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§ 33. Continuation.
The hypostasis of the divine nature having thus, through the personal union, become at the same time that of the human nature, and thus no longer only a divine but a divine and human nature being now predicated of the person of the Redeemer, a real communion of both natures is thereby asserted, in consequence of which the two natures sustain no merely outward relation to each other; for, as the hypostasis of the divine nature is not essentially different from this nature itself, and this hypostasis has imparted itself to the human nature, it therefore follows that there exists between the divine and human nature a true and real impartation and communion.  The first effect of the personal union is, therefore, the “communion (also communication) of natures.” QUEN. (III, 87): “The communion of natures is that most intimate participation (koinwnia) and combination (sunduasiß) of the divine nature of the logoß and of the assumed human nature, by which the logoß, through a most intimate and profound perichoresis, so permeates, perfect, inhabits, and appropriates to Himself the human nature that is personally united to Him, that from both, mutually inter-communicating, there arises the one incommunicable subject, viz., one person.” As, however, in the act of union, the divine nature is regarded as the active one, and the divine logoß as that which assumed the human nature, so the intercommunion of the two natures must be so understood as that, between the two natures, the active movement proceeds from the divine nature, and it is this that permeates the human.  It is, indeed, just as difficult for us to form an adequate conception of this as in the case of the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which furnish us with at least an approximate conception of it. Such we may find, e.g., in the union of soul and body; in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand towards each other; or in the relation between iron and fire in red-hot iron. Just as the soul and body do not stand outwardly related to each other, as a man to the clothing that he has put on, or as an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the union between soul and body is a real, intimate and perfect one, so is also the union and communion of the two natures. As body and soul are inseparably united, and constitute the one man, so are also the human and divine natures most inseparably united. As the soul acts upon the body and is united with it, without there being any mingling of the two, the soul remaining soul and the body remaining body, so are we also to regard the communion of the two natures in such a light, that each abides in its integrity. As, finally, the soul is never without the body, so also the logoß is to be regarded as always in the flesh and never without it.  If, now, there really exists such a communion of natures, it follows — I. That the personal designations derived from the two natures must be mutually predicable of each other; that we must therefore just as well be able to say, “The man (Christ Jesus) is God,” as “God is man,” which expressions, of course, do not signify that God, having become man, has ceased to be God, but rather, that the same Christ, who is God, is at the same time man (HOLL. (686): “The Son of God, personally, is the same as the Son of man: and the Son of man, personally, is the same as the Son of God”); whence the predicate “man” belongs just as much to the subject God as the predicate “God” belongs to the subject man.  For, if we refuse to say this, we would betray the fact that we conceive, not of two natures in Christ, but rather of two persons, each remaining as it originally was, which would be Nestorianism. From the communion of natures are, therefore, deduced the personal designations, i.e., statements in which the concrete of one nature (as united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature; i.e., the two essences really (alehqwß) different, the divine and the human, are in the concrete reciprocally predicated of one another, really and truly, yet in a manner very singular and unusual, in order to express the personal union.  To guard against a misunderstanding of these personal designations, it may be more particularly stated that they are (1) not merely verbal, i.e., they are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says of the son of Mary, He was the Son of God, ascribing to the subject a title, as it were, but altogether refusing to acknowledge that He who was the son of Mary was also really the Son of God; (2) not identical (when the same thing is predicated of itself); i.e., the predicates that are ascribed to the subject dare not be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to the nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. The proposition, “The Son of God is the son of Mary,” dare not, therefore, be interpreted, “The man who is united with the Son of God is the son of Mary;” (3) not metaphorical, figurative, or tropical; as when, in the predicate that is applied to a subject, not the essential nature itself of the subject is ascribed to it, but only particular qualities of this predicate are appropriated to the subject, so that it might be said, in a figurative sense, God is man, as we understand the expression when it is applied to a picture: “This is a man,” “a woman;” or, when it is said of Herod, “He is a fox;” (4) not essential and univocal; as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it (the expression, “God is man,” would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man). The personal designations are rather — (1) Real; i.e., that which is ascribed to the subject really and truly belongs to it. (2) Unusual and singular; for, as there is no other example of the personal union, so there are no other examples of the personal designations. But from the communion of natures it follows also — II. That there is a participation of the natures in the person as well as of the natures with each other.  This is set forth in the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. BR. (467): “The communicatio idiomatum is that by which it comes to pass that those things which, when the two natures are compared together, belong to one of them per se and formally, are to be truly predicated, also, of the other nature (either as regards concretes, or for that which is peculiar to it.)”  According to this doctrine, therefore, it is neither possible to ascribe a quality to one of the two natures, which is not a quality of the whole person, nor is it possible to predicate an act or operation of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not participate (not, however, in such a way as if along with the qualities or the acts proceeding from them, their underlying essence were transferred to the other nature).  There exists, therefore, a communicatio idiomatum between the natures and the person, and between the natures reciprocally.  The communicatio idiomatum is, therefore, of several genera, of which we enumerate three (for so many are distinctly mentioned in the Scriptures),  the idiomatic, majestatic, and apotelesmatic. I. THE IDIOMATIC GENUS. If the two natures are really united in one person, then every idioma (peculiarity) that originally belongs to one of the two natures must be predicated of the entire person; the idiomata (peculiarities) of the divine nature, as well as those of the human nature, must belong to the person of the Redeemer. If, therefore, to be born or to suffer is an idioma of the human nature, then we must just as well be able to say, “Christ, the God-man, was born, suffered,” as it is said of Him, “by Him were all things created,” although creation is an idioma of the divine nature.  For, if we will not say this, but maintain that an idioma of the human nature can be predicated only of the concrete of the human nature, and an idioma of the divine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that we would say: “The man, Jesus Christ, was born,” “by Christ, who is God, all things were created;” then the personal union would be set aside, and it would appear that two persons and not two natures are recognized.  But it is just in this that the personal union shows itself to be real, that all the idiomata which belong to the one or the other nature are equally idiomata of the person. As, further, in virtue of the communion of natures, and of the personal designations resulting therefrom, it is all the same whether we designate Christ by both of His natures or only by one of them, an idioma of one of the two natures can be just as readily predicated of the concrete of the one as of the other; we can, therefore, just as well say, “God is dead,” as, “the man, Jesus Christ, is Almighty.”  While, however, the idiomata of the two natures are attributed to the concrete of both natures (to Christ, the God-man) or to the concrete of one of the two natures (God — the man, Christ Jesus), it by no means follows from this that therefore the idiomata of the one nature becomes those of the other; for the two natures are not in substance changed by the personal union, but each of them retains the idiomata essential and natural to itself. Therefore it is only to the person that, without further distinctions, the idiomata of the one or of the other nature can be ascribed; but this can in no wise happen between the natures themselves, in such a sense as though each of them did not retain the idiomata essential to itself.  To avoid such a misunderstanding in statements of this kind, it is usual to designate particularly from which nature the idiomata predicated of the person are derived.  General Definition. — HOLL. (693): “The first genus of communicatio idiomatum is this, when such things as are peculiar to the divine or to the human nature are truly and really ascribed to the entire person of Christ, designated by either nature or by both natures.”  This genus the later Dogmaticians divide into three species, according as the different idiomata are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are “(a) idiopoihsiß (appropriation), or oikeiwsiß (indwelling), when human idiomata are ascribed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts 3:15; 20:28; 1 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 2:20. (b) koinwnia twn qeiwn (participation of the divine), when the divine idiomata are predicated of the person of the incarnate Word, designated from His human nature. John 6:62; 8:58; 1 Cor. 15:47, (c) antidosiß or sunamfoterismoß, alteration, or reciprocation, in which as well the divine as the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the person, or concerning Christ, designated from both natures. Heb. 13:8; Rom. 9:5; 2 Cor. 13:4; 1 Pet. 3:18.” (HOLL. 694) II. THE MAJESTATIC GENUS. As the divine logoß has assumed human nature, so that by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has become also that of the human nature, a further and natural consequence of this is, that thereby the human nature has become partaker of the attributes of the divine nature, and therefore of its entire glory and majesty:  for, by the personal union, not only the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature; and the participation in the divine attributes by the human nature occurs at the very moment in which the logoß unites itself with the human nature.  But there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata essential to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained, because the divine nature in its essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase.  The attributes, finally, which, by virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures, are communicated to the human nature, are truly divine, and are therefore to be distinguished from the special human excellences possessed by the human nature which the logos assumed, over and above those of other human natures.  Definition. — (HOLL. 699): “The second genus of communicatio idiomatum is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates the idiomata of His own divine nature to the assumed human nature, in consequence of the personal union, for common possession, use and designation.”  III. THE APOSTELESMATIC GENUS. The whole design of the incarnation of Christ is none other than that the logoß, united with the human nature, may accomplish the work of redemption. From the communion of the two natures, resulting from the personal union, it follows that none of the influences proceeding from Christ can be attributed to one only of the two natures.  The influence may, in deed, proceed from one of the two natures, and each of the two natures exerts the influence peculiar to itself, but in such a way that, while such an influence is being exerted on the part of one of the natures, the other is not idle, but at the same time active; that, therefore, while the human nature suffers, the divine, which indeed cannot also suffer, yet in so far participates in the suffering of the human nature that it wills this suffering, permits it, stands by the human nature in its suffering, and strengthens and supports it for enduring the imposed burden;  further, that the human nature is to be regarded as active, not alone by means of the attributes essentially its own, but that to these are added, by virtue of the second genus of the communicatio idiomatum, the divine attributes imparted to it, with which it operates.  For the divine nature could not of itself, alone, have offered a ransom for the redemption of the world; to do this it had to be united with the human nature, which, consisting of soul and body, could be offered up for the salvation of men. Again, the human nature could not have accomplished many of the deeds performed (miracles, etc.), had not its attributes been increased by the addition of the divine.  Definition — GRH. III, 555): “The third genus of the communicatio idiomatum is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs what is peculiar to itself, with the participation of the other. 1 Cor. 15:3; Gal. 1:4; Eph. 5:2.”  If we now contemplate the entire doctrine of the Person of Christ, its supreme importance at once becomes manifest. Only because in Christ the divine and human natures were joined together in one person, could He accomplish the work of redemption.  In order clearly to exhibit this truth, it has been necessary for us to develop the present doctrine at such length.   QUEN. (III, 87): “IF the hypostasis of the logoß has been truly and really imparted to the assumed flesh, undoubtedly there is a true and real participation between the divine and the human nature, since the hypostasis of the logoß and the divine nature of the logoß do not really differ. But as the former is true, so also must be the latter.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 14): “But we must not regard this hypostatic union as though the two natures, divine and human, are united in the manner in which two pieces of wood are glued together, so as really, or actually and truly, to have no participation whatever with each other. For this is the error and heresy of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, who thought and taught heretically that the two natures are altogether separate or apart from one another, and are incapable of any participation whatever. By this false dogma, the natures are separated, and two Christs are invented, one of whom is Christ, but the other God, the logoß, dwelling in Christ.” QUEN. (III, 143): “THe antithesis of the Calvinists, some of whom teach that it is only the person of the logoß, and not, at the same time, His divine nature that has been united to human nature, unless by way of consequence and accompaniment, because of its identity with personality, which alone was at first united. Thus they invent a double union, mediate and immediate; that the natures are united, not immediately, but through the medium of the person of the logoß.”  HOLL. (680): “The communion of natures in the person of Christ is the mutual participation of the divine and human nature of Christ, through which the divine nature of the logoß, having become participant of the human nature, pervades, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates this to itself; but the human, having become participant of the divine nature, is pervaded, perfected, and inhabited by it.” BR. (463): “From the personal union proceeds the participation of natures, through which it comes to pass that the human nature belongs to the Son of God, and the divine nature to the Son of man. For marking this, the word pericwrhsiß, which, according to its original meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be employed, so that the divine nature might indeed be said actively to penetrate, and the human nature passively to be penetrated. Yet this must be understood in such a manner as to remove all imperfection. For the divine nature does not penetrate the human so as to occupy successively one part of it after another, and to diffuse itself extensively through it; but, because it is spiritual and indivisible as a whole, it energizes and perfects at the same time every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it. Here belongs the passage, Col. 2:9. HOLL. (681): “Pericwrhsiß is not indeed a biblical term; nevertheless it is an ecclesiastical term, and began especially to be employed when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not understand pericwrhsiß as local and quantitative, as an urn is said to contain (cwrein) water, but as illocal and metaphorically used.”  FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 18, 19): “Learned antiquity has indeed declared this personal union and communion of natures by the similitude of the soul and body, and likewise, in another manner, by that of glowing iron. For the soul and body (and so also fire and iron) have a participation with each other, not merely nominally or verbally, but truly and really; yet in such a manner that no mingling or equalizing of the natures is introduced, as when honey-water is made of honey and water, for such drink is no longer either pure water or pure honey, but a drink composed of both. Far otherwise is it in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, for the union and participation of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is far more exalted, and is altogether inexpressible.” HOLL. (681): “The fathers have seen fit to describe the personal pericwrhsiß (a) from the essential pericwrhsiß of the persons of the Holy Trinity; (b) from the natural pericwrhsiß of body and soul; (c) from the accidental pericwrhsiß of fire and iron. For, as one person of the Trinity is in another, as the soul pervades the body, as fire penetrates all the pores of iron, so the divinity of Christ is in the humanity, which it completely fills and pervades. From this it is easy to infer that pericwrhsiß denotes (1) that the personal union is an inner one and most complete. A union is outward and incomplete when an angel assumes a body, a pilot stands by a ship, a garment hangs on a man. The teachers of the Church, to separate from it the idea of such an outward union, were in the habit of calling the union a personal union, and the communion proceeding from it pericwrhsiß. For, as the soul does not outwardly stand by the body, nor merely direct its movement, but enters, moves into, and fashions it, by imparting to the body its own essence, life, and faculties; so the logoß enters the flesh, and inwardly communicates to it its own divine nature. (2) That the communion of natures is mutual, yet in such a manner that the divine nature, as actual being (enteleceia), i.e., as a most absolute act, permeates and perfects and assumed human nature, and the assumed flesh is permeated and perfected. (3) That the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is inseparable (acwriston). The rational soul so enters the body that it could in no way have been separated from it, if, by the divine judgment, the violence of death had not followed from the Fall accidentally intervening. It is true that the natural union of soul and body was dissolved during the three days of Christ’s death; but the divine nature of the logos was not separated from the assumed humanity, but was, in the highest degree, present to it. (4) That the natural union and communion is without mingling, mixture, or change (asugcuton, amikton, kai atrepton). As the persons of the Trinity permeate each other without mixture; as the soul fashions the body without any disturbance, mingling, or change of either; so the logoß pervades His own flesh in such manner that in essentials there is in no respect a giving way by either, and neither is mingled or mixed with the other. (5) That the natures of Christ have been united continuously (adiastatouß), or are mutually present to each other. The persons of the Trinity enter each other so mutually that neither is outside of nor beyond the other. In like manner the rational soul is in the body so as never to be outside of or beyond it; the logoß also is in the flesh, so as never to be beyond, and never to be outside of it.”  GRH. (III, 453): “The source and foundation of the personal designations consist solely and alone in the personal union and participation of natures, from which they alone and immediately proceed, from which alone, also, they are to be judged and explained. For God is man, and man is God, because the human and divine natures in Christ are personally united, and because an inner pericwrhsiß exists between these two natures personally united, so that the divine nature of the logoß does not subsist outside of the assumed human nature, and the assumed human nature does not subsist outside of the divine. God is and is called man, because the hypostasis of the logoß is the hypostasis not only of His divine, but also of His human nature.” Scriptural examples: Jer. 23:5, 6; 33:17; Matt. 22:42-45; Luke 20:44; Ps. 110:1; 2 Sam. 7:19; Is. 9:6; Matt. 1:21-23; 16:13, 16; Luke 1:35; 2:11; 1 Cor. 15:47.  a. The expression “concrete” was employed when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one who is of two natures. If the personal designation was derived from one of His two natures, the same was called the concrete of that nature; and, therefore, since Christ is of two natures, the concrete of the divine nature, when the designation was derived from the divine nature; the concrete of the human nature, when the designation was derived from the human nature. To the former class belong the designations, “God,” “Son of God,” etc.; to the latter, “man,” “Son of man,” “Son of Mary.” HOLL. (685): “The concrete of a nature is a term whereby the nature is expressed with a connotation of the hypostasis.” BR. (465): “By the concrete, a term is understood which, in the direct sense, denotes a suppositum, but in an indirect sense a nature. Thus God denotes a suppositum, having a divine nature; man denotes a suppositum, having a human nature. Still, a distinction must be made between the concrete of the nature, and the concrete of the person; the latter expression is employed where the personal designation has not been derived so much from one of the two natures, as where it rather serves to designate, through an expression elsewhere derived, the particular person in whom the two natures are united as one person.” BR. (466): “The concrete of a person is such a term or name, as formally signifies the person consisting of both natures, e.g., Christ, Messiah, Immanuel; which names, in the nominative case, denote the suppositum, and, in an oblique case, neither nature alone, but rather both.” In the present case, only the concrete of the nature comes into use; for the question is only in reference to the cases in which the communion of natures shall also express itself in their personal designations. To personal designations, in the proper sense, such designations do not belong, in which a concrete of the nature is predicated of a concrete of the person, as occurs in the sentences: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. GRH. (III, 453): “For this designations accurately and formally express, not so much the unity of person, as the duality of natures in Christ; for Christ is and is called man, because in Him there is a human nature; and He is and is called God, because in Him there is a divine nature; and He is and is called the God-man, because in Him there is not only a human, but also a divine nature.” It is furthermore self-evident that these designations can be employed only upon the presupposition of the personal union, and that they are not universally applicable. Hence, HOLL. (685): “If the divine and human natures, or man and God, be regarded outside of the personal union, they are disparate, neither can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say: a lion is a horse, so also I cannot say: God is man. But if a union exists between God and man, and that too a real union, such as exists in Christ, between the divine and human natures, they can be correctly predicated of each other in the concrete. The reason is, because, through the union, the two natures constitute one person, and every concrete of the nature denotes the person itself. Since, therefore, Christ the man is the same person who is God, or this person who is God is that very person who is man, it is also said correctly: man is God, and God is man.” b. To the abstracts of nature (“an abstract is that by which a nature is considered, yet not with respect to its union, but in itself, and withdrawn from its union or the concrete, nevertheless not actually, but only in the mind.” HFRFFR. (283)) the like does not apply, as to the concretes of nature; therefore it cannot be said that deity is humanity, and humanity is deity. QUEN. (III, 88): “The reason is, because the union was not made to one nature, but to one complex person, with the difference of natures unimpaired, and therefore, one nature in the abstract is not predicated of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature.”  GRH. (III, 466): “Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the union, that also comes under the participation. But now the properties come under the union, because no nature is destitute of its own properties, since a nature without properties is also without existence, and the two natures are united in Christ, not as alone, or stripped of their properties, but entire, without incompleteness, having suffered no loss of peculiarities. Therefore, the properties also come under the participation.” HOLL. (691): “No union can be perfect and permeant (perichoristic) without a participation of properties, as the examples of animated body show. We readily grant that a parastatic (adjacent) union of two pieces of wood may occur without a participation of properties, because that grade of union is low and imperfect. But, according to the definition of Scripture, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is most absolute, perfect and permeant (perichoristic); therefore it cannot be without a participation of properties.” In like manner, proof can be produced from the communion of natures, which, just as the union, has the participation of properties (commun. idiom.) as a necessary consequence.  HOLL. (690): “The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, who is denominated from either or both natures.” Explanation of the individual notations of the Communicatio and Idioma. — (a) GRH. (III, 465): “Communicatio (communication) is the distribution of one thing which is common to many, to the many which have it in common.” QUEN. (III, 91): “Not that the properties become common, idiwmata koina, but that through and because of the personal union they become communicable (koinwnhta).” (b) idiwma, proprium, property. QUEN. (III, 92): “By idiwmata are understood the properties and differences of natures, by which, as by certain marks and characteristics, the two natures (in unity of person) are mutually distinguished and known apart. The term idiwmata is received either in a narrow sense, for the natural properties themselves, or in a wide sense, so that it comprehends the operations also, through which these properties properly so called exert themselves; in this place, properties or idiomata are received in a wider sense, so that, in addition to the properties strictly so called, they embrace within their compass actions and results, energhmata kai apotelesmata, because properties exert themselves through operations and results.” GRH. (III, 466): “Observe, that the notion of the divine properties is one thing and that of the human properties another. The properties of the divine nature belong to the very essence of the logoß, and are not really distinguished from it. The properties of the human nature do not constitute but proceed from the essence.” In regard to the authority for this doctrine, HOLL. (690): “The expression, communicatio idiomatum, is not found in the Holy Scriptures word for word, yet the matter itself has the firmest scriptural foundation. For as often as Scripture attributes to the flesh of Christ actions and works of divine omnipotence, so often, by consequence, is omnipotence ascribed, as an immediate act, to Him, from whom the divine operation (energeia) proceeds, as a mediate act. But, although the communicatio idiomatum was first so named by the Scholastics, yet orthodox antiquity employed equivalent forms of speech in the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches.” The first complete elaboration of this doctrine among the Dogmaticians is given by Chemnitz, in his book, De Duabus Naturis in Christo, 1580.  Therefore the more specific caution with regard to the communicatio, according to which it is said that it is not a “communicatio kata meqexin, or according to the essence, by which one passes into the essence and within the definition of the other; but a commuinicatio kata sunduasin (not essential or accidental, but) personal, i.e., a participation of the two natures, whereby one of those united is so connected with the other that, the essence remaining distinct, the one, without any mingling, truly receives and partakes of the peculiar nature, power, and efficacy of the other, through and because of the communion that has occurred.” (QUEN., III, 102.) So, also, still more extended definitions have been given, just as of the personal union. GRH. (III, 466): “As the union is not essential, nor merely verbal, neither through mingling, or change, or mixture, or adjacence, neither is it personal or sacramental; so also the communicatio is not such.”  GRH. (III, 465): “The communicatio idiomatum is of a nature to a person, or of a nature to a nature.” HFRFFR. (286): “The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, because of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, not only the idomata of both natures of the person (who is at the same time God and man), but also the properties of each one of the natures, are ascribed to the other, i.e., the human nature to the logoß, and the divine nature to the assumed man. And because of the same communion, each nature works with a communication of the other, yet with their natures and properties preserved unimpaired.” QUEN. (III, 155): “The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) state that the communicatio idiomatum is indeed real with respect to the person, designated by Deity or humanity, but that with respect to natures it is only verbal, i.e., that it is a communicatio of words and terms and not of properties. (2) They say that those are only verbal designations when human things are declared of God, or divine things of man.”  QUEN. (III, 92): “Definite and distinct degrees of the communicatio idiomatum are given; but, inasmuch as the question of the number of degrees or genera of the communicatio idiomatum does not pertain to faith and its nature, but to the method of teaching, some define two, others three, and others four genera of properties. Yet the number three pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as in the holy volume this is discussed according to a threefold method of expression. I say that Holy Scripture distinctly presents three genera, although it does not enumerate them.” A few Dogmaticians assume four genera of communicatio idiomatum, since they distinguish the declarations in which the properties of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God, from the declarations in which the properties of one of the two natures are affirmed in reference to the entire person of Christ; and, therefore, the proposition, “Christ suffered,” they assign to a different genus from the proposition, “God suffered.” Still, the most of the Dogmaticians express themselves against this classification. But the order also in which the three genera are given, is not the same in all the Dogmaticians. QUEN. (ib.): “Some follow the order of doctrine; others the order of nature. The former (Form. Conc., Chmn., Aegid. Hunn.) place the communication of the official actions, since this is more easily explained and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is especially controverted and must be explained more fully. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of the official actions, because the former by nature precedes the latter.”  GRH. (III, 472): “The foundation of this communicatio idiomatum is unity of person. For, inasmuch as, since the incarnation, the one person of Christ subsists in two and of two natures, each of which has been clothed, as it were, with its own properties, the properties of both natures, the divine as well as the human, are affirmed of the one complex (sunqetw) person of Christ.” FORM CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 36): “Since there are in Christ two distinct natures, which in their essences and properties are neither changed nor mixed, and yet the two natures are but one person, those properties which belong only to one nature are not ascribed to it, apart from the other nature, as if separated, but to the entire person (which at the same time is God and man), whether He be called God or man.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): “Nestorius taught such a participation as to ascribe divine properties to Christ only as God, and human properties to Christ only as man; such as that man, not God, was born of Mary, was crucified, etc. Likewise, that God, not man, healed the sick and brought to life the dead. But thus, Christ as God would be one person, and Christ as man would be another, and there would be two persons and two Christs.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): “In order to show this most complete unity of the person, those things which are properties, whether of the divine, or human, or both natures, are ascribed to the one hypostasis, or are designated by the concrete derived from the divine, or from the human, or from both natures.” (Id., 68): “Because the union of natures occurred in the hypostasis of the Word, so that there is now one and the same person of both natures subsisting at the same time in both natures, when the concrete terms derived from the divine nature, as God the logoß, the Son of God, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the designation is derived from the divine nature, yet they signify not only the divine nature, but a person now subsisting in two natures, divine and human. And when the concrete terms derived from the human nature, as man and Son of man, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, they designate not a merely human nature, or a human nature alone, but an hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human nature, or which consists, at the same time, of both a divine and a human nature, and to which both natures belong. Hence it occurs that all the properties are correctly ascribed to concrete terms, denoting the person of Christ, whether named from both or only from one of the two natures.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): “But it” (i.e., true faith) “does not, with Eutyches and the Monotheletes, confound that communication between the natures with a change and mixture both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or the essential property of one nature becomes the substantial property of the other nature, considered in the abstract, whether, on the one hand, beyond the union or in itself, or, on the other, by itself in the union. But a property belonging to one nature is imparted or ascribed to the person in the concrete.” Hence HOLL. (696): “(1) The subject is not the abstract, but the concrete, of the nature or person.” (It cannot, therefore, be said that Deity was crucified.) “(2) The predicate” (namely, that which is affirmed of the subject, i.e., of the incarnate (complex) person) “does not mark a divine or human substance itself, but a property of one of the two natures.” GRH. (III, 485): “In this genus, are the abstract expressions to be employed, ‘Deity suffered, Divinity died?’” He adds, “that they have indeed been employed by some with the limitation, ‘Divinity suffered in the flesh;’” but is of the opinion “that it would be better to abstain from this mode of expression;” and he proves this “(1) From the silence of Scripture. (2) From the nature of Deity. Deity is incapable of suffering, or of change, and interchange; therefore, suffering cannot be ascribed to it. Deity pertains to the entire Trinity; . . . but if, therefore, Deity in itself were said to have suffered, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be reproduced in the Church. . . . (3) From the condition of the union. Through the union, the distinction of natures has not been removed, but the hypostasis of the logoß became the hypostasis of the flesh, so as to constitute one complex person; therefore, something can be predicated of the entire person, according to the human nature, and yet it by no means follows that the same should be ascribed to the divine nature. As works and sufferings belong to the person, and not to the nature, I am correct in saying, ‘God suffered in the flesh;’ but I cannot say, ‘the divinity of the logoß suffered in the flesh.’”  FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 37): “BUt in this class of expressions it does not follow that those things which are ascribed to the whole person are, at the same time, properties of both natures, but it is to be distinctly declared according to which nature anything is ascribed to the entire person.” CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): “Yet, lest the natures may be thought to be mingled, from the example of Scripture there is generally added a declaration to which nature a property belongs that is ascribed to the person, or, according to which nature of the person it is ascribed. For the properties of one nature do not hinder the presence also of the other nature with its properties. Nor do they hinder the properties of one nature from being ascribed to the person subsisting in both natures. Nor is it necessary that what, in this genus, is predicated of the person should be applicable to both natures. But it is sufficient that it pertain to the person according to one or the other nature, whether the divine or the human. QUEN. (III, 94): “Particles used for this purpose are en, ex, dia, kata, 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18; 4:1; Rom. 1:3; 9:5; Acts 20:28.” By this additional more specific statement, it is furthermore shown how the predicate, applied to the subject, properly belongs only to one of the two natures, although, by virtue of the union of persons, it belongs also to both natures. (HOLL. (696): “The mode of expression is true and peculiar by which divine or human properties are declared to belong to the entire theanthropic person (for the properties of humanity, because of the personal union, are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, and vice versa), yet in such a way that, by means of discretive particles, they are claimed for the nature to which they formally belong, while they are appropriated by the other nature to which they belong, not formally, but because of the personal union.”) The mode of expression is illustrated by the following examples. (HOLL. (697): “The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, Rom. 1:3. The subject of this idiomatic proposition is the Son of God, by which the entire person of Christ, designated from the divine nature, is denoted. The predicate is, that He was born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which it does not by itself belong, but through something else, because of the unity of the theanthropic person; whence, by the restrictive particle, kata, ‘according to the flesh,’ the human property of the human nature is asserted, to which a birth in time formally applies; yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from the participation in the nativity, inasmuch as the being born of the seed of David belongs to it by way of appropriation.”) The proposition, “God suffered,” is thus explained: “The Son of God suffered according to His human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted upon the flesh of Peter, not alone the flesh of Peter is said to have been wounded, but Peter, or the person of Peter, has been truly wounded, although his soul cannot be wounded; so, when the Son of God suffers, according to the flesh, the flesh or his human nature does not suffer alone, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature is impassible.” (Id., 698): “The sentence, ‘God has suffered,’ is not then to be explained away with Zwingli into ‘The man, Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suffered,’ in which case the mode of expression would be no real and peculiar one.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 39): “Zwingli names it an allaeosis when anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ, which, nevertheless, is a property of the human nature, and the reverse; For example, where it is said in Scripture, Luke 24:28, ‘Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?’ there Zwingli triflingly declares that the term Christ, in this passage, refers to His human nature. Beware! beware! I say of that allaeosis; . . . for if I permit myself to be persuaded to believe that the human nature alone suffered for me, Christ will not be to me a Saviour of great worth, but He Himself stands in need of a Saviour.” . . . QUEN. (III, 155): “They” (the Calvinists) “explain the designations of the first genus of communicatio idiomatum either with Zwingli by allaeosis, by which they state that the name of the person, or of one of the two natures, is put in the place of the subject only for the other nature which is expressed in the predicate; or with Piscator by synecdoche, of a part for the whole, i.e., that while the entire is put in the place of the subject, yet that it is in such a manner that the passion is restricted and limited to only a part of it, i.e., to the flesh alone. For example, they explain the proposition, ‘God suffered,’ in this way: ‘Man alone, although united to God, suffered.’”  As appellations of this first genus the following were quoted, and their origin traced back to the old Church Fathers: antidosiß, alternation, tropoß antidosewß (Damascenus), enallagh kai koinwnia onomatwn, exchange and participation of names (Theodoret), idiopoiia kai idiopoihsiß appropriation (Cyril), alloiwsiß (but used in a different sense from that of Zwingli), oikeiwsiß, sunamfoterismoß. Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. 13:8; 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 7:55; Ps. 24:7, 8; Acts 3:15; John 8:58.  GRH. (III, 499): “That which is communicated, the holy matter of communication, is the divine majesty, glory, and power, and on this account gifts truly infinite and divine.” QUEN. (III, 102): “The foundation of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis, and of the divine nature of the logoß. For, inasmuch as the human nature was taken into the union, and through the union became a partaker of the person and divine nature of the logoß, it became truly and really a partaker of the divine properties; for these really do not differ from the divine essence.” CHMN. (de duab. nat., 97): “If the dwelling of God in the saints by grace confers, in addition to and beyond natural endowments, many free divine gifts, and works many wonders in them, what impiety is it to be willing to acknowledge in the mass of human nature, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, only physical endowments, and to be willing to believe of that nothing which surpasses and exceeds the natural conditions of human nature considered by or in itself, outside of the hypostatic union?” QUEN. (III, 158) concerning the nature of the mode: “We deny that this communication is merely verbal and nominal, as the Reformed contend” (p. 160, “who altogether deny this second genus of communicatio idiomatum. The propositions: ‘The flesh of Christ quickens, the Son of man is omnipotent,’ the Zwinglians explain by allaeosis thus: ‘The Son of God who assumed flesh, quickens,’ etc.”); “but we maintain that it is true, peculiar, and real. Yet we do not say that there is any transfusion of divine properties into the human nature of Christ (whereby the reproach of Eutychianism is repelled), or that there is any change of the human nature into the divine, or that there is an equalization or abolition of natures, but that there is a personal communication.”  QUEN. (III, 101): “For the communication of majesty occurred in that very moment in which the personal union occurred. For, from the very beginning of incarnation, the divine nature, with its entire fulness, united and communicated itself to the assumed flesh.” With reference to the subsequent doctrine of the states of Christ, QUEN. however still adds: “We must here distinguish between the communication, with reference to possession, and the communication, with reference to use. So far as possession and the first act are concerned, the divine properties were communicated to the human nature at one and the same time with the very moment or the very act of the union, and new ones have not been superadded. And although the second act, and the full use of the imparted majesty, were withheld during the state of humiliation, yet rays of omnipotence, omniscience, etc., frequently appeared, as often as seemed good to divine wisdom. But the full exercise of this majesty began not until His exaltation to the right hand of God.”  QUEN. (III, 159): “Reciprocation, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus; for there cannot be a humiliation, emptying or lessening of the divine nature (tapeinwsiß, kenwsiß, elattwsiß), as there is an advancement or exaltation (beltiwsiß or uperuywsiß) of human nature. The divine nature is unchangeable, and, therefore, cannot be perfected or diminished, exalted or depressed. The object of the reciprocation is a nature in want of and liable to a change, and such the divine nature is not. The promotion belongs to the nature that is assumed, not to the one that assumes it.” THe ground on which only the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human and not the reverse, arises from the mode of the act of union. BR. (472): “It amounts to this, that, as on the part of the nature, although the divine is personally united to the human, and the human to the divine, yet this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature inwardly penetrates and perfects the human, but the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the communicatio idiomatum, this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature, penetrating the human, also makes the same, abstractly considered, in its own way, partaker of its divine perfections; but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot in a like manner render this, abstractly considered, the partaker of its own properties.”  GRH. (III, 499): “We do not deny that, in addition to the essential properties of human nature, certain gifts pertaining to this condition inhere subjectively in Christ as a man, which although they surpass, by a great distance, the most excellent gifts of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite; but we add, that, in addition to these gifts which pertain to the condition and are finite, gifts truly infinite and immeasurable have been imparted to Christ the man, through the personal union, and His exaltation to the right hand of the Father.” HOLL. (702): “Through and because of the personal union, there have been given to Christ, according to His human nature, gifts that are truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable.” And, although it may be said in general “all the divine attributes have been imparted to the flesh of Christ, still a distinction should be made between attributes anenerghta and energhtika.” As is well known, the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum forms a main point of difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. But of most significance is the difference concerning this second genus of properties, since the doctrine set forth under this head is decisive in regard to the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper; for here the discussion has special reference to the attribute of omnipresence. We give, therefore, in this place, first, a summary of the difference between the two churches, and then a more specific statement of the doctrine of omnipresence. COTTA (in GRH., Loci, IV, Diss., I, 50), in the first place, groups together the points in reference to the doctrine of the person of Christ, on which both sides generally agree. “They agree (1) that in Christ there is only one person, but two natures, namely, a divine and a human; (2) that these two natures have been joined in the closest and most intimate union, which is generally called personal; (3) that by this union, a more intimate one than which cannot be conceived, the natures are neither mingled, as has been condemned in the Eutychians, nor the person divided, as has been condemned in the Nestorians; but (4) that this union must be regarded as without change, mixture, division, and interruption (atreptwß, asungcutwß, adiairetwß, acwristwß); and therefore (5) that by this union neither the difference of natures nor the peculiar conditions of either have been removed: for the human nature of Christ is always human, nor has it ever, by its own natural act, ceased to be finite, extended, circumscribed, passible; but the divine nature is and always remains infinite, immeasurable, impassible; (6) that nevertheless by the power of the personal union the properties of both natures have become common to the person of Christ, so that the person of Christ, the God-man, possesses divine properties, uses them, and is named by them; that in addition to this (7) by means of the hypostatic union there have been imparted to the human nature of Christ the very highest gifts of acquired condition (habitualia), for example, the greatest power, the highest wisdom, although finite; but that (8) to the mediatorial acts of Christ each nature contributed its own part, and that the divine nature conferred upon the acts of the human nature infinite power to redeem and save the human race. In a word (9) that the intimate union of God and man in Christ is so wonderful and sublime that it surpasses, in the highest degree, the comprehension of our mind.” But “they” (the Reformed) “differ from us when the question is stated concerning the impartation abstractly considered, or of a nature to a nature; because they deny that, by the hypostatic union, the properties of the divine nature have been truly and really imparted to the human nature of Christ, and that, too, for common possession, use, and designation, so that the human nature of our Saviour is truly Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and Omniscient.” The controversy between the Lutherans and Reformed had mainly reference, therefore, to the possession and use of the divine attributes which were ascribed to the human nature of Christ; among these the following were made especially prominent, viz., omnipotence, omniscience (which He used, however, in the state of humiliation, not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where it pleased Him), omnipresence, vivific power, and the worship of religious adoration, which also were ascribed to the humanity of Christ (so that the flesh of Christ should be worshiped and adored with the same adoration as that due to the divine nature of the logoß). Among these attributes, however, none was more zealously controverted than that of omnipresence, because this was the chief point in dispute between the Lutherans and Reformed with regard to ta presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper. The chief objection against the real presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, Carlstadt, and after him Zwingli, had derived from the statement that Christ is sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, and therefore cannot be at the same time upon earth, in the elements of bread and wine. In opposition to this, Luther appealed to the personal union; from this, and the consequent communion of natures, he inferred the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, and proved thereby the possibility of a real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. Thus the doctrine of the omnipresence, or, as the Reformed expressed it, the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, became very important, and the Lutheran theologians are very accurate in its presentation. QUEN. thus states the question here at issue (III, 185): “Whether Christ, according to the humanity united with His divine and infinite person, and exalted at the Right Hand of the divine majesty, in this glorious state of exaltation is present to all creatures in the universe with a true, real, substantial, and efficacious omnipresence?” From this question the others, viz., whether omnipresence is to be ascribed to Christ, according to His divine nature, and whether it is to be at all ascribed to the person of Christ, are carefully distinguished. The first follows, as a matter of course; and also in regard to the other question, both parties were agreed in this, namely, that “omnipresence is properly ascribed to the entire person, in the concrete, or in the divine person of Christ, in which human nature subsists, wherever it is; or, what is the same thing, that Christ is everywhere, by reason of His person.” And, from the question stated above, they further distinguished the one with reference to the personal or intimate presence, which is mutual between the logoß and the flesh (by which the logoß has the assumed nature most intimately present with itself, without regard to place, so that the logoß never and nowhere is without or beyond His flesh, or this without or beyond Him, but, where you place the logoß, there you also place the flesh, lest there be introduced a Nestorian disruption of the person subsisting of both natures). The controversy had rather to do with the outward presence, viz., that relating to creatures, and the most of the Dogmaticians understood by this omnipresence, “the most near and powerful dominion of Christ in His human nature.” Accordingly, the thesis of the Dogmaticians concerning the question is the following: “The majesty of the omnipresence of the logoß was communicated to the human nature of Christ in the first moment of the personal union, in consequence of which, along with the divine nature, it is now omnipresent, in the state of exaltation, in a true, real, substantial, and efficacious presence. And so there is given to Christ, according to His human nature, a most near and powerful dominion, by which Christ as man, exalted at the Right Hand of God, preserves and governs all things in heaven and earth by the full use of His divine majesty.” QUEN. (III, 185). “And, finally, it was protested that this omnipresence was not physical, diffusive, expansive, gross, local, corporeal, and divisible (as the Calvinists pretend that we hold), and it was described as majestatic, divine, spiritual, indivisible, which did not imply any locality, or inclusion, or expansion, or diffusion.” (Id. III, 186.) And it was not thereby asserted that the body of Christ had lost its natural properties in such a manner that He had now ceased to be at any particular place. (HOLL. (712): “We must distinguish between a natural and personal act of the flesh of Christ. The flesh of Christ, by an act of nature, when Christ dwelt upon earth, was in a certain place, in the womb of His mother, upon the cross, etc., circumscribedly, or by way of occupying it; and now also in the state of glory, in accordance with the manner of glorified bodies, it is in a certain celestial somewhere, not circumscribedly, however, but definitively. But to this natural act that personal act is not opposed, by which it is illocally in the logoß, from which presence all local ideas or conceptions are to be abstracted.”) To the proofs for the second genus of idiomata, the Dogmaticians add also, for the omnipresence especially, that derived from the sitting at the right hand of God. (HOLL. (714): “Christ rules with omnipresence according to the same nature according to which He sits at the right hand of God. But, according to His human nature, etc. Therefore, to sit at the Right Hand of God is explained by ruling. Just as, therefore, the Right Hand of God is everywhere and rules, for by this is designated in Holy Scripture the immense and infinite power and might of God, nowhere excluded, nowhere inoperative; thus, to sit at the Right Hand of God is, in virtue of the exaltation, to rule everywhere with divine power, truly immeasurable, and this cannot be conceived of without omnipresence, for surely the divine dominion is not over the absent, but over the present.”) The opposite statement of the Reformed was this: “Just as the body of Christ, while He moved upon earth, was not present in heaven, so now that same body, after the ascension, is not present on earth; and, exalted above the heavens, we believe it is held there.” Their main arguments against the omnipresence were these: “Because thereby the reality of the body of Christ, of His death and ascension to heaven would be disproved, inasmuch as a true human nature cannot be extended infinitely; because He who is omnipresent cannot die; because He who is, by virtue of His omnipresence, already in heaven, cannot still ascend thither.” To these objections HOLL. (718) answers: “1. The doctrine concerning the reality of the flesh of Christ is not overthrown by the ascription of omnipresence to it, for it is not omnipresent by a physical and extensive, but by a hyperphysical, divine, and illocal presence, which belongs to it not formally and per se, but by way of participation, and by virtue of the personal union. 2. The doctrine concerning the death of Christ is not overturned by it, for the natural union of body and soul was indeed dissolved by death, but without disturbing the permanent hypostatic union of the divine and human natures. 3. The doctrine of the ascension of Christ is not disproved by it, for before the ascension the flesh of Christ was present in heaven by an uninterrupted presence as a personal act, but He ascended visibly to heaven in a glorified body according to the divine economy (kat oikonomian), so that He might fill all things with the omnipresence of His dominion. For Christ, by virtue of His divine omnipotence, can make Himself present in various ways.” Notwithstanding these precise statements concerning the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, there still was no uniform and, in all its features, settled doctrinal statement concerning it prevalent among the Lutheran Dogmaticians. The reason of this lies in the fact, that until the time of the FORM. CONC. the only aim had in view, in the development of this doctrine, was the practical one of showing through it the possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. So far as this was necessary, all the Lutheran Dogmaticians are agreed. But this is no longer the case to such an extent, when, without reference to the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, they had to do merely with the dogmatic development of the doctrine of omnipresence. As, however, the Dogmaticians were led by the right tact, to attribute no great importance to a difference which led to no practical result, they had no controversy about it, and the different views stood unassailed alongside of each other. There was still room enough for different views. The question, e.g., could arise: 1. Whether the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ was to be conceived of as only one by virtue of which Christ, according to His human nature, could be omnipresent when and where He wished; or, as one by virtue of which, in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, He was always, without exception, actually omnipresent from the state of exaltation onward, and only refrained from exercising this omnipresence, during the state of humiliation, in consequence of the mediatorial work He had undertaken? 2. How the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ should be defined; whether only as one by virtue of which the human nature participates in the dominion which is exercised by the divine nature; or as one by virtue of which it is present to all creatures in such a manner as Christ is present to them by virtue of His divine nature? In regard to these questions, the views of the Dogmaticians, already before the FORM. CONC., were not alike, and the FORM. itself is so variable in its utterances on this subject that a satisfactory answer to the questions above stated cannot be elicited from it. Hence it happens that later Dogmaticians of different views believed themselves authorized to appeal to the FORM. CONC. in vindication of their several opinions. After the completion of the FORM. CONC., therefore, the Dogmaticians were divided in opinion, about as follows, viz.: the majority mentioning the omnipresence only as “a most powerful and present dominion over creatures,” either not entering at all upon the questions of the absolute presence, or rejecting that doctrine entirely. This omnipresence was then called also modified omnipresence. Thus QUEN., BR., the latter of whom appeals to the FORM. CONC. (475): “(They (the authors of the Form. Conc.) manifestly describe that omnipresence not as absolute, as a mere close proximity to all creatures and without any efficacious influence, but as modified, or joined with an efficacious influence, and according to the needs of the universal dominion which Christ exercises according to both His natures.”) At the same time they assert that, from the time of the exaltation onward, Christ is to be regarded as constantly omnipresent according to His human nature, i.e., as always exercising the “most powerful dominion.” Others, on the other hand, as the majority of the Swabian theologians, but beside these also, HOLL., asserted, that no only the “most powerful dominion” belonged to the human nature of Christ from the time of the exaltation onward, but also the true presence, and the latter, indeed, from the time of the conception. A short-lived controversy arose at the time when the theologians of Helmstadt and Brunswick refused to accept the FORM. CONC., mainly because, as they asserted, a doctrine of the omnipresence was taught in it with which they could not coincide. They admitted, indeed, that Christ, according to His human nature, can be present where He will; but they maintained that He actually willed to be present only there where it has been expressly promised concerning Him, namely, in the Holy Supper and in the Church. Besides, they characterized this presence not as an effect of omnipresence, but of omnipotence. The omnipresence maintained by them they designated the relative omnipresence. This view (which Calixtus, also, at a later date, adopted) was opposed by both classes of Dogmaticians, mainly because they wished to have the possibility of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper deduced from His omnipresence, and this from the communicatio idiomatum, without agreeing among themselves as to the mode of stating it. This point, therefore, has remained unsettled. Another question that arose was, concerning the time in which Christ, according to His human nature, assumed the exercise of the divine majesty. Cf., on that subject, the topic of the “States of Christ.”  Scriptural Proofs — Majesty is imparted to the human nature: Matt. 11:27; Luke 1:33; John 3:13; 6:62; Phil. 2:6; Heb. 2: 7. The sitting of Christ, the man, at the right hand of Majesty, Matt. 26:64; Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69; Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Heb. 7:26; 8:1. Omnipotence, Matt. 28:18; Phil. 3:21. Omniscience, Col. 1:19; 2:3, 9. Omnipresence, Matt. 18:20; 28;20; Eph. 1:23; 4:10. Power to quicken, John 6:51; 1 Cor. 15:21, 45. Power to judge, Matt. 16:27; John 5:27; Acts 17:31.  FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 46): “With respect to the functions of Christ’s office, the person does not act and operate in, or with one, or through one nature alone, but rather in, with, according to and through both natures; or, as the Council of Chalcedon declares, one nature effects and works, with impartation of the other, that which is peculiar to each. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, Redeemer, King, etc., not merely according to one nature, whether the divine or the human, but according to both natures.” GRH. (III, 555): “The Son of God took upon Himself human nature, for the purpose of performing in, with, and through it, the work of redemption, and the functions of the mediatorial office, 1 John 3:8, etc. Hence in the works of His office, He acts not only as God, nor only as man, but as God-man; and, what is the same, the two natures in Christ, in the works of the office, do not act separately, but conjointly. From unity of person follows unity in official act.” HOLL. (726): “The remote basis of this impartation is unity of person, and the intimate communion of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate basis is the communicatio idiomatum of the first and second genus.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): “When one nature in Christ does that which is peculiar to it, or, when Christ does anything, according to the property of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not unemployed, so as to do either nothing or something else; but, what is a peculiarity of the one nature is effected and performed in Christ with impartation of the other nature, that difference being observed which is peculiar to each. Therefore, when Christ, according to His human nature, suffers and dies, this also occurs with impartation to the other nature, not so that the divine nature in Him also suffers and dies, for this is peculiar to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is personally present with the nature suffering, and wills the suffering of its human nature, does not avert it, but permits its humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it so that it can bear the immense weight of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders these sufferings precious to God and saving to the world.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): “Because the offices and blessings of Christ as Saviour are such that, in many or most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate with its natural or essential properties or operations alone, numberless attributes uperfusika kai parafusika [supernatural and extraordinary] were delivered and imparted to the human nature from its hypostatic union with divinity.” HOLL. (726): “The mode of impartation and mutual confluence consists in this, that the divine nature of the logoß not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the assumed flesh; but the human nature, in the office of the Mediator, acts, not only according to its natural strength, but also according to the divine power which it has communicated to it from the personal union.” QUEN. (III, 106): “I say that by means of His person, He appropriates to Himself actions and sufferings of humanity, for it must not be said the divine nature sheds blood, suffers, dies, just as it is said that the human nature quickens, works miracles, governs all things, but God sheds His blood, suffers, dies.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 86): “The testimonies of Scripture clearly show that the union of the two natures in Christ occurred in order that the work of redemption, atonement, and salvation might be accomplished in, with, and through both natures of Christ. For if redemption, atonement, etc., could have been accomplished by the divine nature alone, or by the human nature alone, the logoß would have in vain descended from Heaven for us men, and for our salvation, and become incarnate man.” GRH. (III, 556): “The human nature indeed could have suffered, died, shed its blood. But the sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have been without a saving result, if the divine nature had not added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us.” Accordingly, the work of redemption, as well as every individual action of Christ, is considered as one in which both natures in Christ participate. The technical term for this is apotelesma (“a common work, resulting form a communicative and intimate confluence of natures, where the operations of both natures concur to produce this, or the work is divinely-human, because both natures here act unitedly.” QUEN. (III, 105)). Yet as each individual action proceeds, first of all, from one of the two natures, namely, from that one to whose original properties it belongs, the technical term for this is energhma (‘a result peculiar to one nature’). Thus, the shedding of Christ’s blood is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has shed blood; the infinite merit which belongs to this blood is an operation of the divine nature. But the atonement for our sins, which has been wrought by means of the shed blood only in view of the fact that both natures have contributed their part thereto, the human nature by shedding it, and the divine nature by giving to the blood its infinite merit, is the work (apotelesma) of both natures. HOLL. (728) further describes the apotelesmata of Christ, as of a twofold order. “The divine nature of the logoß cannot effect some things except by a union with flesh (for example, suffering as a satisfaction, a life-giving death); other things, from His free good pleasure or purpose, He does not will to effect without flesh (for example, miracles).”  BR. (478): “The third genus of communicatio idiomatum consists in this, that actions pertaining to the office of Christ do not belong to a nature singly and alone; but they are common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them that which is its own, and thus each acts with the communication of the other.” QUEN. (III, 209): “The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) deny that the communication of the apotelesmata or of official actions can be referred to the communicatio idiomatum. . . . (2) who teach that both natures act their parts by themselves alone, each without participation of the other, and thus that the human nature of Christ is the works of the office only performs human works from its own natural properties, but must altogether be excluded from divine actions. . . . (3) who affirm that the flesh of Christ contributed to the miracles only as a mere and passive (aergon) instrument.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat.): “This union of the kingship and priesthood of Messiah was made for the work of redemption, for the sake of us and our salvation. But as redemption had to be made by means of suffering and death, there was need of a human nature. And it pleased God that, for our comfort, in the offices of the kingship, priesthood, and lordship of Christ, our assumed nature should also be employed, and thus the acts (apotelesmata) of Christ’s offices should be accomplished in, with, and through both.”  CHMN. (de duab. nat., 81): “For let not exactness be regarded as idle, just as also accurate care in speaking. But let the question, What is the true use of this doctrine? be always in sight. For thus we will be the more inclined to cultivate care in speaking properly, and will be the more easily able to avoid falling into logomachies and quibbles.” . . . B. — OF THE OFFICE OF CHRIST.
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