin to be so free and dependent on the mere
free motion and good pleasure of the divine will, that should not that
oppose, God might by his nod, by his word, without any trouble, by other
modes and ways besides the satisfaction of Christ, if it only seemed proper
to his wisdom, take away, pardon,
Of our own countrymen, the only one I know is
But to me these arguments are altogether astonishing, —
namely, “That sin-punishing justice should be natural to God, and yet that
God, sin being supposed to exist, may either exercise it or not
exercise it.” They may also say, and with as much propriety, that
truth is natural to God, but, upon a supposition that he were to converse
with man, he might either use it or not; or, that omnipotence is
natural to God, but upon a supposition that he were inclined to do any work
without himself, that it were free to him to act omnipotently or
not; or, finally, that sin-punishing justice is among the primary
causes of the death of Christ, and that Christ was set forth as a
propitiation to declare his righteousness, and yet that that justice
required not the punishment of sin, for if it should require it, how is it
possible that it should not necessarily require it, since God would be
unjust if he should not inflict punishment? Or farther, they might as well
assert that God willed that justice should be
But this I cannot forbear to mention, that those very
divines who oppose our opinion, when hard pushed by their adversaries,
perpetually have recourse in their disputations to this justice as to their
sacred anchor, The largest anchor in a vessel, used only in extreme
danger, was so called. — Ed.
But to avoid mistakes as much as possible in discussing the nature of this justice, we will make the following observations:—
1. There are some attributes of Deity which, in order to their exercise, require no determined object antecedent to their egress; of this kind are wisdom and power. These attributes, at least as to their first exercise, must be entirely free, and dependent on the mere good pleasure of God only; so that antecedent to their acting, the divine will is so indifferent as to every exercise of them, on objects without himself, that he might even will the opposite. But if we suppose that God wills to do any work without himself, he must act omnipotently and wisely.
There are, again, some attributes which can in no wise have an egress or be exercised without an object predetermined, and, as it were, by some circumstances prepared for them. Among these is punitive justice, for the exercise of which there would be no ground but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being and its having sinned; but these being supposed, this justice must necessarily act according to its own rule.
2. But that rule is not any free act of the divine will,
but a supreme, intrinsic, natural right of Deity, conjoined with
wisdom, to which the entire exercise of this justice ought to be reduced.
Those men entirely trifle, then, who, devising certain absurd conclusions
of their own, annex them to a supposition of the necessity of punitive
justice, as to its exercise: as, for instance, that God ought to
Whether that necessarily require that every sin should be punished with eternal punishment, let those inquire who choose. “Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.”
3. But the existence of a rational creature, and the moral dependence which it has, and must have, upon God, being supposed, the first egress of this justice is in the constitution of a penal law; not as a law which, as was before observed, originates from the justice of government, but as a penal law.
For if such a law were not made necessarily, it might be possible that God should lose his natural right and dominion over his creatures, and thus he would not be God; or, that right being established, that the creature might not be subject to him, which implies a contradiction not less than if you were to say that Abraham is the father of Isaac, but that Isaac is not the son of Abraham: for in case of a failure in point of obedience (a circumstance which might happen, and really hath happened), that dependence could be continued in no way but through means of a vicarious punishment, and there must have been a penal law constituted necessarily requiring that punishment. Hence arises a secondary right of punishing, which extends to every amplification of that penal law, in whatever manner made. But it has a second egress, in the infliction of punishment.
4. And here it is to be remarked, that this justice necessarily respects punishment in general, as including in it the nature of punishment, and ordaining such a vindication of the divine honour as God can acquiesce in: not the time or degrees, or such like circumstances of punishment, yea, not this or that species of punishment; for it respects only the preservation of God’s natural right and the vindication of his glory, both which may be done by punishment in general, however circumstanced. A dispensation, therefore, with punishment (especially temporary punishment), by a delay of time, an increase or diminution of the degree, by no means prejudiceth the necessity of the exercise of this justice, which only intends an infliction of punishment in general.
5. But, again, though we determine the egresses of this
justice to be necessary, we do not deny that God exercises it freely;
for that necessity doth not exclude a concomitant liberty, but
only an antecedent indifference. This only we deny, — namely,
that supposing a
Let our adversaries, therefore, dream as they please, that we determine God to be an absolutely necessary agent when he is a most free one, and that his will is so circumscribed, by some kind of justice which we maintain, that he cannot will those things which, setting the consideration of that justice aside, would be free to him; for we acknowledge the Deity to be both a necessary and free agent, — necessary in respect of all his actions internally, or in respect of the persons in the Godhead towards one another. The Father necessarily begets the Son, and loves himself. As to these and such like actions, he is of all necessary agents the most necessary. But in respect of the acts of the divine will which have their operations and effects upon external objects, he is an agent absolutely free, being one “who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.” But of these acts there are two kinds; for some are absolute, and admit no respect to any antecedent condition.
Of this kind is his purpose of creating the world, and in
it rational creatures, properly adapted to know and obey the Creator,
Benefactor, and Lord of all. In works of this kind God hath exercised the
greatest liberty. His infinitely wise and infinitely free will is the
fountain and origin of all things; neither is there in God any kind of
justice, or any other essential attribute, which could prescribe any limits
or measure to the divine will. But this decree of creating being supposed,
the divine will undergoes a double necessity, so to speak, both in respect
of the event and in respect of its manner of acting: for in respect of the
event, it is necessary, from the immutability of God, that the world should
be created; and in respect of the manner of doing it, that it should be
done omnipotently, because God is essentially omnipotent, and it being once
supposed that he wills to do any work without himself, he must do it
omnipotently. Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, in the creation
of the world God was entirely a free agent; he exercised will and
understanding in acting, although the choice of acting or not acting, and
There is another kind of the acts of the divine will which could have no possible existence but upon a condition supposed.
This kind contains the egresses and exercise of those attributes which could not be exercised but upon a supposition of other antecedent acts, of which we have treated before. Of this kind are all the acts of the divine will in which justice, mercy, etc., exert their energy. But these attributes of the divine nature are either for the purpose of preserving or continuing to God what belongs to him of right, supposing that state of things which he hath freely appointed, or for bestowing on his creatures some farther good. Of the former kind is vindicatory justice; which, as it cannot be exercised but upon the supposition of the existence of a rational being and of its sin, so, these being supposed, the supreme right and dominion of the Deity could not be preserved entire unless it were exercised. Of the latter kind is sparing mercy, by which God bestows an undeserved good on miserable creatures; for, setting aside the consideration of their misery, this attribute cannot be exercised, but that being supposed, if he be inclined to bestow any undeserved good on creatures wretched through their own transgression, he may exercise this mercy if he will. But again; in the exercise of that justice, although, if it were not to be exercised, according to our former hypothesis, God would cease from his right and dominion, and so would not be God, still he is a free and also an absolutely necessary agent; for he acts from will and understanding, and not from an impetus of nature only, as fire burns. And he freely willed that state and condition of things; which being supposed, that justice must necessarily be exercised. Therefore, in the exercise of it he is not less free than in speaking; for supposing, as I said before, that his will were to speak anything, it is necessary that he speak the truth. Those loud outcries, therefore, which the adversaries so unseasonably make against our opinion, as if it determined God to be an absolutely necessary agent, in his operations ad extra, entirely vanish and come to naught. But we will treat more fully of these things when we come to answer objections.
Finally, let it be observed that the nature of mercy and
justice are different in respect of their exercise: for between the act of
mercy and its object no natural obligation intervenes; for God is not bound
to any one to exercise any act of mercy, neither is he bound to reward
obedience, for this is a debt due from his natural right, and from the
moral dependence of the rational creature, and indispensably thence
arising. But between the act of justice and its object a natural
obligation intervenes, arising from the indispensable subordination of the
creature to God; which, supposing disobedience or sin, could not otherwise
be secured than by punishment. Nor is
These preliminaries being thus laid down, to facilitate our entrance on the subject, I proceed to demonstrate, by a variety of arguments, both against enemies and against friends from whom I dissent, that this punitive justice is natural to God, and necessary as to its egresses respecting sin. But because, since the entrance of sin into the world, God hath either continued or increased the knowledge of himself, or accommodated it to our capacities by four ways, — namely, by the written word, by a rational conscience, by his works of providence, and, lastly, by the person of Jesus Christ, his only-begotten Son, and by the mystery of godliness manifested in him, — we will show that by each of these modes of communication he hath revealed and made known to us this his justice.
I. Our first argument, then, is taken from the testimony of the sacred writings, which, in almost numberless places, ascribe this vindicatory justice to God.
The passages of holy Scripture which ascribe this justice
to God may be classed under three divisions. The first contains those
which certify that the purity and holiness of God hostilely oppose and
detest sin. Whether holiness or purity be an attribute natural to God,
But here, first, occurs to us that celebrated passage of
the prophet Habakkuk,
Of the same import is the admonition of Joshua in his
address to the people of Israel,
Moreover, it is manifest that God meant this holiness in
that promulgation of his glorious name, or of the essential properties of
his divine nature, made face to face to Moses,
That eulogium of divine justice by the psalmist,
To the second class may be referred those passages of
Scripture which ascribe to God the office of a judge, and which affirm that
he judges, and will judge, all things with justice. The first which occurs
is that celebrated expression of Abraham,
But this supreme excellence and general idea which Abraham
made mention of and enforced, the apostle again afterward supports and
recommends:
For why should God so often be said to judge the world
justly, and in justice, unless his justice were that perfection whence this
righteous and just judgment flows and is derived?
But all retaliation “Compensatio” is the word in the original, and
as “retaliation” is frequently used in a particular sense as connected with
evil feeling, perhaps “retribution” would better express the meaning of
Thirdly, It now remains that we take a view of one or two
of those passages of Scripture which, in consideration of this divine
justice, assert the infliction of punishment for sin in itself, and as far
as relates to the thing itself, to be just. To this purpose is that of the
apostle to the Romans,
1. That it is universally acknowledged; nay, it is not unknown even to the most abandoned of mankind, and to those schools of every kind of wickedness which the apostle is there describing. Whence they derive this knowledge of the divine law and justice shall be made to appear hereafter.
2. That, it is the cause, source, and rule of all punishments to be inflicted; for this is the right of God, “that those who commit sin are worthy of death.” From this right of God it follows that “the wages of” every “sin is death.”
3. That, it is natural and essential to
God: for although, in respect of its exercise, it may have a
handle or occasion from some things external to the Deity, and in respect
of its effects may have a meritorious cause, yet in respect of its
source and root, it respects
Here it is necessary to supply another translation: “Yet in respect of its
source and root, so far as pertains to its subject, if
God be absolutely perfect, it cannot be derived to him from any other
source.” — Ed.
You will say that this right of God is free; but I deny that any right of God which respects his creatures can, as a habit inherent in his nature, be free, though in the exercise of every right God be absolutely free. Neither can any free act of the divine will towards creatures be called any right of Deity; it is only the exercise of some right. But an act is distinguished from its habit or root.
And now it appears evident that this right is not that supreme right or absolute dominion of God, which, under the primary notion of a Creator, must be necessarily ascribed to him; for it belongs not to the supreme Lord, as such, to inflict punishment, but as ruler or judge.
The supreme dominion and right of God over his creatures, no doubt, so far as it supposes dependence and obedience, necessarily requires that a vicarious punishment should be appointed in case of transgression or disobedience: but the very appointment of punishment, as well as the infliction of it, flows from his right as the governor; which right, considered with respect to transgressors, is nothing else than vindicatory justice. The apostle, therefore, signifies that that is the justice always resident in God, as a legislator, ruler, and judge of all things; which, by common presumption, even the most abandoned of mankind acknowledge.
To these may be added two other passages which occur in the
writings of the same apostle:
But we will not be farther troublesome in reciting
particular proofs; from those already mentioned, and from others equally
strong, we thus briefly argue:— That to that Being whose property it is to
“render unto every man according to his deeds,” not to clear the guilty, to
condemn sinners as worthy of death and to inflict the same upon them, to
hate sin, and who will in no wise let sin pass unpunished, and all this
because he is just, and because his justice so requires, sin-punishing
justice naturally belongs, and that he cannot act contrary to that justice;
but the passages of Scripture just now mentioned, with many others, assert
that all these properties above recounted belong to
It matters not what we affirm of vindicatory justice,
whether that it be meant of God essentially, and not only denominatively,
that it has an absolute name (for it is called “holiness” and “purity”),
that we have it expressed both in the abstract and concrete; for, what is
more than that, it is affirmed expressly, directly, and particularly,
ofttimes, in the passages above mentioned, that it requires the punishment
of sinners, that it implies a constant and immutable will of punishing
every sin according to the rule of divine wisdom and right. The sentence
might be more intelligibly rendered: “There is nothing which we affirm of
vindicatory justice, — whether that it is meant of God essentially, and not
only denominatively, that it has an absolute name (for it is called
“holiness” and “purity”), that we have it expressed both in the abstract
and concrete, that it requires the punishment of sinners, that it implies a
constant and immutable will of punishing every sin, according to the rule
of divine wisdom and right, — but what is ofttimes affirmed expressly,
directly, and particularly, in the passages above mentioned.” — Ed.
So much for our first argument.
II. The universal consent of mankind furnishes us with a second, from which we may reason in this manner: “What common opinion and the innate conceptions of all assign to God, that is natural to God; but this corrective justice is so assigned to God: therefore, this justice is natural to God.”
The major proposition is evident; for what is not natural to God neither exists in him by any mode of habit or mode of affection, but is only a free act of the divine will, and the knowledge of that can by no means be naturally implanted in creatures; for whence should there be a universal previous conception of an act which might either take place or never take place? No such thing was at the first engraven on the hearts of men, and the fabric of the world teaches us no such thing.
But the minor proposition is established by a threefold proof:— 1. By the testimony of the Scripture; 2. By the testimony of every sinner’s conscience; and 3. By that of the public consent of all nations.
First, The holy Scriptures testify that such an innate
conception The Greek word πρόληψις is employed in the original, for which
perhaps it was difficult to find a precise rendering in one English word.
It was a word employed in the canonics or psychology of
Justice among them, according to their fabulous theology,
which was particularly favoured by the bulk of the people, was the daughter
of Jupiter, whom he set over the affairs of mortals, to avenge the
injuries which they should do to one another, and to inflict condign
punishment on all those who should impiously offend against the gods.
Hence
Again, the same author says, —
Also, Orpheus in the hymns, —
In all which, and in numberless other such passages, the wisest men in those times of ignorance have announced their sense of this vindicatory justice.
And among the Latins, the following passages prove their sense of the same:—
“Seldom hath Punishment, through lameness of foot, left off pursuit of the wicked man, though he hath had the start of her.”
Also, that celebrated response of the Delphic oracle,
recorded by
All which assert this vindicatory justice.
This, then, as
Secondly, The consciences of all mankind concur to corroborate this truth; but the cause which has numberless witnesses to support it cannot fail. Hence, not only the flight, hiding-place, and fig-leaf aprons of our primogenitors, but every word of dire meaning and evil omen, as terror, horror, tremor, and whatever else harasses guilty mortals, have derived their origin. Conscious to themselves of their wickedness, and convinced of the divine dominion over them, this idea above all dwells in their minds, that he with whom they have to do is supremely just, and the avenger of all sin. From this consideration even the people of God have been induced to believe that death must inevitably be their portion should they be but for once sisted in his presence. Not that the mass of the body is to us an obscure and dark prison, as the Platonists dream, whence, when we obtain a view of divine things, being formerly enveloped by that mass, it is immediately suggested to the mind that the bond of union between mind and body must be instantly dissolved.
It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that through sin we have been transformed into worms, moles, bats, and owls; but the cause of this general fear and dismay is not to be derived from this source.
The justice and purity of God, on account of which he can
bear nothing impure or filthy to come into his presence, occurs to sinners’
And these:—
“As every one’s conscience is, so in his heart he conceives hope or fear, according to his actions.
“This is the first Or, chief. — Tr.
“Do you think that those have escaped whom a guilty conscience holds abashed, and lashes with its inexorable scourge, the mind, the executioner, shaking the secret lash?”
It is the saying of a certain author, that punishment is coeval with injustice, and that the horror of natural conscience is not terminated by the limits of human life:—
Hence the famous verses of
“Alas! my soul, thou pleasing companion of this body,
thou fleeting thing, that art now deserting it! whither art thou flying? to
what unknown scene? All trembling, fearful, and pensive! What now is
become of thy former wit and humour? Thou shalt jest and be gay no
more.” Translated thus by — Tr.
Hence, too, mankind have a dread awe of every thing in nature that is grand, unusual, and strange, as thunders, lightnings, or eclipses of the heavenly bodies, and tremble at every prodigy, spectre, or comet, nay, even at the hobgoblins of the night, exclaiming, like the woman of Zarephath upon the death of her son, “What have I to do with thee? art thou come unto me to call my sin to remembrance?” Hence, even the most abandoned of men, when vengeance for their sins hangs over their heads, have confessed their sins and acknowledged the divine justice.
It is related by His mother,
But, moreover, while guilty man dreads the consequences of
evil, which he knows he has really committed, he torments and vexes himself
even with fictitious fears and bugbears. Hence these verses of
— ideas for the most part ridiculous, but, as the old
proverb says, “ ’Tis but reasonable that they should wear the fetters which
themselves have forged.” Hence the guilty trembling mob is imposed upon
and cheated by impostors, by vagrant fortune-tellers and astrologers. If
any illiterate juggler shall have foretold a year of darkness, alluding,
namely, to the night-season of the year, the consternation is as great as
if
1. That God hates sin, as contrary to himself, and
that therefore it is impossible for a sinner with safety to appear before
him. But if God hate sin, he does it either from his nature or
because he so wills it. But it cannot be because he wills it, for
in that case he might not will it; a supposition most absurd. And, indeed,
that assertion of
2. That our sins are debts, and therefore we shun the sight of our creditor. But I mean such a debt as, with relation to God’s supreme dominion, implies in it a perpetual right of punishment.
And such is the second proof of the minor proposition of the second argument; the third remains.
Thirdly, The public consent of all nations
furnishes the third proof of this truth. There are writers, indeed, who
have affirmed (a thing by no means credible) that some nations have been so
given up to a reprobate mind that they acknowledge no deity.
But a respectable writer objects, — namely,
But this learned man blunders miserably here, as often elsewhere, in his apprehension of the design and meaning of his opponents; for they do not use this argument to prove that the egresses of divine justice are necessary, but that justice itself is necessary to God; which Socinians deny. What is his answer to these arguments? “Mankind acknowledge many things,” says he, “which God does freely.” To be sure they do, when he exhibits them before their eyes; but what follows from that? So, too, they acknowledge that God punishes sin, when he punishes it. But because all mankind, from the works of God and from the natural power of conscience, acknowledge God to be good and bountiful, we may, without hesitation, conclude goodness and bounty to be essential attributes of God: so likewise, because, from the natural power of conscience and the consideration of God’s works of providence, they conclude and agree that God is just, we contend that justice is natural to God.
But as mankind have testified this consent by other
methods, so they have especially done it by sacrifices; concerning
which
There were four kinds of sacrifices among the Gentiles:—
First, the propitiatory or peace-making sacrifices; for by those
they thought they could render the gods propitious or appease them, or
avert the anger of the gods, and obtain peace with them. Hence
They were desirous of appeasing Apollo by sacrifices, who
had inflicted on them a lamentable mortality. To the same purpose is that
passage of
Namely, Helenus, Æneid, book iii. — Tr.
Hence, too, that lamentation of the person in the Pœnulus
of
“Unhappy man that I am,” says he, “today I have sacrificed six lambs to my much-incensed gods, and yet I have not been able to render Venus propitious to me; and as I could not appease her, I came instantly off.”
And
The second kind were the expiatory or purifying sacrifices, by which sins were said to be atoned, expiated, and cleansed, and sinners purified, purged, and reconciled, and the anger of the gods turned aside and averted. It would be tedious, and perhaps superfluous, to produce examples; the learned can easily trace them in great abundance. The other kinds were the eucharistical and prophetical, which have no relation to our present purpose.
In this way of appeasing the Deity, mankind, I say,
formerly agreed; whence it is evident that an innate conception See note, p.
517.
But it is strange to think what a stir was made by the ancient enemy of mankind to prevent any ray of light respecting the true sacrifice, that was to be made in the fullness of time, from being communicated to the minds of men through means of this universal ceremony and custom of sacrificing. Hence he influenced the most of the nations to the heinous, horrible, and detestable crime of offering human sacrifices, in order to make atonement for themselves, and render God propitious by such an abominable wickedness.
But as it seems probable that some light may be borrowed
from the consideration of these sacrifices, in which mankind, from the
presumption of a future judgment, have so closely agreed, perhaps the
learned reader will think it not foreign to our purpose to dwell a little
on the subject, and to reckon up some examples. This abomination,
prohibited by God under the penalty of a total extermination, was divers
times committed by the Jews, running headlong into forbidden wickedness,
while urged on by the stings of conscience to this infernal remedy. They
offered their children as burnt-sacrifices to Moloch, — that is, to the
Saturn of the Tyrians; not to the planet of that name, not to the father of
the Cretan Jupiter, but to the Saturn of the Tyrians, — that is, to Baal or
to the sun; and not by making them to pass between two fires for
purification, as some think, but by burning them in the manner of a whole
burnt-offering. “Were initiated by the
devil in the same abomination.” — Ed.
And the same author, in the sixth book, from his Precepts of Magic, has these verses:—
“If, contrary to nature, the child be extracted through a wound in the belly, to be served up on the hot altars.”
But
And thus the Scriptures testify,
Concerning the Tyrians, see
Concerning the ancient Gauls, we have the most credible
evidences, —
No doubt can be entertained concerning the inhabitants of
Britain but that they were guilty of the same practices; for from them came
the Druids, the first promoters of that superstition, not only among the
Gauls, but even in Italy and in the city of Rome itself. “The doctrine of
the Druids,” says
Hence that verse in
At which remote place Namely, Anglesey. — Tr.
Of the same kind was the religion of the Decii, devoting
themselves for the safety of the city. Hence a suspicion arose, and was
everywhere rumoured, among the Gentiles, concerning the sacred rites of the
Jews, with which they were unacquainted, — namely, that they were wont to
be solemnized with human sacrifices: for although, after the destruction of
the temple, it was manifest that they worshipped the God of heaven only,
yet so long as they celebrated the secret mysteries appointed them by God,
A custom that prevailed with some, not unlike this untruth
about the young Greek kept in the temple, seems to have given rise to it;
for thus
But that young Greek, destined for sacrifice, in Apion, has no name; that is, there never was any such person.
The words in the original apply much better to our author’s meaning. See them, Odyss., lib. viii. v. 550. — Tr.
But, after having prepared the plot, he ought not to have
shunned the task of giving names to the actors. We have the name of a
Persian sacrificed even among the Thracians, in
There is still remaining, if I rightly remember, the name
of a Spanish soldier, a captive, with other of his companions, among the
Mexicans, well-known inhabitants of America, who being sacrificed, on a
very high altar, to the gods of the country, when his heart was pulled out
(if we can credit
But what he says concerning
Thus far
It is notoriously known, that in the sanguinary games of
the Romans, they made atonement to the gods with human blood, — namely,
that of captives. But
The Plebeian again charges him with madness:—
But
I have little or no doubt but that this Saturn was Jephthah
the Israelite; that their Hercules was Joshua, the celebrated
But as we have made mention of Jephthah, it will not be
foreign to our purpose briefly to treat of those three famous examples of
human sacrifices recorded in the sacred writings. The first is contained
in that celebrated history concerning the trial of Abraham; an undertaking
so wonderful and astonishing that no age hath ever produced or will produce
its like. It even exceeds every thing that fabulous Greece hath presumed
in story. A most indulgent and affectionate father, weighed down with
age, Abraham is said to have been now a hundred and
thirty-three years of age; for some are of opinion that Isaac, at the time
he was to have been sacrificed, was thirty-three years old. Josephus says
twenty-five; the Jews in Seder Olam, thirty-six. Nor is it any objection
that he is called naar, for so Benjamin, the father of many children, is
called,
But from that right and dominion which God naturally hath
over all the creatures, or from that superior excellence and eminence
wherewith he is endowed and constituted, he might, without any degree or
suspicion of injustice or cruelty, exact victims as a tribute from man.
But he hath declared his will to the contrary:
But this history the falsifying poets of the Greeks have
corrupted by that fable of theirs concerning the sacrifice of Iphigenia,
begun by her father Agamemnon, but who was liberated by the substitution of
a doe. Agamemnon, as the story runs, had killed one of Diana’s
stags, and the goddess would be appeased on no other terms than by the
sacrifice of his daughter; but after she was laid on the pile, Diana,
pitying the virgin, put a doe in her room, and made Iphigenia her
priestess. — Tr.
“O, father, I am here present; and I cheerfully
deliver up my body for my country and for all Greece, to be sacrificed at
the altar
It is worth while to notice, by the way, the use of the word ὑπέρ. The virgin to be sacrificed declared that she was willing to appease the anger of the gods, and suffer punishment in behalf of, or instead of, her country and all Greece; and but a little before she is introduced exulting in these words, —
“Invoke to her temple, to her altar, Diana, queen Diana, the blessed Diana; for if it shall be necessary, by my blood and sacrifice I will obliterate the oracle,” Ib. v. 1480.
Justly celebrated, too, in the second place, is the history
of Jephthah’s sacrificing his only daughter, related by the Holy Spirit in
these words: That is, the expressions
relating to this subject are capable of more meanings than one, and to
ascertain the right one is attended with difficulties. — Tr. [This seems a mistake. It is a
Greek word in the original, ἀναμφισβήτητα, and signifies” indisputable,” or
“beyond controversy.” Had the word been ἀμφισβήτητα, it might have borne the meaning attached
to it by the translator. — Ed]
First, It is evident that a gross ignorance of the law,
either in making the vow or in executing it, is by no means to be ascribed
to Jephthah, who was, though a military man, a man of piety, a fearer of
God, and well acquainted with the sacred writings. Now, then, if he simply
made a vow, that a compensation and redemption, according to the valuation
of the priests, ought to have been made, could not have escaped him; and
therefore there was no reason why he should so much bewail the event of a
vow by which he had engaged himself to the Lord, and to which he was bound,
for he might
Or if we should conjecture that he was so grossly mistaken, and entirely unacquainted with divine matters, was there no priest or scribe among all the people, who, during that time which he granted to his daughter, at her own request, to bewail her virginity, could instruct this illustrious leader, who had lately merited so highly of the commonwealth, in the meaning of the law, so that he should neither vex himself, render his family extinct, nor worship God to no purpose, by a vain superstition? I have no doubt, then, but that Jephthah performed his duty in executing his vow, according to the precept of the law, however much he might have erred in his original conception of it.
Nor is it less doubtful, in the second place, that Jephthah
did not offer his daughter as a burnt-offering, as the words of the vow
imply, according to the ceremony and institution of that kind of sacrifice;
for as these sacrifices could be performed by the priest only by killing
the victim, cutting it in pieces, and consuming it by fire upon the altar,
— offices in which no priest would have ministered or assisted, — so also,
such kind of sacrifices are enumerated among the abominations to the Lord,
which he hateth:
Thirdly, Nor does it seem probable that Jephthah had dedicated his daughter to God, that she should perpetually remain a virgin; for neither hath God instituted any such kind of worship, nor could the forced virginity of the daughter by any means ever be reckoned to the account of the father, as any valuable consideration, in place of a victim.
As, then, there were two kinds of things devoted to God,
the first of which was of the class of those which, as God did not order
that they should be offered in sacrifice, it was made a statute that they
should be valued by the priest at a fair valuation, and be redeemed, and so
return again to common use. The law of these is delivered,
A thing or person so devoted as not to be redeemed. —
Tr.
The question, to which of these two kinds the vow of Jephthah belonged, creates, if I mistake not, the whole difficulty of the passage.
That it belonged not to the first is as clear as the day;
because if we suppose that it did, he might easily have extricated himself
and family from all grief on that account by paying the estimation made by
the priest. It was, then, a cherem which by his vow Jephthah had
vowed to the Lord, by no means to be redeemed, but accounted “most holy
unto the Lord,” as in
But it is doubted whether a rational creature could be made
a cherem; but, in fact, there can hardly remain any room for doubt.
To the person who considers the text itself it will easily appear. The
words are, “Every devoted thing is most holy unto the Lord. None devoted, which shall be
devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to death.” It
is evident from the That is, pointing not
at the persons vowing, but at the object of their vow, or at the thing
vowed or devoted by them. — Tr.
As Jephthah, then, had devoted his daughter as a cherem, it seems hardly to admit of a doubt that the cause of his consternation and sorrow at meeting her was because that, according to the law, he had slain her, having devoted her to God in such a manner as not to be redeemed.
It would be foreign to our purpose to agitate this question
any farther. We shall only say, then, that after having maturely weighed
all the circumstances of the text and of the thing itself, according to the
measure of our abilities, we have gone into the opinion of those who
maintain that Jephthah gave up his daughter to death, she being devoted to
God in such a manner as, according to the law, not The author here uses the words, “at
least interpretatively,” before, so requiring it;” meaning thereby, as I
understand him, that the just and proper interpretation of the passage
wherein this history is recorded, and of the others quoted, relating to
vows, had clearly determined him to adopt this opinion. — Tr. That is, both of the Jewish and Christian persuasion. —
Tr. Patriarch of Constantinople in the year
520. — Tr. Iphianassa, as the story says, was
daughter of Prœtus, king of the Argives, who preferring herself in beauty
to Juno, was struck with such a madness as to believe herself to be a cow,
but was afterwards cured by Melampus, a famous physician, to whom she was
given in marriage. — Tr. Or, than the daughter of Jephthah. For
Iphigenia, see note on p. 532.
But this was a kind of human sacrifice by which, as God intended to shadow forth the true sacrifice of his Son, so the enemy of the human race, aping the Almighty, and taking advantage of and insulting the blindness of mankind and the horror of their troubled consciences, arising from a sense of the guilt of sin, influenced and compelled them to the performance of ceremonies of a similar kind.
There is no need that we should dwell on the third instance
of this kind of sacrifices that occurs in the sacred writings, — namely,
that of the king of Moab, during the siege of his city, offering up either
his own son or the king of Edom’s upon the wall, as he was a heathen and a
worshipper of Saturn, according to the custom of the Phœnicians.
Despairing of his situation, when it seemed to him that the city could no
longer be defended, and when he had no hope of breaking through or of
escaping, he offered his own son, in my
We shall conclude this train of testimonies with that noted
account of the Rugiani, certain inhabitants of an island of Sclavonia,
related by
“Some preachers of the gospel of Christ” (who and what they
were the historian shows) “converted the whole island of the Rugiani to the
faith. Then they built an oratory in honour of our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ, and in memory of St Vitus, patron of Corveia. But after, by divine
permission, matters were changed, and the Rugiani fell off from the faith,
having instantly expelled the priests and Christians, they converted their
religion into superstition; Their religion at best had been
contaminated with the superstitions of the church of Rome. — Tr.
“Since it is thyself that art guilty, why need any victim die for thee? It is madness to expect salvation from the death of another.”
I have no doubt but that this last verse is a diabolical oracle.
By such deceitful practices, the old serpent, inflamed with envy, and being himself for ever lost, because he could not eradicate every sense of avenging justice (which is as a curb to restrain the fury of the wicked) from the minds of men, wished to lead them into mazes, that he might still keep them the slaves of sin, and subject to his own dominion.
There have been, and still are, some of mankind, I confess
it, who, from indulging their vices, are seared in their consciences, and
whose minds are become callous by the practice of iniquity; who, flattering
themselves to their own destruction, have falsely conceived either that God
does not trouble himself about such things, or that he can be easily
appeased, and without any trouble. Hence that profane wretch introduced by
But That is, their acts
or ceremonies of cleansing or purifying themselves from guilt by sacrifice,
or otherwise; the latter word more particularly means the operation of
cleansing by water. — Tr.
“But,” says he, “the light is dark, that a sinful creature
could dream of being able to perform a satisfaction, and make propitiatory
expiation, to an infinite God incensed, and such, too, as would be
satisfactory for sin.” Yea, I say, that a sinful creature could perform
this is false, and a presumption only, arising from that darkness which we
are in by nature. But, notwithstanding, it is true that God must be
appeased by a propitiatory sacrifice, if we would that our sins should be
forgiven us; and this much he hath pointed out to all mankind by that light
of nature, obscure indeed, but not dark. Nor is it necessary, in order to
prove this, that we should have recourse to the fabulous antiquities of the
Egyptians, the very modest writer of which, Hieroglyphics are emblems or pictures that were used in
the first method of writing; but after characters were introduced, they
became generally unintelligible, and contributed much to promote idolatry.
They were used by the Egyptian priests to conceal the mysteries of their
religion from the vulgar, and were thence called hieroglyphics; that is,
sacred engravings or carvings. They were originally engraven or carved on
walls and obelisks. — Tr. [It
is hardly needful to advert to modern discoveries, from A
dynasty in history means a succession of kings in the same line. — Tr.
But passing over these things, it can hardly be doubted
that Jupiter-ammon, among the Egyptians, was no other than Ham, the son of
Noah, and Bacchus Noah himself; and that Vulcan, among other nations, was
Tubal-cain: to all whom, and to others, sacrifices were offered before the
birth of Moses. What, too, do they say to this, that Job, among the
Gentiles, offered burnt-offerings before the institution of the Mosaic
ceremonies? See
But I do not mention these things as if it were my opinion
that sacrifices are prescribed by the law of nature. The most of the
Romish clergy maintain this opinion, that so they may pave the
But to return from this digression: it appears that such a presumption of corrective justice is implanted in all by nature, that it cannot by any means be eradicated. But since these universal conceptions by no means relate to what may belong or not belong to God at his free pleasure, it follows that sin-avenging justice is natural to God; the point that was to be proved.
I shall only add, in one word, that an argument from the
consent of all is by consent of all allowed to be very strong: for thus
says the philosopher, “What is admitted by all, we also admit; but he who
would destroy such faith can himself advance nothing more credible,”
And
And again,
III. See division, page 512.
The philosopher Book viii. chapter 5, of his Topics. A deprivation of
irascibility.
But however this matter be, certain it is that God assumes
no affection of our nature so often to himself in Scripture as this; and
that, too, in words which for the most part, in the Old Testament, denote
the greatest commotion of mind. Wrath, fury, the heat of great anger,
indignation, hot anger, smoking anger, wrathful anger, anger appearing in
the countenance, inflaming the nostrils, rousing the heart, flaming and
consuming, are often assigned to him, and in words, too, which among the
Hebrews express the parts of the body affected by such commotions.
In fine, there is no perturbation of the mind, no
commotion of the spirits, no change of the bodily parts,
by which either the materiality or formality The materiality of
anger is what is essentially necessary to constitute anger; the formality
means its external marks and characters. — Tr.
But since with God, beyond all doubt, “there is no
variableness,
First, then, it is manifest that, by the anger of God, the
effects of anger are denoted: “Is God unrighteous who taketh
vengeance? God forbid,”
Nay, the threatening of punishment is sometimes described
by the words “anger, fury, wrath,” and “fierce wrath.” Thus,
But, secondly, It denotes a constant and immutable will
in God of avenging and punishing, by a just punishment, every injury,
transgression, and sin. And hence that expression, That is, the
principle from which they immediately flow. — Tr.
And what is that perfection but this justice of which we
are discoursing? For we must remove far from God every idea of anger, Quest. 47, art. 1.
But the apostle says that this anger or punitory justice is
“revealed from heaven.” The apostle uses the same word here that is
translated “revealed” in the
Therefore, although “God, willing to show his wrath, and to
make his power known,” not in that way only, — namely, by exercising public
punishments in this life, — of which we are now speaking, “endure with much
long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction,” and though he
should not instantly dart his lightnings against all and every individual
of the abandoned and profane, yet mankind will easily discern Namely,
from those instances of punishment which he is pleased in his wisdom
sometimes openly and awfully to inflict upon the wicked. — Tr.
Moreover, the apostle testifies this revelation to be
made from heaven. Even the most abandoned cannot but observe
punishments of various kinds making havoc everywhere in the world, and
innumerable evils brooding, as it were, over the very texture of the
universe. But because they wish for and desire nothing more ardently than
either that there were no God, or that he paid no regard to human affairs,
they either really ascribe, or pretend to ascribe, all these things to
chance, fortune, the revolutions of the stars and their influence, or,
finally, to natural causes. In order to free the minds of men from this
pernicious deceit of atheism, the apostle affirms that all these things
come to pass “from heaven;” that is, under the direction of God, or by a
divine power and providence punishing the sins and wickedness of men, and
manifesting the justice of God. Thus, “The Lord rained upon Sodom and upon
Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven,”
But not to be tedious, it is evident that God, by the works of his providence, in the government of this world, gives a most copious testimony to his vindicatory justice, not inferior to that given to his goodness, or any other of his attributes; which testimony concerning himself and his nature he makes known, and openly exhibits to all, by innumerable examples, constantly provided and appointed for that purpose. He, then, who shall deny this justice to be essential to God, may, for the same reason, reject his goodness and long-suffering patience.
IV. The fourth argument shall be taken from the revelation
of that name, glory, and nature, which God hath exhibited to us in
It was for the display of his justice that he set forth Christ as a propitiation, through faith in his blood. He spared him not, but laid the punishment of us all upon him. It was for this that he was pleased to bruise him, to put him to grief, and to make his soul an offering for sin.
The infinite wisdom of God, his inexpressible grace, free
love, boundless mercy, goodness, and benevolence to men, in the
constitution of such a Mediator, — namely, a God-man, — are not more
illustriously displayed, to the astonishment of men and angels, in bringing
sinful man from death, condemnation, and a state of enmity, into a state of
life, of salvation, of glory, and of union and communion with himself, than
is this punitory justice, for the satisfaction, manifestation, and glory of
which this whole scheme, pregnant with innumerable mysteries, was
instituted. But that attribute whose glory and manifestation God intended
and accomplished, both in the appointment
We will not at present enter fully into the consideration of other arguments by which the knowledge of this truth is supported; among which that of the necessity of assigning to God (observing a just analogy) whatever perfections or excellencies are found among the creatures, is not of the least importance. These we pass, partly that we may not be tedious to the learned reader, partly because the truth flows in a channel already sufficiently replenished with proofs. It would be easy, however, to show that this justice denotes the highest perfection, and by no means includes any imperfection, on account of which it should be excluded from the divine nature. Neither, in the definition of it, does one iota occur that can imply any imperfection; but all perfection, simple or formal, simply and formally, is found in God. But when this perfection is employed in any operation respecting another being, and having for its object the common good, it necessarily acquires the nature of justice.
I shall not be farther troublesome to my readers; if what
has been already said amount not to proof sufficient, I know not what is
sufficient. I urge only one testimony more from Scripture and conclude.
It is found in
I could heartily wish that some sinner whose conscience the
hand of the omnipotent God hath lately touched, whose “sore ran in the
night and ceased not,” and whose “soul refused to be comforted,” whose
“grief is heavier than the sand of the sea,” in whom “the arrows of the
Almighty” stick fast, “the poison whereof drinketh up the spirit,”
We have
sufficiently proved, if I be not mistaken, that sin-punishing justice is
natural to God. The opposite arguments, more numerous than
weighty, shall be considered hereafter. We are now to prove the second
part of the question, — namely, that the existence and sin of a rational
creature being supposed, the exercise of this justice is necessary. And,
granting what appears from what we have
I. He who cannot but hate all sin cannot but punish sin;
for to hate sin is, as to the affection, to will to punish it, and as to
the effect, the punishment itself. And to be unable not to will the
punishment of sin is the same with the necessity of punishing it; for he
who cannot but will to punish sin cannot but punish it: for “our God is in
the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased,”
For “God hates all workers of iniquity,”
But it is not without good reason that God, who is love, so
often testifies in the holy Scriptures his hatred and abomination of sin:
“The wicked, and him that loveth violence, his soul hateth,”
The learned
But, first, this learned gentleman denies what has been
proved; nor does he deign to advance a word to invalidate the proof. He
denies that God naturally hates sin, hatred being taken for the will
The learned doctor retorts, “Obedience must necessarily
please God; but God is not bound by his justice necessarily to reward it.”
But the learned gentleman will hardly maintain that the relation of
obedience to reward, and disobedience to punishment, is the same; for God
is bound to reward no man for obedience performed, for that is due to him
by natural right:
Away, then, with all proud thoughts of equalling the
relation of obedience to reward and sin to punishment. “Who hath first
given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and
through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen,”
It is impossible that he who is blessed forever and ever, and is so infinitely happy in his own essential glory that he stands in no need of us or of our services, and who, in requiring all that we are and all that we can do, only requires his own, can, by the receipt of it, become bound in any debt or obligation. For God, I say, from the beginning, stood in no need of our praise; nor did he create us merely that he might have creatures to honour him, but that, agreeably to his goodness, he might conduct us to happiness.
But he again retorts, and maintains, “That God can punish where he does not hate; and, therefore, he may hate and not punish: for he punished his most holy Son, whom God forbid that we should say he ever hated.” But, besides that this mode of arguing from opposites hardly holds good in theology, though God hated not his Son when he punished him, personally considered, he however hated the sins on account of which he punished him (and even himself, substitutively considered, with respect to the effect of sin), no less than if they had been laid to any sinner. Yea, and from this argument it follows that God cannot hate sin and not punish it; for when he laid sins, which he hates, to the charge of his most holy Son, whom he loved with the highest love, yet he could not but punish him.
II. The representation or description of God, and of the
divine nature in respect of its habitude Habitude means the
state of a person or a thing with relation to something else. The habitude
of the divine nature with respect to sin is a disposition to punish it. —
Tr.
They represent sin as “that abominable thing which he
hateth,” which he will destroy “as the fire devoureth the stubble, and the
flame consumeth the chaff.”
But the very learned The word in the original is “combustible,” meaning
something that is susceptible of and consumable by fire. It must be
evident to every one that the phrase is used in allusion to the metaphor
which represents God as a consuming fire. The Son of God, then, was not,
strictly and properly speaking, consumable, or susceptible of this fire, —
that is, he was by no means the object of divine anger or punishment,
considered as the Son of God, and without any relation to mankind, — but,
on the contrary, was the beloved of his Father, with whom he was always
well pleased. But he was liable to the effect of this fire, — that is, of
God’s vindicatory justice, — as our representative and federal head. And
every sinner is consumable by this fire; that is, is properly and naturally
the object of divine wrath and punishment. — Tr.
But, in my opinion, this very learned man was never more unhappy in extricating himself; for, first, he acknowledges God to be “a consuming fire,” though “a rational and intelligent one, not a natural and insensible one.” But the comparison was made between the events of the operations, not the modes of operating. Nobody ever said that God acts without sense, or from absolute necessity and principles of nature, without any concomitant liberty. But although he acts by will and understanding, we have said that his nature as necessarily requires him to punish any sin committed, as natural and insensible fire burns the combustible matter that is applied to it. But the learned gentleman does not deny this; nay, he even confirms it, granting that with respect to sin God “is a consuming fire,” though only “an intelligent and rational one.”
I am sorry that this very learned author should have used
the expression, that “this fire burnt something not consumable,” when he
punished his most holy and well-beloved Son; for God did not punish Christ
as his most holy Son, but as our mediator and the surety of the covenant,
“whom he made sin for us, though he knew no sin.” Surely, “he laid upon
him our sins,” before “the chastisement of our peace was upon him.” But in
this sense he was very susceptible of the effects of this fire, — namely,
when considered as bearing the guilt of all our sins; and therefore it was
that by fire the Lord did plead with him.
III. Our third
argument is this: It is absolutely necessary that God should preserve
his glory entire to all eternity; but sin being supposed, Our author here
speaks in the language, and reasons in the manner, of logicians; the
prevalent mode of reasoning at the time when he wrote. For the sake of
those unacquainted with that art, it may not be improper to observe that
the above argument is what they call a syllogism, and that a syllogism
consists of three propositions. The first is called the major, the second
the minor, and the third the conclusion. In the above argument the major
proposition is, “It is absolutely necessary that God should preserve his
glory entire to all eternity.” The minor is, “But sin being supposed,
without any punishment due to it he cannot preserve his glory free from
violation.” The conclusion is, “Therefore, it is necessary that he should
punish it.” The minor is sometimes called the assumption, and sometimes
the conclusion is so named. They are both included under this title by our
author in the following sentence. — Tr.
First, The glory of God is displayed in doing the things
that are just; but in omitting these it is impaired, not less than
in doing the things that are contrary. “He that justifieth the wicked, and
he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord.”
Secondly, A proper regard is not shown to divine
holiness, nor is its glory manifested, unless the punishment due
to sin be inflicted. Holiness is opposed to sin; for “God is of purer eyes
than to behold evil, and cannot look on iniquity,”
Thirdly, We have sufficiently shown above that the natural dominion which God hath over rational creatures, and which they by sin renounce, could not otherwise be preserved or continued than by means of a vicarious punishment. And now let impartial judges decide whether it be necessary to God that he should preserve entire the glory of his justice, holiness, and supreme dominion, or not.
IV. And which is a principal point to be considered on this subject, Were the opinions of the adversaries to be admitted, and were we to suppose that God might will the salvation of any sinner, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to assign any sufficient and necessary cause of the death of Christ. For let us suppose that God hath imposed on mankind a law, ratified by a threatening of eternal death, and that they, by a violation of that law, have deserved the punishment threatened, and consequently are become liable to eternal death; again, let us suppose that God in that threatening did not expressly intend the death of the sinner, but afterward declared what and of what kind he willed that the guilt of sin should be, and what punishment he might justly inflict on the sinner, and what the sinner himself ought to expect (all which things flow from the free determination of God), but that he might by his nod or word, without any trouble, though no satisfaction were either made or received, without the least diminution of his glory, and without any affront or dishonour to any attribute, or any injury or disgrace to himself, consistently with the preservation of his right, dominion, and justice, freely pardon the sins of those whom he might will to save; — what sufficient reason could be given, pray, then, why he should lay those sins, so easily remissible, to the charge of his most holy Son, and on their account subject him to such dreadful sufferings?
While Socinians do not acknowledge other ends of the whole
of this dispensation and mystery than those which they assign, they will be
unable, to all eternity, to give any probable reason why a
I very well know that I cannot pretend to be either
ingenious or quick-sighted; but respecting this matter I am not ashamed to
confess my dullness to be such, that I cannot see that God, The misprint
of quia for quin has occasioned some confusion in the
translation. It should run thus: “I cannot see but that Christ has died in
vain, on the supposition that God could pardon sins without the
intervention of a ransom, consistently with the preservation of his right
and glory entire, justice not demanding their punishment.” — Ed. Or ransom. — Tr.
Perhaps some one will say, “It doth not follow from the death of Christ that God necessarily punisheth sin; for Christ himself, in his agony, placeth the passing away of the cup among things possible. ‘All things,’ saith he, ‘Father, are possible with thee. Let this cup pass from me.’ ”
I answer, It is well known that the word “impossibility” may be considered in a twofold point of view. The first is in itself absolute, which respects the absolute power of God, antecedent to any free act of the divine will: in this respect, it was not impossible that that cup should pass from Christ. The second is conditional, which respects the power of God, as directed in a certain order, that is determined, and (if I might so phrase it) circumscribed by some act of the divine will: and in this sense it was impossible; that is to say, it being supposed that God willed to pardon any sins to sinners, it could not be done without laying their punishment upon the surety. But we do not pursue this argument farther at present, because we intend to resume it again in the consideration of the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction.
There are yet many arguments very proper for establishing the truth on our side of the question, which we choose not to enter on largely and on set purpose, lest we should be tiresome to the reader. Perhaps, however, it will be judged worth while briefly to sketch out some heads of them, and annex them to the former arguments concerning justice and the exercise thereof. The first is to this purport:—
1. A second act presupposes a first, and
a constant manner of operating proves a habit; a sign also expresses the
thing signified. Because God doeth good to all, we believe him to be good,
and endowed with supreme goodness; for how could he so constantly and
uniformly do good, unless he himself were good? Yea, from second acts the
holy Scriptures sometimes teach the first; as, for instance, that God is
the living God, because he giveth life to all, — that he
is good, because he doeth good. Why may we not also say that he
is just, endowed with that justice of which we are treating, because “God
perverteth not judgment, neither doth the Almighty pervert justice,” but
“the Lord is righteous, and
upright are his judgments?” That is, which showeth what the divine
will is. — Tr.
2. It is not the part of a just judge, of his mere good pleasure, to let the wicked pass unpunished: “He that justifieth the wicked is an abomination to the Lord,” and, “Woe to them that call evil good!” But God is a just judge. “But one who is not liable to render a reason,” you will say, “and who is by no means subject to a law.” But the nature of God is a law to itself. He cannot lie, because he himself is truth; nor act unjustly, because he is just. Such as God is by nature, such is he in the acts of his will.
3. The argument, from the immutable difference of
things in themselves is of very considerable weight; for that which is sin,
because it destroys that subjection of the creature which is due to the
Creator, cannot, even by the omnipotence of God, be made to be not sin. To
hate the supreme good implies a contradiction. But if, from the nature of
the thing, sin be sin, in relation to the supreme perfection of God, from
the nature of the thing, too, is its punishment. Yea, God hath ordered
children to obey their parents, because this is right. In the original,
“just.” — Tr.
4. The adversaries acknowledge “That God cannot save the impenitent and obstinately wicked without injury to the glory, and holiness, and perfection of his nature.” Why so? “The justice of God,” say they, “will not suffer it.” But what kind of justice is that, I ask, which can regard certain modes and relations of transgression or sin, and will not regard the transgression or sin itself?
5. God punishes sin either because he simply wills it, or
because it is just that sin should be punished. If because he simply wills
it, then the will of God is the alone cause of the perdition of a sinful
creature. But he himself testifies to the contrary, — namely, that man’s
ruin is of himself: “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is
thine help.”
I am truly ashamed of those divines who have nothing more
commonly in their mouths, both in their disputations and discourses to the
people, than “that God might by other means have provided for the safety
and honour of his justice, but that that way by the blood of his Son was
more proper and becoming.” So said
It is now time
to meet the objections of the adversaries, and so at length put an end to
this dispute, as far as regards the subject-matter of it, already drawn out
to such a length, and yet farther to be continued. We must first, then,
encounter the Socinians themselves, on whose account we first engaged in
this undertaking; and afterward we shall compare notes with a few learned
friends. But as very lately the Racovian
Catechism The Racovian
Catechism is generally said to have been compiled by
The Socinians grant, in that catechism of theirs, the
argument for the satisfaction of Christ, drawn from the nature of this
punitory justice, to be “plausible in appearance;” yea, they must
necessarily acknowledge it to be such as that they cannot, even in
appearance, oppose it, without being guilty of the dreadful sacrilege of
robbing God of his essential attributes, and, therefore, they deny either
this justice or sparing mercy to be naturally inherent in God. And they
endeavour to defend the robbery by a threefold argument. Their first is
this:— “As to mercy, that it is not inherent in God, in the manner that
they think, Let the reader remember that the compilers of the Racovian Catechism are now speaking, and
that the words “they think” allude to the sentiments of the orthodox. —
Tr. De Provid., cap. xxii.
assert. 6, p. 345.
But, “That punitory justice,” say they, “which you assign as the source of punishment, is opposite to mercy.” How, I say, can that be? Punitory justice, essentially considered, is the very perfection and rectitude of God itself, essentially considered; and the essence of mercy, so to speak, is the same. But the essence of God, which is most simple, is not opposed to itself. Moreover, both have their actual egresses by means of the acts of the divine will, which is always one alone and self-consistent. Objectively considered, I acknowledge they have different but not contrary effects; for to punish the impenitent guilty, for whom no satisfaction hath been made, is not contrary to the pardoning of those who believe and are penitent, through the blood of the Mediator, which was shed for the remission of sins. In one word, it is not necessary that, though actions be contrary, the essential principles should also be contrary.
Thus far concerning mercy.
The objections that they bring against justice are easily answered. “If justice be naturally inherent in God,” say they, “then he could let no sin pass unpunished.” We readily grant that God passes by no sin unpunished, nor can do it. He forgives our sins, but he doth not absolutely let them pass unpunished. Every sin hath its just recompense of reward, either in the sinner or the surety; but to pardon sin for which justice hath been satisfied is no wise contrary to justice. That the nature of justice and mercy, in respect of their relation to their object, is different, hath been shown before. Such is their first argument; the second follows, which is this:—
“That justice which the adversaries oppose to mercy,” say they, “whereby God punisheth sins, the sacred Scriptures nowhere point out by the name of ‘justice,’ but call it the ‘anger and fury of God.’ ”
We answer, in the first place, that it is a very gross
mistake that we oppose justice to mercy. These catechists have need
themselves to be catechised. In the second place, let those who shall
please to consult the passages formerly mentioned and explained on this
head, determine whether the sacred Scriptures call this justice This
point is treated at great length, and clearly proved, in the third chapter.
— Tr. The original word means a just
sentence, or righteous judgment. — Tr.
“When God forgives sins, it is attributed in Scripture to
his justice. ‘If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us
our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.’ ‘Being justified
freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom
God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to
declare The argument from
Chap.
xxiii., title, “Of the Power of God,” p. 181, etc.
First, then, he asserts, “That God hath a power of inflicting and of not inflicting punishment, but that it is by no means repugnant to divine justice to pardon the sinner whom by his right he might punish.”
But here
But that God punishes omissions and avenges transgressions,
as the supreme Lord As supreme Lord of the universe he exerciseth an
uncontrolled dominion, doing “in the army of heaven, and among the
inhabitants of the earth,” whatsoever seemeth good unto him; but as the
Ruler and Judge of the world he distributeth impartial justice, “giving to
every one according to his works.” The force of this argument, then, is
this, — That in viewing God as punishing sin, we are not to consider him as
supreme Lord, who may exercise an absolute and uncontrolled will, but as a
righteous Judge, bound by a law to administer justice, and by a law founded
in his nature, necessarily requiring him so to do. — Tr.
“He injures none, whether he punish or do not punish, if so be that the question is only respecting his right: for the punishment is not owing to the offending person, but he owes it, and he owes it to him upon whom the whole injury will ultimately redound; who in this matter is God. But if you consider the matter in itself, every one has it in his power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to prosecute it, or to yield up of it as much as he pleases; for this is the nature of a proper and sovereign right.”
Ans. It is easy to be seen that the former fallacy diffuses its fibres through the whole of this reasoning; for the right, a dispensation with which he maintains to be lawful, he affirms to be a sovereign right, or the right of a lord and master. But this right is not the subject in question. It is a ruler and judge to whom punishment belongs, and who repays it. I would not, indeed, deny that God’s supreme and sovereign right has a place in the matter of the satisfaction made by Christ in our stead: for although to inflict punishment be the office of a ruler and judge (that both these relations, namely, of a ruler and judge, are to be assigned to God, the Scriptures amply testify, — see chap. iii.), yet the very translation of guilt from us upon Christ, constituting him sin for us, is a most free act, and an act of supreme power; unless, perhaps, the acceptance of the promise made by the surety belong of right to him as ruler, and there be no other act to be assigned to God.
But let us consider these arguments of The translation of the last clause is
ambiguous. The words in the original are, “Justitiæ illius, cui pœnas irrogare incumbit,” —
“That justice on which rests the obligation, which is bound, to inflict the
punishment.” — Ed.
The debt of a sinner is not any valuable consideration
due to him, as a debt is to a creditor, but due by him as a debt is by a
debtor; and in consequence of the failure of payment, punishment becomes
due to him, — i.e., is or may be inflicted in vindication of violated
justice. But this is what he could not either claim or would wish to
receive. — Tr.
He thus proceeds: “But if you consider the thing in itself, every one has it in his power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to prosecute it, or to yield up of it as much as he pleases.”
Ans. As
There is, then, a double right; — in the first place, that
of a debt; in the second place, that of government. What
is purely a debt may be forgiven; for that only takes place in those things
which are of an indifferent right, the prosecution of which neither nature
nor justice obliges. There is also a debt, though perhaps improperly so
called, the right of which it is unlawful to renounce; but our sins, in
respect of God, are not debts only nor properly, but metaphorically Sin is
most accurately defined by our Westminster divines, in that inimitable
compendium of sound doctrine, the Shorter Catechism, to be “any want of conformity
unto, or transgression of, the law of God.” — Tr.
The right of government, moreover, is either
natural or positive. The positive right of
government, so to speak, is that which magistrates have over their
subjects; and he who affirms that they can recede wholly from this right
must be either a madman or a fool. But this right, as far as pertains to
its exercise in respect of the infliction
There is also a natural right of government; such
is the divine right over the creatures. The right, I say, of God over
rational creatures is natural to him; therefore immutable, indispensable,
and which cannot by any means be derogated. Thence, too, the debt of our
obedience is natural and indispensable; nor is there any other kind of
obligation to punishment. God, from the very nature of the thing, has
dominion over us; and our subjection to him is either by obedience or a
vicarious punishment, which comes in place of any omission or transgression
on our part, as
The remaining objections, which are interspersed here and
there in that book of his “Concerning God,” against the vindicatory justice of God, either
fall in with those which have been mentioned from
We think proper, by way of conclusion, to annex some
concessions of Book i. chap. xxiii., p. 180, “Of the True Religion.” Chap. xxviii. Chap. xxii.
186, and chap. xxviii.
Chap. xxx. 3, 9. Chapt. i. p. 78, of his
Answer to
Grotius.
Namely, Whether vindicatory justice be essential and natural to God, and the exercise of it, or the punishment of sin, consequently necessary? — Tr.
We come now to
But, on the other hand, gallantly supposing that he had removed this justice out of the way, as if the business were entirely settled, and the strong tower of his adversaries destroyed, he highly glories in the triumphs acquired for himself and his followers; “for,” says he, “having got rid of this justice, had we no other argument, that human fiction of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ must be thoroughly detected, and totally vanish.” This vain boasting of his the learned and pious have long ago sufficiently checked by innumerable testimonies from Scripture.
And forasmuch as the fact is abundantly clear that Christ bore our sins, God laying them upon him, and that by his satisfaction he purchased eternal salvation, though it had even pleased God to keep the causes and reasons of this infinitely wise transaction hid to all eternity in the abyss of his own goodness and wisdom, it would have been our duty to acquiesce in the infinite holiness and wisdom of his will. So, also, it is beyond any doubt that no helps of our faith are to be despised, and that no revelations of the divine nature and will are to be neglected, by which our merciful Father leads us into a more intimate and saving knowledge of this mystery of holiness.
We, also, to whom the most sacred deposit of this divine
truth hath been committed, would immediately judge ourselves unworthy of it
should we spontaneously betray any one point or jot of it, much less so
strong a pillar of our faith and hope, to its adversaries. Though, then,
we have other unanswerable proofs of the satisfaction of Christ, which the
gates of hell shall in vain oppose, and numberless testimonies of the God
who cannot lie, so that we may suppose
In the first place, then, in the first chapter of the
before-mentioned book, when going to dispute against this justice, he
supposes that, according to our opinion, it is opposed to mercy, and that
it is contrary to it, and builds upon this false supposition through the
whole of his treatise, both in making his objections and answers. I
acknowledge that he seized the opportunity of making this blunder from
But he again affirms, in the same chapter, “That the justice of God is twofold: that one kind he always uses when he punishes abandonedly wicked and obstinate sinners, sometimes, according to his law; the other kind, when he punishes sinners neither obstinate nor altogether desperate, but whose repentance is not expected.” And of both these kinds of justice he brings some proofs from Scripture.
That punitory justice is one alone and individual, we
affirm; but that it is variously exercised, on account of the difference of
the objects about which it is employed, we acknowledge; — but this by no
means proves it to be twofold; for he ought not, among men, to be said to
be endowed with a twofold justice who renders different recompenses to
those who merit differently. But his whole treatise, from beginning to
end, is disgracefully built on a mistaken and falsely-assumed principle;
for he supposes that “every sin shall not receive its just recompense of
reward” from divine justice, but that God punishes some sins, and can
punish others only if he please. From an exceeding desire to exclude all
consideration of the satisfaction of Christ entirely in the matter of
inflicting punishment for sins, he
But coming to himself again, he denies that in the sacred writings there is any mention at all made of any kind of justice that is opposed to mercy. We, indeed, have never said that justice is opposed to mercy; but as it clearly appears that it is his wish to deny to God the whole of that kind of justice whence, in punishing sins, he is said, or may be said, to be just (which punishment is an effect different from the pardon of sin that flows from mercy), we choose not to contend about words. Let us see, then, what kind of arguments he produces to support his robbing God of this essential attribute. He says, “that the word ‘justice,’ when applied to God in the sacred writings, is never opposed to ‘mercy,’ but chiefly, and for the most part, means rectitude and equity.”
It hath been already several times shown that justice and mercy are not opposite. We have likewise demonstrated, by many proofs adduced before, that the rectitude or supreme perfection of the divine nature is often called “justice” in Scripture; but this, I am sure, is by no means of advantage, but of much hurt, to the cause of Socinianism. Let him proceed, then.
“But that,” says he, “which is opposed to ‘mercy’ is not named ‘justice’ by the sacred writers, but is called ‘severity,’ or ‘anger,’ or ‘fury,’ or ‘vengeance,’ or by some such name.”
But our opponent avails himself nothing by this assertion;
for that which is false proves nothing. By that which, he says, is opposed
to mercy, he understands that virtue in God by which he punishes sins and
sinners according as they deserve. But that this is never called “justice”
in Scripture, or that God is not thence said to be “just,” is so manifestly
false that nobody would dare to affirm it but one determined to say any
thing in support of a bad cause. Let the reader but consult the passages
adduced on this head in the third chapter, and he will be astonished at the
impudence of the man. But That is, by consequence. — Tr.
He next proceeds to produce some passages, in order to prove that the justice of God in the sacred writings, — namely, that universal justice which we have before described, — is often used for the infinite rectitude of the divine nature (what nobody ever denied), where, in mentioning the justice of faithfulness and remunerative justice, agreeably to his faithfulness, which always hath respect to the covenant of grace ratified and established in the blood of Christ, God is said to pardon sins, and to reward those that believe, according to his justice; and thence he concludes, “that a justice opposed to mercy, by which God must punish sin, is not inherent in God.” “For what,” says he, “is more agreeable to the divine nature, and consequently more equitable and just, than to do good to the wretched and despised race of mankind, though unworthy, and freely to make them partakers of his glory?”
This surely is trifling in a serious matter, if any thing
can be so called; for even novices will not bear one to argue from a
position of universal justice to a negation of particular justice; much
less shall we readily assent to him, who maintain that that particular
justice is by no means distinguished from the universal rectitude of the
divine nature, but that that rectitude is so called in respect of the
egresses that it has, in consequence of the supposition of sin. But it is
consonant with sound doctrine, “that that which is agreeable to the divine
nature should be considered also as righteous and just;” and this
But
In the third part and first chapter of his treatise, being determined to contend to his utmost against the satisfaction of Christ, he maintains “That God, consistently with his right, could pardon our sins without any real satisfaction received for them;” and he endeavours to support the assertion chiefly by the following argument, — namely, “That God is our creditor, that our sins are debts which we have contracted with him, but that every one may yield up his right, and more especially God, who is the supreme Lord of all, and extolled in the Scriptures for his liberality and goodness.” Hence, then, it is evident that God can pardon sins without any satisfaction received; and that he is inclined to do so, he uses his best endeavours afterward to prove.
But because he foresaw that his first supposition, the
foundation of his whole future reasoning, was too much exposed and
obnoxious to the divine justice, he labours hard in the first chapter to
remove that out of the way entirely. Let us attend, then, to his
reasoning, and follow him step by step: for if he have not insuperably, and
beyond all confutation, proved that God can forgive sins without a
satisfaction, what he afterward argues concerning the will, liberality,
“But you will say, ‘It is necessary that God should take care to satisfy his justice, which he cannot even himself renounce, unless he in a manner deny himself.’ ”
Ans. You are right,
“All along, from the beginning of this answer,” says he, “I have sufficiently shown that that justice which you contend ought at all events to be satisfied is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will; for when God punishes sinners, that we may call this work of his by some worthy name, we say that he then exerciseth justice: wherefore, there is no need that God should either provide for the satisfaction of that justice or renounce it.”
Ans. We have already considered what
Distrusting, then, what he had formerly asserted (or it being manifestly of no weight), he attempts again by other sophisms to establish the reasoning which he had formerly begun. And he thus proceeds:—
“But besides the arguments which I have already used to prove that that justice is not inherent in God, it chiefly appears from this, that were it naturally resident in God, he could never pardon not even the least transgression to any one; for God never doth any thing, nor can do any thing, that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him. As, for instance, as wisdom and equity are naturally inherent in God, that justice never doth or can do any thing contrary to wisdom and equity, as we have seen above,” etc.
Yea, in common equity, nothing could be mentioned more inequitable and unwise than this would be opposite to justice, — namely, not to pardon those sins for which that justice hath been amply satisfied. And must, then, this heretic, not only for nothing, substitute his own most absurd, yea, execrable opinion, namely, “That Jesus Christ hath not made satisfaction for our sins, nor borne their punishment,” — that is, that he was not “made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him,” — an opinion neither proved, nor that will ever be proved to all eternity; but also insinuate it as a proof of another error, which that alone, it is evident, first begot in his mind? Indeed, I cannot sufficiently wonder that some, by the sophisms of such disputants, are so easily “removed unto another gospel,” forsaking “him that called them into the grace of Christ.”
“But that justice,” says
A fine painter’s show-board, but void of truth.
Ans. What the adversary so often yelps out is
totally without foundation, — namely, that that justice is never called by
its proper
Our opponent thus proceeds:— “If that justice be inherent in God, — that is, if there be any property in God which is altogether inclined expressly to punish any sins of mankind whatsoever, whether penitent or impenitent, — he neither spares nor can spare any one; for as to what your teachers in the church have devised, that according to this justice he can punish sin, even though the sinner should not be punished, that is quite inconsistent with this and every other kind of justice.”
Our opponent again idly fancies that we are hard pressed by
this conclusion. We grant, yea, we solemnly believe and declare, that
because of his justice God can never spare any sinner, unless he expressly
punish his sins in another. But he artfully and shrewdly endeavours to
load our opinion with prejudice, insinuating “that God then could not even
spare the penitent.” But we believe all repentance of sin to be founded in
the satisfaction and blood of Christ; for “him hath God exalted with his
right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel,
and forgiveness of sins.”
Hitherto our opponent hath discovered nothing but mere
fancies, vain repetitions, absurd allegations, and a shameful ignorance of
the argument. He thus proceeds: “But should you say, that by the same
reasoning it may be proved that mercy is not inherent in God; for if it
were, he could never inflict punishment on any, as mercy is
It hath been shown already that it is not proved by such
reasoning as this that justice is not inherent in God; nor from the force
of such an argument will it easily appear that the divine mercy suffers any
degradation. What he supposes, in the first place, is altogether without
foundation, namely, “That the divine mercy is nothing else than to forgive
offenders;” whereas in this an external effect of that mercy only is shown,
which is itself an essential property of the divine nature, for he
pardoneth sins because he is merciful. The supposition, also, is
groundless, “That if mercy were inherent in God he could never inflict
punishment on any;” for to inflict punishment on the impenitent, and those
for whose sins the divine justice hath in no manner been satisfied, is not
opposite to mercy. For mercy in God is not a sympathy or condolence with
the miseries of others, with an inclination of assisting them, — a virtue
which ofttimes borders near upon vice, — but is that supreme perfection of
the divine nature whereby it is naturally disposed to assist the miserable,
and which, the proper suppositions That is, the existence and misery of a
rational creature being supposed. — Tr.
“But it is evident,” says he, “that neither the justice nor
mercy of which we are treating is inherent in God, from what we read,
namely, that he is ‘The Lord
God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness;’ See
Our opponent again very improperly applies a comparison
made between external acts to the internal habits themselves. That anger
and compassion, which are only attributed to God effectively, are free
effects of the divine will, limited as to their object, and unequal, which
cannot be exercised about the same person, in their highest degree, we
acknowledge; Omitted: “though it is plain from the holy Scriptures
that God not unfrequently manifests some kind of anger, in his paternal
chastisements, towards those who all the while are the objects of his
supreme love and mercy.” — Ed.
But there is no reason that what is applicable to acts, or
rather to effects, should also be applicable to the perfections whence
these flow. But in that promulgation of the glory or name of God which we
have in
See
“Hence it is manifest how grievously they err who affirm
both this justice and mercy of God to be infinite; for as to justice, being
deceived by the appearance of the word, they see not that they say no more
than this, that the severity and anger of God are infinite, contrary to the
most express testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, which, as we have just
now said, declare God to be ‘slow to anger.’ That divine justice which hath
no limit is not this of which we are discoursing, but that which alone, as
we have seen before, is distinguished by this illustrious name in
Scripture, and which, by another
Our opponent here serves up again nothing but his old dish,
variously dressed, and repeatedly refused. We declare justice to be
infinite, not deceived by the show of a word, but being so taught by the
express testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, and by the most convincing
and unanswerable arguments, — and we solemnly maintain it, not only with
regard to that universal justice which may be called rectitude (though
improperly), but also concerning that particular sin-avenging justice,
which we deny to differ, either essentially or subjectively, That is,
as it relates to God, who is the subject of it. — Tr. See
But it would be altogether superfluous here again to repeat what we have before clearly settled concerning this justice, or again to recite the texts of Scripture formerly adduced. The sum is this: Sin-avenging justice differs not in reality from that universal justice which our opponent does not deny to be perpetually inherent in God and a natural attribute. It is only distinguished from it in respect of its egress to its own proper object; for the egresses of justice against sin flow from the most holy perfection of Deity itself. But anger and severity, so far as they may be reduced to that justice which is manifested in them, are also infinite; in respect of their effects, they have their limits assigned them by the wisdom and justice of God. These things, however, have been proved before.
But let the pious reader judge whether our opponent, who hath presumed to call the highest mystery of the gospel, the alone foundation of the salvation of sinners, the darling jewel of our religion, the greatest testimony of the divine love, our victory over the devil, death, and hell, “a human fiction,” had sufficient cause to annex so dreadful an omission to the conclusion of this so long continued debate. He adds, in the last place, —
“But as to mercy, that is, the pardon of sins, how dare
they affirm that to be infinite, when it is evident from the whole of
Scripture that God doth not always use it, but frequently exerciseth
vengeance
Ans. On these heads a few observations shall
suffice:— 1. It is affirmed, without any show of reason, that mercy in God
is not infinite, because sometimes he exerciseth severity; that
is, that God cannot be called merciful, if he punish any guilty and
impenitent sinners. To prove mercy to be an essential property of God, it
is sufficient that he exercises it towards any: for in this very matter,
that ought to be set down as a natural perfection in God which is the
proper and immediate source and ground of that operation: which attributes
(mercy and justice) have no egress but towards objects placed in particular
circumstances; nor have they any effects without some free act of the
divine will intervening. See
2. By what argument will our opponent prove that the
relation between mercy and justice is in such a manner the same, that
because God exerciseth no mercy towards some, — that is, so as to pardon
their sins, — that therefore he should not account it necessary to exercise
justice towards every sin? We have formerly mentioned in what view they
are distinct, — namely, that God is bound to exercise mercy to none, but
that he cannot but exercise his justice towards sinners (provided he be
inclined to be just), if he would preserve his natural right and dominion
over his creatures, and the holiness and purity of his nature uninjured and
entire; for disobedience would
But while
For what need I say more? Doth not God exercise supreme
and infinite mercy towards us, miserable and lost sinners, in pardoning our
sins through Christ? Have we deserved any such thing, who, after doing all
that we can do, even when roused and assisted by his grace, are still
unprofitable servants? Did we appoint a sacrifice, that his anger might be
averted, and that an atonement to his justice might be made from our own
store-house, sheep-fold, or herd? Yea, when we were enemies to him,
alienated from his life, without help and without strength, dead in
trespasses and in sins, knowing of no such thing, wishing for or expecting
no such thing, he himself “made Christ to be sin for us, who knew no sin,”
that he might “save us from the wrath to come;” that, an expiation being
made for our sins, we might be presented blameless before him, to the
praise and glory of his grace. But whether he showed the strictest justice
and severity towards our surety, over whom he exercised a most gracious
care, “Behold my servant,
whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth.” —
Whether, then, when our opponent, relying on these subtleties of his, concludes, “That there is no justice in God which dictates the necessity of punishing sin, and that therefore there is no reason why God cannot freely pardon the sins of whomsoever he may please, without any satisfaction received,” and then, as if he had accomplished a glorious achievement, triumphs over the cross of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, be not acting the part of a most silly trifler and absurd heretic, let the reader determine. But, as all the arguments which he afterward uses against the satisfaction of Christ have their foundation in this most false supposition, which the Scriptures, as hath been shown, so often contradict, and on which he always depends in all his disputations, whether those have acted for the interest of the church of God who have voluntarily surrendered to him this impregnable tower of truth, which he hath in vain laid siege to, that he might with greater audacity carry on his attacks upon the gospel, is well known to God. We, as we hope, instructed by his word, entertain very different sentiments from theirs on this point.
But when our opponent has come to the conclusion of this dispute, he introduces many fictions about the mere good-will of God in pardoning sins, about his ceasing from his right without injury to any one, about the injustice of the substitution of a surety in the room of sinners; — all which arguments, as they depend on a false foundation, yea, on a most base error, it would be easy here to show how vain, false, inconclusive, and absurd they are, unless we had determined, with God’s will, to explain the doctrine of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, the greatest treasure of the gospel, and to defend and vindicate it from the unjust calumnies of heretics, in the proper place and time.
We come now to
those, and the consideration of their opinion, who, agreeing with us
concerning the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, They agree that the satisfaction by Christ is the way of
salvation revealed in the Scriptures, but that it is so because God willed
it should be so, and deny that there was any necessity for such a
satisfaction arising from the nature of divine justice. — Tr.
But those who maintain this opinion are so numerous and respectable, and men who have merited so highly of the church of God, that although the freeman of Christ, and taught to call no man on earth master in matters of religion, unless I had on my side not fewer and equally famous men, I should have a religious scruple publicly to differ from them. I acknowledge that every, even the least particle of divine truth is furnished from heaven with authority towards every disciple of Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life, of holding it fast in the love and admiration of it, and of enforcing its claim, defence, and declaration, even though the whole world should rise up against him; but, perhaps, it would be unbecoming in one who would cheerfully enter as a disciple to oppose such great, learned men, and those, too, so well trained to the field of dispute, unless supported by the dignity and suffrages of others not inferior even to those in merit.
But if modesty must be violated, all will agree that it ought to be violated in the cause of truth, and especially as I perceive that the authority of some theologians is of so great weight with many of our countrymen, that, not having duly weighed and pondered the matter, but relying on this, they go into the opinion contrary to that which we have undertaken to defend. Considering it of importance to weigh the arguments which these very illustrious men have used, although I know myself not only unequal to the task, but that, in marshalling the line for such a controversy, I am not deserving of even a third or fourth place from the van, having been only accustomed to the popular mode of declaiming; however, I do not fear to engage in this undertaking, whatever it be, nothing doubting but that from my attempt, though weak, the readers will easily perceive that the truth might triumph gloriously, were any one furnished with better abilities to come forward in its defence.
But here, first of all the antagonists, and who, indeed, is
almost equal to them all, the very learned
The consideration of
This most absurd opinion, so highly derogatory to divine grace and the merit of the death of Christ, this illustrious man was inclined to differ from, so far that he maintained that that consideration, namely, “That God could forgive sins, his justice notwithstanding, as having been satisfied,” had no place among the effects of Christ’s death.
But
Nor can I at all see how this divine truth of ours should
contribute to the support of Arminianism, as this illustrious writer seems
to signify; for is he who says that Christ by his death and satisfaction
effected this, that God might forgive sins, his justice not opposing, bound
also to affirm that he accomplished nothing farther? God forbid. Yea, he
who, without the consideration of the oblation of Christ, could not but
punish sins, that oblation being made, cannot punish those sins for which
Christ offered himself;
The learned Namely,
There are two parts of the Twissian disputation. The first
is contained in four principal arguments, supported by various reasons, in
which he attacks this sentiment, — namely, “That God cannot without a
satisfaction forgive sin.” In the second, he endeavours to
As to what relates to the first or introductory part,
perhaps our labour may appear superfluous. The judicious
But neither the plan of our work permits us to withdraw
from this undertaking, though unequal to it, nor, perhaps, hath
The first argument of this great man is this: “If God cannot forgive sins without a satisfaction, it is either because he cannot on account of his justice, or because he cannot by his power; but neither of these can be affirmed.”
Ans. That enumeration of the divine attributes, as
to the present cause, is mere trifling: for what God cannot do in respect
of one attribute, he can do in respect of none; or, in
other words, that which
But our learned antagonist leads the proof of it through
its parts; and, first, after a marginal animadversion on a certain
oversight of
“For,” says he, “if God by his might or absolute power cannot pardon sin, then it is absolutely impossible for sin to be pardoned, or not to be punished; therefore, not to pardon sin consists of contradictory terms. The contradiction, then, ought to be shown, as none appears from the formal terms. And, on the other hand, it is evident that man not only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies when they transgress against him.”
Ans. The non-punishment of sin implies a contradiction, — not, indeed, formally and in the terms, but virtually and eminently in respect of the thing itself: for, in the first place, it implies that God is the Lord of mankind by a natural and indispensable right, but that mankind are not subject to him, neither as to obedience nor as to punishment, which would be the direct case if sin should pass with impunity; for that natural and necessary dependence being cut off (which, also, in another respect is moral) which accords to a rational creature in respect of its Creator and supreme Lord, which really comes to pass by means of sin, it cannot be renewed or made amends for but by punishment. In the second place, to hate sin, that is, to will to punish it, and not to hate sin, to will to let it pass unpunished, are manifestly contradictory.
If you say that God hath it in his power not to hate sin,
you say that he hath the contrary in his power, — that is, that he can love
sin; for if he hate sin of his free will, he may will the contrary, for
“the divine will is not so determinately inclined towards any secondary
object by any thing in itself that can justly oppose its inclination to its
opposite.” This
Ans. The supposition is denied, that God may do
what man may do. That learned man raises this objection himself, that man
may sin, which God cannot do, and at great length, and with much erudition,
explains away this example. But as this instance of
I say, then, in the first place, that divine and human forgiveness are plainly of a different kind. The forgiveness of man only respects the hurt; the forgiveness of God respects the guilt. Man pardons sins so far as any particular injury hath been done himself; God pardons sin as the good of the universe is injured. Secondly, Neither is it in the power of every man to let sins pass unpunished, yea, of none absolutely to whom the right of punishing is competent; for although a private person may recede from his right, which for the most part is of charity, yet it is by no means allowed to a public person to renounce his right, which is a right of government, especially if that renunciation should in any way turn out to the hurt of the public. In the third place, then, I say that that instance is nothing to the purpose; for although a private person may, at certain times, renounce his right and dominion in certain cases, and ought to do so, it doth not follow from that that God, whose right and dominion is natural and indispensable, and which he cannot renounce unless he deny himself, can do the same. In the fourth place, the non-punishment of sin is an injury to the universe; for the glory of divine justice would be affronted with impunity.
Our celebrated antagonist proceeds to the consideration of
divine justice. “But neither,” says he, “can it be consistently said that
God cannot do this because of his justice, if it be supposed that he can do
it by his power. But
Ans. We maintain that God from his nature cannot do
this, and, therefore, that he cannot either by his power or his justice;
and as our learned antagonist produces no argument to prove that God can do
it without resistance from his justice, but what flows from this false
supposition, that he can do it by his power, it is not necessary to give
ourselves any trouble on this head. But to
The second is this: “If God cannot let sin pass unpunished, then he must punish it from an absolute necessity; but this no one can maintain consistently with reason.”
This consequence the learned doctor supposes, without any
argument to support it; but we deny the consequence, nor will he ever be
able to prove that there is no other kind of necessity but an absolute
necessity. There is also a necessity arising from a supposed condition,
and which deprives not the agent of a concomitant liberty. God could not
but create the world; but God did not create the world from an absolute
necessity, although it was necessary upon a supposition that it should be
created. It is necessary that God should speak truly, but he doth not
speak from an absolute necessity; but it being supposed that he wills to
speak, it is impossible that he should not speak truly. We say, therefore,
that God cannot but punish sin, or that he necessarily punishes sin; not,
however, from an absolute necessity of nature, as the Father begets the
Son, but upon the suppositions Namely, That he willed to create a
rational being, and to permit it to transgress the law of its creation. —
Tr.
“But that necessity,” you will say, “of what kind soever it
be, flows from the nature of God, not his will or decree; but all necessity
of nature seems to be absolute.” I acknowledge, indeed, that all necessity
of nature, considered in the first act and thing signified, “Actu primo et signato,” — “In its first
and manifested act, its first act and manifestation.” — Ed.
Ans.
The argument which the celebrated
At the end of the “Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione
Christi,” by
But this learned man is mistaken when he imagines that we
affirm God to be such a natural agent as must, without sense and
immediately, operate upon the object that is receptive of it, in a manner
altogether natural, and without any concomitant liberty, — that is, without
any free act of understanding or volition; for although God be “a consuming
fire,” he is an intellectual one. Nor is a sinner alone an object properly
receptive of the exercise of God’s vindicatory justice, as he hath
committed the transgressions in his own person; for antecedent to every act
of that justice, properly so called, in respect of the elect, God appointed
a surety, and this surety being appointed, and all the sins of the elect
laid upon him, he in their room and stead is the proper object of this
vindicatory justice, so far as relates to their sins. “For he hath made
him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the
righteousness of God in him,”
But
But although these arguments are specious, yet, strictly
considered, they have no greater weight than those already discussed; for
in the
“But,” says our celebrated antagonist, “if disobedience thus deserve punishment, why should not obedience in like manner deserve a reward, for no reason to the contrary can be assigned?” I wish this learned man had not so expressed himself, for he will never be able to prove that the relation of obedience to reward and disobedience to punishment is the same; for between obedience and the reward there intervenes no natural obligation. God is brought under an obligation to no one for any kind of obedience; for “after we have done all, we are still unprofitable servants.” But God’s right that rational creatures should be subject to him, either by obedience or a vicarious punishment, is indispensable. In a word, obedience is due to God in such a manner, that from the nature of the thing he can be debtor to none in conferring rewards; but disobedience would destroy all dependence of the creature upon God, unless a recompense be made by punishment.
The celebrated
The third argument is this: “God can inflict a milder punishment than sin deserves; therefore, he can by his absolute power suspend the punishment altogether.”
Ans. I answer, that the punishment which a sin
deserves may be considered in a twofold point of view:— 1. As by means of
it God compels to order a disobedient creature, that hath cast off its
dependence on his supreme and natural dominion, in such a manner that his
will may be done with that creature, that is itself unwilling to do it; and
in this point of view he cannot inflict a more mild punishment than sin
deserves. Yea, properly speaking, in this respect it cannot be said to
admit of degrees, either milder or more severe. And in this sense we
simply deny the foregoing proposition. 2. It may be considered in this
other point of view, — namely, as God, for the greater manifestation of his
glory, hath assigned to it modes, degrees, and other circumstances. But if
punishment be considered in this view, we deny the sequel; Namely,
That God, by his absolute power, can suspend the punishment of sin
altogether. — Tr.
What says our learned antagonist to this? He supposes the
author of the supplement his opponent, and discusses his opinion in a
variety of subtile reasonings, in his answer concerning the extent and
different
But this learned gentleman has still something to oppose to
our reasoning; for he thus proceeds, “God may reward beyond merit;
therefore, he may punish less than what is merited.” But this reason is
evidently of no force; for besides that arguments from opposites do not
hold always good in theology, as hath been shown in various instances by
That is, their relation to their
objects, or their qualities considered in this point of view, is different.
Divine justice necessarily operates towards its object to punish the
sinner, otherwise it would not be justice; but as no creature can merit any
thing of God, it depends on God’s good pleasure whether he bestow rewards
or not. — Tr.
But forasmuch as Socinians
The divine dispensation, then, with the punishment of sins,
respects either temporary or eternal punishment; but a temporary punishment
may be considered either in respect of monitory threats or of a peremptory
decree, and both in respect of the time of the infliction and of the
degrees in the punishment to be inflicted. But God, as the avenger of sin,
is considered in Scripture in a twofold point of view:— 1. As the
Legislator and supreme Lord of the Jews and their commonwealth; whose
state, from that circumstance,
“God is able,” says he, “to inflict any torture, however
great, even an infernal one, upon any person, without the consideration of
Ans. 1. We have before observed that this mode of reasoning does not always hold good in theology; neither, however, in the second place, are these opposites, namely, to inflict torture and to suspend punishment, for torture and punishment are different. But to inflict an infernal punishment upon any innocent person is a thing impossible; for punishment supposes a transgression: and, therefore, not to inflict punishment upon a guilty person is also impossible; for transgression, from the very nature of the thing, requires punishment. But it is astonishing that this learned writer should insist on the proof of the sequel, namely, “That God is more willing to do good than to punish,” as he hath many times, by very strong arguments, disallowed the natural inclination of the Deity towards the good of the creature; nor will he ever be able to prove that God is inclined to bestow such kind of benefits on a sinful creature as are opposite to the punishment due to sin, without regard to Christ and his satisfaction. But that difference respects a will commanding and exhorting according to morality, not decreeing or acting naturally.
And these are what this learned writer calls his “principal
arguments;” in which he contends that God can let sin pass unpunished
without any satisfaction. I hope that impartial judges, however great
respect they may have for the name of
Our very learned antagonist adds other arguments to these;
some of which have been satisfactorily answered by
Namely,
The learned
A learned
protestant divine, who was born in Friesland, and lived 1556–1625. He wrote
several works against
But he brings a grievous charge, no less than even that of
atheism, against this sentiment of
Secondly, “Is God at all bound,” says our very learned
antagonist, “or in any manner obliged, to manifest his justice, more than
to manifest his mercy, munificence, and liberality? It is evident that God
is not bound to exercise any one property whatever more than
In what sense all things are said to be done by God
necessarily, though he be a free agent, hath been already explained. By
these arguments, then, whereby he endeavours to weigh down our opinion with
prejudices, it is evident that our antagonist hath nothing availed himself.
Let us now see whether he hath been more successful in his replies to
He briefly states five arguments of
That passage of the apostle to the Romans,
But, with this great man’s good leave, neither his mode of
disputing, — namely, by substituting a double argument in the place of one
solid and clear answer, — is at all satisfactory, nor are these arguments
of any service to his cause, the first of which is captious and not at all
solid, the other too nice and curious. For, first, See
The second argument which this learned writer uses to
confute the conclusion of
To the second proof brought from the word of God, declaring
himself by that name of his, “Who will by no means clear the guilty,”
But, 1. It is of no service to his cause to urge that God does not punish some guilty sinners in their own persons, but clears them, when this learned man grants, yea, contends, that they have all been punished in Christ their head, by whom justice was fully satisfied. 2. It hath been several times shown before how God, from a necessity of nature, punishes sin, and yet with a concomitant liberty of will; and the difference between justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise and egress towards their proper objects, hath been shown; so that we do not think it proper to insist farther on these at present. These considerations, then, being set aside, it is evident that this learned man has not attended to the force of the argument: for it does not amount to this, that in respect of the event God clears none unpunished, either in themselves or in their surety, — an assertion which nobody but a Socinian speaks against; but rather to this, that as punitory justice is a natural attribute of God, a very considerable portion of his essential glory, yea, a well-known name of God, he can “by no means clear the guilty,” unless he were to deny himself, and deliver up his glory to another, — than which nothing is farther from God. But those for whom the divine justice hath been satisfied by Christ ought not, in respect of the demand of that justice, to be called guilty, for their obligation to punishment, namely, the guilt of sin, is taken away; so that it is just with God to deliver them from the wrath to come, although it be free to him at what time he may will that that deliverance, in respect of them, should take place and be manifested to their consciences, that so “being justified by faith, they may have peace with God.”
To those verses cited by
I am not altogether satisfied with this assertion, “That God doth not punish all who work iniquity;” neither does the instance of the elect confirm it, for even the learned gentleman does not deny that all their sins have been punished in Christ. We maintain alone that God cannot but punish every sin, because he is just; but whether he choose to do this in their own persons or in their surety rests entirely with himself: therefore, it doth not derogate from his justice that he transferred the sins of some upon Christ, and punished them in him. But they themselves, though personally guilty before Christ took their guilt upon himself, are not, however, punished, nor can be accounted guilty in respect of the judgment of God, their sins not being imputed to them; or, they ought to be said to have been punished in Christ their head, with whom they are now closely united. In the second place, we have shown before, and the learned gentleman acknowledges it, that a free act of the will may be consistent with some regard to necessity.
Allow me, then, from these three passages of Scripture
cited by See
Being founded on the words of
Scripture. — Tr.
But “Objects to the argument
on various grounds, which we shall, as briefly as possible, consider in
succession.” — Ed.
“But let
But neither is this comparison between things dissimilar of the smallest advantage to our adversary’s cause: for, — 1. The objects themselves about which these attributes are employed are very different; for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison formed between the giving to every one according to his right, and giving to some beyond their right? That to give to any one beyond his right is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares; but to give to every one his own, or what is due to him, the very thing itself requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of the Deity whether he may will to be bounteous, towards any; but who but an impious wretch would be bold enough to dispute whether he may will to be just towards any? But besides; supposing a constant will in the Deity of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them more than they deserve, in what respect it would not be necessary (the question does not respect absolute necessity) to him to exercise that bounty towards these some, I absolutely do not comprehend. But with regard to the divine bounty, and in what sense that is ascribed to God, and what kind of habitude of the divine will it denotes, this is not the place to inquire.
He again says: “If hence it follow that it is necessary that God should give to each his due, it will certainly be necessary that he should give to each of us eternal damnation.”
That punishment belongs not to us, but to God himself, the
learned gentleman will afterward acknowledge. But God may give to every
one his own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment,
although he do not inflict it on the sinners themselves, but on their
surety, substituted in their room and stead. Thus he
To these he replies: “If justice be only the will of giving to every one his own, it is not the necessity of giving it.”
But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will
and necessity are not opposed, as a thing itself may be prior, and
the mode or affection of it posterior, to some other things, either in the
first or second act. God’s will of giving to every man his own was from
everlasting, justice being an essential attribute of his unchangeable
nature; but it is only after the supposition of a rational being that had
sinned, that he must necessarily, — that is, from the very principles of
his nature, — exercise that will towards sinners, and give them the wages
of sin, namely, death. — Tr.
The Latin is: “Cum prior res ipsa sit,
posterior aliquarum rerum, vel in actu primo vel secundo, modus seu
affectio,” — “Since the former is the thing itself, the latter a
mode or affection of some things,” etc. — Ed.
In the last place, then, this celebrated writer denies that
“punishment can properly be called ours, in such a sense that, from his
will of giving to every one his own, it should be necessary that God should
inflict it upon us sinners;” but he asserts that “it belongs to God, as
having the full power either of inflicting or relaxing it.” That
punishment is ours, or belongs to us, cannot be said with propriety; it
must be traced to the source whence it hath its rise, that is, whence it is
just that it should be inflicted upon sinners; but this is the just right
or righteous judgment of God,
We choose not to enter any farther on the arguments which
this learned writer advances, either in his disputations against
The
consideration of what our justly celebrated antagonist hath advanced
against A learned professor of
divinity at Herborn. He was born at Strasburg 1546, and died 1626. He was
the author of several commentaries, controversial treatises, and a
translation of the Bible into German. — Ed. “In
Collationem Vorstii.” The translation is not very intelligible.
The first argument, then, of It is not
First, then, he maintains, and with many laboured
arguments, that God doth not punish sin from a necessity of nature, which
excludes every kind of liberty. But whom do these kinds of arguments
affect? They apply not at all to us; for
Let us particularly examine some of this learned gentleman’s arguments: “If,” says he, “God must punish sin from a necessity of nature, he must punish it as soon as committed.” Granted, were he to act by such a necessity of nature as denotes a necessary principle and mode of acting; but not if by a necessity that is improperly so called, because it is supposed that his nature necessarily requires that he should so act. As, for instance: suppose that he wills to speak, he must, by necessity of his nature, speak truly, for God cannot lie; yet he speaks freely when he speaks truly.
Again: “If,” says he, “God punished from a necessity of nature, then, as often as he inflicted punishment, he would inflict it to the utmost of his power, as fire burns with all its force; but this cannot be said without blasphemy.”
Here again this learned man draws absurd conclusions from a
false supposition. The nature of God requires that he should punish as far
as is just, not as far as he is able. It is necessary, sin being supposed
to exist, that he should inflict punishment, — not the greatest that he is
able to inflict, but as great as his right and justice require; for in
inflicting punishment, he proceeds freely, according to the
To that asseveration of Abraham, “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?” he thus answers, “He will do right certainly, but his own right, and will exercise it according to his own free appointment. But without the divine appointment I acknowledge no right to the exercise of which God can be influenced by any kind of necessity.”
Ans. That God exerciseth his right, or doeth right,
according to his own free appointment, may be admitted in a sound sense;
for in that exercise of his right he uses volition and understanding, or,
more properly, he hath not appointed or determined so to act, for so to act
is natural and essential to him concerning the things about which there is
no free determination. It is, indeed, of the free determination of God
that any right can be exercised, or any attribute manifested, for he freely
decreed to create creatures, over which he hath a right, but he might not
have decreed it so; and in every exercise of his right there are certain
things, which we have mentioned before,
“But I cannot,” says this renowned man, “sufficiently
express my astonishment at this very grave divine’s assertion, Namely,
If by “willing evil antecedently” be understood his willing
to inflict evil without regard to the demerit of sin, it is a point too
intricate for me to determine. If the evil refer to the infliction of
it, I must differ from this learned doctor. If it refer to the
willing, the assertion avails not his cause; for if we suppose
that God, without doing injury to any one, without dishonouring any of his
own attributes, without regard to sin, hath decreed to punish a creature
for the sin that it was to commit, would it not thence follow that God
might let sin pass unpunished, in despite both of his own glory, and to the
entire destruction of the dependence of rational creatures. Because
if he punished a creature for sin merely because he willed or determined so
to do, and not because the nature of sin necessarily so required, he might
as easily will the contrary; and, consequently, the subordination of the
creature would be entirely subverted. — Tr.
But how many things are there which this learned gentleman
himself acknowledges that God, with respect to his decree, cannot do,
without any disparagement to his omnipotence! He could not break the bones
of Christ; but the person must be deprived of reason
After having brought the dispute thus far, and accurately
weighed what remains of
The
consideration of the arguments advanced by In his book on Providence,
chapter xxii. page 345, assert. 6.
But, with this great man’s leave, I must tell him that
The first, which he acknowledges to be taken from
As there is no need of a sword to cut this “indissoluble knot,” as he calls it, let us try by words what we can do to untie it. I answer, then, The devoting of Christ to death is taken in a twofold sense:— 1. For the appointment of Christ to the office of surety, and to suffer the punishment of our sins in our room and stead. 2. For the infliction of punishment upon Christ, now appointed our surety, and our delivery through his death being now supposed.
The devoting of Christ to death, considered in the first
sense, we deny to be an act of punitory justice, or to have arisen from
that justice; for that act by which God destined his Son to the work of
mediation, by which, in respect of their guilt, he transferred from us all
our sins and laid them upon Christ, are acts of supreme dominion,
What shall we say? — that even this learned man was aware of this twofold sense of the phrase, “The devoting of Christ to death?” He either had not thoroughly weighed that distinction, or else he is inconsistent with and shamefully contradicts himself; for in the beginning of the argument he asserts, that “the devoting of Christ to death had its rise from punitory justice,” but in the end he says it was from “free love.” But certainly punishing justice is not free love. He must, then, either acknowledge a twofold appointment of Christ to death, or he cannot be consistent with himself. But the passages of Scripture that he quotes evidently mean the appointment of Christ to death, as we have explained it in the first sense of the phrase.
What reason this learned man had for so much boasting of this argument as unanswerable, let the reader determine; to me it appears not only very easily answerable, but far beneath many others that one disputing on such a subject must encounter.
But he introduces some as making answers to his argument,
who affirm “That Christ was not innocent, but a sinner by imputation, and
made sin for us; and that it was necessary from the essential justice of
God, and his authority, as enjoining that he should make atonement for sin
in himself and in his own person.” “Necessary from the essential justice
of God that he should suffer the punishment due to sinners, either in his
own proper person, or in that of a surety.” — Ed.
I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who, from
no kind of necessity, but freely, frames answers to his
own arguments. Here he has exhibited such a one as nobody but himself
would have dreamed of; for although what your crazy disputants, or this
learned divine, fighting with himself, say be true, he must, however, be a
fool who can believe that it has any relation to the present subject. To
those adversaries who urge that “God freely punishes sin because he
punished his Son who knew no sin,” and who contend that “God may equally
not punish the guilty as punish the innocent,” we answer, that Christ,
though intrinsically and personally innocent, yet as he
was by substitution, and consequently legally, guilty, is no
instance of the punishment of an innocent person; for he was not punished
as the most innocent Son of God. Passing over these things, then, — and
indeed they are of no import to the present subject, — he endeavours to
prove, by several arguments, that God laid our sins upon Christ
“We readily grant,” says he, “upon supposition that Christ was made our surety by the decree of God, that he could not be but punished by God, and yet freely, as God created the world of mere free will, though necessarily, in respect of his immutability; for it cannot be that a free action should impose on God a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing.”
We have shown before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God in punishing sins. It is not an inanimate or merely physical necessity, as if God acted from principles of nature, in a manner altogether natural, — that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; for “he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.” But it is such a necessity as leaves to God an entire concomitant liberty in acting, but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent indifference, accomplishes its object, — namely, the punishment of sin, — the justice, holiness, and purity of God so requiring. But this necessity, though it hindereth not the divine liberty, any more than that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a decree, from the immutability of his nature, yet it arises not from a decree, but from things themselves particularly constituted, and not as the other kind of necessity, from a decree only. And, therefore, in those things which God does necessarily, merely from the supposition of a decree, the decree respects the thing to be done, and affects it antecedently to the consideration of any necessity incumbent on him; but in those whose necessity arises from the demand of the divine nature, a decree only supposes a certain condition of things, which being supposed, immediately, and without any consideration of any respect to a decree, it is necessary that one or another consequence should follow. As, for instance: after God decreed that he would create the world, it was impossible that he should not create it, because he is immutable, and the decree immediately respected that very thing, namely, the creation of it. But the necessity of punishing sin arises from the justice and holiness of God, it being supposed that, in consequence of a decree, a rational creature existed, and was permitted to transgress; but he punishes the transgression which he decreed to permit because he is just, and not only because he decreed to punish it. The necessity, then, of creating the world arises from a decree; the necessity of punishing sin, from justice.
“But it is impossible,” says
But by a “free action” it can be proved that certain things
may be placed in such a condition that God could not but exercise certain
What this learned writer farther adds in support of his argument is founded on a mistaken idea of the subject in question; for as the necessity of punishing sin arises from the right and justice of God, it is by no means necessary that he should punish it in one subject more than in another, but only that he should punish it, and that thereby his right may be restored and his justice satisfied.
The second argument of this learned writer is this: “As God freely has mercy on whom he will, — for he is under obligation to none, and yet mercy is essential to him, — so God does not by any necessity of nature owe punishment to a sinner. Although, then, man owe obedience to God, or a vicarious compensation by means of punishment, from the necessity of a decree, yet those who say that God, by necessity of nature, owes the good of punitory justice to the universe, which were he not to execute he would not be God, — those, I say, indirectly deny the existence of a God.”
Although any one may perceive that these assertions are
unsubstantial, unfounded, and more obscure than even the books of the
Sibyls, we shall, however, make a few observations upon them. In the first
place, then, it must be abundantly clear, from what has been already said,
that mercy and justice are different in respect of their exercise, nor need
we now farther insist on that point. But how this learned man will prove
that sparing mercy, — which, as not only the nature of the thing itself
requires, but even the Socinians with the orthodox agree, ought to be
viewed in the same light as punitory justice, — is essential to God, when
he affirms punitory justice to exist in God freely, I cannot conjecture.
But as there is no one Namely, mercy. —
Tr.
Secondly, God does not owe to the sinner punishment from a necessity of nature, but he owes the infliction of punishment on account of sin to his own right and justice, for thence the obligation of a sinner to punishment arises; nor is the debt of obedience in rational creatures resolvable into a decree in any other respect than as it is in consequence of a decree that they are rational creatures.
In the third place, the conclusion of this argument would require even the Delian swimmer’s abilities to surmount it. So very puzzling and harsh is the diction, that it is difficult to make any sense of it; for what means that sentence, “That God, by a necessity of nature, owes the good of punitory justice to the universe?” The good of the universe is the glory of God himself. To owe, then, “the good of punitory justice to the universe,” is to owe the good of an essential attribute to his own glory. But, again, what is “the good of punitory justice?” Justice itself, or the exercise of it? Neither can be so called with any propriety. But if the learned author mean this, that God ought to preserve his own right and dominion over the universe, and that this is just, his nature so requiring him, but that it cannot be done, supposing sin to exist, without the exercise of punitory justice, and then that those who affirm this indirectly deny the existence of God, — this is easy for any one to assert, but not so easy to prove.
This learned author’s third argument is taken from some
absurd consequences, which he supposes to follow from our opinion; for he
thus proceeds to reason: “Those who teach that sin merits punishment from a
necessity of the divine nature, without any intervention of a free decree,
teach, at the same time, that God cannot forbid sin to man without
necessarily forbidding it under the penalty of eternal death. As if,” says
he, “when God forbids adultery or theft, in a human court he forbids them
with a modification of the punishment, — namely, that theft should not be
punished with death, but by a quadruple restitution, — he could not forbid
them without any sanction of a punishment; and as he commands these to be
“Et moderari et suspendere,” — “In his own internal
court both mitigate and suspend,” etc. — Ed.
A fine show of reasoning; but there is no real solid truth in it, for all is false.
In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine nature, we have already shown at large. Neither, however, do we think ourselves bound to teach that God could not forbid sin but under the penalty of eternal death; for we hold that not one or another kind of punishment is necessary, but that punishment itself is necessary, and the punishment, according to the rule of God’s wisdom and justice, is death. Moreover, a rational creature, conscious of its proper subjection and obediential dependence, being created and existing, God did not account it at all necessary to forbid it to sin by a free act of his will, under one penalty or another; for both these follow from the very situation of the creature, and the order of dependence, — namely, that it should not transgress by withdrawing itself from the right and dominion of the Creator, and if it should transgress, that it should be obnoxious and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation, the appointment of punishment, even though there should be no mention made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.
“But God,” says he, “in his human court forbids sin by a modification of the punishment annexed; as, for instance, theft, under the penalty of a quadruple restitution: why may he not do likewise in his own internal court, and consequently suspend all punishment?”
There is no need of much disputation to prove that there is nothing sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punishment respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment itself is considered either in respect of its general end, which is the punishment of transgression, and has a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God; or in respect of some special end, and has a respect to the condition of the creatures among themselves. But whatever modification punishment may undergo, provided it attain its proper end, by accomplishing the object in view, the nature of punishment is preserved no less than if numberless degrees were added to it. As to the establishment of punishment, then, in a human court, as it has not primarily and properly a respect to the punishment of transgression, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures with respect to God, but with respect to one another, that degree of punishment is just which is fit and proper for accomplishing the proposed end.
The punishment, then, of theft by a quadruple restitution
had in its appointment no such modification conjoined with it as could
render it
But hence this learned writer concludes, “That in his own internal court God may modify and suspend punishment.”
We can only conjecture what he means by the “internal court” of God. From the justice of God the appointment of punishment is derived; but that is improperly called a court. How far God is at liberty, by this justice, to exercise his power in pardoning sins the Scriptures show. The just right of God is, “that they who commit sin are worthy of death.” “But he may modify the punishment,” says our author. But not even in a human court can any such modification be admitted as would render the punishment useless in respect of its end; nor, in respect of God, do we think any degree or mode of punishment necessary, but such as may answer the end of the punishment, so far as respects the state of the creatures with respect to God. Nor is any argument from a human court applied to the divine justice, nor from the modification to the suspension for a limited time, nor from a suspension to the total punishment, all which this learned author supposes, of any force.
The sum of the whole is this, as we have laid it down, — That God must necessarily, from his right and justice, inflict punishment on sin, so far as this punishment tends to preserve the state of the creature’s dependence on its Creator and proper and natural Lord; so, whatever constitutions or inflictions of punishment, with any particular modification or dispensation, we have admitted, these do not, as the supreme judgment of all is reserved to the destined time, at all operate against our opinion.
The other reasons advanced by this learned author in
support of this argument are not of sufficient weight to merit attention.
It hath been clearly proved already that the supposition of the pardon of
sin, without an intervening satisfaction, implies a contradiction, though
not in the terms, in the very thing itself. Nor does it follow that God
can without any punishment forgive sin, — to avoid which all rational
creatures are indispensably bound from his natural right over them, —
because any distinguished action among mankind, to the performance of which
they are bound by no law, may be rewarded, there being no threatening of
punishments for the neglect of it annexed, that has a respect to a
privilege not due. See
But, according to
In the fifth place, he maintains “That a natural necessity will admit of no dispensation, modification, or delay; which, however, it is evident that God either uses, or may use, in the punishment of sin.”
Ans. With respect to absolute necessity, which excludes all liberty, perhaps this is true; but with respect to that necessity which we maintain, which admits of a concomitant liberty in acting, it is altogether without foundation. Again: a dispensation with or delay of punishment regards either temporary punishment, with which we grant that God may freely dispense, when the immediate end of that punishment hath not a respect to the creatures in that state of subjection which they owe to God; or eternal punishment, and in respect of that, the time of inflicting it, etc., and freely to appoint it, belong entirely to God; — but that he should inflict the punishment itself is just and necessary.
Nor does that instance, brought from the various degrees of
punishment, at all avail him, — namely, “That if God can add or take away
one degree of punishment, then he may two, and so annihilate the whole
punishment:” for we are speaking of punishment as it includes in it the
nature of punishment, and is ordained to preserve God’s right and dominion
over his creatures, and to avenge the purity
What observations our learned author adds in the close of his arguments are either sophistical or very untheological. He says, namely, “That God, influenced by our prayers, averts even an eternal punishment after that we have deserved it.” But what! is it to be imputed to our prayers that God averts from us the wrath to come? What occasion is there, pray, then, for the satisfaction of Christ? We have hitherto been so dull and stupid as to believe that the turning away from us of punishment, which has a respect to our faith and prayers, consisted in the dispensation of grace, peace, and the remission of the sins for which Christ made satisfaction, and that God averted from us no deserved punishment but what was laid upon Christ, “who hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us.”
In his proofs of the sixth argument, which this learned
author adds to his former from
We have explained before what were our sentiments as to
what relates to the distinction between punishment simply considered, and
attended with particular circumstances in the manner of its infliction. We
affirm that a punishment proportioned to sin, according to the rule of the
divine justice, from God’s natural right, and from his essential justice
and holiness, is necessarily inflicted, to vindicate his glory, establish
his government, and preserve his perfections entire and undiminished: and
God himself hath revealed to us that this just recompense of reward
consists in death eternal; for “the righteous judgment of God is, that they
who commit sin are worthy of death.” It is just, then, and consequently
necessary, that that punishment of death, namely, eternal, should be
inflicted. But as God, though a consuming fire, is a rational or
intellectual fire, who, in exercising the excellencies or qualities of his
nature, proceeds with reason and understanding, it is free to him to
appoint the time, manner, and suchlike circumstances as must necessarily
attend that punishment in general, so as shall be most for his own glory
and the more illustrious display of his justice. But when
“The determination of an infernal punishment, as to its
manner and time, and consequently as to its eternal duration, will then
depend on the mere good pleasure of God; therefore, God can determine the
end and measure of infernal punishment; and therefore he is able not to
punish, and to will not farther to punish, those condemned to eternal
torments: therefore, it is not of absolute necessity that he punishes.”
But here is nothing but dross, as the saying is, instead of a treasure.
The time concerning which we speak is of the infliction of punishment, not
of its duration. He who asserts that an end may be put to eternal
punishments expressly contradicts himself. We say that God hath revealed
to us that the punishment due to every sin, from his right and by the rule
of his justice, is eternal; nor could the thing in itself be otherwise, for
the punishment of a finite and sinful creature could not otherwise make any
compensation for the guilt of its sin. But as it is certain that God, in
the first threatening, and in the curse of the law, observed a strict
impartiality, and appointed not any kind of punishment but what, according
to the rule of his justice, sin deserved; and as the apostle testifies,
that “the righteous judgment of God is, that they who commit sin are worthy
of death;” and we acknowledge that death “Dei libertati non
subjacere,” — “is not subject to.” — Ed.
Let us at
length put an end to this dispute; and as all “acknowledging of the truth”
ought to be “after godliness,”
First, then, Hence we sinners may learn the abominable
nature of sin. Whatever there is in heaven or in earth that we have
seen, or of which we have heard, whatever declares the glory of the
Creator, also exposes this disgraceful fall of the creature. The genuine
offspring of sin are death and hell; for “sin, when it is finished,
bringeth forth death.”
Is it to be wondered at, that God should be disposed
severely to punish that which earnestly wishes him not to be God,
and strives to accomplish this with all its might? Sin opposes the divine
nature and existence; it is enmity against God, and is not an idle enemy;
it has even engaged in a mortal war with all the attributes of God. He
would not be God if he did not avenge, by the punishment of the guilty, his
own injury. He hath often and heavily complained, in his word, that by sin
he is robbed of his glory and honour, affronted, exposed to calumny and
blasphemy; that neither his holiness, nor his justice, nor name, nor right,
nor dominion, is preserved pure and untainted: for he hath created all
things for his own glory, and it belongs to the natural right of God to
preserve that glory entire by the subjection of all his creatures, in their
proper stations, to himself. And shall we not reckon that sin is entirely
destructive of that order, which would entirely wrest that right out of his
hands, and a thing to be restrained by the severest punishments? Let
sinners, then, be informed that every the least transgression abounds so
much with hatred against God; is so highly injurious to him, and as far as
is in its power brands him with such folly, impotence, and injustice; so
directly robs him of all his honour, glory, and power, — that if he wills
to be God, he can by no means suffer it to escape unpunished. It was not
for nothing that on that day on which he made man a
But sin, in respect of the creature, is folly, madness, fury, blindness, hardness, darkness, stupor, giddiness, torpor, turpitude, uncleanness, nastiness, a stain, a spot, an apostasy, degeneracy, a wandering from the mark, a turning aside from the right path, a disease, a languor, destruction, — death. In respect of the Creator, it is a disgrace, an affront, blasphemy, enmity, hatred, contempt, rebellion, — an injury. In respect of its own nature, it is poison, a stench, dung, a vomit, polluted blood, a plague, a pestilence, an abominable, detestable, cursed thing; which, by its most pernicious power of metamorphosing, hath transformed angels into devils, light into darkness, life into death, paradise into a desert, a pleasant, fruitful, blessed world into a vain, dark, accursed prison, and the Lord of all into a servant of servants; which hath rendered man, the glory of God, an enemy to himself, a wolf to others, hateful to God, his own destroyer, the destruction of others, the plague of the world, a monster, and a ruin. Attempting to violate the eternal, natural, and indispensable right of God, to cut the thread of the creature’s dependence on the Creator, it introduced with it this world of iniquity.
First, then, to address you who live, or rather are dead,
under the guilt, dominion, power, and law of sin, “how shall ye escape the
damnation of hell?” The judgment of God is, that they who commit those
things to which you are totally given up, and which you cannot refrain
from, are “worthy of death.” “It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands
of the living God;” From the figure of notation to the
close of the paragraph, the sense of the author has been entirely
misapprehended. Read, “must be excited and kept alive by such a fit and
adequate view respecting the transgression of the divine law, the nature of
sin, or the disobedience of the creature, — those who have spiritual eyes
will easily perceive.” — Ed.
When
The acknowledging of this truth has a respect not only to the manifestation of his justice, but also of the wisdom, holiness, and dominion of God over his creatures: for that justice which, in respect of its effect and egress, we call vindicatory, which, as we have before demonstrated, is natural to God and essential, and therefore absolutely perfect in itself, or rather perfection itself, this very truth, which we have thus far defended, evidently illustrates; as also his supreme rectitude in the exercise of it, “when he sits on his throne judging righteously;” and how severe a judge he will be towards impenitent sinners, whose sins are not expiated in the blood of Christ! That justice is not a free act of the divine will, which God may use or renounce at pleasure; nor is sin only a debt of ours, which, as we were unable to pay, he might forgive by only freely receding from his right: for what reason, then, could be assigned why the Father of mercies should so severely punish his most holy Son on our account, that he might, according to justice, deliver us from our sins, when, without any difficulty, by one act of his will, and that too a most free and holy act, he could have delivered both himself and us wretched sinners from this evil? But it exists in God in the manner of a habit, natural to the divine essence itself, perpetually and immutably inherent in it, which, from his very nature, he must necessarily exercise in every work that respecteth the proper object of his justice; for sin is that ineffable evil which would overturn God’s whole right over his creatures unless it were punished. As, then, the perfection of divine justice is infinite, and such as God cannot by any means relax, it is of the last importance to sinners seriously and deeply to bethink themselves how they are to stand before him.
Moreover, the infinite wisdom of God, the traces of which
we so clearly read in creation, legislation, and in the other works of God,
is hereby wondrously displayed, to the eternal astonishment of men and
angels; for none but an infinitely wise God could bring it about, that that
which in its own nature is opposite to him, inimical, and full of
obstinacy, should turn out to his highest honour, and the eternal glory of
his grace. Yea, the divine wisdom not only had respect to God himself, and
to the security of his glory, honour, right, and justice, but even provided
for the good of miserable sinners, for their best interests, exaltation,
and salvation, and from the empoisoned bowels of sin itself. “Out of the
eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness.” By
interposing a surety and covenant-head between sin and the sinner, between
the transgression of the law and its transgressor, he condemned and
punished sin, restored the law, and freed the sinner both from sin and from
It will be for ever esteemed a miracle of God’s providence, that he should have made the captivity or wicked sale of Joseph, by means of so many windings, perplexed mazes, and strange occurrences, issue at last in his own exaltation and the preservation of his brethren, who impiously sold him. But if any one, though endowed with the tongues of angels and of men, should attempt to describe this mystery of divine wisdom, whereby it is evident that God exalts his own name, and not only recovers his former honour, but even raises it, manifests his justice, preserves inviolable his right and dominion in pardoning sin, wherewith he is highly pleased and incredibly delighted (and unless this heavenly discovery, a truly God-like invention, had intervened, he could not have pardoned even the least sin), he must feel his language not only deficient, but the eye of the mind, overpowered with light, will fill him with awe and astonishment. That that which is the greatest, yea, the only disgrace and affront to God, should turn out to his highest honour and glory; that that which could not be permitted to triumph without the greatest injury to the justice, right, holiness, and truth of God, should find grace and pardon, to the eternal and glorious display of justice, right, holiness, and truth, — was a work that required infinite wisdom, an arduous task, and every way worthy of God.
Finally, Let us constantly contemplate in the mirror of this truth the holiness of God, whereby “he is of purer eyes than to behold evil,” in “whose presence the wicked shall not stand,” that we ourselves may become more pure in heart, and more holy in life, speech, and behaviour.
Genesis
3:17 3:21 18:25 18:25 18:25 19:24 43
Exodus
18:12 23:7 34:5-7 34:6 34:6 34:6-7 34:6-7 34:7 34:7 34:19-20
Leviticus
26:30 27:1-2 27:1-8 27:8 27:28 27:28-29 27:28-29
Numbers
Deuteronomy
4:8 4:24 12:31 13:17 16:22 29:24
Joshua
Judges
1 Kings
2 Kings
2 Chronicles
Ezra
Nehemiah
Job
1:5 6:2-4 8:8 10:3 13:4 14:14 16:2 22:3 33:12 33:12-13 33:24 34:12-14 34:12-15 34:12-15 35:7 42:8
Psalms
5:4-5 5:4-6 5:4-6 5:4-6 5:4-6 5:4-6 5:5 7:6 7:9 7:9 9:4 9:4 9:4-5 9:7-8 11:5 14:1 14:1 16:2 45:5 49:8 50:6 56:7 69:24 74:1 78:49 78:49 88:15-16 94:2 101:8 102:3-5 106:36-38 115:3 119:7 119:137 119:137
Proverbs
Isaiah
5:20 5:24 13:9 30:30 33:14 33:14 33:22 34:2 42:1 42:8 51:6 53:6 53:10 66:16
Jeremiah
Lamentations
Ezekiel
Hosea
Jonah
Micah
Habakkuk
Zephaniah
Matthew
Mark
Luke
John
Acts
Romans
1:17 1:17 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 1:32 2 2:2 2:5 2:5 2:8-9 2:12 3:5 3:5-6 3:5-6 3:5-6 3:5-6 3:18-26 3:21 3:23-26 3:23-26 3:24-25 3:24-26 3:25-26 3:26 3:26 6:23 8:20 8:32 9 9:5 9:13 9:14-15 9:18 9:22 11:33 11:35 11:35-36 13:3-4
1 Corinthians
2 Corinthians
Galatians
Ephesians
Colossians
2 Thessalonians
2 Timothy
Titus
Hebrews
2:2 6:10 7:26 9:22 10:1 10:26-27 10:31 11:17 12:23 12:29 12:29
James
2 Peter
1 John
Jude
Revelation
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