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LEC. V.113113   Preached Dec. 19, 1690.

Before we come to evince to you the authority of the Scriptures, I reckon nothing can be of greater importance than to enlarge somewhat in the USE of that we have been upon: for if we let what God is pleased to make known concerning himself, his own nature and existence, slightly pass without improvement, and lose that, we lose all. All our time is lost, and all our labour is lost if we can let so great a thing slide away without some proportionable improvement and impression: and here in lies the proper improvement of it. The state of things is sad among us, upon this account, that there is so little knowledge of God in the land: for this it hath cause to mourn, and I doubt will be made to do so: but if we had ten thousand times more of the knowledge of God than we have, if it be not a lively and impressed knowledge, it is all to no purpose: the increase of our knowledge would be but the increase of our sorrow, as it is said upon another account. You have heard from this scripture, that the existence and nature of God (though invisible) are clearly demonstrated by the things he hath made. The improvement I desire you to make of it, will be partly by way of information in some particular truths that may be deduced from it: partly by way of expostulation, touching sins repugnant hereunto: and partly by way of exhortation to agreeable duties.

I. For truths that may be collected and inferred hence for our information, you may take such as these:

1 That the mind of man is capable of arriving by way of argument unto the knowledge of God; it is capable of attaining in a way of argumentation to the knowledge of God’s existence and in great measure of his nature too. For we are told, the eternal power and Godhead are to be clearly seen by the things that are made. Things in themselves invisible, and while they are in themselves invisible, if we are to come to the knowledge of them by the things that are made, how can that be but by way of argument? In themselves they are said to be invisible: those visible things that are beheld are not the eternal power and Godhead themselves, therefore we can come to the knowledge of the former by the latter no way but by intervening arguments, not immediately, for the things that are made are the medium. Therefore it is by way of argumentation formed from this medium, that we come to this knowledge of God’s eternal power and Godhead, and this is that which concerns 417us very deeply to consider, that if in such a way as this we are to arrive at the knowledge of God, then it is of much importance to us to make a reflection upon ourselves, and understand that from hence, much is to be learned of our own nature. If in this way we are to understand any thing of God’s nature, we must by consequence understand so much of our own nature: that is, that it is a reasonable nature, that it is an intelligent nature, that it is a nature capable of improving itself in point of knowledge, by ratiocination and discourse; and even of knowledge concerning the highest and greatest, and first knowable, that is God and the very nature of God. Indeed here the foundation lies of all obligation that can be upon us to be religious, to be obedient, to be subject, to the common Ruler of this world; that is, that God hath given us a nature capable of knowing him, and of arriving to this knowledge of him by this way of ratiocination, as the text implies: that is, to collect that there is an eternal power, and an essential Deity, from things that are made and extant to view. If we are to come by it, so we are to come by it in a reasoning way, and it is impossible for us to receive conviction concerning our own duty towards God, if we have not a right apprehension of our own natures, and what they are susceptible and capable of. God will deal with us at the last day, according to the nature that he hath given us; and therefore we ought to consider ourselves too according to that nature. There will be a judgment-day for men, when there will not for brutes; and if God will difference us in the final judgment, and doth difference us in the way of his present government, from inferior brute creatures, it concerns us to understand the difference too, and to know that we have natures capable of being so dealt with, and as God will finally deal with us; that he doth not deal with us unsuitably to the natures he hath first given us. “There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty hath given him understanding.” And if so, then he is to be dealt with accordingly; not like a stock or a stone, or a brute creature. It is a great signification to us of the capacity of the nature of man, that it should be said here, to all those that will use their understandings, the eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen, by the things he hath made. And that is one thing we have therefore to collect and infer for our own information, that the mind and understanding are capable of arriving by ratiocination and arguments to the knowledge of God. Indeed it would be a strange kind of perverseness to hesitate at the reception of this, because it is plain, that even lower things than our mental capacity are subservient to our reception of divine knowledge; 418 for faith (that hath to do with the same kind of objects) comes by hearing: and if external sense is to be subservient to our reception of the knowledge of divine things, then certainly much more our understanding, which is a thing far nobler than our external sense, and therefore it is a higher and greater talent that we are to be accountable for. We are to be accountable for all our faculties, as so many talents that God hath intrusted us with; the faculty of seeing, the faculty of hearing, the faculty of remembering and the like. And what do we think, among the rest, the faculty of understanding in so plain and important a case as this, is to be exempted and left out? that God should have distinguished us by this in so great a measure from the beasts that perish, and we take no notice of the difference and not think ourselves accountable for it? No, if we are in this way capable of coming to the knowledge of God’s eternal power and Godhead, certainly this ability of coming this way to this knowledge, is that which must be strictly accounted for another day; that we have such a power and use it not, such a capacity and endowment belonging to our natures and never use it, let It lie asleep, never exert and put it forth to so high and to so great a purpose as this is. But,

2. We may further learn hence, that none who have the use of their understandings can ever be innocently ignorant of God. No, saith the text, there is so cleat a representation of the eternal power and Godhead in the things that are made, that if men will not yet know God they are left without excuse, without apology, the case admits of no apology. That there should be so clear a representation to an apprehensive creature, and he will not know God; there is nothing to be said for it. There is nothing to be said why they do not know him, why they do not live in the eternal adoration of him. The matter will be resolved entirely and only into this at the last, they have not known, because they have not liked to retain God in their knowledge, as it follows after, in the 20th. verse; and into that which we see in that of Ephes. iv. 18. that men are “alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them and the blindness of their hearts. “Pray what kind of blindness is the blindness of the heart? That can be no blindness but voluntary blindness, affected blindness, chosen blindness; that men are blind because they will be blind, because they will not see. A blindness of the mere speculative understanding is quite another thing, but such a blindness as is referred to the heart, as having its seat and subject there, must mean a blindness that men voluntarily do continue themselves in, as he that stifly and resolvedly winks that he may act see the light.


3. We may further infer hence, that the clearest rational knowledge of God is by no means so acquiesced in, as if that would serve the turn, and be answerable to the saving purposes and necessities of our souls. The rational knowledge of God; it may be had and it must be had, but it must not be rested in; for even this knowledge that doth in the means, the objective representation, lie so fairly compassable, (for the discovery is clear) is supposed to be clear; the invisible things of God, his eternal power and Godhead, are clearly seen, clearly to be seen, and there may be a reception in some measure, and proportionable to the representation of the object. Besides the objective representation, there may be a subjective reception; it is a supposable thing, and it is frequent (though not universal) that these things here spoken of under the notion of invisibles, are not only clearly to be seen, but seen: and yet, though this knowledge do lie so fairly compassable and may be actually obtained and received, men, for all that, may be left without excuse, for the reason referred to in the verse next but one foregoing, that is, that the truth that is received is held in unrighteousness. “The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness.” And by this truth (it is plain by what follows) is principally and chiefly meant the truth concerning the existence and nature of God, “that which may be known of God” (so it immediately follows) “is manifest in them: for God hath shewed it unto them:” for the invisible things, such truths as these, may not only be represented but received; and being so, yet held in unrighteousness, defeated of their proper design; so that such are left without excuse; it not attaining the end that such a representation doth finally aim at. Indeed God would never be angry without a cause, therefore if they be under wrath, if the wrath of God be revealed from heaven, and flame against a wicked, atheistical world, it is plain they are without excuse.

But now, will that knowledge of God serve our turn that will only leave us inexcusable? will that answer the purposes and necessities of our souls? It is a supposable thing that the clearest merely rational knowledge of God, may but leave men without excuse, therefore somewhat more is necessary, another sort of knowledge. That which is rational, may be had and ought to be had, and we shall most dearly answer for it, if we have it not: but then when we have it, that is not enough, it is necessary, but not sufficient.

But then it may be said, What more is there wanting than to know clearly the invisible things of God, his eternal power and Godhead? Why I shall tell you in one word: To have that clear knowledge made vital. It is not the mere clearness, but 420 the vitality, of the knowledge of God that must do the needful work in our souls, in order to our present serving of God, and walking and conversing with him in this world, and our final felicity and blessedness with him in the other world. Light there must be, but it must be the light of life, otherwise we shall never be the better for it. A light that is not vital will serve to condemn, but only a light that is vital will serve to save. There is, it is true, a light universally shining in every intelligent mind, in every conscience of man, but it is a light so little profitable to the necessity of an immortal soul, that that light is said to be but darkness, as in that 6 Mat. 23. “If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!” That is, serves for the advantage of souls (if they do acquiesce and take up their rest there) no more than mere darkness would have done. It is but equal to darkness, as to any thing of fruit, emolument and profit to them. And therefore, that light which is truly salutary and finally saving, is the light of life, such is the light which comes by Christ: “He that follows me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.” John viii. 12.

But you will say, What is the difference? One man knows God, that is, he is well assured and able rationally to prove and demonstrate to another man, the existence of God and many particular things concerning his nature; and perhaps can speak more rationally to such a purpose than many another man that carries the reputation of a pious man, whilst perhaps this man is not so: Pray what is the difference?

Why truly, this is a thing (because I must not insist in such a course as I am in, upon particulars) that may (I should think) be easily understood by any one. One, he knows the kind or nature of this or that food, or this or that drink, he is able to discourse rationally of it, and give an accurate description of the kind and properties of this or that sort of meat, or drink: another, he eats and drinks of it. Let the former, discourse as long as he will and never so understandingly and knowingly, and not eat or drink, he will be famished for all his knowledge: the other, he knows this is good meat, and this is good drink: and he eats and drinks heartily and is refreshed, and lives by it. Is not here a plain difference r Why here is the very difference as to the knowledge of God. One, he can discourse rationally and learnedly about many invisible things of God, his eternal power and Godhead, but he never closeth with them, his soul never inwardly unites with him as his best good, never subjects to him as his highest Lord, never fears him, never loves him, never trusts in him, nor delights in him as the other doth. Do you not begin to apprehend, here 421is a vast difference between knowledge and knowledge; one sort of the knowledge of God and another? How plain is it that with many men, the clearest and truest notions of God are only dead notions; lie dead in their minds, operate nothing there, make them no other sort of men than they would be, if they knew no such thing; or if they thought or believed quite the contrary? Take out all those notions of God which some men have in their minds, and put in the room of them quite contrary notions; a scheme of mere atheism, and the men are found not at all to differ. That man whose head before, was full of theism, is just the same man as when his head was full of atheism. There is knowledge, but no vitality: all his notions of God lie dead, and so are as if they were not. But here is the great difference when the light of life concerning God and the invisible things of God comes into the soul of a man, when these vital beams strike into the very centre of a man’s heart, that the man not only hath light about these things, but is light. A wicked man hath light, but it is said of a good man, a regenerate man, he is light. “Ye were darkness but now ye are light in the Lord:” it hath quite altered his temper, begot a new frame and habit in his soul: that is, the knowledge of God hath begot an impression of godliness; and this is that you are to be driving at, and not to take up with any knowledge of God short of this. “He hath given us an understanding to know him that is true, and we are in him that is true.” 1 John v. 20. We know him, and by that knowledge are wrought into a vital union. “We are in him, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life.”

But it may be said, If such a further super-added knowledge of God be so necessary, what is the former rational knowledge worth? what doth it signify? and what doth it serve for?

Why let me bring you back to the former illustration that I gave you before, about the knowledge of meat and drink. You see a plain difference between barely knowing that this is good and useful food, that would be proper and suitable drink; and knowing the same thing by taste and reception in order to nutrition: there is a very plain difference. But what! is the former knowledge therefore useless? that is, to know that this is good meat and drink, is it useless? Is it not a very necessary knowledge that a man should know what is fit to be eaten and drank and what not? If you had not so much knowledge of the former sort as to be able to say, “this is good food which, being duly received, may do me good; and that is poison; if I meddle with it, it will destroy me;” you could not distinguish 422 bread and a stone: you could make no distinction. In what a case were that man in, that did not know bread and a stone asunder? So here, without such a rational knowledge of God, you cannot understand why one ought to be worshipped more than another, why more to be trusted, more to be loved than another. If you had not that former knowledge of God you would not be able to distinguish between a proper object of adoration But what can be plainer than this, that many things may be necessary for such and such a purpose, that yet are not sufficient for that purpose? We must distinguish between necessity and sufficiency. A rational knowledge of God is necessary, it doth not therefore follow that it is sufficient. If one of you did design, incoming hither, to come to the seat where you use to sit, it is necessary that in order to your coming to the seat, that you come to the door. But is therefore coming to the door sufficient? No, you cannot come to your seat unless you come to the door, but it doth not therefore follow that you had nothing more to do when you come hither to hear a sermon than only just to come to the door. Pray apprehend this, that many things are necessary that are not enough. It is necessary that you have this rational knowledge of God as the door, as an intermission into that vital unitive knowledge of him which is also necessary and which only is sufficient. And if the former of these be aimed at, with a design for the latter, with a humble dependance and sense of our own nothingness, blessing God that he is pleased, in that natural way, to reveal so much of himself, but also humbly craving, “Lord do not leave me here, let this vital light shine into my dark soul:” where his further communications are not despised, they will be had; where they are valued, where they are sought, an inquiring soul will not be left destitute. If indeed you think that your case is well already, and that you need no more of God, and that all is well enough, you may sit still and perish till you sink into perdition. But know that the benignity of his nature, and the methods he hath set on foot for the recovery and saving of lost sinners, will not let him throw away any soul that doth cry after him; will not hide himself from them that value the vital efficacious transforming knowledge of him as life itself, and beyond this natural life, which is the true sense of every sincere soul.

4. We may collect hence, that the objection against the acknowledgment of a Deity, from his invisibility, must be most absurd, and contemptibly weak and silly. Nothing can be more so; “for the invisible things of him are clearly seen by the things that are made.” Therefore, nothing can be more foolish 423than for one to say “I will believe there is no God, because I see him not: I see not the brightness of the appearance of his glory that should make me apprehend such a Being perfect, superior to, and more excellent than, all other that I have had, the knowledge of:” nothing can be more childish than this, for it is very plain that if God could be seen, he could not be God. The thing carries a repugnancy in itself; so mean a nature as can be visible cannot be the divine nature. As a heathen said, We are not to ascribe unto God, body or colour or quantity, or any such thing that belongs to objects that fall under our sense. “If we know (saith he) that there is a corporeal nature, and if we know that there is an incorporeal nature, in which of these shall we place the Divine Being? Certainly (saith he) in the incorporeal nature, which is higher and more excellent than to be seen with eyes, or to be heard with ears, or felt with hands, or expressed with human voice.” It was the saying of Maximus Tyrius, the heathen philosopher. And I pray you, why should we be so averse to the entertainment and reception of invisibles in our minds? For which is nearer a kin to our minds, invisible things, or visible? Are not our minds invisible? He thinks with himself, “I am not to acknowledge a Deity unless I see him,” Pray what is it in you that thinks so, that is so sensible: and capable of thinking at all? Did you ever see your own souls? Did you ever see your own minds? Are not we, as to the most noble and excellent part of ourselves, rather to be accounted ourselves among invisibles than among visibles? It was the saying of a poor pagan, when the season of his dying approached, and his friends about him were discoursing of his burial: “Bury me” saith he “Do you talk of burying me? what do you think this body is to me? Do with it when I am gone what you please: if you can catch me, bury me, but you shall never do that, for do you think this body is me?” And pray will you think so basely of yourselves as that this body is you? If it be not, it is a mind, a spirit, a soul in you, that is you: and is not that nearer of kin to invisible things than visible? That there should be an averseness and shyness to entertain in our minds invisible things because they are in visible, when our minds themselves are invisible, nothing can be more unaccountable and unreasonable than this. It shews us to be very low sunk, that the minds and spirits of men are become strangely degenerate things, when any thing because it is invisible is therefore reckoned unsuitable to them, for a reason for which they should be reckoned most of all suitable. And alas! how little things are we capable of comprehending by our sight, in comparison of the things that we cannot see? 424Is our sight fit to be the measure of all realities? How small a part of this universe can we measure with our eye! and must all the rest because we see it not, go for just nothing? Surely there are unspeakably greater things which we see not, than there are that we see. Therefore, a thing should not be reckoned less real, or less considerable, or less excellent, because it is invisible to us, that is, to the eye of our flesh: but unspeakably the more excellent and great for that very reason, for its not being seen.

5. We may hence learn the unjust and mad presumption that is in sin. When the invisible things of God, his eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen in the things that are made, that is, they are clearly to be seen by the things that are made, that they have an invisible Maker, and the eternal power and Godhead of this their Maker is clearly to be seen, then how unjust and mad a presumption is it to sin! For is not that an affront to thy Maker? What doth sin signify but ungovernableness to him that hath power to govern me? And who hath a right to govern you, if not he that made you out of nothing? Are not you one of the things that were made? and who therefore shews the eternal power and Godhead of your Maker? How unjust a presumption then is it to sin! But how mad a presumption is it besides! That is, to consider a world of sinful creatures in an apostacy from God and a rebellion against him: from whom have they revolted? against whom have they rebelled? They are things that are made, that have rebelled against him that made them. An amazing thing, to consider the inhabitants of this world, the intelligent inhabitants of it! They are a company of made things, and this world that they inhabit is a made thing. A made thing! what doth that signify? Why a thing depending upon will and pleasure: a thing that may be, or not be; a thing that may continue in being or be thrown into nothing, thrown into destruction the next moment. Why here is a company of creatures, that have taken upon them to revolt from their Maker, to rebel against him that made them. A strange thing! they have not (as the expression is) a footing for their feet; they are made things, and this world a made thing; all which may be swept away with a breath. For men to take upon them to rise up against the authority of him that made them, when they cannot command a breath, not so much as a breath: for that which hath been made, how presently can he unmake it! That which hath been made by him can be unmade by him in a moment: all this world gone in a moment: how easily may that be done by him! Therefore sin, considered in its general nature, is the most unjust and mad presumption that ever could enter into the 425mind of a rational creature; unjust towards God, and mad as to ourselves. Oh! think whither we are sunk, and what a sort of creatures we are become, and how admirable the divine patience is, that lets such a sort of creatures as we are, live in this world: a world which we did not furnish, which we did not make, and which he can in a breath blow away into nothing, as he raised it up out of nothing, by a breath the other way.

6. See here the admirable greatness of God. Oh! how we should hence apprehend and adore the divine greatness! The things that are made clearly demonstrate his invisible power and Godhead: and do but consider these two things—the greatness of the things that are made and—how little they yet represent God. And then see what cause we have from hence to admire his most adorable greatness.

(1.) How great the things are that are made. Alas, what a spot, a point is this earth of ours in comparison of the universe! If our thoughts should go no further than our own vortex, in which the sun and moon and planets have their course, how much more unmeasurable to our thoughts is that vortex than this earth of ours! This earth, in comparison of that vortex, is no more than a spot to the universe. It is a far less considerable point to the whole universe than this earth is to our vortex, or that circle that doth immediately encompass it. And then to think of the vastness of this universe; all which, and all that it contains are but things that are made. How mighty a One then is their Maker, their invisible Maker! The greatness of the creation gives us a great representation of the greatness of the Creator. But it adds unspeakably more if,

(2.) We consider, that yet all which creation can represent unto us of the Divine Being, is a mere nothing in comparison of what it represents not: for there is a whole infinitude of being besides, that was from eternity, everlasting of itself. And it is but a minute effort of the divine eternal power that is seen in this universe: for all the universe is but a finite thing, as great as it can be supposed to be, it is still but a finite thing: but then, there is an infinity of being besides, that is from all eternity, the being of the invisible God. Take this whole created universe and it is but a shadow in comparison of “I AM.” That Being that claims to itself the name of “I AM,” and there is nothing besides ME; nothing fit to be called being besides my own: for all made being is but at will and pleasure, raised up by a breath and capable of being reduced to nothing by a breath. The whole creation, the whole universe but a bubble created by the breath of the Almighty; and may be let to sink again, if he please, by the retraction or withdrawing of that 426 breath. If then the things made, clearly demonstrate the invisible things; even the eternal power and Godhead of their Maker, how great a one is HE, first, that could make so great a world as this, and yet, secondly, when that is done, it can represent so little of him! There is yet an infinitude of being appropriate to himself. Besides, how little a portion do we take up of him, as it is said, Job xxvi. 5-14. when we view his ways, take notice of such and such things in the course of nature, (as he there speaks of) how “hell is naked before him, and destruction hath no covering;” how “he stretcheth the north over the empty place,” how “he collects the waters into the clouds, and the clouds are not rent under them: these (saith he) are part of his ways, but how little a portion is heard of him?” Oh! how great a thing were it, if we did but once learn to apprehend the difference between beings unmade and made, between made beings and the eternal unmade Being, And again,

7. We may learn hence the impudency of the tempter, the deceiver and the destroyer (as much as in him lies) of the souls of men; that he should ever go about to make any one believe that there is not a God. How strange impudency is it, that he should ever presume he can make an intelligent mind apprehend that there is not a God, when the invisible things of God even his eternal power and Godhead are so clearly seen in the things that are made! Think of this if any of you are vexed at any time (as perhaps many of you may) with malicious injections from that wicked one, that would fain make you believe there is no God; why turn upon him with disdain: “Thou impudent liar, wouldest thou make me believe against my own eyes, against the clear apprehensions of my own mind? What doth not every thing I see, doth not every thing I hear, proclaim the Godhead to me, could there be any thing of being, any thing of motion, any thing of life through this whole creation, if there were not an original Author of all this? Doth not every being speak a first being, and all wisdom speak the first wisdom, and all love the first love, and all goodness speak the first goodness? Can any thing of itself come out of nothing? Nothing is more obvious to a considering mind (as hath been urged before) than that we can be surer of nothing than we are of this—that suppose nothing at all were in being, to eternity nothing could ever be in being. But something is in being now: and if that be the account that is to be given, how there comes to be any thing in being; that is, that there hath been something eternally in being, then that which was eternally in being is the cause of all things that are in being. The 427cause that was eternally in being, must bear proportion to the effect. If wisdom and goodness are to be found amongst made things, they are not nothing, you cannot say that wisdom is nothing, and knowledge nothing, justice nothing, for then there would be no difference between a wise man and a fool. If they are something, they could not of themselves come out of nothing; therefore there must have been eternal goodness, wisdom and life; that, that in itself lived, and lives to all eternity: for you see there are such things as these among what is made. Why then it is fit to retort upon the tempter with disdain, “Dost thou go about to make me believe, against the clear light of my own mind, that there is not a God, when it is clearly seen from the things that are made?” If there were nothing else, this proves the eternal Being, that there must be an eternal Cause that hath in it something proportionable to the visible effects that are to be seen, impressed even upon the things that are made. Characters appearing in the effect must have something correspondent to them in their cause, otherwise something must come of itself out of nothing, which is simply the most impossible thing that can be thought. I would only add this in the last place,

8. Whosoever they are that do terminate their thoughts upon this visible world, and look no further, they resist (nay as much as in them is) defeat and destroy the very design of the creation. Why hath God made such a world as this, and set such creatures as we in it? It is, that this world may be an extant, continual standing representation to us, an evidence, a proof of his invisible eternal power and Godhead who made it. We have our concerns and business lying here, within this visible world from day to day; here we are too apt to take up our thoughts, our desires, our designs; they terminate upon this visible world. If we let them do so, if we tolerate ourselves in such a course as this, it is (as much as in us is) to defeat and destroy the design of the creation. God hath designed this visible frame of things to be to us a continual monument and representation of himself, but we look to the things that are made, and there we let our eyes stay and terminate, and never look through them to that which is unmade. This would be a like case, as if one should have a very curious perspective put into his hands, that was very much adorned and beautified with every thing of external ornature that art could confer upon it, and holds it in his hand, turns it this way and that, and views it on every side for a long time together, and then lays it aside, never looks through it: he would see a vast country that now appears to him nothing else but a dark shadow; 428 just so men deal with this visible creation and frame of things; they look upon it, take notice of the variety of creatures that are in it, they look on every side of this visible world, as it doth apply itself to them and as they have opportunity to view the things therein: but whereas it was intended as a perspective, that they might look through it into the invisible eternal power and Godhead of him that made all: this never comes into their minds. How preposterous a course is this! It is little apprehended how guilty we make ourselves in this kind, every day, when we let our minds stay upon any creature of God, this or that man or woman, or house or star, (if we should go so high) and never think of God; while they are all made things, that tend to represent to us their Maker. Oh! how little is the end answered and considered, why we have such a frame of things set in view and kept in view continually before us, that we might look through them and adore, look up and adore, that we might through all, view and behold the great Author of all, and bow our heads before him. When we eat and drink, and never think of God, commend the food and drink, and never think of God; here we take up with the creature, the made thing, and never consider the unmade Maker of it and of us. The end is defeated and lost, for which this world was made and we placed in it, while we look not through things visible and made, unto him that is invisible and unmade.

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