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57. While, then, this is the case, and it cannot but be that only one of all these opinions is true, they all nevertheless make use of arguments in striving with each other,—and not one of them is without something plausible to say, whether in affirming his own views, or objecting to the opinions of others. In exactly the same way is the condition of souls discussed. For this one thinks that they both are immortal, and survive the end of our earthly life; that one believes that they do not survive, but perish with the bodies themselves: the opinion of another, however, is that they suffer nothing immediately, but that, after the form of man has been laid aside, they are allowed to live a little longer,38013801    Lit., “something is given to them to life.” So the Stoics taught, although Chrysippus (cf. n. 9, ch. 31, p. 446) held that only the souls of the wise remained at all after death. and then come under the power of death. And while all these opinions cannot be alike true, yet all who hold them so support their case by strong and very weighty arguments, that you cannot find out anything which seems false to you, although on every side you see that things are being said altogether at variance with each other, and inconsistent from their opposition to each other;38023802    The ms., first four edd., and Oehler read et rerum contrarietatibus dissonare—“and that they disagree from the oppositions of things.” Hild. reads dissonora, a word not met with elsewhere, while the other edd. merely drop the last two letters, -re, as above; a reading suggested in the margin of Ursinus. which assuredly would not happen, if man s curiosity could reach any certainty, or if that which seemed to one to have been really 456discovered, was attested by the approval of all the others. It is therefore wholly38033803    Lit., “a most vain thing,” etc. vain, a useless task, to bring forward something as though you knew it, or to wish to assert that you know that which, although it should be true, you see can be refuted; or to receive that as true which it may be is not, and is brought forward as if by men raving. And it is rightly so, for we do not weigh and guess at38043804    So the ms., LB., Elmenh., Hild., and Oehler, reading conjectamus, the other edd. reading commetamur or -imur—“measure,” except Gelenius and Canterus, who read commentamur—“muse upon.” divine things by divine, but by human methods; and just as we think that anything should have been made, so we assert that it must be.

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