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    <generalInfo>
      <description>In 1908-1909, Princeton Theological Seminary invited Herman Bavinck to deliver the
	  renowned L.P. Stone Lectures. This volume contains these lectures, all of which concern
	  theories of divine revelation. He details the importance of God’s revealing himself in
	  history, thought, nature, personal experience, and religious tradition, hoping to show that
	  people cannot make sense of the world without acknowledging the divine revelation as
	  foundational. The lectures remain relevant today, and give a more concise insight into
	  early 20th century Reformed thought than some of Kuyper’s and others’ lengthier works.
	  <br /><br />Kathleen O'Bannon<br />CCEL Staff</description>
      <pubHistory />
      <comments />
    </generalInfo>

    <printSourceInfo>
      <published>New York, Longmans, Green, 1909.</published>
    </printSourceInfo>

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      <authorID>bavinck</authorID>
      <bookID>revelation</bookID>
      <workID>revelation</workID>
      <bkgID>philosophy_of_revelation_(bavinck)</bkgID>
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      <DC>
        <DC.Title>The Philosophy of Revelation</DC.Title>
        <DC.Creator sub="Author" scheme="short-form">Herman Bavinck</DC.Creator>
        <DC.Creator sub="Author" scheme="file-as">Bavinck, Herman (1854-1921)</DC.Creator>
 
        <DC.Publisher>Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library</DC.Publisher>
        <DC.Subject scheme="LCCN">BT127.B3</DC.Subject>
        <DC.Subject scheme="lcsh1">Doctrinal theology</DC.Subject>
    <DC.Subject scheme="lcsh2">God</DC.Subject>
    <DC.Subject scheme="lcsh3">Revelation</DC.Subject>
    <DC.Subject scheme="ccel">All;</DC.Subject>
        <DC.Contributor sub="Digitizer" />
        <DC.Date sub="Created">2012-04-29</DC.Date>
        <DC.Type>Text.Monograph</DC.Type>
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        <DC.Language scheme="ISO639-3">eng</DC.Language>
        <DC.Rights>Public Domain</DC.Rights>
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    <div1 title="Title Page" id="i" prev="toc" next="ii">
<h1 id="i-p0.1">The Philosophy of</h1>
<h1 id="i-p0.2">Revelation </h1>
<p id="i-p1"> </p>
<h3 id="i-p1.1">The Stone Lectures for 1908-1909</h3>
<h3 id="i-p1.2">Princeton Theological Semiary</h3>
<p id="i-p2"> </p>

<h3 id="i-p2.1">BY</h3>
<h2 id="i-p2.2">Herman Bavinck</h2>
<p class="Centered" id="i-p3">Doctor of Theology; Professor in the Free University</p>
<p class="Centered" id="i-p4">of Amsterdam</p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 1. The Idea of a Philosophy of Revelation" id="ii" prev="i" next="iii">
<h1 id="ii-p0.1">PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION</h1>
<h2 id="ii-p0.2">Lecture 1 - The Idea of a Philosophy of
Revelation</h2>
<p id="ii-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="ii-p2">The well-known Assyrian scholar, Hugo Winckler, some years ago
boldly declared that “in the whole of the historical evolution of
mankind there are only two general world-views to be distinguished,
—the ancient Babylonian and the modern empirico-scientific” ; “the
latter of which,” he added, “is still only in process of
development.”<note place="foot" id="ii-p2.1" n="1">H. Winckler, Himmels- und Weltenbild der Babylonier. Leipzig, 1903, p.9.</note> The implication was that the religion and
civilization of all peoples have had their origin in the land of
Sumer and Akkad, and more particularly that the Biblical religion,
in its New Testament no less than in its Old Testament form, has
derived its material from that source. This pan-Babylonian
construction of history has, because of its syncretistic and
levelling character, justly met with much serious opposition. But
there is undoubtedly an element of truth in the declaration, if it
may be, taken in this wider sense,—that the religious
supra-naturalistic world-view has universally prevailed among all
peoples and in all ages down to our own day, and only in the last
hundred and fifty years has given way in some circles to the
empirico-scientific.</p>
<p id="ii-p3">Humanity as a whole has been at all times supra-naturalistic to
the core. Neither in thought nor in life have men been able to
satisfy themselves with the things of this world; they have always
assumed a heaven above the earth, and behind what is visible a
persistently ignored in Romanist and liberal circles, and the
Reformation movement systematically represented as the origin and
source of the Revolution. Cousin and Guizot agree in this judgment
with De Bonald and De Maistre.<note place="foot" id="ii-p3.1" n="2">Groen van Prinsterer, Ongeloof en Revolutie. 1862, pp.138 ff.</note> French Protestantism finds it
acceptable, and puts forward and praises the “Declaration of the
Rights of Man” as a blessed fruit of the labors of Luther and
Calvin. And in Germany, by men like Paulsen and Julius Kaftan, Kant
is glorified as a second Luther, the true philosopher of
Protestantism.<note place="foot" id="ii-p3.2" n="3">Fr. Paulsen, Philosophia militans. Berlin, 1901, pp.31 ff. J. Kaftan, Der Philosoph des Protest. Berlin, 1904. Theodor Kaftan, Moderne Theol. des alten Glaubens. 1901, pp.76, 102.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p4">No doubt between these two mighty movements of modern history
certain lines of resemblance may be traced. But formal resemblance
is not the same as real likeness, analogy as identity. Between the
freedom of the Christian man, on behalf of which Luther entered the
lists, and the liberty, equality, fraternity, which the Revolution
inscribed on its banner, the difference is fundamental. Luther and
Voltaire are not men of the same spirit; Calvin and Rousseau should
not be named in the same breath ; and Kant, with his
epistemological and moral autonomy, was not the exponent of the
Reformation, but the philosopher of Rationalism. This is implicitly
acknowledged by all who accord the honor of emancipating the mind
of man in the sixteenth century to Erasmus rather than to Luther,
and who rank the Renascence in importance and value above the
Reformation.<note place="foot" id="ii-p4.1" n="4">Busken Huet, Het Land van Rembrandt. F. Pijper, Erasmus en de Nederl. Reformatie. Leiden, 1907. Paul Wernle, Die Renaissance des Christ. im 16 Jahrh. Tubingen, 1904.</note> According to this view Erasmus and his like-minded
fellow-workers attempted a regeneration of Christianity, but sought
this not, like Luther, in a repristination of the teaching of Paul,
but in a return to the Sermon on the Mount. He is to be thanked,
then, that supranaturalism has slowly given way to materialism,
transcendence to immanence, Paulinism to the religion of Jesus,
dogmatics to the science of religion. Luther remains the father of
the old Protestantism; to Erasmus belongs the glory of having been
the first exponent of modern Protestantism.</p>
<p id="ii-p5">In this historical judgment there undoubtedly lies an element of
truth. Erasmus and his kindred spirits, no less than the Reformers,
aimed at a simpler and more interior type of religion to be
attained through contact with the Person of Christ But the fact is
lost sight of that all these men, in their conception of the
essence of religion, remained entangled in mediaeval dualism, and
were thus in no position to effect a fundamental reformation of the
doctrine and worship of the Church of Rome. The whole mental
attitude of humanism was such as to render it, above everything,
afraid of tumult, and bent upon preserving the “amabilis ecclesiae
concordia.” “Summa nostrae religionis pax est et unanimitas,” said
Erasmus. But altogether apart from this, humanism was and remained
one of the many “Aufklarungsbewegangen” which have periodically
emerged in the Roman Church, and will not fail to reappear in the
future. The experience of sin and grace which came to Luther in the
monastery of Erfurt fixed itself in these two conceptions; the
humanists felt no need of the liberty and joy which flow from the
sinner’s justification in the sight of God through faith alone and
without the works of the law. Humanism, therefore, was nothing more
nor less than the Reformed-Catholicism of the sixteenth century; in
the end it not only broke with Luther, but came to the help of Rome
and the Counter-Reformation.<note place="foot" id="ii-p5.1" n="5">Lezius, Zur Charakteristik des relig. Standpunktes des Erasmus. Güterslohe, 1895. H. Hermelink, Die relig. Reformbestrebungen des deutschen Hamanismus. Tübingen, 1907 (comp. the review of this work in Theol. Lit. Zeitung, Jan. 4, 1908). Max Richter, Desiderius Erasmus und seine Stellung zu Luther auf Grund ihrer Schriften. Leipzig, 1907. Hunzinger, Der Glaube Luthers und das religions-geschichtliche Christentum der Gegenwart. Leipzig, 1907. Hunzinger strikingly observes that the laudation of Erasmus at the expense of Luther is in keeping with the attempt perceptible elsewhere to go back from the Christ of the Bible to the so-called historical Jesus, the Jesus of the Synoptics or the Sermon on the Mount. The line repre sented by Christ, Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin is abandoned in favor of that represented by Jesus, Pelagius, Abelard, Erasmus, the Enlightenment.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p6">Nevertheless, there is this much of truth in the view in
question,—that Luther and Erasmus were two different men, and the
old and the new Protestantism are in principle distinct.
Confirmation of this has recently come from an unprejudiced
quarter, namely, from Professor Troeltsch of Heidelberg, in an
important study of Protestantism contributed by him to Die Kultur
der Gegenwart.<note place="foot" id="ii-p6.1" n="6">Troeltsch, Protest. Kirchentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, pp. 253-458 of Die Christliche Religion, in: Die Kultur der Gegenwart. (comp. for the other side Kattenbusch, Theol. Rundschau, 1907, and Herrmann, Zeits. für Theol. und Kirche, 1907). Comp. also Karl Bell, Katholizismus und Protestantismus. Leipzig, 1903, pp.56 ff. F. J. Schmidt, Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus. Leipzig, 1908, pp.60 ff.</note> He acknowledges, of course, that the ancient
world-view was modified by the Reformation, and enriched with a new
conception of religion; but he none the less maintains that its
general structure was preserved intact. In their view of the world
and life, sin and grace, heaven and earth, church and state, faith
and knowledge, Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin were children of the
Middle Ages, and revealed this fact at every point of their
activity as Reformers. The supranaturalism which finds expression
in the Gospel, and more particularly in the theology of Paul,
received the fullest consent of their hearts. They, no doubt,
moderated and softened the eschatological and mystic-ascetic
elements which characterized primitive Christianity; but, in
Troeltsch’s view, they utterly failed to perceive the great
differences which exist within the New Testament itself between the
Synoptics and the Apostolic Epistles, between Jesus and Paul. The
Christianity of the Bible, the Christianity of the first four
centuries was, to their naive conception, an undifferentiated
whole, a system of faith and practice which they believed
themselves to have received unmodified, and which they meant to set
as the pure expression of the Christian religion over against the
caricature that the Roman Church had later made of it.</p>
<p id="ii-p7">On the other hand, Professor Troeltsch thinks that the modern,
anti-supranaturalistic type of Protestantism gained no hearing
until the eighteenth century. For this form of Protestantism is not
to be understood as a logically or historically consistent
development of the principles of the Reformation, but as the
product of “a great and radical revolution.” In the so-called
“Enlightenment” it presented the world—with a new form of culture
which differed in principle from the culture-ideal of the
Reformation. Consequently not the sixteenth but the eighteenth
century, not the Reformation but the “Enlightenment,” is the source
of that world-view which, turning its back on all supranaturalism,
thinks to find in this world all that science and religion, thought
and life, can ask. In point of fact, before the eighteenth century
the existence of a supranatural world, and the necessity,
possibility, and reality of a special revelation, had never been
seriously called into question. But Deism, springing up in England,
emancipated the world from God, reason from revelation, the will
from grace.<note place="foot" id="ii-p7.1" n="7">Lechler, Geschichte des engl. Deismus. Stuttgart, 1841. Troeltsch, art. Deismus in PRE.</note> In its first exponents, Herbert, Locke, Toland,
Collins, and their fellows, as also later in Kant, Fichte, and
Lessing, it is true, it did not yet deny in principle the
possibility and reality of revelation. But in the first place, from
a formal point of view, it subjected the authenticity of
revelation, especially of “traditional revelation,” in distinction
from “original revelation,” to the critical test of reason, as may
be seen in such writers as Herbert, Hobbes, and Locke. And,
secondly, with respect to the content of revelation, it laid down
the canon, that since we have no power to assimilate anything else,
it can comprise nothing beyond truths of reason, that is, such
truths as would, no doubt, sooner or later have been discovered by
reason, but have been made known earlier and more, readily by
revelation. This concession, however, was deprived of all real
value by adding that God had commonly given the earlier revealed
truth in such a symbolical form that its essential rational content
was not understood until the present age of enlightenment.<note place="foot" id="ii-p7.2" n="8">Schelling, Philos. der Offenbarung, Sämmtliche Werke II, 4, p.5.</note> All
deistic thought tended towards making revelation superfluous, and
all action of God in the world unnecessary.<note place="foot" id="ii-p7.3" n="9">Lechler, op. cit., p.362.</note> While the fact of
creation was still commonly admitted, it served with the original
Deists no other purpose than with Kant, and later with Darwin,
namely, to give the world an independent existence. The world had
in creation been so abundantly supplied with all manners of powers
and gifts that it could dispense with God altogether, and could
save itself without any outside aid and with completeness.</p>
<p id="ii-p8">This principle of autonomy, transplanted into France, first
sought to gain supremacy for itself by way of revolution. The
French Revolution of 1789 furnished the first typical example of
this. This was not a revolt like that of the Netherlands against
Spain, or of the Puritans against the Stuarts, or of the American
Colonies against Britain, for all these upheavals left untouched
the political system, the fundamental principle of government, the
droit divin of the magistracy. The Revolution in France sprang from
a definite deistical theory, and bore from the outset a
doctrinaire, specifically dogmatic character. Attaching itself to
the fiction of the contrat social, it endeavored to subvert the
entire existing social order, and to replace it by a newly
conceived and self-manufactured order of things. It was a violent
effort to establish the principle of popular sovereignty, and was
hailed everywhere, even by men like Kant and Schiller, as the dawn
of popular enfranchisement.<note place="foot" id="ii-p8.1" n="10">Groen van Prinsterer, op. cit.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p9">But, although this Revolution was launched under the most
favorable circumstances, enjoyed the advantage of international
sympathies, and found imitation on a smaller or larger scale in all
countries on the continent of Europe Europe and in South America,
it nevertheless passed beyond the experimental stage in none of
these movements, but in them all, sooner or later, issued in
failure. So far from realizing the ideal, they overwhelmed their
fanatical adherents with grievous disappointment and a deep feeling
of shame.<note place="foot" id="ii-p9.1" n="11">Haller in Groen van Prinsterer, op. cit., pp.253 ff.</note> In the leading thought of the world the idea of
revolution gradually gave way to that of evolution. The eighteenth
century principle of autonomy was not abandoned, but its
application and development were sought by a different method.</p>
<p id="ii-p10">It is hardly necessary to say that the term evolution has not in
itself, any more than revolution, an objectionable connotation. The
idea of development is not a production of modern times; it was
already familiar to Greek philosophy. More particularly Aristotle
raised it to the rank of the leading principle of his entire system
by his significant distinction between “potentia” and “actus.” The
true reality he did not place with Plato outside of and behind and
above phenomenal things, but conceived of it rather as their
immanent essence, not, however, as from the outset fully actualized
in them, but as finding gradual realization in the form of a
process. According to Aristotle, therefore, becoming and change are
not to be explained by mechanical impact or pressure, nor by
chemical combination or separation of atoms. On the contrary, he
derived his theory of becoming from the facts of organic life,
seeing in it a self-actualizing of the essential being in the
phenomena, of the form in the matter. The essence, the idea of a
thing, is not simply a quiescent archetype, but at the same time an
immanent power propelling the thing and moving it on to its
development in a definite direction. Evolution, as conceived by
Aristotle, beam thus an organic and teleological character; the
genesis exists for the sake of the ousia; becoming takes place
because there is being.<note place="foot" id="ii-p10.1" n="12">Comp. the author’s essay: Evolutie, in: Pro en Contra, III, 3. Baarn, 1907. Eucken, Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart. Leipzig, 1904, pp.185 ff.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p11">This idea of development aroused no objection whatever in
Christian theology and philosophy. On the contrary, it received
extension and enrichment by being linked with the principle of
theism. For the essence of it, it appears also in modem philosophy,
in Lessing, Herder and Goethe, Schelling and Hegel, and in many
historians of distinction. Some of these, it is true, have severed
the idea of development from the theistic basis on which it rests
in Christianity, and by so doing have reverted to the ancient
pre-Christian naturalism. Nevertheless, even so, their naturalism
retains a specific character, clearly enough distinguishable from
the later materialism. Whatever terms Goethe and Herder, Schelling
and Hegel might employ to designate the core and essence of things,
they never regarded nature as a dead mechanism, but as an eternally
formative power, a creative artist. The notion that all higher
forms of being have sprung through the action of purely mechanical
and chemical forces from lower ones is entirely foreign to them.
The ascending forms in the world of nature and spirit appear to
them rather evidence of the inexhaustible fulness of life and the
infinite, creative power present in the universe.<note place="foot" id="ii-p11.1" n="13">As regards Goethe, to whom Haekel loves to appeal, this is clearly shown by Vogel, Goethes Selbstzeugnisse über seine Stellung zur Religion. Leipzig, 1906. Comp. also Frank Thilly, The World-view of a Poet: Goethe’s Philosophy, in the Hibbert Journal, April, 1908, pp.530 ff.</note> With Hegel the
entire world becomes one mighty process of thought, which in each
of its moments and in each of its stages is rational, so far as it
is real; but which at the same time, by the principle of immanent
antithesis, to which it remains subject, is forced ever forward and
upward. Whatever exists is therefore pure becoming, not being; it
exists for no other purpose but to pass away; in pursuance of the
law of the dialectic process the old continually gives way to the
new. Hence we should draw back from all violent revolutions and
futile experiments; the eternal spirit itself is unceasingly
occupied in breaking down while building up, and in building up
while breaking down. Process, evolution, endless and restless
becoming, is the principle which governs the Hegelian system to a
much higher degree, and much more one-sidedly, than those of
Aristotle and Leibnitz.<note place="foot" id="ii-p11.2" n="14">Windelband, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Leipzig, 1899, II, p.311.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p12">This doctrine of evolution, however, was too rationalistic, too
aprioristic, too romantic in construction to withstand the onset of
the natural science which was now growing up. It soon gave way
before the mechanical and anti-teleological principles of the
theory of descent. Darwin was led to his agnostic naturalism as
much by the misery which he observed in the world as by the facts
which scientific investigation brought under his notice. There was
too much strife and injustice in the world for him to believe in
providence and a predetermined goal. A world so full of cruelty and
pain he could not reconcile with the omniscience, the omnipotence,
the goodness of God. An innocent and good man stands under a tree
and is struck by lightning. “Do you believe,” asks Darwin of his
friend Gray, “that God slew this man on purpose? Many or most
people believe this; I cannot and will not believe it.” The
discovery of the so-called law of “natural selection” brought him
accordingly a real feeling of relief, for by it he escaped the
necessity of assuming a conscious plan and purpose in creation.
Whether God existed or not, in either case he was blameless. The
immutable laws of nature, imperfect in all their operations, bore
the blame for everything, while at the same time guaranteeing that
the world is not a product of chance and is progressing as a whole
towards a better condition.<note place="foot" id="ii-p12.1" n="15">Bruno Wille, Darwins Weltanschauung von ihm selbst dargestellt. Heibronn, 1906, pp.4,5,16ff,25.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p13">Just as Darwin discovered the misery in nature, so Karl Marx
discovered the misery in society. In the same year in which
Darwin’s Origin of Species was published, Marx’s Political Economy
also appeared. At the grave of Marx, on the 17th of March, in the
year 1883, Friedrich Engels declared that, as Darwin had found the
law of the development of organic nature, so Marx had discovered
that of the development of human society. Darwin believed that his
natural selection, with its adjuncts, had once for all disposed of
teleology, miracles, and all supranaturalism; Marx was convinced
that he had freed Socialism from all utopianism and established it
on a firm scientific foundation. Both Darwin and Marx were thorough
believers in the inviolability of the laws of nature and the
necessary sequence of events; both were deeply moved by the fact
that this necessary process of development has both in the past an
present brought into existence terrible conditions; and both
cherished the fixed hope that development means progress, and
carries with it the promise of a better world, a better race, and a
better society.</p>
<p id="ii-p14">It goes without saying that this mechanical and
anti-teleological conception of evolution left no room for miracles, for a world of the supranatural, for the existence and
activity of God. Darwin, while at first adhering to the deistic
belief in creation, afterwards declined more and more to
agnosticism. It was his custom to dismiss religious problems by
saying that he had not sufficiently reflected upon them and could
not lay claim to a strong religious feeling.<note place="foot" id="ii-p14.1" n="16">Bruno Wille, op. cit., pp.5, 23.</note> And Marx was of the
opinion that religion, “that opiate of the people,” was destined to
die a natural death in the perfect society of the future.<note place="foot" id="ii-p14.2" n="17">L. Woltmann, Der hist. Materialismus. Düsseldorf, 1906, p.148. H. Pesch, Liberalismus, Sozialismus und christl. Gesellschaftsordnung. Freiburg, 1901, II, p.234.</note> The
belief that modern natural science, with its doctrine of evolution,
had made an end of medieval dualism with its conception of two
worlds, and the principle of naturalism had permanently triumphed,
found an echo in the widest circles. Revelation could no longer be
considered a possibility. Renan declared apodictically; “Il n’y a
pas de surnaturel.” According to Haeckel, all revelations to which
religions appeal are pure figments of human phantasy ; the one true
revelation is nature itself. And Strauss, not quite so sure that
the victory had been gained and the enemy slain, called to battle
with the summons: “The last enemy to be conquered is the conception
of another world.” The term evolution embodies in itself a
harm-less conception, and the principle expressed by it is
certainly operative within well-defined limits throughout the
universe. But the trend of thought by which it has been
monopolized, and the system built on it, in many cases at least,
avail themselves of the word in order to explain the entire world,
including man and religion and morality, without the aid of any
supranatural factor, purely from immanent forces, and according to
unvarying laws of nature.</p>
<p id="ii-p15">Nevertheless, the transition from the nineteenth to the
twentieth century has witnessed an important change in this
respect. The foremost investigators in the field of science have
abandoned the attempt to explain all phenomena and events by
mechanico-chemical causes. Everywhere there is manifesting itself
an effort to take up and incorporate Darwin’s scheme of a nature
subject to law into an idealistic world-view. In fact Darwin
himself, through his agnosticism, left room for different
conceptions of the Absolute, nay repeatedly and emphatically gave
voice to a conviction that the world is not the product of
accident, brute force, or blind necessity but in its entirety has
been intended for progressive improvement.<note place="foot" id="ii-p15.1" n="18">Bruno Will, op. cit., pp.7,12,14,16,17,19,23,25.</note> By way of Darwin, and
enriched by a mass of valuable scientific material, the doctrine of
evolution has returned to the fundamental idea of Hegel’s
philosophy. The mechanical conception of nature has been once more
replaced by the dynamical; materialism has reverted to pantheism;
evolution has become again the unfolding, the revealing of absolute
spirit. And the concept of revelation has held anew its triumphant
entry into the realm of philosophy and even of natural science.<note place="foot" id="ii-p15.2" n="19">For instance by von Hartmann, Religions-philosophie. Leipzig, II, pp.74 ff. A. Drews, Die Religion als Selbstbewusstsein Gottes. Jena u. Leipzig, 1906, pp.184 ff. Reinke, Die Welt als That. Berlin 1903, pp.292 ff.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p16">Such generous concessions have not failed to meet with response
from the side of theology. It is true the exponents of the, “new
theology” which has made its appearance in recent years, differ
greatly among themselves as to the significance which should be
accorded in revelation to nature or history, to individualism or
collectivism, to the intellect or the heart. Nevertheless, the
movement as a whole is clearly inspired and controlled by the
desire to identify revelation and evolution, and for this purpose
to shift the centre of gravity from the transcendence of God to his
immanence. To it God is “that which is implied in all being, the
reality behind all phenomena, the sum of the forces of the
universe.” It is admitted that this idea of the immanence of God
was not unknown in former ages; but never until the present has it
been made the lever of a “moral and spiritual movement,” such as
may now be witnessed through the whole of Christendom, a movement
which aims at the perfect reconciliation of religion and science
and finds its highest expression in “the gospel of the humanity of
God and the divinity of man.”</p>
<p id="ii-p17">It needs no pointing out that on this principle, as with Hegel,
the divine revelation must be coextensive with all that exists,
with nature and history, with all nations and religions. Everything
is a manifestation of God. The finite in all its parts is an
essential element of the infinite. It is the infinite itself, as
become finite in the creature. But there is a definite course and
gradation in the self-realizing of God. From the inorganic it
ascends to the organic, from the physical to the psychical, from
nature to spirit, reaching its culminating point in man. “We are a
part of the universe, and the universe is a part of God; there is
no real difference between humanity and deity; every soul is a
sparkle of the divine spirit.” Humanity ever increasingly reveals
God to us, in the same proportion that it develops and progresses.
For everything is subject to the law of progress. Everything is
continually in the making. Man has sprung from the animals, and has
in the civilized portion of the race risen far superior to his
ancestors; but still he has before him an endless vista of
development. He is not “simply what he is, but all he yet may be.”
He is, and becomes ever more and more, an organ of the eternal
consciousness. He was an animal, he became a man, and after
humanizing comes deifying. By way of anticipation the Christian
religion illustrates this principle in the person of its founder;
in Christ humanity and divinity are one. According to Sir Oliver
Lodge, Christ is the glorification of human effort, the upward
development of manhood, the highest point of human striving, the
supreme flower of our race. All men are potential Christs, all
moving on by the development of the forces of our own nature into
that Christhood.<note place="foot" id="ii-p17.1" n="20">R. J. Campbell, The New Theology. London, 1907, pp.20,31,34,68ff. New Theology and Applied Religion by R. J. Campbell, etc. London, Christian Commonwealth Co., pp.12,18,60,62. Sir Oliver Lodge, The Substance of Faith allied with Science. London, pp.85ff. Comp. against this new theology among others, Charles Gore, The New Theology and the Old Religion. London, 1907.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p18">Although the New Theology likes to represent this conception as
a new movement, it is at bottom nothing but a repetition of the
pantheistic world-view which has been embodied in the systems of
Erigena, Spinoza, and especially Hegel. And in all probability no
greater success than was attained by these philosophers will attend
the present attempt to harmonize after this fashion faith and
science, the revelation of the Scriptures, and a materialistically
or pantheistically conceived doctrine of evolution. There is cause
for rejoicing that the intellectualism of the last century has been
succeeded by a feeling for religion and mysticism, for metaphysics
and philosophy; and that in religion itself there is now recognized
a reality and a revelation of God. But joy over this change in the
attitude of the leading minds of the age should not blind us to the
danger to which it exposes us. The religious craving at present
asserting itself bears a pronouncedly egoistic character; it
reveals a longing rather for self-satisfaction than for knowledge
and service of the living God; it seeks God not above but in the
world, and regards his essence as identical with that of the
creature. All of which goes to show that the world-view, which
formerly offered itself under the name of “the scientific,” has not
essentially changed, but has simply, owing to various influences,
assumed now a religious form, and taken up its position as a new
faith over against the old faith.<note place="foot" id="ii-p18.1" n="21">Funt, Religion der Immanenz oder Transcendenz? in: Religion und Geisteskultur, 1907, pp.287-294. Bachmann, Nomen est gloriosum, ibid., 1908, pp.104-114.</note> The difference consists merely
in the doctrine of evolution no longer contenting itself with
standing as “science” by the side of or over against Christianity,
but pressing on determinedly to usurp the place of Christianity as
dogma and religion. Monism lays claim through the mouth of Haeckel
and the monistic alliance not only to the title of the true
science, but likewise to that of the one true religion.<note place="foot" id="ii-p18.2" n="22">Haeckel, Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft. Bonn, 1893. Haeckel, Die Welträthsel. Bonn, 1899, pp.381-439. R. H. Francé, Der heutige Stand der darwin’schen Lehren. Leipzig, 1907, p.17.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p19">As a form of religion, however, monism hardly deserves serious
consideration. A religion which has nothing to offer but an
immanent God, identical with the world, may for a while
aesthetically affect and warm man; it can never satisfy man’s
religious and ethical needs. It fails to raise us above the actual,
and supplies no power stronger than the world; it brings no peace,
and offers no rest on the Father-heart of God. This, after all, is
what man seeks in religion,—strength, life, a personal power,
that can pardon sin, receive us into favor, and cause us to triumph
joyfully over a world of sin and death. The true religion which
shall satisfy our mind and heart, our conscience and our will, must
be one that does not shut us up in, but lifts us up high above, the
world; in the midst of time It must impart to us eternity; in the
midst of death give us life; in the midst of the stream of change
place us on the immovable rock of salvation. This is the reason why
transcendence, supranaturalism, revelation, are essential to all
religion.</p>
<p id="ii-p20">Thus also is explained why humanity, no less than formerly,
continues to think and live after a supranaturalistic fashion. As
regards the heathen and Mohammedan nations, this needs no pointing
out. As to Christendom, here also the Greek Church continues to
occupy the orthodox position. The Roman Church, contrary to the
expectation of many, has during the nineteenth century almost
everywhere increased in power and influence, and yet in the
encyclical letter of July 3, 1907, it repudiated without hesitation
the notion that revelation involves nothing more than man’s
becoming conscious of his relation to God. And while Protestantism
is divided within itself even more thoroughly than Romanism, yet to
a large extent, among all classes in all lands, it too still holds
to the fundamental elements of the Christian confession. Thus,
notwithstanding all the criticism that has been brought to bear
upon the Scriptures, the Bible retains its unique place in the
church,—in the sermon, in the worship, in catechetical
instruction. More than this, all our modern civilization, art,
science, literature, ethics, jurisprudence, society, state,
politics, are leavened by religious, Christian, supranaturalistic
elements, and still rest on the foundation of the old world-view.
“The stamp of this education,” says Troeltsch, “Europe bears deep
in its soul up to to-day.”<note place="foot" id="ii-p20.1" n="23">Troeltsch, op. cit., p.255.</note> Much, therefore, will have to be done
before the modern, pantheistic or materialistic, world-view shall
have conquered the old theistic one. Nay, in view of the past
history of mankind, it may safely be added that this will never
happen.</p>
<p id="ii-p21">Nor is there any warrant for ascribing this loyalty to the
Christian supranatural world-view, to stubborn conservatism or
incorrigible lack of understanding. It requires little discernment
to perceive that the revelation which every religion, and more
particularly Christianity, claims for itself is something
essentially different from that which the new theology and
philosophy would commend to us. This was frankly acknowledged not
long ago by Friedrich Delitzsch. In his first address on Babel and
Bible, he had affirmed that the Old Testament idea of revelation,
like many other Old Testament ideas, was in perfect accord with
that found in the Babylonian religion. This identification having
been contradicted, he reverted to the point in his fourth lecture
entitled Rückblick und Ausblick. Here he points out that the
conception of revelation is no doubt modified by many to-day so as
to make of it a humanly mediated, gradual process of historical
evolution. But be immediately adds that such a conception, while
quite acceptable to him personally, is, after all, only a weak
dilution of the Biblical and theological conception of
revelations.<note place="foot" id="ii-p21.1" n="24">Fr. Delitzsch, Babel und Bibel. Ein Rückblick und Ausblick. Berlin, 1904, p.48. Id., Zur Weiterbildung der Religion. Stuttgart, 1908, p.53.</note> And there can hardly be two opinions on this point.
Not only does Scripture draw a sharp distinction between that
revelation which God continues to give to the heathen through
nature and the false religion to which the heathen have abandoned
themselves (<scripRef id="ii-p21.2" passage="Rom. 1:19-23" parsed="|Rom|1|19|1|23" osisRef="Bible:Rom.1.19-Rom.1.23">Rom. 1:19-23</scripRef>), as well as between that special
revelation which he has granted to his people Israel and the
idolatry and image-worship by which the people of God were
constantly led away; but it also most emphatically proclaims as a
fundamental truth, that Jehovah, who revealed himself to Moses and
the prophets, is the true living God, and that all the gods of the
heathen are idols and things of naught.</p>
<p id="ii-p22">If this be so, it must be contrary to the plain intent of
Scripture to identify revelation and development, divine law and
human conduct, or to consider these as two sides of one and the
same process. When Hegel says of the infinite and the finite: “The
truth is the inseparable union of both,”<note place="foot" id="ii-p22.1" n="25">Hegel, Philos. der Religion, I, p.120.</note> we recognize in this not
the primum verum but the proton pseudos of his philosophy. As in
science one must distinguish between the ideas which God has
deposited in his works, and the errors which constantly are being
drawn from them as truth, even so revelation and religion are not
two manifestations of the same thing, but differ as God differs
from man, the Creator from the creature. Although Gwatkin some
times so widens the idea as to make revelation and discovery the
same process viewed from different standpoints, he quite correctly
explains that not every thought of man, but only true thought,
echoes God’s thought, and that religions can be viewed as divine
revelations only so far as they are true.<note place="foot" id="ii-p22.2" n="26">Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God. Edinburgh, 1906, I, pp.92,155-156,248.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p23">This distinction between revelation and religion, and
consequently the good right of supranaturalism, begins slowly to
dawn once more on people. Titius declared some time ago that it is
the common conviction of all theologians from Kahler to Troeltsch
that supranaturalism and Christianity stand or fall together.
Certainly Troeltsch insists over against Fr. R. Lipsius upon a
certain supranaturalism. Loofs maintains, no doubt, that the
supranaturalism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was of
too clumsy construction for the science of nature and history
seriously to reckon with it. But he propounds at the same time the
pertinent question, whether it is really an immutable axiom of all
modern culture that natural science has made belief impossible in
any kind of revelation except one that can be fully explained on
the principle of evolution, and in any kind of redemption except
one worked out by purely immanent forces. And returning the answer
to the question himself, he declares: “The decisive battle between
the ‘diesseits-religion,’ based on pantheistic ideas of immanence,
and the traditions of a more robust theism has not yet been fought
out.” Titius, adverting to this, gives his opinion to the effect
that a more exact investigation of the problem of supranaturalism
forms the chief task of the Dogmatics of the future, and is of
supreme importance for the absolute character of Christianity.<note place="foot" id="ii-p23.1" n="27">Titius, Theol. Rundschau, Nov., 1907, p.416. The address of Loofs to which Titius refers, appeared in English in the American Journal of Theol., III, pp.433-472, and has been published recently also in German. Das Evangelium der Reformation und die Gegenwart, Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 1908, pp.203-244. Kattenbusch, Die Lage der system. Theol. in der Gegenwart, Zeits. für Theol. u. Kirche, 1905, pp.103-146 ff., especially pp.128 ff.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p24">With the reality of revelation, therefore, Christianity stands
or falls. But our insight into the mode and content of revelation
admits of being clarified; and, in consequence, our conception of
this act of divine grace is capable of being modified. As a matter
of fact, this has taken place in modern theology. In the first
place, the transcendence of God has assumed for us a meaning
different from what it had for our fathers. The deistic belief that
God worked but a single moment, and thereafter granted to the world
its own independent existence, can no longer be ours. Through the
extraordinary advance of science our world-view has undergone a
great change. The world has become immeasurably large for us;
forwards and backwards, in length and breadth and depth and height,
it has extended itself into immensity. In this world we find
everywhere second causes operating both in organic and inorganic
creation, in nature and history, in physical and psychical
phenomena. If God’s dwelling lies somewhere far away, outside the
world, and his transcendence is to be understood in the sense that
he has withdrawn from creation and now stands outside of the
actuality of this world, then we lose him and are unable to
maintain communication with him. His existence cannot become truly
real to us unless we are permitted to conceive of him as not only
above the world, but in his very self in the world, and thus as
indwelling in all his works.<note place="foot" id="ii-p24.1" n="28">Steinmann, Das Bewusstsein von der vollen Wirklichkeit Gottes, Zeits. für Theol. u. Kirche, 1902, pp.429-492.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p25">Thus the divine transcendence was understood by the Apostle
Paul, who declared that God is not far from any one of us, but that
“in him we live and move and have our being.” The transcendence
which is inseparable from the being of God is not meant in a
spatial or a quantitative sense. It is true Scripture distinguishes
between heaven and earth and repeatedly affirms that God has heaven
especially for his dwelling-place, and specifically reveals there
his perfections in glory. But Scripture itself teaches that heaven
is part of the created universe. When, therefore, God is
represented as dwelling in heaven, he is not thereby placed outside
but in the world, and is not removed by a spatial transcendence
from his creatures. His exaltation above all that is finite,
temporal, and subject to space-limitation is upheld. Although God
is immanent in every part and sphere of creation with all his
perfections and all his being, nevertheless, even in that most
intimate union he remains transcendent. His being is of a different
and higher kind than that of the world. As little as eternity and
time, omnipresence and space, infinitude and finiteness can be
reduced to one or conceived as reverse sides of the same reality,
can God and the world, the Creator and the creature, be identified
qualitatively and essentially. Not first in our time, nor by way of
concession to science or philosophy, but in all ages, the great
theologians have taught the transcendence of God in this Scriptural
sense.</p>
<p id="ii-p26">Since, however, we take this idea more seriously at present,
because of the great enrichment our world-view has received from
science, this needs must give rise to a somewhat modified
conception of revelation. The old theology construed revelation
after a quite external and mechanical fashion, and too readily
identified it with Scripture. Our eyes are nowadays being more and
more opened to the fact that revelation in many ways is
historically and psychologically “mediated.” Not only is special
revelation founded on general revelation, but it has taken over
numerous elements from it. The Old and the New Testaments are no
longer kept isolated from their milieu; and the affinity between
them and the religious representations and customs of other peoples
is recognized. Israel stands in connection with the Semites, the
Bible with Babel. And although the revelation in Israel and in
Christ loses nothing of its specific nature, nevertheless even it
came into being not all at once but progressively, in conjunction
with the progress of history and the individuality of the prophets,
polumeros kai polutropos. Even as Christ the Son of God is from
above, and yet his birth from Mary was in preparation for
centuries, so every word of God in special revelation is both
spoken from above and yet brought to us along the pathway of
history. Scripture gives succinct expression to this double fact
when it describes the divine word as rhethen hupo tou theou dia ton
propheton.</p>
<p id="ii-p27">One of the results of the trend of present-day science is that
theology is just now largely occupied with the second of these two
elements, that of the historical and psychological “mediation.” Its
present interest centres rather in the problem how revelation has
come about, than in the question what the content of revelation is.
There is connected with this investigation the disadvantage that
often the woods are not seen for the trees; that the striking
analogies in other religions have dulled perception of what is
peculiar to the religion of Israel; and that the discovery
elsewhere of some trait more or less closely parallel is hastily
given out as a solution of the problem of origin. But, apart from
this, these historical and psychological investigations are in
themselves an excellent thing. They must and will con tribute
towards a better understanding of the content of revelation; the
rhethen dia ton propheton will, in proportion as it is more
profoundly understood, lead to a truer appreciation of the rhethen
hupo tou theou. For, since all historical and psychological
research into the origin and essence of the religion of Israel and
Christianity must leave their peculiarity untouched, what else will
remain, but either to reject them on account of their alleged
foolishness or to accept them in faith as divine wisdom?</p>
<p id="ii-p28">Belief in such a special revelation is the starting-point and
the foundation-stone of Christian theology. As science never
precedes life, but always follows it and flows from it, so the
science of the knowledge of God rests on the reality of his
revelation. If God does not exist, or if he has not revealed
himself, and hence is unknowable, then all religion is an illusion
and all theology a phantasm. But, built on the basis of revelation,
theology undertakes a glorious task,—the task of unfolding the
science of the revelation of God and of our knowledge concerning
him. It engages in this task when seeking to ascertain by means of
exegesis the content of revelation, when endeavoring to reduce to
unity of thought this ascertained content, when striving to
maintain its truth whether by way of aggression or defence, or to
commend it to the consciences of men. But side by side with all
these branches there is room also for a philosophy of revelation
which will trace the idea of revelation, both in its form and in
its content, and correlate it with the rest of our knowledge and
life.</p>
<p id="ii-p29">Theological thought has always felt the need of such a science.
Not only Origen and the Gnostics, but also Augustine and the
Scholastics, made it their conscious aim both to maintain
Christianity in its specific character and to vindicate for it a
central place in the conception of the world as a whole. And after
Rationalism had set historical Christianity aside as a mass of
fables, the desire has reasserted itself in modern theology and
philosophy to do justice to this central fact of universal history,
and to trace on all sides the, lines of connection established by
God himself between revelation and the several spheres of the
created universe.<note place="foot" id="ii-p29.1" n="29">Of the many works dealing with the subject directly or incidentally the following may be named by way of example : Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung. Staudenmaier, Philos. des Christ., I, 1840. O. Willmann, Gesch. des Idealismus, 3 Bde, 1894-1897. James Orr, The Christian View of God and the World. Edinburgh, 1893. John Caird, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, 2 vols. Glasgow, 1904. A. M. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion. London, 1905. A. Campbell Fraser, Philosophy of Theism. Edinburgh, 1899.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p30">It must be acknowledged that the attempt to outline a philosophy
of revelation exposes one to losing himself in idle speculation.
But, besides appealing to the general principle that the abuse of a
thing cannot forbid its proper use, we may remind ourselves that
this danger is just now reduced to a minimum, because philosophy
itself has become thoroughly convinced of the futility of its
aprioristic, constructions, and looks to the empirical reality for
the subject matter of its thought. A philosophy which, neglecting
the real world, takes its start from reason, will necessarily do
violence to the reality of life and resolve nature and history into
a network of abstractions. This also applies to the philosophy of
the Christian religion. If this be unwilling to take revelation as
it offers itself, it will detach it from history and end by
retaining nothing but a dry skeleton of abstract ideas. The
philosophy of Hegel has supplied a deterring, example of this, as
is well illustrated by the Leben Jesu and the Glaubenslehre of
Strauss. Speculative rationalism, to borrow a striking word of
Hamann, forgot that God is a genius who does not ask whether we
find his word rational or irrational. Precisely because
Christianity rests on revelation, it has a content which, while not
in conflict with reason, yet greatly transcends reason; even a
divine wisdom, which appears to the world foolishness. If
revelation did not furnish such a content, and comprised nothing
but what reason itself could sooner or later have discovered, it
would not he worthy of its name. Revelation is a disclosure of
mysterion tou theou. What neither nature nor history, neither mind
nor heart, neither science nor art can teach us, it makes known to
us,—the fixed, unalterable will of God to rescue the world and
save sinners, a will at variance with well-nigh the whole
appearance of things. This will is the secret of revelation. In
creation God manifests the power of his mind; in revelation, which
has redemption for its centre, he discloses to us the greatness of
his hearts.<note place="foot" id="ii-p30.1" n="30">Schelling, loc. cit., p.26. For the conception of revelation which it was impossible to unfold in these lectures reference may be made to the author’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 2d ed., I, pp. 291 ff. The present lectures elaborate in detail the fundamental ideas expressed by the author in an address on Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, 1904.</note></p>
<p id="ii-p31">The philosophy of revelation, just like that of history, art,
and the rest, must take its start from its object, from revelation.
Even its idea cannot be construed apriori. There is but one
alternative: either there is no revelation, and then all
speculation is idle; or else there comes to us out of history such
a revelation, shining by its own light; and then it tells us, not
only what its content is, but also how it conies into existence.
The philosophy of revelation does not so much make this fit in with
its system as rather so broadens itself that it can embrace
revelation too in itself. And doing this, it brings to light the
divine wisdom which lies concealed in it. For though the cross of
Christ is to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks
foolishness, it is in itself the power of God and the wisdom of
God. No philosophy of revelation, any more than any other
philosophy, whether of religion or art, of morals or law, shall
ever be able to exhaust its subject, or thoroughly to master its
material. All knowledge here on earth remains partial; it walks by
faith and attains not to sight. But nevertheless it lives and works
in the assurance that the ground of all things is not blind will or
incalculable accident, but mind, intelligence, wisdom.</p>
<p id="ii-p32">In the next place this philosophy of revelation seeks to
correlate the wisdom which it finds in revelation with that which
is furnished by the world at large. In former times Christian
theology drew the distinction between special and general
revelation. But it never wholly thought through this distinction,
nor fully made clear its rich significance for the whole of human
life. When modem science arose and claimed to have found a key to
the solution of all mysteries in the principle of evolution, the
attempt was made to withdraw successively nature, history, man, and
his entire psychical life, from the control of the existence, the
inworking, the revelation of God. Not a few theologians have
yielded to this trend and with more or less hesitation abandoned
the, entire world to modern science, provided only somewhere, in
the Person of Christ, or in the inner soul of man, a place might be
reserved for divine revelation. Such a retreat, however, betrays
weakness and is in direct opposition to the idea of special
revelation. Revelation, while having its centre in the Person of
Christ in its periphery extends to the uttermost ends of creation.
It does not stand isolated in nature and history, does not resemble
an island in the ocean, nor a drop of oil upon water. With the
whole of nature, with the whole of history, with the whole of
humanity, with the family and society, with science and art it is
intimately connected.</p>
<p id="ii-p33">The world itself rests on revelation; revelation is the
presupposition, the foundation, the secret of all that exists in
all its forms. The deeper science pushes its investigations, the
more clearly will it discover that revelation underlies all
created being. In every moment of time beats the pulse of eternity;
every point in space is filled with the omnipresence of God; the
finite is supported by the infinite, all becoming is rooted in
being. Together with all created things, that special revelation
</p>


<p id="ii-p34"> </p>
<p id="ii-p35"> </p>
<p id="ii-p36"> </p>
<p id="ii-p37"> </p>
<p id="ii-p38"> </p>
<p id="ii-p39"> </p>
<p id="ii-p40"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 2. Revelation and Philosophy" id="iii" prev="ii" next="iv">
<h2 id="iii-p0.1">Lecture 2 - Revelation and Philosophy</h2>
<p id="iii-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="iii-p2">In entering upon our task we may derive encouragement from the
position accorded at present to philosophical thought. There is
reason for rejoicing in the reflection that from an object of
contempt it has come to inspire the warmest interest. When in the
last century the natural sciences began their triumphal progress,
and the enthusiasm Hegel had aroused gave way to sober
disenchantment, people turned their backs on all metaphysics and
for a while cherished the delusion that exact science would
sometime give a satisfactory solution to all the problems of life.
This was the so-called “period of Renan,” in which physics was
satisfied with itself and professed to have no need of
metaphysics.<note place="foot" id="iii-p2.1" n="31">Renan, L’avenir de la science, 1890. Bertholot, Science et morale, 1897. Ladenburg, Der Einfluss der Naturwissenschaft auf die Weltanschauung, 1903.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p3">But this period now belongs to the past. Natural science, it is
true, has by no means become insolvent, as Brunetiare asserted. On
the contrary, it has gone on year after year adding one great
discovery to another. But many have been disappointed in the
foolish expectations they had cherished regarding it: the ignoramus
et ignorabimus has rudely awakened them out of their dreams. Thus
toward the close of the last century a great change gradually took
place in the prevailing mental attitude. With the return to
mysticism in literature and art, the need of philosophy and
metaphysics and religion reasserted itself. This remarkable
reaction has extended into the very camp of natural science. Not
only has Ostwald published his “Lectures on Natural Philosophy,”
his “Annals of Natural Philosophy,” and Reinke his “Philosophy of
Botany,” but natural scientists have eagerly discussed
philosophical and especially epistemological problems—witness
such names as W. K. Clifford, Poincare, Kleinpeter, Ostwald,
Verworn. Haeckel, no doubt, professes to base his conclusions
wholly on facts, but even he, none the less, recognizes that, in
order to reach a monistic world-view, thought must be called to the
aid of perception, philosophy of science, faith of knowledge.<note place="foot" id="iii-p3.1" n="32">Haeckel, Die Welträthsel, 1899, pp.345 ff.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p4">Nor is this return to philosophy and religion the result of
arbitrary caprice. It has all the characteristics of a universal
and necessary phenomenon. It is not confined to one people or one
stratum of society, but appears in many countries and among men of
all ranks. It is not peculiar to this or that particular branch of
learning, but manifests itself in the spheres of history,
jurisprudence, and medicine, as well as in that of natural science;
its influence is no less strong in literature and art than in
religion and theology themselves. Verlaine and Maeterlinck,
Sudermann and Hauptmann, Ibsen and Tolstoi and Nietzsche are all
equally dissatisfied with present-day culture, and all seek
something different and higher. They endeavor to penetrate beneath
the appearance of things to the essence, beneath the conscious to
the unconscious, beneath the outward forms to the inner mystery of
infinite life, of silent power, of hidden will. From every quarter
comes the demand for a new dogma, a new religion, a new faith, a
new art, a new science, a new school, a new education, a new social
order, a new world, and a new God. The things offered under this
label are too varied, and often also too silly, to enumerate.
Buddhism and Mohammedanism and the religion of Wodan are commended
to us, theosophy, occultism, magic and astrology, daemonism and
satan-worship, race- and hero-worship, ethical culture and the
pursuit of ideals, the cult of humanity and of Jesus. Reform
movements are the order of the day. Modernism is in the air
everywhere.<note place="foot" id="iii-p4.1" n="33">A. M. Weisz, Die religiöse Gefahr., Freiburg, 1904, pp.117 ff.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p5">Divergent as these tendencies may be, they all have two
characteristics in common. In the first place, the principle of
autonomy, expressing itself on the one hand in anarchism of
thought, on the other hand in the auto-soterism of the will.<note place="foot" id="iii-p5.1" n="34">L. Stein, Gedankenanarchie, in: An der Wende des Jahrhunderts, 1899, pp.287 ff. Ed. von Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie, I, pp.624 ff. A. Drews, Die Religion als Selbstbew. Gottes. 1906 pp.237 ff.</note> Each
individual regards himself as independent and self-governing, and
shapes his own course and pursues his own way. Having nothing to
start with except a vague sense of need, men seek satisfaction in
every possible quarter, in India and Arabia, among the civilized
and uncivilized nations, in nature and art, in state and society.
Religion is treated as a matter of purely personal invention and
individual construction, as a mere product and element of culture.
Everybody has his own religion,—not merely every nation and every
church, but every person. Thus we hear of a religion of the modern
man, a religion of the layman, a religion of the artist, a religion
of the scientist, a religion of the physician. It has become a,
vogue to study and expound the religion of Goethe and Lessing, of
Kant and Schleiermacher, of Bismarck and Tolstoi.</p>
<p id="iii-p6">But in the second place these modern movements are all alike
seeking after religion, after the supreme good, abiding happiness,
true being, absolute worth. Even though the word “religion” be
avoided and the new-fashioned term “world-view” preferred, in point
of fact the satisfaction of no other need is aimed at than that
which used to be supplied by religion. As to the proper definition
of such a world-view, there exists considerable divergence of
opinion. But whether with Windelband we define philosophy as the
theory of “the determination of values,” as the science of “normal
consciousness,” or conceive of it with Paulsen as a mode of viewing
the world and life “which shall satisfy both the demands of reason
and the needs of the heart,” in any case it is plain that
philosophy is not content with a scientific explanation of reality,
but seeks to vindicate the higher ideals of humanity, to satisfy
its deepest needs. Philosophy wishes itself to serve as religion,
and from an attitude of contempt for all theology has veered round
to a profession of being itself at bottom a search after God.<note place="foot" id="iii-p6.1" n="35">Paulsen, Einl. in die Philosophie, Vorwort. Paulsen, Die Zukunftsaufgaben der Philos., pp.389 ff., in Systematische Philosophie, in: Die Kultur der Gegenwart, 1907.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p7">The agreement between these various movements of reform extends,
however, still farther than this. The ways in which satisfaction is
sought for the ineradicable “metaphysical need” appear to be many
and divergent. But appearances are deceitful. Some youthful
enthusiast discovers an idea, which takes him by surprise, and he
forthwith claims for it the importance of a new religion, or a new
philosophy. But historical study and scientific reflection will, as
a rule, convince him in short order that the thing he regarded as
new was, in point of fact, quite old, having in the past repeatedly
emerged and passed away. That which has been is that which shall
be, and there is no new thing under the sun. The new fashions in
theology are as much like the old Arianism and Socinianism and
Gnosticism and Sabellianism as one drop of water is like another.
The new roads in philosophy have all been travelled by the thinkers
of ancient Greece. It is difficult to square this fact with the
theory of evolution and its boast of the wonderful progress of our
times. But in reality the limitations of the human intellect soon
become apparent, the originality of human thought is readily
exhausted. Troeltsch strikingly observes that “the number of those
who have had something really new to tell the world has always been
remarkably small, and it is astonishing to observe on how few ideas
humanity has actually subsisted.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p7.1" n="36">Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christ. und die Religions-geschichte. 1902, p.56. Comp. A. Vierkandt, Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel, Leipzig, 1908. pp.1 ff.</note> The directions in which it is
possible for our thinking to move are not nearly so numerous as we
suppose or imagine. We are all determined in our thought and action
by the peculiarity of our human nature, and then again by each
one’s own past and present, his character and environment. And it
is not rare that those who seem to lead others are rather
themselves led by them.<note place="foot" id="iii-p7.2" n="37">According to the well-known saying of Ledru-Rollin: Je suis votre chef, il faut donc que je vous suive.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p8">If, then, we attend to details, to words and forms of ex
pression, to outward considerations and modes of presentation, we
seem in the presence of a chaotic mass of religions and world-views
among which choice is difficult. But when we penetrate to the
centre of things and consider principles, all this mass reduces
itself to a few types. “The epochs of human life,” as Goethe’s
saying has it, “traverse in typical development a series of
world-views.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p8.1" n="38">In Dilthey, Das Wesen der Philos., p.37, in System. Philos., in : Die Kultur der Gegenwart.</note> And as every world-view moves between the three
poles of God, the world, and man, and seeks to determine their
reciprocal relations, it follows that in principle only three types
of world-view are distinguishable,—the theistic (religious,
theological), the naturalistic (either in its pantheistic or
materialistic form), and the humanistic. These three do not succeed
one another in history as Comte imagined his trois états to
do. They rather recur in rhythmical waves, more or less
intermingle, and subsist side by side. Thus Greek philosophy was
born out of the Orphic theology, passed over into the naturalism of
the old nature-philosophy, and became humanistic in the Sophists
and the wisdom-philosophy of Socrates. Plato in his doctrine of
ideas went back to the old theology and to Pythagoras; but, after
Aristotle, his philosophy gave way to the naturalistic systems of
Epicurus and the Stoa; and these in turn, by way of reaction, gave
birth to the teachings of the sceptical and mystical schools.
Christianity gave theism the ascendancy for many centuries; but
modern philosophy, which began with Descartes and Bacon, assumed in
ever increasing measure a naturalistic character till Kant and
Fichte in the ego once more took their starting-point from man.
After a brief period of the supremacy of the theistic philosophy in
the nineteenth century, naturalism in its materialistic or
pantheistic form resumed its sway, only to induce during these
recent years a new return to Kant and the principles of
humanism.</p>
<p id="iii-p9">At present the materialistic form of naturalism has been
generally discredited among all thinkers of repute. Practically it
still survives and counts many adherents, but it has lost all hold
upon the leaders of thought. Three causes have chiefly contributed
to this.</p>
<p id="iii-p10">In the first place, the criticism to which Darwinism in the
narrower sense of this term has been subjected. It should be
remembered that Darwin was not the father of the idea of evolution.
This existed long before him. Bodin and Hobbes, Montesquieu,
Voltaire and Roussean, Kant and Schiller, had already taught that
the original state of man was merely animal. Hegel had changed
Spinoza’s substance into a principle of active force, and made out
of immutable being a restless becoming. But all these earlier
thinkers held the idea of evolution in a purely philosophical form.
Darwin., on the other hand, endeavored to supply it with a
scientific basis in facts, just as Marx tried to detach the
socialistic hopes from all utopianism and raise them to the rank of
a scientific theory. But no sooner had Darwin succeeded in laying
such a scientific foundation in his “struggle for existence” with
its correlates of “natural selection” and “survival of the
fittest,” than the attack on his work and its demolition began. In
rapid succession the principles of struggle for existence, of
unlimited variability, of gradual accumulation of minute changes
during vast periods of time, of the heredity of acquired qualities,
of the purely mechanical explanation of all phenomena, of the
exclusion of all teleology, were subjected to sharp criticism and
in wide circles pronounced untenable. The prophecy of Wigand that
this attempt to solve the riddle of life would not survive until
the close of the century has been literally fulfilled. And the
declaration of J. B. Meyer has met with wide assent that Darwin’s
doctrine of descent was not so much an hypothesis proposed to
explain facts as rather an invention of facts for the support of an
hypothesis.<note place="foot" id="iii-p10.1" n="39">J. B. Meyer, Philos. Zeitfragen, 1870, p. 92. Comp. further on the history of Darwinism after Darwin and its critics: Ed. von Hartmann, Der Darwinismus seit Darwin, in Ostwald’s Annalen der Naturphilos., Leipzig, 1903, pp.285ff. R. H. Francé, Der heutige Stand der darwin’schen Fragen, Leipzig, 1907. H. Meyer, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Entwicklungslehre, Bonn, 1908. A. R. Wallace, The Present Position of Darwinism, Cont. Review, Aug., 1908.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p11">In the second place, natural science itself has undergone
considerable modification in its fundamental conceptions. Physics
and chemistry for a long time proceeded on the assumption of atoms,
which, however minute, yet had the property of extension and were
capable of fillng space. With sober scientists this atomism never
took the place of a scientific theory, but served simply as a
working hypothesis within defined limits. Materialism, however,
elevated this hypothesis into a theory capable of explaining the
world, regarded the atoms as the ultimate and sole elements of the
universe, and viewed all change and variation in the world as due
in the last analysis to mechanical combination and separation of
these primitive elements. Not merely was protest raised against
this by philosophical thought as represented in Kant, Schelling,
and Schopenhauer, on the ground that atoms possessing extension and
filling space cannot at the same time be conceived as indivisible;
but modern physics and chemistry themselves through their study of
the phenomena of light, and their discovery of the Roentgen and
Becquerel rays, and their insight into the endless divisibility of
matter, came more and more to the conviction that actio in distans
is absurd, that empty space between the atoms is inconceivable,
that the atom itself is a mere figment, and that the existence of a
world-aether filling all is highly plausible.<note place="foot" id="iii-p11.1" n="40">Dennert, Die Weltanschauung des modernen Naturforschers., Stuttgart, 1907, pp.60 ff.. Ed. von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik, Leipzig, 1902. Ludwig Baur, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Philos., in: Philos. Jahrbuch, 1907, pp.1-21, 156-177, especially pp.164 ff. A. Schneider, Der moderne deutsche Spiritualismus, Philos. Jahrbuch, 1908, pp.339-357.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p12">To this must be added, in the third place, the effect of the
criticism which has been brought to bear upon the naturalistic
hypothesis from the epistemological point of view. Materialism made
pretence to being monistic, but could furnish no support for this
claim, seeing that in its atoms it continued to place matter and
force side by side and had nothing to say about the relation
between these two, and so remained obviously dualistic. Hence, in
the name of monism materialism was condemned. Ostwald dispensed
entirely with the conceptions of atom, matter, substance,
“thing-in-itself,” and substituted for them the idea of energy.
What the vulgar notion regards as matter is a pure product of
thought, and in itself nothing else but “a group of various
energies arranged in space.” These energies are the only reality.
All our knowledge of the outside world can be subsumed under the
form of representation of existing energy.<note place="foot" id="iii-p12.1" n="41">Ostwald, Die Ueberwindung des wissensch. Materialismus, Leipzig, 1895. Id., Vorlesungen über die Naturphilos., 1905. Comp. on Ostwald: Dennert, op. cit., pp.222 ff. W. von Schnehen, Energetische Weltanschauung, Leipzig, 1908.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p13">But even this “energetic monism,” which Ostwald sought to
substitute for “material monism,” did not prove a permanent
resting-place. On further reflection it appeared that none of the
outside world, including ourselves, is directly present to our ego,
but comes to us through the medium of consciousness only. The
ultimate elements, therefore, which are positively given and form
the foundation of science, appear to be not, matter and force,
aether and energy, but sensations and perceptions. The phenomena of
consciousness are the only fixed reality. Hence it becomes the task
of all genuine, empirical, and exact science, taking its start from
these phenomena of consciousness, to strip them of all accretions,
and then to proceed to the construction of a system on the basis of
these ultimate elements of “pure experience” only.<note place="foot" id="iii-p13.1" n="42">Comp. on this tendency especially Mach, Populärwiss. Vorlesungen, Leipzig, 1897. Id., Erkenntnis und Irrtum., Leipzig, 1905. Also the exposition of Mach’s philosophy by Hönigswald, Zur Kritik der machsehen Philos., Berlin, 1903, and Hell, Ernst Machs Philosophie., Stuttgart, 1907. The following may also be consulted: Spruyt, Het empirio-criticisme, de jongste vorm van de wijsbegeerte der ervaring, Amsterdam, 1899. Koster, De ontkenning van het bestaan der materie en de moderne physiol. psychologie, Haarlem, 1904. Jelgersma, Modern Positivisme, Gids, Oct., 1904. Wobbermin, Theologie und Metaphysik, Berlin, 1901. Schapira, Erkenntnisstheor. Strömungen der Gegenwart, Bern, 1904.</note></p>
<p id="iii-p14">These considerations, drawn from the philosophy of “pure
experience,” as advocated chiefly by Mach and Avenarius, led the
Gottingen physiologist, Max Verworn, to a new form of monism, to
“psychical monism.” In the opinion of this scientist, materialism,
while capable of rendering some service as a working hypothesis, is
altogether without value as an explanation of the world. Mind
cannot be explained from matter, nor phenomena of consciousness
from the movement of atoms. Even the “parallelistic monism” of
Spinoza, advocated of late chiefly by Paulsen, does not satisfy,
because it is neither monism nor parallelism. Nor is the “energetic
monism” of Ostwald more satisfactory, because it continues to
distinguish between physical and psychical energy, thus falling
back into dualism. There is no way of saving monism except by
abandoning materialism and energeticism alike, rejecting altogether
the distinction between soul and body as a delusion inherited from
primitive man, and deliberately reducing reality in its whole
extent to a “content of the soul.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p14.1" n="43">Max Verworn, Natur- und Weltanschauung, Leipzig, 1905. Id., Principienfragen in der Natur, Jena, 1905. Id., Die Mechanik des Geisteslebens, Leipzig, 1908, pp.1-20. Comp. Dennert, op. cit., pp.130 ff. As a result of this criticism of the faculty of knowledge modern science has once more become conscious of its limitations. Not only have Duboise-Reymond in his Sieben Welträthsel and Balfour in his Foundations of Belief expressed themselves to this effect, but the same views in regard to the limitations of science, and even its exclusively empirical character, are taken by H. Poincaré, La science et l’hypothèse; Id., La valeur de la science; L. Poincaré, La physique moderne; and others whose works have appeared in the Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique under the editorship of G. le Bon. Comp. Gustave Dumas,  Réflexions sur la science contemporaine, Foi et Vie, 16 Dec, 1907, pp.752-759.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p15">In view of the fact, however, that such “psychical monism” may
easily lead to solipsism and scepticism, others have concerned
themselves with establishing the objective reality of the phenomena
of consciousness. The Marburg school, represented by Cohen, Natorp,
Cassirer, and their colleagues, seeks to secure this end by finding
the subject of experience, not like Protagoras, in the
consciousness of the individual as such, but in this as rooted in
and supported by a universal, objective, transcendental
consciousness, which, although incapable of individual states of
experience, yet bears in itself aprioristic forms and so offers to
our representation a basis and a norm.<note place="foot" id="iii-p15.1" n="44">H. Cohen, Religion und Sittlichkeit, Berlin, 1907. P. Natorp, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, Freiburg, 1894. Comp. Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. der Philos., III, 2, 1897, pp.198 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p16">Others, however, while equally intent upon maintaining the
objectivity of knowledge, regard such a “transcendental psychical
monism” as unwarranted and unnecessary. They believe an
“epistemological or logical monism” sufficient to meet the
requirements of the case. Especially Rickert, but also Schuppe,
Leclair, Rehmke, Schubert-Soldern and their supporters, are
convinced indeed that in order to escape from solipsism a universal
consciousness must needs be assumed. But they do not understand by
this a concrete, objective, real consciousness, carrying the
individual consciousness in itself, like a sort of deity, something
as Malebranche said that man sees all things in God. Their view
rather is that a nameless, general, impersonal consciousness
suffices, a consciousness which forms the abstract, logical
presupposition of all human consciousness, but can never itself
become the content of conscious experience, which therefore as a
matter of fact amounts to the presence in the world of a universal
potency attaining to consciousness in man.<note place="foot" id="iii-p16.1" n="45">Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, Tübingen, 1904. Id., Geschichtsphilosophie, pp.51-145, of: Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20 Jahrh., Heidelberg, 1905, especially pp.110 ff. Heymans, Einführung in die Metaphysik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung, Leipzig, 1905, pp.224, 293.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p17">The unprejudiced mind, passing in review these several attempts
to save monism, can scarcely fail to reach the conclusion that the
history of this monistic movement provides to a remarkable degree
its sufficient criticism. Its development is a rapid process of
dissolution. The very name with which the philosophy of the
preceding century loves to describe itself is open to objection. It
is difficult to find in the history of science another such
instance of the wanton abuse of a word. It is of comparatively
recent origin, and came into vogue especially as an attractive
designation of pantheism, which in its turn, if we may believe
Schopenhauer, is but another name for atheism, although it takes
leave of God after a somewhat more polite fashion. But while the
name “pantheism” still bears some definite meaning, the term
“monism” is so vague and meaningless as to make it impossible to
attach to it any clear conception. All possible or impossible
systems may be so designated. We hear of a materialistic,
pantheistic, parallelistic, energetic, psychic, epistemological,
logical, and still further of an empirical, a critical, an
idealistic, a naturalistic, a metaphysical, a concrete, an
immanent, a positive, and of several other kinds of monism.<note place="foot" id="iii-p17.1" n="46">Eisler, Wörterbuch der philos. Begriffe s. v.; further: Der Monismus, dargestellt in Beiträgen seiner Vertreter. Herausgeg. v. Arthur Drews. I. Systematisches, II. Historisches, Jena, 1900.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p18">The name is particularly affected by the pantheistic materialism
of Haeckel, who wishes by its use to brand every system differing
from his own as dualism, and so to bar it out as unscientific. By
his own “pure monism” he understands that there exists but a single
substance which is at one and the same time God and world, spirit
and body, matter and force. And in his opinion this monism is the
world-view to which modern natural science stands committed. He
agrees with Schopenhauer in declaring it equivalent to atheism, at
least if God is to be conceived as a personal being. In the name of
this monism he condemns as unscientific, all who recognize in
nature, in the soul, in consciousness, in the freedom of the will,
I do not say a supernatural factor, but even any force different
from and higher than that at work in the mechanism of natural
science. That men of high standing, like Kant, von Baer,
Dubois-Reymond, Virchow, have kept aloof from this mechanical
monism, is due, declares the President of the German Monistic
Alliance, to inconsistency in thought or some decay of mental
powers.</p>
<p id="iii-p19">Such an act of scientific excommunication in itself betrays an
arrogance little calculated to commend a theory. No one who has
proofs to rely on need resort to “energetic language” like this. In
the realm of science there is no pope to proclaim dogmas, no
emperor to promulgate laws. All investigations here stand on equal
ground, and truth alone is lord. But least of all is such a lofty
tone in place when one’s own system utterly fails to meet the
scientific requirements laid down. Haeckel himself oscillates
between materialism and pantheism, conceives of his substance as
both God and world, ascribes to his atoms a principle of life and
consciousness, and appears to be naively unconscious of the
involved antinomies. And the same is true of all systems which
offer themselves under this name of “monism.” The name is a mere
disguise under which are concealed the distinctions between God and
world, mind and matter, thought and extension, being and becoming,
physical and psychical energy, as with Ostwald, or consciousness
and the content of consciousness, as with Verworn.</p>
<p id="iii-p20">But even more serious is the objection that no one can tell us
what this straining after monism in science and philosophy exactly
means. Does it mean that there shall be recognized in the last
analysis only one single and simple substance or force or law? But
to lay down such an axiom apriori amounts to a palpable petitio
principii, and applies to the world perchance a standard by which
it neither can nor will be measured. The universe is doubtless much
richer and more complex than we are able to imagine. Reinke very
properly says: “I regard monism as an abortive attempt to
understand the world. . . . The desire for unity, natural though it
be, should never be given decisive weight in determining our
world-view. The supreme question is not what would please us, but
what is true.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p20.1" n="47">Reinke, Die Welt als That, Berlin, 1903, p.457.</note>  No doubt science properly strives to reduce the
phenomena as much as possible to simple principles and to subsume
them under general laws. And in accordance with this our thoughts
refuse to rest in a sort of eternal Manichaeism, which assumes two
powers antithetically related to each other. But Sir Oliver Lodge
truly observes that in this sense the striving after monism is
proper to all science: “the only question at issue is, what sort of
monism are you aiming at?”<note place="foot" id="iii-p20.2" n="48">Sir Oliver Lodge, Life and Matter, London, 1907. Comp. also: Fr. Traub, Zur Kritik des Monismus, Zeits. fur Theol. u. K., May, 1908, pp.157-180. U. Flügel, Monismus und Theologie, Cothen, 1908.</note>  When the use of this name is intended
to imply that all multiformity in the world must be merely the
manifestation of one substance, we must reject the demand as
unwarranted, as the offspring of an aprioristic philosophical
system, and as directly opposed to the results of all unprejudiced
investigation of the phenomena.</p>
<p id="iii-p21">The demand in question appears even more unjustified when we
consider how the monists attain the desired unity. The actual world
presents to us an infinite variety of things and phenomena, and by
no empirical research do we discover that unity of matter and force
out of which monism seeks to explain the world. If such a unity be
assumed, it can be reached only by way of abstraction. Greek
philosophy was the first to conceive the idea of a principle of
things, wherein it found both the temporal beginning and the
efficient cause of all phenomena. Such a principle always
necessarily bears this characteristic,—that all the peculiarities
which actuality presents to our view have been eliminated, and
nothing is left except the notion of universal, abstract being,
which is not capable of any further definition. Even if we suppose,
that thought can without logical fallacy reason from the full
actuality to such an apeiron, this would by no means prove that the
world really had sprung from and been formed out of this arche.
Pantheistic philosophy, to be sure, proceeds on this assumption,
identifying as it does thought and being. But this is to forget
that logical analysis is something totally different from real
decomposition or regression. In geometry points are conceived as
occupying no space, but it does not follow that such points can
exist anywhere objectively in the real world. Real space and real
time are always finite, but this does not prevent the attribution
to them in thought of infinite extension and duration. Similarly
the conception of ultimate being reached by abstraction is a mere
product of thought, upon which nothing can be posited in the real
world; nothing can come out of it because it is itself nothing.</p>
<p id="iii-p22">The proof of this lies in the fact that the relation between the
absolute and the world is described by pantheism only by the aid of
varying images and similes. It speaks of natura naturans and natura
naturata, of substantia and modi, of the idea and its
objectivation, of reality and appearance, of the whole and its
parts, of the species and the individuals, of the ocean and the
waves. But it utterly fails to form a distinct idea or clear
conception of this relation. Closely looked at, the relation
assumed appears in each case to be either that of emanation or that
of evolution. In former times, when thought was more accustomed to
the category of substantiality, the former was in vogue. The
absolute was represented as a fulness of being out of which the
world flowed as water from a fountain. After criticism had attacked
this conception of substance, thinking reverted to the category of
actuality, and, under the influence of Hegel, substance was changed
into a subject, being into an absolute becoming, and thus the idea
of evolution was made supreme.</p>
<p id="iii-p23">The term “evolution,” in point of fact, has become a magic
formula. Says L. Reinhardt: “The idea of evolution was like the
kindling of a torch which suddenly cast a brilliant light upon the
mysterious processes of nature, the dark recesses of creation, and
gave us the simple, nay, the only possible explanation of them;
evolution is the magic formula through which we learn the secret of
the apparently insoluble riddle of the origin and development of
the infinite variety of terrestrial creatures.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p23.1" n="49">L. Reinhardt, Der Mensch zur Eiszeit in Europa, Munschen, 1906, p.2. Haeckel, Die Welträthsel, 1899, p.6. Id., Der Kampf um den Entwicklungsgedanken, Berlin, 1905, pp.13 ff. L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., Freiburg, 1899, pp.47 ff. C. Stumpf, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie, 1899.</note>  To all questions
concerning the origin and the essence of things, of heaven and of
earth, of minerals and of plants, of animals and of men, of
marriage and of family, of the state, and of society, of religion
and of ethics, the same answer is invariably given: evolution is
the key to the origin and existence of all things.</p>
<p id="iii-p24">It is a pity that a conception which is to explain everything
should itself so much need explaining.<note place="foot" id="iii-p24.1" n="50">Rümelin in de la Saussaye, Geestelijke Stroomingen, Haarlem, 1907, p. 288, well says: “The idea of evolution must itself first be explained, before anything is explained by it,” but what cannot be explained is looked upon as evolution. Eyes are being opened, however, to the abuse made of the word. Comp. Lexis, Das Wesen der Kultur, in: Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I. pp.13-19. H. Schurtz, Altersklassen und Männerbünde, Berlin, 1902, pp.6 ff., 69. Steinmetz, De studie der volkenkunde, ‘s Gravenhage, 1907, pp.30 ff.</note>  The definitions that are
given of it vary immensely. A widely different sense attaches to it
in Heraclitus and Aristotle, in Spinoza and Leibnitz, in Goethe and
Schelling, in Hegel and von Hartmann, in Darwin and Spencer, in
Huxley and Tylor, in Haeckel and Wundt. And no single definition
covers all the phenomena that are subsumed under the conception. In
the several realms of nature, and in the various stages of
historical process, the element of becoming that is met everywhere
bears widely different characters. The transformation observed in
the inorganic world is of a different kind from that seen in living
beings. And among the latter, again, consciousness and will,
science and art, the family and society, the individual and the
body collective, have each its own nature and its own law. There is
unity, no doubt, but this unity does not justify our dissolving the
variety into a mere semblance. There is no formula which will fit
the universe with all its wealth of matter and force and life. “Do
not think it likely,” says Lodge, repeating with slight
modification a saying of Ruskin,—“do not think it likely that you
hold in your hand a treatise in which the ultimate and final verity
of the universe is at length beautifully proclaimed and in which
pure truth has been sifted from the error of the preceding ages. Do
not think it, friend; it is not so.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p24.2" n="51">Lodge, Life and Matter, pp.6, 7.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p25">The most striking proof of the pertinence of this criticism of
monism has been furnished in a practical way by the rise of that
new form of philosophical thought which introduces itself as
pragmatism (activism, humanism), and already numbers conspicuous
adherents in various lands. Though it has taken many by surprise,
its appearance is easily explicable. When naturalism passes over
from pure materialism to pantheism, this is tantamount to the
return of philosophy to the ideas of life, mind, and soul. If,
having recovered these, philosophy be unwilling to refer them to
their origin in a personal God, it can find no foothold except in
man. Hence, taking pragmatism as a general type of philosophical
thought (as James himself describes rationalism and empiricism<note place="foot" id="iii-p25.1" n="52">James, Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Longmans, Green &amp; Co., 1907, pp.9 ff.</note> )
apart from all individual modifications, as these appear in James
or Schiller, Pierce or Panini, Höffding or Eucken, we find in
it a reaction of the ego from monism in its several forms, a
self-assertion of the science of mind against the science of
nature, of the one against the many, of man against the world. Very
properly James calls pragmatism “a new name for some old ways of
thinking.” Wherever monism makes of the absolute a Saturn devouring
his own children, wherever the substance is permitted to resolve
the modi, the natura naturans the natura naturata, being the
becoming, reality the appearance, into a mere semblance, there
humanity, personality with its consciousness and will, with its
sense of religious and ethical values, with its scientific and
aesthetic ideals will never fail to enter an emphatic protest.</p>
<p id="iii-p26">Thus Socrates brought philosophy back from heaven to earth. Thus
in the Renascence and the Reformation the human mind shook off the
shackles of scholasticism. Thus over against the dogmatism of the
rationalists the philosopher of Königsberg asserted the
autonomy of human knowledge and action. And when in the nineteenth
century monism had waxed powerful, and had found in socialism an
ally in the sphere of civil and practical life, the birthhour of a
new sense of personality could no longer be delayed. Of this
movement Carlyle was the first, the mighty, the paradoxical
prophet. During the years 1833 and 1834 he lifted up his voice
against the intellectualism of the school of Bentham and Mill, and
pleaded the cause of faith, of personal conviction, of the
experience of the soul. All of his ego rose in him and set over
against the no of the world its strong, triumphant yea. I am
greater than thou, O nature; I stand above thee, for I know and
have power; in the life of my spirit, in my religion and ethics, in
my science and art, I furnish proofs of my imperishable
superiority. And this cry, born from distress of soul, found an
echo everywhere. It was the same impulse that led a Soren
Kierkegaard to revolt against the Christianity and Church of his
time; that induced a Ritschl to break as a church-historian with
the Tubingen school; that made a Hoffding range “values” above
“facts”; that determined an Eucken, in the mental life of man, to
choose his standpoint above the empirical reality; that in the
Netherlands filled the poet de Génestet with horror at the
web which Scholten’s monism threatened to spin around him; that
impelled a Tolstoi, an Ibsen, a Nietzsclhe to hurl their anathemas
against the corruption of society; that caused the men of art to
draw back from naturalism to symbolism and mysticism, and
everywhere procured for the principle of “voluntarism” an open door
and a sympathetic reception.<note place="foot" id="iii-p26.1" n="53">Comp. an article by Prof. F. J. E. Woodbridge, Naturalism and Humanism, Hibbert Journal, 1907, pp.1-17. L. Stein, Der Sinn des Daseins, Tubingen, 1904, pp. 22 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p27">While formerly the attempt was made to explain man from nature,
thus doing violence to his personality, at present it is proposed
to pursue the opposite method and seek in man the solution of the
riddle of the world. Heretofore thinkers have looked backward, and
investigated the past in order to discover the origin of man and
how he became what he is; now the eflort is to look forward, to
inspire man to work for his future, with the watchword, “make life,
the life thou knowest, as valuable as possible.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p27.1" n="54">Höffding, Philosophy of Religion, London, 1906, p. 381, reviewed in Review of Theol. and Philos., Nov., 1907, p. 318.</note>  Hitherto man
has learned to know himself only as a product of the past: let him
now learn to regard himself as “creator of the universe.”<note place="foot" id="iii-p27.2" n="55">The idea that man’s physical evolution has reached its climax, and that henceforward it depends on him to direct with his mind the further development and to create a new world, occurs in many writers: E. Schurtz, Urgeschichte der Kultur, 1900, Vorwort, and pp.3 ff. Stanley Hall, Adolescence, 2 vols. London, 1905, I, preface. Henry Demarest Lloyd, Man the Social Creator, London, 1906, p.15. In the last-mentioned work occur, for example, the following statements. The laborer is the creator, he is the remaker of man, nature, and society, p.12. As labor is creation, by labor men are divine and become godlike, p.13. Every good man (is) a creator and redeemer, p.32. Man is a possible God, p.25. an is not under the law, he creates the law, p.41. The creature is the creator, every creature. Man is not the creator, nor the creator of all, but he is the greatest creator we know on earth. He is the creator of himself and society, p. 42, etc.</note>  For is
it not evident that in man evolution has reached its culminating
point? Having after endless ages of strife and labor, after
innumerable failures and disappointments of every sort, produced
man, evolution now continues its task in and through man
exclusively, with his co-operation and under his guidance.
Personality is the most precious product, the most valuable
quintessence of the process of the development of nature. Goethe’s
words, “Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder ist nur die
Persönlichkeit,” are being quoted with universal delight and
approval.</p>
<p id="iii-p28">We see, therefore, that pragmatism as a philosophical theory
stands by no means isolated, but is connected with a mighty, ever
recurrent mental movement. None the less it has a shade and color
of its own. True, at first sight it seems to be nothing more than
the recommendation of a new method differing from that usually
applied in philosophy; and sometimes it introduces itself with an
amiable modesty befitting this humble claim. It disclaims every
desire to advocate any dogma, and maintains no preconceived
theories. Discouraged by the outcome of the philosophical systems,
and sceptical as to the fruitfulness of philosophic thinking, it
turns, we are told, its back upon all “verbal solutions, apriori
reasons, fixed principles, and closed systems,” and applies itself
to “concreteness and adequacy, to facts, to action, and to power.”
Still this is nothing more than the old demand which we have become
accustomed to hear from varying quarters, that science must not
start from preconceived opinions, but with strict impartiality
build on the simple naked facts. Empiricism through the ages has
harped on this, and positivism has simply played again the same
tune in a slightly higher and shriller tone.</p>
<p id="iii-p29">In making this demand these schools of thought have acted under
the naive impression that they themselves stand outside of the pale
of philosophy and are absolutely free from all preconceptions.
Pragmatism also cherishes this conviction, and, through the mouth
of Schiller, compares itself to a corridor or passage in a hotel
through which all the guests from the different rooms must pass in
order to reach the open air. This is, however, nothing but a
well-meant delusion. Empiricism is as much a guest in the great
hotel of science, and as truly occupies a separate room, as all
other inmates of the building. All engaged in the pursuit of
knowledge recognize that thought must be based on experience, and
that no other foundation can be laid on which to build science than
that of the facts of nature or history. The scientific investigator
does not resemble the spider or the ant, but the bee; he gathers
the honey of knowledge from the flowers of experience. In order to
see one has to open his eyes; in order to hear, his ears. Even
mediaeval scholasticism, which, owing to various causes held the
writings of antiquity, especially of Aristotle, in excessive
reverence, never failed to recognize the principle that “omnis
cognitio intellectualis incipit a sensu.” But there is and always
has been difference of opinion with regard to the influence which
is exercised or which should be exercised by the personality of the
investigator in the discovering, observing, arranging, and
systematizing of the facts. No difference exists as regards the
formal canon that science must proceed on the basis of the facts.
Pragmatism, in exhorting us to obey this canon, does no more than
reiterate a well-known and well-nigh universally acknowledged
principle. The difference begins when the question what are the
facts is reached, how they are to be found and observed, to be
classified and elaborated.</p>
<p id="iii-p30">The case of pragmatism itself furnishes the best illustration of
this. While offering itself as a mere method, it soon appears to be
a theory and a system. It brings to the investigation of things a
preconceived judgment of its own, both as to reality and as to
truth.</p>
<p id="iii-p31">As regards reality, pragmatism not only declares the philosophy
of materialism and pantheism aprioristic and dogmatic, but passes
the same judgment on all philosophy which would recognize the
reality of ideas and would count ideas among the facts to which
consciousness bears witness. Appealing to the well-known words of
Goethe, “In the beginning was not the word but the deed,” it
rejects all realism in the mediaeval sense of this term, to take
its stand consciously and unequivocally on the side of nominalism.
All generic conceptions, such as God, the absolute, the world, the
soul, matter, force, time, space, truth, substance, causation,
language, religion, morality, and the like are considered,
therefore, not designations of objective realities, but terms by
means of which we put together for the sake of convenience certain
groups of phenomena, mere “helps to thought,” which have to prove
their serviceableness and value in the using; by no means invested
capital, but current coin, subject to fluctuation. To the
pragmatist the world is in itself no unity, no organism, no kosmos,
but an avowed multiplicity of phenomena, an infinite mass of facts,
a hyle, a chaos.</p>
<p id="iii-p32">Pragmatism adduces in favor of this nominalistic world-view the
consideration already urged by Aristotle against Plato’s doctrine
of ideas, namely, that otherwise the world exists in duplicate, or
even in triplicate. For, as James observes, to the rationalist the
world exists either from the outset complete in the idea, or, at
any rate, finished and ready in its objective reality exterior to
us, in which case it once more appears in the form of a more or
less imperfect copy in our minds. To the pragmatist, on the other
hand, the unity of the world is not a given fact, but a growing
thing, ever in process of becoming and improvement. In itself the
world is essentially unformed matter, hyle, but “it is still in the
making, and awaits part of its completion from the future.” Or,
better still, the world becomes what we cause it to be; “it is
plastic, it is what we make it.” For this reason it is a matter of
comparative indifference how we conceive that it in the past became
what it now is, whether we explain it materialistically or
theistically. For, after all, the world is that which it is. And
the main question is not, What has it been? but What is it
becoming? What are we doing with it and making of it?<note place="foot" id="iii-p32.1" n="56">James, Pragmatism, pp.122, 127,162, 243, 257.</note> </p>
<p id="iii-p33">From this peculiar outlook upon reality pragmatism reaps the
advantage of being able to accord unstinted and honest recognition
to many facts which rationalism has to ignore or explain away. The
world is a chaos, full of pathetic facts of sin and misery and
sorrow, facts which the philosophy of the absolute seeks in vain to
justify or to reconcile with the harmony of the universe. It also
gives due consideration to a great number of the most diversified
phenomena and experiences of religious and moral life, and, without
in connection with these raising the question of truth and right,
seeks to respect and appreciate them from a psychological and
sociological point of view. Since it does not take its start from
any idea of the absolute, not even of absolute goodness or justice
or ominipotence, it does not feel called upon to furnish a
theodicy. It does not sacrifice reality to any theological or
philosophical theory nor force it into the procrustean bed of any
apriori system. The world is a miserable world and in itself cannot
be anything else.</p>
<p id="iii-p34">But while judging thus pessimistically of the past and the
present, pragmatism cherishes quite optimistic expectations with
regard to the future. And in connection with this it holds a
peculiar conception of truth. Behind and around about us, no doubt,
gloom and darkness reign, but ahead of us the dawn is breaking. For
evolution has now so far advanced as to produce man, and has
committed to him the further improvement of the world. On man it
depends what the world is to become. True, this renders the future
more or less uncertain; the world is not saved, necessarily, by its
own inherent powers; if to be saved, it must be saved by man. Still
this salvation is possible, and in part even probable. Pragmatism
is not wholly pessimistic nor wholly optimistic; its frame of mind
might be described as melioristic. Although the world be wretched
in itself, the power and the duty of saving it belong to us.</p>
<p id="iii-p35">Man possesses such power because through a long series of ages
he has come to be a knowing, and especially a willing and acting,
being; his intellect and his will constitute him, in the midst of
the sad, ugly reality, “a creative power.” He has raised himself
gradually to this plane. He was not endowed with such intellect and
will at the start; he has slowly acquired them. Nor is he by nature
endowed with a so-called “common sense,” with innate knowledge of
apriori forms, as even Kant from his rationalistic standpoint still
imagined. The intellect itself, with all its content of
conceptions, categories, laws of thought, etc., has been evolved in
the struggle for existence, because it proved practically useful
and valuable for life. And this consequently is the only criterion
of truth.</p>
<p id="iii-p36">Truth does not exist before or outside or independent of man. It
has no more objective existence than the unity, the goodness, or
the happiness of the world. It is nowhere to be found in its
completeness, as though man could receive it after a purely passive
fashion into his consciousness. Nor does its criterion lie in the
agreement of our representations with the external reality, for it
exists only in and not outside of man. It is not, but becomes; as
the world in general, so truth is “in the making.” Truth is that
which in the experience of the life of knowledge and volition
approves itself as useful. Its changeableness and relativity are
necessarily given with this. There is no single truth that is
settled absolutely, above all possibility of doubt; all truth
remains subject to revision. Every truth is to be measured by its
value for life, and for this reason may change any day. Science
itself gives no knowledge of the objective reality. All it can do
is to provide us with instruments for using the reality. It
furnishes no absolute, but only relative, practical truth. It
teaches no necessary, but only contingent, laws. That system is
most true which is most useful. Truth, religion, morality,
civilization in its whole extent, are all subject and subservient
to life. The reality may be hard and chaotic; it is for us to make
it true and good.<note place="foot" id="iii-p36.1" n="57">James, op. cit., Comp. on the related French philosophy of Ravaisson, Boutroux, Bergson, Le Roy, and others, an article by George M. Sauvage, New Philosophy in France, Catholic University Bulletin, April, 1906; J. de Tonquédec, La notion de la vérité dans la philosophic nouvelle, Paris, 1908. G. Rageot, Les savants et la philosophie, Paris, 1908.</note> </p>




























<p id="iii-p37"> </p>

<p id="iii-p38"> </p>

<p id="iii-p39"> </p>

<p id="iii-p40"> </p>

<p id="iii-p41"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 3. Revelation and Philosophy (cont.)" id="iv" prev="iii" next="v">
<h2 id="iv-p0.1">Lecture 3 - Revelation and Philosophy (cont.)</h2>

<p id="iv-p1"> </p>

<p class="First" id="iv-p2">To pragmatism belongs the great merit of having freed us from
the bane of monism and of having exposed the barrenness of its
abstract conceptions. It deserves appreciation and praise so far as
it turns its back upon “fixed habits, pure abstractions, and verbal
solutions,” calls us back to the facts, and places emphasis afresh
on the practical element in all knowledge and science.</p>

<p id="iv-p3">But if it may be justly demanded of every world-view that it
shall satisfy both the requirements of the intellect and the needs
of the heart, it will be seen that pragmatism also is
unsatisfactory. It is itself not pragmatic enough. While professing
to have no dogmas, and rejecting alike the philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle, of Spinoza and Hegel, of Bradley and Taylor, in point of
fact it aligns itself with the humanism of Socrates, links its
thinking to that of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and simply
replaces the philosophy of rationalism by that of empiricism. When
it not only throws overboard the abstract conception of the
absolute and its self-realization in the world-process, but also
refuses to acknowledge as realities “upon which it can rest” God
and his attributes, mind and matter, reason and conscience, and
finds in all these names merely “a programme for more work, only
with a practical value”; when it discards the idea of substance and
resolves the thing into its properties; when it regards religion
and philosophy as “largely a matter of temperament, even of physical condition,” and places
the criterion of all truth in “satisfactoriness” alone; pragmatism
proves that it is far from merely a new method, but is to all
intents a new philosophy, and comes therewith into conflict with
its own point of departure and its own fundamental principle. No
wonder James declares that it cannot be refuted by pointing out in
it a few contradictions, but that the only way to learn to
understand and accept it is by becoming thoroughly
“inductive-minded” one’s self through “a real change of heart,” “a
break with absolutistic hopes.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p3.1" n="58">James, Mind, 1905, p.191.</note>  Here we touch the real core of
pragmatism: it has abandoned all hope of knowing anything that
bears any absolute character,—not only God, but all ideas and
names. It is born from a sceptical frame of mind, and for this
reason as a last resort clings to what it considers ultimate,
incontrovertible facts.</p>

<p id="iv-p4">It follows from this that pragmatism is not correctly defined by
indispensable, practically inalienable ingredient of our mental
equipment.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p4.1" n="59">Ed. von Hartmann, Kritische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart, 1890, p.190, in: C. Willems, Die Erkenntnisslehre des modernen Idealismus, Trier, 1906, p.13. Comp. also Max Frischeisen-Kohler, Die Lehre von den Sinnesqualitaten und ihre Gegner, Zeits. f. Wissensch. Philos. und Soziologie, 1906.</note>  As though idealism had become frightened by its own
practical consequences, Paulsen and Verworn hasten to assure us,
that, whether one’s philosophy be idealism or realism, everything
in life remains the same, and science retains its truth and value.<note place="foot" id="iv-p4.2" n="60">Paulsen, Einl. in die Philosophie, Berlin, 1892, p.363. Verworn in Dennert, Die Weltanachauung des modernen Naturforschers, p.147.</note> 
But, in addition to this, the facts directly contradict the
assumption that reality is reached only through a process of
reasoning from representation or will. It is by no means in every
case that we posit reality behind our representations. Difficult as
it may be to point out the difference theoretically, practically we
all draw a distinction between the waking and dreaming states,
between the representation of reality and hallucination. And in the
same manner we ascribe reality to many things with which our will
has no concern whatever, and from which it experiences no
resistance whatever. The sun and the moon and the stars possess no
less reality for us than the stone against which we strike our foot
or the wall which shuts off our view.</p>
<p id="iv-p5">Now, since we are not in the least conscious of any such process
of reasoning or inference, some have thought that these activities
take place in the subconscious region of our mind.<note place="foot" id="iv-p5.1" n="61">So Helmholtz, von Hartmann, and others, in C. Willems, Die Erkenntnislehre des mod. Ideal, pp.42 ff.</note>  This, however,
entirely fails to make the matter more plausible. For either an
unconscious inference of this kind must be the precipitate of long
years and ages of experience, in which case it would presuppose the
very thing to be established by it; or the human mind must by its
very nature be under the necessity of connecting its
representations with reality, in which case the procedure can
neither be unconscious nor consist of an act of syllogistic
reasoning; or, as von Hartmann actually represents it, it is
something accomplished in us by the great Unconscious, in which
case it is no conclusion of ours, and all self-activity of man in
thinking and acting disappears. When idealism has begun by severing
the representation in its origin and essence from reality, it has
lost the power to reinstitute the inward connection between them.
The mind, having once shut itself up in the circle of
representations, is unable to free itself from this
self-constructed prison. Whithersoever it may turn, it perceives
nothing but representations, products of its own consciousness ;
its will is a representation; the resistance that will encounters
is a representation; the ego is a representation. Representations
gird it about on all sides, and nowhere is access open to reality;
for no inference can be drawn from thinking to being; from the
representations there is no bridge to reality. Just as little as
Satan can be cast out by Satan is there escape from representations
by means of representations.<note place="foot" id="iv-p5.2" n="62">E. L. Fischer, Die Grundfragen der Erkenntnisstheorie, 1887, p.424.</note> </p>
<p id="iv-p6">Idealistic philosophy is like the she-bear which draws all her
nourishment from her own breasts, and thus eats herself up, ipsa
alimenta sibi.<note place="foot" id="iv-p6.1" n="63">Paulsen, in Willems, op. cit., p.103.</note>  The case becomes entirely different if we take our
starting-point not from the representations as such, but from
self-consciousness; if for the act of cogitare we substitute the
fact cogito. But modern psychology seeks to obstruct also this last
road to reality. It bids us remark that we do not observe in
ourselves any ego, any soul, any substance, but only a continuous
succession of phenomenal states of consciousness, and that we lack
warrant to infer from these the existence of a bearer or substrate.
This obstruction, however, is easily removed, because the same
mistake is made here that before was found to vitiate the reasoning
with regard to the reality of the outside world. As our perception
does not have for its object the representations, but in and
through these the things themselves, so in the phenomena of
consciousness our own ego always presents itself to us. In neither
case is there involved any process of reasoning or inference. As
the external perception, of itself and immediately, convinces of
the reality of the perceived object, so the perception of self in
the phenomena of consciousness assures us spontaneously and
immediately of the existence of ourselves.</p>
<p id="iv-p7">Of course a distinction must be made here between the
psychological investigation to which the man of science subjects
the phenomena of consciousness, and by means of which he may
abstract these from the self-consciousness, and the state of
self-consciousness experienced in daily life by every man, the
scientist not excluded. But in the latter case the self is always
and immediately given in self-consciousness. If this were not so,
we should indeed be shut up to the proposition, advocated no doubt
by idealism, but none the less paradoxical, which is formulated by
Max Verworn as follows: “There is no such thing as a soul dwelling
in the human body, nor as a man which is the seat of sensations,
but a man is a complex of sensations, and to others as well as to
himself he consists of sensations.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p7.1" n="64">Verworn, Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung, 1904, p.43. Comp. Mach. in Hell, Ernst Machs Philosophie, 1907, p.23. Heijmans, Het Ik en het psychisch Monisme, Tijdschr. voor Wijsbegeerte, I, 3.</note>  That this is a paradox is
recognized even by John Stuart Mill, for in spite of his
actualistic standpoint, he declares that here a dilemma confronts
us: we must either believe that the ego is distinct from the
phenomena of consciousness belonging to it, or accept the paradox
that a series of sensations can become conscious of itself as a
series.<note place="foot" id="iv-p7.2" n="65">Stuart Mill, in Willems, op. cit., p.79.</note>  Here, as little as in the case of outward perception,
does monism suffice. There is a distinction, an irremovable
distinction, between the representation and the thing of which it
is a representation, and there is an equally sharp and equally
indelible distinction between the phenomena of consciousness and
the subject that manifests itself in them. How else could unity and
continuity of psychical life, how could memory and imagination,
thinking and judging, comparison and inference, be possible? The
ego is not an aggregate of parts, not a mass of phenomena of
consciousness, afterwards grouped together by man under one name.
It is a synthesis, which in every man precedes all scientific,
reflection, an organic whole possessing members. It is complex but
not compound.<note place="foot" id="iv-p7.3" n="66">John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, London, 1906, p.108. Over against idealism the unity and independence of the ego are upheld by Landmann, Die Mehrheit geistiger personlichkeiten in einem Individuum, 1894. Gutberlet, Der Kampf um die Seele, Mainz, 1903, pp.121 ff. Rudolf Otto, Naturalistiche und religiose Weltansicht, Tubingen, 1904, pp.244 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="iv-p8">In self-consciousness, therefore, we have to deal not with a
mere phenomenon, but with a noumenon, with a reality that is
immediately given us, antecedently to all reasoning and inference.
Self-consciousness is the unity of real and ideal being; the self
is here consciousness, not scientific knowledge, but experience,
conviction, consciousness of self as a reality. In
self-consciousness our own being is revealed to us, directly,
immediately, before all thinking and independently of all willing.
We do not approach it through any reasoning or exertion of our own;
we do not demonstrate its existence, we do not understand its
essence. But it is given to us in self-consciousness, given gratis,
and is received on our part spontaneously, in unshaken confidence,
with immediate assurance. In self-consciousness the light dawns for
us on our own being, even as nature emerges from darkness and
stands revealed in the rays of the sun. To ignore this fact of
self-consciousness, this primary fact, this foundation of all
knowledge and activity, to make it dependent on our own
affirmation, to undermine it by doubt, is to commit against
ourselves and against others not merely a logical but also an
ethical sin. It is to shake not only the foundation of science, but
also the indispensable basis of all human conduct; to weaken all
confidence, spontaneity, volitional energy, and courage. And no
effort of the will can repair afterwards the injury which has been
wrought by thought. The will lacks the authority and the power to
become the foundation of faith and knowledge, of religion and
morality. “Practical reason” cannot bear the weight which
“theoretical reason” has cast off of itself, and “theoretical
reason” is not in a position to demonstrate that which is the
presupposition of all demonstration. The “will to believe” may be
indispensable to faith, but it can never become the ground of
faith; and every demonstration of the intellect must rest on the
intuitive certainty of self-consciousness.</p>
<p id="iv-p9">In self-consciousness, however, there is revealed something
different from and more than our own self. Or rather, the ego that
is revealed to us in self-consciousness is no cold, bald unity, no
dead mathematical point, no quiescent, unvarying substance but is rich in content,
full of life and power and activity. It is no monad without
windows, no insensible “Reale” lying beneath the psychical
phenomena and bearing them as the stage bears the players. On the
contrary, it is itself immanent in the psychical phenomena and
develops itself in and through and with them; it is capable of
working out its own salvation with fear and trembling, but also of
working its own destruction and ruin. It is, but at the same time
it becomes and grows; it is a fulness of life, a totality of gifts
and powers, which do not play their roles behind the curtain, but
reveal themselves and find development in the multiform activities
of psychical life, in the whole man with all his works. Augustine
was the first who so understood self-consciousness. Socrates did
not comprehend this; for although he brought philosophy back from
nature to man, he was interested exclusively in gaining true
conceptions of knowledge and conduct. And later Descartes took, it
is true, his starting-point from thought, but thought meant for him
the essence of the soul. Augustine went deeper and found more; he
discovered reality within himself. The scepticism into which Greek
philosophy had issued had lost, together with God and the world,
also the self-certainty of man. But when the Christian religion
revealed to us the greatness of God’s heart, and in the day-spring
from on high visited us with his tender mercy, it at the same time
cast its light on man and on the riches and value of his soul. It
imparted to him an ew certainty, the certainty of faith; it
restored to him his confidence in God, and therewith his confidence
in himself. And by this light of revelation Augustine descended
deep into his own inner life; forgetting nature, he desired to know
naught else but God and himself. There he found thought, to be
sure, but not thought alone; beneath thought he penetrated to the
essence of the soul, for in himself always life preceded thought;
faith, knowledge; self-consciousness, reflection; experience,
science; he first lived through the things which later he thought
and wrote. Thus Augustine went back behind thought to the essence
of the soul and found in it not a simple unity, but a marvellously
rich totality; he found there the ideas, the norms, the laws of the
true and the good, the solution of the problem of the certainty of
knowledge, of the cause of all things, of the supreme good; he
found there the seeds and germs of all knowledge and science and
art; he found there, even, in the triad of memoria, intellectus,
and voluntas, a reflection of the triune being of God. Augustine
was the philosopher of self-examination, and in self-consciousness
he discovered the starting-point of a new metaphysies.<note place="foot" id="iv-p9.1" n="67">Comp. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Leipzig, 1880, pp.322 ff. Warfield, Augustine’s Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority, Princeton Theol. Review, July and Oct., 1907.</note> </p>
<p id="iv-p10">The mind of man is indeed no tabula rasa, no empty form, but a
totality of life from the very first moment of its existence. And
when it becomes conscious of itself, this self-consciousness is not
a mere formal apprehension of existence, but always includes in it
an apprehension of a peculiar nature, a particular quality of mind.
It is never a consciousness of pure being, but always a
consciousness of a specific being, of a definite something. This is
acknowledged even by those who follow Herbert Spencer in assuming
that the rational, moral mind of man has been slowly evolved out of
an animal state and has acquired in the struggle for existence a
set of general conceptions, a common sense, to which attaches, up
to the present day, great practical value, and which is transmitted
as a habitus from parents to children.<note place="foot" id="iv-p10.1" n="68">James, Pragmatism, pp.165 ff.</note>  By this evolutionary
explanation the difficulty is simply pushed back into the past,
into the life of our ancestors. In actual life we never see mere
sensation developing into thought, and it is highly improbable that
such a transition will ever be witnessed, as, for example, in the
case of apes. But such an evolution is no easier to understand in
the past than in the present; between perception and intellect,
representation and conceptions, association of representations and
conceptual thinking, there is a fundamental difference. Association
combines representations according to accidental, external points
of resemblance; thought combines conceptions according to the laws
of identity and contradiction, cause and effect, means and end.
Causation, for example, is something wholly different from habitual
association, because it has its essence in an internal and
necessary connection of phenomena. Unless the thinking mind be
introduced into the explanation from the outset, every effort to
make it emerge out of the faculty of perception by way of evolution
must remain futile. Very properly Mr. R. W. B. Joseph, in his
criticism of James, observes, that in order to acquire a “common
sense,” man must needs be possessed antecedently of mind. “A mind
which had no fundamental categories and whose experience was purely
chaotic would not be a mind at all.” The nature of mind consists
just in “the fundamental modes of its thinking.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p10.2" n="69">Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, in Mind, 1905, p.33.</note>  But, be this as
it may, the evolutionists themselves will have to acknowledge that
to the mind of man, as at present constituted, this “common sense”
is an integral possession which belongs to it from the start.</p>
<p id="iv-p11">When we endeavor to determine more closely the nature of this
mind and descend for this purpose into the depths of
self-consciousness, we find at its very root the sense of
dependence. In our self-consciousness we are not only conscious of
being, but also of being something definite, of being the very
thing we are. And this definite mode of being, most generally
described, consists in a dependent, limited, finite, created being.
Before all thinking and willing, before all reasoning and action,
we are and exist, exist in a definite way, and inseparable
therefrom have a consciousness of our being and of its specific
mode. The core of our self-consciousness is, as Schleiermacher
perceived much more clearly than Kant, not autonomy, but a sense of
dependence. In the act of becoming conscious of ourselves we become
conscious of ourselves as creatures.</p>
<p id="iv-p12">This dependence is brought to our knowledge in a two-fold way.
We feel ourselves dependent on everything around us; we are not
alone. Solipsism, although the inevitable outcome of idealism, is
in itself an impossible theory. According to the philosopher Wolf,
there lived in his day in Paris a pupil of Malebranche, who
advocated solipsism, and still found adherents, quod, Wolf
observes, mirum videri poterat. Even Fichte felt compelled, chiefly
by moral considerations, not to regard himself as the only existent
being.<note place="foot" id="iv-p12.1" n="70">Flugel, Die Probleme der Philosophie, Cothen, 1906, pp.114-115.</note>  Every man knows that he does not exist alone, that he is
not able to do what he pleases, that on every side he is curbed and
hedged in, and encounters resistance. But in the second place we
feel ourselves, together with all creatures, wholly dependent on
some absolute power which is the one infinite being. How this power
is defined does not matter for the present; the main point is that
all men feel themselves dependent on a being which is the cause and
ground of all being. This sense of dependence, with its two-fold
reference, is not a philosophical conception, not an abstract
category, not “a verbal solution,” but a fact which in point of
certainty is equal to the best established fact of natural science.
It is something genuinely empirical, universally human, immediate,
the very core of self-consciousness, and involves the existence of
both the world and God.</p>
<p id="iv-p13">True, from the standpoint of idealism this last-named conclusion
will be rejected. Still, two things need to be sharply
distinguished in connection with this. That the belief in the
existence of an objective world (and likewise of God) is a fact
nobody can deny. The most thorough-going idealist cannot ignore the
fact that all men without distinction, and antecedently to all
reasoning, are convinced of the reality of the world, and that he
himself in daily life shares this conviction, nay, finds it
indispensable for knowledge and activity. Nor did Kant himself deny
this fact. The problem which Kant set himself to solve was not how
the world of our perception, the Wahrnehmungswirklichkeit, is
produced,, for it is self-evident that we obtain this from
perception, and that from the first we conceive of it as existing
in space and time. But, starting from this world of perception and
presupposing it, Kant sought to answer this other question,—how
we can obtain scientific knowledge of this empirical world. And for
this problem he offered the solution, that such knowledge cannot
come through sense-perception, because the latter discovers nothing
but an orderless mass of phenomena; that scientific knowledge is
possible and attainable only when the human mind introduces order
into this chaos of phenomena and subjects it to its own law.
According to Kant the mind has such a law of its own: it carries in
itself all sorts of apriori forms, which are not called apriori
because in point of time they precede perception, or because they
lie ready-made in our minds, but because they are independent of
perception and are produced and applied by the mind in the very act
of working on the representations.<note place="foot" id="iv-p13.1" n="71">Paul Kalweit, Das religiose Apriori, Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1908, I, pp.139-156.</note> </p>
<p id="iv-p14">From this activity of the mind in acquiring scientific
knowledge, idealism (whether rightly or wrongly appealing to Kant
cannot and need not be here investigated) has drawn the conclusion
that the world of perception is either in part or in whole a
product of the perceiving subject. But in doing this it confounds
two questions which Kant kept distinct. The world of perception is
given to us in our consciousness, not as dream or hallucination,
but as phenomenon and representation, involving, according to
universal belief, the existence of an objective world. This
empirical and undeniable fact is recognized, and to some degree
explained, only when self-consciousness is conceived in the sense
above defined as the unity of real and ideal being; when it is
recognized as a matter of intuitive certainty that in
self-consciousness both the existence and the specific mode of
existence of the self, the ego, are revealed. For in that case the
gulf between the reality and the representation, between being and
thinking, is bridged over. And with the selfsame certainty with
which we assume the existence of our own ego, the existence of the
world is recognized. For the representation is connected with
reality by the same inner tie that binds self-consciousness to the
self. It is the same sense of dependence that inheres in the mind
as a whole which also inheres in all its representations and
activities; the ego does not exist in a quiescent state, nor lie
insensible outside of and behind the psychical phenomena, but is
immanently active in them, and attains in them its revelation and
development; and self-consciousness does not exist apart from the
representations, but lives and realizes itself in them; it imparts
its own certainty to these representations; it in them feels
assured of itself. To undermine belief in the external world,
therefore, always carries with it the undermining of
self-confidence and of volitional energy, of the faith the mind has
in itself, and hence of the superiority of the mind to nature, of
religion and morality. Not evolution, but revelation, is the secret
of the mind; in our self-consciousness, independently of our
co-operation and apart from our will, the reality of our ego and of
the world is revealed to us. Whosoever here does not believe shall
not be established.</p>
<p id="iv-p15">In seeking to obtain knowledge of this world of perception
science must needs set out from this fact of inner consciousness.
It can and must endeavor to understand this; but the reality of the
fact should not be made dependent on our ability to explain it. We
do not know how the world can exist, or how, in this world,
consciousness is possible, yet no one doubts the reality of either.
It is imperative, both logically and ethically, that science shall
respect the reality of the soul’s inner consciousness, for if it
refuses belief here, it undermines its own foundation.
Epistemological idealism furnishes the most forcible demonstration
of this. For according to this theory reality is itself a hyle, a
chaos, and order is first introduced into it by the knowledge, and
activity of the human mind. The world in itself is neither true nor
good; it is we who slowly make it true and good. No doubt in this
proposition, even when thus paradoxically expressed, there is
always contained this much of truth, that the world apart from man
is imperfect and unfinished. In the Pentateuchal account of
creation the preparation of the earth is described from this very
point of view; in man the world finds its head and its lord. Hence
man is given a vocation with reference to this world. Though good,
yet it is not “finished.” It exists in order to be replenished,
subjected, made the object of knowledge, and ruled over by man. To
this extent it would be proper to say that it was man’s task to
make the world true and good.</p>
<p id="iv-p16">But the idealistic philosophy understands all this in quite a
different sense. It takes its position in the second verse of the
first chapter of Genesis, placing itself not after but before the
preparation of the earth by God’s omnipotent hand. The earth in
itself, apart from man, is a waste and empty chaos, unformed,
without ordinances and laws, without light and color. Now right
here a difficulty emerges of so serious a nature that it divides
the idealists into two camps, which we may, perhaps, call the
“thoroughgoing” and the “half-hearted” idealists. The thoroughgoing
idealists dispense even with the hyle, and regard the entire world
as a product of the human mind, and man not merely as the orderer,
but also as the creator of the world. It was in this sense that
Fichte aftirmed that the ego posits the non-ego, and Paulsen, along
with many kindred spirits in our own day, declares that the objects
of the external world are “a creation of the subject.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p16.1" n="72">Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 1892, p.425.</note>  Most
idealists, however, draw back from this phenomenalism, which would
seem bound to issue into solipsism; they, therefore, with Locke,
draw a distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities
of things, and, while ascribing to the latter a purely subjective
origin, uphold the objective reality of the former as something
that belongs to them independently of man.</p>
<p id="iv-p17">If this latter position, however, be correct, and the primary
qualities, such as impenetrability, extension, number, motion, can
lay claim to independent existence, then the assertion that the
world in itself is nothing but chaos seems overbold; for on such a
view there must be in it substance and causality, law and
government, order and measure, and man appears to be not the
creator, but merely the orderer of the world. And in his ordering
of the world he is dependent on these primary qualities; he is not
absolutely free, or autonomous, but determined in his knowledge and
activity by the objective world. But in that case his activity
cannot, even with regard to secondary qualities, be held to be an
autonomous, creative one. It is true, idealism considers the
subjective nature of these secondary qualities the impregnable
fortress of its position, and believes that both epistemologically
and physiologically the correctness of its view in this respect has
been irrefutably demonstrated.</p>
<p id="iv-p18">Epistemology, however, teaches the very opposite of what
idealism asserts. The perceptive and cognitive activity of man is
only in a psychological, and not in a logical, sense a purely
immanent act of the mind. Both perception and representation would
cease to be what they are if nothing existed that was perceived and
represented. On both the character of logical transcendence is
indelibly impressed; by their very nature they point to an
objective reality, detached from which they would become equivalent
to hallucinations and illusions. As self-consciousness presupposes
the self not outside but in the content of consciousness, so by the
same law and with the same certainty the representation, which does
not operate outside of self-consciousness but is the product and
content of it, points back to an object. This explanation of the
character of perception has not been modified in the least by the
physiology of sensation. Physiology has clarified to a very
important degree our insight into the conditions under which, the
ways by which, and the means through which, perception takes place,
but the act of perception itself remains precisely what it was
before. We now know that the sensations of sight and of hearing
cannot originate except under the condition of some millions of
aether-vibrations per second, that the sensation of seeing is
attended by an image thrown inverted on the retina of the eye, that
smell and taste depend on a chemical dissolution of the
constituents of the object, that nervous stimuli are transmitted
from our sense organs to the centre of the brain. But the nexus
that exists between all these intermediate processes and the
perception itself utterly eludes us. What, for example, has the
sensation of color as such to do with 437 billions of vibrations
per second? What has the sensation of hardness or softness to do
with stimulation of the nerves? The distinction between the cause
and the condition, between the mediation and the object of the
perception, for all this, retains its full validity. Just as
writing and reading, telegraphy and telephony avail themselves of
all sorts of mechanical movements of hand and tongue or of all
kinds of visible signs and audible sounds, and nevertheless
presuppose at each end of the process a thinking subject which by
means of the signs understands the thought, so the sense-organs,
together with all further intermediaries, are only the conditions
under which, the ways in which, the subject sees and hears, tastes
and smells, but in no wise the cause, and hence not in any way the
explanation, of these perceptions. After all physiological
investigation the mental act of perception remains as mysterious as
before. Before and after there remains unshaken and unreduced the
distinction between subject and object, between the act of
perception and the object of perception, between sight, hearing,
smell, taste, touch, on the one hand, and being seen, heard,
smelled, tasted, touched, on the other hand. Both grammatically and
logically the distinction between the active and the passive voice
remains in force.</p>
<p id="iv-p19">The moderate idealists, therefore, were wrong in conceding the
subjectivity of the secondary qualities. Of course, continued
observation and reflection may improve and render more accurate our
perceptions of color and sound, of smell and taste, as well as
those of space and time, of size and distance; both soul and body,
the mental faculties and the senses, need teaching and training.
But this does not affect the fundamental character that should be
ascribed to the perceptions of the secondary qualities or the
maintenance of their objectivity. It is already note-worthy that a
number of such thinkers as Berkeley and Hume, Paulsen and Wundt,
Eucken and Stumpf, consider the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities unfounded and arbitrary.<note place="foot" id="iv-p19.1" n="73">In Willems, op. cit., pp.36-47. Comp. also Bradley, Appearance and Reality, London, 1906, pp.11 ff., and further the article by Frischeisen-Kohler, cited in note 4 above.</note>  In regard to space—
and time—relations errors are no more excluded than in regard to
perceptions of color and sound. Apart from secondary qualities,
space, extension, form are incapable of becoming objects of
perception. The objective validity of the secondary qualities in no
respect falls behind that of the primary qualities. If it be given
up with respect to the former, it will be impossible to maintain it
with respect to the latter; semi-idealism arbitrarily stops short
half-way. But, apart from this, if such a great difference exists
between the two groups of qualities, it is hard to understand that
ordinary observation, in the learned and the unlearned alike, has
remained entirely unaware of this. And yet ordinary observation in
other cases draws all kinds of distinctions. It knows quite well
that an hallucination is different from a, representation; if a
person hurts his foot on a stone, it predicates the pain, not of
the stone, but of the subject. It knows that food can be called
healthy in a figurative sense only, because it promotes health
(which is the attribute of a human being). And it is likewise aware
that the senses of smell and taste are much more subjective than
the others, so as to lie outside the region of disputation. Yet,
notwithstanding all this, ordinary observation adheres to the
conviction that the representations are no more light or dark,
green or red, sweet or bitter, than they are high or low, round or
square, near or distant, but that all these qualities belong to the
object, and that the subject does not produce, but only perceives
and takes knowledge of them.</p>
<p id="iv-p20">It is impossible, therefore, to remove or separate these
qualities—and the secondary no less truly than the primary ones—
from the object. It will not do to say with Verworn, The stone is
hard—a sensation; it is heavy—a sensation; it is cold—a
sensation; it is gray—a sensation, etc., and thence to conclude
that what I call a stone is nothing but a specific combination of
sensations. Or rather, it is possible to talk in this way, but it
is not feasible to practise it in actual life. We may proceed after
this fashion in abstract thinking and come to maintain that nothing
objective remains; but such an abstract procedure is no proof that
we can act on it in practical life. The important point is
precisely that the stone is a specific combination, or rather a
complex, of qualities, which occur in combination with one another,
and which are not held together subjectively in my consciousness,
but objectively in the thing itself.<note place="foot" id="iv-p20.1" n="74">Verworn, in Dennert, op. cit., p.140.</note>  And so it is with every
object we perceive and with the entire world spread out before our
eyes. The world is not a group of perceptions formed by us for
economic reasons, for the sake of the practical necessities of
life, but a complex of qualities which exist objectively and are
mutually bound together, a totality which cannot be reduced to any
representation of ours. As little as subjectively the ego, the
personality, admits of being resolved into a series of sensations,
can the world of our external perception be reduced to a group of
representations. In both cases we are face to face with one and the
same fact. In consciousness our own being, and the being of the
world, are disclosed to us antecedently to our thought or volition;
that is, they are revealed to us in the strictest sense of the
word.<note place="foot" id="iv-p20.2" n="75">Comp. G. E. Moore, Refutation of Idealism, Mind, N. S. n. 48, and, in answer, C. A. Strong, Has Mr. Moore refuted Idealism? Mind, 1905, pp.178-189. Further, J. S. Mackenzie, The New Realism and the Old Idealism, Mind, 1906, pp.308-328.</note> </p>
<p id="iv-p21">In man’s self-consciousness, however, still more is implied.
Unless there were more, the result obtained could not satisfy us.
For without more we should not be warranted in speaking of
revelation, and could not maintain our confidence in the testimony
of our self-consciousness. A true unity would be unattainable for
us; naturalism and humanism, materialism and idealism, monism and
pluralism, would continue to stand in irreconcilable opposition to
each other. We should in that case have to call in doubt even the
possibility of objective knowledge, and not be able to answer the
objection that all our knowledge is pure delusion and imagination.
Idealism has felt the seriousness of this objection, and has been
led by it to seek in some way or other in the absolute the ground
for the objectivity and the reality of our knowledge. In regard to
the nature of this absolute there is difference of opinion.
Malebranche conceived of it as a personal God in whom we see all
things. Green speaks of an eternal consciousness. The Marburg
school assumes a transcendental consciousness, which bears in
itself the apriori forms. Rickert believes that an abstract
impersonal consciousness will suffice. Paulsen and von Hartmann
think of an absolute substance which is the only true being and of
which all real things are unsubstantial accidents.</p>
<p id="iv-p22">That idealism has come to such a belief in the absolute cannot
cause surprise. For it set out by breaking down the bridge between
thinking and being, and thus created a chasm which, afterwards, no
reasoning of the intellect could fill up nor any act of the will
overleap. Thinking lost hold upon being. If, therefore, it was not
to lose itself in subjective dreaming, but actually to issue in
knowledge of the truth, it was necessary to re-establish, either
high in the air or deep underground in the absolute, some
connection between thought and being, between subject and object.
The absolute thus serves to guarantee the truth of human thought.
According to some it is not even necessary that this absolute shall
restore the reality of the objective world or shall itself know all
things according to truth; it suffices if it be no more than the
objective norm of thinking or that as unconscious force it attain
to consciousness in man.</p>
<p id="iv-p23">Although the attempt to recover after this fashion the lost
unity of thought and being deserves appreciation, it is impossible
to regard it as the true solution of the problem. Here again it is
the testimony of self-consciousness that enters a protest. It has
already been observed that Schleiermacher apprehended better than
Kant the essence of self-consciousness when he defined it as an
absolute sense of dependence. It now remains to add that in this
sense of dependence self-consciousness at the same time posits the
independence and freedom of man. Apparently this is an
irreconcilable antinomy, but it will be shown presently that these
two testimonies of self-consciousness are not mutually exclusive,
but inclusive, of each other. Even Sehleiermacher himself
overlooked this, and Kant was so far ustified in affirming the
autonomy of human knowledge and action. For no matter whether
learned or unlearned, all of us without distinction are conscious
that we ourselves perceive, we ourselves think, we ourselves
reason, we ourselves draw conclusions, and in the same manner that
we ourselves deliberate, will, and act. Religion and morality,
responsibility and accountability, science and art, all the labor
and culture of humanity are built on this basic assumption. Hence
the absolute cannot be conceived as an unconscious and involuntary
force. No doubt from time to time the deity has been so conceived
by a few “intellectuals,” but pantheism has never been the creed of
any people, the confession of any church. Men have, it is true,
often broken up, along with the unity of the world and the unity of
the human race, the unity of God, also ; but the personality of God
has remained firmly established, always and everywhere, among every
nation and in every religion. Just as confidently as man is
convinced in his self-consciousness of his own existence and of the
reality of the world, does he believe also in the reality and
personality of God.</p>
<p id="iv-p24">This belief is interwoven with his self-consciousness, more
particularly with its double testimony to dependence and freedom.
These are not antagonistic, but rather postulate each the other.
The sense of dependence is the core of self-consciousness and the
essence of religion, but it is not a mere de facto dependence, as
the unconscious and the irrational creation is dependent on God; in
man it is a sense of dependence; the dependence in him attains to a
cognizance, to a testimony of his self-consciousness, and thus
certainly does not cease to exist, but yet assumes a different
form. It becomes a felt, conscious, voluntary dependence, a
dependence of man as a rational and moral being, and for this very
reason it becomes a sense of absolute, schlechthinnige dependence.
If the sense of dependence did not include this element, if it did
not know itself as a conscious and voluntary dependence, it would
cease to be absolute, because the most important factors in man,
consciousness and will, would fall outside of it, or stand opposed
to it. Consequently, if man repudiates his dependence, withdraws
from it, he does not thereby become independent, but his dependence
changes in nature. It loses its rational and moral character and
becomes the subservience of a mere means to an end. Man, in
becoming a sinner, does not rise, but falls; does not become like
God, but like the animals. Therefore the feeling, the sense of
dependence, conscious and voluntary dependence, includes the
freedom of man: Deo parere libertas; Libertas ex veritate.</p>
<p id="iv-p25">This testimony of self-consciousness, combining dependence and
freedom in one, is further the basis of religion, and likewise of
morality. It leads man everywhere and always, and that quite freely
and spontaneously, to belief in and service of a personal God. In
view of the universality and the spontaneity of religion many have
assumed an innate idea of God. But this representation is scarcely
well conceived, and the name is somewhat unfortunately chosen. Of
course, in the strict sense of the term innate ideas do not exist.
They savor rather of rationalism and of a mysticism which separates
man from the world, than of a Christian theism which finds God’s
eternal power and divinity revealed in the works of his hands. It
is the mind of man, with all of its peculiar nature and
organization, its intellect and reason, heart and conscience,
desire and will, and with the ineradicable consciousness of its
dependence and freedom, that is innate, brought into the world in
principle and germ at birth, not acquired later phylogenetically or
ontogenetically. Thus, when man grows up and develops in accordance
with the nature implanted in him, not in detachment from the world
and the social organism, but in the environment in which a place
was assigned to him at birth, he attains as freely and as
inevitably to the knowledge and service of a personal God as he
believes in his own existence and that of the world. He does not
invent the idea of God nor produce it; it is given to him and he
receives it. Atheism is not proper to man by nature, but develops
at a later stage of life, on the ground of philosophic reflection;
like scepticism, it is an intellectual and ethical abnormality,
which only confirms the rule. By nature, in virtue of his nature,
every man believes in God. And this is due in the last analysis to
the fact that God, the creator of all nature, has not left himself
without witness, but through all nature, both that of man himself
and that of the outside world, speaks to him. Not evolution, but
revelation alone accounts for this impressive and incontrovertible
fact of the worship of God. In self-consciousness God makes known
to us man, the world, and himself.</p>
<p id="iv-p26">Hence this revelation is of the utmost importance, not only for
religion, but also for philosophy, and particularly for
epistemology. All cognition consists in a peculiar relation of
subject and object, and is built on the agreement of these two. The
reliability of perception and thought is not assured unless the
forms of thought and the forms of being correspond, in virtue of
their origin in the same creative wisdom. Philosophy itself has not
failed to perceive the necessity of this, but by taking a wrong
start it has strayed either to the right or to the left. It either,
with Hegel, has identified thought with being and raised logic to
the rank of metaphysics ; or with Kant and humanism it has
separated thought from being, leaving to logic a purely formalistic
character. In either case the true relation between thought and
being, and hence the correct principle of all cognition and
knowledge, are imperfectly recognized. As even von Hartmann admits,
there is no other way of doing justice to both subject and object
except by recognizing that it is one and the same reason “which is
active in consciousness as a principle introducing order into the
sensations, and in the objective world as the principle of
synthesis for the things in themselves.”<note place="foot" id="iv-p26.1" n="76">Ed. von Hartmann, in Willems, op. cit., pp.56-79.</note>  The forms of being, the
laws of thought, and—to add this here for the sake of
completeness—the forms of conduct, have their common source in
the divine wisdom. The three departments of philosophy, physics,
logic and ethics, form a harmonious whole. What monism seeks in the
wrong direction, and cannot attain unto, has here been reached,
viz., the unity which does not exclude but includes the
multiformity the systema of philosophy.</p>
<p id="iv-p27">On this firm theistic foundation, finally, there is room for
belief in the progress of science and the realization of the ideal
of truth. There is some degree of warrant for the assertion that
the truth is not, but becomes. As a matter of fact, the truth
nowhere meets us “cut and dried,” ready, as it were, to be simply
taken into our consciousness. On the contrary—and this is the
difference between “revelation” and “discovery”—man has to
conquer the truth in the sweat of his brow, with the exertion of
all his strength, foot by foot and piece by piece. The branches of
knowledge have without exception “grown up in the practice of life
itself”;<note place="foot" id="iv-p27.1" n="77">Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswissenschaften, pp.26-48.</note>  they have all been born of necessity, and possess a
practical, economic value. Nor is the truth a mere copy, a portrait
of reality; it is something different from a globus intellectualis.
No one, by the mere act of gathering into his consciousness a
complete account of Goethe’s life and labors, to their smallest
details, will attain the truth concerning Goethe; such knowledge is
a mere chronicle, not science; a photograph, not a painting; a
copy, not a living reproduction. Science aims at something higher:
it seeks not the dead, but the living; not the transitory, but the
eternal; not the reality, but the truth. Only it does not find the
truth apart from the reality. Whosoever wants to know Goethe must
inform himself as to his person and labors. Whosoever wants to know
nature must open his eyes. Whosoever desires to enter the kingdom
of truth, no less than he who wants to enter the kingdom of heaven,
must, to quote Bacon’s words, become as a little child which learns
by obeying. We do not create the truth and we do not spin it out of
our brain; but, in order to find it, we must go back to the facts,
to reality, to the sources.</p>
<p id="iv-p28">All science rests on the assumption that reality is not
coextensive with the phenomena, but contains a kernel of divine
wisdom, being the realization of the decree of God. In so far the
truth is bound to reality, and finds its criterion in
correspondence with reality. But the truth transcends the empirical
reality, because and in the same degree that scientific
investigation descends more deeply and penetrates more fully into
its essence. And the truth thus found by science is adapted to
consciousness, as it can be discovered and received by
consciousness alone. It would, therefore, not be improper to say
that for us the truth comes into being only by being made the
object of our knowledge and an element of our consciousness. For
this purpose God has deposited the truth in nature and Scripture,
that we might have it, and by knowing it might rule through it. In
the knowledge of the truth lies the end of its revelation; reality
is an instrument to enable us to find the truth; reality is
intended to become truth in our consciousness and in our
experience. Reality, therefore, does not offer us in the truth a
mere copy of itself, so that the world, as pragmatism objects,
would be duplicated.<note place="foot" id="iv-p28.1" n="78">James, Pragmatism, p.257.</note>  In the truth, reality rises to a higher mode
of existence; having first lain in darkness, it now walks in the
light; having once been a riddle, it now finds its solution; not
understood at the beginning, it now is “declared.”</p>
<p id="iv-p29">So the truth obtains an independent value of its own. Its
standard does not lie in its usefulness for life, for, if
usefulness were the criterion of truth, then perfect unanimity
ought to prevail in regard to usefulness, and life itself ought to
be a value not subject to fluctuation. But in regard to life, what
counts is not merely existence, or pleasure, or intensity, but
first of all content and quality. And it is precisely by truth that
this content and quality are determined. The truth is of more value
than empirical life: Christ sacrificed his life for it. None the
less, by doing so he regained his life. Truth is worth more than
reality; it belongs to that higher order of things in which physis,
and gnosis, and ethos are reconciled, and in which a true
philosophy gives full satisfaction both to the demands of the
intellect and to the needs of the heart.</p>

<p id="iv-p30"> </p> 
<p id="iv-p31"> </p>
<p id="iv-p32"> </p>
<p id="iv-p33"> </p>
<p id="iv-p34"> </p>
<p id="iv-p35"> </p>
<p id="iv-p36"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 4. Revelation and Nature" id="v" prev="iv" next="vi">
<h2 id="v-p0.1">Lecture 4 - Revelation and Nature</h2>
<p id="v-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="v-p2">God, the world, and man are the three realities with which all
science and all philosophy occupy themselves. The conception which
we form of them, and the relation in which we place them to one
another, determine the character of our view of the world and of
life, the content of our religion, science, and morality.<note place="foot" id="v-p2.1" n="79">A. C. Fraser, Philosophy of Theism, 1899, pp.24-34.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p3"> But at the very outset there emerges a profound difference of
opinion in regard to the sciences which are devoted to these
important subjects. It is often represented as if only the special
science of theology concerned itself with God and divine things,
and as if all the other sciences, particularly the natural
sciences, have nothing whatever to do with God; nay, as if they
would even forfeit their scientific character and become disloyal
to their task, should they refer to him or take account of him. A
chasm is thus created, objectively, in the sphere of reality,
between God and the world, and, subjectively, in man, between his
intellect and heart, between his faith and knowledge; even if the
very existence of God be not denied and all right of existence be
refused to faith.</p>
<p id="v-p4">But such a dualism is impossible. God does not stand apart from
the world, much less from man, and therefore the knowledge of him
is not the peculiar domain of theology. It is true, theology
especially occupies itself with his revelation, in order that its
nature and contents may be, so far as possible, scientifically
understood. But this revelation addresses itself to all men; the
religion which is founded on it is the concern of every man, even
of the man of science and the investigator of nature; for all men,
without exception, the knowledge of God is the way to eternal life.
Moreover, the man who devotes himself to science cannot split
himself into halves and separate his faith from his knowledge; even
in his scientific investigations he remains man,—not a purely
intellectual being, but a man with a heart, with affections and
emotions, with feeling and will. Not only mankind, but also every
individual, finds, as he grows to full consciousness, a view of the
world already prepared for him, to the formation of which he has
not consciously contributed.<note place="foot" id="v-p4.1" n="80">Mach, Erkenntniss und Irrtum., p.5.</note>  And the demand which truth and
morality make on him is not, and cannot be, that he shall denude
himself of himself, but that he shall be, a man of God, furnished
completely unto every good work. The thinker and philosopher, as
well as the common citizen and the day laborer, have to serve and
glorify God in their work.</p>
<p id="v-p5">This leads immediately to the conclusion that natural science is
not the only science, and cannot be. The French and English use of
the word “science” might, unfortunately, lead us to think so,<note place="foot" id="v-p5.1" n="81">Ladd, The Philosophy of Religion, I, 1906, p.11. Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God, I, 1906.</note>  and
gives support to the idea of Comte that humanity has successively
traversed the three stadia of theology, metaphysics, and
positivism, and only now has reached the standpoint of true
science. But history knows nothing of such a progression; the
sciences do not develop successively one after the other, but more
or less side by side and in connection with one another. By all
sorts of interrelations they exercise an influence on each other,
and thus support and promote each other. Nor, in the development of
science, do all things move on as simply as is postulated in the
easy and aprioristic scheme of the, doctrine of evolution. No
universal formula, which endeavors to embrace the entire course of
history, is true; and Comte’s law also fails in the face of the
criticism of life in its richness. Not uniformity, but
differentiation and totality, are everywhere the distinctive marks
of life.<note place="foot" id="v-p5.2" n="82">Frischeisen-Köhler, Moderne Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1907, pp.18-37. L. Stein, Der Sinn des Daseins, pp.225-239.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p6">To the sciences of nature, therefore, there belongs in the
circle of the sciences the same liberty of movement and work which
is the right of every other science. They have their own object,
and therefore their own method and aim. In their effort to know and
to explain natural phenomena they have no need to call in the aid
of a Deus ex machina. and make of faith an asylum ignorantiae. As a
science, natural science busies itself not only with the
succession, but also with the causes, of phenomena. In searching
after these causes the conception of evolution, as a working
hypothesis, has done eminent service. Analogies and relations have
been traced out and discovered, which otherwise would not so easily
have been found and investigated. But here the mistake has been
made that evolution, which has proved, like, for instance, the
physical atom, useful as a working hypothesis, has been elevated to
the rank of a formula of world-explanation and elaborated into a
system of world-conception. Thus natural science leaves her own
domain and passes over to that of philosophy. It must acquiesce in
the other sciences, of religion and ethics, of jurisprudence and
Aesthetics, coming also to their rights and incorporating the
results of their investigations too into the structure of an
all-embracing view of the world.</p>
<p id="v-p7">The representation is therefore wrong, that faith in the
existence and providence of God finds its home exclusively in the
chasms of our knowledge, so that as our investigations proceed, we
must be continually filled with anxiety, and steadily lose the
territory of our faith in proportion as more and more problems are
solved. For the world is itself grounded in God; witness its law
and order.<note place="foot" id="v-p7.1" n="83">Otto, Natural. und relig. Weltansicht, p.44.</note>  Faith naturally insists,—how could it fail to do so?
—that it shall retain a place in the world. It maintains its
demand that natural science shall retain consciousness of its
limitations and that it shall not form a conception, out of the
narrow sphere in which it works, in which no room is left for the
soul and immortality, for intelligence and design in the world, for
the existence and providence of God, for religion and Christianity.
Natural science remains, therefore, perfectly free in its own
sphere ; but it is not the only science, and must therefore cease
striving to construe religious and ethical phenomena after the same
physico-chemical and mathematico-mechanical fashion as is warranted
and required in the case of numberless natural phenomena. In
principle what faith demands is that science shall itself maintain
its ethical character, and shall not put itself at the service of
the evil inclination of the human heart in its endeavor to explain
the world without God and to erect itself into a self-supporting
and self-sufficient divinity.</p>
<p id="v-p8">No barrier is thus erected around natural science which it
cannot respect; but rather a boundary is assigned to its sphere of
labor which is demanded by its own object and character. For
whereas formerly the concept “nature” frequently embraced all
creation, and, as naturata, was distinguished from God as the
natura naturans, it is nowadays usually limited to sensible objects
and phenomena, so far as they are not produced by human art. In
this sense nature stands, then, as the non-ego, in antithesis with
the human psyche, as the observing and knowing subject. But because
the mechanical view has a perfect right of existence in a part of
the territory which history has gradually assigned to natural
science, and has indeed led in it to various valuable results, many
have drawn the conclusion that natural science is the only true
science, and that the mechanical solution is the only true solution
of all phenomena. Haeckel goes even so far as to claim that every
one who still believes in a soul, or a principle of life, deserts
the domain of science, and seeks refuge in miracles and
supernaturalism.<note place="foot" id="v-p8.1" n="84">Haeckel, Die Welträthsel, p.209. Id., Der Kampf um den Entwicklungsgedanken, p.23. Comp. Otto, op. cit., pp.78, 112 ff, 200 ff.</note>  On the other hand, von Hartmann justly maintains
that whosoever, as a scientist, deems the mechanical explanation of
the phenomena of life, for instance, insufficient, and endeavors to
explain them in another way, namely, by a principle of life, deals
with the matter just as scientifically as any other.<note place="foot" id="v-p8.2" n="85">Ed.. von Hartmann, Mechanismus und Vitalismus in der modernen Biologie, Archiv f. syst. Philos., 1903, p.345. Id., Philos. des Unbew., III, 1904, p.vi.</note>  And Ostwald
has even called the mechanical view of the world “a mere delusion,”
which cannot be utilized even as a working hypothesis.<note place="foot" id="v-p8.3" n="86">Ostwald, Die Ueberwindung des wissensch. Materialismus., 1895, in Dennert, op. cit., pp.235-236.</note>  In fact,
the conception that the world as a whole and in all its parts is
one vast machine is so absurd and self-contradictory that it is
difficult to understand how it could even for one moment have
satisified and dominated the human mind. For aside from the fact
that even a machine would postulate an intelligent maker<note place="foot" id="v-p8.4" n="87">Reinke, Die Welt als That, pp.464 ff.</note>  the other
fact remains that a machine which is eternally self-moving, and
never has ceased to work and never will cease to do so, is in
conflict with all our experiences and all our thinking. In point of
fact the world, far from being intelligible as a machine, is “in no
respect self-explaining, but in every respect mysterious.” Its very
existence is a riddle. The great miracle before which we stand is,
that there is something which is, that there is an existence of
which we are unable to point to the ground.<note place="foot" id="v-p8.5" n="88">Otto, op. cit., pp.39, 46, 47.</note>  To the world, as a
whole and in all its parts, we ascribe only a contingent existence,
so that its explanation is not found in itself. Physics points back
to and is founded in metaphysics.</p>
<p id="v-p9">This is already evident from the fact that the science of
nature, although it has in many respects the advantage over the
mental sciences, still utilizes, and is compelled to utilize, all
sorts of ideas which are not derived from experience, but are
present from the very start. Ideas like “thing” and “property,”
“matter” and “force,” “aether” and “movement,” “space” and “time,”
“cause” and “design,” are indispensable to natural science; but
they are derived from metaphysics. They serve as logical apparatus
which precedes all observation; and yet they are so far from plain
and clear that they, each in itself and all together, contain a
world of mysteries. Naturally this does not satisfy the human mind.
It endeavors, whether successfully or not makes no difference, to
apprehend the meaning and the truth, the principle and the cause,
of these ideas. Natural science may for a time despise philosophy;
by and by it must return to it, because it has itself proceeded
from it.<note place="foot" id="v-p9.1" n="89">Alfred Dippe, Naturphilosophie, München, 1907, pp.3-14.</note>  When the “thirst for facts” has been in a way satisfied,
“the hunger for causes” will come to the surface.<note place="foot" id="v-p9.2" n="90">L. Stein, Der Sinn des Daseins, p.24.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p10">The proof of this is found herein, that no one is able to banish
from his heart or to remove from his lips the question of the
origin of things. Haeckel justly observes, however, that this
question lies outside of the domain of natural science. If creation
ever took place, “it lies entirely beyond the scope of human
knowledge, and hence can never become the object of scientific
investigation.” But he does not stop there, but immediately
proceeds—“Natural science regards matter as eternal and
imperishable , because the origination or annihilation of the
smallest of its particles has never yet been proved by experience.”
In announcing this dogma of the eternity of matter, however, it is
not the student of nature but the philosopher, not science but
faith, that speaks; for what he objects against faith is of force
against himself : “where faith begins, there science ceases.”<note place="foot" id="v-p10.1" n="91">Haeckel, Schöpfungsgeschichte. 1874, p.8. Comp. Die Welträthsel, p.15.</note> 
And this is all the more forcible because elsewhere he is compelled
to admit: “We nowhere reach a knowledge of ultimate causes” ; even
if all the riddles of the world and of life were solved, the one
great riddle of substance would confront us like a sphinx.<note place="foot" id="v-p10.2" n="92">Haeckel, Schöpfungsgesch., p.28. Welträthsel, p.18.</note> 
Physics, then, is not the only science solving all riddles, but
before it and above it stands metaphysics. if, nevertheless, it
wishes an explanation of the origin of all things, it commits
itself to what, scientifically considered, as Lodge says, “must be
viewed as guess-work, being an overpressing of known fact into an
exaggerated and over-comprehensive form of statement.”<note place="foot" id="v-p10.3" n="93">Lodge, Life and Matter, p.23.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p11">Not less great are the difficulties which confront natural
science when it investigates the essence of things. Here we have to
deal with three factors,—space, time, and a quale, howsoever we
may further define it, which in space and time makes their mutual
relations possible. These factors, too, the science of nature does
not find by its own investigations, but rather postulates from the
start. And these ideas again embrace a whole array of difficulties.
We do not know what space and time are in themselves. We do not
know the relation which they sustain to matter and force; and of
their finiteness or infinity we can form not the slightest
notion.<note place="foot" id="v-p11.1" n="94">Bradley, Appearance and Reality, ch. IV, pp.35 ff.</note>  Kant points out in his antinomies of reason that with
these ideas we confront difficulties which are insoluble to our
thought. The affirmation that the world has had no beginning and
has no limits, involves us in the self-contradictions of an
infinite time and an infinite space, for the sum total of finite
parts, however many they may be, can never equal infinitude.<note place="foot" id="v-p11.2" n="95">Otto, op. cit., pp.50-57.</note>  Time
and space are therefore the existence-form of the world and the
conception-form of our consciousness; but they cannot be identified
with that which is the absolute ground and cause of all existence.
In this sense they belong not to “reality,” but to “appearance,” or
rather, they appertain only to creation, but not to the Creator.
And since an eternal time and a boundless space are like a wooden
iron, our thinking forces us to distinguish the absolute from the
relative. Monism does not exist here, and if it nevertheless be
sought here, it can bring us nothing but confusion. Eternity and
time, immensity and space, do not differ quantitatively but
qualitatively. And since the words “absolute,” “eternal,”
“immense,” “infinite,” are predicates, and, when substantivized,
form only empty abstractions, they presuppose a transcendent
subject, differentiated from the world, to whom they belong. That
is to say, physical science, which thinks through its own
conceptions, and fathoms its own nature, issues in metaphysics and
rises straight to God.</p>
<p id="v-p12">Not less involved is the problem presented by the third
conception, of which the science of nature makes use, namely, the
idea of some sort of substance which exists in the forms of time
and space and makes their interrelation possible. In a formal sense
natural science is “the exhibition of the coherence of reality as a
unified system of regulated relations of dependence between
elements of space, time, and number.”<note place="foot" id="v-p12.1" n="96">Lipps, Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung, 1906, p.13.</note>  Its aim is—whether
rightly or wrongly—to comprehend all change and movement in a
mathematical formula and to reduce all qualitative differences to
quantity. So far as it strives after this aim, it is a formal
science. But it is self-evident that reality is not comprehended in
these formal defintions. Reality is something else and something
more than a complex of quantitative relations. These presuppose
precisely a quale, which exists in those relations. Even if we knew
all the laws of motion and of change to which matter is subject,
with all that its essence would still remain a mystery. Astronomy
maybe able to compute the movements of celestial bodies, but this
does not enlighten us in regard to their nature and
composition.</p>
<p id="v-p13">Now, ideas concerning the substance of things, even among the
votaries of natural science, diverge very widely. But even the very
first question, whether such a substance exists, or whether the
psychic sensations are the ultimate elements of reality, falls
entirely outside of the bounds of physics and brings us again into
the domain of philosophy. When Max Verworn attacks materialism and
“energetism” in the name of monism, he no longer speaks as a
physiologist, but as a philosopher. But even he, although he repels
the antithesis of subject and object, of spirit and matter, of soul
and body, does not find monism. For when he says that the entire
physical world is only “a content of the psyche,” he begins,
without admitting it, with the reality of the psyche, that is of
substance, and differentiates between it and its contents. As long,
therefore, as science believes in itself, it cannot escape the
necessity of postulating in and above experience a unity, a bond, a
subject, which tests and orders this experience.<note place="foot" id="v-p13.1" n="97">Ed. von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik, pp.195, 197 ff., 204 ff. Dennert, Die Weltanschauung des mod. Naturforschers, p.143.</note>  And as the
experience subjectively presupposes a subject which experiences, it
also objectively points to a reality, which just as little as the
subject is exhausted in relations. In the subject there is a
difference between a Beziehendes and a Bezogenes; and in the object
there is a difference between the relations and the reality of
which they are predicated. Very truly Fechner says : “Not merely
the detailed phenomena, but also that which holds them together,
has reality; nay, to the latter belongs the highest reality.”<note place="foot" id="v-p13.2" n="98">Fechner, Ueber die Seelenfrage, 1907, p.214. Comp. also Bradley, op. cit., ch. II, pp.25 ff.</note> 
But whatever we may think of this, the question of the reality of
the soul and the world belongs to metaphysics; it is not answered
by empirical investigations, but by metaphysics, that is to say, in
other words, by faith.</p>
<p id="v-p14">The same is true with reference to the problem of the ultimate
nature of that reality which must be accepted unless we are willing
to sink into solipsism. Whether we take the theistic standpoint
here, or accept some one of the different forms of monism, we do
not attain to our conception of the nature of reality by the way of
experience, but must permit ourselves to be led by metaphysical
reasoning on the basis of observation. And it is not exact science,
but faith and the character of our personality, which decides the
matter here. It is not presumable that physics and chemistry,
however far they may extend their researches, will ever change this
state of affairs. Chemistry still has some seventy elements, whose
resolution or composition it cannot effect and which differ from
one another in qualities. And although physics reduces the
phenomena of light, heat, and electricity to vibrations, it has not
yet succeeded in reducing the qualitative differences, which
manifest themselves in these phenomena, to quantitative relations.
The nature of the ultimate element of things is still utterly
unknown. Whether these elements are atoms, which differ only in
size, form, and weight, or even in quality, or whether these
ultimate elements of existence are rather “monads” or “reales,”
matter or energy, or both together—all this is a fit subject for
philosophic speculation, but must per se far transcend all
observation. In our day natural science, in order to explain the
phenomena of light and electricity, assumes the existence of an
ether, which fills all space. But this ether has never been
observed, and its nature is unknown. A great effort is being made
to discover an original stuff, which lies at the base of all
matter, especially since Sir William Ramsay’s announcement that
radium can be transmuted into helium and lithium; and hypotheses
have already been constructed which see such an original stuff in
hydrogen or in the electron or in the ether. But for the time being
W. A. Shenstone is perfectly justified in saying, “that we are
still very far from knowing definitely that atoms are composed
entirely of electrons, or that electrons are nothing but electric
changes; and though electrons have been shown to exhibit electric
inertia, it has not been proved that the inertia of atoms is also
electrical.”<note place="foot" id="v-p14.1" n="99">Shentone, The Electric Theory of Matter, in Cornhill Magazine, quoted in The Literary World, Aug., 1907, p.381. Comp. also A. J. Balfour, Unsere heutige Weltanschauung. Einige Bemerkungen zur modernen Theorie der Materie. Deutsch von Dr. M. Ernst, Leipzig, 1904. M. Shoen, Bestaat er een oer-grondstof? Wet. Bladen, May, 1908, pp.249-259, after an essay in Naturwiss. Wochenschrift, 2 Febr., 1908. Reinke, Die Natur und Wir. Berlin, 1908, p. 38.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p15">And just as little as all matter has been reduced to one
original stuff, have the different forces been as yet shown to be
only forms of one original force. Force in itself is a mysterious
phenomenon. When Ostwald seeks to reduce all matter to energy, he
can only hypostatize and personify a conception which has been
derived from matter by abstraction, and mistakenly imagines that he
has thus eliminated matter.<note place="foot" id="v-p15.1" n="100">Dippe, Naturphilosophie, pp.86, 89.</note>  Similarly every specific force is an
unexplained mystery; the force of gravitation, for instance, is not
an explanation, but only the name of a phenomenon, and it is even
questionable whether the name is exact.<note place="foot" id="v-p15.2" n="101">Rethwisch, in Dippe, pp.79 ff. Reinke, op. cit., pp.40-50. Th. Newest, Die Gravitationslehre ein Irrtum. Wien, 1905. For the various views on Vital Force the reader is referred to the article by von Hartmann, quoted above in note 7, and f urther to Karl Braeunig, Mechanismus und Vitalismus in der Biologie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Leipzig, 1907.</note>  Especially in regard to
the vital force, differences of opinion assert themselves.
Mechanism and vitalism here stand in bitter opposition, and the
neovitalists are at war among themselves on the question whether
the cause of life is to be sought in a special force of the
organism, or rather in an idea or form dominating and governing
this organism. And thus the riddles increase step by step, as
science penetrates more deeply into the essence of things or rises
higher in the ascending scale of creation. The cell is the last and
lowest form of life, but the cell-core and proto-plasm, which form
the cell, are not homogeneous, and point to different compositions;
the original individua of bioplasts are not of one kind; plants,
animals, and man do not yet form an uninterrupted ascending chain
of creatures; even the animals have not been reduced to one
primordial type, and are nowadays usually divided into eight
classes. Everywhere in creation we face an endless differentiation,
an inconceivable multiformity of creatures, an inexhaustible wealth
of essence and life.</p>
<p id="v-p16">Beyond question it is the duty of science to reduce this chaos
of phenomena to order. It has to give us the thread, following
which we may not lose our way in this labyrinth, but find the right
path. But, as has already been said, it is an aprioristic and
wholly unjustified assumption that this path through the labyrinth
of the world must lead to monism,—particularly when monism itself
has been erected on an utterly aprioristic view of the world;
namely, on the conception that this world must find its explanation
in itself. But unity, true unity, a unity which does not destroy
differentiation, but rather includes and enfolds it, may come, and
can come, only when the entire world is conceived as the product of
the wisdom and power which reveal God’s eternal plan. Only a
personal God, who is both will and intelligence, can call a world
into existence, which is one and yet differentiated; just as man
alone, who has been created in his image, is a knowing and willing
being, a knowledge-making and tool-making animal.</p>
<p id="v-p17">But suppose for a moment that all matter and all force, all
existence and all life, could be reduced in our thinking to one
ultimate principle; even so nothing is gained for the truth of
monism or for the explanation of the world. For first of all the
old logical rule is still in force—a posse ad esse non valet
consequentia. The mere fact that in our thought we can form the
conception of a world which has produced itself from one substance
through the action of one force, would not prove at all that this
conception is the true one and that reality corresponds to this
conception. For instance, it is well known that the elements which
constitute the bodies of living beings are, besides oxygen, carbon,
hydrogen, nitrogen, and sulphur. But these four elements are never
found in a free state, but always in combination with oxygen
(oxidized), especially in the form of carbonic acid, water,
sulphuric acid, and saltpetre. In order, therefore, that they may
be serviceable for the formation of albumen and other organic
compounds, they must first be separated from the oxygen
(deoxidized). To the question whether, in earlier periods of this
world’s existence, free carbon, hydrogen and sulphur existed, an
answer could be given by experience alone; but in the nature of the
case this is not available. Logical analysis is thus something
different from real decomposition. Even if chemistry should
ultimately discover a single original element, even that would not
at all prove that this original element existed in the beginning
separately, and has slowly and gradually, through a variety of
mechanical combinations, brought into being the several existing
elements.<note place="foot" id="v-p17.1" n="102">W. von Schnehen, Die Urzeugung, Glauben und Wissen. Dec., 1907, pp.403-415.</note>  Physics never is empowered to conclude from the posse
to the esse, from the conception to the reality; it is not limited
by any extraneous power, but by its own character.</p>
<p id="v-p18">Still, for the sake of argument let us also admit that there was
originally only one element and one force, from which by slow
degrees everything has developed. Then natural science would be
simplified, but the riddle of the multiformity of the world would
continue undiminished.<note place="foot" id="v-p18.1" n="103">Otto, op. cit., p.37.</note>  It would be merely transferred and moved
backwards; transferred to the one substance and moved back to an
endless past. And by this it would even be increased in intensity.
For the question thus becomes: how, from one single uniform
original element, by any possibility, this world, with its endless
differentiations, could have been produced. The answer to the
atomists used to be that the Iliad could not have been produced by
an accidental collocation of a font of type. But there is nothing
here to compare to the difficulty of the monists in explaining the
world. For an alphabet at least consists of different letters, and
language may illustrate how the human mind can from a few sounds
form tens of thousands of words. But the new monism lets the Iliad
of the world arise out of the collocation of the same letter and
the same sound. Such a process is possible only if the one
world-substance is elevated to deity and invested with the
attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, which, according to
theism, belong to the personal God alone. Without metaphysics,
without faith, without God, physics does not reach its mark. But
the deity which is finally invoked is a Deus ex machina; the faith
in which it hides itself is an asylum ignorantiae; and the divinity
which it conceives is one of its own making.</p>
<p id="v-p19">In the conflict which nowadays rages on all sides, and which is
frequently represented as a conflict between science and faith,
physics and theology, the principal difference, therefore, does not
concern the question, What is nature? but rather this other one,
What is God? If possible, this will be still more clearly seen if
we call attention finally to the problem, of motion. Nothing proves
more clearly that this problem cannot be solved than the fact that
philosophy throughout the ages and among all nations and down to
the present day divides itself into two tendencies. With Zeno,
“becoming” is sacrificed to “being,” or with Heraclitus, “being” to
“becoming.” In point of fact, we can spare neither, for “becoming”
presupposes “being.” There can be no question of change if there is
no identity and continuity of the subject.<note place="foot" id="v-p19.1" n="104">Kant, in Eisler, Wörterbuch, p.618.</note>  But monism cannot
accept this differentiation, endeavors to reduce motion to rest or
rest to motion, and thus once again sacrifices the facts of reality
to a play of ideas. And by this endeavor it gets, at every
subordinate point which is raised by the problem of motion, in an
impasse which has no outlet.</p>
<p id="v-p20">For whether motion is reality or appearance, the questions of
its cause and nature, its laws and aim, can never be suppressed. If
now there is no primum movens, no “being” which gives existence to
the “becoming,” nothing is left but to think of motion as eternal.
And Haeckel accordingly affirms that the substance of the universe,
with its two attributes, matter and energy, fills infinite space
and is in an eternal motion, and that this motion thus proceeds in
an endless time.<note place="foot" id="v-p20.1" n="105">Haeckel, Die Welträthsel, pp.15-16.</note>  But such words, though no doubt they endure to
be set side by side on paper, form in thought an intolerable
antinomy. Eternity and motion can be just as little correlated in
one and the same subject as infinitude and space (or time), as the
absolute and the relative, as God and the world. And this is all
the less possible if the world, according to Haeckel’s notion, is a
vast machine. For a machine which keeps on working forever, without
ever coming to a stop, is an inconceivable and impossible perpetuum
mobile. If the world is eternal, it is no machine; if it is a
machine, it cannot be eternal.</p>
<p id="v-p21">A similar difficulty arises with respect to the nature of
motion. Man has always lived in the conviction that there is no
effect without a cause. Even if in earlier times numerous phenomena
or occurrences were explained by the operation of divinities, of
spirits, or of mysterious powers, this is merely a proof that the
law of causality is not an invention of modern times, but is a
category of the human mind. Neither did men in early times ascribe
all phenomena to supernatural operations, nor is this done to-day
among the so-called “nature-peoples.” For everywhere and always
there has been quite an extended sphere in which things were
referred to natural causes. From his origin man has worked in order
to eat; has applied himself to fishing and to the chase, to
agriculture and stockraising, and, in a primitive way, also to
knowledge and art. By the aid of the means at hand he has obtained
food and clothing and shelter. The conception of natural causes has
never been wholly lacking in man. But no doubt this domain of
natural causes was much more limited than at the present day.
Science has gradually expanded the idea of nature and of the
natural. And every reasonable man rejoices in this expansion of our
knowledge, which is at the same time power and domination of spirit
over matter.</p>
<p id="v-p22">But when science seeks to apply the law of causality in such
sense as to permit only a mechanical relation between cause and effect, it not only passes beyond its
competence, but also cuts itself off from explaining the phenomena.
For just as motion presupposes no less continuity than change,
causality implies both that cause and effect stand in relation to
one another, and that the effect is something more than, or at
least something different from, the cause. For if this were not so,
everything would remain where it is, or at least at the same level;
everything would revolve in a circle, and there could be no
possible question of progress, ascent, or development. Now reality
teaches us certainly to recognize such progress and development;
there is a great differentiation of being. And even in the sphere
where we speak, and justly so, of mechanical causality, causality
is not at all exhausted by mechanism. We call it by that name, no
doubt, but this name does not cover the much richer reality.</p>
<p id="v-p23">Lodge has said very truly: “There is no necessary justification
for assuming that a property exhibited by an aggregate of particles
must be possessed by the ingredients of which it is composed; on
the contrary, wholly new properties may make their appearance
simply by aggregation.”<note place="foot" id="v-p23.1" n="106">Lodge, Life and Matter, p.49. Reinke, Die Natur und Wir, pp.25, 26, 33.</note>  The simplest combinations of elements
already manifest properties different from those of the elements
themselves. Water differs in nature from each of its two
components,—oxygen and hydrogen; vitriol is different from any of
its three components,—iron and sulphur and oxygen.<note place="foot" id="v-p23.2" n="107">Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, II, pp.314-335.</note>  And in a much
higher measure this is true of organic beings. Heredity has been
for years the object of keen investigation, but no one will affirm
that its secret has been disclosed and that its explanation has
been accomplished. The variety of the theories which have been
framed concerning it—those of Lamarck and Darwin, Erlsberg and
Haeckel, Nägeli and de Vries, Weismann and Hertwig—is enough
to show that not one of them is satisfactory. For the present we
can only say that there is such a thing as heredity, and that there
is such a thing as variability, as certainly we might very well
have expected from the beginning. But of its cause and relations we
thus far know nothing. All change seems, in varying degrees, to be
a sort of generation which produces something newer and higher.
Thus change, progress, and development are possible, but thus also
it becomes manifest that the attempt to transmute all causality
into mechanical relationship is doomed from the very start. In
causality other forces are at work than those which can be
expressed by figures.</p>
<p id="v-p24">This being so, the laws of nature also assume an aspect
different from that which still is often ascribed to them. Really
we can speak of natural laws only from the standpoint of theism.
Natural laws exist only when there is a lawgiver, who stands above
nature and who has decreed that seedtime and harvest, and cold and
heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease
while the earth remains. Abstracted from God as the law-giver, the
laws of nature are nothing but a human and ever fallible
description of the way in which things operate. Like substance and
force and motion, these natural laws are frequently no doubt
hypostatized and elevated to the rank of powers and rulers over
things. But against this the words of von Hartmann are pertinent,
that “Of all entities created by hypostatizing abstractions
probably that of (natural) law as a power antedating the existence
of things, hovering over them and controlling them, is the most
fictitious.”<note place="foot" id="v-p24.1" n="108">Von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung, etc., p.203.</note>  Our natural laws are only a formula for the method
of work and of motion of the things.</p>
<p id="v-p25">Therefore they are far from fixed, are anything but
unchangeable; on the contrary they are changed, modified,
restricted, enlarged, according as we learn to know the things
better. Robert Mayer, for instance, the discoverer of the law of
the conservation of energy, completely excluded from this law the
entire domain of psychical life, and considered it a great error to
identify things physical and psychical.<note place="foot" id="v-p25.1" n="109">E. Schmid, Das naturwiss. Glaubensbekenntnis eines Theologen, Stuttgart, 1906, p.87.</note>  And although Wundt in the
first edition of his Lectures on the Human and Animal Soul,
published in 1863, applied this law in the psychical domain too, he
expressly receded from this position in the second edition of his
work, published in 1892, and has since defended the theory of
psychophysical parallelism,—a change of opinion which brought
upon him the gibe of Haeckel, that it was usual in old age for “a
gradual degeneration to set in, in the brain as well as in the
outer organs.”<note place="foot" id="v-p25.2" n="110">Haeckel, Welträthsel, pp.117-118.</note>  Similarly Lodge offers very serious objections to
the laws of the constancy of matter and energy, since at best they
are applicable only to the forces which we know at present and as
we now know them. But in case that matter should prove the
phenomenal form of a complex of ether, production and dissolution
of matter would be possible. And in case that life should prove to
be more than a phiysico-chemical force, we would have to modify the
law of the constancy of energy, as some have already proposed to
do, since the discovery of radium. So long, therefore, as matter in
its essence is unknown, and the resident forces of creation are not
exhausted by us, all formulation of laws is necessarily tentative,
and a large degree of modesty is the proof of a scientific
spirit.<note place="foot" id="v-p25.3" n="111">Lodge, Life and Matter, pp.54 ff. Comp. also J. Froehlich, Das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der Kraft in dem Geist des Christ, Leipzig, 1903.</note>  For in the last analysis all laws of nature, whatever
philosophical standpoint we may occupy, are determined by the
nature of that being which is the ground and origin of all things
and the force of all forces. Laws, ordinances they are, therefore,
then only, and in so far only, as they may have a metaphysical
character.</p>
<p id="v-p26">And, moreover, only in that case can there be any question, in
the development of the world, of a meaning and an aim. Darwin
rejoiced in the discovery of natural selection, because he thought
that by its aid he could explain the adaptations of nature without
a divine intelligence.<note place="foot" id="v-p26.1" n="112">Bruno Wille, Darwins Weltanschauung, etc. Comp. Lect. I, note 16 ff.</note>  Helmholtz found the novelty of the
doctrine of descent, in its exhibition how “adaptation in the
formation of organisms can be produced by the blind reign of
natural law without the interference of any intelligent factor.”<note place="foot" id="v-p26.2" n="113">In K. Dieterich, Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft, Freiburg, 1885, p.9.</note> 
And notwithstanding his mechanical view of the world, Haeckel
continues to talk about means and aim, about egoistic and
altruistic duties, about a “fundamental law of ethics,” and about
ethics as “the science of norms.”<note place="foot" id="v-p26.3" n="114">Haeckel, Welträthsel, pp.342, 404, 405.</note>  The attack of the evolutionary
hypothesis is really not directed against adaptation in nature. On
the contrary, although it proceeds from a mechanical causality, it
lays all its stress on the tendency and aim of the development. It
loves to pose as the theory of progress, and to tell us that
evolution has successively originated life, consciousness, will,
and all that is true, and good, and beautiful; that it has
gradually ennobled the struggle for existence, and has made it a
“battle of the spirit,” for that which is noblest and best.
Causality in the doctrine of evolution does not antagonize
teleology, but is only a means and an element in the process of
development. By the one it ascribes to nature compulsion; by the
other, will and fitness (sollen).<note place="foot" id="v-p26.4" n="115">Haeckel, op. cit., pp.388 ff., 439. Nat. Schöpf., pp.156, 656. L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., p.51. Id., Der Sinn des Daseins, pp.42 ff. Dippe, Naturphilos, p.153. Reinke, Die Natur und Wir, pp.209 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p27">But as soon as this adaptation in the world is taken as a
teleological proof of the existence and providence of an
intelligent power, opposition is aroused, and all monstrosities and
rudimentary organs, all disasters and mishaps are called to the
witness-stand, to break down the force of this proof. There may be
an unconscious and blind adaptation, but no conscious and
intelligent one. Haeckel once said that the eye and the ear are so
marvellously constructed that they might seduce us into believing
in a creation according to a definitely thought-out plan of
construction. But he steels himself against the “seduction.” And
thus he betrays the fact that the so-called conflict between
science and faith lies not in the realm of the physical, but in
that of the metaphysical; concentres not in nature, but in God.
What nature is to us is determined by what we think of God and who
he is for us.</p>
<p id="v-p28">It is, therefore, by no means an indifferent matter for science,
and especially for physics, what ground we occupy in metaphysics.
We may not think as we please; even scientific work has a moral
character, and we have to render an account of it as well as of
every idle word. When we sever nature from God, and do not consider
nature as a work and revelation of God, but look on it in the
completest sense as atheos, this unbelief immediately turns into
superstition. Without God all things go wrong, both in our living
and in our thinking. The denial of the existence of God includes,
in the same moment, the elevation of the creature into the place of
God. This is manifested in the materialism of Haeckel, when he
openly avows his atheism, but at once invests his substance with
the predicates of eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc., which
belong to God alone. It comes even more clearly into evidence in
the energetic-psychical and logical monism. For there is bound up
with this the acknowledgment that the world is no machine, which
man can take apart and put together again, but an unconscious,
mysterious power, which produces and directs everything. The
intelligibility of nature, which was so long believed in by
science, is therefore more and more giving place to the confession
of its unknowableness. Some years ago Fechner preached his
hylozoism and, as many Greek philosophers had done, conceived of
the universe literally as a living organism, and this conception
has of late found acceptance with many. In 1889 Vogt ascribed to
atoms a sense of pain. Haeckel not only sees in the attraction and
repulsion of atoms the forces of love and pain, but he animates all
plastidules and replaces the wood—and water—nymphs of the Greeks
by countless elementary souls and spirits, which are the properties
of cells.<note place="foot" id="v-p28.1" n="116">Dr. W. H. Nieuwhuis, Twee vragen des Tijds, Kampen, 1907, pp.39, 66.</note>  The laws of nature—although they are only a defective
formulation of the way in which forces, which are but imperfectly
known, are working—are elevated to the rank of mythical beings,
like the abstracta of the Romans.<note place="foot" id="v-p28.2" n="117">Ed. von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung, etc., p.203.</note>  All investigators of nature
apply to nature the conceptions of power, force, industry, labor,
resistance, tension, etc., without stopping to consider that all
these things are borrowed from human personality, have a
psychological content, and are therefore, when robbed of it,
nothing but empty forms. In the essence of the thing, what is done
is what is ascribed as a naive error to primitive man: nature is
explained by animistic, or anthropomorphic conceptions.<note place="foot" id="v-p28.3" n="118">Lipps, Naturwiss. und Weltanschauung, p.19.</note>  The issue
of science in our day, in a remarkable manner, reaches out the hand
of fellowship to man, such as he existed, according to the common
idea, in his infancy.<note place="foot" id="v-p28.4" n="119">Ritter, Schets eener critische geschiedenis van het Substantiebegrip in de nieuwere wijsbegeerte, Leiden, 1906, p.471.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p29">Recent literature and art afford even more startling proof of
this deification of nature than science. For without in the least
belittling its value, it may be said, on good grounds, that recent
art, as a whole, has as its aim to represent man as powerless over
against nature. Its revival in the last century was a reversion to
mysticism. The essence of things did not exist in material atoms,
but it was life, infinitely deep life, eternally operative force.
From this principle advance could be made to symbolism, which sees
in art an attempt to give a suggestion, in sound or color, in line
or arabesque, of the inexpressible; and then further to a
glorification of the mystici, and an aesthetic prizing of religion,
especially of the Romish worship, as happened with the
“néo-Chrétiens” of France. But from the pantheistic
and agnostic conception of the universe, the conclusion could just
as well be drawn that the everywhere operative force is a
mysterious blind fate, of which man is the plaything and against
which nothing can prevail. It is thus that in the art of the
present day nature is pictured. It is provided with secret powers,
dark operations, soft moods, and over against it man is degraded to
the point of a mere natural being, which, borne down by heredity,
is abandoned to the play of his lusts and passions, stripped of his
spontaneity, liberty, and personality, and left incapable of aught
but living himself out, like a plant in the field.<note place="foot" id="v-p29.1" n="120">Natur und Christenthum, Vier Vorträge von D. Lasson, Lüttgert, Schäder, Bornhäuser. Berlin, 1907, pp.49 ff. Richard Hamann, Der Impressionismus in Leben und Kunst, Köln, 1907.</note>  Thus the
relation of man to nature, notwithstanding the victories of
science, becomes the very opposite of what it was before. The
Christian view of nature is gradually giving place to that of the
heathen peoples; and the widely spread movements of theosophy and
spiritism, of telepathy and astrology, assist in this degradation
of man under nature. The un-deification of nature turns into
deification of nature, the royal liberty of man into fatalistic
subjection.</p>
<p id="v-p30">Man can attain to a true, free relation to nature only when
bestands in his true relation to God. And this we owe to Christianity alone. In the polytheistic religions of
India and China, Babylon and Egypt, Greece and Rome, man cannot
obtain his freedom over against nature, because all creatures,
plants and animals, woods and trees, mountains and brooks, stars
and suns, are conceived as inhabited by gods or spirits. Over
against all this man is tortured by a continuous fear and unbroken
anxiety. But this relation is utterly changed when we listen to
Moses and the prophets, to Christ and the apostles. They are all
free over against nature, because, through communion with God, they
are elevated above nature. Deification of nature is here just as
inconceivable as contempt of nature. “Paganism oscillates between
overbearing abuse of the world and childish dread of its powers.”
But in Israel this is wholly different. “With sovereign
self-consciousness the Hebrew faces the world and nature. Fear of
the world is unknown to him; nevertheless he meets it with a sense
of the highest responsibility. As God’s representative man rules
the world, but in that capacity only. He may not obey his caprice,
but only the revealed will of God.”<note place="foot" id="v-p30.1" n="121">Smend, Lehrbuch der altt. Religionsgeschichte, 1893, p.458. Martensen Larsen, Die Naturwiss. in ihrem Schuldverhältnis zum Christenthum, Berlin, 1897. Lange, Gesch. des Materialismus, 1882, pp.129 ff. Sellin, Die alttest. Religion und die Religionsgeschichte, pp.28-34.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p31">Man owes this free and royal relation to nature first of all to
the fact that all the world is recognized as created by God. Here
at once the truth is found for which monism seeks in vain. There
must be a unity, which lies at the bottom of all diversity. But
this unity cannot be found within the world, for matter and force,
spirit and matter, the physical and the psychical, the psychical
and the ethical, personality and association cannot be reduced to
one another; they do not exist after each other, but each with its
own concept and valuation, side by side with each other. Whosoever,
within the world, tries to reduce unity to multiformity, being to
becoming, spirit to matter, man to nature, or the reverse, always
plays false with the other half of the distinction. Thus physics
calls for metaphysics; nature itself shows, in the core of its
existence, that it does not exist of itself, has not been
originated by evolution, but is grounded in revelation.</p>
<p id="v-p32">And revelation, by the word of prophets and apostles, confirms
this and gives us, in the wisdom and omnipotence of God, in his
sovereignty and counsel, that unity for which the human spirit
thirsts. So soon, therefore, as this theistic monism is
surrendered, after a brief and unsatisfactory trial of materialism
and pantheism, polytheism in different forms returns.<note place="foot" id="v-p32.1" n="122">James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1906, p.525. Id., Pluralism and Religion, Hibbert Journal, July, 1908. Wundt, Völkerpsych., II, 2, p.223. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, pp.257 ff. Rogers, according to Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1908, p.445. Comp. Dr. Rashdall, who denies to God omnipotence; Dr. Harrison, who denies him even creation (in McTaggart, p.221, note), and the so- called “ethical modernists” in the Netherlands, who distinguish between God as nature-power and as ethical power. Hooijkaas, God in de geschiedenis, Schiedam, 1870, p.35. Goethe already said: “I cannot satisfy myself in the manifold tendencies of my being with one mode of thinking : as poet and artist I am a polytheist, but on the other hand a pantheist as a student of nature, and one just as decisively as the other. If I need a God for my personality as a moral being, this also is already provided for.”</note>  The power
of nature and the power of the morally good fall asunder as in
Manichaeism; to man and nature, nations and religions, different
origins are ascribed; and since the forces at work in the world
cannot be reduced to unity, each of them in its own sphere is
hypostatised, and first in the conception, but later also in the
imagination, they are made gods. But the revelation which comes to
us in Christ protects us from all this. It joins itself to the
revelation, which nature itself makes known to us; it elevates this
to its fullest right, and maintains it in its real value, and by
its doctrine of creation cuts all polytheism and all dualism up by
the roots. Not only mind but also matter, not only man but also
nature, is of divine origin, and has lain in the thought of God
before it came into being.</p>
<p id="v-p33">The doctrine of creation maintains the divinity, the goodness
and sacredness of all created things. In this world man now
receives his own independent place. He is of kin to all the world,
formed out of matter, earthy of the earth; nothing natural is
strange to him. But in one respect he is different from all
creatures; he is the son, the image, the similitude of God, his
offspring. Thereby he is elevated above animal and angel, and
destined and fitted for dominion over all the world. In this
relation of man to God and to the world is the foundation laid and
the origin given of all science and art. For how can it be
explained that man through his senses can observe the world, and
through his intelligence can know and understand it? Whence this
wonderful correspondence of knowing and being? What is the basis of
the belief that the conception and the thought in the human brain
are no imagination and no hallucination, but correspond with the
reality? What is the ground for the harmony between subject and
object, the ego and the non-ego? What is the root from which
springs the unity of the laws of existence, the ideas of our
thinking, the norms of our actions? In what do physis, gnosis, and
ethos find their common systema? What is the foundation of the
symbolism of nature, not in the sense of an unfounded
nature-theosophy, but in the sense in which Christ saw in the world
a parable of the kingdom of heaven; in the sense in which Goethe,
said that “all transitory things are but a parable”; in the sense
in which Drummond in “the natural law” detected an analogy of the
law of the spirit? On what, in a word, are founded comparison,
metaphor, poetry, art, and all science and all culture? On what
else do they rest but on the confession that one word, one spirit,
one divine, intelligence lies at the foundation of all things and
maintains their unity and mutual relations?</p>
<p id="v-p34">And thus finally place is found for the acknowledgment of the
diversity of the world. Nothing is simpler than to allow, according
to the scheme of emanation, all things gradually to descend from
above; or, according to the scheme of evolution, all things
gradually to ascend from below. In a museum, and equally in the
mind, it is a very easy matter to place one creature by the side of
another and to fill in the missing links by some hypothesis or
individual construction. It is just as easy as—to use a humorous
example—to explain the origin of the English fox, from the Greek
word alopex, by assuming that the transitional forms, lopex, pex,
fex, have disappeared.<note place="foot" id="v-p34.1" n="123">In Nieuwhuis, op. cit., p.82.</note>  But reality laughs at this system just as
it laughs at the aprioristic world-construction in Hegel’s
philosophy. Creatures do not exist in succession to one another, in
a straight line of development, but side by side; they thus live
out their lives and hold continually with one another a living,
organic, diversified, reciprocal relation. So it was throughout all
the ages, and so it is yet, in our day. The constancy of the
species is an undeniable fact, in the face of all variability of
which we are cognizant in the historical period which we know. The
weaker specimens and species do not die out, according to the law
of “natural selection,” but continue to exist, side by side with
the stronger, to this day. Existence is not simply and alone a
battle of all against all, but also a continuous mutual supporting
and aiding. There is much hatred, but there is also much love in
the world. The diversity of the world is a fact which, taken in
connection with its harmony, can find its explanation only
transcendently in a personal God. For F. A. Lange has said very
correctly: “When after a free and grand fashion we ascribe to the
one God a unified plan of operation on a large and comprehensive
scale, then the coherence of all things according to the principle
of law and effect, not only becomes conceivable, but even appears a
necessary consequence of this assumption.”<note place="foot" id="v-p34.2" n="124">Lange, Gesch. des Material., p.130.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p35">Against this organic view of the world only one argument is
advanced. But it is an argument which is of very great weight, for it is drawn from the awful misery
of the world. And this misery, viewed both as sin and suffering, is
a touching and heart-breaking fact. The whole creation is in
travail. Anguish is the fundamental trait of all living things. A
great secret pain throbs through nature. Everywhere the lawless,
the chaotic, lies at the base of the orderly; there is an
inexplicable restlessness in all things. Vanity, change, death are
written on all existing things. Humanity walks by the margin of an
abyss of guilt. It perishes under the anger of God and is troubled
by his wrath. How can such a world be reconciled with the wisdom,
the goodness, the omnipotence of God? Both philosophy and theology
have made many attempts to solve this problem. It has been sought
to find the explanation of misery, metaphysically, in the finite,
or to give it, aesthetically, a part in the harmony of the world as
a whole, or to interpret it, paedagogically, as a strengthening of
man’s spiritual life. The infralapsarians have deduced it from the
justice of God. Others, with Lotze, have despaired of finding any
explanation, or have even taken refuge in a limitation of God’s
omnipotence and wisdom, and have found in matter or in the laws of
nature a limit to his working.<note place="foot" id="v-p35.1" n="125">Paul Grunberg, Das Uebel in der Welt und Gott, Lichterfelde, 1907. Bruining, Het geloof aan God en het kwaad in de wereld, Baarn, 1907.</note> </p>
<p id="v-p36">But even if there is a measure of truth in each of these various
theories, the misery of the world is too great and too diversified
to be explained from any single cause, or to be subsumed under any
single formula. And it is not lessened by it all. What profit is
there, for instance, in saying, “Who to-day thinks of the San
Francisco earthquake as an act of God and not as a mechanical
occurrence?”<note place="foot" id="v-p36.1" n="126">Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1907, p.9.</note>  Is God then no longer the God whose providence
extends over all? Pragmatism is so far within its right that it
finds all these explanations insufficient and misleading, and calls
attention once more to realities. It breaks mere appearance, it
snatches the blindfolding from our eyes, and it avows openly that
this world is a chaos, which can become good and true only through
the hands of men.</p>
<p id="v-p37">But in so doing it forgets that, in its deepest sense, the
struggle lies not between man and nature, but is fought out in the
heart of man himself, between his what is and his what ought to be.
The struggle is primarily of an ethical rather than of a physical
nature. This is proved first of all by the fact that all the
acquisitions of culture, however rich they may be, do not quiet the
restlessness of the heart and are unable to silence the voice of
conscience. Moreover, according to the testimony of the heroes of
our race, all the misery of the world can be overcome by faith. And
that is the only way which revelation—that in nature already, but
far more plainly that in the Scriptures—points out to us for the
reconciliation of the discord. It makes no effort to explain all
the suffering of the world. It allows it to remain where it is and
accepts it: accepts it so fully that no pessimistic literature can
surpass the pathos of its complaint. But revelation does not incite
man to resistance and rebellion, but lays bare to his consciousness
the guilt in his own life. It casts him down in his littleness, and
says to him, Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? But
then, also, it immediately raises him from his humiliation; it
preaches to him no stoical apathy or fatalistic, acquiescence in
things, but it makes him through the Word to know the will of God
to save the world notwithstanding all its misery, and it fills his
soul through the Spirit with the patience of faith, so that weak
man can endure all his pain, can glory in tribulation, and, with
God, can overcome the world. If God is for us, who can be against
us? And this is the only victory which overcomes the world, even
our faith.</p>


<p id="v-p38"> </p>
<p id="v-p39"> </p>
<p id="v-p40"> </p>
<p id="v-p41"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 5. Revelation and History" id="vi" prev="v" next="vii">
<h2 id="vi-p0.1">Lecture 5 - Revelation and History</h2>
<p id="vi-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="vi-p2">The indispensability and significance of revelation appear in
history in an even higher and richer measure than in nature. But so
soon as we set foot on this domain, our attention is immediately
attracted by an interesting controversy which for several years has
been waged by historians among themselves.</p>
<p id="vi-p3">When the natural sciences in the last century attained all
manner of brilliant results through the application of the
inductive method, the wish arose in many breasts that history might
be studied after the same method, and thus reach equally certain
results. There was ultimately only one science, that of nature;
whatever was reckoned to the so-called intellectual sciences must
be reduced to and embodied in natural science if it were to retain
its claim to the name of science. Thus historical investigation
could be considered a true science only if its object—historical
occurrences—were conceived as a mechanical process, dominated
from the beginning to the end by the same laws as nature. But in
the attempt to make of history an empirical, positive science there
were developed from the very beginning different tendencies. All
were at one in the conviction that the events of history were just
as inevitable as the phenomena of nature, and that they should be
observed and fixed just as unprejudicedly and objectively as the
latter. But a great difference of opinion arose upon the question
how these facts were to be understood and from what causes they
were to be explained.</p>
<p id="vi-p4">There are some who, like Buckle, de Greef, Mongeolle, seek the
ultimate and principal causes of historic events in the physical
environment of climate, soil, and food, and base history on
anthropogeography. There are others who, like Taine, and especially
Gobineau and H. St. Chamberlain, consider the race the principal
factor in history and ask of ethnology the solution of historical
problems. Men like Le Bon, Tarde, René Worms, Ratzenhofer,
and Sighele try to find the explanation of historical facts in
psychology and social circumstances; whilst many scholars like
Hobbes, Rousseau, Comte, Spencer, von Hellwald, Shäffle,
Durkheim, and others, cherish the idea that society itself is to be
looked upon as an organism of a higher order, which, like all
living things, stands under the dominion of biological laws, and is
gradually developed and perfected in the struggle for existence by
natural selection and heredity. The Socialists, Marx, Engels,
Kautsky, and their fellows, look at everything from the viewpoint
of the conflict between the classes, and defend the materialistic
or economic view of history, according to which the consciousness
of man does not determine his being, but reversely his social being
his consciousness. And finally, in these last years, Karl Lamprecht
has appeared as a defender of the culture-historical method, which
discovers the deepest ground of historical events in the folk-soul,
and therefore seeks after a social-psychological solution of the
problem.<note place="foot" id="vi-p4.1" n="127">On these various tendencies the reader may consult: R. Flint, History of the Philosophy of History in France and Germany, I, 1893. Rocholl, Die Philosophie der Geschichte, 1878, 1893. M. Giesswein, Determin. und metaph. Geschichtsauffassung. Wien, 1905. Fr. Oppenheimer, Neue Geschichtsphilosophie, Die Zukunft, Nov., 1905. Fr. Eulenburg, Neuere Geschichtsphilosophie, Archiv. f. Sozialwiss. und Sozialpolitik, 1907, pp.283-337. Colenbrander, Hedendaagsehe Geschiedschrijvers, Gids, May, 1907 pp.319, 341. P. Schweizer, Die religiose Auflassung der Weltgeschichte. Zurich, 1908.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p5">This endeavor to bring in these different ways, surety and
certainty into the science of history, is easy to understand. For
history differs from physics in this respect, that it does not have
the object of its investigation immediately at hand so as to be
able to experiment upon it, but can know it only by means of a
testimony which others, either intentionally or unintentionally,
directly or indirectly, have given. Even though this testimony is
not accepted unconditionally, but is first subjected to a severe
criticism, there must enter into the study of history, through the
interposition of tradition, a certain personal element of trust
which is not found, or at least not in such a degree, in the
investigation of natural phenomena. This personal element in
historical research is considerably augmented by the fact that we
are unable to assume as objective and dispassionate an attitude to
the persons and testimonies with which history brings us into
contact as to natural phenomena. In history we are not
disinterested observers, but live the lives of other men, are
attracted or repelled by them, feel sympathy or antipathy towards
them. And especially in the case of important persons or great
events, such as, for instance, the, origin of Christianity, the
Reformation, the Revolution, etc., our convictions, our heart, and
our emotions play an important part. From the very start personal
interest makes itself felt in our criticism of the witnesses, and
it continues to exercise its influence in the pragmatic description
and judgment of events. A believer in and a denier of the divinity
of Christ cannot judge the books and contents of the Old and New
Testaments in the same way; and we cannot expect the same history
of the Reformation from a Roman Catholic and from a Protestant.<note place="foot" id="vi-p5.1" n="128">The appointment of Prof. M. Spahn at Strassburg in 1901 furnished a striking proof of this.</note>  In
historical research the personality of the student is felt much
more strongly, therefore, than in natural science; the science of
history splits into tendencies and thus seems to lose its claim to
the name of science. We can therefore perfectly understand the
effort which is made to rescue history, as a science, from this
subjectivity, and to make it just as objective and exact as the
science of nature, which seems the same to all men, without
distinction of religious convictions.</p>
<p id="vi-p6">To this was added in the last century that the field of history
was expanded in an extraordinary way, in no less degree indeed than
that of natural science. What in the fifteenth century the travels
of Vasco de Gama, Columbus, Magellan, Cook, etc., had been for our
knowledge of the earth, the discoveries of Champollion, Rawlinson,
Grotefend, Layard, W. Jones, Burnouf, and others, became for our
knowledge of history. Whilst historical knowledge was formerly
confined to a few countries and peoples, it has now widely extended
itself to all sorts of peoples, and reaches back into the past to
times far earlier than Moses. This extraordinary extension of the
domain of investigation has, naturally, increased the material
inconceivably, and made it necessary, in order to create order in
this chaos, to conceive the events in their mutual relations and to
discover the process and the law which is hidden in them. It was
inevitable that the ideological view of history presented by Hegel
and the Tübingen school should give place under the
inspiration of natural science to a positive and homological
treatment of history. It was no longer permissible to construe the
facts in accordance with a preconceived idea; but, inversely, from
the facts the laws must be learned which controlled them in their
development.</p>
<p id="vi-p7">Apparently this positive treatment of history goes to work in an
utterly unprejudiced manner, purely empirically and inductively.
But actually it is just as much dominated by a preconceived idea as
the ideological treatment of Hegel, and this idea is in both cases
that of evolution, conceived in a mechanical or in a dynamic sense.
It is silently presupposed that, in the last analysis, one and the
same causality originates all events and causes them to succeed
each other according to the law of progressive development, in a
straight, upward line. Monism and evolution are the principia of
the modern view of history, just as in the last lecture they proved
to be such in the investigation of nature. But it deserves
attention at the outset that the conception of evolution, when
applied in history to a family or a tribe, to a people or to
humanity, has an entirely different sense from that which it bears
in individual organisms. In a remarkable study of the idea of
development and its application to history Mr Galloway says
perfectly correctly that the idea of development is an idolum fori,
“a stock phrase in the scientific market-place.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p7.1" n="129">Mind, Oct., 1907 pp.506-534.</note>  We can conceive
what must be understood by development in an organism. The germ,
the egg, the embryo expands itself, through the working of the
power of assimilation, and becomes bigger and stronger; the child
grows up into a youth and a man. But when development is spoken of
in a people or in humanity, we fall immediately into difficulty
with the question of what is here the subject, the germ or the
embryo of the development, and in what this development consists.
We can no doubt speak of a unity in the case of a people or of
humanity; but this unity is necessarily of a different kind from
that of an individual organism. The comparison not only,—for this
has to a certain extent the right of existence,—but the
identification of society and of a people with an organism, led
Spencer, Schäffle, and others, into all kinds of error and
artificiality, which no one would now be willing to take
responsibility for. Society is not a biological organism, but an
organization, which no doubt is not exclusively established by the
will of man, but certainly not without it. Before we can
investigate the origin and the development of such an organization
as a family, society, or people, other factors than merely
biological ones must come into consideration; just as in an
organism forces are at work which are not found in a machine.
Monism overlooks the difference between a biological, a psychical,
and an ethical organism, just as it does that between an organism
and a mechanism; but nevertheless this differentation continues to
exist in reality without any abatement.<note place="foot" id="vi-p7.2" n="130">H. Pesch, Liberalismus, Sozialismus und christl. Gesellschaftsordnung, II, 1901, pp.283 ff. L. Stein, Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philos. Stuttgart, 1903, p.47. H. Elsler, Soziologie, Leipzig, 1903, pp.40-45.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p8">We might speak of evolution in families, nations, or humanity if
men successively increased in height, in size and weight, in
strength or length of life, or even in intellectual, moral, or
religious capacity, in “capability of culture.” But this is by no
means the case. Years ago Buckle said that the child born in a
civilized country probably does not excel that of barbarians; and
when this remark is understood strictly as referring to the
capacity and not to the milieu of the child, it is rather
strengthened than weakened by ethnological investigation.<note place="foot" id="vi-p8.1" n="131">L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., p.50, enters a protest.</note>  The
capacities and gifts of the culture-people of to-day are, on the
average, no greater than those of the Greeks and Romans,
Babylonians or Assyrians; the seventy or eighty years of which the
Scriptures speak are still the limitation of the life of the
strong; the religious sensibility, moral capacity, adaptation to
art, etc., by no means advance with the years; “every-where,” as
Professor de Vries says, “the characteristics of individuals
librate about an average, and everywhere they do it according to
the same law.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p8.2" n="132">Hugo de Vries, Afstammings- en Mutatieleer, Baarn, 1907, p.35.</note>  We might cherish the hope of progress, however
slow it might be, if it were established that characteristics, once
attained, are transmitted by heredity. But on this there exists the
greatest possible difference of opinion. Experience teaches us that numberless
characteristics, both intellectual and moral, are not transmitted
from parent to child. Learned men not rarely have stupid children;
pious parents frequently bring up godless children; the gifts of
grace prove to be no heirloom. Newly acquired variations do not
always continue, but disappear after one or more generations. Every
variety displays a tendency to return again to the original type,
and nowhere, among plants, animals, or men, do we find an
inclination to continue to vary in any one given direction. And
yet, on the other hand, we see organisms appreciably modify
themselves under the influence of climate, soil, food, and other
circumstances, and transmit their variations to their descendants.
Races and national types, the nose of the Bourbons and the lip of
the Hapsburgs, the varieties among the descendants of the horse and
the dog, prove this conclusively. But a straight line of
development is nowhere indicated. Heredity is a dark region. We can
do no more for the present than with Delage state the fact that
modifications acquired under the influence of environment generally
are not, but sometimes are, hereditary.<note place="foot" id="vi-p8.3" n="133">In Nieuwhuis, Twee vragen des tijds, p.77.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p9">Thus we can predicate with certainty only this of the idea of
evolution in humanity, that later generations are more favorably
situated than the earlier ones, by reason of the inheritance which
has come to them, in money and goods, in science and art, in
civilization and culture. But this inheritance can hardly be
denominated by the name of evolution; for these several possessions
of culture have not organically developed from a germ and have not
evolved themselves, but are the product of the thought and will of
man. The discovery of America, the discovery and application of
steam power, the knowledge and use of electricity, did not come spontaneously, nor are they the
necessary product of economic or social factors, but they
presuppose thirst for knowledge and intense intellectual labor in
man. It is true man is here subject to the influence of his
environment, and is perhaps as much indebted to it as it is to him.
But the influence certainly does not come exclusively from one
side; discoveries and inventions frequently are due to
extraordinary personalities, whose origin and existence remain a
mystery, despite all biographical investigation. A genius like
Goethe is far from explained when we know that he inherited his
“stature” from his father and his “cheerful disposition” from his
mother. Evolution is a great word, but it turns its back on
difficulties and sums up a rich and complicated reality under a
vague formula.<note place="foot" id="vi-p9.1" n="134">Lexis, Das Wesen der Kultur, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I, pp.13-19.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p10">This appears all the more clearly when we consider that the
advantages of culture, handed down by progenitors, cannot be taken
up, conserved, and increased by their descendants without some
action on their part. Although every man is born from the
community, and is formed by it, he has to begin again for himself
at the very beginning. He has to begin with the exercise of his
bodily members and senses, with learning to read and write and
cipher. From his birth on he must strive to make the inheritance of
the past his own; he must “labor for it in order to possess it.”
And there is the possibility and danger that he may squander,
dissipate, and turn to his own destruction the treasures which fall
in his lap at his birth. Individuals, but also families, tribes,
and peoples, are exposed to this danger. Culture may be a blessing,
but it can also be a curse; it does not always advance, it may
degenerate and come to nothing; it can be augmented, but it can
also be destroyed and annihilated through the decadence of nations,
through calamities and wars. And in the strifes between peoples it
is not always the cultured peoples which are victorious, but as the
history of the Babylonians and Assyrians, of the Greeks and Romans,
of the Franks and Germans teaches us, very frequently those peoples
who are poor in culture and well-nigh devoid of civilization.<note place="foot" id="vi-p10.1" n="135">Dr. E. R. Lankester, Natur und Mensch, Mit einer Vorrede von Dr. K. Guenther, Leipzig, pp.xi ff, 28.</note>  When
they take over the culture of the conquered peoples afterwards,
this does not happen on their part, except in the course of a long
lapse of time and by the eflorts of their own intellectual
strength.</p>
<p id="vi-p11">All these considerations show that history presents a character
far too involved and complicated to be reduced to one common
formula or to be explained from one cause. Monism, no doubt,
endeavors to do this with history as well as with nature. But all
efforts to comprehend historical personages and occurences
exclusively from mechanical, physical, biological, psychological,
social, or economic factors, have only succeeded in making evident
the richness of life and the complication of conditions.</p>
<p id="vi-p12">Lamprecht, for instance, goes back to the folk-soul, and finds
in it the ultimate cause of history. But questions multiply
themselves as soon as we try to give to ourselves a somewhat clear
account of this folk-soul. What are we to understand by it, and
where is it to be found? How did it originate, and what factors
influenced its formation? And if it exists, what is its dominant
element? For no more than the soul of a man can it be a simple
phenomenon. If the folk-soul is really a soul, what plays the chief
role in it? Intelligence, the emotions, or the will; concepts or
feelings, hunger or love? And further, what is the connection
between the folk-soul and the folk-body, and between it and all
nature, climate and soil and nourishment? As many questions, so
many enigmas.<note place="foot" id="vi-p12.1" n="136">Lamprecht, Die Kulturhist. Methode, Berlin, 1900. Id., Moderne Geschichtswiss., 1905. Compare on him the above mentioned articles of Eulenburg and Colenbrander; also E. Pesch, Lehrbueh der Nationaloekonomic, I, 1905, pp.95 ff.</note>  Instead of attaining unity, we come to an infinite
diversity. For the folk-soul is no unity; it lacks the unity of
self-consciousness, which in man is expressed in his soul.<note place="foot" id="vi-p12.2" n="137">Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswiss., pp.39, 51.</note> ] And
it is a matter of great wonderment that, at a time in which
psychology is endeavoring to dissolve the individual soul into a
complex of experiences, historical science wishes to believe in the
unity of the folk-soul. In point of fact, it thus walks in the same
path which is followed by natural science when it just abstracts in
thought the forces of nature, and then personifies them through the
imagination. The conception of a folk-soul is just as useless for
history as that of an organism. There may be analogy, there is no
identity. In a much higher degree than is the case in nature, we
stand in history before a complex of causes and operations which
are utterly unknown to us in their essence and interrelations, and
cannot be, comprehended in one single word. “There is just as
little such a final and simple word of history, which can express
its true sense, as nature has such a word to offer.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p12.3" n="138">Dilthey, ibid., p.115.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p13">The same difficulty which erects itself against the monistic
doctrine of causality returns when the attempt is made to
distinguish in history an aseendin series of periods, and to
express each of those periods in a single name. Of course, we are
compelled to speak of periods in history, and to characterize them
by some trait or other. If that could not be done, it would be
quite impossible to bring order into the chaos of events. We speak,
therefore, without hesitation, of ancient, mediaeval, and modern
history; of the age of the Reformation and of the “Enlightenment.”
But we must not forget that we do not comprehend the totality of
such a period, by any means, in such a formula. The age of the
Reformation, for instance, was also that of the Renascence, of the
revival of philosophy and of natural science, of the origin of
world-communication and world-commerce. The eighteenth century was
the golden period of the “Enlightenment,” but it also witnessed the
activity of Pietism, Moravianism, and Methodism; it also gave being
to Winckelmann and Lessing, Goethe and Schiller, Rousseau and Kant.
And when the children of the nineteenth century felt the need of
characterizing their own age, they called it the age of historic
sense and of the natural sciences, of commerce and communication,
of steam and electricity, of autonomy and anarchy, of democracy and
popular power, of reason and of mysticism, of cosmopolitanism and
of the national consciousness; and all felt that no one of these
names answers to the fulness of the reality.<note place="foot" id="vi-p13.1" n="139">Theob. Ziegler, Die geistigen und sozialen Strömungen des 19 Jahrh., Berlin, 1901, pp.1 ff. H. St. Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des 19 Jahrh., 1903, I, pp.26 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p14">And we must further keep in view that all division of the
world’s history, however unprejudicedly it be studied, quietly
assumes the unity of the race and a monistic-evolutionary
conception of its history. The consequence is that only a narrow
strip of peoples is taken into account and is abstracted from all
other peoples. And at the same time events and conditions are
deliberately placed in succession to one another which in reality
occurred side by side. A distinction is made between the stone,
bronze, and iron ages; between the chase, the pastoral life,
agriculture, manufacture, and commerce; between an
Asiatic-despotic, mediaeval-feudal, and civil- capitalistic
society; between a natural-, money-, and credit- system of
commerce, a home-, city-, and national- organization, a form of
economy based on the principle of need, and one based on the
principle of acquisition; between symbolism, typism,
conventionalism, individualism, and subjectivism in the history of
the German people; between savagery, barbarism, and civilization;
between matriarchy, patriarchy, polygamy, and monogamy; between
fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism; between theological,
metaphysical, and positivistic phases, etc. But in all these
distinctions it is forgotten that the relations and conditions
which are thus placed in a series one after another exist
throughout the ages side by side in different peoples, and even
within the same people in different strata of society. The
excavations in Assyria and Babylon, in Egypt and Greece, have
informed us that a high civilization existed even in antiquity;
industry and technic, science and art, commerce and society had
even then reached a high degree of development.</p>
<p id="vi-p15">It is therefore futile to attempt to divide the history of
humanity into sharply defined periods, in accordance with the
evolutionary hypothesis. Ranke saw better when he said that not
every succeeding period stands above the preceding. A period
precedent in time does not serve exclusively, as the system of
Hegel demanded, to prepare for a succeeding one: it also occupies
an individual, independent position, and represents an independent
value. Even if a period is older in history, it is very possible
that it may have something which it alone possesses and by which it
excels all others. The classical period, the middle ages, and also
every one of the succeeding ages, have each something peculiar to
itself, a special gift and calling, and they add, each in its own
way, to the capital of humanity. The same is true of the nations.
They do not simply stand in regular order, the one after the other;
but, whether isolated or in communion, they live on together. And
all these periods and peoples have not only a horizontal
significance for what succeeds, but each period and each people has
also vertically its own significance for God, who created and
guided it. “Each period stands immediately related to God, and its
value does not at all depend on what proceeds from it, but on its
very existence, on its very self.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p15.1" n="140">Ranke, Ueber die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, 1888, quoted by de la Saussaye, Geestel. Stroomingen, pp.301 ff. Comp. also H. Pesch, Der Gang der wirtschaftsgesch. Entwicklung, Stimmen aus Maria Laach, Jan., 1903, pp.1-16, and Lehrbuch der Nationaloekonomie, I, pp.107 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p16">In the division into period’s the monistic-evolutionary view of
history comes into still greater difficulties. It may at best point
out that the history of a people here or there has followed a
certain course. It can never furnish the proof that this course is
really necessarily and universally prescribed to all peoples. True,
it makes this the starting-point of its monistic law of causality,
and this is inevitable. But this starting-point is arbitrarily
chosen and is contradicted by facts. Who dares to contend that
every people has passed through or must pass through the periods of
stone and copper and iron; of the chase, agriculture, and industry;
of theology, metaphysics, and positivism, and the like? Even more
than in nature, in history laws, if they exist at all, must bear an
empirical character. They cannot be determined beforehand, but have
to be derived from the facts. But this exposes us to the greatest
difficulties. It is true, it is thoroughly justifiable to search in
history also for the reign of law, for a connection between cause
and effect, for an order and a plan. In the chaotic, in the
arbitrary, in the accidental, we find no resting place, either for
our intelligence or for our heart. But it is equally certain that
this reign of law has not yet been found in history, and presumably
never will be.</p>
<p id="vi-p17">If we do not know, in one way or another, and to a certain
extent from elsewhere, it is impossible to determine in a purely
empirical way from the facts, what course history takes and must
take, and to what end it is advancing. We feel the need of this
knowledge; in our innermost soul we all believe in such a course
and such an aim in history. For if history is to be truly history,
something must be accomplished by it. It is the very sense and
value and meaning of history that in it and by it something shall
be realized which makes it worth while for history to exist, with
all its misery and pain. But the positivistic method does not
enable us to find this order and this aim of history. In nature we
scarcely know as yet what laws really are; but, as is seen and
acknowledged more and more, in history we have as yet got no
farther than that we perceive a certain rhythm in its events.<note place="foot" id="vi-p17.1" n="141">The following writers deal with the subject of laws of history. L. Stein, Die soziale Frage, pp.35-42. Elsler, Soziologie, p.12. Rümelin, Reden unel Aufsätze, 1875. Tiele, Inleiding tot de godsdienstwetenschap, I, pp.193 ff.. H. Pesch, Lehrbuch, I, pp.443 ff. Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswiss., I,1883. Gumplovicz, Grundriss der Sozologie. Wien, 1905, pp.361 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p18">And accordingly opinions about the meaning and aim of history
are widely divergent. There is difference of opinion as regards the
place which should be assigned to the great men in history, and to
each man and people in particular. Are the individual men only
thoroughfares for the idea, phenomena of the Universal Being,
expressions of the folk-soul, waves of the ocean; or have they each
a significance for eternity? There is difference as regards the
method by which a rule of judgment may be found. We stand over
against the persons and the events not only as onlookers, but also
as judges; we cannot assume a neutral attitude with respect to them
as we may do in the case of nature. But where is the standard which
we have to apply to be found, and how is it to he applied? And in
the closest connection with this there is a great difference about
the true contents, the moving-forces and the aim of history. Are
these to be found in the development of the understanding and in
the advance of science as Buckle thought; or in the idea of liberty
as Kant and Hegel imagined; in the establishment of an order of
government as Breysig thinks; or in production as Marx supposes?
Are they to be found in mind or in matter, in man or in culture, in
the state or in society? The history which is studied in an
exclusively empirical way gives no answer. And since every one
seeks an answer and cannot live without such an answer, the science
of history raises itself to philosophy of history; for the cause
and aim, the essence and development of history cannot be
understood without metaphysics.</p>
<p id="vi-p19">In recent years this conviction has reasserted itself in the
minds of many. A strong reaction has arisen against the
monistic-evolutionary view of history. In 1883 Dilthey already
declared the need of a “criticism of the historical reason;” in
1894 Windelband pronounced an oration on “History and Natural
Science,” in which he laid stress on the independence of the
former; Heinrich Rickert followed him in 1899, with an essay on
“The Science of Culture and the Science of Nature,” and published
in 1902 an important logical introduction to the historical
sciences, entitled, “The Limits of the Application of Conceptions
framed by Natural Science.” Since then the scientific discussion of
the character of the science of history has been unbrokenly
prosecuted, and flows out in a long series of orations and
treatises, which apparently increases day by day.<note place="foot" id="vi-p19.1" n="142">Dilthey, op. cit., p. 45. Windelband, Geschichte und Naturwissenchaft. Strassburg, 1900. Rickert, Kulturwiss. und Naturw., Tübingen, 1899. Id., Die Grenzen der naturw. Begriffsbildung, Tübingen, 1902 (cf. Troeltsch, Theol. Rundschau, 1903). Id., Geschichtsphilosophie, in: Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20 Jahrh., II, pp.51-135. Eucken, Philosophic der Geschichte, pp.247-280 of System. Philos. in Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Lindner, Geschichtsphilos., Stuttgart, 1901. Richter, Die Vergleichbarkeit naturwissenseliaftlicher und geschichtlicher Forschungsereignisse, Deutsche Rundschau, April, 1904, pp.114-129. G. Heymans, De geschiedenis als wetenschap, Versl. en Meded. der Kon. Ak. v. Wet. Afd. Lett. 1906, pp.173-202. Van der Wijck, Natuur en Geschiedenis, Onze Eeuw, March, 1907, pp. 419-445.</note>  And still
further there is also a difference among those who antagonize the
nomological science of history. According to Windelband and Rickert
the sciences of nature and history are alike empirical and
positive; but they are distinct in the aim with which they are
studied. The natural sciences take their start, like the
mathematical sciences, from general propositions, axioms, and
postulates; or else search, like the empirical sciences, in the
natural phenomena for the universal, the idea, the law; they are
therefore nomothetic in character. On the other hand the historical
sciences do not search out the universal, but the particular, das
Einmalige (“the singular”), and they have their strength in the
realizing power of conception; they have an ideographic character.
But this is not all. For historical science by no means takes up
everything which is particular and has occurred at some time or
other, but it makes selection and treats only that which in a
definite sense is important and possesses a real value. Just as the
individual man retains in his memory only that which has been of
importance for his life; so the history of a people or of humanity
retains the memory of those persons and occurrences only which were
significant for the universal progress, for the development of the
whole. To accomplish this sifting of the material the historian
must therefore be “a man of judgment.” He must proceed from the
belief that there are “universal values” and must derive these from
ethics. Ethics is therefore the “epistemology of the historical
sciences.” According to the system of “values” which this science
offers, the facts of history are sifted, ordered, estimated.
History, in a word, is not a science of nature, but a science of
culture.</p>
<p id="vi-p20">Others, such as Dilthey, Wundt, Sigwart, go back one step
farther still. They seek the difference between natural and
historical science, not only logically in the aim with which they
are cultivated, but also in the contents of each group. The
character of the historical sciences is not sufficiently expressed
by the name “sciences of culture,” but receives full justice only
when they are indicated as mental sciences over against the natural
sciences. The historical sciences occupy themselves with their own
distinct object; they come into touch with other factors than the
natural sciences. They concern themselves with man, with his
psychic faculties and functions, and therefore they follow a
different method and have a different name from the natural
sciences.<note place="foot" id="vi-p20.1" n="143">Frischeisen-Köhler, Moderne Philos., pp.385 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p21">This reaction against monism in the science of history is
already remarkable, because it does not stand alone, but is
connected with the entire movement which manifested itself toward
the close of the last century, in many different countries and in
various spheres, and which has in a previous lecture been
characterized as a revolt of the will against the reason, of the
heart against the understanding, of liberty against necessity, of
man against nature.<note place="foot" id="vi-p21.1" n="144">Eucken, Philos. der Gesch., loc. cit., pp.261 ff.</note>  But it is also remarkable on its own account,
because it has once more clearly enunciated the difference in aim
and contents between the natural and historical sciences and has
demanded for the latter independence and liberty of movement.
History is something else and something more than a process of
nature which develops itself after a dialectic method, is
independent of the consciousness, the will, and the aim of man, and
is the necessary product of a power which works, as a whole,
without consciousness and will.<note place="foot" id="vi-p21.2" n="145">Marx in Woltmann, Der histor. Materialismus, p.183, comp. Engels, ibid. p.241.</note>  But we cannot halt even at the
conception of history as science of culture or mental science. For
if history, in distinction from natural science, were to teach us
really, in a definite sense, only the particular das Einmalige
(“the singular”), it would cease to be science and would become
art.</p>
<p id="vi-p22">Rickert has the courage to draw this conclusion, and refuses to
acknowledge any laws in this domain. The so-called “laws” in
history are nothing but Wertformeln, formulas of valuation.<note place="foot" id="vi-p22.1" n="146">Rickert, Geschichtsphilos., loc. cit., p.104.</note>  Now
we admit that das Einmalige (“the singular”) has great significance
in history.<note place="foot" id="vi-p22.2" n="147">Dilthey, Einleitung, pp.114-116, 129.</note>  But when this is postulated, in contradistinction to
and to the exclusion of the “particular” in nature, this position
cannot be assumed without criticism. For if the natural sciences
generalize and search for laws which apply to a multiplicity of
cases, this does not permit us to conclude that these particular
cases are without value and have only served as illustrations of
the universal laws; we must hold, rather, that they all have an
historical significance in the process of the world, a place and
task of their own.<note place="foot" id="vi-p22.3" n="148">Frischeisen-Köhler, Moderne Philos., p.385.</note>  Moreover it is not true that natural science,
in its entirety, directs itself only to the discovery of the
universal; it is easy to say this, as is explained by Professor
Heymans, so long as one thinks only of the abstract natural
sciences, like physics and chemistry; but it can by no means be
applied when the concrete natural sciences, like geology and
astronomy, are taken into consideration. For the student of geology
the physical and chemical laws are not ends, but means, the means
to account for the appearance of definite phenomena in the
earth-crust, which, as they appear and are to be explained, mostly
occur only once and no more.<note place="foot" id="vi-p22.4" n="149">Heymans, De geschiedenis als wetenschap, loc. cit., p. 185.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p23">On the other hand historical science cannot avoid all
abstraction and generalization. It is true, history does not, like
nature, make us acquainted with laws, although even here more and
more doubt arises whether, in any sphere, we have really attained
to the knowledge of the laws of elementary phenomena.<note place="foot" id="vi-p23.1" n="150">Heymans, ibid. p.182.</note>  But this
does not in the least hinder us from concluding that the historian
by no means fixes his attention on das Einmalige (”,the singular”)
alone, but connects every person and every event with the past,
searches out the connection of facts, and thus carries on his
investigations under the guidance of an idea,, a plan, a course in
history. He who would deny this would make history itself an
impossibility and reduce it to the viewpoint of a chronicle. From
this point of view the historian would see trees but no forest;
would retain facts but no history; would have bricks but no
building; would have details but no living, organic whole. It
cannot be denied that historical investigation has at times lost
itself in such details, and in that way has called into existence
the danger of historicism and relativism. And Nietzsche was fully
justified when he broke out in wrath against such a treatment of
history, for the overwhelming flood of details does not elevate us,
but crushes us down; it robs us of our independence and freedom; it
denies the, superiority of mind over matter.<note place="foot" id="vi-p23.2" n="151">In Frischeisen-Köhler, op. cit., p.202.</note>  Troeltsch remarks,
therefore, that “All history uses the study of details rather as a
means and never views it as a.final aim. And in truth it is the
means of understanding the great closed cycles of human
civilization, of the leading nations, of the important circles of
culture, of the great branches of culture.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p23.3" n="152">Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christ., pp.50 ff.</note>  Without undervaluing
the significance of details, history aims at the knowledge of the
idea, of the sense of history. Bare facts do not satisfy us; we
want to see behind the facts the idea which combines and governs
them.<note place="foot" id="vi-p23.4" n="153">Buckle in Giesswein, Determ. und metaph. Gesch., p.6.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p24">The newer view of history so far recognizes this that it makes
the essence of history to lie in the realization of values. If this
is so, the historian must be “somewhat of a man of judgment,” and
must possess a standard by which he can judge of the values in
history. The danger is here far from imaginary that the historian,
in determining these values, will permit.his own interest to
intrude itself and will test all facts by his own limited insight
and his own selfish advantage. Rickert sees this danger, and
discriminates therefore between practical and theoretical, personal
(individual) and general valuations, demanding that the historian
shall lay the former aside and thus be wholly objective.</p>
<p id="vi-p25">But granting the practicability of this certainly very difficult
discrimination proposed by Rickert, the question will nevertheless
remain whence we must derive the standard of the general
valuations. It is not to be supposed that history itself will
furnish it. It would seem, no doubt, that Troeltsch is of this
opinion when he says that history, notwithstanding that everything
in it is relative, yet sets forth and maintains “norms, ideals of
life, contents of life,” which may be compared with one another by
the historian. He therefore proposes wholly to lay aside the old
historico-apologetic and speculative method, to replace it by that
of the history of religions, and in this way to prove the
(relative) truth and value of Christianity.<note place="foot" id="vi-p25.1" n="154">Troeltsch, op. cit., pp.23 ff. Id., Theol. Randschau, VI. pp. 1-3.</note>  But if history, as
Troeltsch says elsewhere, makes everything relative, occupies
itself only with das Einmalige (“the singular”) and the individual,
and cannot “find a standard of universal application,” it must be
impossible for it to furnish us with the norms and ideals by which
we may estimate facts and persons. In a fact, by itself, there is
of course no qualitative difference ; the crime “happens” just as
well as the noblest act of self-sacrifice; to a purely objective
view sin and virtue are in the same sense products as vitriol and
sugar.<note place="foot" id="vi-p25.2" n="155">Rickert, Geschichtsphilos., I. c. p. 82.</note>  The expectation that history is to realize ideals of life
and norms proceeds from the assumption that history is not a “play
of endless variants,” but forms a whole which is animated by a
governing idea, by the providence of God.<note place="foot" id="vi-p25.3" n="156">Troeltsch, op. cit., Comp. Reischle, Hist. u. dogm. Methode der Theologie, Theol. Rundschau, 1901. Traub, Die religionsgesch. Methode und die syst. Theol., Zeits. Für Theol. u. Kirche, 1901.</note>  A comparison of persons and facts in
history is possible only, then, when the historian is from the
start a “man of judgment” and brings to his task a standard of
judgment acquired elsewhere. And the question remains, whence we
must derive the standard for measuring “universally valid
values.”</p>
<p id="vi-p26">The outcome and the result, the use and the profit,—culture,
in a word,—can scarcely serve the purpose of such a standard,
although Rickert sometimes seems to incline to this idea. For the
standard would then be wholly utilitarian, even if it be
social-eudaemonistic in character; and all truth and virtue would
become subordinated to utility. But, apart from this, such a
standard would be no standard at all, i.e. it would be no norm or
rule, which is fixed in itself, and therefore can serve for
impartial and fair judgment of phenomena and facts. If their
culture-value is to determine the truth and goodness of things,
this value itself ought to be fixed for all. But this is so little
the case that the greatest possible difference exists about the
contents and the value of the products of culture. And this
entirely without considering the other question how we who have our
place in its midst can take the final issue of history for a
standard. The question, therefore, continues to clamor for an
answer, where the standard is to be found which can be used in
judging historical facts and personages. History itself does not
present it; immanently, within the circle of historical phenomena,
it cannot be found. If history is to be truly history, if it is to
realize values, universally valid values, we cannot know this from
the facts in themselves, but we borrow this conviction from
philosophy, from our view of life and of the world,—that is to
say, from our faith. Just as there is no physics without
metaphysics, there is no history without philosophy, without
religion and ethics.</p>
<p id="vi-p27">Very certainly there is no history without religion, without
faith in a divine wisdom and power. For suppose that philosophy,
especially ethics, could offer us an absolute standard, by which
historical values may be judged—a possibility which is by no
means unconditionally determined—still the final and most
important question is not answered: What is the ground for the
belief that such an absolute value has an objective existence and
must be realized in history, notwithstanding all opposition? What
right have we to expect that the good will ultimately be
victorious? Rickert is of the opinion that the existence of such an
absolute, transcendent value can be accepted and maintained without
postulating a transcendent reality. But he himself does not
entirely escape this postulate. For he has to assume that the idea
of value, which, in accordance with the German idealism, he
considers as the highest, namely, “development unto freedom,” is
“itself in some way inherent in the nature of the world.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p27.1" n="157">Rickert, Geschichtsphilos., I. c. p.131.</note>  This
idea, then, has an objective reality, perhaps not in a personal,
transcendent God, but immanently in the nature of the world. It is
difficult, however, to attach a clear conception to these words.
The ideas of freedom, of truth, of goodness, of beauty, have no
existence in themselves, but are abstractions, which we have formed
by our thinking. They are no transcendent powers or forces which
realize themselves and can break down all opposition, but they are
conceptions which we have derived from reality and have
disassociated from it by our thinking. When later on we hypostatize
these abstractions, and when we clothe them with divine wisdom and
power, then we do in reality nothing but what natural science
frequently does with its force and laws, and what the Roman of old
did when he elevated justice and truth and peace and all sorts of
possible and impossible abstractions to the rank of divinities. It
is therefore in vain when we say that this idea is grounded in the
nature of the world. For it passes comprehension how the idea of
freedom, if it is no more than an idea, can be grounded in the
nature of the world and can realize itself. And if it is indeed
capable of so doing, then it must be more than an idea, and we
cannot conceive of it in any other way than as an attribute and
power of a personal God. In point of fact, goodness, justice,
wisdom, etc., have no existence in this world but as personal
attributes. And therefore not only the theology of all the ages,
but also philosophy in a good number of its interpreters, has
postulated the existence of a personal God. In the newer philosophy
Kant here set the example, and at the present time he is followed
in this respect by Eucken, Howison, and many others.<note place="foot" id="vi-p27.2" n="158">Eucken, Philos d. Gesch., I. c. p.271. In this class must be reckoned in general all advocates of so-called Personal Idealism. Comp. Personal Idealism, ed. by H. C. Sturt, Oxford, 1902.</note>  If history
is to remain what it is and must be, it presupposes the existence
and activity of an all-wise and omnipotent God, who works out his
own counsels in the course of the world. The more we penetrate in
our thinking to the essence of history, as to that of nature, the
more we grasp its idea and maintain it, the more it will manifest
itself as rooted in revelation and as upborne by revelation; the
more it will lift itself up to and approach that view of history
which Christianity has presented and wherewith Christianity in its
turn confirms and supports revelation in nature and in history.</p>
<p id="vi-p28">Historians, it is true, to the detriment of their own science,
sometimes assume an inimical or indifferent attitude towards
Christianity. Rickert, for instance, will have none of it. He is of
the opinion that the philosophy of history has done wholly away
with it, that the image of the world has been totally changed, and
that the idea of “a closed, explorable, (übersehbar) cosmos”
is utterly destroyed. The doctrine of Giordano Bruno about the
infinitude of the world has caused shipwreck to all world-history
in the strict sense.<note place="foot" id="vi-p28.1" n="159">Rickert, loc. cit., p.121.</note>  Indirectly, however, this declaration is a
confirmation of the importance of Christianity for history; for it
is indeed the special revelation in the Scriptures which has made a
world-history possible and without which it is threatened with
destruction. The significance of Christianity for history is
therefore universally acknowledged.<note place="foot" id="vi-p28.2" n="160">Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswiss., pp.123, 135 ff. Eucken, Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart., Leipzig, 1904, pp.190 ff. Hipler, Die christliche Geschichtsauffassung, Köln, 1884. Harnack, Das Christentum und die Geschichte, 1904. Sellin, Die alttest. Religion, pp.34 ff. Fairbairn, The Philos. of the Christian Religion, pp.169-185. H. H. Kuyper, Het Geref. beginsel en de Kerkgeschiedenis, Leiden, 1900.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p29">In the first place the confession of the unity of God is the
foundation of the true view of nature and also of history. If this
be denied, we must either abide by the multiplicity of reality, by
a pluralism of monads and souls, spirits or “selves,” demons or
Gods; or because man can never find satisfaction in such a
multiplicity, we have to search in the world itself for a false
unity, as is done by monism in its various forms, and then all
differentiation is sacrificed to this false unity. The souls of men
then become parts and phenomena of the one world-soul, and all
created things become modi of the one substance. Only, then, when
the unity of all creation is not sought in the things themselves,
but transcendently (not in a spacial but in a qualitative,
essential sense) in a divine being, in his wisdom and power, in his
will and counsel, can the world as a whole, and in it every
creature, fully attain its rights. A person alone can be the root
of unity in difference, of difference in unity. He alone can
combine in a system a multiplicity of ideas into unity, and he
alone can realize them by his will ad extra. Theism is the only
true monism.</p>
<p id="vi-p30">But to the Unity of God the unity of humanity stands very
closely related, and this also is of fundamental importance for
history. The evolutionary hypothesis usually accepts this unity,
although the right to do so from its own standpoint may well be
doubted, and it considers man as the highest creature, as the crown
of all creation. Thus Heinrich Schurtz, for instance, says that,
whilst the question cannot be scientifically decided whether
humanity originates from one couple or more, yet all investigation
of the races must proceed from the fact that “humanity forms one
great unity.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p30.1" n="161">H. Schurtz, Vö1kerkunde, Leipzig und Wien, 1900, p.5. Steinmetz, De Studie der Volkenkunde, p.46</note>  And not only this, but human nature also is
considered one and unchangeable. The same historian of culture says
elsewhere, that changes of bodily structure still proceed with
animals, but that man, having attained the height at which he now
stands, no longer reacts on his environment by unconscious bodily
changes, but by weapons and instruments, by science and art. The
development of the mind has put a stop to changes in bodily
structure. And this mind itself is stationary in its structure.
Years ago Virchow declared this; Ammon has proved it; and Hugo de
Vries assents to it: “Man is a stationary type” (Dauertypus); he
continues at the same height, as concerns his hereditary
attributes, i.e., the average attainment and the degree of
development of the race.<note place="foot" id="vi-p30.2" n="162">Hugo de Vries, Afstammings- en Mutatieleer, pp.35, 36. Schurtz, Urgesch. der Kultur, 1900, Vorwort. Wundt, Vö1ker-psychologie, II, 1, pp. 16, 587 ff., 589, II, 2, pp.168. Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1890, p.128. R. C. Boer, Gids, Jan., 1907, p. 83. Stanley Hall, Adolescence, I, preface, p. vii.</note> </p>
<p id="vi-p31">However thankful we may be that the evolutionists usually accept
this unity of humanity and human nature, and thereby show that life
is stronger than doctrine, we must bear in mind that this unity
does not rest on scientific grounds, but is derived from
revelation. And yet it is an indispensable presupposition for
history. For thereby only is a history in the true sense made
possible,—a history of the world and a history of humanity, in
which all men, all peoples, nay, all creatures, are embraced, and
are held together by one leading thought, by one counsel of God.
And this unity is important for history in still another sense.
Eucken says with perfect truth: “A type of human nature ever stands
between the historian and his sources.”<note place="foot" id="vi-p31.1" n="163">Eucken, Geschichtsphilos., loc. cit., p. 40.</note>  Knowledge of history is
possible, then, only when the men who act on its stage, whenever
and wherever they may have lived, have been of like passions with
us. For when the historian wishes to give an account to himself of
their conceptions and emotions, of their words and deeds, he can do
so only by transporting himself in his imagination into the
characters and circumstances of the persons he desires to depict.
He must endeavor to reproduce within himself their inner life, and
thus to form a plausible conception of the way in which they came
to act as they did.<note place="foot" id="vi-p31.2" n="164">Heymans, De geschiedenis als wetenschap, loc. cit., p.191, 194. Comp. also Emerson’s Essay on History.</note>  He finds the key to explain the thinking and
willing, the feeling and acting of his historical personages, in
his own spiritual life. The unity of human nature and of the human
race is the presupposition of all history, and this has been made
known to us only by Christianity.</p>
<p id="vi-p32">But this unity in its contents is entirely different from that
after which monism is striving. Monism always understands by unity
a universal principle, which is abstracted from all that is
particular, and which is then, as a universal origin, made the
ground of all that is particular. The psyche of man, for instance,
is, according to monism, a unity only when all psychic phenomena
can be deduced from one principle, whether from conception or from
feeling. The organisms are a unity when they have successively
originated from one original cell. The world is a unity when all
existence has developed itself from one matter and from one force.
Monism knows no other unity than a genetic one, and can therefore
never do full justice to the differentiation of the world, the
difference between the inorganic, and organic, between irrational
and rational creatures, the dependence and liberty of man,—the
difference between the true and the false, good and evil. The unity
of monism is a dead, stark, uniform unity, without life and its
fulness. This is plainly shown in the judgment which it passes upon
the heroes of history, who are sacrificed to the idea, to the
mechanical interaction of matter, to the one power which
necessarily produces all. Against this view pragmatism continually
raises protest, just as one-sidedly seeing in the great men the
makers of history, and resolving the historic content in their
personality, and ultimately arriving at the apotheosis and
adoration of genius.</p>
<p id="vi-p33">The unity which revelation makes known to us is of another kind
and of a higher order. It is the unity of harmony, which includes
riches, multiformity, differentiation. Just as soul and body in man
are not genetically one and have not originated from each other,
and yet form in the “ego” of man an inner organic unity; just as
the members of an organism are neither exclusively producent nor
exclusively product of the organism, but stand in reciprocal
relations with it and thus form a unity ; so the matter stands with
every man and every people in history, and also with all humanity.
Therefore history is so rich, its life so full, and therefore so
many factors are at work in it. But therefore it is also that the
monistic attempt to explain the entire process of history from
specific biological, psychological, or economic factors is so
mistaken. Life resists this view, the personality of man perishes
in it. Over against it the Scriptures teach us that the unity of
humanity does not exclude, but rather includes, the differentiation
of man in race, in character, in attainment, in calling, and in
many other things. Every man lives in his own time, comes into
being and passes away, appears and disappears; he seems only a part
of the whole, a moment of the process. But every man also bears the
ages in his heart; in his spirit-life he stands above and outside
of history. He lives in the past and the past lives in him, for, as
Nietzsehe says, man cannot forget. He also lives in the future and
the future lives in him, for he bears hope imperishably in his
bosom. Thus he can discover something of the connection between the
past, the present, and the future; thus he is at the same time
maker and knower of history. He belongs himself to history, yet he
stands above it; he is a child of time and yet has part in
eternity; he becomes and he is at the same time; he passes away and
yet he abides.</p>
<p id="vi-p34">All this Christianity has made us understand. But it does more
than that. The special revelation which comes to us in Christ not
only gives us the confirmation of certain suppositions, from which
history proceeds and must proceed, but itself gives us history, the
kernel and the true content of all history. Christianity is itself
history; it makes history, is one of the principal factors of
history, and is itself precisely what lifts history high above
nature and natural processes. And that it says and proves by its
own act; Christ came to this earth for a crisis; the content of
history lies in a mighty struggle. Monism knows nothing about this;
it schematizes everything with its before and after. It has only
one model—earlier and later, lower and higher, less and more, not
yet and already past. It knows no pro and contra, but thus it does
despite to life, to the experience of every man, to the terribly
tragic seriousness of history. Revelation is a confirmation and
explanation of life when it says the essence of history lies in a
mighty conflict between darkness and light, sin and grace, heaven
and hell. The history of the world is not the judgment of the
world; and yet it is one of the judgments of the world.</p>
<p id="vi-p35">Furthermore revelation gives us a division of history.<note place="foot" id="vi-p35.1" n="165">Eucken, Geistige Strömungen, p. 190.</note>  There
is no history without division of time, without periods, without
progress and development. But now take Christ away. The thing is
impossible, for he has lived and died, has risen from the dead, and
lives to all eternity; and these facts cannot be eliminated,—they
belong to history, they are the heart of history. But think Christ
away for a moment, with all he has spoken and done and wrought.
Immediately history falls to pieces. It has lost its heart, its
kernel, its centre, its distribution. It loses itself in a history
of races and nations, of nature- and culture-peoples. It becomes a
chaos, without a centre, and therefore without a circumference ;
without distribution and therefore without beginning or end;
without principle and goal; a stream rolling down from the
mountains, nothing more.<note place="foot" id="vi-p35.2" n="166">H. H. Kuyper, op. it., p.19.</note>  But revelation teaches that God is the
Lord of the ages and that Christ is the turning point of these
ages. And thus it brings into history unity and plan, progress and
aim.<note place="foot" id="vi-p35.3" n="167">Dilthey, Einleitung, p.41.</note>  This aim is not this or that special idea, not the idea of
freedom, or of humanity, or of material well-being. But it is the
fulness of the Kingdom of God, the all-sided, all-containing
dominion of God, which embraces heaven and earth, angels and men,
mind and matter, cultus and culture, the specific and the generic;
in a word, all in all.</p>
<p id="vi-p36"> </p>
<p id="vi-p37"> </p>
<p id="vi-p38"> </p>
<p id="vi-p39"> </p>
<p id="vi-p40"> </p>
<p id="vi-p41"> </p>
<p id="vi-p42"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 6. Revelation and Religion" id="vii" prev="vi" next="viii">
<h2 id="vii-p0.1">Lecture 6 - Revelation and Religion</h2>
<p id="vii-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="vii-p2">We shall be strongly confirmed in the view that history as well
as nature is rooted in revelation and needs it for its explanation,
if we fix our attention upon one of its most prominent motive
powers, namely, religion. The bare fact that religion exists
already means much. Demons have no religion; they are no doubt
convinced that God exists, but the thought of God moves them only
to fear and hatred. We cannot speak of religion in animals; the
idea of God is indispensable to religion, and animals entirely lack
this idea, as they lack all abstract conceptions. The veneration of
a dog for his master may show some resemblance and likeness to what
religion is in man, but analogy is not identity.<note place="foot" id="vii-p2.1" n="168">George Trumbull Ladd, The Philosophy of Religion, London, I, 1905, pp.138ff. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung und seine Entwicklung, Paderborn, 1903, pp.522 ff.</note>  On the other
hand, religion is characteristic of all peoples and all men;
however deeply a human being may be sunk in degradation, he is
conscious of the existence of God and of his duty to worship
him.</p>
<p id="vii-p3">This fact is of extraordinary significance; however far man may
wander from God, he remains bound to heaven; in the depths of his
soul he is linked to a world of unseen and supernatural things; in
his heart he is a supernatural being; his reason and conscience,
his thinking and willing, his needs and affections have their
ground in that which is eternal. And religion is the irrefutable
proof of this. It is not thrust upon him by force or foisted upon
him by deceit, but it rises spontaneously from his own nature,
although it is nourished from without. The religion of man in the
fallen state is no doubt always arbitrary, but at the same time
also voluntary, service. Thereby every man acknowledges and
confesses that he can be free only in absolute dependence; that he
can be true to himself and he a human being only when serving God.
The feeling of absolute dependence includes freedom; the subjection
of man to God bears a character of its own, and is distinguished
from that of demons and animals by being inseparably conjoined with
his affinity to God. In religion these two things are always
united, although sometimes the theocratic, and then again the
theanthropic, element predominates.<note place="foot" id="vii-p3.1" n="169">Tiele, Inl. tot de Godsdienstwet., I, pp.141 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p4">It is true there is an effort being made to remove religion from
the central place which it occupies in the life of the individual
as well as in the history of the race. This effort, however, is
doomed from the outset to prove abortive, because it clashes with
the unchangeable needs of human nature.</p>
<p id="vii-p5">When the Mercure de France last year opened a discussion on the
dissolution or evolution of religion, some, it is true, used the
occasion to air their hatred of the church and religion or to
predict their approaching disappearance. But even among those there
were some who sought a substitute for religion in altruism and
socialistically organized society, in morality, science, or
spiritualism. And an overwhelming majority were convinced that
religion, although its forms may change, nevertheless in its
essential nature is ineradicable and will survive all the crises
through which it may have to pass. They based their conviction
especially upon these two considerations, that religion is deeply
rooted in human nature,<note place="foot" id="vii-p5.1" n="170">Het Vraagstuk van den Godsdienst, Ontbindin of Evolutie, beantwoord door de grootste Denkers der Wereld, Amsterdam, 1908, pp.5, 10, 79, 80, 84, 90, 106, 115, 117, 119, 121, 197, 289, 316.</note>  and that science, which can make known
only the inter-relations of things, but never their origin,
essence, and end, will never be able to satisfy the needs of the
human heart.<note place="foot" id="vii-p5.2" n="171">Ibid., pp.13, 21, 57, 59, 99, 212, 252, 290, 301.</note>  Beyond that from which science has drawn away the
veil there always remains unexplored the domain, sublime, immense,
and silent, where the supreme power dwells on which we depend; and
from the innermost recesses of man’s personality religion always
rises anew.<note place="foot" id="vii-p5.3" n="172">Ibid., pp.21, 79.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p6">What is thus said of the present and expected in the future
finds its foundation and support in the past; there are no peoples
without religion, and history takes us back to no past in which
religion is not already the universal possession of man.<note place="foot" id="vii-p6.1" n="173">Ladd, op. cit., I, pp.120 ff.</note>  And not
only so, but from the beginning it has ever been the vitalizing
element of all culture. Of course we must beware here of
one-sidedness and take care not to construe actuality in the terms
of a theory. From his origin man has been not only a religious, but
also a moral and corporeal being; various wants and powers have
been implanted in him from the beginning of his existence, which
have worked together harmoniously. Morris Jastrow’s assertion that
science, art, and morality have grown out of religion, is too
strongly put; they rather have come forth together in intimate
connection with one another, out of the several wants and
inclinations of human nature as such.<note place="foot" id="vii-p6.2" n="174">Morris Jastrow, in Tiele, Inleiding tot de Godsdienstwet., II, pp.219.</note>  No monistic abstract
principle, but the totality of human nature has been the
starting-point of all development; just as little as the need of
food and drink, shelter and raiment, have there been developed
immediately from religion, agriculture, and industry, science and
art and the several constituent parts of culture; every one of them
has its own root in human nature, and hence its own particular
character and life. But religion certainly belongs, and always has
belonged, to the most intimate movements of the human heart, and
has made its influence felt upon the whole life, with all its
experiences and activities. Most certainly other agencies besides
religion have been at work in the development of science,
philosophy, art, etc., as, for instance, curiosity, desire for
adornment and sport, and the like. But the more deeply we sink
ourselves in the past, the more we find religion, morality,
knowledge, art, in fact all the elements of civilization together,
undivided and undifferentiated. They do not yet exist independently
side by side with one another, but lie still undeveloped, enclosed
in the same germ. A complex, a totality of experiences preceded the
differentiation. And among these those of a religio-moral kind took
the first place. In this sense it may be said that religion has
been the deepest cause of the process of civilization, the mother
of arts and of all sciences.<note place="foot" id="vii-p6.3" n="175">Het Vraagstuk van den Godsdienst, etc., pp.34, 112 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p7">This consideration of human nature is of great importance for
the investigation of the origin of religion. At present there is a
tendency among men of science first to dissolve the organic
connections in which religion appears in life, and then to
investigate its origin. They treat religion as a chemist does the
substances, which he separates from their actual connections and
then analyzes into their component parts. Scientifically this is of
high value, if only we do not forget that the process to which
science subjects its object differs entirely from that which
happens in actuality. There is no proof at all that the elements
have all existed originally in an unmixed state; and similarly
there is no ground for asserting that the factors which we at
present discover in the religious life ever existed separately.
Actuality presents a different appearance from theory. Life, full,
rich life, is always first; the abstractions of our thinking come
only later. When science in its search for the origin of things
allows itself to be exclusively guided by the idea of evolution,
and therefore ever endeavors to go back to the most insignificant
beginnings, to the most meagre principles, it simply elevates the
abstractions of thought into concrete powers, and in its
interpretation of things takes refuge in mythology. No abstract
principle, however, no simple power has been the origin of human
life in all its richness, and no rectilinear law of evolution has
directed the development. When we go back in the actual as far as
possible to the origins, we find a human nature which already
contains everything which it later on produces out of itself.
Natural and spiritual life, religion and morality, knowledge and
art, sense of beauty and consciousness of values, have been united
in man from the beginning. The experiences of life are the
background of all development and civilization.<note place="foot" id="vii-p7.1" n="176">Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswiss., pp.170, 184, 185.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p8">The researches of recent years into the origin of things, of
religion and morality, science and art, family, society, and state,
have put this in the clearest light. Of course we cannot speak here
in the strict sense of the word of a scientific investigation,
whether naturalistic or historical, for the elements of culture we
have mentioned have always existed, as far as history carries us
back. When Lubbock tried to prove that all peoples have passed
through a phase of atheism,<note place="foot" id="vii-p8.1" n="177">Lubbock, Entstehung der Civilisation. Deutsche Ausgabe, 1875, p.172.</note>  he not only overstepped the limits of
our empirical knowledge, but he also invented a condition which, if
it ever had existed, would be totally unintelligible to us, in
whose life religion forms an essential part.<note place="foot" id="vii-p8.2" n="178">Dilthey, op. cit., pp.168, 172.</note>  We can form no
conception of beings which are not animals, but men, and which yet
wholly lack religion; they are unthinkable and impossible. The case
is, in fact, the same with all the component parts of human
civilization; men are not thinkable without some knowledge and art,
without some kind of family and social life, without some
conception of morality and justice. If, notwithstanding all this,
science continues to attempt to penetrate behind all culture and to
form a conception of the way in which all these phenomena arose in
human life, it is in the nature of the case shut up to conjectures
and guesses. Thia is frankly acknowledged by many. For instance,
Oscar Hertwig, speaking generally of descent in the past, says:
“When we try to trace the genealogical chains of the mammals,
amphibians, and fishes in primitive times, we launch into a
darkness which even the bright light of science cannot penetrate
with a single ray, and scientific research is accordingly exposed
to the danger of deviating from that path in which alone it can
reach knowledge of the truth and consequently permanent results.”
<note place="foot" id="vii-p8.3" n="179">Oscar Hertwig, Das biogenetische Grundgesetz, Intern. Wochenschrift f. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, April 20, 1907, pp.97, 98.</note>  It is “a fatal and yet unavoidable necessity for the science
which investigates the origins of the family, property, society,
etc.,” says Ludwig Stein, “that it is compelled to operate with
hypotheses.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p8.4" n="180">L. Stein, Die soziale Frage, pp.38, 63, 105, 107.</note>  And with respect to the origin of religion it is
agreed by Lehmann and Troeltsch, Tiele and Pfleiderer, and many
others, that it is as impossible now as in former days to speak of
a knowledge of these things, and we have to be content with
conjectures and hypotheses.<note place="foot" id="vii-p8.5" n="181">Lehmann, Die Anfänge der Religion und die Religion der primitives Völker, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I, III, p.1. Troeltsch, Die Christl. Religion, ib., p. 483. Tiele, Inleiding, II, p. 183. Pfleiderer, Religion und Religionen, München, 1906, p. 53.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p9">That these hypotheses may not hang wholly in the air an attempt
is made to support them with data derived from embryology and
anthropology, from palaeontology and ethnography. Study of the
animal and the child on the one hand, and on the other study of the
so-called nature-peoples, is pressed into service in order to form
in some sense an idea of primitive man still wholly without
culture. But the method which is thus employed, and the results
which some think they have obtained, inspire little confidence, and
on better acquaintance evacuate the hope that along this road we
shall ever reach any certainty about man’s original condition.</p>
<p id="vii-p10">Commonly the truth of the doctrine of the descent of man is
tacitly presupposed. In Darwin himself this assumption had at least
the foundation that he could explain it by means of “natural
selection” and “the struggle for existence;” but although many have
now discarded Darwinism in its original form, either altogether or
in part, as an explanation of the development of living beings,
they still hold the theory of descent unimpaired. As a working
hypothesis the idea of evolution undoubtedly is of undeniable
significance; it leads to the discovery of analogies which
otherwise probably would not have been noticed, and offers a clue
which opens a way through the labyrinth of phenomena. Nevertheless,
science must never lose sight of the fact that it is dealing in it
with an hypothesis and not, as Haeckel supposes,<note place="foot" id="vii-p10.1" n="182">Haeckel, Der Kampf um den Entwickelungsgedanken, pp.56, 70. Haeckel is sometimes more modest and refers to his “Stammesgeschichte” as an “hypothetical structure,” because the empirical records underlying it remain to a high degree defective; comp. H. Meyer, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Entwickelungslehre, pp. 59, 60.</note>  with a “firmly
established fact.” Sober naturalists, who give ear to facts alone,
express themselves differently, not only formerly through the lips
of Virchow, but now also through the lips of Branco, Reinke,
Wasmann, and others. Reinke, for example, acknowledged in 1900 :
“We must confess unreservedly that there is not at our disposal a
single unexceptionable proof of its correctness.” Two years later,
in still stronger language, he affirmed that science knows nothing
about the origin of man. And at the International Congress of
Zoologists at Berlin, in 1901, Branco bore witness that
palaeontology knows no ancestors of man, but that man suddenly and
immediately appears before us in the diluvial age as a perfect homo
sapiens.<note place="foot" id="vii-p10.2" n="183">Reinke, Die Entw. der Naturwiss. insbes. der Biologie im 19 Jahrh., 1900, pp.19, 20. Id., Die Natur und Wir, Berlin, 1907, pp.151 ff. Branco in Wasmann, Die moderne Biologie und die Entwickelungslehre, 1904, pp.302, 304.</note>  The mental and physical gap between animal and man
remains at present as wide as it ever was. In the structure of the
skull and brains, for example, the interval between the other
mammals and the apes may possibly be bridged over, but not between
the apes and man. Among all the mammals now existing there is not
one which in this respect can be compared with man. Stanley Hall
also has to acknowledge that what intervenes between the highest
anthropoid brain of 500 cubic centimeters and that of the lowest
man, 1150 cubic centimeters, is almost as lost as a sunken
Atlantis. When he adds that all the ancestors of man have been
accidentally extirpated, this is nothing but a make-shift, entirely
without scientific value.<note place="foot" id="vii-p10.3" n="184">Stanley Hall, Adolescence, II, p.91. H. Meyer, op. cit., p.71. Lankester, Natur und Mensch, p.24. Dr. H. C. Stratz, Wij stammen niet van de apen af. Baarn, 1907, p. 23.</note>  The common ancestor of ape and man is a
mere invention of the mind.<note place="foot" id="vii-p10.4" n="185">Wasmann, op. cit., p.295.</note>  All inferences from the animal to the
original man lack thus firm scientific foundation. It is not
without significance that many adherents of the doctrine of descent
have recently turned their backs upon historical zoology and look
for their salvation to experimental morphology.<note place="foot" id="vii-p10.5" n="186">Prof. Dr. C. Ph. Sluiter, Het Experiment in Dienst der Morphologie, Amsterdam, 1907.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p11">It may be doubted, however, whether this new science will be
able to shed more light on the subject. The opposition to Haeckel’s
biogenetic law is growing in strength day by day. Geganbaur and
Oscar Hertwig both intimate that ontogeny is a sphere where a
lively imagination may no doubt carry on a perilous game in seeking
phylogenetic relations, but where assured results are by no means
easy to get at; and they warn against the false paths which lead to
the construction of fictitious conditions, or even of entirely
fictitious organisms.<note place="foot" id="vii-p11.1" n="187">Oscar Hertwig, Das biogenetische Grundgesetz nach dem heutigen Stand der Biologie, Intern. Wochenschrift, April 13 and 20, 1907, p.93. Most botanists, zoologists, and palaeontologists are at present believers in polyphyletic development. H. Meyer, Der gegenw. Stand der Entwickelungslehre, pp.50 ff. Reinke, Die Natur und Wir, pp.126 ff., 139 ff. Wasmann, Der Kampf um das Entwickelungsproblem in Berlin, Freiburg, 1907.</note>  The embryological forms of the mammals
show, it is true, correspondences with amphibians and fishes, but
this “ancestral similarity” does not, according to Professor Emery,
authorize an inference to “ancestral inheritance.” The simple germ
cell is already a life-form, which comprehends a fulness beyond
belief of great and small varieties, and which already is the
product of a phylogenetic process of development. Further, the
fertilized germ cells of the several species of animals differ as
much from each other in their nature as the individuals which come
forth from these germ cells. And finally, there is a very great
essential difference between the stages of ontogenesis which pass
into one another and the forms of an ancestral series which do not
pass into one another at all. This is the reason why Hertwig finds
the hypothesis improbable that our earth in a former period
produced only one kind of cells; and in view of the hundreds of
thousands of species of animals and plants prefers the polyphyletic
supposition, according to which the organisms now living are not
derived from one primitive cell, but from a large number of cells,
which are already differently organized, and which in a former
period have been produced in some way or other by the creative
power of nature. Closer study thus leads in this domain not to
uniformity, but to multiformity. Nature is far from being as simple
as the advocates of the mechanical theory conceive it to be. There
was not in the beginning the poverty of the monistic principle, but
the fulness and wealth of created life.</p>
<p id="vii-p12">The biogenetic law grows still more improbable when it is
applied in detail, and the conditions of the life of the embryo, of
childhood and of youth are considered a recapitulation of those of
the ancestors of men and of the first men themselves. The small
stature of human beings in youth certainly ought to prove that the
original men were very small; but, according to Stanley Hall and
others, they were rather of gigantic stature.<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.1" n="188">Stanley Hall, Adolescence, pp.35,45,49. Stratz, op. cit., p.17.</note>  The late appearance
of the teeth in children ought to be considered a proof that
original men were toothless, but this also is not at all
acknowledged.<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.2" n="189">Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung und seine Entwickelung. Paderborn, 1903.</note>  In the man of our time the brain is of early
growth, and has reached its full size at the age of about fourteen
years, but the doctrine of the descent of man postulates, on the
contrary, a very late development for it in the phylogenesis.<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.3" n="190">Stanley Hall, Adolescence, I, p.107; II, p.67.</note>  The
heart develops before the blood-vessels, but in the history of the
human race the reverse must have taken place.<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.4" n="191">Ibid., I, p.55.</note>  If the rudimentary
tail of man is to be looked upon as an argument for his animal
descent, then certainly the breasts of the male should be a
reminder and a remainder of the period when man was androgynal; but
few are inclined to draw this conclusion.<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.5" n="192">Ibid., II, p.568.</note>  It is no wonder that
Stanley Hall, having in mind all these considerations, reaches the
conclusion that there are “many inversions” in the ontogenetic law:
“ontogeny often reverses the order of phylogeny.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p12.6" n="193">Ibid., I, p.241.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p13">A similar change is noticeable also with regard to the notion
that the nature-peoples afford us the means of learning to know
primitive man. The name itself is misleading; nature-peoples are
nowhere to be found, any more than wild or cultureless peoples. The
cultured peoples are no less dependent on nature than the so-called
nature-peoples; the difference between the two is not to be sought
in the degree, but in the character of their relation to nature.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.1" n="194">Fr. Ratzel, Völkerkunde, 3 Bde. Leipzig, 1885, I, p.5.</note> 
And wild or cultureless peoples do not exist either. The ridiculous
fancies about men who formerly or even now clamber up into the
trees like apes, covered over the whole of their bodies with hair,
knowing nothing of fire, without language or religion, reappear, it
is true, now and then; but they are antiquated. All men and
peoples, though they may be poor in culture, yet possess at least
its fundamental elements, the crest walk, the average weight of
brain, the hand and the thumb, fire and light, language and
religion, family and society.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.2" n="195">Schneider, Die Naturvö1ker, 2 Bde., 1885, 1886. Gutberiet, op. cit., pp. 380 ff., 412 ff. 474 ff. Froberger, Die Schöpfungsgeseh. der Menschheit in der voraussetzungslosen Völkerpsychologie, Trier, 1903.</note>  Furthermore, the nature-peoples do
not form a separate group, and do not all stand on the same level;
they cannot be dealt with all alike, nor brought together under a
common name.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.3" n="196">Steinmetz, De Studie der Volkenkunde, p.31.</note>  They are related to higher peoples by means of all
kinds of links, and upon better acquaintance do not seem to be
nearly so barbarous and uncivilized as at first they were thought
to be. The savage of Australia does not stand intellectually below
the level of other peoples of little culture. The decision about
the Batakudes and other South American peoples is on the whole
favorable. Among the Bushmen and the Esquimaux the imagination
exhibited in their drawings, toys, fairy tales, and legends, is a
clear proof of their capabilities.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.4" n="197">Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, II, 2, 1906, p.150.</note>  There can then be no question
of nature-peoples and civilized nations differing in fundamental
endowment, as if the one were predestinated to barbarism and
destruction, the other to progress and high culture. Repeated
instances have occurred of transitions from the one group to the
other. The Bedouins of Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia live now just
as they did hundreds of years ago, but they have produced civilized
races. Finns and Magyars have recently become cultured peoples,
while their kindred are still living in the barbaric state. The
Japanese have all of a sudden accepted Western culture, while the
Mongols and the Kalmucks remain stationary at the old stage of
civilization. Thus it has repeatedly happened that nature-peoples
have become culture-peoples.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.5" n="198">Steinmetz, op. cit., p.41.</note>  Missions, especially, furnish
abundant proofs of this fact.<note place="foot" id="vii-p13.6" n="199">Orr, God’s Image in Man, London, 1906, pp.163 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p14">While the nature-peoples are thus again being gradually looked
upon as men, our eyes are being opened on the other side to the sins and imperfections of the
culture-peoples. Experience has taught us that even here it is far
from everything that glitters that is gold. Not only were the
ancestors of the culture-peoples of today, for instance the Germans
and the Gauls, who were idealized by Caesar and Tacitus, poor in
culture, but also with regard to many peoples, for instance the
Chinese, the Mongols, the Thibetans, the Russians, it is a question
to which of the two groups they ought to be reckoned. Rude and
barbarous customs still prevail among the Russians, Letts, Bulgars,
Magyars, etc.; and in general the so-called culture-peoples, when
carefully considered, are far from standing on the high level which
many ascribe to them. The percentage of those who occupy the
highest round of the ladder is very low. Many individuals and
circles among the culture-peoples fall below the nature-peoples in
civilization. Vagabonds and pariahs, the enfeebled and deficient,
such as we meet with in our large cities, are all but never found
among the nature-peoples. The mass among those peoples is more
intelligent than with us. Animism, spiritism, superstition,
sorcery, belief in witches and ghosts, prostitution and alcoholism,
crimes and unnatural sins, occur among the culture-peoples no less,
and sometimes in more aggravated forms, than among the
nature-peoples. When the nature-peoples become civilized, they gain
much, but lose no less. Many beautiful qualities, such as
faithfulness, truthfulness, simplicity, artlessness, sincerity,
ingenuousness, are lost in civilization.<note place="foot" id="vii-p14.1" n="200">Steinmetz, op. cit., pp.32 ff. Fr. Ratzel, op. cit., I, p.10. H. J. Koenen, Het Recht in den Kring van het Gezin., Rotterdam, 1900, pp.65, 69.</note>  There are many today who
are not far from thinking of the nature-peoples after the idyllic
fashion of the age of Rousseau. Tolstoi and Nietzsche return along
different paths to nature ; in literature and art there is a
reaction against the conventional, and a recurrence to the
unconscious, instinctive, passionate life. Stanley Hall describes
savages as amiable children: “Most savages in most respects are
children, or because of their sexual maturity, more properly
adolescents of adult size. Their faults and their virtues are those
of childhood and youth. He, who knows them, loves them.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p14.2" n="201">Stanley Hall, Adolescence, II, pp.649-650, 685, 713 ff., 726 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p15">Yet both theories are one-sided: equally that according to which
the nature-peoples are semi-animals and that according to which
they are innocent children. The notion that all peoples are on the
road to progress is as incorrect as that they are continuously
declining and degenerating. Neither development nor degeneracy
covers the course of history; this is wider than our thinking, and
is not disturbed by the logic of our reasoning. There are peoples
who have developed and have attained a high level of civilization ;
it may even be not impossible that this development in some cases,
as, for instance, in Peru and Mexico, has been autochthonous. But
it is no less evident that a number of peoples have declined from a
more or less high degree of civilization. This has been the case
with many peoples of antiquity in Asia and North Africa, which have
either totally disappeared or sunk into complete insignificance.<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.1" n="202">Korte Beschouwingen over Bloei en Verval der Natiën, Wetensch. Bladen, July, 1904, pp.117-128.</note> 
Virchow called the Laplanders and the Bushmen even “pathologically
degraded, degenerated races,” and Darwin, Spencer, Tylor, Wallace,
Max Müller, and many others, have acknowledged the decline and
ruin of many peoples.<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.2" n="203">Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen, Gütersloh, 1879, pp.140 ff. Orr, God’s Image in Man, p.301.</note>  Environment has had a great deal to do with
degeneracy. “It is of great importance for the development of a
people, whether it dwells in the midst of the inhabited world,
where it is exposed to numerous influences, or near its margin;
peoples living on the margin of the inhabited world are mostly poor
in culture and few in numbers.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.3" n="204">H. Schurtz, Völkerkunde, 1903, p.25. Stoinmetz, op. cit., p.49. Orr, op. cit., p. 186. Zöckler, op. cit., p.135.</note>  The peoples cannot, therefore,
be arranged in succession, one after the other; it is arbitrary to
place the nature-peoples at the beginning of the genealogical table
of the human race and to represent their condition as the original
condition of mankind.<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.4" n="205">Fr. Ratzel, Vö1kerkunde, I, p. 14.</note>  The theory of development which in every
case maintains apriori, “that the human race only knows aspiration,
progress, development, and no retrogression, decline and decay,”<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.5" n="206">Ibid.</note> 
is just as one-sided as the theory of degeneracy. History declines
to follow in its course a single straight line. Every people and
every group of peoples, spread over the globe, has its own life,
and continues it in the midst of the others.<note place="foot" id="vii-p15.6" n="207">Steinmetz, pp. 45, 54.</note>  We must return from
the “after-one-another” to the “by-the-side-of-one-another,” from
uniformity to multiformity, from the abstract theory of monism to
the f ulness of life.</p>
<p id="vii-p16">The nature-peoples supply us, therefore, just as little as
embryos and children with the desired material for the construction
of original man. The primitive man, wherewith the historian of our
day operates, is nothing but a fiction<note place="foot" id="vii-p16.1" n="208">Dilthey, Einleitung, pp.38, 39.</note>  of the same kind as the
contrat social, of which Rousseau made use in order to explain the
origin of society, and as the ape-man, who is placed by zoology at
the beginning as our common ancestor, and, according as
circumstances require, is thought of sometimes as an ape and
sometimes as a man. In the same manner Wundt says: “It is
impossible to exaggerate the enormousness of the gap which
separates the man of today from primitive man. But we must not
think of this gap in such a way, as if no connection existed any
longer between them, or as if the narrow path of a single thought
were the only one to lead from one side to the other. . . . Every
view which conceives of primitive man in a one-sided manner puts
itself self not only in contradiction with the facts, but deprives
itself also of the possibility of comprehending a psychological
development. For every change of motive, however vast it may be in
some cases, presupposes at least this, that some germs of the
motives which come into activity later on, were already present
originally.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p16.2" n="209">Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, II, p.428.</note>  Primitive man, in other words, must be constructed
physically and psychologically in such a manner that an ape and a
man can be derived from him. Thus you can make whatever use of him
you like; you wield a two-edged sword. If you desire to explain the
animal or the animal character in man, you asscribe to primitive
man the qualities of the ape; if, on the contrary, you wish to
explain man, you acknowledge in him as easily the necessary human
qualities.<note place="foot" id="vii-p16.3" n="210">Gutberlet, Der Mensch.</note>  Primitive man accordingly is a worthy counterpart of
the animated atoms, the personified powers of nature, the
apotheosized natural laws, the deified evolution idea. In reality
he has never existed; he is nothing but a poetical creation of
monistic imagination.</p>
<p id="vii-p17">This is gradually becoming understood by many. We have already
remarked that Oscar Hertwig looks upon the polyphyletic hypothesis
as much more probable than the monophyletic, and thus assumes that
the creative power of nature in the beginning produced at once a
great number of variously organized primitive cells. Just as
Haeckel, not being able to give a satisfactory explanation of them,
declares matter and force, motion and life, consciousness and will
to be eternal, so Hertwig places the idea of species already in the
very first cells which were produced by the creative power of
nature. Whether, however, we assign priority to the cells or to the
organisms proceeding from them, or, in other words, to the egg or
to the chicken, amounts to much the same thing. The starting-point
in both cases is not a monistic principle, but the multiformity of
life, and the miracle, and faith in miracles as well, remains in
either case equally great. Sociology also is beginning to see, now
and again, that the sociological problem cannot be solved by the
single formula of imitation (Tarde), local association or clan
(Mucke), division of labor (Durkheim), struggle of the classes
(Gumplowicz), blood-relationships (Morgan), or consociation
(Schurtz).<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.1" n="211">L. Stein, Der Sinn des Daseins, pp.220-239.</note>  Many accordingly assume the existence from the
beginning of what lies to be explained. Gustav Ratzenhofer, for
example, maintains that society has not in the strict sense of the
word been originated : man did not create society, but society man;
the human race was from the beginning subject to its social nature,
the social is what is original, the individual is derived.<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.2" n="212">G. Ratzenhofer, Die soziologische Erkenntniss. Leipzig, 1898, p.125. Comp. L. Stein, op. cit., p.226.</note> 
According to Zenker even property did not gradually come into
existence, but existed from the beginning. “Without social life and
self-consciousness, that is, with common life and without personal
work, the pithecoanthropos would never have been able to lift
himself out of his animal state.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.3" n="213">In L. Stein, op. cit., pp.227 ff.</note>  The theory of original
promiscuity, which was advocated by Lewis Morgan and found favor
with many, has later on been strongly contradicted by Westermarck,
Starcke, Grosse, and others.<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.4" n="214">Dr. Joseph Müller, Das sexuelle Leben der Naturvölker. Leipzig, 1906.</note>  Among economists, according to
Schmoller, a conviction is growing more and more towards unanimity,
that a psychologico-ethical view of social life is necessary which
shall recognize not only the emotions and passions, but also the
ethical powers in man, and shall investigate political economy in
connection with the state, religion and morals; “all great social
communities are a result of human nature in general, founded on
language and writing, on custom, law, morals, religion, and
intercourse.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.5" n="215">Schmoller, Grundriss der allgem. Volkswirtschaftslehre, Leipzig, 1901, I, p.122; II, p.654.</note>  In general men have become more cautious in the
application of the theory of evolution along single- and
straight-lined processes of developments.<note place="foot" id="vii-p17.6" n="216">Steinmetz, op. cit., p.54.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p18">This is also apparent in the investigation of the origin of
religion. History does not lead us back in this domain, either, to
the beginnings; all beginnings, said Schelling, are from darkness
to light. If we are nevertheless determined to seek out a
beginning, we are driven to conjectures which endeavor to support
themselves upon the psychology of the child and the savage.
Nature-peoples furnish us, however, very little material for the
investigation of the origin of religion, because religion has
already long existed among them all and is intimately interwoven
with their whole life. Instead of offering a solution of the
problems which the man of culture proposes to himself, the savage
is himself a problem. This is also the case with the children; no
more than the animal can the child serve to explain the adult; the
adult, on the contrary, is needed to explain the child. It is
extremely difficult, accordingly, to penetrate into the life of the
child soul and to understand it truly.<note place="foot" id="vii-p18.1" n="217">Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, II, 1, Leipzig, 1905, pp.64, 85, 335. II, 2, p.165. Id., Vorlesungen über die Menschen und Tierseele, 1906, p.17. Fr. Ratzel, Vö1kerkunde, I, p.13. Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God, I, pp.253 ff. Reinke, Die Natur und Wir. 1908, p.84.</note>  Moreover it will not do to
compare present-day children with, and to take them as an example
of, original adult men. For our children on the one hand have
advantages far above any enjoyed by primitive men, by their birth
and education in the midst of a rich, cultured life; and yet on the
other hand they, as children, are far behind the adults of the past
ages in the development of bodily and spiritual powers. If the
comparison contained any truth and entitled us to a conclusion, it
could only be that primitive men received and learned their
language and religion by communication from others; that is,
ultimately by revelation of God.<note place="foot" id="vii-p18.2" n="218">Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, II, 2, p.165. Gutberlet, Der Mensch., pp.398 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p19">The many and manifold theories which have been presented as an
explanation of religion have all again been abandoned one after the
other. They all have the defect that they derive religion from
non-religious factors, and either cannot find the transition, or,
if they indicate such a transition, always presuppose religion;
they thus oscillate between a metabasis eis allo genos and a
petitio principii. The result of all the research is accordingly
the humble confession, ignoramus, we do not know. How religion
arose, and out of what causes, “is entirely unknown to us,” says
Troeltsch, “and just as in the case of morals and logic, will
always remain unknown to us. An absolute equivocal generation is
denied to us.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p19.1" n="219">Troeltsch, Die Christ. Religion in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, p.483.</note>  Openly or secretly all turn back to an inborn
disposition, to a religio insita. Just as matter and force, life
and consciousness, society and state, so also the religion which is
to be explained is already assumed in the explanation. Troeltsch
does this, but also Schroeder, who is certainly an adherent of the
doctrine of descent, and speaks, therefore, of Untermenschen
(“undermen”), but nevertheless presupposes already in them a divine
spark, which develops them into men. Tiele goes back to an inborn
feeling and need of the infinite, and even Hugo de Vries speaks of
the need of religion as an inborn quality of man.<note place="foot" id="vii-p19.2" n="220">Schroeder in Beiträge zur Weiterentw. der Christl. Religion, 1905, p.8. Tiele, Inleiding, II, pp.108, 202, 204. H. de Vries, Afstammings- en Mutatieleer, p.36.</note>  In the
beginning, therefore, there did not reign the dead unity of monism
but the totality of human nature.</p>
<p id="vii-p20">If, however, religion as religio insita is an essential element
of human nature, it points directly back to revelation. We stand
here before essentially the same dilemma as in the case of
self-consciousness. If this is not a delusion or imagination, the
reality of the self is necessarily included in it; hence religion
is either a pathology of the human spirit, or it postulates the
existence, the revelation, and the knowableness of God. It is, as
we have seen, necessary because of the peculiarity of human nature;
and it is universal, as is apparent from the history of the human
race and all the peoples. And wheresoever it manifests itself it is
a relation of man, not to his neighbor or to the world in general,
or to one of its parts, but to a personal being, who stands above
nature and the world, and is therefore able to raise man above them
and to unite him to himself. Religion is always a service of God,
and hence it is either folly or necessarily implies the existence
of God. Furthermore, faith in the knowability of God is inseparable
from the existence of God, which is pre-supposed in and with the
truth of religion; for a God who is wholly unknowable is
practically for us a God who does not exist. Consistent agnosticism
amounts practically to atheism. And finally, if God, even in
however small a measure, is knowable, there can be no explanation
of this except that he has revealed himself; for what we cannot
perceive at all cannot be known, and what we cannot know at all we
cannot love and serve, ignoti nulla capido. All who recognize and
defend religion as truth believe accordingly, whether they are
willing to confess it or not, in the existence, knowableness, and
revelation of God. Naturalism in the strict sense and religion are
irreconcilable. All religion is supernatural, and rests upon the
presupposition that God is distinct from the world and yet works in
the world. Men may impose limits on revelation and not recognize it
in nature and history, but only in their own consciousness; the
thing itself remains in principle the same: religion has its
foundation in revelation and derives from it its origin.<note place="foot" id="vii-p20.1" n="221">Garvie, art. “Revelation,” in Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p21">The investigation into the essence of religion has led to the
same result as that into its origin. When the study of religions
came into vogue, it was thought that by means of comparative
research the essence of religion might be determined, and thus the
value of all forms of religion be estimated. But so many and such
serious difficulties have been met with in the prosecution of this
task that it may be reasonably maintained that it has now come to
the dead point. It is undoubtedly impracticable for any one to
obtain a thorough knowledge of all religions, or even of the
principal religions, and to compare them with one another. Religion
is of such a complex nature that it is scarcely possible to
characterize accurately the essence of a single religion, or even
of the religion of a single person. Very various opinions obtain
among us of the essence of Christianity, of Romanism and of
Protestantism; how, then, would it be possible to penetrate into
the essence of all the different religions and to compare them with
one another? To this must be added, that the study of the history
of religions professes no doubt to be undertaken without any
prejudice whatever, but facts disprove the assertion. Even the
idea, from which it as a rule proceeds, that religion is neither an
illusion nor a disease, but a necessary element of man’s nature, a
habitus and a virtue which has a right and reason to exist,—even
this idea, I say, is an assumption of such importance that it is
impossible to speak here of unprejudiced investigation; it is an
assumption which from the outset binds and dominates the entire
science. But every student of the history of religions approaches
his task, whether he intends it or not, with his own conception of
religion, which guides him in his investigation and serves him as a
rule. If he proceeds, let us say, merely from the view that that
religion is true which lies at the basis of all and manifests
itself more or less purely in each, he thereby puts forth a dogma
which is derived from philosophy and has far-reaching results for
his investigation. Already in the case of the physical sciences,
and yet more so in the case of the sciences of the mind, it is
impossible to begin investigation without assumptions, for they all
are founded on ideas and canons which have their basis in the
rational and moral nature of man.<note place="foot" id="vii-p21.1" n="222">Comp. the author’s address: Christelijke Wetenschap, 1904, pp. 73 ff. Bertholet, Religion und Geisteskultur, II, pp.1 ff.</note>  This explains the fact that the
search for the essence of religion has ended by resolving it into a
vague, indefinite formula which is intended to embrace all
religions, but cannot do justice to a single one of them, and
which, as far as it contains anything positive, has given
expression only to the notion which each investigator had formed
beforehand of the essence of religion.<note place="foot" id="vii-p21.2" n="223">Flournoy, Les Principes de la Psychologie religieuse. Genève, 1903, pp.8, 9. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp.26, 27.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p22">Many have for this reason turned their backs upon this
comparative historical investigation of the essence of religion,
and have even run into the opposite extreme. They say there is no
universal, objective religion valid for all, and there is no
essence which is everywhere the same and only clothes itself in
different forms. But religion is always something thoroughly
personal,—a thing which concerns the individual man, and hence it
is endlessly variant and incapable of being comprehended in a
general definition. He who desires to know it must watch it in
particular men, and especially in the splendid specimens, the
geniuses and heroes of religion, the mystics, the enthusiasts, the
fanatics; they are the classics of religion. It is not history but
psychology which will tell us what religion really is.<note place="foot" id="vii-p22.1" n="224">Comp. the author’s Psychologie der Religie, Versl. en Meded. der Kon. Ak. v. Wet., Afd. Lett., 1907, pp. 1-32.</note>  Even a man
like Troeltsch, who persists in maintaining the historical point of
view, and upbraids the psychology of religion with the lack of an
epistemology, is compelled to confess that the expression “essence
of religion” leads into error on account of its obscurity, and
creates the false impression that it is possible “to answer with
one stroke the different questions which are bound up with it in
one and the same investigation.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p22.2" n="225">Troeltsch, op. cit., p.481.</note>  As it was in the case of the
origin, so again in the consideration of the essence, of religion,
many turn back from abstract monism to the totality of religious
life. There is not one principle which governs all religions and
religious phenomena, and there is not one formula under which they
all can be summed up. The investigation of the essence of religion
has, however, by no means been unfruitful. On the contrary, it has
made as clear as the day that religion and revelation are bound
together very intimately, and that they cannot be separated. All
religion is supernatural in the sense that it is based on faith in
a personal God, who is transcendently exalted above the world, and
nevertheless is active in the world and thereby makes himself known
and communicates himself to man. Let it remain for the present
undetermined whereby and how God reveals himself, whether in nature
or in history, through mind or heart, along ordinary or
extraordinary ways. Certain it is that all religions, in harmony
with their own idea, rest upon conscious and spontaneous revelation
of God. This is confirmed by the consideration of what man seeks in
religion. Siebeck divides religions into nature-, morality-, and
redemption-religions. Tiele, however, rightly observes that, in a
wide sense, the idea of redemption is common to all religions, and
therefore all religions are redemption-religions. As to the evil
from which redemption is sought, and the supreme good which men
desire to obtain, their conceptions diverge widely. But all
religions are concerned with redemption from an evil and the
attainment of a supreme good. The first question always is, What
must I do to be saved?<note place="foot" id="vii-p22.3" n="226">Tiele, Inleiding, I, p.61; II, pp.66, 110, 214, 215.</note>  This being so, religion everywhere, by
virtue of its very nature, carries along with it the idea of
revelation. Religion and science differ in many things, and in this
too, that the one owes the contents of its knowledge to divine
revelation, the other to human investigations.<note place="foot" id="vii-p22.4" n="227">Dilthey, Einl. in die Geisteswiss., pp. 167 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p23">To a considerable extent religion and science (philosophy) stand
in relation to the same objects. To separate between religion and
metaphysics, however often it may have been attempted, is
impossible; religion is not merely a certain frame of mind, an
emotion of the heart, but it always includes certain conceptions,
and the emotions are modified in accordance with the nature of
these conceptions. These conceptions of religion extend to man, the
world, and God, and hence enter the same domain which science also
tries to cultivate. But religion gives to its conceptions the
character of dogmas which it accepts on divine authority; science
endeavors to obtain its conceptions by means of independent
investigation, and has no other authority except reasoning and
proof. Now, according to Tiele, all religious conceptions move
around three centres,—God, man, and the way of salvation.<note place="foot" id="vii-p23.1" n="228">Tiele, Inleiding, II, pp.64 ff.</note>  All
these three elements are most intimately connected with the idea of
revelation. Regarding the first element, the doctrine concerning
God (theology proper), this is clear; there is no knowledge
concerning God, except so far as he has revealed himself ; the
distinction of nature- and revelation-religions, in the sense that
religions may exist without appealing to revelation, is untenable.
But also in the case of the other two elements, the connection with
the idea of revelation is clearly traceable. For when religion
carries along with it a distinct conception of man, it soars far
above experience. The religious anthropology speaks of man’s origin
and destination, of his needs and ideals, of his disobedience and
communion with God, of his sin and atonement,<note place="foot" id="vii-p23.2" n="229">Ibid., p. 65.</note> —all of which are
elements that cannot be obtained by means of empirical
investigation and scientific reflection, but can be known, so far
as they are true, only by means of revelation. Nearly all the
religions have their reminiscences of paradise and their
expectations of the future, and trace them back to revelation. And
regarding the third element, soteriology, this also is either
untrue or derived from revelation. For this part of religious
dogmatics indicates the means by which communion with God can be
restored, the power of evil broken, a new life begun, and the hope
of abiding happiness realized.<note place="foot" id="vii-p23.3" n="230">Ibid.</note>  Among these means a chief place is
assigned in all religions to mediators, sacrifices, and prayer.
Those persons are considered mediators through whom the Godhead
makes known its revelations to man. Sacrifices, whatever theory of
their origin and purpose may be favored, always include the idea
that man is dependent upon God, owes everything to him, and is
acceptable in his sight through a special service (cultus)
distinguished from the ordinary ethical life. And prayer, which
forms the heart of religion, has its ground in the belief that God
is not only a personal being, but also is able to govern the world
by his power, wisdom, and goodness, and make it subservient to
man’s salvation. Prayer never, not even in its highest form, loses
this character; the petition for the remission of sins, for a pure
heart, for communion with God, is as supernaturalistic as that for
the healing of the sick or for deliverance from some danger to
life.<note place="foot" id="vii-p23.4" n="231">Pierson, Gods Wondermacht en ons Geestelijk Leven, 1867, p. 42. W. Sanday, The Life of Christ in Recent Research, Oxford, 1907, pp. 204 ff. The Nature of Prayer, by the Rev. Lyman Abbott, Moncure D. Conway, the Rev. Dr. W. R. Huntingdon, North American Review, Nov., 1907, pp.337-348.</note>  Revelation is the foundation of all religion, the
presupposition of all its conceptions, emotions, and actions.</p>
<p id="vii-p24"> </p>
<p id="vii-p25"> </p>
<p id="vii-p26"> </p>
<p id="vii-p27"> </p>
<p id="vii-p28"> </p>
<p id="vii-p29"> </p>
<p id="vii-p30"> </p>
<p id="vii-p31">Finally, all the attempts to classify the religions have led to
the acknowledgment of the necessity of revelation. All the proposed
divisions—into such as have grown and such as have been founded,
into nature- and revelation- religions, into polytheistic and
monotheistic, into particular and universal religions, etc.,—
suffer, according to the increasing conviction of many, from
excessive one-sidedness; they ignore other elements, do no justice
to the richness and variety of religious life, and all proceed
tacitly from the Hegelian notion that the chapters which
successively treat of the several religions represent so many steps
in the development of religion. No one, however, believes that a
satisfactory distribution has been found.<note place="foot" id="vii-p31.1" n="232">Ch. de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, I, 1905, p.6.</note>  As little as natural
phenomena, societies, and the peoples, can the religions be ranged
one after the other in a formal system without violence to
reality.</p>
<p id="vii-p32">In view of this it is worthy of remark that the old distribution
of religions into true and false has been revived in a new form.
The more accurately the nature of the conceptions of the peoples
was investigated, the clearer it became that they contain various
elements which cannot be derived from one single principle. Thus it
appeared that their religious conceptions are essentially distinct,
not only from legends and fables, but also from myths. In the
beginning of the last century, under the influence of the romantic
school, the idea prevailed, and through the Grimm brothers found
acceptance almost everywhere, that mythology was the real science
of religion. This mythology accordingly arose out of nature- myths,
was to be looked upon as the embodiment of religious, often
sublime, ideas, but afterwards had faded into hero-sagas and
fables. But deeper study has led to a different view. Myths, sagas,
and fables no doubt often bear relation to one another; originally,
however, they are distinct in origin and aim. “Myths axe primitive
philosophy, the most simple intuitive form of thought, a series of
attempts to understand the world, to explain life and death, fate
and nature, gods and cults. Sagas are primitive history, artlessly
shaped in hatred and love, unconsciously formed and simplified.
Fables, on the contrary, have grown out of and serve only the need
of entertainment.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p32.1" n="233">Bethe, Mythus, Sage, Märchen,&amp;lt;.I&amp;gt; Leipzig, 1905, pp.43, 44.</note>  Religion is always distinguished from all
these in that it is always connected with a cult.<note place="foot" id="vii-p32.2" n="234">R. C. Boer, Heldensage en Mythologie, Gids, Jan., 1907, p. 84. Comp. also Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilos., pp.127, 150. Dilthey, Einl., pp.169, 171, 174 ff., 178. Wundt, Vö1kerpsych., II, pp.551 ff. De historische achtergrond der Europeesche sprookjeswereld, Wet. Bladen, July, 1908, pp.1-16, after an article by A. S. Herbert, in The Nineteenth Century, Febr., 1908.</note> </p>
<p id="vii-p33">It is of still greater importance to observe that religion is
more and more being recognized as distinct from magic. J. G. Fraser
has no doubt attempted to explain religion just by means of
magic,<note place="foot" id="vii-p33.1" n="235">J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough. Comp. Ladd, I, pp.144 ff.</note>  and with him K. Ph. Preuss is of the opinion “that
primitive human stupidity is the original source of religion and
art;—for both proceed directly from sorcery, which on its part is
the immediate result of that prudence which proceeds from
instinct.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p33.2" n="236"> Preuss, Der Ursprung der Religion und Kunst, Globus Bd, 86, 87, p. 249.</note>  This theory, however, is very strenuously opposed by
Andrew Lang and others; we gather, says Tiele, no figs from
thistles; superstition cannot be the mother of religion.<note place="foot" id="vii-p33.3" n="237">Tiele, Inl., II, 120. Ladd, I, pp.103, 144. Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God, I, pp.249, 252, 263.</note> 
Superstition and magic are indeed often connected with religion,
but they are neither the source nor the essence of it. They are
rather to be regarded as morbid phenomena, which occur by no means
only among the lowest, but also among the most advanced peoples and
religions; and even in the present time, in Christendom, not only
among the common people,—but relatively more markedly among the
cultured and educated, where they number their adherents by the
thousands; they are not “a lower stage or a first step of a
religious development, but under-currents of real religion.”<note place="foot" id="vii-p33.4" n="238">Jeremias, Die Panbabylonisten, Leipzig, 1907, p. 17.</note>  If
this distinction is correctly drawn, it follows immediately that it
is impossible to reduce the religions and the religious phenomena
among the different peoples to one head and to derive them from one
principle. Monism as truly as the doctrine of evolution is
contradicted by the facts. The religions have no common root;
various factors, fetichism, animism, ancestor-worship, etc., have
worked together in bringing them into existence.<note place="foot" id="vii-p33.5" n="239">Bethe, op. cit., p.40.</note>  Particularly
have religion and magic different sources and must receive distinct
explanations.</p>
<p id="vii-p34">The great question in the history of religions is thus no
longer, How in general did religion originate? but Whence
dosuperstition and magic derive their origin? This is the problem
that confronts us, namely, the old question, Pothen to kakon?
Existence, the good, the true, the beautiful are eternal and have
no beginning; but becoming, error, false-hood, sin, shame, cannot
be eternal and must have been originated in time. In superstition
and magic ignorance in general and lack of knowledge of nature in
particular certainly play a ro1e. And yet “original stupidity”
cannot be their only source. For not only do these morbid phenomena
finer credence in the highest circles of civilization even to-day,
but even the most artless man distinguishes emphatically between
the natural and the supernatural, although he draws his line of
demarcation differently from us; and recognizes a domain which is
subject to himself and governed by his knowledge and action.<note place="foot" id="vii-p34.1" n="240">Dilthey, Einl., pp.178 ff.</note>  To
this must be added, that superstition and magic bear not only an
intellectual, but also a moral character; they are errors of the
head, but more especially errors of the heart. They furnish us
proof that nature, but equally that God, is not known. The
knowledge of nature and history also is intimately conjoined with
that of God. Prophets and apostles had no knowledge of natural
science, as it has been developed in these later centuries, but
they had a very sound conception of nature, because they knew God
and saw in the world his handiwork, and they left no room for
superstition and magic. So soon, however, as the pure knowledge of
God disappears, nature too in its true character is disowned, and
either exalted into the sphere of the godhead or degraded to the
sphere of a demoniacal power. And this mixture of God and the
world, which results from vain speculations of the mind and a
darkening of the heart, always was and still remains the origin of
all superstition and magic.</p>
<p id="vii-p35">But as sickness reminds us of former health, and aberration
calls to remembrance the right path, so these phenomena of
superstition point back to the original image of religion.
Superstition and magic could not have arisen if the idea of another
world than this world of nature had not been deeply imprinted on
man’s self-consciousness. They themselves are of a later origin,
but they presuppose religion, which is inherent in human nature,
having its foundation and principle in the creation of man in the
image of God. Hence religion is, not only with reference to its
origin and essence, but also with reference to its truth and
validity, founded in revelation. Without revelation religion sinks
back into a pernicious superstition.</p>

<p id="vii-p36"> </p> 
<p id="vii-p37"> </p>
<p id="vii-p38"> </p>
<p id="vii-p39"> </p>
<p id="vii-p40"> </p>
<p id="vii-p41"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 7. Revelation and Christianity" id="viii" prev="vii" next="ix">
<h2 id="viii-p0.1">Lecture 7 - Revelation and Christianity</h2>
<p id="viii-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="viii-p2">The arguments for the reality of revelation, derived from the
nature of thought, the essence of nature, the character of history,
and the conception of religion, are finally strengthened by the
course of development through which mankind has passed, and which
has led it from paradise to the cross and will guide it from the
cross to glory.</p>
<p id="viii-p3">We cannot reach the origin of the human race or form an idea of
its primitive condition by the aid of animal, child, and savage;
neither do biology, geology and palaeontology give us any certainty
with regard to its first abode or concerning the unity of the race.
If there are no other sources and resources from which to draw our
knowledge, we continually move in guesses and conjectures, and form
for ourselves the image of an incomprehensible and impossible
primitive man at the beginning of history.</p>
<p id="viii-p4">Tradition, the testimony which mankind itself bears to its
origin in tradition and history, points out a safer way to acquire
knowledge regarding the oldest condition of the human race. In
former times this was the method by which people sought to
penetrate into the past. The Church Fathers derived all the wisdom
they found among the heathen from the theology of the eternal
Logos.<note place="foot" id="viii-p4.1" n="241">Clemens Alex., Stromata, I, 5; VI, 8. Clemens Alex., Stromata, I, 5; VI, 8.</note>  Augustine speaks of a Christianity which has existed since
the beginning of the human race, and was of the opinion that the
doctrine of God as the creator of all The arguments for the reality
of revelation, derived from the nature of thought, the essence of
nature, the character of history, and the conception of religion,
are finally strengthened by the course of development through which
mankind has passed, and which has led it from paradise to the cross
and will guide it from the cross to glory.</p>
<p id="viii-p5">Augustine speaks of a Christianity which has existed since the beginning of the human race, and was of the opinion that the doctrine of God as the creator of all things and the light of all knowledge and action had been known
to all the wise men and philosophers of all peoples.<note place="foot" id="viii-p5.1" n="242">Augustinus, de Civ., VIII, 9-12; de Doctr. Chr., II, p. 40. Retract., I, 3.</note>  Lactantius
rejoiced in this unity of all peoples, and beheld in it a prelude
of the great alleluiah which in the days to come will be sung by
all mankind, although he complains that the traditions have been
corrupted by poetical license and the truth often perverted into a
delusion.<note place="foot" id="viii-p5.2" n="243">Lactantius, Inst., VII, 7, 22.</note>  Both in earlier and later times in the Christian Church
the truth and wisdom found among the heathen have been generally
derived from a primitive revelation, from the continuous
illumination by the Logos, from acquaintance with the literature of
the Old Testament, or from the operation of God’s common
grace.<note place="foot" id="viii-p5.3" n="244">Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, I, 1894, pp. 14 ff.; II,. 23 ff. Mausbach, Christentum und Weltmoral. Munster, 1905, pp. 9 ff. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, I, 1894, pp. 14 ff.; II,. 23 ff. Mausbach, Christentum und Weltmoral. Munster, 1905, pp. 9 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p6">No doubt the rationalism of the eighteenth century threw all
these theories overboard, because it believed that it possessed in
reason the only and sufficient source of all truth. But it was cast
down from this exalted pedestal by the philosophy of Kant, by the
theology of Schleiermacher, and with more prevailing power by the
rise of the romantic school. When towards the end of that century
Persian, Indian, and Egyptian antiquity gradually disclosed its
treasures, the idea of an original revelation, a common tradition,
a primitive monotheism, revived in wide circles. A host of men—
Schelling, Creuzer, Chr. G. Heyne, F. G. Welcker, O. Müller,
Fr. Schlegel, Ad. Müller, and others—proceeded from this
hypothesis and, often rather one-sidedly, elevated India or Egypt
or Persia to the cradle of the human race and the source of all
wisdom.<note place="foot" id="viii-p6.1" n="245">Willmann, Gesch. des Ideal., III, pp. 763 ff.</note>  Traditionalists, such as de Maistre and de Bonald, carried
this tendency to an extreme, maintaining that language, and with it
all knowledge of the truth, had been communicated to man by God in
the primitive revelation, and that this knowledge was now
propagated by tradition and had to be received on authority.<note place="foot" id="viii-p6.2" n="246">A. Stöckl, Lehrbuch der Philos. I, 1887, pp. 406 ff.</note> 
Antagonism to the autonomy asserted by the Revolution led these men
to ignore entirely the activity of reason and to deny all personal
independence. By these extravagancies the romantic school digged
its own grave; empirical science raised its voice against it,
called men back to reality, and at first imagined that all the
advance of culture as well as the origin of man himself could be
explained by means of minute variations, occurring through an
endless series of years. But deeper study and continued
investigation, not only of the culture but also of the history of
the most ancient peoples, has in this case too led to the
acknowledgment of the just claims that lay at the foundation of the
old view.</p>
<p id="viii-p7">In the first place, we have to consider the primitive history of
culture, which is best known to us through many important and exact
researches concerning the oldest inhabitants of Europe. The
prehistoric men who lived there no longer speak to us, and have
left nothing behind them in writing; hence our knowledge of their
condition always remains in the highest degree imperfect; we cannot
even directly prove that they possessed language and religion,
morality and laws; there is here a large domain for the play of the
imagination. Nevertheless they are known to us in part by means of
the fossils of their bones and skulls, by means of the relics of
their arms and tools, of their dwellings and graves, their food and
clothing, their furniture and ornaments. And these teach us that
the original inhabitants of Europe stood on a much lower level in
culture, science, art, technic, etc., than the culture-peoples of
the present time; but in intellect, talents, capabilities, in
bodily and mental qualities, they were men of like passions with
us. In elements of culture they did not stand on a lower plane than
many nature- peoples of our day as, for instance, the</p>
<p id="viii-p8">Patagonians and Bushmen, whom we nevertheless reckon among men,
and who have in common with other men the same mind and the same
bodily structure. In fact the study of the arms and tools which
have been preserved proceeds on the assumption that those who made
them were men; for we consider objects arms and tools only when
they manifest intellect and reflection, thought and purpose, and
hence are an evidence of the activity of the human mind. Schurtz is
right in saying that “all material culture is a creation of the
mind, and always serves to strengthen the body or to free it of
burdens; the staff lengthens the arm, the stone strengthens the
fist, the dress protects the body, the dwelling shelters the
family.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p8.1" n="247">Schurtz, Urgeschichte der Kultur, pp. 298 fP. Ulrich Wendt, Die Technik als Kulturmacht. Berlin, 1906.</note>  The original inhabitants of Europe, having left behind
objects such as never have been conceived or made by any animal,—
these bear incontestable witness to their mental gifts and their
human nature. When we consider, indeed, that they stood at the
beginning of culture and had to invent many things which we, aided
by their labor, simply need to modify and develop, we stand amazed
at their inventiveness, and especially their artistic skill, which
accomplished so much with such defective means and under such
unfavorable conditions.</p>
<p id="viii-p9">But there is still something further in ancient culture which
draws our attention. Notwithstanding all the differences caused by
character and talents, wants and environment, soil and climate,
there exists a striking likeness between the oldest culture which
is met with in Europe and that which is found in other parts of the
world and among other peoples. For example dolmens, that is family
graves, composed of five large blocks of granite, are found in all
parts of the earth, with the exception of Australia, and are
ascribed on this account by some writers on the history of
civilization to a single race which had spread through various
lands.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.1" n="248">Schurtz, op. cit., p. 441. S. Müller, Urgeschichte Europas, Gruudzüge einer prähist. Archaeologie. Strassburg, 1905, p. 40. J. Guibert, Les origines. Paris, 1905, p. 348. C. W. Vollgraff, Over den oorsprong onzer Europeesche beschaving. Gids, Dec., 1905.</note>  Axes, which mark the boundary between the palaeolithic and
the neolithic conditions show great similarity to one another in
the whole of Europe and in Egypt; and the pottery which is found in
the latter country vividly reminds us of the forms which are
scattered through Europe.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.2" n="249">S. Müller, op. cit., p. 19.</note>  It is remarkable in this respect, that
numerous axes have been found in Southern- and Central-Europe, made
of kinds of stone which are not indigenous to Europe, but are
common in Central-Asia.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.3" n="250">Ibid., p. 21.</note>  The ornamentation by which the pottery
especially is decorated is the same which from time immemorial was
used in Egypt.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.4" n="251">Ibid., p. 22.</note>  The same species of cereals, wheat, barley, and
millet found in Egypt and Asia were later raised in Europe.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.5" n="252">Ibid., p. 24.</note>  All
the principal elements of culture in Europe—tools, decorations,
agriculture, cattle-breeding, dwellings, and graves—point back to
the East, to Egypt and Asia. On this account Sophus Müller
says that not only has the more recent culture been influenced by
the East, but the oldest culture also did not grow up independently
in Europe, but was introduced from the East.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.6" n="253">Ibid., p. 3. Comp. also pp. 25, 26, 28, 29.</note>  In point of fact,
scientific research increases the probability of the hypothesis
that man did not originate in Europe, but came across from Asia and
Africa into Italy and Spain. Even such an enthusiastic adherent of
the doctrine of evolution as Ludwig Reinhart testifies that, as
Europe is only an appendix of the vast continent of Asia, so also
the principal gifts of culture were for the most part not acquired
in Europe, but brought over from the ancient civilized countries of
Western-Asia.<note place="foot" id="viii-p9.7" n="254">L. Reinhardt, Der Mensch zur Eiszeit in Europa, 1906, p. 249.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p10">The remarkable excavations which have been undertaken in recent
years in several parts of Greece and especially in Crete, have
confirmed this result of the history of civilization. They make it
clear that Greece, long before the Hellenic culture proper, that is
to say, more than a thousand years before Christ, passed through an
extremely interesting period of culture, which is designated the
pre-Mycenic and the Mycenic ages, the latter of which is intimately
connected with the Egyptian civilization.<note place="foot" id="viii-p10.1" n="255">Holworda, in Ch. de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, II, p. 245.</note>  Some, it is true, such
as Karl Penka, have been of the opinion that civilization really
began in Northern-Europe and spread thence towards the South;
others, like Solomon Reinach, have expressed the judgment that the
civilization of Europe had an origin of its own, independent of
Asia. But the arguments in favor of the contrary are so numerous
and strong that the great majority of the experts are persuaded of
the Egyptian origin of the Mycenic civilization. Just as in later
days the art of writing, the brick-kiln, the coining of money,
Christianity, etc., have been brought over from the south to
northern Europe, so it happened with the other constituents of
civilization. The south was the real source of civilization for
Europe, although it is true that the north has greatly modified and
developed the elements received, as, for example, the stone axe.<note place="foot" id="viii-p10.2" n="256">S. Müller, op. cit,. pp. 49-52.</note> 
And Southern-Europe in its turn stood under the influence of Africa
and Asia. The knowledge of metals penetrated from the East into
southern Europe. Bronze objects found in the lowest strata of Troy,
pottery and objects of worship in Crete, graves in large numbers,
especially on the islands of the Archipelago, but also in Greece
ancl Asia Minor, daggers and axes of bronze in the graves,
ornaments wrought on the pottery in the form of spirals, lines, and
female figures,—all these point to the civilization of ancient
Egypt.<note place="foot" id="viii-p10.3" n="257">Ibid., pp. 30 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p11">The study of Greek philosophy points in the same direction.
Zeller, Ueberweg and others succeeded in introducing into wide
circles the idea that the philosophy of Thales and his fellow
spirits was the result of opposition to religion, or at least of
the emancipation of the mind from religion, and that philosophy had
taken an antithetical position to belief in any form. But further
research has brought to light the incorrectness of this
explanation. As a rule, the philosophers were opposed to the
superstition of the people and the superficiality of the masses,
but we have no right whatever to represent them on this account as
infidel and irreligious. On the contrary, religion and philosophy
were still in their case one; they were not one-sided,
materialistic, nature-philosophers, but on the contrary propounded
a positive view about man and God. They investigated not only the
essence of nature, but also the essence of man, his soul and its
immortality. Moreover, the philosophy of Thales did not fall
abruptly from the skies; a long time of preparation preceded it.
According to the testimony of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the
theologians and lawgivers were the precursors of the philosophers.
The age before Homer was by no means one of rude barbarism, without
history and without letters; but the Pelasgians brought over from
Asia a treasure of religious conceptions, manners and customs. When
the several tribes in Greece intermingled, there was born from
their intercourse a new cult, the cult of the Muses, who formed the
court retinue of the Doric god Apollo. Orpheus was in this period
the great figure; singers and poets in their nomoi regulated the
worship of Apollo; the siege of Troy and the founding of the
colonies in Asia Minor furnished new material for thought and hymn;
Homer and Hosiod did not invent, but systematized the religious
ideas and customs. Next to these poets and singers appeared the
politicians and the law-givers, the wise men and the moralists, the
theologians and the mystics. Along with them appeared very soon on
the scene the real, afterwards so-called, philosophers. They were
men of like passions with the others, and stood not outside the
rich, full life of their time, but, as Heinrich Gomperz has
described them, as men of flesh and blood, in the midst of it</p>
<p id="viii-p12">The rich tradition which existed in poetry and aphorisms, in
theology and legislation, forms the background of their philosophy,
and is itself intimately connected with Oriental wisdom. The
greatest thinkers of Greece—Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and
later Plutarch and Plotinus—derived their wisdom, especially the
knowledge of the ideas, from ancient tradition, and further on from
divine revelation.<note place="foot" id="viii-p12.1" n="258">Willmann. Gesch. des Ideal., I, pp. 2 ff.</note>  Of course this tradition was, to a large
extent, corrupted, especially through the imagination of the poets,
and was more purely preserved in the Orphic school than in the
works of Homer and Hesiod. But it was nevertheless the source from
which philosophy drew its most elevated ideas. Just as poetry and
art, so philosophy enriched itself from the precious treasure which
was preserved in tradition. The first problems on which thinking
tried its strength were brought to the thinkers by life itself.
Philosophy arose out of religion, and the question which presents
itself to us is, not how philosophy later on assumed a religious
character in Pythagoras and Plato, but, on the contrary, how
philosophy was born of religion and theology.<note place="foot" id="viii-p12.2" n="259">Dilthey, Einl., pp. 184 ff. Karl Joël, Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik, Basel, 1903. Willmann, Gesch. des Ideal., I, pp. 1 ff., 33 ff., 142 ff. R..E. Woltjer, Het mystiekreligieuse Element in de Grieksche Philologie, Leiden, 1905.</note>  The marvellous
discoveries which have been made in recent years in the land of
Babylon and Assyria enable us now to trace further back this broad
stream of tradition which culture and history both indicate to us.
A new world has here risen out of the ground. New peoples have
appeared on the scene whose names were scarcely known to us. As
natural science has expanded our horizon above, beneath, and around
us, so historical science has extended it into an almost infinite
past. They who recognized the historical value of the book of
Genesis of course knew better; but for many there lay behind the
time of Moses nothing but a world of rude barbarism. All this has
now been changed. Penetrating into the past<note place="foot" id="viii-p12.3" n="260">D. Gath Whitley, What was the Primitive Condition of Man? The Prinecton Theol. Review, Oct., 1906, pp. 513-534.</note>  under the guidance,
not of imagination, but of history, we encounter in ancient Asia
not half-bestial men and savage hordes, but highly civilized
peoples and a richly developed culture.</p>
<p id="viii-p13">Not only do we find a land, the fertility of which in that dry
climate was increased by numerous canals and channels of
irrigation, under the superintendence of a large multitude of
officials, whose activity was carefully regulated. Legislation and
jurisprudence also had reached a high degree of development. The
code of Hammurabi contains decrees about marriage, about the
relations between parents and children and between freemen and
slaves, about the protection of honor and life, about rents and
leases, about feudal tenure, mortgage, inheritance, and penal
justice. Trade and art rejoiced in a rich measure of prosperity;
architecture and sculpture, metallurgy, the arts of the goldsmith,
potter, and stone-cutter produced works which excite even now our
admiration, and had at their disposal even then a great wealth of
forms. Commerce flourished and moved along excellent roads of
communication which led from Babylonia to Western-Asia. Science
also found its students, especially astronomy, in harmony with the
astral character of the religion, but also arithmetic, geometry,
chronology and geography, hieroglyphics and history. Not a few even
maintain that the civilization of Babylonia, like that of Egypt,
does not, so far as it is known to us, exhibit a picture of advance
and bloom, but rather of retrogression and decadence. The oldest
works of art in both lands are, in their opinion, far in advance of
later productions in talent and in freedom, and truth of
conception. Otto Weber expresses this view thus. “The dogma of a
gradual development from a lower to a higher level is not sustained
by the history of the Oriental peoples. What history gives us
leaves upon us, on the contrary, the impression of decadence rather
than of an advancing civilization, which tries to find fixed forms;
everywhere in art, science, and religion, this is confirmed.”
<note place="foot" id="viii-p13.1" n="261">O. Weber, Theologie und Assyriologie im Streite um Babel und Bibel, 1904, p. 17. Comp. Tiele, Inl., II, p. 220. Winckler, Religionsgesch. und gesch. Orient. Leipzig, 1906, p. 9. Id., Die Babylon. Geisteskultur. Leipzig, 1907, pp. 18 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p14">It has happened with the excavations in Babylon and Assyria very
much as it happens with all discoveries. At first they were greatly
overestimated and their importance exaggerated. Just as in former
ages all the wisdom of the peoples was derived from the books of
the Old Testament, and in the days of romanticism from India,
Egypt, or Persia, so also there has arisen in sequence to the
important discoveries in the land of Sumer and Accad a
Panbabylonian school, which imagines it has discovered in Babel’s
astral religion a key to the religion and worldview of all the
peoples. Certain similar features in the narratives of creation and
the deluge, for example, so astonished men that borrowing or
community in origin was at once assumed, the differences ignored,
and even the precipitate conclusion formed that probably affinity
and agreement existed in everything else too. Just as the points of
resemblance between man and beast have been the occasion of a rash
inference of common descent, so also the Panbabylonists, through
the mouth of Winckler, Zimmern, Jeremias, Mücke, Stucken, Hans
Schmidt, and especially Jensen in his Gilgamesh-Epos, have made a
fearful abuse of the argument from analogy. The Babel formula
seemed to furnish the explanation of the entire history of the
world. But this exaggeration need not cause much solicitude; all
exaggerations hasten by and are succeeded in a short time by a
calmer and more sober view.<note place="foot" id="viii-p14.1" n="262">H. H. Kuyper, Evolutie of Revelatie, Amsterdam, 1903, and the literature there quoted. Felix Stähelin, Probleme der Israel. Geschichte, Basel, 1907.</note>  And the result will be the
recognition of the significant fact that the land of Babel was the
cradle of the descendants of Noah and the starting-point of all
civilization.</p>
<p id="viii-p15">This fact receives strong confirmation from another side also.
Not only the Babylonists and the Assyriologists, but also the
ethnologists in a wider sense, supply us with strong grounds for
the suggestion that the cradle of the human race stood in
Central-Asia. We meet with striking points of agreement, in
conceptions, manners, customs, institutions, between the most
widely separated peoples. The state of society of the Greeks as
described by Homer, for instance, shows remarkable resemblances to
the condition of the ancient Irish, Welsh, Scottish Highlanders,
and further to that of the ancient Norsemen, Araucanians, Massai,
Turcomans, and the Kirgish. All the institutions, all the
characteristics of the ancient ancestors of the Romanic, Germanic,
Slavonic, and Semitic, peoples, find their parallels in the
primitive races which still exist or have recently become extinct.
The similarity between the Semites and the American Indians is so
great that some old ethnologists imagined that they had discovered
in the aborigines of America the lost ten tribes of Israel.<note place="foot" id="viii-p15.1" n="263">Steinmetz, De Studie der Volkenkunde, pp. 36, 37, 39. Steinmetz, De Studie der Volkenkunde, pp. 36, 37, 39.</note> 
Richthofen found astronomical conceptions in China which distinctly
pointed back to Babylon. This led him to remark: “We stand here
before one of the most remarkable problems which prehistoric times
offer us in reference to the inter-communication of peoples.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p15.2" n="264">Richthofen, in Jeremias, Die Panbabylonisten. Leipzig, 1907, p. 15.</note>  In
a word, the study of history and civilization makes it more and
more clear that Babylon was in ancient times the ancestral country
of the human race and the source of civilization. The peoples in
Western-Asia stood in active communication with one another; there
was no “spiritual isolation” (geistige Sonderexistenz) of the
peoples, no Chinese wall which separated them from one another; a
common tradition in the widest sense bound together all lands and
peoples,—Babylonia, Arabia, Canaan, Phoenicia, and Egypt. Whether
the tribes and generations after the building of the tower of Babel
took many elements of culture away with them from their original
home, or whether these were in various ways conveyed to them or
were developed through later communication, it is a fact that the
hypothesis gains progressively in strength, that the same tradition
and the same culture lie at the foundation of the conceptions and
customs of all peoples.<note place="foot" id="viii-p15.3" n="265">Winkler, Religionsgesch. und gesch., orient., pp. 7, 8, 9, 17, 33. Id., Die Weltanschauung des alten Orients, p. 4. Id., Die Babyl. Geisteskultur, pp. 6, 47, 48. Winkler, Religionsgesch. und gesch., orient., pp. 7, 8, 9, 17, 33. Id., Die Weltanschauung des alten Orients, p. 4. Id., Die Babyl. Geisteskultur, pp. 6, 47, 48.</note>  Probably more light will be shed on all
this as excavations are continued, the texts translated, and the
researches of palaeontologists and ethnologists further
prosecuted.</p>
<p id="viii-p16">But we are at least warranted in saying, even at present, that
the so-called Völkeridee of Adolph Bastian has received a
heavy blow. The ethnologists have always been struck by the many
and strong analogies which exist between even widely sundered
peoples in all sorts of conceptions and institutions, manners and
customs. The celebrated and widely travelled Bastian thought this
explicable on the hypothesis that human nature is everywhere the
same, and that the several peoples have given birth wholly
independently of one another to the same conceptions and customs;
and this theory for a long time met with much favor. Dogs bark
everywhere alike, the cuckoo utters everywhere the same note, and
in the same way man everywhere forms the same ideas and performs
the same actions.<note place="foot" id="viii-p16.1" n="266">A. Bastian, Der Völkergedanke im Aufban einer Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Leipzig, 1881. Cf. Gumplovicz, Grundriss der Soziologie, pp. 27 ff. A. Bastian, Der Völkergedanke im Aufban einer Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Leipzig, 1881. Cf. Gumplovicz, Grundriss der Soziologie, pp. 27 ff.</note>  Of course it cannot be denied that next to
heredity variability, next to dependence independence, plays an
important ro1e, and it is well-nigh impossible to draw the boundary
line where the one ends and the other begins. A frivolous game has
often been played with formal agreement, affinity, descent, not
only in the science of religion, but also in the science of
philology.<note place="foot" id="viii-p16.2" n="267">As regards language comp., Fritz Mauthner, Die Sprache, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 45 ff.</note>  But on the other side it must not be forgotten that
the unity of human nature, on which Bastian based his argument,
includes more than is actually derived from it.</p>
<p id="viii-p17">It is, of course, easy to imagine that the animal-man stands
behind the culture-man whom we meet with even in the primitive
races, and that the interval between man and beast was bridged over
in earlier times by many transition—forms which are now extinct
and lost. This, however, is pure fancy, which has no rooting in
reality. The facts are, that everywhere and always, so far as
investigation can carry us, an essential difference exists between
man and beast. Human nature is sui generis; it has its own
character and attributes. If this be true, then the common origin
of all men is necessarily given with it, without needing further
proof; and in point of fact this hypothesis is accepted
theoretically by many adherents of the doctrine of descent, and
practically by almost all. This monogeny, however, again implies
that the first human pair was either created by God or arose all of
a sudden, by means of an enormous leap of mutation, to the height
of human nature, and still further, that the oldest men dwelt
together for a long time as one family. But there is involved in
this not only the possibility but also the necessity of a common
tradition. Human nature is not an empty notion, no purely abstract
conception, but a reality, a particular manner of being, which
includes distinctive habits, inclinations, and attributes. And this
tradition was undoubtedly supported and strengthened for a long
time by the intercommunication which the families and tribes kept
up even after they had separated. Some tribes no doubt wandered so
far away that they became isolated and impoverished in culture;
others, however, remained in close proximity and came often in
contact with one another. Commerce, intercommunication,
intercourse, are, according to the latest researches, much older
and more widely extended than is usually represented. There is
nothing, therefore, that can be urged in itself as an argument
against the existence of a common tradition.</p>
<p id="viii-p18">Even Wundt acknowledges “that the historical testimonies do not
of themselves exclude the hypothesis that all myths and religions
have proceeded in prehistoric time from one single centre of
origin, if only the possibility of such an hypothesis could be
psychologically conceded.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p18.1" n="268">Wundt, Vö1kerpsych., II, 1, p. 570.</note>  Why this should be impossible is not
easy to understand. For since human nature is one, the possibility
is certainly implied in this, that conceptions may be taken over
and further developed; and it is assuredly more readily explicable
that peoples should have interchanged conceptions and customs than
that they should have produced them all independently, and yet in
close agreement. Moreover, however much a general tradition, the
common property of all, may be denied, the same thing is
acknowledged by all in a narrower circle. Wundt, for example,
thinks it possible that in America, Oceania, South-Africa, and
India “a flood of legends may have deluged vast territories.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p18.2" n="269">Wundt, op. cit., II, pp. 343, 571.</note> 
Every household, every family, every town, every people, in its
turn is a centre around which spread out, in narrower or wider
circles, conceptions and views, manners and customs. And the human
race is similarly one large family, which in all its movements and
in all its tendencies is dependent on its common origin and its
original equipment. It is, as G. F. Wright correctly observes, a
wise and holy arrangement of Divine Providence that succeeding
generations are in a high degree dependent on preceding ones, and
that the better-favored parts of the human race, to whom much is
given, are made responsible for the communication of these gifts to
the less favored.<note place="foot" id="viii-p18.3" n="270">G. P. Wright, Scientific Confirmations of Old Testament History, Oberlin, 1906.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p19">Through what channels this communication has been made it is
often impossible to trace. This gap in our knowledge, however,
cannot be adduced, as Wundt<note place="foot" id="viii-p19.1" n="271">Wundt, op. cit., pp. 342, 570.</note>  supposes, as an objection to the fact
itself. For in a number of cases we can say that such channels must
have existed, although we possess no detailed knowledge of them.<note place="foot" id="viii-p19.2" n="272">Jeremias, Die Panbabylonisten., pp. 15, 16.</note> 
Since the human race has been made of one blood, then certainly men
at first dwelt together, and when they went forth to fill the whole
earth they must also have carried with them conceptions and customs
from the parental home to all parts of the world. The unity of the
human race, which forms the basis of the unity of human nature,
necessarily includes in it an original common tradition.</p>
<p id="viii-p20">Of course a large measure of wisdom and circumspection is needed
for distinguishing among the traditions and manners of the peoples
between what has been brought from the original abode and what has
been the result of later modification and mutilation, extension and
augmentation, by the different peoples. Apologeties has sometimes
taken its task here too easily, for general phrases do not suffice
here; every element of the civilization of mankind needs to be
investigated carefully and comprehensively before we are ready to
draw conclusions. And even after the deepest and most extended
research it will be found that we have very often to be satisfied
with a conjecture or a probability.</p>
<p id="viii-p21">Nevertheless there are phenomena which point back with great
probability to a common origin. Among these we find, for example,
the knowledge of a single supreme Being, which is found among
various peoples. We have no historical testimony to the development
of polytheism into pure monotheism; when polytheism comes no longer
to satisfy the intellectual circles, it is remodelled into
pantheism, which has in common with polytheism the
“nature-character” of the godhead, and dissolves the multitude of
nature-gods into one nature-godhead. On the other hand, we have
many historical examples of monotheism not developing, indeed, but
gradually degenerating into polytheism and polydemonism. There are
Christian churches in the past, and in the present also, which
furnish proof of this statement; and even among the most cultured
people there are some who, in our own day, turn not only to
Mohammedanism and Buddhism, but also to the crudest forms of
superstition and sorcery. Sometimes even theologians and
philosophers prefer polytheism to monotheism. Goethe, himself once
said that he was not satisfied with one system, but was by turns
monotheist, polytheist, and pantheist.<note place="foot" id="viii-p21.1" n="273">See note 44 of Lecture IV.</note>  We may also see with our
own eyes the theoretical profession of faith in one God accompanied
in practice by the adoration of many angels and saints. The same
phenomenon appears among many peoples.</p>
<p id="viii-p22">When some speak of “monotheistic currents” in the Babylonian
religion, very serious objections may certainly be advanced. But it
cannot be denied, and is indeed recognized on all hands, that many
nature-peoples in Africa, America, Australia, Mongolia, Tartary,
and the Indian Archipelago, alongside of a practical religion full
of superstition and sorcery, believe in a supreme good God, who is
often called the great Spirit, the supreme Being, the Father, our
Father. It may be that this belief in such a supreme Being has
often been too much idealized, as, for example, by Andrew Lang; it
is, no doubt, seldom worshipped, and even sometimes not conceived
in a pure monotheistic form; it remains, nevertheless, in the
religions of the nature-peoples a most remarkable phenomenon, which
cannot be explained from Christian or Mohammedan influences, and as
little from animism or ancestor-worship. And if now we do not
forget that the religious worship of natural phenomena and spirits
always already presupposes the idea of God, and that religion,
according to many students of the philosophy of religion, is rooted
in human nature as such, the hypothesis lies close at hand that we
are confronted in this belief in the great Spirit with an original
monotheism which preceded all polytheistic religions and is still
at work in them.<note place="foot" id="viii-p22.1" n="274">Andrew Lang, Magic and Religion, p. 224, in Ladd, I, p. 153. Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturöblker, 1860, 11, pp. 168 ff. C. von Orelli, Allg. Religionsgesch., pp. 39, 745, 775 ff. Id., Die Eigenart der bibl. Religion, 1906, pp. 11, 12. Schroeder, in Beitrage zur Weiterentw. der Chr. Rel. 1905, pp. 1 ff. Jeremias, Monoth. Strömungen innerhalb der Babylon. Religion., 1904. Baentsch, Monoth. Strömungeit und der Monoth. Israels., 1907. Gloatz, Die vermutlichen Religionsanfänge und der Monoth., Religion und Geisteskultur, 1906, pp. 137-143. Söderblom, Die Allväter der Primitiven, ib., 1907, pp. 315-322. Lehmann, in: Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I, III, p. 26.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p23">But not to insist upon this or other agreement in details, so
much at least remains undoubtedly assured that human nature, both
in body and soul, points back to the common origin of all men. In
the fundamental ideas and fundamental elements of religion,
morality, law, science, art, technic,—in short, in all the
foundations of culture,—a unity exists which, from the viewpoint
of the doctrine of descent, must be considered a miracle. According
to the nominalistic point of view, represented, for example, by
Professor William James, all men must be considered as not
originally one, but as gradually becoming one. This view forgets
that whatever can become one already is one in its deepest
foundation, and it ignores, moreover, the actual unity which has
through all the ages existed among men notwithstanding all
differences. According to James, it is pure accident that our
ancestors have followed precisely the line of thought along which
we still travel, just as, according to Darwin, we owe it to pure
chance that our women have not been trained like bees, and on this
account refrain from killing their daughters. This, however, does
not remove the fact that the methods of thinking and acting, which
have been gradually invented by men and transmitted by heredity
from generation to generation, have become inextirpably tenacious.
Yea, according to James’ own expressions, “these fundamental ways
of thinking” have continually grown firmer and remain practically
useful and indispensable.<note place="foot" id="viii-p23.1" n="275">James, Pragmatism, pp. 165, 169, 170, 171, 181 ff.</note>  We may therefore quietly set aside the
hypothesis that these modes of thinking and acting, like men
themselves, have come gradually into being; in reality, they form
the immutable foundation on which all our civilization is
built.</p>
<p id="viii-p24">Thus it is in every respect. The human race is everywhere and
always bound to its nature, to its origin, to its past. There are a
multitude of ideas, a whole complex of views regarding the chief
concerns of life which men have in common. They concern the idea of
God as the almighty and all-wise source of all things, the world as
established by wisdom, order and the reign of law, the unity and
harmony of creation, the symbolical meaning of all things, the
distinction between a world of things seen and unseen, the
opposition of truth and falsehood, the struggle between good and
evil, the memory of a golden age and a subsequent decay, the wrath
of the gods and the hope of reconciliation, the divine origin and
destination of man, the immortality of the soul and the expectation
of a judgment, reward and punishment in the hereafter.<note place="foot" id="viii-p24.1" n="276">Willmann, Gesch. des Ideal., I., pp. 119 ff.</note>  All these
fundamental ideas form the beginning and the foundation of history,
the principle and starting-point of all religion, morality, and
law, the bond of all social relations, the germ and the root of all
science and art, the harmony of thinking and being, of being and
becoming, of becoming and acting, the unity of logic, physics, and
ethics, of the true, the good, and the beautiful All these
fundamentals are given from the beginning in human nature; they are
transmitted from generation to generation, and are at the same time
grounded in the very nature of man, so that dependence and
independence work together here. And they all point back to a
divine origin: “all knowledge is,” at least so far as principles
and foundations are concerned, “of divine origin.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p24.2" n="277">Jeremias, Monoth. Strömungen innerhalb der Babyl. Religion, 1904, p. 8.</note>  Knowledge in
this sense flows from revelation.</p>
<p id="viii-p25">To this original revelation is joined on that revelation which
according to the Old Testament was bestowed upon Israel. The latter
is built upon the former and rests upon it, and is at the same time
the continuation, the development and completion of it. The
distinction between what has come to be called general and special
revelation does not begin until the call of Abraham; before that
the two intermingle, and so far have become the property of all
peoples and nations. Special revelation certainly is set
antithetically over against all the corruption which gradually
entered into the life of the peoples, but it takes up, confirms,
and completes all that had been from the beginning put into human
nature by revelation and had been preserved and increased
subsequently in the human race. The earlier view, which exclusively
emphasized the antithesis, no less than that now prevalent which
has an eye only for the agreement and affinity, suffers from
one-sidedness. The latter, however, is giving way gradually to
another and better view. For a time the notion was prevalent that
the history and the religion of Israel could be thoroughly
explained if the books of the Old Testament were subjected to free
criticism and redating like other literature. But when this
historical criticism had analyzed and rearranged the books of the
Bible, consciously or unconsciously under the influence of the
doctrine of evolution,—after all this source-criticism, the
problem of the religion of Israel remained still unsolved.
Historico-critical investigation had not succeeded in destroying
the peculiar and special character of this religion. And yet this
was the motive which had given the impulse to this research.</p>
<p id="viii-p26">What profit was there in the analysis of the sources if Israel
itself with its religion remained in the midst of the peoples
unexplained? It is therefore that Panbabylonism has drawn away the
attention of scholars and supplanted the historico-critical period
by a religio-historical one. It has been right in suggesting that
there may be a great difference and a long interval between the
origin of ideas and institutions and their literary description; it
has restored to honor the living tradition, and has shown that
there are many other ways besides the literary one of exercising
and receiving influence. For the field of religion especially these
observations have been of great importance. For a religion is not
invented by this or that thinker, and is not imposed upon a people
from without, but is always a doctrine, a worship, a sum total of
conceptions, rules, ordinances, and institutions which are linked
to the past, live in the hearts of the people, and are transmitted
from generation to generation. And religious and moral conceptions
do not develop themselves after a logical method, as a result of
apriori thought, but are often of older origin, exist side by side
with each other, and develop themselves together in mutual
connection. The simple and rectilinear theory of evolution comes in
conflict with the complicated reality.</p>
<p id="viii-p27">Thus the religio-historical method was right in reverting from
literary criticism to the study of religion, and therewith from
theory to life, from a system of abstract conceptions to the
folk-soul, to the totality of reality. Its purpose, however, is to
derive this totality, this complex of conceptions and
prescriptions, not from Moses and the patriarchs, but from
Babylonia. There, in its opinion, is to be found the source of the
religion and worship of Israel, and even of the whole of
Christianity. “Babel and Bible,” says Otto Weber, “are products of
one and the same world-view.”<note place="foot" id="viii-p27.1" n="278">O. Weber, Theol. und Assyriologie, 1904, p. 4.</note>  Continued research will result,
however, here, as in geology and anthropology, in a reaction from
one-sidedness, and soon in the agreement the unlikeness and the
difference will also be noticed. In the meantime, however, this
gain has been registered, that it is no longer possible to consider
Israel as an island, separated by a wide ocean from the rest of the
world. Israel stands as a people and in its entire religious life
in relation with its environment, and also with the past. No sudden
breach was made by the prophets of the eighth century before Christ
between the past and the future. The narrative of creation and the
deluge, monotheism and the worship of Jehovah, the laws and
ceremonies of the cultus, the reminiscences of paradise and the
expectations of the future, the idea of the Messiah and the Servant
of Jehovah, and all the eschatological conceptions, are much older
than the literary documents wherein they are mentioned. Babel does
not lie behind the Bible, but behind the Scriptures lies the
revelation which begins with the origin of the human race,
continues in the tribes of the Sethites and Semites, and then flows
on in the channel of the Israelitish covenant towards the fulness
of time. For although Abraham left Babylonia and was sent to dwell
apart in a strange land, the God who manifested himself to him, and
later to Moses and to Israel, is no new, strange God, but the God
of old, the creator of heaven and earth, the Lord of all things,
who had been originally known to all men, and had still preserved
the knowledge and worship of himself in many, in more or less pure
form.<note place="foot" id="viii-p27.2" n="279"><scripRef id="viii-p27.3" passage="Gen. 14:18-20" parsed="|Gen|14|18|14|20" osisRef="Bible:Gen.14.18-Gen.14.20">Gen. 14:18-20</scripRef>, <scripRef passage="Gen 14:20" id="viii-p27.4" parsed="|Gen|14|20|0|0" osisRef="Bible:Gen.14.20">20</scripRef>:3 ff., 21:22 ff., 23:6, 24:50, 26:19, 40:8, etc. Comp. also Dr M. Peisker, Die Beziehungen der Nicht-Israeliten zu Jahve, nach der Anschauung der altt. Quellen Giessen, 1907.</note>  The segregation and the election of Israel served the sole
purpose of maintaining, unmixed and unadulterated, continuing and
perfecting, the, original revelation, which more and more
threatened to be lost,<note place="foot" id="viii-p27.5" n="280">Joz. 24:2, 14, 15; <scripRef id="viii-p27.6" passage="Deut. 26:5" parsed="|Deut|26|5|0|0" osisRef="Bible:Deut.26.5">Deut. 26:5</scripRef>, etc.</note>  so that it might again in the fulness of
time be made the property of the whole of mankind. The promise
became temporarily particular, in order that thus it might later
become universal. Israel belongs to the human race, remains in
relation to all peoples, and is chosen not at the cost, but for the
benefit of the whole human race.</p>
<p id="viii-p28">Hence the peculiarity of the religion of Israel does not consist
exclusively or primarily in its ethical monotheism. There are a
number of elements in the history and religion of Israel which
occur nowhere else, so far as is now known to us, and not even a
parallel to which is found among other peoples. Among these are the
name of Jehovah, the cosmogony free from all theogony, the idea of
the unity of the human race, the narrative of the fall, the week of
seven days and the Sabbath, circumcision of all male children on
the eighth day, prophetism which accompanies Israel through its
entire history, the plan of salvation embracing all nations,
ethical monotheism, the invisibility of God and the impossibility
of representing him, etc.<note place="foot" id="viii-p28.1" n="281">Ed. König, Schlaglichter auf dem Babel-Bibelstreit. Beweis des Glaubens, 1905, pp. 3-23.</note>  And there are many more elements in the
Old and New Testaments still whose explanation is sought by the
Panbabylonists in the astral religion of Babel, but in such a
manner that the far-fetched character and the artificiality of the
derivation are manifest to all.<note place="foot" id="viii-p28.2" n="282">Biesterveld, De jongste Methode voor de Verklaring van het Nieuwe Testament, 1905.</note>  Nevertheless all these elements
do not yet form the essence of the religion of Israel. They stand,
indeed, in very close connection with it, and form with it an
integral whole; but the substance of the revelation which came to
Israel, and the core of the religion which corresponded with it in
Israel, consist in something else.</p>
<p id="viii-p29">In order to find this, we must go back to the prophets and
psalmists, to Jesus and the apostles, and they all teach us
unanimously and clearly that the content of the divine revelation
does not consist primarily in the unity of God, in the moral law,
in circumcision, in the Sabbath, in short, in the law, but appears
primarily and principally in the promise, in the covenant of grace,
and in the gospel. Not law, but gospel, is in the Old and the New
Testament alike the core of the divine revelation, the essence of
religion, the sum total of the Holy Scriptures. Every other view
fails to do justice to special revelation, effaces its difference
from general revelation, degrades the Old Testament, rends apart
the two economies of the same covenant of grace, and even gradually
changes the gospel of the New Covenant into a law, and makes of
Christ a second Moses. Paul, however, declares that the promise is
older than the law, that Abraham already received the righteousness
of faith, not by the law, which was in his days not yet in
existence, but by the promise which was granted him by grace. The
law was thus originally not joined to the promise, but was added to
it later, that transgressions might abound, and accordingly the
necessity and indispensableness of the promise might be ever more
clearly revealed, and its contents ever more fully developed and at
last completed. The law thus is temporal, transitory, a means in
the service of the promise, but the promise is eternal; it had its
beginning in paradise, was preserved and developed by revelation in
the days of the Old Covenant, received its fulfilment in Christ,
and is now extended to the whole human race and all the
peoples.<note place="foot" id="viii-p29.1" n="283">Willmann, Gesch. des Ideal., II., pp. 12 ff., 20 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p30">In this promise, given to the patriarchs and to Israel, there
are three things included. In the first place, there is the free,
electing love of God, who seeks, calls, and adopts as his own
Abraham and his seed, by pure grace, without any desert or merit of
their own. The new element, which enters in with Abraham and later
with Israel, consists in this, that God, the knowledge and service
of whom were gradually passing away, at a given point of time
places himself in a most special relation to a particular person
and people. This relation is not grounded in nature; it is not a
matter of course; it does not exist by virtue of creation; it is
not instituted on the part of man, by his conscience or reason, by
his feeling of dependence or need. But it is an historical product;
the initiative came from God; he so reveals himself as, by the act
of revelation, to receive a particular person and people into
communion with himself. The calling of Abraham, the deliverance
from Egypt, the institution of the covenant on Sinai, are
accordingly the main pillars upon which the religion of Israel
rests.<note place="foot" id="viii-p30.1" n="284">Giesebrecht. Die Geschichtlichkeit des Sinaibundes. Königsberg, 1900. Lotz, Der Bund vom Sinai., Neue Kirchl. Zeits., 1901.</note>  It is the sovereign and gracious will of God which calls
this federal relation into life. By this will, which injects itself
into history and establishes a new relation between God and his
people, God is once for all in Israel made free from nature and
raised above it. God is no nature-power, as is the case among the
nations. He is an independent person, has his own nature and will,
and a law and worship of his own which, in the most stringent way,
prohibit all idolatry and image-worship. The human race owes a
great deal to Babylon, many good things of civilization and
culture. But let us not forget that there have also come forth from
Babylon all superstition and magic. It was Babylon which made all
peoples drunk with the wine of her fornication and sorcery.<note place="foot" id="viii-p30.2" n="285"><scripRef id="viii-p30.3" passage="Jer. 51:7" parsed="|Jer|51|7|0|0" osisRef="Bible:Jer.51.7">Jer. 51:7</scripRef>, Comp. Fr. Delizsch, Mehr Licht, 1907, p. 45.</note>  And
it was Israel alone which, by the revelation of God, was delivered
from these bonds, and in this respect Israel stood alone in the
midst of all peoples.</p>
<p id="viii-p31">Because to-day we evaporate religion into frames of mind, detach
it from every object, and retain scarcely any sympathy with the
knowledge and worship of God, we no longer feel the importance of
this entirely unique position of Israel. The prophets and apostles,
however, thought of it very differently. The true religion
consisted for them first of all in the knowledge and worship of the
true God, according to his will and in consonance with his command.
They still knew the difference between faith and superstition,
between religion and magic, between theology and mythology. Well,
now, Israel is the people chosen by God, which never had a
mythology, and has rescued the human races from the bonds of
superstition and sorcery. The Bible did not come forth from Babylon, but in
its fundamental thought is in diametrical opposition to Babylon,
and has made an end to Babylon’s spiritual dominion over the
peoples. Granted that the chaos-myth, as Gunkel supposes, has had
an influence upon Israel, that Rahab and Leviathan, Tiamat and
Nachash, were originally mythological conceptions; they have on
Israel’s soil, in the sphere of special revelation, totally cast
aside this character. The poetical personification of natural
phenomena is in Israel as strong as among other peoples; the
thunder is God’s voice, the light his garment, the lightning his
fiery arrow, the storm his breath, the clouds are his chariot, and
the like. But nowhere is this poetry presented as a description of
objective reality, and never are these poetical conceptions
combined and elaborated into a mythological narrative. Israel has
no mythical feeling; by special revelation, by the intervention of
God in history, by miracles, it has been profoundly convinced of
the distinction between God and the world; the knowledge of God has
expelled all myths. God no doubt works in nature and in history,
but he transcends them as the free and almighty One; he has a
character and will of his own. However personal and poetic the
description of the phenomena of nature may be—though it may be
said that the mountains clap their hands, that Tabor and Hermon
rejoice, that the cedars gambol like calves, and that the whole
creation listens and keeps silence, declares the honor of God and
proclaims his glory—they are never represented as real,
independent powers with which God has to struggle. The narratives
also of the creation and the fall, of the deluge and the building
of the tower of Babel, of the patriarchs and judges, are for the
Israelite no myths, but history. Israel’s God is far exalted above
nature, but by special revelation he brings about in the world a
peculiar history.<note place="foot" id="viii-p31.1" n="286">Köberle, Oriental. Mythologie und Bibl. Religion, Neue Kirchl. Zeits., 1906, pp. 838-859. Ed. König, Altorient. Weltamschauung und Altes Test. Berlin, 1905.</note> </p>
<p id="viii-p32">In the second place, God’s pardoning grace is contained in the
promise which was given to Israel. Although Tiamat and Nachash,
Rahab and Leviathan, are no longer real, inimical nature-powers,
yet certainly the Old Testament knows a power which opposes God.
But this power must not be looked for in the abyss or the stars,
nor in the sea or the mountains; on the contrary, it appears in
history, in the world of men. It is sin, sin alone, which opposes
God and with which he fights. It admits of no doubt that sin and
sickness (misfortune, disaster, demoniacal possession), guilt and
misery, forgiveness and deliverance, were in Israel’s consciousness
more intimately connected and much more closely interrelated than
in ours. All the pious of Israel wrestled with the problem of the
relation between them. But this very wrestling presupposes that
there is, after all, a distinction between them; it can arise only
when the just, convinced of his innocence, maintains himself in his
religio-moral consciousness in the face of the suffering of the
world. Therefore we owe to special revelation in Israel the purely
ethical conception of the nature of sin, with respect both to its
origin and to its essence and punishment. Sin is no disease,
although disease is often the result and proof of it; it is not
involved in existence itself, for every creature, as it comes forth
from the hand of God, is very good; it consists in transgression of
God’s commandment. As God is distinct from nature, so also is his
moral will distinct from the law of nature, the ethical from the
physical, the “what ought to be” from “what is.” The third chapter
of Genesis, therefore, tells us just about the origin of sin; it
cannot be explained except as a narration of how sin has entered
into the world, and consists in transgression of God’s command. The
following chapters sketch for us the progress of sin, which is an
imagination, a product of the heart of man from his youth. And when
again after the deluge the stream of unrighteousness flows on its
course, God chooses Abraham and his seed for a people of his own,
that they may walk in holiness before his face.</p>
<p id="viii-p33">But the electing love of God is at the same time a forgiving
love. God not only elects and calls, but gives himself to his
people; he joins himself to them, so intimately and tenderly, that
he charges their guilt and transfers it, as it were, to himself. I
am thy shield and exceeding great reward; I am the Lord thy God,
who has led thee out of Egypt. The covenant with Abraham and his
seed is built in a certain sense upon redemption and remission, and
the walk before God’s face to which the patriarchs and Israel were
called is the duty of gratitude. The law which God gave his people,
entered in after the promise, is built on the promise and is placed
in the service of the promise. It was not a law of the covenant of
works, but a law of the covenant of grace, a law of the covenant, a
law of gratitude. It served the purpose not of acquiring
righteousness and life, but of confirming these gifts to our
consciousness, and of bringing them out in our walk before God’s
face. Nor was the ceremonial law a means to bring about
reconciliation, but to maintain the reconciliation which already
existed in the covenant relation. Prophecy revived from time to
time the consciousness of this: it did not usher in a higher law,
it did not establish a new religion, it was not the promulgator of
ethical monotheism, but it had the covenant of God with his people
for its presupposition and was built upon the regulation of their
reciprocal relation in the law. Never did it call upon the people
to make themselves God’s people by keeping the law; it always
started from the supposition that Israel had become God’s people by
election, and laid upon them the demand that therefore they must as
God’s people walk in his ways. Morality was in Israel grounded in
religion. God forgives sins for his name’s, for his covenant’s, for
his glory’s sake.</p>
<p id="viii-p34">That God forgives sin by grace, for his name’s sake the
knowledge of this mystery we owe wholly to the special revelation
which God granted unto Israel. We would value this more highly if
we had a deeper consciousness of guilt. For the forgiving love of
God is not a matter of course; it is not known to us from nature,
or from history, or from our own intellect and conscience. On the
contrary, appearances are against it,—we do not perceive it by
sight or by touch; it is a matter of faith. Nay, more than this: if
God forgives sin for his own sake, then he must himself provide the
atonement. For without atonement, without the shedding of blood,
there is no remission of sins. In the ceremonial legislation God
himself gave his people instruction In this matter; it pointed to
the way in which God himself would bring about reconciliation. Man
can as little make propitiation for his sin as he can forgive it
himself. But God can do both, atone and forgive; he can do the one
just because he can do the other. The tension, however, which
existed between them in the days of the Old Testament, the time of
the paresis is reflected in the consciousness of the Israelites, as
a disharmony between righteousness and suffering, holiness and
blessedness, virtue and happiness, but in this way contributes to
prepare the wav for its own solution. For so in Israel’s prophecy,
psalmody and chokhma, the profound thought is gradually formed of a
suffering which is endured on account of and for others; thus there
gradually reveals itself the divine mystery of an innocent and
atoning suffering, which is illustrated in Isaiah by the Servant of
Jehovah, who is wounded for our transgressions, bruised for our
iniquities, but upon whom was the chastisement of our peace, and
with whose stripes we are healed.</p>
<p id="viii-p35">In the third place the gospel in the Old Testament includes also
the promise of God’s unchangeable faithfulness. The more Israel’s
apostasy and unfaithfulness increased, making it ever more apparent
how little reliance could be placed on man, the louder the prophets
announced that God will not break his covenant and will not annul
his promise. Mountains may depart and hills may be removed, but his
loving-kindness shall not depart from his people, and the covenant
of his peace shall not be removed forever. The prophets narrate the
past of Israel, they explain the present; but they likewise foresee
the future not as fortune-tellers and soothsayers, but as seers and
watchmen upon the walls of Zion, as searchers according to the
description of Peter, and as inquirers under the guidance of the
Spirit into the salvation which in the future was to be obtained
and given by the Messiah. Thus they see what others do not see;
persevere in believing where others doubt; cling to the promise in
hope against hope, and expect that God himself will in his own time
realize and extend his dominion to all peoples through his Anointed
One. As he is to complete his revelation through the Prophet like
unto Moses and to procure the atonement through the Servant of
Jehovah, so also is he to establish his kingdom on the earth
through the Anointed King. Theology leads through soteriology to
eschatology. The love of election passes over through the grace of
forgiveness into the full communion of God with his people. In the
future God will make a new covenant, wherein the old promise, I
will be your God and you shall be my people, will be fully
realized.</p>
<p id="viii-p36">These are the contents of the gospel, which was preached and
intrusted to Israel. No criticism of the books of the Bible can
destroy this content. Election, gracious forgiveness and true,
perfect communion, are the great thoughts and the spiritual gifts
which Israel has received from God and in the fulness of time has
communicated to humanity. For in the Person of Christ, who is the
Son of God and also the Son of Man, who is at the same time the
highest prophet, the only priest and the eternal king, all the
promises have been fulfilled. He indeed is the object of the
conflict of the ages, at present fiercer and more serious than ever
before. Judged from the present position of scientific
investigation, it would seem as if everything concerning his person
and work is uncertain and even unknowable. All kinds of hypotheses
have been erected and numerous attempts made to explain the origin
and essence of Christianity. Judaism and Heathenism, apocryphal and
Talmudic literature, political and social conditions, the
mythologies of Egypt and Persia, of Babylonia and India, are called
upon to help us derive not only the world and man, religion and
morality, but also the Christian religion, from weak beggarly
elements and the poorest possible beginnings. These investigations
have an important value and contain a rich promise. Through them
the Christian religion will become better known in its close
connection with the world and history, and the words and facts of
the New Testament will be better understood in their universal
significance and bearing. But more than this, all these
investigations, provided they are not broken off half-way but
carried on to the end, will throw into ever clearer and clearer
light the uniqueness of the Christian religion.</p>
<p id="viii-p37">For Christ, the mediator of creation, the life and the light of
men, the promise to the fathers, the desire of the nations, the
saviour of the world, and the judge of the quick and the dead, is
akin to all and to everything, and at the same time distinguished
from all and exalted above all. Whatever may be adduced to
elucidate and explain his person and work, he appears now as ever
on the pages of the gospel before us and the whole world in his
unique superiority. The central facts of the incarnation,
satisfaction, and resurrection are the fulfilment of the three
great thoughts of the Old Covenant, the content of the New
Testament, the kerygma of the Apostles, the foundation of the
Christian Church, the marrow of its history of dogma and the centre
of the history of the world. Without these facts history breaks
into fragments. Through them there is brought into it unity and
variety, thought and plan, progress and development. From the
protevangel to the consummation of all things one thread runs
through the history of mankind, namely, the operation of the
sovereign, merciful, and almighty will of God, to save and to
glorify the world notwithstanding its subjection to corruption.</p>
<p id="viii-p38">This will of God forms the heart of pure religion and at the
same time the soul of all true theology. For according to the
counsel of this will we are chosen, conformably to this will we are
regenerated, through this will we are sanctified. In virtue of the
good pleasure of this will both that which is in heaven and on
earth will be gathered in one in the dispensation of the fulness of
time under Christ as Head. And in the whole course of revelation
this will of God unfolds itself ever more clearly as the love of
God, the grace of the Son, and the communion of the Holy Ghost.</p>
<p id="viii-p39"> </p>
<p id="viii-p40"> </p>
<p id="viii-p41"> </p>
<p id="viii-p42"> </p>
<p id="viii-p43"> </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 8. Revelation and Religious Experience" id="ix" prev="viii" next="x">
<h2 id="ix-p0.1">Lecture 8 - Revelation and Religious Experience</h2>
<p id="ix-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="ix-p2">If Christianity were at one with itself, and there were no other
religions, the recognition of its truth would be easier. But it is
endlessly divided and tornto pieces. The one church, which was the
centre of village and city in the Middle Ages, is completely
demolished; on every side a number of sects arise around her, each
laying claim to be the purest expression of Christian truth, and
continually subdividing and multiplying. Beyond that, the religions
of the various nations are latterly becoming much better known to
us than in former centuries, and the relation which Christianity
bears to other religions has become a serious problem. Among those
religions there are some which number millions of adherents, and
numerically considered may, therefore, put in a more telling claim
to the name of world-religions than Christianity. They provide
examples of strong conviction of faith, earnest piety, and
self-denying devotion which bear comparison with those of Christian
confessions. All the elements of religion—doctrine and ethics,
consciousness of sin and forgiveness, comfort and hope, contempt of
death and certainty of salvation, prayer and praise, assemblies and
public-service—appear in all. The claim to divine revelation is
common to all religions.<note place="foot" id="ix-p2.1" n="287">Comp., e.g., Otto Pautz, Mohammeds Lehre von der Offenbarung. Leipzig, 1898.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p3">This extension of the religious horizon would not have proved so
undermining to faith in Christian truth had it not been accompanied
by a keen criticism of the power and value of human reason. In
accordance with Scripture, Christian theology has always taught
that sin involves also error, and thus has not only corrupted the
heart and will, but also blinded the understanding. This doctrine
of Scripture was especially reasserted in the Reformation, in
opposition to the Roman view that the natural gifts have remained
to men and only the supernatural lost. Luther, above all, was not
on friendly terms with reason; though the substance of this
doctrine is merely that intelligence has been blinded by sin, but
not extinguished, and by its nature remains able to understand
unseen and divine things. The newer philosophy, however,
emancipated itself entirely from this Christian conviction and
placed its trust exclusively in the power of reason, and was soon
called upon to pass through an unpleasant experience. Both
Descartes and Bacon established a separation between faith and
reason, leaving the domain of faith to theology and satisfying
themselves with a position external to it. For a while they lived
in the illusion that they could very well dispense with revelation
and faith, and could throw sufficient light upon all that man needs
for his religious and moral life by reason. When this new
philosophy, however, had reached the highest point of its
development, it was wrecked by its own continued inquiry. In
criticising revelation it had forgotten one thing,—criticism of
itself. Reason in this newer philosophy took its starting-point in
childish naiveté from its own integrity and trustworthiness.
But when it had completed its work of demolishing revelation and
now came to itself and examined its own nature and content, it
found itself quite dissatisfied with itself. Reason found in reason
its keenest inquisitor, and received its sharpest criticism from
itself. All that had appeared to stand firm began to waver and to
fall. The secondary attributes, the law of causality, the objective
world of sense, the ideas of substance, personality, and
self-consciousness, the world of supernatural and divine things—
all appeared untenable and unknowable. Kant struck the balance of
this critical process thus: the intelligence of man is confined to
the world of phenomena, and does not know anything of what lies
behind it. Reason is not merely blinded or weakened by sin; it is
in its very nature blind and deaf and dumb in the presence of the
spiritual world.</p>
<p id="ix-p4">Whatever value we may attach to this critical philosophy, there
can be no doubt that it has roughly shaken confidence in human
reason, and has given a deep wound to the faith and conviction, to
the spiritual security and moral will-power of the modern man. As
on the one side it has declared man autonomous, and set him free
from all objective forms and external authority, on the other side
it has opened the door for a wild anarchy of thought. If the
knowledge of God and of spiritual things is excluded from the
domain of science, then not only is science bereft of moral
character and made atheistic, but religion and morality also are
left to individual caprice. Both become matters of private judgment
and individual taste; each one can do what he will. That is an
incalculable injury, not only for the schools, but still more for
life; agnosticism produces ethical and practical indifference.</p>
<p id="ix-p5">But naturally one cannot live on criticism and agnosticism.
Although the agnostic view, that “scientific superstition,” as Mr
F. W. H. Myers calls it, is embraced to-day by many learned men, it
has never been the creed, nor is it now the creed, of the human
race.<note place="foot" id="ix-p5.1" n="288">Frederic W. H. Myers, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death. Ed. and abridged by his son, L. H. Myers, 1907, p. 2.</note>  Questions continually arise in the mind for which every one
necessarily seeks an answer. There are some beliefs for which man
cannot afford to wait. What must I do to be saved? is a question of
an urgency of a totally different kind from the cause of the tides
or the meaning of the marks on the moon. Men must settle roughly
somehow or other what they have reason to hope or to fear from the
unseen world.<note place="foot" id="ix-p5.2" n="289">Ibid., p. 3.</note>  Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy grew into a
sociolatry and a positive religion which made humanity and its
heroes objects of worship. The whole of the nineteenth century is
full of endeavors to recover the loss that had been suffered, to
heal the gaping wound. Kant himself began it. In order to find a
place for faith he confined science to the knowledge of sensible
phenomena; what he demolished by theoretical reason, he tried to
build up by practical reason. After him first one and then another
arose, to make a similar effort to find a way to the unknown land.
Speculative reason and intellectual contemplation, mysticism of
feeling and the moral power of the will, the faith of the church
and the religions of the nations, were all summoned in turn to aid
in penetrating into the supernatural world, and building up the
knowledge of God on a new scientific, unassailable foundation.
However these efforts may differ, they all have in common that they
no longer subject themselves to any so-called external authority,
but try to find out God through man. Theology has, since Kant’s
time, become theology of consciousness and experience, and thus
loses itself practically in religious anthropology.</p>
<p id="ix-p6">In this transformation of theology into the science of religion
the new conception of science comes to light. Kant had already
limited the power of the intelligence, because he was under the
influence of the one-sided Newtonian explanation of nature and
could recognize as scientific only a conception of the world which
bore a strictly mechanical character.<note place="foot" id="ix-p6.1" n="290">Kant gave to his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, 1755, the sub-title of Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprung des ganzen Weltgebäudes nach Newtonschen Grundsätzen abgehandelt.</note>  This mechanism is in wide
circles no longer looked upon as a sufficient explanation of the
world, so that philosophy has acquired a new value; but
nevertheless, the idea still exists that there is only one science,
or at most two sciences, namely, the sciences of nature and of
history, and that accordingly there are, only two scientific
methods, the empirical and the historical.<note place="foot" id="ix-p6.2" n="291">Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christ. und die Religionsgesch., 1902. Bernoulli, Die wissenschaftliche und die kirchliche Methode in der Theologie. Freiburg, 1897. Gross, Glaube, Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, 1902. Rade, Zeits. fur Theol. und Kirche, 1900, pp. 80 fl.; 1901, pp. 429 ff.</note>  Thus, if theology is to
be a science, and the knowledge of unseen and divine things
trustworthy, the same method must be applied in its domain as in
those of nature and history. Theology must become an empirical
science.<note place="foot" id="ix-p6.3" n="292">G. Berguer, L’Application de la Methode scientifique à la Théologie. Genève, 1908.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p7">But in this way the word “experience” is made to play an
ambiguous ro1e. When used in religion and theology, it has a wholly
different significance from that which it bears in empirical
science. In the latter what is meant is, that, by consistent
application of the empirical method, personal interest in the
inquiry is to be excluded as much as possible, and that the
phenomena are observed and explained in their purity and
impartially; empiricism even calls to its help the experimental
proof. But when men speak of experience in religion, they mean it
to be understood, on the other hand, that religion is, or at any
rate must become, a personal matter through and through. Religion
is, according to this interpretation, no doctrine, no precept, no
history, no worship, in a word, not a belief on authority, nor a
consent to truth, but arises from within, when the heart is touched
and a personal fellowship established between God and our soul. Now
there is certainly such a religious experience; the devotional
writings of all religions bear witness to it, and serve in their
turn to feed and strengthen that religious life even more than
Bible and catechism.<note place="foot" id="ix-p7.1" n="293">Ritschl, Rechtf. und Versöhnung, II, p. 12.</note>  But the mistake is when men fancy they in
this way make theology a science as exact as that of nature, and
thus arrive at a scientific knowledge of unseen and eternal
things.<note place="foot" id="ix-p7.2" n="294">Bachmann, Zur Würdigung des religiö:sen Erlebens, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. Dec.; 1907, pp. 907-931.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p8">For whatever meaning religious experience may have, it is not
and cannot be an heuristic principle. Experience comes into being
only when, first, there exists something to experience, and
afterwards this something is really experienced ; it cannot
otherwise exist. Religion is without doubt a matter of the heart;
but it cannot be separated from all objective knowledge of God
through his revelation in nature and history, in Scripture and
conscience. A subjective religion is always preceded by an
objective religion, whatever this may be. Just as language
presupposes the capacity for speech in the child, but yet is
learned from the mother, so also religious experience arises out of
preceding revelation. Every child grows up in the religion of its
parents, and thereby develops its own religious life; the pious
teaching and example of the mother awaken piety in the heart of the
child. No less than in sensation, science, and art, does this take
place also in religion. Man is never self-sufficient and
independent of the outside world; he needs the earth to feed and
clothe him, light to see, sound to hear, the phenomena of nature or
the facts of history to observe and to know, and in the same way
revelation to awaken and strengthen his religious life. The heart
cannot be separated from the head, nor faith as trust from faith as
knowledge. Even those who look upon dogmatics as an exposition of
pious feelings recognize that these feelings nevertheless are due
to external influences, as, for example, from the person of
Christ.<note place="foot" id="ix-p8.1" n="295">Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack, Schian, one and all, connect Christian experience in some way or other with the Person of Christ and the revelation given us by God in him.</note>  Experience does not come first, after which interpretation
follows, but revelation precedes, and is experienced in
faith.<note place="foot" id="ix-p8.2" n="296">Bachmann, loc. cit.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p9">If we reject the empirical order and proceed in an oppositive
direction, we reach the so-called psychology of religion which has
latterly aroused so much attention. There is no doubt that this
young science, for which Pietism and Methodism prepared the way,
and which is a direct fruit of the empirical psychology and
theology, has a right to exist, and may be expected to yield
important aid for the knowledge and guidance of religious life. It
may be hoped also that the method which has been applied in this
science by James, Starbuck, Coe, and others, will gradually meet
the objections which to-day are properly urged against it. Finally,
we may acknowledge that dogmatics, especially in the doctrine of
the ordo salutis, must become more psychological, and must reckon
more fully with religious experience.<note place="foot" id="ix-p9.1" n="297">Mulert, Zeits. f. Theol. und Kirche., Jan., 1907, pp. 63, 436.</note>  But this does not alter the
fact that the psychology of religion only inquires into the
experiences of the soul and cannot form a judgment upon their right
and value. It observes and describes the phenomena of religious
consciousness, but it cannot pronounce upon their truth and purity.
It regards religion, no doubt, as one of “the most important
biological functions of mankind,”<note place="foot" id="ix-p9.2" n="298">James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 506.</note>  but it can never come to the
question of its truth, it cannot elevate itself to a logos of
religion, and therefore can never replace metaphysics or
dogmaties.<note place="foot" id="ix-p9.3" n="299">Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnisstheorie in der Religionswissenschaft. Tübingen, 1905. Scheel, Zeits. f. Theol. u. K., 1907, pp. 149-150, 305-307. Id., Die moderne Religionspsych., ib. 1908, pp. 1-38.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p10">We may reasonably question even the anticipation of Coe, that
this psychology of religion will be able to regain many who in our
days have turned away from all religion.<note place="foot" id="ix-p10.1" n="300">G. A. Coe, The Spiritual Life, 1903, pp. 23-27.</note>  For without
underestimating the new conclusions which present themselves, and
the important suggestions which have been derived from this new
study of religious life, the results to which it has led do not
support the expectations which Coe formed for them. This is very
clearly manifested in the fact of conversion, to which the greatest
attention has been devoted. The psychology of religion not merely
conceives conversion as a “natural and necessary process,”<note place="foot" id="ix-p10.2" n="301">E. D. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion, 1901, pp. 143-153.</note> 
forming a part of man’s biological development and connected
intimately with puberty,<note place="foot" id="ix-p10.3" n="302">Starbuck, pp. 28 ff. Coe, pp. 29, 40 ff. Stanley Hall, Adolescence, I, pp. 411 ff.; II, pp. 95 ff.; 288 ff.</note>  but its investigation gradually loses
sight of what must be understood by conversion. In itself it has no
standard by which to form a judgment of what conversion consists
in; it inquires into and describes conversion only as a
psychological phenomenon. But regarded from this point of view the
treason of Judas is as important as the penitence of Peter, and
conversion is nothing other than one of the many transformations of
consciousness, or alterations of personality, which take place so
frequently in human life.<note place="foot" id="ix-p10.4" n="303">James, Varieties, pp. 178 ff., 195, 196, 201 ff. Starbuck, op. cit., pp. 101-117. Alfred Binet, Les A1térations de la Personalité. Paris, 1902.</note>  If all these religious phenomena are
studied only from a psychological standpoint, the result is that
they lose their character and their content is sacrificed to their
form. Conversion thus loses its special meaning; on the ground of
certain analogies with other psychological phenomena it is confused
and identified with them in the same manner as in the
religio-historical method. All religions are first compared one
with another, and then, on the ground of some points of agreement,
are identified with one another. What conversion is and ought to be
no psychology of religion can teach us; the Scriptures alone can
tell us that; and if they do not tell it to us, nobody knows.</p>
<p id="ix-p11">This remark applies not to conversion only, but also to all
special religious experiences, such as consciousness of sin,
repentance, faith, hope, sense of forgiveness, prayer, fellowship
with God; and it applies as well to religion in general. Religious
psychology occupies a neutral standpoint outside and above all
religions, and studies and compares the religious experiences of
Romanist and Protestant, Christian, heathen, Jew and Mohammedan,
and feels itself naturally attracted by those persons and groups
whose religious life bears a more or less eccentric character;
mystics, fanatics, enthusiasts of all sects and confessions, form
for it interesting cases which it eagerly inquires into.<note place="foot" id="ix-p11.1" n="304">James, Varieties, pp. 3, 6, 29, 30, 486. Flournoy, Les principes de la psych. relig. 1903, pp. 16, 17. Murisier, Les maladies du sentiment religieux. Paris, 1903, préface, p. viii.</note>  But
again the qualitative discrimination disappears from view; or
rather the psychology of religion does not perceive it, and attends
only to the psychological form of these phenomena; it does not
penetrate to their core and essence. So it treats them all alike.
Religion is everywhere the same as to contents,—only the form
differs,—and every religion, wherever it appears, is therefore
true and good. Thus James, for example, says that religion is quite
“private” and “individualistic”;<note place="foot" id="ix-p11.2" n="305">James, op. cit., pp. 135, 163, 325, 430.</note>  all do not need to have the
same religion; each one has his own God. So long as a man has use
for his God, he cares little about who he is; “God is not known; he
is used.” In the house of the Father are many mansions; “all ideals
are matters of relation.”<note place="foot" id="ix-p11.3" n="306">James, op. cit., pp. 333, 374, 487, 506, 507.</note>  The question even arises whether
polytheism does not better correspond to the variety of religious
experience than monotheism, for what is required is not an absolute
power, but only one higher than that of nature.<note place="foot" id="ix-p11.4" n="307">James, op. cit., pp. 122, 131-133, 525, 526 Comp. Lecture IV, note 44.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p12">That this peculiar idea is not a private opinion of Professor
James, but a necessary and general conclusion from the premises, is
demonstrated by the fact that other men, though widely separated
from one another, announce the same opinion. Some years ago, even,
Schian declared that there is no such thing as an ideal type of
faith and piety, but that each dogmatist presents his own type. If
there is no infallible Scripture, “there can exist only a
subjective and purely individual notion of what belongs to
Christian faith.” All ways are good, if they but lead to faith: not
to what is contained in faith, for this differs endlessly, but to
faith as trust in God as revealed in Christ.<note place="foot" id="ix-p12.1" n="308">Schian, Der Einfluss der Individiialität auf Glaubensgesinnung und Glaubensgestaltung, Zeits. Für Theol. und Kirche, 1897, pp. 513 ff. Id., Glaube und Individualität, id. 1898, pp. 170-194. Schian, Der Einfluss der Individiialität auf Glaubensgesinnung und Glaubensgestaltung, Zeits. Für Theol. und Kirche, 1897, pp. 513 ff. Id., Glaube und Individualität, id. 1898, pp. 170-194.</note>  Schian has received
much support from others in this idea,<note place="foot" id="ix-p12.2" n="309">Pfister, Das Elend unserer wissensch. Glanbenslehre, Schweizer. theol. Zeits., 1905, pp. 209 ff. Häberlin, Ist die Theologie eine Wissenschaft? ib. 1906, pp. 17 ff. Pfister, Das Elend unserer wissensch. Glanbenslehre, Schweizer. theol. Zeits., 1905, pp. 209 ff. Häberlin, Ist die Theologie eine Wissenschaft? ib. 1906, pp. 17 ff.</note>  and Professor Herrmann too
has given his adherence to it during the last few years. The strict
Ritschlian distinction between religion and metaphysics, between
judgments of value and judgments of being, has led him to supplant
faith almost wholly by trust. Revelation, he says, is not an
external thing, but “man receives the revelation, which is the
ground of his religion, because the depths of his own being are
opened to him.” Religion is a new life, and rests upon an
experience of the power of moral good, as Jesus has shown us. To
trust in that power is to believe, to live, to be saved. And
because religion is thus “the complete quickening of a man, there
is no general religion, the same for every one, but there are only
individuals in religion.”<note place="foot" id="ix-p12.3" n="310">Herrmann, Christ. Protest. Dogmatik, pp. 583-632 of Die Christl. Religion, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Id., Die Lage und Aufgabe der evang. Dogm. in der Gegenwart, Zeits. Für Theol. und Kirche, 1907, pp. 315, 351. Id., Die Altorthodoxie und unser Verständuiss der Religion, ib. Jan., 1903, pp. 74-77. Comp. C. Wistar Hodge, The Idea of Dogmatic Theology, The Princeton Theol. Review, Jan., 1908.</note>  So we see that from the standpoint of
religious psychology there is no longer a place for metaphysics,
theology, or dogmatics, nor even for an “ethics of the religious
personality.” For every standard fails here; there is no single law
or rule; the individual man is the measure of all things, also of
religion; God does not say how he will be served, but man decides
how he will serve him.</p>
<p id="ix-p13">Naturally such a consistent indifferentism does not please all,
and in the long run cannot satisfy any one. Most of those who have
followed Kant and Schleiermacher in taking their standpoint in the
religious subject, try nevertheless to build up on that subject one
or another view of the world. In truth, Kant himself set limits to
knowledge in order to make a place for faith, and to find room, by
reasoning on the nature and content of practical reason, for the
reality of a moral government of the world. And Schleiermacher,
though striving after the liberation of theology from philosophy,
could act in this way according to his conviction only because he
believed he possessed in the religious feeling of absolute
dependence an immediate revelation of the Infinite.<note place="foot" id="ix-p13.1" n="311">Comp. Walther, Eine neue Theorie über das Wesen der Religion, Religion und Geisteskultur, 1907, 3, pp. 201-217. Bruining, Over de Methode van onze Dogmatiek, Teylers Theol. Tijdschr., 1902, 2, pp. 175 ff.</note>  The
peculiarity of the whole mediating theology which spread over the
world in the nineteenth century, and remains still to-day dominant
in many circles, is its effort to attain a transcendent reality
—which was only more or less a reflection of the old dogmatics—by
means of speculative reasoning on the immanent requirements, needs,
or experiences of the religious and ethical man. Ritschl, it is
true, set himself in opposition to this, and brought about a
separation between religion and metaphysics which Herrmann
especially has carried forward. But a powerful reaction
theologically and philosophically has arisen against this
separation, even among Ritschl’s own followers. We are witnesses in
these days of a rebirth of philosophy, a fresh acknowledgment of
the right of metaphysics; and in connection therewith of a fuller
recognition of the spiritual life, of its norms and values of its
religious and ethical nature.<note place="foot" id="ix-p13.2" n="312">By way of example we name: F. J. Schmidt, Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus. Leipzig, 1908. Dorner, Die Bedeutung der spekulativen Theologle für die Gegenwart, Die Studierstube, 1907, pp. 193-207. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 1-12.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p14">This new philosophy, however, appears in many respects different
from that of former times. The old problems always remain the same,
but they return in quite another form. Whilst formerly the
procedure was often aprioristic, and the world was constructed out
of the idea, now the opposite direction is taken and an effort is
made to raise the real world of sensation and experience to its
idea. The natural and mental sciences have brought much that is new
into the field. What has been said as to the source of mathematical
axioms, the ideas of number, time, and space, matter and force,
movement and law, the development of the whole organic life, in plants, animals, and humanity, the
interpretation of history, of the origin and progress of state and
society, presents so much that is important that nobody, and
certainly no philosopher, can neglect it without great loss.<note place="foot" id="ix-p14.1" n="313">C. Stumpf, Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie. Leipzig, 1908, especially pp. 23 ff.</note>  This
applies also to psychology. Here above all continued study has
shown that the so-called empirical psychology cannot suffice for
the right understanding of the psychical life.</p>
<p id="ix-p15">Researches into uncommon phenomena, such as telepathy and
teloesthesy, hypnotism and spiritualism, faith- and prayer-healing,
the intuition of genius and prophetic or poetic inspiration have
demonstrated one fact beyond all doubt,—that the psychical life
of man is much richer than his conscious intelligence and action.
One may disagree over the names; but whether we speak of waking and
dreaming, clay and night, supraliminal and subliminal, intuitive
and reflexive, consciousness, in any case there is a great
difference between what happens beneath and what above the
threshold of consciousness. It certainly does not commend itself
when Max Dessoir speaks of two personalities in one man;<note place="foot" id="ix-p15.1" n="314">Max Dessoir, Das Doppel-Ich. Leipzig, 1896, p. 80.</note>  for
there always remains a weaker or stronger consciousness that both
dwell in one and the same breast, and belong to one person.<note place="foot" id="ix-p15.2" n="315">Höffer, Grundlehren der Psychologie. Wien, 1905, p. 108.</note>  But
still a man may be so divided against himself, and so many
alterations may take place in his consciousness, that he leads as
it were a double life. Sometimes he seems to live in two worlds,
which have nothing to do with each other. In many pathological
cases, and especially in the so-called demoniacal possession, the
apparatus of consciousness appears to become an instrument of a
foreign, mysterious power. Apart altogether from these extremes,
however, in every man there is present a difference between his
subliminal and supraliminal consciousness.</p>
<p id="ix-p16">Man tries to give direction to his life by his consciousness,
but that life itself has its origin in the depth of his
personality. It must not be forgotten, Coe says truly, that though
reason is necessary to guide the ship of life, feeling is the
stream that propels it.<note place="foot" id="ix-p16.1" n="316">Coe, The Spiritual Life, p. 93.</note>  Beneath consciousness there is a world of
instincts and habits, notions and inclinations, abilities and
capacities, which continually sets on fire the course of nature.
Beneath the head lies the heart, out of which are the issues of
life.</p>
<p id="ix-p17">For this reason empirical psychology will never be able fully to
explain the psychical life. It may with the utmost closeness
examine the phenomena of consciousness, the sensations, the
feelings, the passions, and it may try to conceive their working
mechanically ; it may even endeavor to explain the ego or the
self-consciousness by association of ideas ; but naturally it
cannot penetrate to what lies behind and beneath consciousness, and
can kindle no light in the secret places of the heart. Herein the
declaration may find its application that God alone proves the
hearts and reins of man. Empirical psychology can inquire into the
conditions of consciousness, can even investigate the
self-consciousness which slowly arises in man and is subject to all
kinds of changes. But the question whether a hidden ego or an
independent soul lies behind it is beyond its reach. So soon as it
occupies itself with this question it passes beyond itself into
metaphysies.<note place="foot" id="ix-p17.1" n="317">Max Dessoir, op. cit., p. 77.</note>  Let us put it more strongly still,—in inquiring
into the phenomena of consciousness, empirical psychology always
takes its start from an abstraction; it separates man from his
social environment, the psychical processes from their contact with
life, and in those psychical processes it again isolates definite
phenomena, such as sensations of time, space, color, wholly from
the psychical life. No doubt there are gains to be registered by
this method; but we must abandon the illusion that human psychical
life can ever find its explanation in this manner. For if science
cherishes this illusion it degenerates into psychologism,
historism, and relativism, and the fulness and richness of life are
curtailed. In reality all these phenomena of consciousness, so far
from being isolated, exist only in intimate mutual relations, and
ever spring out of the depths of personality. The whole cannot be
explained in an atomistic manner by a combination of its parts; but
on the contrary the parts must be conceived in an organic way by
unfolding the totality. Behind the particular lies the general, and
the whole precedes the parts. if, for example, we had to learn to
see, we should be dead before the task was accomplished.<note place="foot" id="ix-p17.2" n="318">Möbius; Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie. Halle, 1907, p. 56.</note>  But just
as the bird knows how to build its nest, so we bring with us from
our birth all kinds of abilities and capacities. It is the
instinctive, organic life which in sensations, in thoughts and
actions, gives an impulse to us and shows us the way. Instinct and
capacity, norm and law, precede the life of reflection. Man is not
sent into the world unarmed, but is equipped in body and soul with
rich gifts and powers; he receives the talents which he has only to
invest and augment them in the acts of his earthly life. Empirical
psychology may thus possess an important pedagogical significance,
but it takes its origin from, and also leads back to, metaphysical
psychology. And thus it becomes manifest that empirical life is
rooted in an aprioristic datum, which does not come slowly into
existence by mechanical development, but is a gift of God’s grace,
and a fruit and result of his revelations.<note place="foot" id="ix-p17.3" n="319">Schmidt, Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus, p. 96.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p18">If psychology leads by serious reflection to a metaphysical
reality, and this again to the idea of revelation, we are not far
removed from the conviction that man, in the hidden places of his
soul, yet belongs to another and a higher world than that of this
earthly existence. Plato asserted that the human soul existed
before its indwelling in the body, lived in the world of ideas, and
preserved the memory of it in its earthly exile.<note place="foot" id="ix-p18.1" n="320">Comp. the pre-existenceism of McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 112 ff. Myers, Human Personality, p. 26.</note>  Others cherish
the idea that man in the hidden side of his nature holds communion
with the unseen world and can receive from it all kinds of
manifestations and revelations. The Society for Psychical Research,
established in 1882, aimed at inquiring into all the phenomena
which belong to the domain of spiritualism,<note place="foot" id="ix-p18.2" n="321">Bennett, La société Anglo-américaine pour les recherches psychiques. Trad. de M. Sage. Paris, 1904.</note>  and one of its
members, namely, F. W. H. Myers, who died in 1901, arrived with
others at the conclusion that man in his subliminal life possesses
faculties and powers whereby, without the help of the body, he can
hold communication with souls and spirits.<note place="foot" id="ix-p18.3" n="322">Myers, Human Personality, p. 16.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p19">Now there has always existed very great difference of opinion as
to the nature and origin of hypnotic and spiritualistic phenomena,
notwithstanding the exact research which has been devoted to them.
On the one side an attempt is made to explain all these phenomena
in a natural way, especially by suggestion, and this attempt is
even extended to the miracles of Scripture; and on the other side,
men feel forced by the facts to assume in some or in maiiy cases a
supernatural interposition. It is unnecessary to examine here the
correctness of these opinions; for it is not impossible, apriori,
that such an intercourse with souls and spirits, without the help
of the body, may exist. If the human soul indeed exists from the
beginning as a whole, and is not slowly produced by steps and
stages in the way of mechanical evolution, then it is in itself
super-empirical, and has part in another world besides this visible
one. It is then spiritual in its essence, and it is possible for it
to hold communication with spirits or souls without the body. The
body evidently is the organ of the soul; it is not the body, but
the soul, which sees and hears, thinks and acts, through the body.
Thus there is nothing absurd in the idea that the soul can exercise
those activities in special cases without the organ of the body. It
is also remarkable that humanity, every- where and in all ages, has
acknowledged this possibility, that Scripture often presupposes it,
and that it is included in the idea of revelation. For revelation
always supposes that man is able to receive impressions or thoughts
or inclinations from another than this phenomenal world, and in a
way other than that usually employed.</p>
<p id="ix-p20">But when science undertakes to inquire into the phenomena which
belong to such a spiritual intercourse, it exposes itself to
serious dangers. For naturally those who devote their time and
strength to this study will not be contented with the phenomena as
such, but in order to obtain completely trustworthy material for
their work will adopt the experimental method, and will endeavor to
produce such experiences in themselves or in others by artificial
means. The seriousness of scientific study compels them to seek
such intercourse with the world of spirits themselves. Such an
intercourse is not within the circle of their common experience; if
it is possible, it can only be reached in artificial ways, that is,
by the help of means, all of which, however diverse, have the
tendency to throw into the background the conscious supraliminal
life and to set the subliminal consciousness to work. If we do not
lay stress on the injury which these artificially induced trance
conditions may work to the bodily health, yet we must at least
observe that it is silently supposed that subliminal life is the
chief domain of the spirit. Just as the philosophy of the
unconscious so spiritism and hypnotism inculcate the idea that
consciousness is only a temporary and defective form of knowledge,
and that true being lies in the unconscious; and the best way to
come into contact with this being, and to obtain knowledge about
it, is in the dream, the ecstasy, the trance. Nevertheless,
whosoever intentionally robs himself of self-consciousness, reason,
and will, extinguishes the light which God has given to man,
annihilates his human freedom and independence, and degrades
himself to an instrument for an alien and unknown power.<note place="foot" id="ix-p20.1" n="323">As to the dangers for body and soul comp. Zeehandelaar, Het spiritistisch Gevaar, Gids, Aug., 1907. Traub, in Kalb, Kirchen und Sekten der Gegenwart. Stuttgart, 1905, pp. 437 ff., 448, 460. Coe, The Spiritual Life, pp. 169 ff. Joseph Hamilton, The Spirit World, 1906, p. 264.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p21">For—and this is a second danger which threatens—nobody knows
to what influences he abandons himself in such states of trance. It
is easy to say, on the one side, that all is suggestion or
hallucination, or, on the other side, that a real intercourse with
spirits takes place; but nothing is really certain. By
intentionally suppressing reason and will, and by going back from
this world of revelation to a land of darkness, we lose all
guidance and make all control impossible. The reality of the
phenomena and revelations which take place in the ecstatic state
remains uncertain; uncertain it remains also whether the spirits
who appear are really what they represent themselves to be; and,
again, whether the revelations which they give contain truth or
lies, must be followed or rejected.<note place="foot" id="ix-p21.1" n="324">Traub in Kalb, op. cit., p. 449 ff.</note>  Let it be supposed that real
intercourse is held with the spirits, still the alternative is ever
before us whether we shall give ourselves unconditionally up to the
phenomena and revelations thus received, in which case, just as in
common human intercourse, we should become dupes of misleading and
seduction ; or whether we shall later on control the revelations
received by the standards which conscience has given to us, in
which case we should interpret them according to the view of the
world and life, which is ours in conscious existence.</p>
<p id="ix-p22">The history of occultism, whether in earlier or later times,
demonstrates this. The complaint is common that the revelations
which spiritualism and hypnotism impart to us are characterized by
banality and are not worth the attention which is bestowed upon
them; also that they contain nothing more than fragments of the
world-view which the receiver already adheres to. Myers, for
example, is of opinion that “psychical research” indicates the
reality of the spiritual world, the immortality of the soul, and
endless “spiritual evolution,” and that it has established these
beyond all doubt. In consequence of this he expects that religion
in the future will no longer rest on authority and belief, but on
observation and experiment, and in that way will in the long run
bring about a “synthesis of religious belief.”<note place="foot" id="ix-p22.1" n="325">Myers, Human Personality, pp. 1 ff., 8, 24, 340 ff.</note>  But these ideas
are so well known that there is really no need of revelation to
make them known to us; they have been proclaimed at all times by
pantheistic philosophy, and have only in later days received
another, and, for our generation, more attractive form, through a
peculiar combination of Darwinism and Buddhism, evolution and
theosophy, Western intelligence and Eastern wisdom. It is so
incredible that this pantheistic-theosophical world-view should be
produced by the revelation of spirits that it could, on the
contrary, be with more justice contended that the newer philosophy
has in a high degree furthered occultism, and has strengthened the
belief therein. And as to the expectation that religion will rest
in the future on the results of psychical research, the remark may
suffice that the religion which seeks its foundation in intercourse
with and in the revelation of spirits denies the name and the
essence of pure religion, and instead of this introduces pagan
superstition. Belief in spirits leads among all peoples and at all
times to spirit-worship. For if the spirits of demons or the
deceased can be called up, hold communication with us, and reveal
to us secret things, then naturally arises the notion that they are
more, or less partakers of the divine attributes of omniscience and
omnipresence, and can help or injure us, at least in a certain
degree. This belief leads unintentionally and of itself to the
practice of adoration and homage. Occultism issues on the one side
in unbelief and indifference with regard to existing religions, and
on the other in the most abounding superstition, spirit- worship,
and magic.<note place="foot" id="ix-p22.2" n="326">Traub, loc. cit. p. 449 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p23">There is only one religion which in principle condemns and
prohibits all this superstition and magic, and that is
Christianity. The Old Testament already contained the revelation
that the Lord alone is Israel’s God, and therefore he only must be
worshipped and served; soothsaying and magic,, inquiry of spirits
and demons, are throughout forbidden. In the New Testament this
worship of the one only true God is emancipated from all national
limits, and is thus raised to its true condition as a worship in
spirit and in truth. True there are prophets and apostles who act
as organs of revelation, but they are still men, and enjoy no other
honor than that which belongs to their office and vocation; even
Mary, the blessed among women, is an ordinary member of the church.
There is also, according to the Scripture, a realm of spirits; but
the angels, notwithstanding the great power which is given to them,
and the important task which is intrusted to them, are never
objects of religious worship; while the attitude which is required
to be taken toward the devils is so far from one of abject slavery
that the only duty which we are commanded to fulfil toward them is
to hate and resist them.</p>
<p id="ix-p24">Christianity is the absolutely spiritual religion, because it is
the only religion which sets religion in relation to God alone;
therefore it is nothing else but religion; the idea of religion is
completely fulfilled in it. For if religion is a reality, then
necessarily it must consist in this,—that man, avoiding all
idolatry, shall rightly acknowledge the one true God, trust only in
him, subject himself to him alone in all humility and patience,
expect all good things from him, love, fear, and honor him with the
whole heart, so that he would rather renounce every created thing
than do anything in the least against the will of God. Now, this is
completely fulfilled in Christianity. It is purely a service of God
alone, with exclusion of all creatures. God is the content and the
subject, the beginning and the ending, the alpha and the omega, of
religion, and nothing of the creature enters into it. On the other
side the whole man is taken into fellowship with that one true God;
not only his feelings, but also his mind and will, his heart and
all his affections, his soul and his body. Christianity is religion
alone, and therefore the pure religion, the full and complete,
indissoluble and eternal, fellowship of God and man.</p>
<p id="ix-p25">Christian theology, which investigates this religion, is on this
account alone an independent and genuine science. As soon as the
Christian religion is no longer acknowledged to be the pure,
complete religion, but is thrown into a heap with all religions,
theology ceases to be an independent science. There may still
remain the study of the religious man (religious anthropology), and
also psychological and historical inquiry into the religions of
different peoples, perhaps also an endeavor to frame a philosophy
of religion and a metaphysics, but there is no longer a theology,
no longer an inquiry into the knowledge of God, and thus no
standard for the judgment of religious phenomena. There only
remains positivism, psychologism, relativism. Revelation, religion,
and theology stand or fall together.</p>
<p id="ix-p26">But if theology possesses a reason for and a right to existence,
it brings with it, as an independent science, its own method also.
At the present time most people hold another opinion. Because they
have abandoned the self-sufficiency of the Christian religion, they
cannot hold to a theology with a method of its own. They suppose
that there are only one or two scientific methods, namely. the
physical and the historical. And thus, if theology is to maintain
itself as a science in the university, it must accept one of these
two methods, and apply it logically to the whole domain of inquiry;
in other words, it must become natural or historical science. In
this way it would lose its right to form an independent faculty in
the circle of science, and would require, therefore, to be brought
into the domain of the philosophical faculty.<note place="foot" id="ix-p26.1" n="327">Harnack, Die Aufgabe der theol. Fakultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgesch., 1901.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p27">Whether one accepts this consequence or not, the principle on
which the standpoint is founded violates science, and denies its
richness and diversity. True, if monism were the right world-view,
and if all phenomena were purely modifications of one, substance,
then there would be only one science and also only one method. It
would be to deny its principle, to give an independent place to
historical science by the side of natural science, and to defend
the right of the historical method. But the world is richer than
materialistic or pantheistic evolution wishes it to appear. A
single factor never suffices for the explanation of phenomena in
any domain. Everywhere there is a richness of life and a fulness of
being. There are different kinds of creatures and phenomena, each
of which requires a special method according to its nature, that we
may know and understand it. Religion and virtue, art and science,
beauty and justice, cannot be handled and measured like bodies; yet
they exist, and occupy a dominating place in existence. Reality
does not arrange itself to fit our system, but our system must form
itself in accordance with reality.</p>
<p id="ix-p28">Life itself receives much greater injury from monistic
doctrinairism than science. If the empirical and historical methods
are the only paths to knowledge, then that wisdom which by nature
is proper to every man, and is augmented and extended in the
practice of life, loses all its value, and there arises between the
schools and society a continually greater divergence and ever
increasing opposition. For however science, with her inquiries and
results, may serve, lead, and promote life, this life always and
everywhere precedes science; it did not originate in science, and
cannot wait for it. Family and society, work and vocation,
agriculture and cattle-rearing, trade and industry, morality,
justice, and art, have all an independent source and sustain
their own character. The whole complete life, which reveals itself
in all these domains and activities, can gratefully make use of the
light which science kindles, but it flows from its own proper
source and streams onward in its own channel. For both life and
science it is, therefore, of the highest importance that the
empirical knowledge, which is obtained in life, and the scientific
knowledge, which is striven after in the schools, should support
and strengthen one another; the wisdom of life is the
starting-point and the foundation of all science, and the
researches of the learned should not aim at extinguishing this
knowledge of practical experience, but at purifying and augmenting
it.<note place="foot" id="ix-p28.1" n="328">J. Kaftan, Die Wahrheit der christl. Religion. Basel, 1888, pp. 266 ff., 318, 319.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p29">This applies especially to religion. If theology acknowledges no
other method than that which is usually taken in the sciences of
nature and history, the religious man is not only totally dependent
on the clericalism of science, but religion itself is robbed of its
independence and freedom. This is recognized by all, so far as
under the influence of Schleiermacher they strive to set religion
free from all knowledge and assent, and conceive it as only trust
in the heart. But this endeavor is a fruitless one. For religion
does not spring up in every individual spontaneously, without
outside influence, but always comes to development by connecting
itself with the religious representations which are, recognized in
a definite circle as truth. The word “faith,” which in Christendom
expresses subjective religiousness, includes, along with the
original religious habit which dwells in the heart of man, also the
adjustment to representations which exist in this religion about
God, world, man, etc.; it is at the same time knowledge and trust,
and expresses the peculiarity of the Christian religion so well
because this religion desires a knowledge of God which is at the
same time trust, love, piety. Just because religion always includes
knowledge, it comes into collision with science, and vice versa.
This collision has existed through all ages and in all religions;
the cause does not lie in arbitrary or occasional abuses of power,
as would be the case if faith were nothing more than a matter of
feeling; but the cause is that both, according to their several
natures, move in the same domain and pronounce themselves on the
same objects and phenomena.<note place="foot" id="ix-p29.1" n="329">Troeltsch, Der Begriff des Glaubens, Religion und Geisteskultur, 1907, 3, pp. 191-221.</note>  And knowledge belongs so intimately
to the essence of religion that religion, if freed from all
religious representations and limited purely to feeling, would
immediately lose its own character. For feeling has in itself no
content and no quality; religious, ethical, and aesthetic feelings
do not exist independently of each other, but are distinguished by
the various representations by which feeling is awakened. Monism,
therefore, always promotes the confusion of religious and wsthetic
feeling, and thereby weakens religion; to limit religion to
feelings does not maintain its independence, but undermines its
existence.</p>
<p id="ix-p30">After the criticism of “the pure reason,” which Kant has worked
out from the standpoint of a mathematical-mechanic science, and
after the criticism of “the historical reason,” which has recently
been developed by men like Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, over
against the one-sidedness of the science of nature, a “criticism of
the religious reason” is still necessary. Theology is occupying
itself with this task in all lands; the formal part of dogmatics is
drawing thought to itself much more than the material part. Yet it
cannot proceed here by mere speculation. Each science must borrow
its form from the object which it investigates, for method is
determined by the object. Now, if the object of theology is no
other than the true and pure religion, which appears to us in
Christianity as the fruit of revelation, then the inquiry after
method results in this one and very important question: How does
the Christian religion itself represent that a man comes to her,
acknowledges her truth, and by her becomes a true religious man,—
that is, a Christian, a child of God? Theology may afterwards
reflect upon the answer which the Christian religion gives, as she
does also upon other elements of truth; she has even the right, the
duty, and the vocation to do this. But she can never produce any
other method than that which is given by her own object. The plan
of salvation in the Christian religion determines the method of
Christian theology.</p>
<p id="ix-p31">If we institute an inquiry into that plan of salvation, we are
met by the fact that the Christian religion does not bring us
merely into relation with persons and events of the past, but by
means of revelations in history seeks to bring us into fellowship
with that God who manifests his truth in that he is always the
same, in the past and in the present. The Christian religion is an
historical, but also a present, religion.<note place="foot" id="ix-p31.1" n="330">G. Vos, Christian Faith and the Truthfulness of Bible History, The Princeton Theol. Review, July, 1906, pp. 289- 305. Troeltsch, Glaube und Geschichte, Religion und Geisteskultur, 1908, pp. 29-39. R. Eucken, Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilos. der Gegenwart. Berlin, 1907, p. 38: Religion und Geschichte.</note>  Whoever seeks
fellowship with God, excluding all history, and revelation in
nature and history,—that is to say, without Christ,—experiences
a religious feeling which misses the objective reality, which feeds
only on itself, and therefore also digests itself. He who frees
himself from all connection with what is before and around him
ruins himself by his autonomy. On the other hand, whosoever
considers the Christian religion simply and alone as historical
religion, and does not make it a religion of the present, wipes out
in principle the distinction between Christianity and the other
religions, and reduces it to a phenomenon which belongs only to the
past, and loses its significance for to-day and the future.</p>
<p id="ix-p32">The peculiarity of the Christian religion, then, as has been so
often shown, and acknowledged even by opponents,<note place="foot" id="ix-p32.1" n="331">E.g. Ed. von Hartmann, Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen Theologie. Berlin, 1880, pp. 1 ff.</note>  lies in the
person of Christ. All other religions are independent, to a certain
degree, of their founders, because those founders were nothing more
than their fust confessors. But Jesus was not the first Christian;
he was and is the Christ. He is not the subject, but the object, of
religion. Christianity is not the religion of Jesus, still less
Jesus-worship,<note place="foot" id="ix-p32.2" n="332">W. von Schnehen, Der moderne Jesuskultus. Frankfort a. M., 1906. O. Pfleiderer, Der moderne Jesuskultus, Protest. Monatshefte, 1906, No. 5.</note>  but Christ-religion. Christianity is now as
dependent on him, from moment to moment, as when he trod this
earth. For he is not a person who lived and worked only in the
past, but he lives and works still, is still Prophet, Priest, and
King, and himself upholds the church, which he established, from
age to age, and assures to her the victory. Christianity, according
to its own confession, does not exist through the strength and
fidelity of its confessors, but through the life and will of its
Mediator. The stages of the application of salvation are as much,
and in the same sense, his interest as the impetration of
salvation. His will and his work is to make men truly religious, to
bring them into fellowship with God, and that is also the will and
the work of God himself. For the will of God to save the world was
not only an annunciation of God’s inclination in the past, but is
an action, a deed, a work of God, which goes on from day to day.
God is love; but that love is no quiescent attribute, but an
eternal, omnipresent energy which realizes itself in the hearts of
men. God is Father; but that Fatherhood is no mere title of honor,
but an almighty, energetic power which regenerates men as his
children and heirs.<note place="foot" id="ix-p32.3" n="333">Henry W. Clark, The Philosophy of Christian Experience. Edinburgh, 1905, pp. 75 ff.</note>  Christianity is no mere revelation of God in
the past, but it is, in connection with the past, a work in the
midst of this and every time. The Father of Jesus works always
hitherto, and he himself works also. All other religions try to
obtain salvation by the works of men, but Christianity makes a
strong protest against this; it is not autosoteric but
heterosoteric; it does not preach self-redemption, but glories in
redemption by Christ alone. Man does not save himself, and does not
save God, but God alone saves man, the whole man, man for eternity.
It is a religion, not of works, but of faith; not of merits, but of
grace. Christianity proves itself in the plan of salvation to be
the absolutely spiritual and pure religion. Man can add nothing to
it,—salvation is God’s work alone; of him, and through him, and to
him, are all things.</p>
<p id="ix-p33">But this almighty and always active will of God is not realized
without man, as antinomians of all kinds imagine, but in man, and
through man. It is realized, according to the witness of the whole
Scripture, in regeneration and faith, in conversion and forgiveness
of sin, in sanctification and perseverance. In other words, if we,
ask of the prophets, of Christ and his apostles, how man comes to a
knowledge of the truth, and to a new life in God’s fellowship, then
they give the answer unanimously,—not by knowledge or action, nor
yet by science or art, nor yet again by good works or civilization,
but by faith and conversion. Scripture has a richness of names for
this plan of salvation; it never gives a dry, dogmatic description,
nor an abstract scheme of conceptions, but shows it to us in life,
and gives us thereby a psychology of religion such as no scientific
investigation, and no questionaire method can bring to light. For
all the steps in the way of salvation are God’s work, the effect
and fulffiment of his will; but because they take place in man, and
are realized in his consciousness and will, they may all be
considered and described also from an anthropological point of
view. The distinct individuality and experience of the prophets and
apostles themselves appear in the different names by which the
process of salvation is indicated. But from whatever point of view
this plan of salvation is considered, this is always the result,
—that man, in order to become a child of God, does not need to be
a cultured being or a citizen of standing, a man of science or of
art, a civilized or a developed man. These are all good, but not
one indicates the way to divine fellowship. In order person must be
converted. Conversion is the sole and the absolutely peculiar way
to heaven.</p>
<p id="ix-p34">In speaking in this way the Christian religion gains at once the
consciences of all men. For there can be no doubt that, if there is
really a redemption, this must consist before all things in
redemption from sin. All men have a notion of good and evil, a
conscience which accuses or excuses thein, a consciousness of guilt
and impurity, a fear of punishment, and a desire for redemption.
But they often err as deeply about the character of sin as about
the way of redemption. On the one side, sin is minified to an
accidental and arbitrary act, from which man can eventually deliver
himself by knowledge or act; on the other side, sin is considered
as such an ineradicable evil that it is identified with being and
nature itself. Confucius holds here the opposite view from Buddha,
Mohammed from Mani, Socrates from Plato. And within the Christian
church the same ideas and contrasts appear now and then. In our
days some preach the doctrine that one must not take sin too
seriously, because it is no habit, no condition, no bad inclination
of the heart, but exclusively an arbitrary act of the will, which
very easily arises from the conflict between the individual and
society, between nature and culture, but for that reason also can
easily be given up and conquered.<note place="foot" id="ix-p34.1" n="334">Comp. the well-known saying of Emerson: “The less we have to do with our sins the better,” and further, Ph. Vivian, The Churches and Modern Thought, 1907, pp. 208 ff. ; F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, Cambridge, 1906. W. R. Inge, Personal Idealism and Mysticism, 1907, p. 171. Lodge, The Substance of Faith, pp. 46 ff. Comp. John M. Edwards, The Vanishing Sense of Sin, Presb. and Ref. Review, Oct., 1899, pp. 606-616.</note>  On the other hand, sin is
represented as a mass of egoistic instincts and passions, which
have been carried over by man from his former animal condition,
which still hold supremacy over the altruistic inclinations in the
savage and in the child, and anachronistically and atavistically
exercise their influence in the criminal type.<note place="foot" id="ix-p34.2" n="335">Thus Lubbock, Lombroso, Bagehot. Comp. Wynaendts Francken, Sociale Vertoogen. Haarlem, 1907, pp. 245 ff.</note>  The two views
approach one another in this way, that the innate egoistic
inclinations, namely, the animality and sensuality, are of
themselves no sin, that they also in later life, if they are
yielded to in conflict with the interests of society, cause no
guilt and no stain, but only betray a weakness and disease, which
need cure. What the wound is to the body, that is the criminal in
society.<note place="foot" id="ix-p34.3" n="336">Corre in R. P. Mees, Wetenschappelijke Karakterkennis. ‘s Gravenh., 1907, p. 63.</note>  In so-called “Christian Science” sin consequently is put
into the same category as illness, and both are represented as an
illusion, as an error in thought, which can only be cured by
thought.<note place="foot" id="ix-p34.4" n="337">In James, Varieties, p. 63.</note>  The fundamental error of heathenism thus returns,
because the holiness of God is lost, and the gods are identified
with the powers of nature; and therefore the distinction between
sin and misery, and accordingly between redemption from sin and
relief from misery, is lost. Modern superstition and the increasing
quackery rest upon each other. If the power on which man depends
loses the character of personal holiness, man feels himself no
longer a guilty sinner, but a powerless, helpless, miserable
creature, and desires not an ethical redemption, but physical cure
and bodily welfare. And if one cannot find these among the
physicians, they are sought for amongst the charlatans and
quacksalvers through superstitious and magic means.</p>
<p id="ix-p35">The Christian religion alone maintains, in opposition to all
these tendencies, the purely ethical character of sin. It does this
by distinguishing between creation and fall. In all systems which
identify sin with the substance of things, creation is changed into
a fall, and the fall which Scripture relates is represented as the
symbol of a remarkable progress in the life of humanity, as the
rise from animal innocence into the state of human consciousness.<note place="foot" id="ix-p35.1" n="338">Stanley Hall, Adol., II, p. 72.</note> 
In reality, the whole order of things is thereby reversed; God
becomes the author of sin, and the serpent the author of human
progress. The Ophites acted, therefore, logically when they
represented God as an unhappy demiurge, and the serpent as a
blessed deity. In truth, in the voluntaristic-pantheistic
philosophy of recent times it is uot God who saves man, but man who
saves God. Scripture restores the original order by distinguishing
and separating creation and fall, but maintains thereby also the
possibility of redemption. For if sin is identified with animality
and sensuality, and has its origin in the descent and nature of
man, then there is no redemption possible except by annihilation.
Heaven is then no uppermost expansion of true life, but the
extinction of all consciousness, will, and personality, the abyss
of nothing, the sinking into everlasting death. On the contrary, if
sin bears an ethical character, then redemption is possible, and
conversion is in principle the conquest of sin, the death of the
old and the resurrection of the new man.<note place="foot" id="ix-p35.2" n="339">Henry Scott Holland, Vital Values, pp. 107-110.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p36">But in that case conversion is a necessary and moral duty for
every man. If the Christian religion maintains the absolute
necessity of conversion, it. joins to itself again the witness of
all consciences, the doctrine and life of the whole of humanity.
Every man has the deep and ineradicable conviction that he is not
what he ought to be; there is a schism between his duty and his
inclination which he cannot deny and cannot do away with. Man is
broken; his unity, his harmony has gone. And the strangest thing in
this strange phenomenon is that he is not two men who struggle with
one another, but he is in both cases the same man. It is our
conceptions, ideas, inclinations and desires which are striving
together and seeking to obtain the mastery; it is the same subject
which excuses and accuses itself, which gives way willingly to
sinful desire, and is afterwards torn by repentance and grief,
which alternately springs up in joy and languishes in sorrow.<note place="foot" id="ix-p36.1" n="340">Höfler, Grundlehren der Psychologie. 1905, p. 108.</note> 
From the whole history of man resounds a heartbreaking complaint
over the disruption of life; it finds its finest expression in the
songs of the poets, but each man knows it by experience; all
religion is animated by it, every eflort toward reform proceeds
from it, all ethics assume the imperative tone after the
descriptive one, and every philosophy strives to set the heart at
ease as well as to satisfy the intelligence. Men may differ as to
the nature and the reach of conversion, but its necessity is
established beyond all doubt; the whole of humanity proclaims the
truth of the fall.</p>
<p id="ix-p37">There is no doubt much diversity in the manner in which
conversion takes place. Scripture makes it clear that by conversion
is meant a religious and moral change in man, by which he deserts
his sinful ways and learns to know, love, and serve with his whole
heart the true God, who has revealed himself in Christ; but it at
the same time allows a wide application of this idea, and
discriminates the process itself from the manner in which it is
brought about. It speaks of the conversion of Israel and of the
heathen, of individuals and of towns and of peoples, and it
exhibits ir. the examples of Nathanael and Nicodemus, Zaccheus and
Mary Magdalene, Paul and Timothy, different modes in which
conversion may be realized.<note place="foot" id="ix-p37.1" n="341">Joh. Herzog, Der Begriff der Bekehrung. Giessen, 1903, pp. 21 ff. Jacques de la Combe, Les nouveau nés de l’Esprit. Paris, 1905, pp. 133 ff.</note>  In early times, when Christianity was
conquering a place for itself in the world through the preaching of
the apostles, conversion coalesced with the resolution to abandon
idolatry and to serve the only living God. The New Testament
describes to us the transition of Christianity from Judaism to the
Greco-Roman world, and is, in the first place, the book of the
mission which was fulfilled by the work of the apostles.<note place="foot" id="ix-p37.2" n="342">John W. Diggle, Short Studies in Holiness. London, 1900, pp. 47 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p38">When later the church obtained a firm foothold in the world, and
grew not so much through missions among the heathen as by means of
catechizing her own children, conversion assumed another form,
while remaining the same in essence. In infant baptism it was
confessed that conversion and regeneration differ, and conversion
is ordinarily a coming to consciousness of that new life which has
long before been planted in the heart. An illustration of this is
supplied also by revivals, which do not occur among heathen, but
only within the limits of the Christian church. The psychology of
religion also suggests that the sudden conversions which occur in
revival-meetings need not be so sudden as they appear, but may he a
revivification of impressions and emotions received sometimes years
previously, and have sunk into the heart beneath the threshold of
consciousness, and by the force of peculiar circumstances spring
again into new life.<note place="foot" id="ix-p38.1" n="343">Starbuck, Psychol. of Religion, pp. 85,108, 158.</note>  It is a good work to awaken the sleeping
churches, and to stir up the unconscious life into conscious
action, but it is a fault if the organic existence of the church is
insufficiently recognized, involving as this does a
misunderstanding of the covenant of grace and too close an
identification of conversion with one definite form of conversion,
which is therefore prescribed as necessary to all and produced
artificially. As soon as this happens, human agency is confused
with the work of the Spirit, the essence is sacrificed to the form,
and sometimes even to very strange forms, and the earnestness and
richness of Scripture is lost.</p>
<p id="ix-p39">It may be remarked throughout Scripture that the essence and the
seriousness of conversion are never obseured, and yet the rich
variety of its manifestation is continually exhibited. Mary and
Martha were very different in religious disposition, but Jesus
loved them both. The apostles differed in endowments and character,
but they were all disciples of the Lord. In the Christian church,
Augustine and Francis of Assisi, Luther and Calvin, Wesley and
Zinzendorf, walked in various pathways, but still they were all
children of the same Father’s house, with its many mansions. So far
as it is intended merely to give expression to the rich diversity
of spiritual life, the distinction between “healthy-minded” and
“morbid-minded souls” need not be condemned.<note place="foot" id="ix-p39.1" n="344">James, Varieties, pp. 78-126, 127-165.</note>  All have not the
same experience of guilt and grace; the deeper knowledge of sin,
and the richer comfort of forgiveness, are not the root, but the
fruit of Christian faith.<note place="foot" id="ix-p39.2" n="345">Joh. Herzog, op. cit., p. 103.</note>  The Gospel is so rich, and the
salvation purchased by Christ contains so many and diverse
benefits, that the most varied needs of men are satisfied by it,
and the richest powers of human nature are ‘brought to development.
There are times in which the Gospel especially attracts, because it
promises forgiveness of all guilt of sin; and there are other times
in which it charms most, because it stills the thirst for a new,
holy life.<note place="foot" id="ix-p39.3" n="346">Ibid., pp. 99 ff.</note>  The Gospel of the Synoptics, of John, and Paul, and
Peter, and James, have awakened various sympathies in the different
churches and among different peoples in different times and places.
In every nation is accepted with God he who fears him and works
righteousness.</p>
<p id="ix-p40">Nevertheless conversion must remain conversion. What it is no
science or philosophy can tell us, but we learn from Holy Scripture
alone. If this does not tell us, or is not to be trusted in what it
tells us, we are in despair as to the redemption of the world and
the salvation of mankind. Philosophy may teach us through the lips
of Kant and Schopenhauer—though even this always under the
influence of Christianity—that if sin is to be really eliminated
from human nature, a sort of regeneration is necessary. But it can
never proclaim the glad tidings that such a conversion exists, nor
can it show the way to obtain it. The psychology of religion may
bring into view the phenomena which are connected with conversion
from the anthropological side, and illustrate thein by analogies
from other regions, but it does not penetrate, as it itself
acknowledges,<note place="foot" id="ix-p40.1" n="347">James, Varieties, pp. 196 ff., 242-270. Coe, The Spiritual Life, p. 144.</note>  to the core and the cause of these phenomena. It
even incurs the danger—if it abandons the guidance of Scripture
and presents these phenomena exclusively from an anthropological
standpoint—of sacrificing the essence to the form and the kernel
to the husk. Viewed psychologically, all alterations of personality
are alike: the fall is as much a transformation of consciousness as
redemption and regeneration; the change of a virtuous man into a
drunkard or a voluptuary, a thief or a murderer, is as much a
“conversion” as the coming to himself of the prodigal son and his
return to his father’s house.<note place="foot" id="ix-p40.2" n="348">James, op. cit., pp. 178 ff., 201, 203.</note>  If certain phenomena which are
often connected with conversion are wanting, some rashly conclude
that conversion itself has not really taken place, or was not
wholly necessary. By the side of the “twice-born” is ranged, then,
the category of the “once-born men,” or righteous men who have no
need of conversion.<note place="foot" id="ix-p40.3" n="349">James, op. cit., pp. 78 ff.</note>  The diversity of religious phenomena leads
men rashly to the conclusion that conversion has no reality, that
all “conversions” are in themselves equally real, and that each man
can be saved in his own way.<note place="foot" id="ix-p40.4" n="350">James, op. cit. pp. 162, 374,347, 487.</note>  Thus under the psychological
treatment the essence of conversion is lost, just as life perishes
vivisection. Pragmatism, which only takes into account empirical
phenomena, is nominalistic in principle, and becomes relativistic
in result.</p>
<p id="ix-p41">Scripture and experience are both in opposition to this
levelling of all essential distinctions; for both testify that
conversion is not one of those many transformations of
consciousness which often take place in human life, but that it
bears a specific character. Conversion can be said to be genuine
only when a man is changed in his entire being in such a way that
he experiences a hearty repentance and an inner horror of sin,
succeeded by a lively joy in God and a sincere desire for the
fulfilment of his will. True conversion consists only in the dying
of the old sinful man, and in the resurrection of the new, holy
man.<note place="foot" id="ix-p41.1" n="351">Heidelberg Catechism, questions 88-90. Comp. Gennrich, Die Lehre von der Wiedergeburt, die Christl. Zentrallehre in dogmengesch. u. religionsgeseh. Belenchtang. Leipzig, 1907.</note>  “All holy persons are twice-born persons,”<note place="foot" id="ix-p41.2" n="352">John W. Diggle, op. cit., pp. 25 ff.</note>  for by nature
man does not possess that holiness and that deep and hearty love to
God and desire for the fulfilment of his commandments. When Kant
and Schopenhauer, and many others speak so much of the radical evil
in human nature, they thereby bear witness to the truth. Stanley
Hall rightly asks, “Who that is honest and has true self-knowledge
will not confess to recognizing in his own soul the germs and
possibilities of about every crime, vice, insanity, superstition,
and folly in conduct he ever heard of?<note place="foot" id="ix-p41.3" n="353">Stanley Hall, Adolescence, II, p. 86.</note>  And James acknowledges
in the same way that “healthy-mindedness is inadequate as a
philosophical doctrine because the evil facts which it refuses
positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality.”<note place="foot" id="ix-p41.4" n="354">James, Varieties, p. 163.</note> </p>
<p id="ix-p42">Now there may be differences of opinion as to the possibility
and reality of a conversion such as Scripture and the Christian
religion teach. But if it exists, there can be no doubt that it has
another source and another cause than the purely psychological
operation of human representations and powers. The psychology of
religion rightly says that it neither will nor can pronounce a
decision.<note place="foot" id="ix-p42.1" n="355">See above, note 61.</note>  James goes even further, and says that reality itself
is revealed in the unconscious, that hidden powers and ideas work
there, and that God’s mercy is working through the “subliminal
door”; and so he calls himself a supernaturalist, though in a
modified form.<note place="foot" id="ix-p42.2" n="356">James, Varieties, pp. 230 ff., 270, 501, 520 ff</note>  It causes no wonder that this supernaturalism is
acknowledged in religious experience, for, if revelation in
history, especially in the person and work of Christ, is denied,
the truth and the right of religion can only be maintained by
accepting a revelation in the religious subject. If religion is,
really communion with God, it includes his indwelling and inworking
in the human soul. Scripture and theology, therefore, have always
taught and maintained such a fellowship of God and man in their
doctrine of the mystical union. But if this revelation in the
subject is isolated from all objective revelation in nature and
Scripture, in history and the church, it opens the door for all
kinds of error. Finally, such a subjective revelation results in
nothing beyond a “more,” which works in the “subliminal
consciousness” of man, and is interpreted by each one according to
his nature and environment.<note place="foot" id="ix-p42.3" n="357">James, op. cit., pp. 433, 513-525.</note>  Pragmatism leads here also to
indifferentism regarding all religions.</p>
<p id="ix-p43">Such a religious indifferentism is, however, in conflict with
all experience, and is in the strongest way contradicted by the
Christian religion. For the conversion which brings us into
fellowship with God never happens unmediatedly, but is always
connected with representations and impressions which we have
received at some time, shorter or longer, previously.<note place="foot" id="ix-p43.1" n="358">The operation of a supernatural factor in the subliminal consciousness is denied by Peirce, Jastrow, Stanley Hall (Adol., I, preface, II, p. 43), over against Myers and James.</note>  It always
takes place in connection with historical Christianity, which in
one or another form exists before and without us, and now enters
into harmony with our own soul. It does not arise spontaneously out
of and by ourselves, but causes us to live with fuller conviction
in the religious circle wherein we were born and brought up, or into which in later life we have been introduced. The religious representations are thus no subjective interpretations of our personal emotions; we formulate them as little as the child, who, though it brings with it the faculty of speech, does not produce speech itself, but receives the whole treasure of words from the lips of its mother. Man does not produce truth by thought in any domain, and certainly not in religion, but by inquiry and study he learns to know the truth, which exists independently of and before him. Therefore religious experience is neither the source nor the foundation of religious truth;<note place="foot" id="ix-p43.2" n="359">Forsyth, The Distinctive Thing in Christian Experience, Hibbert Journal, April, 1908, pp. 481 ff.</note> it only brings us into union with the existing truth, and makes us recognize as truth what formerly was for us only an empty sound, or even was denied and opposed by us. Conversion is not the source of truth, but the source of certainty as to the truth. It bears witness in our heart as to the religious representations which existed outside of and before us. </p>
<p id="ix-p44">So we have on the one side to maintain the dependence of religious experience on historical Christianity, and on the other side equally to recognize its independence and liberty. Many know no other dilemma than either external authority, blind belief, intellectual consent to alien and hard dogma, or else free piety and individual formulation of religious life.<note place="foot" id="ix-p44.1" n="360">Sabatier, Les Religions d’Autorité et la Religion de l’Esprit. Paris, 1904.</note> But reality teaches us quite differently. Just as we with open eyes do not create the reality of the world, but only recognize it,—just as we by thought do not produce the truth, but seek and find it,—so also the religious man receives the reality of spiritual things which are presented to him by God perfectly freely and spontaneously. He now sees them, where he was formerly blind; he understands now what he earlier as a natural man could not conceive; by re-birth he enters into the kingdom of heaven; by loving the will of God he knows that Jesus speaks, not of himself, but of the Father; he hears and understands Jesus’ voice now because he can endure his word. So one can understand that conversion produces and generates an unwavering certainty as to the things which the Christian religion teaches us. If it were nothing more than a matter of feeling or sentiment, and were confined entirely to the mysticism of the heart, it would not be able to awaken such a personal interest in the objective words and events of Christianity. But experience teaches otherwise. Conversion takes place in connection with the Christian religion; faith, which forms its positive side, is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, because it is at the same time cognitio and fiducia, a trustful knowledge and a knowing trust. It is accompanied from its first existence by a group of representations, is born in our heart in connection with them, and binds us to them irrevocably. Conversion, which is equally repentance and faith, sorrow and joy, death and resurrection, changes the whole man in principle as to his being and consciousness, incorporates him into another world of representations than that in which he formerly lived. Those representations also depend mutually on each other. Both psychologically and logically the representations which we receive in our conversion associate themselves with those which Christianity includes within the circle to which we belonged from birth or were later adopted into. It is not the least merit of Christianity that it includes such an harmonious whole of representations, which reconcile subject and object, man and world, nature and revelation.<note place="foot" id="ix-p44.2" n="361">Seeberg, Grundwahrheiten der Chr. Religion. Leipzig, 1903, pp. 11-37.</note></p>
<p id="ix-p45">This whole process of conversion, which begins with the awakening of the consciousness of guilt and misery and develops itself into a hearty joy in God through Christ, is from the beginning to the end psychologically mediated. We do not here see God face to face, even if we descend into the depths of our own soul. Unconsciousness, ecstasy, hallucination, dreaming, and contemplation do not bring us nearer to him than the conscious life, as the mysticism of all centuries has fancied, for we walk by faith and not by sight. And not only so, but there arise in our own heart, in the world around us, and in the revelation of Scripture itself, all kinds of difficulties which we cannot resolve. But if we are convinced in our deepest soul that God will save us personally, and in its beginnings has saved us, then it is an unavoidable postulate of faith that this will also reveals itself outside of us in history, and that the world and humanity will not be led to an eternal death and a dark night and an unfathomable abyss, but to a never-ending day of light and glory. Above the power of nature and above the power of sin raises and maintains itself the almighty will of the Heavenly Father, who subdues wind and sea and all things. </p>
<p id="ix-p46">Conversion and faith in our own heart are the operation and fruit of that will. Though they occur thus in a psychological way, which takes into account each man’s character and environment, yet they are a revelation of that will which works in us both to will and to do according to his good pleasure. In and by our own testimony we bear the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which, in its turn is added to the witness of Holy Scripture and of the church of all centuries. In this witness the souls of all God’s children are secure; through the breakers of doubt it brings them into the haven of God’s love. </p>
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 9. Revelation and Culture" id="x" prev="ix" next="xi">
<h2 id="x-p0.1">Lecture 9 - Revelation and Culture</h2>
<p id="x-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="x-p2">The well-known preacher, J. Chr. Blumhardt, once said that man must be twice converted, first from the natural to the spiritual life, and then from the spiritual to the natural.<note place="foot" id="x-p2.1" n="362">In Joh. Herzog, Der Begriff der Bekehrung, p. 1 9.</note> He thus declared, in somewhat paradoxical language, a truth which is confirmed by the religious experience of every Christian and by the history of Christian piety in all ages. The spiritual life, which is from above, strives again after what is above; it expresses itself in the sigh of the psalmist,—Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee; and it knows no higher desire than to depart and be with Christ, which is far better. It was under the influence of this inclination of the spiritual life that in the early days of Christianity ascetic life arose, and it is for that reason also that it has maintained itself till the present day in various pious circles. Other causes and considerations have, however, certainly added to that influence, which in primitive times gave origin and strength to this tendency of spiritual life. </p>
<p id="x-p3">When Christianity entered into the world, it was immediately called on to face a difficult problem. Christianity, which is based on revelation, appeared in a world which had long existed and led its own life. A society had been formed which was full of intricate interests. A state was in existence the citizens of which lived in safety and peace. Arts and sciences were practised and had been brought to great perfection. Morals and habits had assumed a fixed form. Conquests had created a powerful kingdom, and had brought in enormous capital. In a word, the Gospel of Christ found a rich natural life, a highly developed culture. And thus the question was inevitably raised how the relations between the two should be adjusted. </p>
<p id="x-p4">The different forms in which this question may be put show its importance and extent. For the problem always remains the same, whether one speaks of the relation between the preaching of the apostles and the Greco-Roman world, or between re-creation and creation, the work of the Son and the work of the Father, the kingdom of heaven and the kingdoms of the earth, sabbath- and week-days, Christianity and humanism, church and state, faith and science, theology and philosophy, authority and reason, the religious and empirical world-view, heaven and earth, divine gifts and human labor, revelation and culture. The problem which is present in all these forms of expression belongs not to a single period, but has been in order all through the ages, and will remain so till the return of Christ. And it does not belong to scientific thought alone, but forces itself upon every man in his every day life. All tendencies which present themselves in life and thought can be described and estimated from the standpoint they take respecting this principial question. Even systems which have broken with all religion and Christianity are compelled, by the force of reality, to take it into account. For though thousands exert themselves to set our present-day culture free from all the past, and to establish it on a new scientific foundation, in reality all our institutions of family and society and state are still resting on Christian principles, and all our morals and habits are still pervaded by the Christian spirit. </p>
<p id="x-p5">Therefore it is not to be wondered at that the first Christians did not solve this world-historical problem satisfactorily, and did not attain unanimity in the position which they adopted. There were those who looked so kindly upon culture that they failed to do justice to the rights and requirements of the Christian confession. There were others who turned their backs on the entire culture of the time, and sought their strength in renouncing it. The early Christians were nevertheless not essentially ascetics. They firmly believed that the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof ; and they considered themselves the new humanity, in which Jew and Greek found their unity and destination.<note place="foot" id="x-p5.1" n="363">Harnack, Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, I, pp. 185-197. Sell, Katholiz. und Protest. Leipzig, 1908, pp. 24, 103 ff.</note> But the then existing culture was so intimately connected with all kinds of heathen practices that Christians could take little part in it without denying their faith, and needed to content themselves with practising the more passive virtues of Christian morality. In a world such as Paul describes in the first chapter of his epistle to the Romans there was, for a small, weak body of believers, no other than a negative position possible.</p>
<p id="x-p6">But this negative position nevertheless brought serious dangers in the long run. When in the second century dualistic and ascetic Gnosticism spread in its varied forms over the Roman empire, it did not fail of influence over many Christians also. The ascetic inclination which thus appeared was in the third and fourth centuries increased by the worldliness of the church, and strengthened by the infiltration of Stoic and Neoplatonic elements of thought.<note place="foot" id="x-p6.1" n="364">Harnack, Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte. Giessen, 1886. Zöckler, Askese und Mönchtum, Frankfurt a. M., 1897.</note> From that time onward many sought solitude in order to
pass their life in penitence, or to devote it to works of mercy.
This anchorite life in the West underwent later an important
modification, and was made use of by the church for all kinds of
moral ends,—land-development and agriculture, science and art,
the spreading of the gospel and the expansion of the church. But
the church also felt the influence of this recognition of the
monastic life, and developed a double way to the attainment of the
ideal of Christian perfection by introducing the distinction
between precepts and counsels. Perfection, to be sure, is the goal
for every Christian, as much for the laity as for the clergy and
the monk. But the vow of poverty, chastity and obedience is
nevertheless the shorter and safer way to that goal. Ascetic, life
is a specially meritorious striving after perfection; monastic life
sets apart a special class of men, and is a praiseworthy form of
Christian life; marriage, family, social vocation, service of the
state, property, and riches are not in themselves sinful but place
many obstacles in the way of the religious life; he who abstains
from them acts better, and becomes the religious man par
excellence.<note place="foot" id="x-p6.2" n="365">P. Höveler, Prof. A. Harnack und die katholische Askese. Düsseldorf, 1902.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p7">Though this asceticism is intimately associated with the
doctrine and the life of the Roman Church, it has nevertheless,
from the Reformation to the present day, exercised also a strong
attractive power over many churches and sects in Protestantism.
Anabaptism certainly cannot be fully explained from the monastic
orders and sects of the Middle Ages; for whence came then its
schism with the Roman Church, and its strong opposition to its
hierarchy and forms of worship? But it adopted the old ascetic
ideal, and tried to realize it by a radical reformation in the
circle of believers. This reformation ended in separation,—
separation, namely, between church and world, Christian and civil
life, re-creation and creation, Spirit and Word, New and Old
Testament; in a word, between the heavenly substance, which Christ
brought with him and communicates to his believers in regeneration, and the
earthly substance, which we receive from Adam in the natural birth.
The same dualism has in a modified form since continued to work in
many devout circles, and has even received more lately strong
support from all those persons and schools which ascribe to
original Christianity an ascetic ideal of life. These, however, are
themselves divided again into two parties.</p>
<p id="x-p8">The first group is formed by those who, by inclination or
education, by their own experience or through exterior influences,
have learned to know the value of the ascetic life, and therefore
look with more or less of grief and ofeence on present-day culture.
There are not a few who, in comparing the life of our time with
that of Jesus, discover no connection or congruity, but only
contrast and opposition. If, they say, Jesus, who condemns the
powerful and rich, despises earthly treasures, feels compassion for
the sick and poor, and seeks out the publican and sinner, is right,
then present-day society, with its mammonism and capitalism, with
its self-conceit and deification of power, is quite wrong. They
demand of Christians, If you confess Jesus as the Son of God, and
accept his word as divine truth, why do you not follow his example
and walk in his footsteps? Why do you live in magnificent homes,
clothed in purple and fine linen, and fare sumptuously every day,
and gather treasures which are corrupted by moth and rust? And why
do you not give your possessions away, feed the hungry, relieve the
thirsty, shelter the homeless, clothe the naked, visit the sick and
in prison, proclaim the gospel to the poor? They explain to us and
figure out how Jesus if he lived now would behave, and what would
be his conduct towards the press and politics, towards the market
and exchange, towards the factory and parliament.<note place="foot" id="x-p8.1" n="366">E. g. The True History of Joshua Davidson, Communist. 1873 (2 ed.. The Life of Joshua Davidson, by E. Lynn Linton, 1889). Sheldon, In his Steps: or “What Would Jesus Do?” Chicago, 1897, Rev. ed. 1899. Comp. also Hall Caine, The Christian, and Marie Corelli, The Master-Christian.</note>  And some have
taken the matter so seriously to heart that they have sought to put
this moral ideal into actual practice. Tolstoi, for example,
constructed a wholly passive ethics, from the commandment in the
sermon on the mount, to resist not evil. The source of all misery
is found, they declare, in society, with its lies and pretences; in
the church, with her absurd dogmas; in the state, with its law and
war; in the whole civil life of our time, with its marriage,
castes, conventional forms, corrupt atmosphere, tobacco and
alcohol. And escape from these miseries, we are told, is possible
only if we turn our backs on all these institutions, return to
nature, abandon altogether all force and justice, all wrath and
punishment, and live again like children, simply and uprightly.
Then the broken harmony between need and satisfaction will be
restored, and happiness and peace return.<note place="foot" id="x-p8.2" n="367">Tolstoi, Worin bestebt mein Glaube? 1885.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p9">On the other side are those who agree, no doubt, that original
Christianity bore an ascetic character, but draw therefrom just the
opposite conclusion, namely, that Christianity has had its day, and
can no longer live with our present-day culture. In the estimate of
the person of Jesus an important change has slowly taken place.
After Rationalism had rejected the church doctrine concerning the
person of Christ, men such as Strauss and Renan, Schenkel and Keim
and Holtzmann took indeed a humanitarian view of the life of Jesus.
But in their view Jesus, though not the Son of God, was still the
true, ideal man, who established the pure religion by his word and
deed, free from all sacerdotalism and ceremonial worship, who
purified morals from all legalism, who as a human man shared in all
the pleasures of life, and presented a moral ideal which deserves
our admiration and imitation to-day.<note place="foot" id="x-p9.1" n="368">Weinel, Jesus im neunzehnten Jahrh. Tiibingen, 1903. Schweitzer, Von Reimarus zu Wrede. Tübingen, 1906. W. Sanday, The Life of Christ in Recent Research, Oxford, 1907.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p10">But in these last days, especially since the investigations of
Baldensperger and Johannes Weiss,<note place="foot" id="x-p10.1" n="369">W. Baldensperger, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu im Lichte der messian. Hoffnungen seiner Zeit I. Strassburg, 1903. J. Weiss, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes. Göttingen, 1900.</note>  an entirely new conception has
in the case of many taken the place of this humanitarian idea.
Humanitarian traits are not indeed entirely lacking from the figure
of Jesus; yet according to the description given of him by the
Synoptic Gospels he was a totally different kind of man. He was not
a quiet, pious man, and not a philosophic teacher of virtue. but a
prophet, an enthusiast, a fanatic, who lived under the impression
of the speedy advent of the kingdom of God, and therefore exhorted
his contemporaries to faith and conversion. As a man he was not
nearly so great as the liberal theology has represented him.
Although he was characterized by a praiseworthy willingness to help
all misery, he was nevertheless a limited and superstitious man,
believed in evil spirits and eternal punishment, was subject to
visions and hallucinations, showed traits even of an hereditary
epilepsy, paranoia, and finally attempted, when his preaching
received no acceptance, to gain the victory by an act of force. His
doctrine contained nothing new, but joined itself to the ideas and
expectations of his time; his notion of the kingdom of God was not
that of a moral community,but bore an exclusively eschatological
character; and his ethics acquired, under Essenic, or even under
Buddhistic, influences, an ascetic color. Perhaps he was originally
an Aryan, or perhaps even he never existed, and his figure is the
creation of one or another of the sects produced by the commotions
of the age.<note place="foot" id="x-p10.2" n="370">The literature which deals with Jesus in this spirit is increasing daily; witness such works as the following: Kalthoff, Das Christusproblem, Grundlinien zu einer Sozialtheologie. Leipzig, 1903. Pfleiderer, Das Christusbild des urchristl. Glaubens in religionsgesch. Beleuchtung. Berlin, 1903. Paul Wernle, Die Anfänge unserer Religion, 1904. W. B. Smith, Der vorchristl. Jesus nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgesch. des Urchrist. Mit einem Vorwort vou P. W. Schmiedel.I&amp;gt;Christus ein Inder? Stuttgart, 1907. Dr. de Loosten, Jesus Christus vom Standpunkte des Psychiaters. Bamberg, 1905. E. Rasmussen, Jesus, eine vergleichende psychopathol. Studie. Leipzig, 1905. Binet-Sangle, La Folie de Jésus. Paris, 1908. Arthur Heulhard, Le mensonge Chrétien (Jésus-Christ n’a pas existé), I. Le Charpentier. Paris. 1908. Bolland, Het Leven en Sterven van Jezus Christus, 1907.</note>  In any case his view of the world and life is not
suitable for our time and circumstances. When he pronounces his woe
on the rich, esteems occupation with earthly affairs an obstacle to
the heavenly vocation, recommends the unmarried condition, and
takes no thought at all of political and social life, he can be no example for us, and his ethics can supply us with no
standard.<note place="foot" id="x-p10.3" n="371">Thus among others Mill, On Liberty, chap. 2. Theob. Ziegler, Gesch. der christl. Ethik, I, pp. 62 ff. Paulson, System der Ethik, pp. 50 ff. Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube. 1872, pp. 57 ff. Ed. von Hartmann, Das Christentum des N. Testam. 1905. Vorwort, etc.</note>  Nor does this opposition to Christian ethics concern
subordinate points, but their kernel and essence. Christian ethics
have laid to their charge legalism and heteronomy, seeking for
reward and transcendent eudaemonism, withdrawal from the world and
contempt of all culture, and especially of the senses and marriage.
Nietzsche has endeavored, therefore, to reverse all its values.
Instead of the morals of slaves which Jews and Christians have
introduced, he wished to restore to honor the original morals of
free men; his system may be called a logical aristocratic
anarchism.<note place="foot" id="x-p10.4" n="372">Nitzsch, Die Weltanschauung Fr. Nietzsche’s, Zeits. Für Theol. und Kirche. 1905, pp. 344 - 360.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p11">If we are to speak of the relation which Christianity bears to
culture, we must first of all give a clear account of what we
understand by culture, and of precisely the kind of culture
Christianity is to form a contrast to. The word “culture,” which
has come into use especially since the eighteenth century, along
with other terms, such as civilization, enlightenment, development,
education, indicates generally cultivation, improvement, and always
presupposes an object which must be improved. This object may be
indicated generally by the name of nature, for it always consists
of something not made by man, but ofiered to him by creation.
Culture in the broadest sense thus includes all the labor which
human power expends on nature. But this nature is twofold; it
includes not only the whole visible world of phenomena which is
outside man, but also, in a wider sense, man himself ; not his body
alone, but his soul also. The faculties and powers which man
possesses have not been acquired by him, but are given to him by
God; they are a gift of nature, and these gifts are a means for
cultivating the external world, as well as an object which must be
cultivated. Thus there are two great circles of culture. To the
first belong all those activities of man for the production and
distribution of material goods, such m agriculture, cattle-rearing,
industry, and trade. And the second circle includes all that labor
whereby man realizes objectively his ideals of the true, the good,
and the beautiful, by means of literature and science, justice and
statecraft, works of beauty and art, and at the same time works out
his own development and civilization.<note place="foot" id="x-p11.1" n="373">Lexis, Das Wesen der Kultur, in Die Nultur der Gegenwart I. Eucken, Geistige Strömungen, 1904, pp. 226 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p12">Such a culture has existed at all times, from the moment when
man appeared on the earth and sought satisfaction of his manifold
needs by labor. And from its first origin this culture has been
closely connected with religion; in all ages and among all peoples
these two are found together, and go forward hand in hand. It was
not till the eighteenth century that culture was raised to a power
which emancipated itself from the Christian religion and the whole
ancient world-view, and sought to become an absolutely new, modern
culture. Nobody, therefore, can declare that culture as such stands
in contrast with religion, for all the preceding centuries raise a
sharp protest against such an assertion. It can, at the most, be
contended that our specifically present-day culture is in conflict
with religion and Christianity.</p>
<p id="x-p13">But before this can be proved an exact definition should first
be given of what is meant by modern culture. Immense difficulties
present themselves when this is attempted, and the hope of
attaining a clear and generally accepted conception seems illusive.
In the first place, modern culture in some respects, and according
to some estimates, forms an antithesis to that of former centuries.
But this antithesis is not absolute. We are all, whether we will or
not, standing on the shoulders of former generations. All our
society, family, labor, vocation, state-craft, legislation, morals,
habits, arts, sciences, are permeated still with the Christian
spirit. The opponents of Christianity know this very well, and
their antagonism against Christianity is so strong just because the
Christian spirit shows itself all along the line, leavens
everything, and exerts its influence even upon them notwithstanding
themselves. Thought has often to a great extent emancipated itself
from Christianity ; but life goes quietly on, and is continually
led from the sources of the past. Modern culture would like to be
absolutely modern, but it is not, and cannot be so; it is a product
of, and thus also a moment in, history.</p>
<p id="x-p14">But even if we do not take into account this alliance with the
past, and wish to judge modern culture on its own merits, we do not
obtain the unity and clearness which are necessary in order to form
an exact conception of it. For modem culture is an abstract name
for many phenomena, and forms no unity at all. Not only are there
innumerable factors which ]have contributed to its development, but
it is also in the highest degree divided in itself. Everywhere, and
in all domains, in politics, social economy, art, science, morals,
instruction, education, there are parties, tendencies, and schools
which stand in opposition to one another; the realms of justice and
culture, church and state, faith and science, capital and labor,
nomism and antinomism, combat each other, and proceed on different
principles. Monism no doubt seeks here also for an abstract unity;
but it sacrifices the diversity and richness of life to a theory,
and blinds itself to the sharp contrasts which reality exhibits. It
is, therefore, an empty phrase to say that modern culture, is at
strife with Christianity and religion; as to some phenomena it may
be said with some appearance of right, but to others it is not in
the least applicable.</p>
<p id="x-p15">Finally, we should consider that modern culture in the sense of
an extensive group of various phenomena is not a finished thing; it
is not complete, and not objectively placed before us; it has
existed but a short time in the past, and is still developing from
day to day. We are thus in the middle of it, and live in a
“transition period,”—an expression which says little of itself,
because all time is a time of transition and change, but yet here
embodies an old and well-known truth, in opposition to all who try
to separate the present from the past and the future and make it
absolute. Therefore nobody can say whither modern culture will lead
us; one can surmise, guess, speculate, but there is no certainty at
all. As to the phenomena which now already present themselves, and
are included under the name of modern culture, the estimates of
their value vary very much. There are some of them which are
approved by nobody. Who, for example, defends the materialistic
tone, the mammonism, the alcoholism, the prostitution so
prevalentinthesedays? Who is blind to the defects which attach to
our modern culture or to the dangers to which it exposes us? Each
one is thus obliged, whatever religious or philosophical standpoint
he may occupy, to apply a standard in his judgment of modern
culture; he cannot accept it in its entirety; whether he will or
not, he goes to work eclectically. and will approve some phenomena
as in agreement with his own world-view, and dissent strongly from
others in the name of that same world-view. And as to the future,
the estimation of modern culture will depend upon the direction in
which it moves, which nobody can foresee or foretell. Men are
alternately panegyrists and grumblers, and the same man plays in
turn the one or the other role according to what pleases or vexes
him.</p>
<p id="x-p16">The assertion that modern culture is in conflict with
Christianity is thus a meaningless phrase. Who ventures to assert
that marriage and family, state and society, art and science, trade
and industry as such are condemned and opposed by Christianity? At
the most such an assertion may be made as to the manner and the
direction in which these institutions and activities at the present
time are developing or are carried on. This is no doubt what is
meant. There are phenomena upon which a very different estimate is
placed by many of our contemporaries from that placed upon them by
the gospel of Christ. But it is mere presumption for them to
identifv their judgment with modern culture itself and to reject
the whole of Christianity in her name. It may be explainable, for
it makes an impression to say that culture, and science and state
have antiquated Christianity; but it is not excusable, for it
places the antithesis in a false light, brings confusion into the
ideas, and is injurious to both Christianity and culture. If we
search out what in modern culture is antithetically opposed to
Christianity and then reduce this to a principle, we shall arrive
at the same idea which was found above to be irreconcilable in it
with Christian faith. The complaint which many make against
Christianity, its doctrine of faith and life, is based on its
so-called heteronomy and transcendence. There is in modern society
a striving after independence and freedom, such as was unknown in
earlier times, or at least not recognized in the same degree. We
meet with this among all men, and in every position and circle of
life ; science, art, industry, trade, labor, capital, all desire to
govern themselves, and to be obedient only to the laws which are
laid down for them by their own mode of life. This striving in
itself is not illegitimate or unjustifiable, for men are not
machines, but free-thinking and free-living rational and moral
beings. But it undeniably often assumes a character which
interdicts existence, and the right of existence, to all objective
authority, to all external law, to every destiny of man which
passes beyond this earthly life. The legitimate, struggle for
independence and liberty is transformed into a theoretically
proclaimed and practically applied autonomy and anarchy, and these
naturally place themselves in opposition to Christianity. For
Christianity comes into collision with such an autonomy, as does
every religion. It asserts all possible freedom and independence
for man, for it teaches his creation after the image and likeness
of God ; but it maintains at the same time that man is a creature,
and thus can never become or be absolutely independent; it joins
him to God, and binds him to his word and will. When the apologists
of modern culture accuse Christianity of legalism, heteronomy,
transcendent eudaemonism, etc., these are words which intentionally
represent the matter in an unjust way and rouse prejudice against
Christianity; but the matter itself is beyond dispute. It is
supernaturalism, which in point of fact forms the point of
controversy between Christianity and many panegyrists of modern
culture.</p>
<p id="x-p17">The Christian religion cannot abandon this supernaturalism
without annihilating itself. There is even no religion thinkable or
possible without belief in a supernatural power. For all religion
implies that God and the world are distinct, and that God can work
in the world, enter into fellowship with man, and by that
fellowship can raise him above, and maintain him against, the
world. Because Christianity is the pure and true religion, it is
not less, but more supernatural than all other religions. For these
religions dissolve the godhead into all kinds of natural powers,
see everywhere in the world only the influences of good or evil
spirits, and cannot therefore bring man into a true fellowship with
God. But according to the Christian confession the one, all-wise,
all-good, and all-powerful will of God lies behind the phenomena of
nature and the events of history, and this will breaks down all
resistance in the world and humanity and leads them in the face of
their opposition to salvation and glory. This is the idea which
underlies the whole of Scripture; on it Moses and the prophets,
Christ and the apostles take their stand; the Christian church is
built on the great facts of creation, incarnation, and
resurrection; the gospel as it is preached by Jesus himself in his
earthly life embodies this same counsel and will of God.</p>
<p id="x-p18">It is not open to doubt that it was not as a poet or
philosopher, as a scholar or artist, as a politician or social
reformer, that Jesus appeared among the people of Israel. What is
new and peculiar in the person of Christ consists in this—that he
was more than Solomon and Jonab, or one of the prophets; that he is
the Messiah, the Son of God, sent by God to seek the lost, and save
sinners, to proclaim the gospel to the poor, and to preach the
acceptable year of the Lord, to declare the Father, and to reveal
his name. What he came to bring to earth is therefore a blessing of
unspeakable value, namely, the kingdom of heaven, not as a
community which could be founded by human endeavor, but as a
heavenly, divine treasure, embracing righteousness, salvation from
corruption, eternal life, and obtainable only through regeneration,
faith, and conversion.</p>
<p id="x-p19">We may differ on the question whether Jesus was right in this
preaching of the gospel, and whether the knowledge of God and
eternal life mean the highest good for man. There are many at least
who deny and controvert this, and seek to set Christian morals
aside in favor of the ethics of individualistic or social
eudeamonism. Now Christianity leaves full room for the ethical
culture of our own personality in the midst of society, but there
is a notable contrast between the two systems of ethics, which
cannot be disguised or obliterated. Christian morals lays stress
upon sin and grace, the ethics of evolution proclaims the natural
goodness of man; the former regards man as a lost being, who needs
salvation, the latter sees in him the one creature who can reform
and save the, world; the first speaks of reconciliation and
regeneration, the second of development and education; for the one
the new Jerusalem comes down from God out of heaven, for the other
it comes slowly into being by human eflort; there divine action
moves history, here evolution is the all-directing process.<note place="foot" id="x-p19.1" n="374">Compare the contrasts drawn by Forsyth between the Reformation and the “Enlightenment,” Hibbert Journal, April, 1908, pp. 482 ff.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p20">But this is certain,—if the gospel is true, then it carries
with it its own standard for the valuation of all culture. Jesus
has shown this distinctly in the attitude which he adopted towards
all earthly things and natural relations. He was no ascetic: he
considered food and drink, covering and clothing, as good gifts of
the Heavenly Father, and was present at wedding-feasts and dinners.
And he was as little an epicurean, who thinks only of himself and
cares only for himself ; he was continually moved with compassion
for all kinds of misery. Neither shallow optimism nor weak
pessimism finds in him an ally. But although he did not despise
natural institutions and blessings, still he does not undertake to
estimate them as such or to determine their inherent value. That
was not the work which the Father had given him to do. He
accepted the social and political conditions as they were, made no
ondeavor to reform them, and confined himself exclusively to
setting the value which they possessed for the kingdom of heaven.
And in that connection he said, that nothing a man possesses in
this world—food or drink, covering or clothing, marriage or
family, vocation or position, riches or honor—can be compared with
that pearl of great price which he alone can present. It must all
be abandoned, if necessary, for the gospel’s sake, and the
treasures of earth are often a great obstacle to entrance into the
kingdom of God. In a word, agriculture, industry, commerce,
science, art, the family, society, the state, etc.,—the whole of
culture—may be of great value in itself, but whenever it is
thrown into the balance against the kingdom of heaven, it loses all
its significance. The gaining of the whole world avails a man
nothing if he loses his own soul; there is nothing in creation
which he can give in exchange for his soul.</p>
<p id="x-p21">The truth of this declaration can be denied only by the man who
shuts his eyes to the awful seriousness of real life. Not only does
Scripture teach that man has lost himself, and may lose himself
more and more, but our own experience also testifies to this. Man
is lost before God, for he does not give himself to God, and does
not serve him in love, but flies from him, and hides himself from
his presence. He is lost for his neighbor, for he abandons him in
his need, and sacrifices him to his own interests in the struggle
for existence. He is also lost for himself, for there is a cleft
between his being and his consciousness, a dissension between his
duty and his desire, between his conscience and his will. That is
the. reason why we seek diversions in the world; instead of
re-collecting our thoughts we scatter them, and in proportion as
with our representations and imaginations, with our thoughts and
desires, with our inclinations and passions, we move in various
directions, we lose more and more the centre of our own life. Man
is ever losing himself more and more. No treasures are able to
compensate for the spiritual loss of our soul, for when the soul is
lost all is lost. Nothing fills the emptiness, nothing replaces the
loss, nothing covers the poverty. For this reason Christ brought
the kingdom of heaven to earth; he implants it in the hearts of
men, and thereby gives them back to God, and their neighbor, and
also to themselves. Peace with God carries with it for man peace
with himself also; the cleft between his conscience and his will is
filled up; the discord between his being and consciousness is
reconciled; his soul with all its powers is brought back to unity
in the fear of God’s name. His duty becomes his choice, and his
choice his privilege. Conversion is a turning back to God, but at
the same time a coming to one’s self.<note place="foot" id="x-p21.1" n="375">Comp. the Pensées of Pascal.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p22">If this is the content of the gospel,—namely, that God
maintains and renews the ethical ideal of man by his merciful and
powerful will in the way of forgiveness and conversion,—then the
reality of this content may indeed he denied, but it is
inconceivable that such a gospel should be opposed to culture. Much
rather is it, if we may so say, the most important element of all
culture,—principle and goal of what all culture in the genuine
sense of the word strives after, and must strive after. There are
indeed many who think that the development and progress of the
human race principally or exclusively consist in the improvement of
material welfare. But this materialistic view of life is strongly
contradicted by man’s rational and moral nature. Heart and
conscience witness to us all that man cannot live by bread alone;
“life is not the highest good.” It is not religion only, but
philosophy, which has at all times proclaimed this. Its chief
representatives have declared, without exception, that the destiny
of man and humanity must bear an ethical character, and that that
ethical character must take the first place; the good is the same
as the divine, and is raised high above the sensual world; ethics
goes further than Physics. So powerfully does this idea of the
value of the good work in the heart of man that material culture,
which began to flourish in the last century and for some time cast
a certain glamour over materialism, soon gave way to a strong
reaction in life, and by the disappointment which it brought caused
the heart of man to thirst again after idealism and mysticism. Even
Haeckel has felt this influence; he has continued, indeed, to call
his world-view materialistic, but he has raised his monism to the
rank of religion, and regards as its kernel the worshipping of the
true, the good, and the beautiful.<note place="foot" id="x-p22.1" n="376">Haeckel, Welträthsel, p. 439, and above, Lect. I.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p23">Now as soon as culture wishes to be ethical culture, not in
name, but in fact and in truth, it loses all ground for accusing
the gospel of enmity against it, and it cannot do itself greater
service than by honoring the gospel as the chief and highest power
making for culture. It cannot bring a valid objection even against
the supernatural elements which are included in the gospel, because
as ethical culture it rests on metaphysics, and on deeper
introspection proves to be based indeed on revelation. Thus, it is
historically proved that culture has not had an independent origin
and development, but from its first commencement is bound up with
religion in the closest way. The higher elements of culture
especially, such as science, art, and morality, are indebted to
religion for their origin and growth. The oldest science of which
we have knowledge, in Greece, Egypt, Babylon, and India, was
theology; philosophy originated in religion, and only later brought
forth various particular sciences.<note place="foot" id="x-p23.1" n="377">Comp. Lectures - I, note 2; VI, note 7 ; VII, note 19.</note>  Art among the people of old
bore a specially religious character;<note place="foot" id="x-p23.2" n="378">Portig, Religion und Kunst in ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältniss. Iserlohn, 1879.</note>  and among all men of
ancient times we meet the tendency to regard moral laws as divine
commandments.<note place="foot" id="x-p23.3" n="379">Eisler, Kritische Einführung in die Philosophie. Berlin, 1905, p. 297.</note>  Science, art, and morality are cognate in origin,
essence, and meaning with religion, for they are all based on the
belief in an ideal world, the reality of which is assured and
guaranteed only by religion; that is, from God’s side by
revelation.<note place="foot" id="x-p23.4" n="380">Ernst Linde, Religion und Kunst. Tübingen, 1905.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p24">No doubt an endeavor has recently been made to make ethical
culture independent of religion.<note place="foot" id="x-p24.1" n="381">Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion. Kneib, Die Jenseitsmoral, pp. 239 ff.</note>  But this attempt is still new
and limited to a small circle, and it probably will have little
success. It is a dishonor for religion, to be sure, to serve as a
police agent, or as a watchdog of morality. Religion and morality
are not bound together in this external and mechanical way, but
they are in alliance with each other organically, by reason of
their inner nature. The love of God includes that of our neighbor,
and the latter is reflected in the former. For good presents itself
to us all from our earliest youth in the form of a commandment.
Neither autonomic nor evolutionary ethics can make any change here.
The child does not gradually create moral laws by instinct or
reflection, but is brought up in a circle which has possessed those
laws long before, and which imposes them on the child with
authority.<note place="foot" id="x-p24.2" n="382">Eisler, Krit. Einführung, p. 297.</note>  As we look around us among the nations and examine the
history of mankind, we are witnesses of much vacillation and
variety, but a fund of moral laws is always and everywhere found.<note place="foot" id="x-p24.3" n="383">Ibid. p. 302.</note> 
Every man acknowledges that in morality a law is laid upon him
which obliges him to obedience in his conscience. If this be so,
then in this wonderf ul phenomenon we have to do either with an
illusion, a dream, an imagination of mankind, or with a reality
which is raised high above the empirical world and fills us with
deepest reverence. For if the moral law or the ideal good indeed
exists around and above us, then it must he grounded in the
world-power and be one with the Godhead. God alone is the source,
and thus also the guarantee of the reality of the moral law, of the
objectivity of duty, the ethical vocation and destiny of man. In so
far all ethics is also heteronomous.</p>
<p id="x-p25">Philosophy, particularly since Kant, has strongly controverted
this heteronomy, and it is right in its opposition if this
heteronomy be thought of as a moral law, which comes to us from
without, is forcibly imposed upon us from above, and finds no echo
in our own spirit. Such a merely external law may be, perhaps, a
natural law, but in no case can it he a moral law. Such a view of
the heteronomy of law might be acceptable, accordingly, to those
moralists who think that man was originally an animal, and has
become man by external influences, either by the pressure of
society or by the discipline of the state; but it has no
attractions to, and is quite superfluous to, Christian ethics,
which is based on Holy Scripture. For Scripture teaches that man
was originally created after God’s image, and bore the moral law in
the inmost recesp,es of his heart; that even in the state of sin he
is still bound to the ideal world by his reason and conscience; and
that the dissension which now exists between duty and inclination,
according to all experience, is, in principle, reconciled in
regeneration and conversion. As Jesus said that it was his meat to
do the will of his Heavenly Father, so Paul testified, that he
delighted in the law of God after the inward man; and all sincere
Christians humbly speak the same words.</p>
<p id="x-p26">Autonomous morality and ethical culture cannot raise objection
to this doctrine, for it is the ultimate fulfilment of what they
themselves mean and wish. It is rightly said that good must be the
inner inclination of man. Good does not in a social-eudeamonistic
way borrow its standard and nature from the consequences of human
actions, for these consequences are external, often accidental, and
almost always incalculable. Man is not good by the operation and
fruit of his actions, but the actions are good because, and in so
far as, they are a revelation and expression of the good will of
man. There is therefore, according to Kant, nothing in the world
which can be considered as good without limitation except a good
will. The philosopher therein simply repeated in other words what
Jesus had said: A good tree alone can bring forth good fruit, and a
man can only bring forth good things out of the good treasure of
his heart.<note place="foot" id="x-p26.1" n="384">Ibid. p. 292. Stange, Der heteronome Character der christlichen Ethik, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. June, 1908, pp. 454-473.</note>  This declaration of Scripture even avoids the
one-sidedness of Kant, who makes it seem as if good can be achieved
only if it is accomplished by the intellectual sense of duty alone
without the co-operation of the heart. In place of this
intellectual rigorism, which always produces by reaction emotional
romanticism, Christian ethics maintains that the whole man must be
good in intellect and will, heart and conscience. To do good is a
duty and a desire, a task and a privilege, and thus the work of
love. Love is therefore the fulfilling of the law.</p>
<p id="x-p27">But again, if this is the kernel of Christian morality, with
what right can the charge of enmity against culture be brought
against it? For it is it alone which makee; true culture possible,
and places it on a firm foundation. Ethical culture rightly
declares that man must be good internally, in the roots of his
being, in the core of his will; but it feels itself obliged, after
honest consideration, to confess that such men do not exist, and
that it cannot create them. All culture, whatever significance it
may have, just as all education, civilization, development, is
absolutely powerless to renew the inner man. For it always works
externally, and does not penetrate into the heart of man. It may
fashion, prune, restrain, bridle, form; it may force life to run in
harness; it may cultivate legalism and even morality. But that is
nevertheless not the good, the genuine, inner, spiritual good; it
is no true Sittlichkeit. As long as ethical culture thinks itself
sufficient, it is exposed to serious danger. For adhering firmly to
its ideal, and esteeming itself able to realize it, it will hedge
man about on all sides, and lay upon him command on command, rule
upon rule; or it will, after many endeavors, convinced of its
powerlessness, abandon the height of the moral ideal, give the
leadership to the will, and permit every one to live himself out in
accordance with his own character. Phariseeism and Sadduceeism are
no uncommon phenomena on philosophical and practical ground. Thus
the true, and the good, and the beautiful, which ethical culture
means and seeks, can only come to perfection when the absolute good
is at the same time the almighty, divine will, which not only
prescribes the good in the moral law, but also works it effectually
in man himself. The heteronomy of law and the autonomy of man are
reconciled only by this theonomy.</p>
<p id="x-p28">Ethical culture accordingly can neither in the source nor in the
essence of morals be independent of the metaphysical foundation ;
and finally much less can it clisponse with it in the definition of
the goal of morality.<note place="foot" id="x-p28.1" n="385">Ibid. pp. 312 ff., 324, 330 ff., 334.</note>  As long as it remains diesseitig, it cannot
give to the question, What may be the goal of the moral action? any
other answer than that this is to be found either in the individual
man or in humanity. In the first instance, whether it wishes to do
so or not, it sacrifices the community to the individual, and in
the second it sacrifices the individual to the community. But
nature itself distinctly proves that neither of these may be
lowered to a mere means to the other; the individual and the
community are not subordinate to one another, but coordinate with
each other. If both are thus to maintain their independence and be
brought into agreement, this can be accomplished only when men rise
above both, and posit a goal for moral action outside of both.
Another consideration enforces the necessity of</p>
<p id="x-p29">Jenseitigkeit still more strongly. Neither humanity nor the
individual can have the origin or the goal in itself. There was a
time when they did not exist; they are transitory, and near their
end. In the universe they occupy a temporary, transitory place;
they are a means, and not an end, and certainly no final end,
because they are not their own origin.</p>
<p id="x-p30">But if neither the individual man nor humanity can be the final
end, because they are creatures, then the question is unavoidable
what this final end is. Ethical morality, which reflects, must go
beyond this world of visible things; it cannot maintain its
standpoint within humanity. But then there are only two paths open,
—either humanity, with all its culture, is a means for the
unconscious, unreasonable, and purposeless world-power, or it is a
means for the glorifying of God. The first can, and will, and may
never be believed by humanity, for it is tantamount to suicide. The
second, that man and humanity exist for God’s sake, from him, and
through him, and to him, upholds their moral, spiritual value far
above the whole inanimate universe, and brings indeed the true, the
good, and the beautiful to eternal triumph. This alone gives peace
to the understanding and rest to the heart. Ethical culture must be
a philosophy of revelation or it cannot exist.</p>
<p id="x-p31">Now the peculiarity of all revelation is, that while it posits
principles and lays foundations, it charges men with the
application of these principles and the building upon these
foundations. Creation was the first revelation, the principle and
foundation of all revelation ; but, on the other hand, every
revelation is also a creation, a divine work, in order to
accomplish something new, to make a new commencement, and to unlock
the possibility of a new development. From nothing, nothing could
begin; all evolution supposes a germ; all becoming proceeds from
being. Thought and speech, life and history, science and art, have
all had their commencement in principles which are laid down by
God’s creative power. The whole special revelation which has its
centre in Christ has no other content and no other meaning than to
lay this firm foundation whereon the new humanity can be built.
Christ is the head, and the church is his body; Christ is the
cornerstone, and believers are the living stones of the divine
building. Nothing can be, changed in this foundation; it is laid,
and remains for all time. But when it is laid both in deed and
word, in nature and history, in the world of being and
consciousness, then the independent work of the church begins with
the development of doctrine and life, of organization and worship.
Revelation from God’s side always opens a way for “discovery” by
man.<note place="foot" id="x-p31.1" n="386">Comp. Lecture I, note 27; Lecture VI, note 60.</note> </p>
<p id="x-p32">This is applicable also to culture. In the measure that it
considers more deeply its own essence, it arrives at the discovery
that it is rooted in metaphysics and founded on revelation. It
rests on data which God himself established, and is certain of its
rights and value only because God is creator, regenerator, and
consummator of all things. The creation of the first man shows
this; the subduing of the earth, that is, the whole of culture, is
given to him, and can be given to him, only because he is created
after God’s image; man can be ruler of the earth only because and
in so far m he is a servant, a son of God. But man has not
continued to build on this foundation; the development of the human
race has not been normal; there has always on a time of flourishing
followed a time of decay and ruin for culture. Then God takes, as
it were, the development into his own hands by raising up great
men, by causing new races to appear, by creating events of a
world-wide significance; he demolishes the sinful development and
raises culture from its abasement, and opens out to it a new road.
This is particularly manifest among the Israelites, in Abraham,
Moses, the prophets, and finally in Christ. Culture, therefore,
sinks into the background; man must first become again a son of God
before he can be, in a genuine sense, a cultured being. Israel was
not a people of art and science, but a people of religion; and
Christ is exclusively a preacher of the gospel, the saviour of the
world, and founder of the kingdom of heaven. With this kingdom
nothing can be compared; he who will enter into it must renounce
all things; the cross is the condemnation of the world and the
destruction of all sinful culture.</p>
<p id="x-p33">But it is wrong to educe from this pronouncement that the gospel
must be at enmity with culture. For although the gospel limits
itself to the proclaiming of the requirements and laws of the
kingdom, it cannot be set free from the organic alliance in which
it always appears in history and Scripture. For, in the first
place, Christ does not stand at the commencement, but in the middle
of history. He presupposes the work of the Father in creation and
in providence, especially also in the guidance of Israel; yea, the
gospel asserts that Christ is the same who as the Word made all
things and was the life and the light of all men. As he was then in
his earthly life neither a politician nor a social reformer,
neither a man of science nor a man of art, but simply lived and
worked aa the Son of God and Servant of the Lord, and thus has only
been a preacher and founder of the kingdom of heaven, he cannot
have come to annihilate the work of the Father, or his own work in
creation and providence, but rather to save it from the destruction
which has been brought about by sin. According to his own word, he
came not to judge the world, but to save it.</p>
<p id="x-p34">Secondly, for the same reason, the preaching of Jesus cannot be
separated from what has followed after the cross. The gospel goes
back in the past to creation, and even to eternity, and stretches
forward to the farthest future. Christ, who as the Word created all
things, and bore the cross as the Servant of the Lord, is the same
who rose again and ascended into heaven, and will return as Judge
of the quick and the dead. In his exaltation he regains what he
denied himself in his humiliation; but now it is freed from guilt,
purified from stain, reborn and renewed by the Spirit. The
resurrection is the fundamental restoration of all culture. Christ
himself took again the body in which he bore on the cross the sin
of the world; he has received all power in heaven and earth, and is
exalted by God himself to his right hand as Lord and Christ. The
demand which has been made from many sides of late, as earlier by
many sects and monastic orders, that we should return from the
Pauline and Johannine Christ to the so-called historical Jesus, the
gospel of the Synopties, the sermon on the mount, and the parables,
is not only impracticable, because in the whole New Testament the
same dead and risen Christ meets us, but mutilates the gospel,
leads to asceticism, and creates an irreconcilable dissension
between creation and re-creation, Old and New Testament, nature and
grace, the Creator of the world and the Father of Christ.</p>
<p id="x-p35">Such a dissension may be proper to Gnosticism and Manichaeism,
and also to the Buddhism nowadays admired by so many, but it is in
direct contradiction to Christianity. The truth and value of
Christianity certainly do not depend on the fruits which it has
borne for civilization and culture: it has its own independent
value—it is the realization of the kingdom of God on earth; and
it does not make its truth depend, after a utilitarian or
pragmatical fashion, on what men here, have accomplished with the
talents entrusted to them. The gospel of Christ promises
righteousness and peace and joy, and has fulfilled its promise if
it gives these things. Christ did not portray for his disciples a
beautiful future in this world, but prepared them for oppression
and persecution. But, nevertheless, the kingdom of heaven, while a
pearl of great price, is also a leaven which permeates the whole,
of the, meal; godliness is profitable unto all things, having the
promise of the life which now is, and that which is to come. The
gospel gives us a standard by which we can judge of phenoinena and
events; it is an absolute measure which enables us to determine the
value of the present life; it is a guide to show us the way in the
labyrinth of the present world; it raises us above time, and
teaches us to view all things from the standpoint of eternity.
Where could we find such a standard and guide if the everlasting
gospel did not supply it? But it is opposed to nothing that is pure
and good and lovely. It condemns sin always and everywhere; but it
cherishes marriage and the family, society and the state, nature
and history, science and art. In spite of the many faults of its
confessors, it has been in the course of the ages a rich
benediction for all these institutions and accomplishments. The
Christian nations are still the guardians of culture. And the word
of Paul is still true that all is ours if we are Christ’s.<note place="foot" id="x-p35.1" n="387">A. Ehrhard, Kathol. Christentum und moderne Kultur. Mainz, 1906. E. W. Mayer, Christentum und Kultur. Berlin, 1905.</note> </p> 

<p id="x-p36"> </p> 
</div1>

    <div1 title="Lecture 10. Revelation and the Future" id="xi" prev="x" next="xii">
<h2 id="xi-p0.1">Lecture 10 - Revelation and the Future</h2>
<p id="xi-p1"> </p>
<p class="First" id="xi-p2">Although the Christian religion is not at enmity with culture in
principle, still there is no gainsaying that it attributes only a
subordinate value to all the possessions of this earthly life. The
value of the whole world is not so great as that of the
righteousness of the kingdom of heaven, the forgiveness of sins,
and eternal life in fellowship with God. In this respect the
Christian religion is in direct opposition to the view of the world
taken by the modern man, and is neither prepared nor fitted for
compromise with it. The question between them concerns no less than
the highest good for man.</p>
<p id="xi-p3">Therefore not only is Christianity accused to-day of rather
opposing than furthering culture in the past, and of adopting
towards it at the present day a repellent and hostile attitude, but
men go further and declare that it has had its time, and cannot be
a factor in the development of the future. If modern culture is to
advance, it must wholly reject the influence of Christianity, and
break completely with the old world-view. There must be inaugurated
a Kulturkampf, compared to which that of Bismarck against the
Jesuits was child’s play. For Christianity in its essence, and
consequently in all the forms which it has adopted in its several
confessions, is always occupied with such supernatural subjects as
eternity, heaven, God, etc.; it gives a bill of exchange for the
life hereafter, which perhaps will never be honored, and makes men
indifferent to this life; it does not stimulate to activity, but
recommends as the highest virtues, patience, forbearance,
obedience, and contentment.</p>
<p id="xi-p4">The present century, on the contrary, is wholly diesseitig; it
believes no longer in unseen things, but reckons only with those
which are seen and temporal. After the disappointment caused by the
French Revolution, a deep, general dejection reigned in Europe
under the Napoleonic regime. But oppression occasioned a rebound.
When the hour of liberty struck, humanity awoke to a new life and
went to work with unimagined courage. Its energy was crowned, and
at the same time increased, by the brilliant successes which were
achieved in science and technic, in society and state. Discoveries
and inventions, with their application to life, showed what man
could accomplish by his skill and labor. Within half a century
humanity was, as it were, reborn, and the surface of the earth was
renewed. What the forefathers in former ages, what even the
preceding generation had not dared to think or dream of, now came
to pass in reality. Humanity stood amazed at its own creations.</p>
<p id="xi-p5">In the measure in which self-confidence grew, confidence in God,
belief in miracles, consciousness of misery, the urgency of prayer,
and longing for redemption decreased, at least in many circles.
Kant had boldly spoken the word,—du sollst, also du kannst,—and
the humanity which trod the stage of the nineteenth century adopted
this motto. It perceived in itself a necessity, a will, a power,
and an obligation to reform the world ; and with this pressure it
felt its strength awaken, and an irresistible desire to set to
work. The modern man no longer feels himself a miserable creature,
who has fallen from his original destiny, and no longer regards the
earth as a vale of tears, which has taken the place of the original
paradise. He can conceive nothing more wonderful than this
beautiful world, which has evolved itself from the, smallest
beginnings and has reached its highest point of development in
grand and mighty man.<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.1" n="388">Carneri, Der moderne Mensch., Volksausgabe, Stüttgart, p. xi.</note> He is in his own estimation no mere creature,
but a creator and redeemer of himself and society.<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.2" n="389">H. D. Lloyd, Man the Social Creator, London, 1908, p. 3.</note> More and more
he becomes his own providence.<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.3" n="390">Ellen Key, Das Jahrhundert des Kindes, Berlin, 1902, p. 358.</note> And he is so, and becomes so
through his work, for labor is creation. By labor men are divine,
and become continually more godlike. Labor must therefore be the
foundation of religion and morality, and also of the entirety of
modern society.<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.4" n="391">Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 12, 13.</note> In earlier times, no doubt, both outside and
within the bounds of Christianity, labor was estimated as of great
moral value, but there was nevertheless no system of morals built
upon it, either by the Greeks, who despised labor, or by the
Christians, who considered this life as a special preparation for
eternity, or yet by the new moralists, who deduce the moral law
from the subject, that is, from the categorical imperative. But
among such men as Ihering, Wundt, Höding, Paulsen, Spencer,
and Sidgwick, we see ethics becoming more and more a section of
sociology, which perceives in labor for himself and for others the
calling and destiny of man. For labor reconciles the egoistic and
social instincts and takes into captivity the whole human life.<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.5" n="392">Jeruzalem, Gedanken und Denker, 1905, pp. 133-148.</note>
Labor is “the meaning of our existence.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p5.6" n="393">L. Stein, Der Sinn des Daseins, 1904, p. 1, 5.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p6">This awakening of human energy is reflected in the world-view
which now receives the strongest sympathy. Till now the whole world
was riveted to absolute conceptions, such as substance and essence,
spirit and matter, soul and faculties, ideas and norms. But now
everything is changed; there is nothing firm, unchangeable,
steadfast; there is no status quo, but only an eternal movement.<note place="foot" id="xi-p6.1" n="394">Proudhon, Philosophie du Progrès, Bruxelles, 1853, pp. 20, 24, 25.</note>
Physics and chemistry dematerialize themselves, and seek their
foundations in pure mathematical proportions; psychology has closed
the account with substance and the faculties of the soul, and only
reckons with psychical phenomena; logic, ethics, and aesthetics
withdraw themselves from the government of fixed aprioristic norms,
and seek to build themselves up on psychology and sociology; the
atomistic world-view has given way in late years to the energetic,
and the absolute is no longer considered as a being, but only as a
becoming; “will is the real substance of the world.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p6.2" n="395">Stanley Hall, Adol., I, pp. 131.</note> If Descartes
pronounced his cogito ergo sum as the principle of philosophy, the
new world-view proclaims her moveo ergo fio; vivere is now no
longer cogitare, but velle; in a word, modern wisdom can be summed
up in this short epigram of Proudhon : Affirmation du
progrè, négation de l’absolu.<note place="foot" id="xi-p6.3" n="396">Proudhon, op. cit., pp. 25, 19, 156.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p7">As this world-view is a precipitate of modern life, so in its
turn it influences that life and gives it direction and guidance.
The century in which we live is distinguished from all preceding
ones by its restless activity, by its exploitation of physical and
psychical forces, but at the same time also by its endeavor to
obtain the greatest possible results from the smallest possible
expenditure of power.<note place="foot" id="xi-p7.1" n="397">G. Portig, Das Weltgesetz des kleinsten Kraftanwandes in den Reichen der Natur, 1903-1904.</note> The activities of men move in the most
divergent directions, and cross each other every moment, so that
nobody can obtain a clear view or give a complete account of them.
And yet it seems as if all this manifold and many-sided labor
accomplished to-day by men under the sun, is animated by one
spirit, is directed by one aim, and is made serviceable to one end,
namely, the improvement of the human race. Men live to-day in a
land of abundance, but there still remains a longing for a richer
and more durable happiness. This earthly life is confidently
declared the sole home man; yet men seek even here below another
and better dwelling. And therefore there are not wanting reformers
who earnestly reflect on the miseries of this life, and recommend
ways and means not only for the deliverance, but also for the
perfecting of humanity.</p>
<p id="xi-p8">In the first place, there is being made an attempt, which should
be remarked, to improve the racial qualities of mankind in an
artificial way. Individuals follow one another like small,
unsubstantial waves from an unlimited ocean of being, but are all
nevertheless equipped with free and .active powers. They must
therefore not be passive in the routine of nature, and must not
lose heart from the thought that man remains eternally the same and
is capable of no improvement or perfecting. The Christian religion
may offer in its doctrine of the inheritance of sin such a
comfortless view; but this dogma, that man is radically corrupt,
must be saved by Christ, and can never become holy and happy by his
own power, is the most demoralizing of all the articles of the
Christian faith, and ought to be opposed and eradicated with
determined strength. In its place must come the comforting
conviction that man is still always becoming; he has already raised
himself above the animal, and is moving in the direction of the
Uebermensch. The evolutionary process, of which we have evidence
all over the world, presses on not only forward, but also upward,
to meet the light, the life, the spirit.<note place="foot" id="xi-p8.1" n="398">E. Key, Das Jahrh. des Kindes., pp. 322, 3-5.</note> It is only necessary
that man understand this process, and take an active part in it; he
must feel his responsibility for the carrving of the process
through by man, and for its advancing through him to a higher type
of being. It seems as if the physical development of man has
reached its end, at least so far as its basal structure is
concerned; but all the more necessary now is the spiritual
development, that is, the conscious, intentional, systematic work
of man towards his own perfecting. And to this belongs in the first
place the improvement and ennobling of the human race.</p>
<p id="xi-p9">But now we are faced by the fact that, as Karl Pearson expresses
it, “the mentally better stock in the nation is not reproducing
itself at the same rate as it did of old; the less able and less
energetic are more fertile than the better stock.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p9.1" n="399">In Fr. Galton, Probability, the Foundation of Eugenics, The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered on June 5, 1907, p. 10.</note> And that is
not all; but in all lands the law allows, apart from certain
limitations of age and cousanguinity, complete freedom to marriage,
so that it is possible for all kinds of weak, sick, incurable, and
degenerate people to be united in marriage and to give birth to
unfortunate children, and in this way to promote the steady
deterioration of the human race. Nobody can deny that such a
deterioration takes place. While hygiene does its best, on the one
side, to prolong the life of the weak as much as possible, the
number of these weak beings is continually increasing by the
complete freedom of marriage. Weismann may assert that propensities
which are acquired during life are not inherited, but the fact
still remains that the physical and psychical condition of the
parents influences that of the children. Insanity and crime,
tuberculosis and alcoholism, and all kinds of venereal diseases are
increasing among all nations; increasing numbers of inmates are
sent to hospitals and prisons; and all this lays on the community a
burden which in the long run it will not be able to bear. Therefore
it is our duty to devote the greatest possible attention to
marriage, and to the people between whom it is concluded.</p>
<p id="xi-p10">In the first place, it is necessary that the act of propagation
be restored to honor. Ascetic Christianity has imprinted the stamp
of impurity on it, and humanity therefore will never become better
by returning to this mode of thought. But it will enter the path of
self-perfecting when it turns its back on all asceticism and comes
to understand the holiness of propagation. The act of generation is
not impure, but a holy sacrament, and all conception is immaculate.
True progress will come when humanity returns to the classic
honoring of the strength and beauty of the body and regains the old
respect for the divinity of propagation.<note place="foot" id="xi-p10.1" n="400">E. Key, op. cit., p. 2. Stanley Hall, Adol., II, p. 123.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p11">But with this restoration to honor of the propagation of the
race earnest investigation must be combined. The science of
“eugenics,” which was already inaugurated by Francis Galton in
1883, and for which he not long ago founded a research-fellowship
at the University of London, must become a science which subjects
to exact inquiry everything that bears upon propagation and
heredity, and endeavors to discover the laws by which these are
governed. Such an inquiry has not yet been prosecuted far enough to
warrant the deduction of conclusions on which legislation might be
founded. But public opinion can be instructed, and the way for new
legislation respecting matrimony may be prepared, and the state can
at any rate begin to make medical inquiry obligatory before
marriage, forbid marriage in definite serious cases, and so prevent
the birth of unfortunate children. Artificial selection shows how
genera and species may be modified among plants and animals; if
this selection is applied also to the human race, it will promote
its well-being and improvement in the highest degree.<note place="foot" id="xi-p11.1" n="401">Galton, op. cit., Stanley Hall, Adol., II, p. 722. Lankester, Natur und Mensch, pp.44,49. Ludwig Wilser, Rassentheorien, Stuttgart, 1908. Wynaendts Franken, Sociale Vertoogen, Haarlem, 1907, pp. 1-46. H. Treub, Verspreide Opstellen, Haarlem, 1904. Nijhoff, De Noodzakelijkheid van geneeskundig Onderzoek vóór het Huwelijk, Rotterdam, 1908.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p12">In close alliance with this attempt to ennoble the human race by
artificial selection is the effort which is making for the
perfecting of humanity by a radical reform in education. Many
opinions exist as to the nature of such a new education. Some
accept in principle the perfect equality of man and woman, defend
free marriage and free love, and would withdraw education as early
as possible from the family and delegate it to the community.
Others, on the contrary, esteem the woman in every respect distinct
from man, and wish to maintain and re-establish her in the ro1e of
mother and educator of her children. According to these, biology
and anthropology prove that woman, who, in her whole physical and
psychical development is much more closely allied to the child than
man, and lives by instinct, intuition, and feeling more than he, is
on this very account a much better representative and supporter of
the human race; she is more “reminiscent of the past,” more
“prophetic of the future,” and therefore superior to man. In the
new philosophy of sex, of which biological psychology already
dreams, the woman and the mother will stand “at the heart of a new
world,” become the object “of a new religion, and almost of a new
worship.” The mothers are the most valuable portion of the people,
and must therefore be liberated in the future from all other cares
than those of motherhood, and be treated by state and society with
the highest honor.<note place="foot" id="xi-p12.1" n="402">Stanley Hall, Adol., II, pp. 561 ff. Ellen Key, op. cit., pp. 86, 253. Louise Stratenus, Het Kind., pp. 128, 336.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p13">But whatever difference of opinion on this or similar points may
exist among the reformers of pedagogy, all agree that education
requires radical changes and must be built up anew on a scientific
basis. Education is of far too great importance for the future of
humanity to be abandoned to caprice or chance. Education is “man’s
chief problem, and the home, school, state, and church are valuable
exactly in proportion as they serve it,” yea, “the highest
criterion of pure science is its educative value.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p13.1" n="403">Stanley Hall, op. cit., I, p. ix; II, p. 55.</note> And the
science which must be the principle and foundation of education is
genetic psychology. This teaches us that man has slowly risen from
the animal, and repeats in his development as embryo and suckling,
as child and boy and youth, the different stages of phylogeny. The,
soul of man is thus not complete, but as it has become, so is it
still becoming; it does not stand alone, but is cognate with the
souls of the animals and plants and all creatures; it strikes its
roots deeply into the past, as the tree does into the ground, is
the product of an immemorial heredity, and can and must be
conceived and explained by the history of the human race. We shall
never really know ourselves until we know the soul of the animals,
and especially that of those which are in the line of our
descent.<note place="foot" id="xi-p13.2" n="404">Stanley Hall, op. cit., I, p. viii; II, pp. 62, 69.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p14">He who takes into account the lesson of evolution quickly comes
to the conclusion that the present-day system of education is one
great error. Up to now men have given almost exclusive attention to
the soul of man, and to its hereafter. They have taken their start
from ideas, fixed norms, unchangeable conceptions, and have placed
before themselves as their chief aim to implant maxims and dognias,
and to fill the head with representations and ideas which are in
opposition to nature, and can therefore never be assimilated. This
education has neglected the body, fatigued the brain, weakened the
nerves, suppressed originality, slackened initiation, and the
consequence is that the children on leaving school have possessed
no independence, and have had no eye to see and no ear to hear.
They have been completely estranged from life; and what is of more
importance, the education which has alone been hitherto procurable
has shown its incapacity, especially, in that during its
continuance men have retained the same nature and the same defects;
it has not eradicated a single sin or brought about any moral
improvement whatever.<note place="foot" id="xi-p14.1" n="405">Ellen Key, p. 293. Stanley Hall, I, pp. 168 ff.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p15">Instead of this a new system of education must be instituted
which in the first place is to be characterized by an honoring of
the child. The child has been hitherto governed peremptorily and
from without, but in the future the child must be placed in the
centre, must be considered in whatever peculiarity it may have, and
must be developed according to its own individuality. It is now the
era of the child. The child is born good, for there is no
hereditary sin; every defect in the child is only a hard shell,
which contains the germ of a virtue, which as such has the right
not to be eradicated, but to be trained. There must be no question
of punishment or breaking of the will; if the child is not good in
later life, then it has been a victim of its parents and teachers,
and upon them lies the guilt. They have to bow to the superiority
of the child; a child is only another name for majesty.<note place="foot" id="xi-p15.1" n="406">Ellen Key, pp. 110 ff., 181. Louise Stratenus, Het Kind., p. 103. Stanley Hall, II, p. 497. Lodge, Literary World, Aug., 1907, p. 380;</note></p>
<p id="xi-p16">Further, this great reformation must be wrought in education,—
it must return from school to life, from books to nature, from
theology and philosophy to biology. In the life of the child sense,
nature, and the body are, in the foreground. Before consciousness
awakens, and intelligence and judgment are formed, the child is
passion, desire, movement, will. Formerly men said that life was
thought, but now we see that life is will. Will is the essence of
the world, and the innermost nature of man; first life, then
thought; first the natural, then the spiritual, The muscles make
forty-three per cent of the weight of the human body, and are the
organs of the will and the creators of all culture. Man is
one-third intelligence and two-thirds will. The “age of art” must
thus take the place of the “age of science.” The body with its
members and organs ought to be developed before all things; manual
labor, gymnastics, sports, and all kinds of play ought to take up a
large, yes, the principal part in education. For mere knowledge.
produces a serious danger; better ignorance than knowledge which
does not develop the strength of man; “muscle-culture” is at the
same time “brain-building”; power must accompany knowledge.<note place="foot" id="xi-p16.1" n="407">Stanley Hall, I, pp. 131 ff.,170 ff. II, pp. 40 ff., 58 ff., 204 ff.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p17">As to the knowledge which must be communicated in the various
schools of instruction, the natural sciences ought to take the
place which was formerly given to the so-called spiritual sciences,
literature, history, theology, and philosophy. The science of
nature must form the groundwork of all teaching, and the common
possession of all civilized people. For even the spiritual sciences
can no longer be understood and practised with benefit, if they do
not rest, on the basis of the science of nature. Without knowing
man in his prehistoric life, they cannot attain their full
development. If they have latterly advanced, and have reached
assured results, they are indebted for this to the application of
that method which is used in the sciences of nature. This, then, is
the indispensable foundation for all other sciences and for all
culture. Nobody ought to be nominated to any important office,
therefore, or to be accepted as a member of parliament, or as a
minister of the state, unless he has acquired a solid knowledge of
nature. In a word, the old world-view must be replaced in all
schools by the world-view of the doctrine of evolution. Then only
will a great future stretch out before education, for knowledge of
nature has not merely an intellectual, but also great practical,
technical, and ethical value.<note place="foot" id="xi-p17.1" n="408">Stanley Hall, II, pp. 153 ff. Lankester, Natur und Mensch, pp. 56, 66, Mach, Popular-wissensch, Vorlesungen. Leipzig, 1896 (last lecture). Lehmann-Hohenberg, Naturwissenschaft und Bibel, Jena, 1904, pp. 5, 45, 55, etc.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p18">But a reformation which will usher in a new era for the human
race cannot confine itself to a change in the system of education.
If reformation must consist principally in replacing the old
world-view by that of evolution, then educational reform is but a
single step in a long road, and there remains a great deal to do.
For the old world-view—that is, that conception of world and life
which has been formed under the influence of Christianity—is so
intimately interwoven with our whole being, with all our thoughts
and actions, that to eradicate it would seem almost a hopeless
task, and if it could be accomplished, would throw humanity into a
violent crisis, the consequences of which no one can foresee.
Church, and state, and society, religion, morality, and justice,
marriage, family, and school, habits and laws, and our whole
culture are, notwithstanding many foreign elements which have
intruded from elsewhere, built on a Christian basis and animated by
the Christian spirit. He who desires such a reform may, no doubt,
make a beginning, but who knows what the end will be, and who can
estimate the cost? None the less, if such a reformation is to be
wrought, it cannot be satisfied with a mere change in the system of
education; it must proceed to a total rebuilding of society.</p>
<p id="xi-p19">However, even if we do not reckon with the conscious will of
man, there is already at work in present-day society a hidden force
which affects it, as it were, in heart and reins, and distinguishes
it from all earlier forms in a very remarkable way. We may approve
or disapprove of this movement, but the trend of modern society is
in the direction of freedom, autonomy, and democracy. All boundary
lines which formerly separated men, and all bonds which encumbered
their movements and activities, have been broken down one after
another. All forms of servitude—slavery, bondage, feudalism, and
subordination—are thought to be opposed to the independence and
dignity of man; even service for wages appears to the modern man
humiliating, and is accounted merely another form of slavery. All
the relations which have grown up between men in the course of the
centuries are more and more losing their organic, moral, and
natural character, and are being replaced by voluntarily formed
contracts. Liberty of religion and conscience has been succeeded by
freedom of habitation and occupation, of trade and intercourse, of
union and association, of writing and thinking; and thought has so
much outstripped discipline that the most absurd ideas arouse the
greatest admiration.</p>
<p id="xi-p20">Specialization and multiplication of occupations go hand in hand
with this autonomy. The number of trades which were organized as
guilds in Germany in the eighteenth century were counted by tens;
they are now to be numbered by thousands, and continually increase,
almost from day to day. Labor is endlessly differentiated and
specialized. All activities which are auxiliary to the provision of
the necessities of life have become independent occupations. The
machine which has replaced the impleinent in the hand of the
workman, and operates much more quickly, uniformly, cheaply, and
powerfully than any human power, increases the division of labor,
and makes the simplest article into a product which is accomplished
by the cooperation of many hands. And this specializing of labor
may be observed not only in material, but also in spiritual
domains. There was a time when one could say of a person that he
knew everything that was written in books, but such an
encyclopaedic knowledge is not possible now, even for the greatest
genius ; sciences are divided and multiplied, and are so far
removed from the common centre that the investigator in one science
is a complete stranger in the disciplines of the others, and does
not even understand the terms employed in them.</p>
<p id="xi-p21">With this specialization of labor is combined, contrary to what
would perhaps apriori be expected, an increase in social
dependence. It is usually said that the French Revolution has made
men free and equal, but to tell the whole truth one has to add that
it has replaced personal by social dependence. We depend on each
other now more than ever. Nobody, no man, no city, no village, no
people, and no state is independent any longer. We have no food and
no drink, no covering or clothing, no warmth or light, no furniture
and no implements, which are not procured for usby the community
from day to day. Each man has significance only as a part of the
whole, as a “labor-unit of the social organism”; if he be left to
himself, and excluded from the social body, he is powerless and
loses his value. This life in community, which forms such a
remarkable trait in the society of to-day, is indebted for its
growth in a large degree to the decline of the value of
personality.</p>
<p id="xi-p22">And this social dependence is continually increasing; the
organization of society is progressing from day to day under our
eyes. Society has already become a most artificial system of
manifold and complicated relations, a gigantic organism, wherein
all members are closely connected; but all agree that the
socialization of society proceeds without intermission; we are
carried steadily forward in the direction of what Lamprecht calls
the “bound enterprises.” The anarchy which reigns in the production
of goods, the abuse of power of which the trusts are guilty, the
law of parsimony in labor, the caprices of demand and supply, and the conflict of capital and proletariat,—all
this leads to social organization and demands help from the
all-embracing state. And the state has already traversed a good
part of this way. Private enterprise has been replaced in many
departments by the service of the community; one circle, of life
after another loses its independence. Jurisprudence, army, navy,
taxation, the postal system, telegraphy, trams and railways,
instruction in all kinds of schools, the care of libraries and
museums, of health and cleanliness, of poorhouses and asylums, the
exploiting of water and heat supply, of gas and electricity, fire-
and police-departments, roads and canals, parks and theatres,
savings banks and insurance companies, and many other interests,
are wholly or in part withdrawn from private enterprise and given
into the hands of local or national authorities.</p>
<p id="xi-p23">Well, then, social reformers say to us, if these things are so,
what can we do but help on and direct, promote and complete, this
powerful movement which is already proceeding? We are working in
the same direction if we break down finally the last barrier which
separates men, and that is capital, private property. The
Reformation has procured for us religious freedom; that is, the
equality of all men before God. The Revolution of 1789 gave us
political liberty,—the equality of all men before the law. A
third reformation is now in order,—the establishment of freedom
in society, and the equality of all men in respect to the
possessions of culture. What good are religious and political
freedom for men if social equality is withheld from them? What
value has the declaration of the rights of man if the right to
labor and food and pleasure remains unsecured? As Protestantism has
prepared the way for liberalism, and liberalism for democracy, so
now democracy ought to be fulfilled in socialism. The motto of
liberty, equality, and fraternity will be completely realized only
when the community, leaving the means of enjoyment and the ratio of
consumption to the individual, possesses itself of all means of
production, land, factories, and implements,—and, systematically
regulating the whole production, divides the product among all
citizens, according to their merits or necessities. In a word, the
reformation of society will reach completion only in the
socializing of all the possessions of culture.<note place="foot" id="xi-p23.1" n="409">The Socialistic literature is sufficiently well-known. Comp. only H. D. Lloyd, op. cit., H. G. Wells, New Worlds for Old, London,1908. R. J. Campbell, Christianity and the Social Order, London, 1907. A series of articles on The New Socialism, an Impartial Inquiry, in the British Weekly, 1908.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p24">Men cherish the boldest expectations on the faith of all these
reformers. Marx, it is true, held the opinion that he had set
socialism free from utopianism, and had established it on a firm,
scientific basis. His effort was to conclude an alliance between
the suffering and the thinking part of humanity and to make science
serviceable for the proletariat. Therefore he made a study of
presentday society, tried to learn the laws which govern its
development, and endeavored to show that the old society could
produce an entirely new one by way of evolution. He refused indeed
to draw up a complete description of the future state, but he did
not shrink from proclaiming his expectations concerning it, and
thus he ceased to be a scientific inquirer, and came forward in the
ro1e of a prophet. And when he further not only published the
results of his inquiry, but also made it the basis of a programme
which was to be adopted and realized by a definite party, he threw
off the toga and put on the mantle of a preacher of repentance and
a reformer. Even Marx thus could not escape from utopianisrn; and
the socialism which operates under his name is, as a doctrine
concerning a future society, no scientific school, but a political
party. The society of the future naturally is no subject of
experience and investigation, but an object of hope and
expectation, of desire and endeavor. This is sufficiently proved by
the fact that socialism, in consequence of the serious criticism
which its anticipated future state has aroused, has finally
abandoned all details and left to the future what the future shall
bring forth.<note place="foot" id="xi-p24.1" n="410">Woltmann, Der histor. Materialismus, pp. 418-430. Weisengrun, Das Ende des Marxismus, Leipzig, 1899. Ed. Bernstein, Wie ist wissensch. Socialismus Mglich? Berlin, 1901.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p25">Nevertheless it can never completely abstain from framing a
description of the future state, either with respect to its own
members or those who are outside; for after all each man wishes to
know, to a certain extent, in what direction and to what end lie is
led by such a radical change in society. If the ideal which men
strive after cannot be described, or on being described betrays to
all its impracticability, all confidence is lost and all obedience
is at an end. Hope alone keeps socialism alive; “the vision of the
future is for every present circumstance the strongest bearer of
power.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p25.1" n="411">Paul Kleinert, Die Profeten Israels in sozialer Beziehung, Leipzig, 1905, p. 27</note> Socialism, therefore, ever seeks its satisfaction in the
forecast of Bebel, that the future state will bring a condition of
happiness and peace for all men. The state with its ministers and
parliaments, its army and police, will not be necessary in the new
society, for all those relations of possession and power in the
behalf of which they have been called into being will have passed
out of existence. All men will receive equal positions in life and
a suitable subsistence. Each will have to accomplish a definite
work; but this work will require only a few hours a day, and for
the remainder of his time each man way devote himself, according to
his free choice, to spiritual occupations, to companionship, to
pleasure. There will no longer exist distinctions between rich and
poor, idle and industrious, learned and ignorant, the population of
city and country, because there will no longer exist commerce,
trade, money, or unequal division of pleasure and labor. Each one
after the necessary labor will do what he pleases, so that
according to his free option one will become a musician, another a
painter, a third a sculptor, a fourth an actor. Even diseases will
disappear more and more, and natural death, the slow dying of the
powers of life, will become more and more the rule.<note place="foot" id="xi-p25.2" n="412">Bebel, Die Frau, 16e Aufl. 1892, pp. 263 ff.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p26">Socialism does not stand alone in these utopian expectations. It
has had its predecessors in Plato and Thomas More, in Campanella
and Morelly, St. Simon and Fourier, Proudhon and Comte, and in many
other theologians and philosophers, in many religious sects and
political parties. Humanity as a whole has always lived, and still
lives, in hope, notwithstanding all empiricism and realism. Men
paint the future state in very different colors; and according to
the different conceptions each one has of the highest good,
represent that future state as a kingdom of morality (Kant), or
humanity (Herder), as a kingdom of liberty, in which spirit fully
penetrates nature (Hegel), or as a Johannine church, which will at
the end replace the church of Peter and Paul (Schelling); as a
world in which ideal or material possessions are the chief
enjoyment. But such a future is expected by every one; all
religion, all philosophy, and all views of life and the world issue
in an eschatology. And not only so, but all systems have in common
that they finish the world’s history with to-day, and hereaf ter
expect only a world era wherein the hope and the dream of humanity
will be realized;<note place="foot" id="xi-p26.1" n="413">Gumplovicz, Grundriss der Soziologie, p. 361.</note> all eschatology which lives in the heart
includes the belief in a speedy parousia.</p>
<p id="xi-p27">This ineradicable hope of humanity is full of potent charm. And
if to-day it springs up with new strength, shuns no exertion,
esteems all opposition conquerable, and strives to introduce the
new era for humanity by all kinds of reformation, it compels
respect and stimulates to activity. When Ludwig Stein preaches a
social optimism, which wages war on all Nirvana-philosophy and
turns its back on all conservatives and pessimists;<note place="foot" id="xi-p27.1" n="414">L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., p. 332. Id., Der Sinn des Daseins, pp. 149 ff.</note> when
Metschnikoff proclaims in the name of science the coming day of the
abolition of all sickness, the lengthening of human life to a good
old age, and the reduction of death to a gentle, painless fading
away;<note place="foot" id="xi-p27.2" n="415">Metschnikoff, Beiträge zu einer optimistischen Weltauffassung, Deutsch von Michalsky, München, 1908.</note> when Stanley Hall tells us that the world is not old, but
young, that the twilight in which we live is not that of the
evening but of the morning, that the soul is still always becoming,
and is capable of a much higher development;<note place="foot" id="xi-p27.3" n="416">Stanley Hall, Adol., I, pp. viii, xviii.</note> when James declares
that the world is, or becomes, that which we make it:<note place="foot" id="xi-p27.4" n="417">James, Pragmatism, pp. 243 ff.</note> when all
these men appeal to our responsibility, to our consciousness of
duty, to our power and energy, then our hope is rekindled, our
courage is raised, and we are stimulated to go forward immediately
without further hesitation.</p>
<p id="xi-p28">Nevertheless it should be observed that while this optimistic
activity seems to depend only on man, and to feel not the least
need of divine help, yet on the other hand it breaks through the
circle of immanent thought and action, mounts to transcendency, and
seeks strength and security in metaphysics. The doctrine that man
is corrupted by sin and cannot sanctify and save himself by his own
strength is commonly accounted the most fearful of all errors;
autonomy and autosotery reject all heterosotery. But at the same
moment when all transcendency and metaphysics are denied, the human
being is exalted above his usual state and is identified with the
divine. The superhuman task of transforming present society into a
state of peace and joy requires more than ordinary human power; if
God himself does not work the change, hope can be cherished only
when human power is divinized. This is in fact the intimate idea of
that philosophical theory which Strauss has most clearly
formulated, that the infinite is not realized in a single man, but
only in humanity; humanity being the true unity of divine and human
natures, the man becoming God, the infinite spirit descending to
finiteness, the child of the visible mother nature, and of the
invisible father spirit, the doer of miracles, the saviour of the
world. What humanity confesses concerning Christ, and pronounces in
its idea of divinity, is merely a symbol of what it finds in
itself, and what it is. Theology is mainly anthropology; the
worship of God is humanity adoring itself. Comte, therefore, was
quite consistent when he substituted the worship of humanity for
the worship of God.<note place="foot" id="xi-p28.1" n="418">Comp. also Proudhon, Philos. du Progrès, p. 65. H. D. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 12.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p29">This deification of man proves clearly that no eschatology is
possible without metaphysics. But this is shown still more clearly
by another fact. Culture, ethics, idealism, all striving after a
goal, must always seek alliance with metaphysics. Kant reversed the
relation between them, and tried to make morals entirely
independent of science; but on those morals he again built up
practical faith in a divine providence. In the same way, any
ethical system which aspires to be true ethics and to bear a
normative and teleological character, not failing into merely a
description of habits and customs, is forced to seek the support of
metaphysics. If man has to strive after an ideal, he can gain
courage only by the faith that this ideal is the ideal of the world
and is based on true reality. By banishing metaphysics, materialism
has no longer an ethical system, knows no longer the distinction
between good and evil, possesses no moral law, no duty, no virtue,
and no highest good. And when the immanent humanistic philosophy of
Natorp, Cohen, and others endeavors to base ethics exclusively on
the categorical imperative, it loses all security that the “ought”
will one day triumph over the “is,” and the good over the bad.<note place="foot" id="xi-p29.1" n="419">Comp. Paul Kalweit, Religion und Philos. Idealismus, Religion und Geisteskultur, II, 1908, pp. 44-60.</note>
Whatever one believes to be the highest good, this highest good is
either an imagination, or it is and must be also the highest, true
being, the essence of reality, the meaning and destiny of the
world, and thus also the bond which holds all men and nations
together in every part of the world and saves them from anarchy.<note place="foot" id="xi-p29.2" n="420">Paulsen, Ethik, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, System. Philos., p. 309. Haering, Das Christliche Leben, 1907, pp. 104 ff. Kulpe, Einl. in die Philos., 1907, p.332. Kulpe here declares: “No immanent definition of the supreme good can possess more than relative character; the positing of a transcendental goal alone (which as such is inaccessible to scientific ethics) satisfies the idea of an ultimate, supreme, absolute value.” Comp. also C. Fraser, Our Final Venture, Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1907, and G. F. Barbour, Progress and Reality, Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1907.</note>
The Christian finds his assurance of the triumph of good in his
confession of God’s sovereign and almighty will, which, though
distinct from the world and exalted above it, still accomplishes
through it its holy purpose, and, in accordance with this purpose,
leads humanity and the world to salvation. But he who rejects this
confession does not therefore escape from metaphysics. It sounds
well to call man the rebel in nature, who, when it says “Die!”
answers, “I will live.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p29.3" n="421">Lankester, Natur und Mensch, p. 26.</note> But with all his wisdom and strength man
is powerless against that nature in the end, unless it be subject
to a will which maintains man in his superiority above it. That is
the reason why, even when theism is denied, the true reality, the
world-will which is hidden behind phenomena and very imperfectly
manifested, is nevertheless always thought of as analogous to that
of man, and especally as an ethically good will. Notwithstanding
all his self-confidence and self-glorification, man is, in every
possible world-view, incorporated in a larger whole, and is
explained and confirmed by that totality. Metaphysics, that is the
belief in the absolute as a holy power, always forms the foundation
of ethics. In our days evolution takes the place of such
metaphysics.</p>
<p id="xi-p30">The modern man derives his faith and animation, his activity and
his optimism, from the idea of evolution, which according to his
belief governs the whole world. If he endeavors restlessly to
establish a holy and happy kingdom of humanity on earth, and stands
firm in his belief in its realization notwithstanding all
diiticulties and disappointments, this can he explained only in one
way,—that he feels himself borne on by the true reality, which is
hidden behind the oftentimes very sad phenomena. Striving and
laboring to attain his ideal, he believes himself in harmony with
the innermost motive-power of the world, with the mysterious course
of nature. To work, to endeavor, to strive, to become, is the
deepest meaning of the world, the heart and the kernel of true
reality. The doctrine of evolution thus takes the place of the old
religion in the modern man.<note place="foot" id="xi-p30.1" n="422">Gust. Le Bon, Psychologie du Socialisme, Paris, 1902. Ed. Dolléans, Le Caractère religieux du Socialisme, Paris, 1906. Diepenhorst, Naast het Kruis de roode Vaan., Amst., p. 46.</note> It is no science; it does not rest on
undeniable facts; it has often in the past and in the present ‘been
contradicted by the facts. But that does not matter; miracle is the
dearest child of faith. All change in the world, as if it were
nothing, is identified with development, development with progress,
progress with material welfare or ethical culture, with liberty or
morality. Although monism in its different forms denies that the
absolute power which rules the world has personality, consciousness
and will, yet it always speaks of this power as if it were a
person. Consciousness, instinct, will, labor, endeavor,
development, aim, and holiness are unintentionally ascribed to it;
it is even identified with absolute divine love in a naive way,
which is in direct antagonism to the scientific pretensions of the
speakers. And love is then called “the original of all social
forces, the creator and reconciler of all; the only true God is
love.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p30.2" n="423">Lloyd, op. cit. pp. 6 ff. Stanley Hall, Adol., I, pp. 546 ff. II, p. 123.</note> Just as the pagan treats his idol, so modern man acts
with the idea of evolution.</p>
<p id="xi-p31">The superstitious character, which is more and more taken on by
this idea, is clearly seen in the contents of the optimistic
expectations which are cherished concerning the future of the human
race. . For these expectations involve nothing less than that human
nature in the future, either slowly by gradual development, or
suddenly by leaps of mutation, will undergo radical change. In the
future state there will he no longer any sickness or crime, no envy
or malice, no enmity or war, no courts of justice and no police,
but contentment and peace will be the portion of all. Now it is
possible to say that sin and crime are owing to circumstances
alone, and thus will disappear with the reformation of the
environment. But this is nevertheless such a superficial judgment
that no refutation of it is necessary. Every man knows by
experience that sin is rooted in his own heart. If there ever is to
be a humanity without sin and crime, holy and blessed, then it must
be preceded by a radical change in human nature. But such a change
is not too great for the expectation of the optimists, for they are
assured of it by evolution. Man has advanced so much in the past
that we may cherish the best hope for the future. He was an animal,
and became a man,—why should he not become an angel in the
future? As by immanent forces alone life has proceeded from the
lifeless, consciousness from the unconscious, intelligence from the
association of representations, will from feeling, spirit from
matter, good from evil, what should hinder man from conquering in
course of time all sin, putting an end to all misery, and
establishing “the kingdom of man” on earth once for all, the more
because he himself by exertion can lead and promote the
evolutionary process? Thus the idea of an Uebermensch is intimately
connected with the idea of evolution. Darwin himself believed in
it, and comforted himself for the suffering of this present time
with the hope that man in the far future would become a much more
perfect creature than he is now;<note place="foot" id="xi-p31.1" n="424">Bruno Wille, Darwins Lebensanschauung, p. 6.</note> and the optimistic evolutionists
join in this expectation: man is still in the making, he is still
at the beginning of his development,—a rich, beautiful future
lies before him.<note place="foot" id="xi-p31.2" n="425">Stanley Hall, Adol., I, p. viii; II, pp. 63,-64.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p32">But although this future may speedily appear, it is not in
existence yet, and it is not likely that it will dawn in the days
of the present generation. What profit all these expectations for
the men who now live, and each day draw nearer to their end?
Socialism scoffs at the Christian faith, which promises a bill of
exchange on eternity; but eternity is after all more worthy of our
trust than an insecure, doubtful, and distant future. So the
doctrine of evolution has found itself suddenly confronted with the
question, what significance the eschatological expectations have
for the individual. In the materialistic period, which lies behind
us, it had for this serious question only a contemptuous smile. But
the belief in a future kingdom of humanity is always confronted by
the problem of personal immortality. And the doctrine of evolution
assumes now in its new idealistic form quite a different bearing
towards this problem.<note place="foot" id="xi-p32.1" n="426">Comp. Jos. Royce, Immortality, Hibbert Journal, July, 1907. Sir Oliver Lodge, The Immortality of the Soul, ib., Jan., April, 1908. Eucken, The Problem of Immortality, ib., July, Jan., 1908.</note> Why should it be impossible to introduce
this immortality into its system? If man in the long process of his
development has raised himself by his intelligence high above the
animal, probably he can make himself immortal by continual
development. Of course it is improbable that all men who have
already lived and borne that name have reached such immortality,
for the transition from animal to man has been very gradual; and it
is also possible, as the adherents of conditional immortality
assure us, that even now and in the future not all men will be able to advance so far, but only they who ethically work
out their own self-perfecting. But in itself there is no reason why
man by his own development should not become immortal.</p>
<p id="xi-p33">Death certainly cannot be thought of as a catastrophe, as a
punishment of sin, as a judgment which is executed upon man. It is
simply a normal phenomenon, a gradual transition, such as often
takes place in the organic world. The egg becomes a chick, the
caterpillar becomes a butterfly; and so man advances, as at birth
so at death, into another form of existence; he changes his
clothing,—he lays aside the coarse, material body, and continues
his life in a finer, ethereal body. So Darwinism successively
brings .us into company with Swedenborg and Jang Stilling, Davis
and Kardec, Madame Blavatsky and Mrs. Annie Besant, Mrs. Eddy and
Elijah Dowie, with all the theosophists and spiritualists of recent
times. And it is not to be wondered at that many adherents of the
evolutionary doctrine are at the same time advocates of
spiritualism.<note place="foot" id="xi-p33.1" n="427">For example, William Crookes, Alfred Wallace, Sir Oliver Lodge, Fred. W. H. Myers in England, Fechner, Zöllner, Carl du Prel in Germany, Hartogh Heys van Zouteveen in Holland.</note> For all these tendencies are produced by the same
root idea: they are all strongly opposed to the Christian doctrine
of creation and fall, of hereditary sin and ethical impotence, of
redemption by Christ and salvation by grace; and they declare
instead that all is eternally becoming, that in an absolute sense
there is no coming into existence and no dissolution, but only a
change in the form of existence. This leads to the consequence
that, as Haeckel has equipped substance, ether, and atoms with
spirit, soul, conscience, and will, so men have truly existed
eternally; and it is no wonder that pre-existenceism has again
gained many adherents to-day.<note place="foot" id="xi-p33.2" n="428">For example, McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 112 ff.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p34">But although there may be difference of opinion on this point,
human development is a part of the great evolutionary process and is bound to fixed laws. Man is what he
does, and perhaps already has done, in preceding states of
existence; all that happens to a man upon earth, his external as
well as his internal condition is a strict consequence of his
behavior and actions. There is place only for merits, for the law
of reward of man’s works; there is no grace or forgiveness in the
course of nature. The ethical law is the same as the natural law;
everywhere karrna reigns,—the law of inevitable consequences.
Therefore there exist also differences among men, not in origin and
disposition, by divine ordinance, but by the use or misuse which
they make of their gifts. Men do not run with equal ardor; they do
not exert themselves with the same vigor. There are sarcical,
psychical, and pneumatic men; and according to their work in their
earthly existence they continue their life after death. Death is no
death, but life,—a form of transition to a higher existence. The
deceased do not even know that they have died; they keep a body,
they see and hear, think and speak, consider and act, just as they
did here upon earth. Perhaps they continue their intercourse for a
shorter or longer time with men on earth, as spiritualism teaches;
or they return in another body to the earth, as theosophy assumes;
or they continue their purification in some other way.<note place="foot" id="xi-p34.1" n="429">Comp. W. Bruhn, Theosophie und Theologie, Glückstadt, 1907.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p35">But whatever evolution thinks about the future, it affords no
rest for the mind and none for the heart, because it takes away
from us the Lord of the world. If there is no being, but only
becoming, then there is no final state, either on this side of
death for humanity, or on the other side for the individual man.
The doctrine of evolution is even mortally wounded by this eternal
process, because the idea of a never-ending development means a
process without aim,<note place="foot" id="xi-p35.1" n="430">Schelling, Philos. der Offenbarung, p. 365. Liebmann, Analysis der Wirklichkeit, pp. 398 ff.</note> and thus no longer a development. For every
state exists only to make way for another; as soon as the kingdom
of man came into existence it would pass away, and this the more
because, according to the testimony of science, the present world
and the present humanity cannot last eternally.<note place="foot" id="xi-p35.2" n="431">Bruno Wille, Darwins Lebensanschauung, p. 6. Ed. von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik, p. 33. Otto, Natur und relig. Weltansicht, p. 47. J. Ude, Monist. oder Teleolog. Weltanschauung, Graz, 1907. J. C. Snijders, De Ondergang der Wereld, Tijdspiegel, Oct., 1907. Fridtjof Nansen, Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, pp. 748 ff.</note> If there is no
omnipotent and holy God who exists above the world, and is for it
the goal and resting-place of its strife, then there is no final
end, no completion of the process of the world, and no rest for the
human heart. It is then an empty sound even to speak with
Höfding and Münsterberg of the eternal preservation of
values,<note place="foot" id="xi-p35.3" n="432">Höffdign in Paul Kalweit, Religion und Geisteskultur, 1908, pp. 44 ff.; in Lodge, Hibbert Journal, April, 1908, p. 565, and Barbour, ib., Oct., 1907, pp. 59 ff. Münsterberg in Royce, ib., July, 1907, pp. 724 ff.</note> for all value disappears with personality; or to take
refuge in a mysterious Buddhistic Nirvana, as is proposed by
Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, wherein all life, consciousness, and
will sink into an eternal, hypnotised condition.<note place="foot" id="xi-p35.4" n="433">About Schopenhauer’s Nirvana comp. J. de Jager, De Beteekenis van Schopenhauers Pessimisme, Gids, Nov. 1907.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p36">From the standpoint of evolution there is place only for an
eternal return, as was already assumed in Greek philosophy by
Heraclitus and the Stoics, and in these later days has been
advocated even by Nietzsche. Nietzsche was first a pessimist, pupil
of Schopenhauer and Wagner; later he became a positivist, and,
rejecting all metaphysics, took his standpoint in reality as the
one true world; still later he combined with this the doctrine of
the Wille zur Mackt; the real world became for him an ocean of
powers, which is not, but eternally becomes, which has no origin
and aim, but continually rises and falls, appears and disappears.
Although he draws from this creative energy of the Wille zur Macht
the belief in the appearance of the Uebermensch, and takes this as
the aim of the process of the world, yet it is self-evident that
this belief is in direct opposition to his positivism, as well as
to his doctrine of the eternal return. The Uebermensch is not only
a pure product of his imagination, but can only be a transition
form in the process of the world.<note place="foot" id="xi-p36.1" n="434">J. Kaftan, Aus der Werkstatte des Uebermenschen, Deutsche Rundschau., Oct. and Nov., 1905. George S. Patton, Beyond Good and Evil, The Princeton Theol. Review, July, 1908, pp. 392-436, especially pp. 430 ff. On the idea of an endless return of things, comp. Zeller, Die Philos. der Griechen, III, pp. 154 ff. Further, Gumplovicz, Soziologie, pp.158, 166ff., 348: E. Arrhenius, Die Vorstellung vom Weltgebaude im Wandel der Zeiten. Das Werden der Welten, 1907.</note> An optimism which is
exclusively built on evolution is always transmuted into pessimism
if one ponders a little more deeply.</p>
<p id="xi-p37">This is apparent also in the so-called meliorism of James. If
pragmatism is opposed to idealism, and takes its standpoint in the
empirical world, it cannot attain to an eschatology. One may with
Comte require from science that it give us the power to look
forward and predict the future;<note place="foot" id="xi-p37.1" n="435">Comp. also Ostwald, Biologie en Chemie, Wet. Bladen, Dec. 1904, pp. 420-443.</note>  but Ostwald rightly says that our
knowledge of the commencement and end of the world is null,<note place="foot" id="xi-p37.2" n="436">Ostwald, Naturphilos., Syst. Philos. in Die Kultur der Gegegenwart, pp. 170-171.</note> for
the world is so enormously great, and human society so complicated,
that nobody can calculate with any certainty how they will develop
in the future. Every one who holds strictly to experience must
protest against a metaphysics of evolution which speaks of an
infallible and eternal progress. All this belongs to the province
of faith, and is not able to withstand a logical and ethical
criticism. On the ground of empirical reality we can only resign
ourselves to ignorance; we know not what the future may bring, or
how humanity will be developed. The only thing we have to do is to
fulfil our duty. We cannot stop the process,but we may perhaps bend
and guide it a little. Let us take the world as it is, and make the
best of it. Perhaps the future will be better than we think.<note place="foot" id="xi-p37.3" n="437">Thus, in agreement with Huxley, Romanes, James, also Siebeck, Der Fortschritt der Menschheit, in Zur Religionsphilosophie, Tübingen, 1907.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p38">This meliorism certainly does not bear witness to strong faith
and great courage. It has to all intents abandoned the whole world
to pessimism, and maintains itself only by holding fast to duty.
But this isolation of the categorical imperative from the totality
of life, in which it is presented to us in man and humanity, has in
no small measure contributed to the appearance and spreading of a
pessimistic feeling in the nineteenth century;<note place="foot" id="xi-p38.1" n="438">[Ed: There is no text in the notes for reference 51.]</note> the system of
Schopenhauer depends closely on Kant’s criticism. If the essence of
things is unknowable, the misery of man cannot be fathomed. For
metaphysical need is born in all of us, and the thirst after the
knowledge of the absolute cannot be uprooted from the heart. Our
condition would be more tolerable if religion did not consist in
fellowship with God, or if that fellowship could be realized and
enjoyed without consciousness. But what we do not know, we have
not, and we love not. The special needs of our time are therefore
caused by agnosticism. Trust is undermined not only in science, but
also and principally in ourselves, in the witness of our
self-consciousness, in the value of our religious and ethical
perceptions, in the power of our intelligence and reason. Doubt is
awakened in all hearts, and the uncertainty causes our convictions
to sway hither and thither; we are moved by every wind of doctrine,
and weakened in our will by the yeas and nays which resound on all
sides.</p>
<p id="xi-p39">Nobody can predict how the human race will overcome this
disease. Philosophy, which has revived in late years, assuredly is
not fitted for the task. For it is itself infected in a great
measure by the disease; it is uncertain in its starting point, is
in doubt concerning its own task and aim, and is divided into all
kinds of schools and systems. There is no question of a steady
progress in its history; it has, especially in the period of Kant,
broken more down than it has built up, and its defenders not
infrequently give utterance to the opinion that the advantage which
it has produced consists solely in the enlightening of insight into
the essence of human knowledge, and that aside from this it is
mostly a history of instructive and important human errors.<note place="foot" id="xi-p39.1" n="439">Hieron. Lorm, Der grundlose Optimismus, in Jerusalem, Gedanken und Denker, pp. 156-163. L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., p. 54. Der Sinn des Daseins, p. 76. Comp. an address by Dr. D. G. Jelgersma on, Is de Geschiedenis der Philosophie meer dan eene Geschiedenis van menschelijke Dwalingen? Handelsblad, Oct. 33, 1907. Also Topinard in Philip Vivian, The Churches and Modern Thought, London, 1907, pp. 266 ff.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p40">The ethical autonomy also, which formed for Kant the basis of
his metaphysics, offers in its isolation no sufficient security.
For if the whole world is ascribed to the operation of a blind
process, it cannot be understood how consciousness of duty could
obtain a firm foothold in this stream of becoming. Evolution, which
is everywhere else recognized, does not respect this apparent
immutability, but penetrates into the essence of the moral man,
analyzes his views, shows the sources from which his opinions are
drawn, and shrugs its shoulders over the eternity of moral duty and
moral laws.<note place="foot" id="xi-p40.1" n="440">Prof. H. van Embden expressed himself to this effect in a discussion with Prof. Aengenent, Handelsblad, Nov. 28, 1907.</note> But apart from this serious objection, moral autonomy
may uplift and animate man for a short time; it may fill him with
admiration, as does also the starry sky above his head; and in days
of self-confidence it may stimulate him to restless eflort, but it
can give him no comfort in hours of repentance and bitter agony. It
is good for the Pharisee, who knows no other law than reward for
service, but it is pitilessly hard for the publican and sinner, who
need God’s grace. And such poor sinners are we all, each in his
turn. The strongest among men have times in which they feel
miserable, and as desolate as the prodigal son. The “healthy-minded
men” are not separated from “the morbid-minded” as a special
aristocratic class, but often themselves pass over into their
opposites; optimism and pessimism alternate in every man’s life.<note place="foot" id="xi-p40.2" n="441">James, Varieties, pp. 136 ff.</note>
Fichte, the philosopher, affords us a striking illustration of
this. In the first period of his philosophic thought he felt no
need of God, and was content with the moral world-order: in the
beginning of things there was not being, but doing; not the word,
but the deed; the non-ego was nothing but the material of duty, and
the fulfilment of this duty the highest blessedness. But later,
when serious experiences had enriched his life and thought, he
returned from doing to being, from duty to love, from striving to
rest, from morality to religion. The more deeply we live, the more
we feel in sympathy with Augustine, and the less with Pelagius.<note place="foot" id="xi-p40.3" n="442">Joh. Jüngst, Kultus- und Geschichts-religion (Pelagianismus und Augustinismus). Ein Beitr. zur relig. Psych. und Volkskunde, Giessen, 1901.</note>
Knowledge of law awakens the need for grace.</p>
<p id="xi-p41">Present-day culture ofiers still less security for a glad hope.
There are still many who are enthusiastic about science, and
anticipate from its technical applications the salvation of
humanity. The cries of science, progress, and liberty are
continually heard on the lips of free-thinkers.<note place="foot" id="xi-p41.1" n="443">Berthelot, Science et Morale, Paris, 1897. Ladenburg, Der Einfluss der Naturwiss. auf die Weltanschauung, 1903.</note> But the
hollowness of the sound reveals itself to any keenly listening ear.
Culture brings with;it its blessings, but also its dark shadows and
serious dangers; it develops attributes and powers in men which are
highly valuable, but it does this almost always at the cost of
other virtues which are not of less value; while it promotes
reflection, sagacity, activity, and strenuous striving, it
suppresses the unbiassed opinion, the childlike naivetè, the
simplicity and the guilelessness, which often belong to the natural
life.<note place="foot" id="xi-p41.2" n="444">Comp. Lect. VI. note 33.</note> Intellectual development is in itself no moral good, as
rationalism has dreamed ever since Socrates’ day, but may be used
equally well for evil as for good; it can be serviceable to love,
but it may also become a dangerous instrument in the hands of hate;
not only the virtuous, but also the criminal, profit by it. What da
Costa said of the invention of printing, that it was a gigantic
step to heaven and to hell, may be applied to all scientific and
technical elements of culture.</p>
<p id="xi-p42">We are indeed witnesses in our own developed society that sin
and crime increase frightfully, not only in the lowest ranks of
population, but quite as much in high aristocratic circles.
Unbelief and superstition in all forms; adultery, unchastity, and
unnatural sins, voluptuousness and excess, avarice, theft, and
murder, jealousy, envy, and hatred, play no less a part in the life
of cultured humanity than among the lower races. Art and literature
are not infrequently handmaids to all these sins, and the plays,
which in such centres of civilization as Paris and Berlin are given
before the èlite, seriously raise inquiries whither we are
bound with all our civilization.<note place="foot" id="xi-p42.1" n="445">E.g. Max Weber, Die Protestantische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus, Archiv. f. Sozialwiss. und Sozialpolitik, XX, pp. 1 ff., XXI pp. 1 ff. He concludes his important survey with the question whether culture is to issue in this, that men become “professionals without spirit, pleasure-seekers without heart; non-entities of this sort pride themselves on having mounted to a previously unattained stage of culture.”</note> And at the same time with these
iniquities the cleft becomes wider between religion and culture,
between morality and civilization, between science and life,
between the various classes and ranks of society. Legislation is
almost powerlesshere; internal corruption, moral degeneration, and
religious decay cannot be removed by a law of the state; on the
contrary, every law has to reckon with the egoism and the passion
of men, if it does not wish to be doomed to complete impotence; if
law does not find support in conscience, it does not touch life.
Besides this, legislation is put more and more into the hands of
the people, so that it is not seldom made the servant of party
interests. Complaints about the shady side of parliamentary
government increase in all lands;<note place="foot" id="xi-p42.2" n="446">Paulsen, Parteipolitik und Moral, Dresden, 1900. Valckenaer Kips, Tijdspiegel, March, 1908.</note> the state, which is above all,
and has to further the interests of all, tends to become a ball in
the strife of parties, and a powerful means by which the majority
tries to suppress the minority. The benefit of liberty itself, in
religious, social, and political domains, comes very seriously into
question in many countries, such as France.</p>
<p id="xi-p43">There is even reason for the question, whether the theory of
evolution does not promote in a high degree this continual triumph
of the power of the strongest. For though it believes in progress
in this sense, that the material gives birth to the spiritual in
the way of gradual development, it also teaches that in the
struggle for life the unfit perish, and only the fittest survive.
Therefore opinions greatly differ on the relation between Darwinism
and socialism; according to Virchow, Loria, Ferri, and others,
Darwinism is serviceable to socialism, but Haeckel, O. Schmidt,
Ammon, H. E. Ziegler, and H. Spencer maintain, on the contrary,
that the principle of selection bears an aristocratic character.<note place="foot" id="xi-p43.1" n="447">Dr. D. van Embdon, Darwinisme en Democratie. Maatsch. Vooruitgang en de Hulp aan het Zwakke. ‘s Gravenhage,1901.</note>
In any case, we are witnesses to this remarkable fact, that a
social aristocracy is raised against a social democracy; the
Herrenmoral of Nietzsche is also defended on economical grounds;
capitalism is deeply despised and fanatically opposed, but it gains
also strong support and passionate defence;<note place="foot" id="xi-p43.2" n="448">J. St. Loe Strachey, Problems and Perils of Socialism, London, 1908. Comp. Handelsblad, April 12, 1901, Avondblad 2, on an essay by R. Ehrenberg, Over het Ontstaan en de Beteekenis van groote Vermogens, and Ammon, Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre naturlichen Grundlagen, 1895-1900.</note> and art in late years
very seriously protests against social levelling, and makes a
strong plea for riches and luxury, for the genius and aristocracy
of the mind; it is highly normal, it is said, that the many should
live for the few and the few live at the cost of the many.<note place="foot" id="xi-p43.3" n="449">Van Deyssel, Prozastukken, 1895, pp. 43 ff., 277 ff. Karl Bleibtreu, Die Vertreter des Jahrh. Berlin, 1904, II, pp. 260-303. W. His, Medizin und Ueberkultur, Leipzig, 1908. Gérard, Civilization in Danger, Hibbert Journal, July, 1908.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p44">The same fact also presents itself internationally in the mutual
relations of the nations. The cosmopolitanism of the
“Enlightenment” was not only exchanged in the nineteenth century
for patriotism, but this patriotism was not infrequently developed
into an exaggerated, dangerous, and belligerent chauvinism, which
exalts its own people at the cost of other nations. In its turn
this chauvinism was fed and strengthened by the revival of the
race-consciousness which in Gobineau and H. St. Chamberlain found
its scientific defenders. Not only in the different parts of the
earth, but also often among the same people, and in the same land,
races are sharply opposed to each other, striving after the chief
power in the state, and supremacy in the kingdom of the mind. This
race-glorification acquires such a serious character, and so
far exceeds all bounds, that the virtues of the race are identified
with the highest ideal. Deutschtum, for example, is placed on a
level with Christendom, and Jesus is considered as an Aryan in
race.<note place="foot" id="xi-p44.1" n="450">Steinmetz, De Rassenquaestie, Gids, Jan. 1907.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p45">Economical interests besides sharpen the competition between the
nations. Though this competition still bears outwardly a peaceful
character, it widens the gulf between the nations, feeds egoism,
stimulates the passions, and may on the smallest occasion break out
into a war which would surpass all previous wars in devastation.
From a kingdom of peace, which shall embrace all nations, we are
farther away than ever. Many men have, indeed, dreamed sweet dreams
of such a peace, or at least of a palace of peace and international
arbitration;<note place="foot" id="xi-p45.1" n="451">L. Stein, An der Wende des Jahrh., pp. 348 ff.</note> but they have been sadly undeceived, and forced into
fresh reflection by the sudden apparition of Japan. Just as many in
the state are returning to monarchy and despotism, and wish again
to accord the first place in society to aristocracy and capitalism,
so others in international relations defend the arming of nations,
the conflict of races, and sanguinary war. The effacement of all
differences between the nations is not, according to their opinion,
the highest aim to be striven after. An amalgamated humanity would
cause, without doubt, an impoverisheel civilization and a weakening
of human life. Of course race-hatred and contempt for foreigners
are not approved on this account; but it is said that strong
nations, just like strong individuals, will respect most the rights
of others and will be most merciful to their defects. And though
this diversity between nations and races may now and then cause a
war, history proves that such a war has been a source of strength
and welfare for many peoples, and for humanity as a whole.<note place="foot" id="xi-p45.2" n="452">Steinmetz, Die Philosophie des Krieges, Leipzig, 1907.</note> War
is, according to Moltke, an element of the world-order, as it is
established by God, in which the noblest virtues of men are
developed, such as courage and self-denial, faithfulness to duty,
and self-sacrifice; without war the world would become a morass,
and would sink into materialism.<note place="foot" id="xi-p45.3" n="453">Thus also Ruskin, who declared that he had always observed that all great nations acquired their power of resistance and mental vigor in war, that war has instructed, peace has deceived them; war has schooled them, peace led them astray, in a word that war has made and peace has unmade them.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p46">If we take into account all these facts, it is not to be
wondered at that culture is often treated with deep disdain, not
only by Christians, but by the children whom it has fed and
nourished. There are those—and their number increases—who, with
Buckle, notwithstanding the intellectual development which has
taken place, do not believe in any moral progress and speak only of
a circle of development.<note place="foot" id="xi-p46.1" n="454">Gumplovicz, Soziologie, pp. 158-166 ff., 348.</note> Others go still farther, and are of
opinion that the human race, just in consequence of culture, is
retrograding physically, psychically, intellectually, morally, and
socially, and that safety can be obtained only by a radical change,
namely, by a return to nature, or even to the animal state in which
men originally lived. The great number of reformers who appear
to-day in every domain of thought and action, indeed, sufficiently
shows that culture, with all its blessings, does not content the
heart, and does not meet all the needs of the soul. Evolutionists
and socialists, though glorying in the conquests which the man of
culture has made, vie with each other in condemning present-day
society, and build all their hopes on the future. But that future
is distant and uncertain ; for he who considers the moral
corruption which has attacked our culture at the core, and takes
into consideration the perils which press upon us from without,—
the red, the black, and the yellow peril,—feels the anxious
question rising within him, whether our whole modern culture is not
destined sometime to devastation and annihilation like that of
Babylon and Egypt, Greece and Rome.<note place="foot" id="xi-p46.2" n="455">Ibid. pp. 350, 352, 354. A. J. Balfour, Decadence, Cambridge, 1908, p. 42.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p47">Thus it appears that neither science nor philosophy, neither
ethics nor culture, can give that security with regard to the
future which we have need of, not only for our thought, but also
for our whole life and action. This need of security cannot be
voided by saying that every one must do his duty and leave the
future to itself. For though there is great truth in the Christian
motto, “Blind for the future, and seeing in the commandment,” such
true resignation is not born of doubt,but of faith, and does not
leave the future to itself, but to God’s fatherly guidance. The
need of security concerning the future and the ultimate end of the
world, therefore, always remains with us, because everything we
value in this life is inseparably connected with the future. If the
world at the end of its development is dissolved in a chaos, or
sinks back into everlasting sleep, the value of personality, of
religious and ethical life, and also of culture, cannot be
maintained. The weal and woe of man, and the safety of our souls,
are closely interwoven with the final destiny of the world.
Therefore, in order to live and to die happily we need a
consolation which is firm and durable, and gives security to our
thought and labor. All world-views, therefore, end in an
eschatology, and all eflorts at reformation are animated by faith
in the future.</p>
<p id="xi-p48">If neither science nor culture, nor the combination of both,<note place="foot" id="xi-p48.1" n="456">Balfour, op. cit., p. 48.</note>
can give us such security, the question remains whether there is
anything else in the whole world in which we can trust at all
times, in adversity and death, with our whole heart? Now history
teaches, with a distinctness which precludes all doubt, that there
is only one power which can give such a security, and can awaken
such an absolute confidence in the heart always and everywhere, and
that is religion. While science can boast of only a few martyrs,
religion counts its witnesses by thousands and tens of thousands.
Who would be ready to sacrifice his life for a purely mathematical
or scientific truth? If we wish to find the security which gives us
rest in life and death and keeps us firm in the midst of the storms
of doubt, we must seek it in religion, or we can find it nowhere.
All certainty concerning the origin, the essence, and the end of
things, is based on religion. As soon as a world-view attacks these
problems, it is met by the alternative, either to content itself
with guesses and doubts, or to take refuge in a religious
interpretion of the world. Comte thought, indeed, that religion and
metaphysics belonged to the past, but none the less made his
positivism serviceable for the preaching of a new religion; and
Herbert Spencer did not explain how he, in his philosophy, could
accept an unknowable power behind phenomena, and could give
expression to the suggestion that this power is the same as that
“which in ourselves wells up in the form of consciousness.”<note place="foot" id="xi-p48.2" n="457">C. Frazer, Hibbert Journal, Jan., 1907, p. 242.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p49">The reason why religion alone can create such a security lies at
hand. First, it always includes faith in a divine power, which is
distinct from the world, far above it, and can govern and guide it
according to its own will; and, secondly, it puts man himself
personally into connection with the divine power, so that he sees
in the affairs of God his own affairs, and allied with God can defy
the power of the whole world, even unto death. But this idea of
religion has only come to its true and full embodiment in
Christianity. For all religions which exist without the special
revelation in Christ, and equally all confessions and world-views
which differ from it, are characterized by this common peculiarity,
that they identify God and the world, the natural and the ethical,
being and evil, creation and fall, and therefore mix up religion
with superstition and magic. There is only one religion which moves
on pure lines and is conceived altogether as religion, and that is
Christianity.</p>
<p id="xi-p50">In this religion God is the creator of all things. The whole
world is the work of his hands; matter itself is made by him, and
before its making was the object of his thought. All being and
becoming thus embody a revelation of God. This revelation is the
starting point of the unity of nature, the unity of the human race,
the unity of history, and is also the source of all laws,—the
laws of nature, of history, and of all development. The ideas and
norms which govern religious, ethical, and social life, and appear
in the self-consciousness and the thought of humanity, are the
product of this revelation of God. In a word, that the world is no
chaos, but a cosmos, a universe, is the silent postulate of all
science and art for which they are indebted to the revelation which
Christianity makes known to us. Nature and grace, culture and
cultus, are built upon the same foundations.</p>
<p id="xi-p51">But this revelation is not sufficient. God is creator: he is
further the reconciler of all things. There is much evil in the
world,—natural and moral evil, sin and misery. Christianity is
the one religion which connects these two kinds of evil and yet
distinguishes them. Sin does not lie in matter, nor in nature, nor
in the substance of things, but it belongs to the will of the
creature; it is of ethical nature, and thus capable of being
expiated, effaced, extinguished. It can be separated from the
creature, so that it disappears and the creature remains intact,
yea, much more, is restored and glorified. For God is above the
world, and is also above sin and all evil. He allowed it because he
could expiate it. So he maintained through all centuries and among
all men the longing and the capacity for redemption, and wrought
that redemption himself in the fulness of time, in the midst of
history, in the crucified Christ. “God was, in Christ, reconciling
the world with himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.”
The cross of Golgotha is the divine settlement with, the divine
condemnation of sin. There it is revealed that sin exists; it is no
fiction which can be conquered by thought, no external defect which
can be obliterated by culture; but it is an awful reality, and has
a world-historical significance. But although it exists, it has no
right of existence; it should not exist, and therefore it shall not
exist.</p>
<p id="xi-p52">For God is the creator and redeemer, but also finally the
restorer and renewer of all things. The history of mankind after
the resurrection of Christ is the execution of the judicial
sentence which was passed on the cross, of the sentence which in
Christ condemns sin and absolves the sinner, and therefore gives to
him a right and claim to forgiveness and renewal. The cross of
Christ divides history into two parts, - the preparation for and
the accomplishment of reconciliation; but in both parts, from the
creation to the cross and from the cross to the advent, it is one
whole, one uninterrupted work of God. Christianity is as religion
much more than a matter of feeling or temperament; it embraces the
whole man, all humanity, and the totality of the world. It is a
work of God, a revelation from the beginning to the end of the
ages, in word and in deed, for mind and heart, for the individual
and the community. And it has its heart and centre in the person
and the work of Christ.</p>
<p id="xi-p53">Christ occupies in Christianity quite a different position from
that which Zarathustra or Confucius, Buddha or Mohammed, hold in
the religion which was founded by each of them. Christ is not the
founder of Christianity, nor the first confessor of it, nor the
first Christian. But he is Christianity itself, in its preparation,
fulfilment, and consummation. He created all things, reconciled all
things, and renews all things. Because all things have in him their
source, their being, and their unity, he also gathers in one all
things under himself as Head, both those which are in heaven and
those on earth. He is Prophet and Priest, but also King, who does
not cease his work until he has delivered the kingdom perfect and
complete to God the Father. This one equally sovereign and
almighty, holy, and gracious will of God, which meets us and speaks
to our conscience in the person and the, work of Christ, is the
firm basis of our certainty, of our certainty concerning the past,
the present, and the future. For nobody can deny that if there is
and works such a will, then the origin, development, and destiny of
the world are certain; then the life and fate of every man who
identifies himself with this will of God and makes God’s cause his
own is assured now and for eternity. But the world of science and
art, culture and technique, knows nothing of such a merciful will
of God. It can advance no further, with all its thoroughness and
sagacity, than the postulate that there must be such a will of
God.</p>
<p id="xi-p54">But even this result of human knowledge and effort is a
significant fact; for it contains the confession that the whole
world, with all its development, is lost and must perish if it is
not sustained and guided by an almighty will, which can cause light
to appear out of darkness, life out of death, and glory out of
suffering. What eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has
entered into the heart of man to conceive otherwise than as a wish
or a sigh, is revealed to us in the gospel. Jesus Christ came into
the world to preserve it and to save it. This is the content of the
gospel and the testimony of Scripture in spite of all criticism and
opposition. By this testimony the prophets have lived, and the
apostles and the whole Christian Church, and by it men will live
till the end of time. For the truth of this testimony lies outside
and beyond the bounds of all criticism in the system of the whole
world, in the existence of the Christian church, and in the need of
the human heart. The world cries: Such a will of God ought to be,
if I am ever to be saved; and the gospel says: There is such a will
of God; lift your eyes to the cross. Between the world as it exists
around us, with all its laws and all its calamities; between
culture, with all its glory and all its miseries; between the human
heart, with all its aspirations and all its pains; between this
whole universe and the will of God as it is made known to us in the
gospel, there exists a spiritually and historically indissoluble
unity. Take away that will, and the world is lost; acknowledge that
will, and the world is saved. Revelation in nature and revelation
in Scripture form, in alliance with each other, an harmonious unity
which satisfies the requirements of the intellect and the needs of
the heart alike.</p>
<p id="xi-p55">This result of a philosophy of revelation is finally confirmed
by this, that the will of God, which, according to the gospel, aims
at the salvation of the world, yet acknowledges fully here and
hereafter the diversity which exists in the world of creatures.
Monism in all its forms sacrifices the richness of reality to the
abstract unity of its system. It asserts that all that exists is
but the development of one matter and one power; it sees in the
diversity only modifications of the same being; it dissolves even
the contrasts of true and false, of good and evil, of right and
wrong, into historical moments of the same, movement, and it
concludes with the declaration that the world at the end of the
process returns to chaos, to darkness and death, perhaps after a
while to begin anew its monotonous round. The eschatological
expectations which present themselves under the name of the
restitution of all things, hypothetical or absolute universalism,
and conditional immortality, also have received so much sympathy
only because man closes his eyes consciously or unconsciously to
reality and transforms the wishes of his heart into prophecies of
the future. By the magic formulas of monism and evolution men make
the world to be and to become in the past, present, and even in the
future, everything they please. But reality scoffs at these
phantasies; it places before us the sorrowful facts that the power
of evil raises itself against good, that sin does not annihilate
man, but hardens him spiritually, and that virtue and happiness,
sin and punishment, are not in proportion to each other here upon
earth as all hearts and consciences require. And yet since this is
what really exists, it must in some way be in accordance with the
holiness and goodness of God.<note place="foot" id="xi-p55.1" n="458">C. Frazer, Philos. of Theism., p. 277. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 114.</note></p>
<p id="xi-p56">The gospel is suited to this reality, and is quite in agreement
with it; it takes and acknowledges the world exactly as it is shown
to our unbiassed view; it does not fashion it after a prescribed
pattern, but accepts it unprejudicedly, with all its diversities
and contrasts, with all its problems and enigmas. Man is indeed
what Scripture describes him, and the world appears as Scripture
shows it to us. A superficial view may indeed deny it; deeper
experience and more serious inquiry always lead back again to the
acknowledgment of its truth; the greatest minds, the noblest souls,
the most pious hearts have repeated and confirmed the witness of
Scripture from age to age. Scripture therefore does not stand
isolated in its contemplation of the world and life, but is
surrounded, upheld, and supported on all sides by the sensus
communis of the whole of humanity; there is neither speech nor
language where its voice is not heard. The world certainly was not
originated in a monistic way, and it does not exist in this way.
From the beginning it has shown a great variety, which has had its
origin in divine appointment. This variety has been destroyed by
sin and changed into all kinds of opposition. The unity of humanity
was dissolved into a multiplicity of peoples and nations. Truth,
religion, and the moral law have not kept their unity and
sovereignty, but are confronted by lies, false religion, and
unrighteousness. So the world was, and so it still remains. In
spite of all striving after unity by means of world conquest,
political alliance, and international arbitration, trade unions and
economical interests ; in spite of the advocacy of an independent,
positive, and common world-language, world-science, world-morality,
and world-culture—unity has not and cannot be realized. For these
forces can at the most accomplish an external and temporal unity,
but they do not change the heart and do not make the people of one
soul and one speech. The one true unity can only be brought about
by religion, by means of missions. If there is ever to be a
humanity one in heart and one in soul, then it must be born out of
return to the one living and true God.</p>
<p id="xi-p57">Although the gospel lays this missionary work on the consciences
of all its confessors with the greatest earnestness, yet it never
flatters us with the hope that thereby the inner spiritual unity of
mankind will be accomplished in the present dispensation. The idea
of a millennium stands in direct opposition to the description of
the future which runs through the whole of the New Testament. Jesus
portrays to his disciples much rather a life of strife, oppression,
and persecution. He promises them on earth not a crown, but a
cross. The highest ideal for the Christian is not to make peace
with the world, with science, with culture at any price, but in the
world to keep himself from the evil one. We have no guarantee that
the church and the world will not as fiercely strive with one
another in the future as in the first centuries of Christianity. We
have not the least assurance that, in spite, of all preaching of
tolerance, a persecution which will exceed all previous oppressions
will not break out against the church of Christ before the end of
time. On the contrary, there is great danger that modern culture,
progressing in its anti-supernaturalistic course, will be stirred
up to anger against the steadfastness of believers and attempt to
accomplish by oppression what it cannot obtain by reasoning and
argument. At any rate, this is what the teaching of Christ and the
apostles predicts of the last days.</p>
<p id="xi-p58">Because it recognizes this reality the gospel cannot end in a
monistic formula; there remains difference, there remains an
opposition, until and, indeed, even after the advent. Heaven and
hell in what concerns their essence are no products of imagination,
but elements of all religious faith, and even postulates of all
thought which seriously takes into account the majesty of the moral
world-order, the ineradicable consciousness of justice in the heart
of man, and the indisputable witness of his conscience.<note place="foot" id="xi-p58.1" n="459">Kant judged an “Ausgleichung” between virtue and happiness necessary hereafter, and Paulsen is of the same opinion, Ethik, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, System. Philos., pp. 304 ff. Comp. also a paper, with discussion, on Eschatological Expectations in the meeting of Modern Theologians, April 28, 29, 1908.</note> But in
contradistinction to all other religions Christianity teaches that
the position which man will hold in the future world is, in
principle, determined by the relation in which he stands to God and
his revelation, and that the allotment of that position will be
made by no one else than Chdst, who created the world, who
continually supports it in its being and unity, who is the life and
light of man always and everywhere, who appeared in the fulness of
time as the saviour of the world, and who therefore knows the world
through and through, and can judge it in perfect justice. Nobody
will be able to make objection to the righteousness and equity of
his sentence. Whatever may be the result of the world-history, it
will be acknowledged by all willingly or unwillingly, be raised
above all criticism, and be consonant with God’s virtues. Right and
left from the great dividing line there remains room for such
endless diversity that no single idle word will be forgotten, nor
will a single good thought or noble action fall unnoted. Nothing of
any value will be lost in the future; all our works do follow us,
and the kings and nations of the earth will bring together into the
city of God all their glory and honor. Above all differences, and
over every variety, there will extend into the future the one holy
and gracious will of God, which is the bond of the whole universe,
and to which all will be subject and ancillary. The absolute,
immutable, and inviolable supremacy of that will of God is the
light which special revelation holds before our soul’s eye at the
end of time. For monism the present economy is as a short span of
life between two eternities of death, and consciousness a lightning
flash in the dark night.<note place="foot" id="xi-p58.2" n="460">Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science, Paris, 1905, p. 276. Comp. J. Woltjer, De Zekerheid der Wetenschap, Amsterdam, 1907.</note> But for the Christian this dark world is
always irradiated from above by the splendor of divine revelation,
and under its guidance it moves onward towards the kingdom of light
and life. Round about revelation are clouds and darkness;
nevertheless righteousness and judgment are the foundation of God’s
throne.</p>
<p id="xi-p59"> </p>
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      <h1 id="xii-p0.1">Indexes</h1>

      <div2 title="Index of Scripture References" id="xii.i" prev="xii" next="toc">
        <h2 id="xii.i-p0.1">Index of Scripture References</h2>
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<p class="bbook">Genesis</p>
 <p class="bref">
 <a class="TOC" href="?scrBook=Gen&amp;scrCh=14&amp;scrV=18#viii-p27.3">14:18-20</a>  
 <a class="TOC" href="?scrBook=Gen&amp;scrCh=14&amp;scrV=20#viii-p27.4">14:20</a>  
 </p>
<p class="bbook">Deuteronomy</p>
 <p class="bref">
 <a class="TOC" href="?scrBook=Deut&amp;scrCh=26&amp;scrV=5#viii-p27.6">26:5</a>  
 </p>
<p class="bbook">Jeremiah</p>
 <p class="bref">
 <a class="TOC" href="?scrBook=Jer&amp;scrCh=51&amp;scrV=7#viii-p30.3">51:7</a>  
 </p>
<p class="bbook">Romans</p>
 <p class="bref">
 <a class="TOC" href="?scrBook=Rom&amp;scrCh=1&amp;scrV=19#ii-p21.2">1:19-23</a>  
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