Chapter II.—A Resurrection is Not Impossible.
Let us, then, consider the subject in the way
I have indicated. If all disbelief does not arise from levity and
inconsideration, but if it springs up in some minds on strong grounds and
accompanied by the certainty which belongs to truth [well and good]; for
it then maintains the appearance of being just, when the thing itself to
which their disbelief relates appears to them unworthy of belief; but to
disbelieve things which are not deserving of disbelief, is the act of men
who do not employ a sound judgment about the truth. It behoves, therefore,
those who disbelieve or doubt concerning the resurrection, to form their
opinion on the subject, not from any view they have hastily adopted, and
from what is acceptable to profligate men, but either to assign the origin
of men to no cause (a notion which is very easily refuted), or, ascribing
the cause of all things to God, to keep steadily in view the principle
involved in this article of belief, and from this to demonstrate that the
resurrection is utterly unworthy of credit. This they will succeed in, if
they are able to show that it is either impossible for God, or contrary
to His will, to unite and gather together again bodies that are dead,
or even entirely dissolved into their elements, so as to constitute the
same persons. If they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless
disbelief, and from this blasphemy against sacred things: for, that
they do not speak the truth when they say that it is impossible, or not
in accordance with the divine will, will clearly appear from what I am
about to say. A thing is in strictness of language considered impossible
to a person, when it is of such a kind that he either does not know what
is to be done, or has not sufficient power for the proper doing of the
thing known. For he who is ignorant of anything that requires to be done,
is utterly unable either to attempt or to do what he is ignorant of;
and he, too, who knows ever so well what has to be done, and by what
means, and how, but either has no power at all to do the thing known, or
not power sufficient, will not even make the attempt, if he be wise and
consider his powers; and if he did attempt it without due consideration,
he would not accomplish his purpose. But it is not possible for God to
be ignorant, either of the nature of the bodies that are to be raised,
as regards both the members entire and the particles of which they
consist, or whither each of the dissolved particles passes, and what
part of the elements has received that which is dissolved and has passed
into that with which it has affinity, although to men it may appear
quite impossible that what has again combined according to its nature
with the universe should be separable from it again. For He from whom,
antecedently to the peculiar formation of each, was not concealed either
the nature of the elements of which the bodies of men were to consist,
or the parts of these from which He was about to take what seemed to
Him suitable for the formation of the human body, will manifestly,
after the dissolution of the whole, not be ignorant whither each of the
particles has passed which He took for the construction of each. For,
viewed relatively to the order of things now obtaining among us, and the
judgment we form concerning other matters, it is a greater thing to know
beforehand that which has not yet come to pass; but, viewed relatively
to the majesty and wisdom of God, both are according to nature, and it
is equally easy to know beforehand things that have not yet come into
existence, and to know things which have been dissolved.