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Article Five

Whether Servile Fear is substantially the Same as Filial Fear

We proceed to the fifth article thus:

1. It seems that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. Filial fear seems to be related to servile fear as formed faith is related to unformed faith, since the one is accompanied 317by mortal sin, and the other is not. Now formed and unformed faith are substantially the same. Hence servile and filial fear are also substantially the same.

2. Again, habits are differentiated according to their objects. But servile and filial fear have the same object, since they both fear God. They are therefore substantially the same.

3. Again, just as a man hopes to enjoy God, and also to receive benefits from him, so does he fear to be separated from God, and also to be punished by him. Now the hope by which we hope to enjoy God is identical with the hope by which we hope to receive other benefits from him. The filial fear by which we fear to be separated from God is therefore identical with the servile fear by which we fear to be punished by him.

On the other hand: Augustine says that there are two kinds of fear, the one servile, the other filial or chaste (Tract. 9 in Joan.).

I answer: the proper object of fear is evil. But fears are bound to differ in kind if the evils which they fear are different, since actions and habits are distinguished according to their objects, as we said in 12ae, Q. 54, Art. 2. Now it is clear from what we said in Art. 2 that the evil of punishment, which is feared by servile fear, differs in kind from the evil of guilt, which is feared by filial fear. This makes it obvious that servile and filial fear are not substantially the same, but differ in their specific natures.

On the first point: formed and unformed faith do not differ in respect of their object, since they both believe in God, and believe God. They differ solely in what is extrinsic to them, namely, in the presence or absence of charity. Hence they do not differ in their substance. Servile and filial fear, on the other hand, differ in respect of their objects. They are therefore not of the same nature.

On the second point: servile and filial fear do not have regard to God in the same way. Servile fear looks upon God as the principal source of punishments. Filial fear does not look upon God as the principal source of guilt, but rather as the term from which it fears to be separated by guilt. These two fears do not then have the same specific nature on account of their object, since even natural movements have different specific natures if they are related to a term in different ways. The movement away from whiteness, for example, is not specifically the same as the movement towards it.

On the third point: hope looks to God principally, whether 318in regard to the enjoyment of God or in regard to any other benefits. But it is not so with fear. We cannot therefore argue about them in the same way.

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