SECT. XII. Or disagreeable to reason.

NOR is there more heed to be given to them who say, that there are some doctrines to be found in these books which are inconsistent with right reason: for, first, this may be disproved by that great multitude of ingenious, learned, and wise men, who have relied on the authority of these books from the very beginning: also, every thing that has been shown in the first book to be agreeable to right reason, viz. that there is a God, and but one, a most perfect 137Being, all-powerful, loving, wise, and good; that all things which are, were made by him; that his care is over all his works, particularly over men; that he can reward those that obey him after this life; that we are to bridle sensual appetites; that there is a natural relation betwixt men, and therefore they ought to love one another: all these we may find plainly delivered in these books. To affirm any thing more than this for certain, either concerning the nature of God, or concerning his will, by the mere direction of human reason, is an unsafe and fallible thing;⁴²⁷⁴²⁷   Matt. xi. 27. Rom. xi. 33, 34, 35. 1 Cor. ii. 11, 16. as we may learn from the many opinions of the schools different from one another, and of all the philosophers. Nor is this at all to be wondered at; for, if they who dispute about the nature of their own minds, fall into such widely different opinions,⁴²⁸⁴²⁸   See Plutarch’s works, book iv. or the opinions of the philosophers. And Stobæus’s physics, chap. xi. must it not necessarily be much more so with them who would determine any thing concerning the Supreme Mind, which is placed so much out of our reach? If they who understand human affairs affirm it dangerous to pry into the councils of princes,⁴²⁹⁴²⁹   Tacitus says so in the vith of his annals. and that therefore we ought not to attempt it, who is sagacious enough to hope, by his own conjectures, to find out which it is that God will determine of the various kinds of those things that he can freely will! Therefore Plato said very well, that none of these things could be known without a revelation:⁴³⁰⁴³⁰   The place is in his Phædon, and also in Timæus. It was well said by Ambrose, “Who should I rather believe concerning God, than God himself?” and there can be no revelation produced, which can be proved truly to be such by greater testimonies than those contained in the books of the New Testament. There is so far from being any proof, that it has never yet been asserted that God ever declared any thing to man, concerning his nature, that was contradictory to these books; nor can there be any later declaration of his will produced that is credible. And if any thing was commanded or allowed, before Christ’s time, of those 138sort of things which are plainly indifferent, or certainly not at all obligatory of themselves, nor plainly evil, this does not oppose these books; because, in such things, the former laws are nulled by the latter.⁴³¹⁴³¹   “The latter constitutions are more valid than the former.” It is a saying of Modestinas, L. ultima, D. de Constitutionibus Principum. Tertullian, “I think (says he) that in human constitutions and decrees, the latter are more bidding than the former.” And in his apology: “Ye lop and hew down the ancient and foul wood of the laws, by the new axes of the decrees and edicts of the princes.” And concerning baptism, “In all things we are determined by the latter; the latter things are more binding than those that went before.” Plutarch, Sympos. ix. “In decrees and laws, in compacts and bargains, the latter are esteemed stronger and firmer than the former.