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THE CONTENTS.
THE Introduction, concerning the causes of Atheism |
1 |
PROP. I. That Something has existed from Eternity |
7 |
Of the difficulty of conceiving Eternity |
8 |
That Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, are not to be regarded, because equal in all Suppositions |
ibid. |
PROP. II. That there has existed from Eternity some one Immutable and Independent Being |
10 |
Of the Absolute Impossibility of an eternal Succession of dependent Beings, existing without any original independent cause at all |
11 |
PROP. III. That that Immutable and Independent Being, which has existed from Eternity, without any external cause of its Existence, must be Self-existent, that is, Necessarily-existing |
13 |
Of the true Idea of Self-existence; That it is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence is an express Contradiction |
15 |
That every Man may be more certain of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of any thing else besides his own Existence |
18 |
Of the Idea of God, including Self-Existence |
ibid. |
That the Material World cannot possibly be the first, original, and independent Being |
21 |
The Form of the World not necessary |
22 |
Nor its Motion |
ibid. |
Mr Toland’s pernicious opinion of Motion being essential to Matter, confuted |
ibid. |
The Matter of the World not necessarily existing |
23 |
A Confutation of Spinoza’s opinion concerning one only Substance |
25 |
Concerning the Eternity of the World, and that the opinion of the best Ancient Philosophers in that Matter did not at all favour the Sentiments of Modern Atheists |
28 |
PROP. IV. What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is Self-existent or Necessarily-existing, is, we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it |
35 |
Of Infinite Space |
36 |
Of the Vanity of explaining things by such School-terms as have really no Signification at all |
37 |
PROP. V. That though the Substance or Essence of the Self-existent Being is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence; as, in the first place, that he must of necessity be Eternal |
38 |
Of the manner of our conceiving the Eternity of God with respect to succession |
ibid. |
PROP. VI. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent |
40 |
|
II Of the Simplicity, Unchangeableness, Incorruptibility, &c. of his Nature |
41 |
Of the Manner of our conceiving the Immensity of God |
42 |
PROP. VII. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be but One |
43 |
Of the Blessed Trinity |
44 |
Of the Absolute Impossibility of two different Self-existent Independent Principles, such as God and Matter |
ibid. |
The Error of Spinoza concerning one Uniform Substance |
ibid. |
PROP. VIII. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things, must be an Intelligent Being |
46 |
This the main Question between us and the Atheists |
ibid. |
Not easily proved a priori |
ibid. |
But demonstrably proved, a posteriori, from the variety and degrees of perfection in things, and the order of Causes and Effects |
47 |
From the Intelligence that created Beings are confessedly indued with |
48] |
That, if Intelligence be a real distinct Quality or Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion, then Beings indued with Intelligence can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which itself had no such Perfection |
49 |
That Intelligence is such a real distinct Perfection, and not possible to be a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent figure and motion |
51 |
Mr Hobbes forced to recur to that prodigiously absurd Opinion, that all Matter, as Matter, is indued with Thought |
52 |
The Proposition demonstrated further from the Beauty, Order, and Final Cause of Things |
53 |
From the Original of Motion |
55 |
That the Material World cannot possibly have been Self-existent |
56 |
PROP. IX. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things is not a Necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice |
ibid. |
This Proposition a necessary consequent of the foregoing |
57 |
Proved further from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World, with a full answer to Spinoza’s arguments for the necessity of all things |
58 |
Also from Final Causes |
63 |
And from the Finiteness of Created Beings |
ibid. |
And from the Impossibility of an Infinite Succession of Causes |
64 |
That Liberty is not in itself an Impossible and contradictory Notion |
66 |
PROP. X. That the Self-existing Being, the Supreme cause of all things, must of necessity have Infinite Power - |
67 |
Of working Contradictions, and Natural or Moral Evil |
68 |
Of the Power of creating Matter |
69 |
Of the Power of creating immaterial Cogitative Substances, and those indued with Liberty of Will or Choice |
70 |
Of the Immateriality of Human Souls |
73 |
That the Power of Perception is not confined to Bodily Senses |
74 |
Of the Possibility of Communicating to a Creature the Power of beginning Motion |
75 |
Of the Possibility of induing a Creature with Freedom of Will |
78 |
An Answer to Spinoza’s and Mr Hobbes’s arguments against the Possibility of Liberty |
80 |
That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation |
ibid. |
|
III That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can possibly be Qualities or Affections of Matter |
82 |
That, supposing they were Affections of Matter, yet even that most absurd supposition would not at all affect the question about the possibility of Liberty |
88 |
A shameful Fallacy in Mr Hobbes and his Followers arguing, who, when they would prove the Soul to be mere Matter, then they suppose Matter to be a substance capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown properties; and when they would prove the will and all other Operations of the Soul to be necessary, then they divest Matter of all its unknown properties, and make it mere Solidity indued only with Figure and Motion again |
ibid. |
Of the Necessity of the Will’s being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding |
90 |
Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-knowledge, not repugnant to the Liberty of Men’s Actions |
94 |
Of the Original of Evil |
98 |
PROP. XI. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things must of necessity be Infinitely Wise |
99 |
Proved a priori |
100 |
And a posteriori, from the Wisdom and Perfection of the Works of God, evidenced more illustriously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy |
101 |
PROP. XII. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections, such as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the World |
104 |
Of Providence |
107 |
The Necessity of God’s Moral Attributes, consistent with perfect Liberty |
ibid. |
Of the Necessity of God’s doing always what is Best and Fittest in the whole |
109 |
Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil |
110 |
That Liberty is not in itself an Imperfection, but a Perfection |
111 |
That the highest moral Perfection of Rational Creatures does not exclude Natural Liberty |
112 |
That the Grounds of all Moral Obligations are Eternal and Necessary, and depend not on any Laws |
ibid. |
The Conclusion |
114 |
| IVTHE EVIDENCES OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION. | |
|---|---|
The INTRODUCTION |
131 |
Of the Several sorts of Deists |
140 |
The first sort of Deists, and of Providence |
141 |
Human Affairs not beneath the Regard of Providence |
144 |
The second sort of Deists |
146 |
Profane and debauched Deists not capable of being argued with |
147 |
The Third sort of Deists |
149 |
The Fourth sort of Deists |
150 |
That there is now no consistent scheme of Deism in the World |
153 |
PROP. I. That, from the Eternal and Necessary Differences of Things, there naturally and necessarily arise certain Moral Obligations, which are of themselves incumbent on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to all positive Institution and to all expectation of Reward or Punishment |
156 |
That there are Eternal and necessary Differences of Things |
157 |
The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and Necessary Difference of Things |
159 |
An Answer to the Objection drawn from the variety of Opinions of the learned Men, and the Laws of different Nations, concerning Right and Wrong |
163 |
That the will of God always determines itself to act according to the Eternal Reason of Things |
165 |
That all Rational Creatures are obliged to govern themselves in all their actions by the same Eternal Rule of Reason |
166 |
Proved from the Original Nature of Things |
167 |
And from the Sense that all, even wicked Men, unavoidably have of their being under such an Obligation |
169 |
And from the Judgment of Men’s Consciences upon their own past actions |
171 |
Of that Natural Knowledge which Plato thought to be Reminiscence |
ibid. |
The most profligate of Men not utterly insensible of the difference of Good and Evil |
172 |
Men’s Natural sense of Eternal Moral Obligations proved further from the Judgment they all pass upon the actions of others |
173 |
An Answer to the Objection drawn from the Total Ignorance of some Barbarous Nations in Matters of Morality |
176 |
Of the Principal Moral Obligations in particular |
177 |
Of Piety, or Men’s Duty towards God |
178 |
Of Righteousness, or the duty of Men one towards another |
180 |
Of Justice and Equity |
ibid. |
Of Universal Mutual Benevolence |
184 |
Of Sobriety, or Men’s Duty towards themselves, and of the Unlawfulness of Self-Murder |
187 |
The Law of Nature Eternal, Universal, and Absolutely Unchangeable |
191 |
Eternal Moral Obligations antecedent, in some respect, even to this Consideration, of their being the Will or Command of God himself |
195 |
The Law of Nature Obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of particular Rewards and Punishments |
198 |
|
V Yet it does not from hence at all follow, either that a Good Man ought to have no respect to Rewards and Punishments, or that Rewards and Punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the Practice of Virtue in this present World |
200 |
The Manifold Absurdities of Mr Hobbes’s Doctrines concerning the Original of Right, shown in particular |
204 |
PROP. II. That the same Eternal Moral Obligations, which arise necessarily from the Natural Differences of Things, are moreover the Express W 1, Command, and Law of God to all Rational Creatures |
218 |
Proved from the Consideration of the Divine Attributes |
ibid. |
And from the Consideration of the Nature of God’s Creation |
222 |
And from the Tendency of the Practice of Morality to the Good and Happiness of the whole World |
223 |
PROP. III. That the same Eternal Moral Obligations, which are of themselves incumbent indeed on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular Reward or Punishment, must yet certainly and necessarily be attended with Rewards and Punishments |
226 |
Proved from the Attributes of God |
ibid. |
And from the Necessity there is that there should be some Vindication of the Honour of God’s Laws and Government |
227 |
PROP. IV. That because these Rewards and Punishments are not distributed in the present State, therefore there must of necessity be a Future State |
228 |
That, according to the Original Constitution of Things, Virtue and Vice are attended with Natural Rewards and Punishments |
230 |
But that now, in this present World, the Natural Order of Things is so Perverted, that Vice often flourishes in great Prosperity and Virtue falls under the greatest Calamities of Life |
231 |
That therefore there must needs be a Future State of Rewards and Punishments |
233 |
Of the Stoical Opinion concerning the Self-Sufficiency of Virtue to its own Happiness |
234 |
From whence the Certainty of a Future State is again concluded |
236 |
Why the Wisdom of God is not so Clearly and Plainly seen in his Government of the Moral, as in the Fabric of the Natural World |
238 |
Of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Natural Proofs we have of it |
239 |
The Natural Credibility of the Soul’s being Immortal, of great Use to the Wiser Heathens |
243 |
The Argument for a Future State drawn from Men’s Natural Desire of Immortality |
245 |
Another, drawn from Men’s Conscience or Judgment of their own Actions |
246 |
Another, drawn from Man’s being by Nature an Accountable Creature |
ibid. |
PROP. V. That though the Necessity and Indispensableness of all the great and Moral Obligations of Natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, be in general deducible from Right Reason, yet such is the present Corrupt Estate and Condition of Mankind in the World, that very few are able, in reality and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves, but Men have great need of Particular Teaching and much Instruction |
248 |
|
VI Men Hindered from Discovering and Understanding Religious Truths, by Carelessness and Want of Attention |
249 |
And by Early Prejudices and False Notions |
250 |
And by Sensual Appetites, Passions, and Worldly Business |
251 |
And, above all, by Vicious Habits and Practices |
252 |
Wherefore Men have great need to be Taught and Instructed in Matters of Religion |
254 |
The great Use and Necessity of an Order of Preachers |
256 |
PROP. VI. That all the Teaching and Instruction of the best Heathen Philosophers, was for many Reasons Utterly Insufficient to Reform Mankind |
ibid. |
That there have been in the Heathen World some Excellent Teachers of Morality |
257 |
Who seem to have been designed by Providence to bear witness against the Wickedness of the Nations wherein they lived |
258 |
But yet none of these Men were ever able to Reform the World with any considerable success |
259 |
Because they have been but very few that have in earnest set themselves about that Excellent Work |
261 |
And those few were entirely ignorant of some Doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about that Great End |
263 |
Particularly, they were Ignorant in what Manner God will be Acceptably Worshipped |
265 |
And in what Method God would be Reconciled to Returning Sinners |
267 |
And other Doctrines absolutely necessary to the same end, they were very doubtful and uncertain about |
268 |
And those things which they were certain of, yet they were not able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough |
271 |
And those things which they were able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, yet they had not sufficient authority to enforce in practice |
275 |
PROP. VII. That there was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of their Universal Degenerate Estate, and that both the Necessities of Men, and their Natural Notions of God, gave them reasonable ground to hope for such a Revelation |
278 |
A Divine Revelation very necessary for the Recovery of Mankind |
ibid. |
That it was agreeable to the Dictates of Nature and Right Reason to expect or hope for such a Divine Revelation |
280 |
The Unreasonableness of Modern Deists in Denying the Want and Use of a Revelation |
284 |
The great Necessity and Use of Divine Revelation |
285 |
Yet God was not absolutely obliged to afford men the help of such a Revelation |
288 |
Want of Universality no sufficient Objection against the Truth of a Revelation |
289 |
PROP. VIII. That there is no other Religion now in the World, but the Christian, that has any Just Pretence or Tolerable Appearance of Reason to be esteemed such a Divine Revelation |
291 |
|
VII Of the Mahometan Religion |
291 |
Of the Jewish Religion |
ibid. |
PROP. IX. That the Christian Religion has all the Marks and Proofs of its being Actually and Truly a Divine Revelation, that any Divine Revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or desired to have |
292 |
The Marks of a Religion Coming from God |
ibid. |
PROP. X. That the Practical Duties, which the Christian Religion enjoins, are all such as are most agreeable to our Natural Notions of God, and most Perfective of the Nature and Conducive to the Happiness and Well-being of Men |
293 |
Proved in the Several Instances of Duty |
ibid. |
This a Great Evidence of a Religion coming from God |
296 |
PROP. XI. That the Motives by which the Christian Religion enforces the Practice of the Duties it enjoins, are such as are most suitable to the excellent wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural expectations of Men |
299 |
Of the Acceptableness of True Repentance as a Motive to Obedience |
ibid. |
Of the Divine Assistance as another Motive to Obedience |
300 |
Of the Clear Discovery of Future Rewards and Punishments, as another Motive to Obedience |
301 |
PROP. XII. That the Peculiar Manner and Circumstances, with which the Christian Religion enjoins the Duties, and urges the Motives before-mentioned, are exactly consonant to the Dictates of Sound Reason, or the Unprejudiced Light of Nature, and most wisely perfective of it |
303 |
Proved by Particular Instances |
ibid. |
An Answer to the Objections drawn from the Divisions among Christians |
305 |
PROP. XIII. That all the Credenda, or Doctrines, which the Christian Religion requires our particular assent to, are agreeable to Unprejudiced Reason, have every one of them a Natural Tendency and Direct Influence to Reform Men’s Manners, and do together make up the most consistent and rational Scheme of Belief in the World |
306 |
Of the One Supreme God |
ibid. |
Of the Only-begotten Son of God |
307 |
Of the Holy Spirit |
308 |
Of the Creation of the Universe |
ibid. |
Of the Formation of the Earth |
309 |
Of the Continual Government of Providence |
310 |
Of Paradise, and the Loss of it by Sin |
311 |
Of the Flood |
312 |
Of God’s Revealing Himself to the Patriarchs, and giving the Law to the Jews |
313 |
Of the other Particulars of Scripture-history in the Old Testament |
ibid. |
Of God’s sending his Son into the World, for the Redemption of Mankind |
315 |
That it is not Unreasonable to Suppose God Making a Revelation of his Will to Men |
316 |
That it is not unreasonable to believe that God would appoint a Sacrifice or Expiation for Sin |
ibid. |
|
VIII That it is not unreasonable to believe that a Mediator should be appointed between God and Man |
317 |
Of the Objection drawn from the Dignity of the Person whom we believe to be our Mediator and Redeemer |
ibid. |
Of the Objection drawn from the Christian Revelation not being in fact Universal - |
322 |
Of the other Particulars of Scripture-history contained in the New Testament |
323 |
Of the Day of Judgment and Christ the Judge |
324 |
Of the Resurrection of the Body |
325 |
Of the Resurrection of the same Body |
326 |
Of the Eternal Happiness of the Blessed, and the Eternal Punishment of the Damned |
328 |
All the Articles of our Belief agreeable to Right Reason |
331 |
Every one of them has a Direct Tendency and Powerful Influence to Reform Men’s Manners |
ibid. |
And all of them together make up the most Consistent and Rational Scheme of Belief in the World |
335 |
PROP. XIV. That the Christian Revelation is positively and directly proved to be sent to us from God by the Miracles which our Saviour worked, by the fulfilling of the Prophecies, and by the Testimony of the Apostles |
336 |
Of the Life and Character of our Saviour, as an Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Revelation |
337 |
Of the Miracles of Christ, as the Evidence of his Divine Commission |
338 |
Of Miracles in General |
ibid. |
That, in Respect of the Power of God, all things are alike easy |
339 |
That therefore Miracles ought not to be defined by any Absolute Difficulty in the Nature of the Things themselves to be done |
ibid. |
What degrees of Power God may have communicated to Created Beings, is not possible for us to determine |
340 |
That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be such an Effect as could not have been produced by any less Power than the Divine Omnipotence |
ibid. |
All things that are done in the World, are done either Immediately by God Himself, or by Created Intelligent Beings, Matter being capable of no laws or powers; and consequently there is, properly speaking, no such thing as the Course or Power of Nature |
343 |
That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be that which is against the Course of Nature, or above the Natural Powers of Created Agents |
342 |
The Unreasonableness of those who deny the Possibility of Miracles in General |
ibid. |
Some Effects prove the Constant Providence of God, and others prove the Occasional Interposition either of God himself or of some Intelligent Being Superior to Men |
343 |
Whether such Interposition be the Immediate work of God, or of some Good or Evil Angel, can hardly be discovered merely by the Work Itself |
344 |
That there is no reason to suppose all the Wonders worked by Evil Spirits to be mere Delusions |
ibid. |
|
IX How we are to Distinguish Miracles wrought by God for the Proof of any Doctrine, from the Frauds of Evil Spirits |
345 |
The Difference between those who teach that the Immediate Power of God is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the Working of a Miracle, is not very great at bottom |
347 |
The True Definition of a Miracle |
ibid. |
The Strength of the Evidence of our Saviour’s Miracles |
348 |
Concerning the Objection, that we prove in a circle the Miracles by the Doctrine, and the Doctrine by the Miracles |
ibid. |
Of the Pretended Miracles of Apollonius and others |
350 |
Of the fulfilling the Prophecies as an Evidence of our Saviour’s Divine Commission |
351 |
Of the Prophecies that went before Concerning the Messiah |
ibid. |
Of the Prophecies that Christ Himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after |
353 |
An Answer to Objections against Applying the Prophecies in the Old Testament to Christ |
354 |
Of the Testimony of our Saviour’s Disciples, as an Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Revelation |
399 |
What Things are requisite to make the Testimony of our Saviour’s Disciples a Complete Evidence |
400 |
That the Apostles could not be Imposed upon Themselves |
ibid. |
That they could have no design of imposing upon Others |
401 |
That the Apostles’ Testimony has been truly conveyed down to us |
403 |
Of the Authority of the Books of Holy Scripture |
404 |
PROP. XV. That they who will not, by the Arguments and Proofs before-mentioned, be convinced of the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion, would not be convinced by any other Evidence whatsoever,—no, not though one should rise on purpose from the dead to endeavour to Convince them |
405 |
That the Evidence which God has afforded us of the Truth of our Religion is abundantly sufficient |
ibid. |
That the Cause of Men’s Unbelief is not Want of Better Evidence to prove the great Truths of Religion |
406 |
But that Wickedness and Ungoverned Lusts are the only Causes of Obstinate Infidelity |
408 |
And so long as Men are under the Dominion of their Lusts, they would not be convinced, though the Evidence of Religion was even much Stronger than it is |
ibid. |
Nay, not even though one should Rise on Purpose from the Dead to Convince them |
410 |
That therefore it is Absolutely Necessary in the first place, that Men become Impartially Willing to embrace all Truth, and to obey all Reasonable Obligations |
411 |
That Men of such a Disposition would be Religious, though the Evidences of Religion were much less than they are |
412 |
That God may require us to take notice of some things at our peril |
414 |
Letters from a Gentleman in Gloucestershire relative to some points stated in the foregoing Discourses, with the Answers thereto |
418 |
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