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   Title: The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and
   Course of Nature to Which Are Added, Two Brief Dissertations
   Creator(s): Butler, Joseph (1692-1752)
   CCEL Subjects: All; Apologetics
   LC Call no: BT1100.B9
   LC Subjects:

   Doctrinal theology

   Apologetics. Evidences of Christianity
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THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION,

NATURAL AND REVEALED

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS:

I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.—II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

BY

JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L

LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.
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   Ejus [Analogiæ] hæc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo
   non quæritur, referat ut incerta certis probet.—QUINTIL. L. 1. C. 6.
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    WITH

  AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR,

BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D.D.

  LATE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.
     _________________________________________________________________

NEW YORK:
ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS,
No. 530 BROADWAY.
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ADVERTISEMENT

  PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION.

   IF the reader should meet here with any thing which he had not before
   attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and
   course of nature, these being all obvious; but in the application of them:
   in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real
   weight, and therefore of great importance; yet he will observe several
   things, which will appear to him of very little, if he can think things to
   be of little importance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a
   subject as religion. However, the proper force of the following Treatise
   lies in the whole general analogy considered together.

   It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that
   Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at
   length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if,
   in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of
   discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject
   of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so
   long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much, at
   least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any
   reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much
   assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a
   case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its
   truth; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied
   of the contrary. And the practical consequence to be drawn from this is not
   attended to by every one who is concerned in it.

   May, 1736.
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CONTENTS.

   Page
   INTRODUCTION                                           48
                            PART I.
                     OF NATURAL RELIGION.
   Chap. 1.—Of a Future Life                              57

   Chap. II.—Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments; and
   particularly of the latter
   73
   Chap. III.—Of the Moral Government of God              83

   Chap. IV.—Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and
   Danger
   105

   Chap. V.—Of a State of Probation, as intended for moral Discipline and
   Improvement
   112

   Chap. VI.—Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice
   134

   Chap. VII.—Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution,
   imperfectly comprehended
   148
   CONCLUSION                                             158
                           PART II.
                     OF REVEALED RELIGION.
   Chap. I.—Of the Importance of Christianity             165

   Chap. II.—Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered as
   miraculous
   181

   Chap. III.—Of our incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a
   Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain Things
   appearing liable to Objections
   187

   Chap. IV.—Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution,
   imperfectly comprehended
   201

   Chap. V.—Of the particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a
   Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him
   208

   Chap. VI.—Of the Want of Universality in Revelation: and of the supposed
   Deficiency in the Proof of it
   225
   Chap. VII.—Of the particular Evidence for Christianity 242

   Chap. VIII.—Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from the
   Analogy of Nature to Religion
   275
   CONCLUSION                                             286
   DISSERTATION I—Of Personal Identity,                   297
   DISSERTATION II—Of the Nature of Virtue                303
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    TO

  THE REVEREND

DR THOMAS BALGUY,

    ARCHDEACON AND PREBENDARY OF W1NCHESTER, &c.
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   DEAR SIR,

   I TRUST you will excuse the liberty I have taken of prefixing your name to
   the following sheets; the latter part of which, I am confident, will not be
   thought undeserving of your approbation; and of the former part you will
   commend the intention at least, if not the execution. In vindicating the
   character of Bishop Butler from the aspersions thrown upon it since his
   death, I have but discharged a common duty of humanity, which survivors owe
   to those who have deserved well of mankind by their lives or writings, when
   they are past the power of appearing in their own defence. And if what I
   have added, by way of opening the general design of the Works of this great
   Prelate, be of use in exciting the younger class of Students in our
   Universities to read, and so to read as to understand, the Two Volumes
   prepared and published by the Author himself; I flatter myself I shall have
   done no inconsiderable service to Morality and Religion. Your time and
   studies have been long successfully devoted to the support of the same great
   cause: and in what you have lately given to the world, both as an Author and
   an Editor, you have largely contributed to the defence of our common
   Christianity, and of what was esteemed by One, who was perfectly competent
   to judge, its best Establishment, the Church of England. In the present
   publication I consider myself as a fellow-labourer with you in the same
   design, and tracing the path you have trod before, but at great distance,
   and with unequal paces. When, by His Majesty’s goodness, I was raised to
   that state of eminence in the Church, to which you had been first names, and
   which on account of the infirmity of your health, you had desired to
   decline; it was honour enough for me on such an occasion to have been
   thought of next to you: and I know of no better rule by which to govern my
   conduct, so as not to discredit the Royal Hand which conferred on me so
   signal and unmerited a favour, than in cases of difficulty to put the
   question to myself, How you would probably have acted in the same situation.
   You see, Sir, I still look up to you, as I have been wont, both as my
   Superior and my Example. That I may long reap the benefit of your advice and
   friendship; and that such a measure of health and strength may be continued
   to you, as my enable you to pass the evening of your days with comfort, and
   enjoy the blessings of the life you love; is the cordial wish of,

   Dear Sir.

   Your very affectionate

   and faithful Servant,

   S. GLOUCESTER.

   Dartmouth Street, Westminster,
    12th May, 1786.
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PREFACE BY THE ED1TOR

   “When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best established
   characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity often as malignant to
   virtue as the age that saw it was envious of its glory; and how ready a
   remote age is to catch at a low revived slander, which the times that
   brought it forth saw despised and forgotten almost in its birth; I cannot
   but think it a matter that deserves attention.”—Letter to the Editor of the
   Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, &c., by Bishop Warburton. See his
   Works, vol. vii. p. 547.

   THE Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham was printed and published
   in the year 1751, by the learned Prelate whose name it bears; and, together
   with the Sermons and Analogy of the same writer, both too well known to need
   a more particular description, completes the collection of his Works. It has
   long been considered as a matter of curiosity, on account of its scarceness;
   and it is equally curious on other accounts—its subject, and the calumny to
   which it gave occasion, of representing the Author as addicted to
   superstition, as inclined to popery, and as dying in the communion of the
   Church of Rome. The improved edition of the Biographia Britannica, published
   under the care of Dr Kippis, having unavoidably brought this calumny again
   into notice, it may not be unseasonable to offer a few reflections in this
   place, by way of obviating any impressions that may hence arise to the
   disadvantage of so great a character as that of the late Bishop Butler;
   referring those who desire a more particular account of his life, to the
   third volume of the same entertaining work, printed in 1784. art. BUTLER
   (Joseph). [1]

   I. The principal design of the Bishop in his Charge is, to exhort his Clergy
   to “do their part towards reviving a practical sense of religion amongst the
   people committed to their care;” and, as one way of effecting this, to
   “instruct them in the Importance of External Religion,” or the usefulness of
   outward observances in promoting inward piety. Now, from the compound nature
   of man, consisting of two parts, the body and the mind, together with the
   influence which these are found to have on one another, it follows, that the
   religious regards of such a creature ought to be so framed, as to be in some
   way properly accommodated to both. A religion which is purely spiritual,
   stripped of every thing that may affect the senses, and considered only as a
   divine philosophy of the mind, if it do not mount up into enthusiasm, as has
   frequently been the case, often sinks, after a few short fervours, into
   indifference: an abstracted invisible object, like that which natural
   religion offers, ceases to move or interest the heart; and something further
   is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more present to our view, than
   merely an intellectual contemplation. On the other hand, when, in order to
   remedy this inconvenience, recourse is had to instituted forms and ritual
   injunctions, there. is always danger lest men be tempted to rest entirely on
   these, and persuade themselves that a painful attention to such observances
   will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue. Yet surely there is a
   way of steering safely between these two extremes; of so consulting both the
   parts of our constitution, that the body and the mind may concur in
   rendering our religious services acceptable to God, and at the same time
   useful to ourselves. And what way can this be, but precisely that which is
   recommended in the Charge; such a cultivation of outward as well as inward
   religion, that from both may result, what is the point chiefly to be
   laboured, and at all events to be secured, a correspondent temper and
   behaviour; or, in other words; such an application of the forms of
   godliness, as may be subservient in promoting the power and spirit of it? No
   man, who believes the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and
   understands what he believes, but must know, that external religion is as
   much enjoined, and constitutes as real a part of revelation, as that which
   is internal. The many ceremonies in use among the Jews, in consequence of a
   divine command; the baptism of water, as an emblem of moral purity; the
   eating and drinking of bread and wine, as symbols and representations of the
   body and blood of Christ, required of Christians, are proofs of this. On
   comparing these two parts of religion together, one, it is immediately seen,
   is of much greater importance than the other; and, whenever they happen to
   interfere, is always to be preferred: but does it follow from hence, that
   therefore that other is of little or no importance, and, in cases where
   there is no competition, may entirely be neglected? Or rather is not the
   legitimate conclusion directly the reverse, that nothing is to be looked
   upon as of little importance, which is of any use at all in preserving upon
   our minds a sense of the Divine authority, which recalls to our remembrance
   the obligations we are under, and helps to keep us, as the Scripture
   expresses it, “in the fear of the Lord all the day long?” [2] If, to adopt
   the instance mentioned in the Charge, the sight of a church should remind a
   man of some sentiment of piety; if, from the view of a material building
   dedicated to the service of God, he should be led to regard himself, his own
   body, as a living “temple of the Holy Ghost,” [3] and therefore no more than
   the other to be profaned or desecrated by any thing that defileth or is
   impure; could it be truly said of such a one, that he was superstitious, or
   mistook the means of religion for the end? If, to use another, and what has
   been thought a more obnoxious instance, taken from the Bishop’s practice, a
   cross, erected in a place of public worship, [4] should cause us to reflect
   on Him who died on a cross for our salvation, and on the necessity of our
   “own dying to sin,” [5] and of “crucifying the flesh with its affection and
   lusts;” [6] would any worse consequences follow from such sentiments so
   excited, than if the same sentiments had been excited by the view of a
   picture, of the crucifixion suppose, such as is commonly placed, and with
   this very design, in foreign churches, and indeed in many of our own? Both
   the instances here adduced, it is very possible, may be far from being
   approved, even by those who are under the most sincere convictions of the
   importance of true religion: and it is easy to conceive how open to scorn
   and censure they must be from others, who think they have a talent for
   ridicule, and have accustomed themselves to regard all pretensions to piety
   as hypocritical or superstitious. But “Wisdom is justified of her
   children.” [7] Religion is what it is, “whether men will hear, or whether
   they will forbear;”Ezek. ii. 5 and whatever in the smallest degree promotes
   its interests, and assists us in performing its commands, whether that
   assistance be derived from the medium of the body or the mind, ought to be
   esteemed of great weight, and deserving of our most serious attention.

   However, be the danger of superstition what it may, no one was more sensible
   of that danger, or more in earnest in maintaining, that external acts of
   themselves are nothing, and that moral holiness, as distinguished from
   bodily observances of every kind, is that which constitutes the essence of
   religion, than Bishop Butler. Not only the Charge itself, the whole
   intention of which is plainly nothing more than to enforce the necessity of
   practical religion, the reality as well as form, is a demonstration of this,
   but many passages besides to the same purpose, selected from his other
   writings. Take the two following as specimens. In his Analogy he observes
   thus: “Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their
   religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to
   moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between. them, and
   consequently without determining which is to have the preference, the nature
   of the thing abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly
   subversive of true religion: as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole
   tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations
   of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue.”
   [8] And to the same purpose in his Sermon, preached before the Society for
   the Propagation of the Gospel, in February, 1738-9. “Indeed, amongst
   creatures naturally formed for religion, yet so much under the power of
   imagination as men are, superstition is an evil, which can never be out of
   sight. But even against this, true religion is a great security, and the
   only one. True religion, takes up that place in the mind, which superstition
   would usurp, and so leaves little room for at; and likewise lays us under
   the strongest obligations to oppose it. On the contrary, the danger of
   superstition cannot but be increased by the prevalence of irreligion; and,
   by its general prevalence, the evil will be unavoidable. For the common
   people, wanting a religion, will of course take up with almost any
   superstition which is thrown in their way: and in process of time, amidst
   the infinite vicissitudes of the political world, the leaders of parties
   will certainly be able to serve themselves of that superstition, whatever it
   be, which is getting ground; and will not fail to carry it to the utmost
   length their occasions require. The general nature of the thing shows this;
   and history and fact confirm it. It is therefore wonderful, those people who
   seem to think there is but one evil in life, that of superstition, should
   not see that atheism and profaneness must be the introduction of it.” [9]

   He who can think and write in such a manner, can never be said to mistake
   the nature of real religion: and he, who, after such proofs to the contrary,
   can persist in asserting of so discreet and learned a person, that he was
   addicted to superstition, must himself be much a stranger both to truth and
   charity.

   And here it may be worth our while to observe, that the same excellent
   Prelate, who by one set of men was suspected of superstition, on account of
   his Charge, has by another been represented as leaning to the opposite
   extreme of enthusiasm, on account of his two discourses On the Love of God.
   But both opinions are equally without foundation. He was neither
   superstitious, nor an enthusiast: his mind was much too strong, and his
   habits of thinking and reasoning much too strict and severe, to suffer him
   to descend to the weaknesses of either character. His piety was at once
   fervent and rational. When impressed with a generous concern for the
   declining cause of religion, he laboured to revive its dying interests;
   nothing he judged would be more effectual to that end, among creatures so
   much engaged with bodily things, and so apt to be affected with whatever
   strongly solicits the senses, as men are, than a religion of such a frame as
   should in its exercise require the joint exertions of the body and the mind.
   On the other hand, when penetrated with the dignity and importance of “the
   first and great commandment,” [10] love to God, he set himself to inquire,
   what those movements of the heart are, which are due to Him, the Author and
   Cause of all things; he found, in the coolest way of consideration, that God
   is the natural object of the same affections of gratitude, reverence, fear,
   desire of approbation, trust, and dependence, the same affections in kind,
   though doubtless in a very disproportionate degree, which any one would feel
   from contemplating a perfect character in a creature, in which goodness,
   with wisdom and power, are supposed to be the predominant qualities, with
   the further circumstance, that this creature was also his governor and
   friend. This subject is manifestly a real one; there is nothing in it
   fanciful or unreasonable: this way of being affected towards God is piety,
   in the strictest sense: this is religion, considered as a habit of mind; a
   religion, suited to the nature and condition of man. [11]

   II. From superstition to Popery, the transition is easy: no wonder then,
   that, in the progress of detraction, the simple imputation of the former of
   these, with which the attack on the character of our Author was opened,
   should be followed by the more aggravated imputation of the latter. Nothing,
   I think, can fairly be gathered in support of such a suggestion from the
   Charge, in which Popery is barely mentioned, and occasionally only, and in a
   sentence or two; yet even there, it should be remarked, the Bishop takes
   care to describe the peculiar observances required by it, “some as in
   themselves wrong and, superstitious, and others of them as being made
   subservient to the purposes of superstition.” With respect to his other
   writings, any one at all conversant with them needs not to be told, that the
   matters treated of both in his Sermons and his Analogy did none of them
   directly lead him to consider, and much less to combat, the opinions,
   whether relating to faith or worship, which are peculiar to the Church of
   Rome: it might therefore have happened, yet without any just conclusion
   arising from thence, of being himself inclined to favour those opinions,
   that he had never mentioned, so much as incidentally, the subject of Popery
   at all. But fortunately for the reputation of the Bishop, and to the eternal
   disgrace of his calumniators, even this poor resource is wanting. to support
   their malevolence. In his Sermon at St Bride’s before the Lord Mayor in
   1740, after having said that “our laws and whole constitution go more upon
   supposition of an equality amongst mankind, than the constitution and laws
   of other countries;” he goes on to observe, that “this plainly requires,
   that more particular regard should be had to the education of the lower
   people here, than in places where they are born slaves of power, and to be
   made slaves of superstition: [12] meaning evidently in this place, by the
   general term superstition, the particular errors of the Romanists. This is
   something: but we have a still plainer indication what his sentiments
   concerning Popery really were, from another of his additional Sermons, I
   mean that before the House of Lords on June the 11th, 1747, the anniversary
   of his late Majesty’s accession. The passage alluded to is as follows; and
   my readers will not be displeased that I give it them at length. “The value
   of our religious Establishment ought to be very much heightened in our
   esteem, by considering what it is a security from; I mean that great
   corruption of Christianity, Popery, which is ever hard at work to bring us
   again under its yoke. Whoever will consider the Popish claims, to the
   disposal of the whole earth, as of divine right, to dispense with the most
   sacred engagements, the claims to supreme absolute authority in religion; in
   short, the general claims which the Canonists express by the words,
   plenitude of power—whoever, I say, will consider Popery as it is professed
   at Rome, may see, that it is manifest, open usurpation of all human and
   divine authority. But even in those Roman Catholic countries where these
   monstrous claims are not admitted, and the civil power does, in many
   respects, restrain the papal; yet persecution is professed, as it is
   absolutely enjoined by what is acknowledged to be their highest authority, a
   general council, so called, with the Pope at the head of it; and is
   practised in all of them, I think, without exception, where it can be done
   safely. Thus they go on to substitute force instead of argument; and
   external profession made by force, instead of reasonable conviction. And
   thus corruptions of the grossest sort have been in vogue, for many
   generations, in many parts of Christendom; and are so still, even where
   Popery obtains in its least absurd form: and their antiquity and wide extent
   are insisted upon as proofs of their truth; a kind of proof, which at best
   can only be presumptive, but which loses all its little weight, in pro..
   portion as the long and large prevalence of such corruptions have been
   obtained by force.” [13] In another part of the same Sermon, where he is
   again speaking of our ecclesiastical constitution, he reminds his audience
   that it is to be valued, “not because it leaves us at liberty to have as
   little religion as we please, without being accountable to human
   judicatories; but because it exhibits to our view, and enforces upon our
   consciences, genuine Christianity, free from the superstitions with which it
   is defiled in other countries; which superstitions, he observes, “naturally
   tend to abate its force.” The date of this Sermon should here be attended
   to. It was preached in June, 1747; that is, four years before the delivery
   and publication of the Charge, which was in the year 1751; and exactly five
   years before the Author died, which was in June, 1752. We have then, in the
   passages now laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal proof, brought
   down to within a few years of Bishop Butler’s death, that Popery was held by
   him in the utmost abhorrence, and that he regarded it in no other light,
   than as the great corruption of Christianity, and a manifest, open
   usurpation of all human and divine authority. The argument is decisive; nor
   will any thing be of force to invalidate it, unless from some after-act
   during the short remainder of the Bishop’s life, besides that of delivering
   and printing his Charge (which, after what I have said here, and in the
   Notes added to this Preface and to the Charge I must have leave to consider
   as affording no evidence at all of his inclination to Papistical doctrines
   or ceremonies), the contrary shall incontrovertibly appear.

   III. One such after-act, however, has been alleged, which would effectually
   demolish all that we have urged in behalf of our Prelate, were it true, as
   is pretended, that he died in the communion of the Church of Rome. Had a
   story of this sort been invented and propagated by Papists, the wonder might
   have been less:

   Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.

   But to the reproach of Protestantism, the fabrication of this calumny, for
   such we shall find it, originated from among ourselves. It is pretty
   remarkable, that a circumstance so extraordinary should never have been
   divulged till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Bishop’s decease. At
   that time Dr Thomas Secker was Archbishop of Canterbury; who of all others
   was the most likely to know the truth or falsehood of the fact asserted,
   having been educated with our Author in his early youth, and having lived in
   a constant habit of intimacy with him to the very time of his death. The
   good Archbishop was not silent on this occasion: with a virtuous indignation
   he stood forth to protect the posthumous character of his friend; and in a
   public newspaper, under the signature of Misopseudes, called upon his
   accuser to support what he had advanced, by whatever proofs he could. No
   proof, however, nor any thing like a proof, appeared in reply; and every man
   of sense and candour at that time was perfectly convinced the assertion was
   entirely groundless. [14] As a further confirmation of the rectitude of this
   judgment, it may not be amiss to mention, there is yet in existence a strong
   presumptive argument at least in its favour, drawn from the testimony of
   those who attended our Author in the sickness of which he died. The last
   days of this excellent Prelate were passed at Bath; Dr Nathanael Forster,
   his chaplain, being continually with him; and for one day, and at the very
   end of his illness, Dr Martin Benson also, the then Bishop of Gloucester,
   who shortened his own life in his pious haste to visit his dying friend.
   Both these persons constantly wrote letters to Dr Secker, then Bishop of
   Oxford, containing accounts of Bishop Butler’s declining health, and of the
   symptoms and progress of his disorder, which, as was conjectured, soon
   terminated in his death. These letters, which are still preserved in the
   Lambeth library, [15] I have read; and not the slenderest argument can be
   collected from them, in justification of the ridiculous slander we are here
   considering. If at that awful season the Bishop was not known to have
   expressed any opinion tending to show his dislike to Popery, neither was he
   known to have said any thing, that could at all be construed in approbation
   of it; and the natural presumption is that whatever sentiments he had
   formerly entertained concerning that corrupt system of religion, he
   continued to entertain them to the last. The truth is, neither the word nor
   the idea of Popery seems once to have occurred either to the Bishop himself,
   or to those who watched his parting moments: their thoughts were otherwise
   engaged. His disorder had reduced him to such debility, as to render him
   incapable of speaking much or long on any subject: the few bright intervals
   that occurred were passed in a state of the utmost tranquillity and
   composure; and in that composure he expired. “Mark the perfect man, and
   behold the upright: for the end of that man is peace.” [16] “Let me die the
   death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his!” [17]

   Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I had never the happiness
   of knowing, or even of seeing, but from whose writings I have received the
   greatest benefit and illumination, and which I have reason to be thankful to
   Providence for having early thrown in my way, I have adventured, in what I
   have now offered to the public, to step forth in his defence, and to
   vindicate his honest fame from the attacks of those, who, with the vain hope
   of bringing down superior characters to their own level, are for ever at
   work in detracting from their just praise. For the literary reputation of
   Bishop Butler, it stands too high in the opinion of the world, to incur the
   danger of any diminution: but this in truth is the least of his excellences.
   He was more than a good writer, he was a good man; and what is an addition
   even to this eulogy, he was a sincere Christian. His whole study was
   directed to the knowledge and practice of sound morality and true religion:
   these he adorned by his life, and has recommended to future ages in his
   writings; in which, if my judgment be of any avail, he has done essential
   service to both, as much, perhaps, as any single person, since the
   extraordinary gifts of “the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge” [18]
   have been withdrawn.

   In what follows I propose to give a short account of the Bishop’s moral and
   religious systems, as these are collected from his Works.

   I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be gathered from the
   volume of his Sermons, and particularly from the three first, and from the
   preface to that volume.

   “There is,” as our Author with singular sagacity has observed, “a much more
   exact correspondence between the natural and moral world, than we are apt to
   take notice of.” [19] The inward frame of man answers to his outward
   condition; the several propensities, passions, and affections, implanted in
   our hearts by the Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to the
   circumstances of life in which he hath placed us. This general observation,
   properly pursued, leads to several important conclusions. The original
   internal constitution of man, compared with his external condition, enables
   us to discern what course of action and behaviour that constitution leads
   to, what is our duty respecting that condition, and furnishes us besides
   with the most powerful arguments to the practice of it.

   What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a question of fact; to
   be determined, as other facts are, from experience, from our internal
   feelings and external senses, and from the testimony of others. Whether
   human nature, and the circumstances in which it is placed, might not have
   been ordered otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our concern:
   our province is, taking both of these as they are, and viewing the connexion
   between them, from that connexion to discover if we can, what course of
   action is fitted to that nature and those circumstances. From contemplating
   the bodily senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we learn
   that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with. In like manner,
   from considering our inward perceptions and the final causes of then, we
   collect that the feeling of shame, for instance, was given to prevent the
   doing of things shameful; compassion, to carry us to relieve others in
   distress; anger, to resist sudden violence offered to ourselves. if,
   continuing our inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the
   nature, the whole nature, of man leads him to and is fitted for that
   particular course of behaviour which we usually distinguish by the name of
   virtue, we are authorized to conclude, that virtue is the law we are born
   under, that it was so intended by the Author of our being; and we are bound
   by the most intimate of all obligations, a regard to our own highest
   interest and happiness, to conform to it in all situations and events.

   Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of several parts; and we
   can have no just idea of it as a system or constitution, unless we take into
   our view the respects and relations which these parts have to each other. As
   the body is not one member, but many; so our inward structure consists of
   various instincts, appetites, and propensions. Thus far there is no
   difference between human creatures and brutes. But besides these common
   passions and affections, there is another principle, peculiar to mankind,
   that of conscience, moral sense, reflection, call it what you please, by
   which they are enabled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some
   actions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this principle will
   of course have some influence on our behaviour, at least at times, will
   hardly be disputed: but the particular influence which it ought to have, the
   precise degree of power in the regulating of our internal frame that is
   assigned it by Him who placed it there, is a point of the utmost consequence
   in itself, and on the determination of which the very hinge of our Author’s
   Moral System turns. If the faculty here spoken of be, indeed, what it is
   asserted to be, in nature and kind superior to every other passion and
   affection; if it be given, not merely that it may exert its force
   occasionally, or as our present humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it
   may at all times exercise an uncontrollable authority and government over
   all the rest; it will then follow, that, in order to complete the idea of
   human nature, as a system, we must not only take in each particular bias,
   propension, instinct, which are seen to belong to it, but we must add
   besides the principle of conscience, together with the subjection that is
   due to it from all the other appetites and passions: just as the idea of a
   civil constitution is formed, not barely from enumerating the several
   members and ranks of which it is composed, but from these considered as
   acting in various degrees of subordination to each other, and all under the
   direction of the same supreme authority, whether that authority be vested in
   one person or more.

   The view here given of the internal constitution of man, and of the
   supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the conceptions of Bishop Butler,
   enables us to comprehend the force of that expression, common to him and the
   ancient moralists, that virtue consists in following nature. The meaning
   cannot be, that it consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of our
   nature which happens to be the strongest; or which propels us towards
   certain objects, without any regard to the methods by which they are to be
   obtained: but the meaning must be, twat virtue consists in the due
   regulation and subjection of all the other appetites and affections to the
   superior faculty of conscience; from a conformity to which alone our actions
   are properly natural, or correspondent to the nature, to the whole nature,
   of such an agent as man. From hence too it appears, that the author of our
   frame is by no means indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at
   liberty to act at random, as humour or appetite may prompt us; but that
   every man has the rule of right within him; a rule attended in the very
   notion of it with authority, and such as has the force of a direction and a
   command from Him who made us what we are, what course of behaviour is suited
   to our nature, and which he expects that we should follow. This moral
   faculty implies also a presentiment and apprehension, that the judgment
   which it passes on our actions, considered as of good or ill desert, will
   hereafter be confirmed by the unerring judgment of God; when virtue and
   happiness, vice and misery, whose ideas are now so closely connected, shall
   be indissolubly united, and the divine government be found to correspond in
   the most exact proportion to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this just
   prerogative or supremacy of conscience it is, which Mr Pope has described in
   his Universal Prayer, though perhaps he may have expressed it rather too
   strongly where he says,


     “What conscience dictates to be done,

     Or warns me not to do,

     This teach me more than hell to shun,

     That more than heaven pursue.”

   The reader will observe, that this way of treating the subject of morals, by
   an appeal to facts, does not at all interfere with that other way, adopted
   by Dr Samuel Clarke and others, which begins with inquiring into the
   relations and fitnesses of things, but rather illustrates and confirms it.
   That there are essential differences in the qualities of human actions,
   established by nature, and that this natural difference of things, prior to
   and independent of all will, creates a natural fitness in the agent to act
   agreeably to it, seems as little to be denied, as that there. is the moral
   difference before explained, from which we approve and feel a pleasure in
   what is right, and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still, however,
   when we are endeavouring to establish either this moral or that natural
   difference, it ought never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be
   distinctly shown, that both of these, when traced up to their source,
   suppose an intelligent Author of nature and moral Ruler of the world; who
   originally appointed these differences, and by such an appointment has
   signified his will that we should conform to them, as the only effectual
   method of securing our happiness on the whole under his government. [20] And
   of this consideration our Prelate himself was not unmindful; as may be
   collected from many expressions in different parts of his writings, and
   particularly from the following passages in his eleventh Sermon. “It may be
   allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our
   ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most
   important to us; that they will, nay if you please, they ought to prevail
   over those of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there
   should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence
   between them.” And again, “Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed
   consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet,
   when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or
   any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness,
   or at least not contrary to it.” [21]

   Besides the general system of morality opened above, our Author in his
   volume of Sermons has stated with accuracy the difference between self-love
   and benevolence; in opposition to those who, on the one hand, make the whole
   of virtue to consist in benevolence, [22] and to those who, on the other,
   assert that every particular affection and action is resolvable into
   self-love. In combating these opinions, he has shown, I think unanswerably,
   that there are the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were
   made to promote the happiness of others, as that we were made to promote our
   own: that it is no just objection to this, that we have dispositions to do
   evil to others as well as good; for we have also dispositions to do evil as
   well as good to ourselves, to our own most important interests even in this
   life, for the sake of gratifying a present passion: that the thing to be
   lamented is, not that men have too great a regard to their own real good,
   but that they have not enough: that benevolence is not more at variance with
   or unfriendly to self-love, than any other particular affection is: and that
   by consulting the happiness of others a man is so far from lessening his
   own, that the very endeavour to do so, though he should fail in the
   accomplishment, is a source of the highest satisfaction and peace of mind.
   [23] He has also, in passing, animadverted on the philosopher of Malmsbury,
   who, in his book “Of Human Nature,” has advanced, as discoveries in moral
   science, that benevolence is only the love of power, and compassion the fear
   of future calamity to ourselves. And this our Author has done, not so much
   with the design of exposing the false reasoning of Mr Hobbes, but because on
   so perverse an account of human nature he has raised a system, subversive of
   all justice and honesty. [24]

   II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly to be collected from
   the treatise, entitled, “The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to
   the Constitution and Course of Nature.”

   “All things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing
   imperfect.“.“ [25] On this single observation of the son of Sirach, the
   whole fabric of our Prelate’s defence of religion, in his Analogy, is
   raised. Instead of indulging in idle speculations, how the world might
   possibly have been better than it is; or, forgetful of the difference
   between hypothesis and fact, attempting to explain the divine economy with
   respect to intelligent creatures, from preconceived notions of his own; he
   first inquires what the constitution of nature, as made known to us in the
   way of experiment, actually is; and from this, now seen and acknowledged, he
   endeavours to form a judgment of that larger constitution, which religion
   discovers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are now under,
   considered as inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal interest to
   secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece
   with, that further dispensation, which relates to us as designed for another
   world, in which we have an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour
   here; if both may be traced up to the same general laws, and appear to be
   carried on according to the same plan of administration; the fair
   presumption is, that both proceed from one and the same Author. And if the
   principal parts objected to in this latter dispensation be similar to and of
   the same kind with what we. certainly experience under the former; the
   objections, being clearly inconclusive in one case, because contradicted by
   plain fact, must, in all reason, be allowed to be inconclusive also in the
   other.

   This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to what is disputed, from
   things known to other things that resemble them, from that part of the
   divine establishment which is exposed to our view to that more important one
   which lies beyond it, is on all hands confessed to be just. By this method
   Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the system of nature; by the same method
   Bishop Butler has explained the system of grace; and thus, An use the words
   of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, “has formed and concluded a happy
   alliance between faith and philosophy.” [26]

   And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be imperfect, and by no
   means sufficient to solve all difficulties respecting the government of God,
   and the designs of his Providence with regard to mankind (a degree of
   knowledge, which we are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at least
   in the present state); yet surely it is of importance to learn from it, that
   the natural and moral world are intimately connected, and parts of one
   stupendous whole or system; and that the chief objections which are brought
   against religion may be urged with equal force against the constitution and
   course of nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And this
   information we may derive from the work before us; the proper design of
   which, it may be of use to observe, is not to prove the truth of religion,
   either natural or revealed, but to confirm that proof, already known, by
   considerations from analogy.

   After this account of the method of reasoning employed by our Author, let us
   now advert to his manner of applying it, first to the subject of Natural
   Religion, and secondly to that of Revealed.

   1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future life; and with this
   the treatise begins. Neither the reason of the thing, nor the analogy of
   nature, according to Bishop Butler, give ground for imagining, that the
   unknown event, death, will be our destruction. The states in which we have
   formerly existed, in the womb and in infancy, are not more different from
   each other than from that of mature age in which we now exist: therefore,
   that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as different from the
   present as the present is from those through which we have passed already,
   is a presumption favoured by the analogy of nature. All that we know from
   reason concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies: and the
   frequent instances among men of the intellectual powers continuing in high
   health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point of
   putting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope that it may
   have no effect at all on the human soul, not even so much as to suspend the
   exercise of its faculties; though, if it have, the suspension of a power by
   no means implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us. [27]

   The probability of a future state once granted, an important question
   arises, How best to secure our interest in that state. We find from what
   passes daily before us, that the constitution of nature admits of misery as
   well as happiness; that both of these are the consequences of our own
   actions; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that
   our happiness or misery in a future world may depend on our own actions
   also, and that rewards or punishments hereafter may follow our good or ill
   behaviour here, is but an appointment of the same sort with what we
   experience under the divine government, according to the regular course of
   nature. [28]

   This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance, that the natural
   government of God, under which we now live, is also moral; in which rewards
   and punishments are the consequences of actions, considered as virtuous and
   vicious. Not that every man is rewarded or punished here in exact proportion
   to his desert; for the essential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce
   happiness and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect from
   accidental causes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and beginnings
   of a righteous administration to be discerned in the constitution of nature:
   from whence we are led to expect, that these accidental hindrances will one
   day be removed, and the rule of distributive justice obtain completely in a
   more perfect state. [29]

   The moral government of God, thus established, implies in the notion of it
   some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of acting wrong as well as right,
   in those who are the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, that the
   present life is in fact a state of probation for a future one, is rendered
   credible, from its being analogous throughout to the general conduct of
   Providence towards us with respect to this world; in which prudence is
   necessary to secure our temporal interest, just as we are taught that virtue
   is necessary to secure our eternal interest; and both are trusted to
   ourselves. [30]

   But the present life is not merely a state of probation, implying in it
   difficulties and danger; it is also a state of discipline and improvement;
   and that both in our temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is a
   state of discipline for youth; youth for manhood; and that for old age.
   Strength of body, and maturity of understanding, are acquired by degrees;
   and neither of them without continual exercise and attention on our part,
   not only in the beginning of life, but through the whole course of it. So
   again with respect to our religious concerns, the present world is fitted to
   be, and to good men is in event, a state of discipline and improvement for a
   future one. The several passions and propensions implanted in our hearts
   incline us, in a multitude of instances, to forbidden pleasures: this inward
   infirmity is increased by various snares and temptations, perpetually
   occurring from without: hence arises the necessity of recollection and
   self-government; of withstanding the calls of appetite, and forming our
   minds to habits of piety and virtue; habits, of which we are capable, and
   which, to creatures in a state of moral imperfection, and fallen from their
   original integrity, must be of the greatest use, as an additional security,
   over and above the principle of conscience, from the dangers to which we are
   exposed. [31]

   Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of nature, to the general
   doctrine of religion, destroyed or weakened by any notions concerning
   necessity. Of itself it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea; and as
   much requires an agent, that is, a necessary agent, in order to effect any
   thing, as freedom requires a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively
   true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same as false: for it
   is matter of experience, that, with regard to our present interest, and as
   inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we were free; and therefore
   the analogy of nature leads us to conclude, that, with regard to our future
   interest, and as designed for another world, we shall be treated as free
   also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at all
   affect either the general proof of religion, or its external evidence. [32]

   Still objections may be made against the wisdom and goodness of the divine
   government, to which analogy, which can only show the truth or credibility
   of facts, affords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, if it suggest
   that the divine government is a scheme or system, and not a number of
   unconnected acts, and that this system is also above our comprehension. Now
   the government of the natural world appears to be a system of this kind;
   with parts, related to each other, and together composing a whole: in which
   system ends are brought about by the use of means, many of which means,
   before experience, would have been suspected to have had a quite contrary
   tendency; which is carried on by general laws, similar causes uniformly
   producing similar effects: the utility of which general laws, and the
   inconveniences which would probably arise from the occasional or even secret
   suspension of them, we are in some sort enabled to discern; [33] but of the
   whole we are incompetent judges, because of the small part which comes
   within our view. Reasoning then from what we know, it is highly credible,
   that the government of the moral world is a system also, carried on by
   general laws, and in which ends are accomplished by the intervention of
   means; and that both constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so
   connected, as to form together but one scheme. But of this scheme, as of
   that of the natural world taken alone, we are not qualified to judge, on
   account of the mutual respect of the several parts to each other and to the
   whole, and our own incapacity to survey the whole, or, with accuracy, any
   single part. All objections therefore to the wisdom and goodness of the
   divine government may be founded merely on our ignorance; [34] and to such
   objections our ignorance is the proper, and a satisfactory answer. [35]

   2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Religion being now removed, our
   Author proceeds, in the next place, to that which is Revealed; and as an
   Introduction to an inquiry into the Credibility of Christianity, begins with
   the consideration of its Importance.

   The importance of Christianity appears in two respects. First, in its being
   a republication of Natural Religion, in its native simplicity, with
   authority, and with circumstances of advantage; ascertaining in many
   instances of moment, what before was only probable, and particularly
   confirming the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. [36]
   Secondly, as revealing a new dispensation of Providence, originating from
   the pure love and mercy of God, and conducted by the mediation of his Son,
   and the guidance of his Spirit for the recovery and salvation of mankind,
   represented in a state of apostasy and ruin. This account of Christianity
   being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices of these three divine
   Persons being once discovered to us, we are as much obliged in point of duty
   to acknowledge the relations we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our
   Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of duty to acknowledge
   the relation we stand in to God the Father; although the two former of these
   relations be learnt from Revelation only, and in the last we are instructed
   by the light of nature; the obligation in either case arising from the
   offices themselves, and not at all depending on the manner in which they are
   made known to us. [37]

   The presumptions against Revelation in general are, that it is not
   discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what is so discovered, and that
   it was introduced and supported by miracles. But in a scheme so large as
   that of the universe, unbounded in extent and everlasting in duration, there
   must of necessity be numberless circumstances which are beyond the reach of
   our faculties to discern, and which can only be known by divine
   illumination. And both in the natural and moral government of the world,
   under which we live, we find many things unlike one to another, and
   therefore ought not to wonder if the same unlikeness obtain between things
   visible and invisible; although it be far from true, that revealed religion
   is entirely unlike the constitution of nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor
   is there any thing incredible in Revelation, considered as miraculous;
   whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at the beginning of the
   world, or after a course of nature has been established. Not at the
   beginning of the world; for then there was either no course of nature at
   all, or a power must have been exerted totally different from what that
   course is at present: all men and animals cannot have been born, as they are
   now; but a pair of each sort must have been produced at first, in a way
   altogether unlike to that in which they have been since produced; unless we
   affirm, that men and animals have existed from eternity in an endless
   succession; one miracle therefore at least there must have been at the
   beginning of the world, or at the time of man’s creation. Not after the
   settlement of a course of nature, on account of miracles being contrary to
   that course, or, in other words, contrary to experience; for, in order to
   know whether miracles, worked in attestation of a divine religion, be
   contrary to experience or not, we ought to be acquainted with other cases,
   similar or parallel to those, in which miracles are alleged to have been
   wrought. But where shall we find such similar or parallel cases? The world
   which we inhabit affords none: we know of no extraordinary revelations from
   God to man, but those recorded in the Old and New Testament; all of which
   were established by miracles; it cannot therefore be said, that miracles are
   incredible, because contrary to experience, when all the experience we have
   is in favour of miracles, and on the side of religion. [38] Besides, in
   reasoning concerning miracles, they ought not to be compared with common
   natural events, but with uncommon appearances, such as comets, magnetism,
   electricity; which, to one acquainted only with the usual phenomena of
   nature, and the common powers of matter, must, before proof of their actual
   existence, be thought incredible. [39]

   The presumption against Revelation in general being dispatched, objections
   against the Christian Revelation in particular, against the scheme of it, as
   distinguished from objections against its evidence, are considered next. Now
   supposing a revelation to be really given, it is highly probable beforehand,
   that it must contain many things appearing to us liable to objections. The
   acknowledged dispensation of nature is very different from what we should
   have expected: reasoning then from analogy, the revealed dispensation, it is
   credible, would be also different. Nor are we in any sort judges at what
   time, or in what degree, or manner, it is fit or expedient for God to
   instruct us, in things confessedly of the greatest use, either by natural
   reason, or by supernatural information. Thus, arguing on speculation only,
   and without experience, it would seem very unlikely that so important a
   remedy as that provided by Christianity, for the recovery of mankind from
   ruin, should have been for so many ages withheld; and, when at last
   vouchsafed, should be imparted to so few; and, after it has been imparted,
   should be attended with obscurity and doubt. And just so we might have
   argued, before experience, concerning the remedies provided in nature for
   bodily diseases, to which by nature we are exposed: for many of these were
   unknown to mankind for a number of ages; are known but to few now; some
   important ones probably not discovered yet; and those which are, neither
   certain in their application, nor universal in their use: and the same mode
   of reasoning that would lead us to expect they should have been so, would
   lead us to expect that the necessity of them should have been superseded, by
   there being no diseases; as the necessity of the Christian scheme, it may be
   thought, might also have been superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so
   that he should not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all. [40]

   As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of Christianity, the same
   answer may be applied to them as was to the like objections against the
   constitution of nature. For here also, Christianity is a scheme or economy,
   composed of various parts, forming a whole; in which scheme means are used
   for the accomplishing of ends; and which is conducted by general laws, of
   all of which we know as little as we do of the constitution of nature. And
   the seeming want of wisdom or goodness in this system is to be ascribed to
   the same cause, as the like appearances of defects in the natural system;
   our inability to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance of the relation
   of those parts which are discernible to others beyond our view.

   The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, and against the
   wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated together, the chief of them
   are now to be considered distinctly. One of these, which is levelled against
   the entire system itself, is of this sort: the restoration of mankind,
   represented in Scripture as the great design of the Gospel, is described as
   requiring a long series of means, and persons, and dispensations, before it
   can be brought to its completion; whereas the whole ought to have been
   effected at once. Now every thing we see in the course of nature shows the
   folly of this objection. For in the natural course of Providence, ends are
   brought about by means, not operating immediately and at once, but
   deliberately, and in a way of progression; one thing being subservient to
   another, this to somewhat further. The change of seasons, the ripening of
   fruits, the growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are instances of this.
   And therefore, that the same progressive method should be followed in the
   dispensation of Christianity, as is observed in the common dispensation of
   Providence, is a reasonable expectation, justified by the analogy of nature.
   [41]

   Another circumstance objected to in the Christian scheme is the appointment
   of a Mediator, and the saving of the world through him. But the visible
   government of God being actually administered in this way, or by the
   mediation and instrumentality of others, there can be no general presumption
   against an appointment of this kind, against his invisible government being
   exercised in the same manner. We have seen already, that with regard to
   ourselves this visible government is carried on by rewards and punishments;
   for happiness and misery are the consequences of our own actions, considered
   as virtuous and vicious; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee.
   It might have been imagined, before consulting experience, that after we had
   rendered ourselves liable to misery by our own ill conduct, sorrow for what
   was past, and behaving well for the future, would, alone and of themselves,
   have exempted us from deserved punishment, and restored us to the divine
   favour. But the fact is otherwise; and real reformation is often found to be
   of no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sickness, infamy,
   and death, the never-failing attendants on vice and extravagance, exceeding
   a certain degree. By the course of nature then it appears, God does not
   always pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision made, even
   in nature, that the miseries, which men bring on themselves by unlawful
   indulgences, may in many cases be mitigated, and in some removed; partly by
   extraordinary exertions of the offender himself, but more especially and
   frequently by the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and from motives
   of compassion, submit to labour and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting
   inconveniences to themselves, as the means of rescuing another from the
   wretched effects of former imprudences. Vicarious punishment, therefore, or
   one person’s sufferings contributing to the relief of another, is a
   providential disposition in the economy of nature: [42] and it ought not to
   be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous to this we be redeemed from
   sin and misery, in the economy of grace. That mankind at present are in a
   state of degradation, different from that in which they were originally
   created, is the very ground of the Christian revelation, as contained in the
   Scriptures. Whether we acquiesce in the account, that our being placed in
   such a state is owing to the crime of our first parents, or choose to
   ascribe it to any other cause, it makes no difference as to our condition:
   the vice and unhappiness of the world are still there, notwithstanding all
   our suppositions: nor is it Christianity that hath put us into this state.
   We learn also from the same Scriptures, what experience and the use of
   expiatory sacrifices from the most early times might have taught us, that
   repentance alone is not sufficient to prevent the fatal consequences of past
   transgressions: but that still there is room for mercy, and that repentance
   shall be available, though not of itself, yet through the mediation of a
   divine Person, the Messiah; who, from the sublimest principles of
   compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins, [43] suffered and
   died, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust, [44] that we
   might have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins. [45]
   In what way the death of Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in
   procuring the reconciliation of sinners, the Scriptures have not explained;
   it is enough that the doctrine is revealed; that it is not contrary to any
   truths which reason and experience teach us; and that it accords in perfect
   harmony with the usual method of the divine conduct in the government of the
   world. [46]

   Again, it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation were true, it
   must have been universal, and could. not have been left upon doubtful
   evidence. But God, in his natural providence, dispenses his gifts in great
   variety, not only among creatures of the same species, itut to the same
   individuals also at different times. Had the Christian revelation been
   universal at first, yet, from the diversity of men’s abilities, both of mind
   and body, their various means of improvement, and other external advantages,
   some persons must soon have been in a situation, with respect to religious
   knowledge, much superior to that of others, as much perhaps as they are at
   present: and all men will be equitably dealt with at last; and to whom
   little is given, of him little will be required. Then as to the evidence for
   religion being left doubtful, difficulties of this sort, like difficulties
   in practice, afford scope and opportunity for a virtuous exercise of the
   understanding, and dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest satisfied with any
   evidence that is real. In the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to act
   upon great un certainties, with regard to success in their temporal
   pursuits: and the case with regard to religion is parallel. However, though
   religion be not intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are amply
   sufficient in reason to induce us to embrace it; and dissatisfaction with
   those proofs may possibly be men’s own fault. [47]

   Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence there is for the
   truth of Christianity. Now, besides its direct and fundamental proofs, which
   are miracles and prophecies, there are many collateral circumstances, which
   may be united into one view, and all together may be considered as making up
   one argument. In this way oi treating the subject, the revelation, whether
   real or otherwise, may be supposed to be wholly historical: the design of
   which appears to be, to give an account of the condition of religion, and
   its professors, with a concise narration of the political state of things,
   as far as religion is affected by it, during a great length of time, near
   six thousand years of which are already past. More particularly it
   comprehends an account of God’s entering into covenant with one nation, the
   Jews, that he would be their God, and that they should be his people; of his
   often interposing in their affairs; giving them the promise, and afterwards
   the possession, of a flourishing country; assuring them of the greatest
   national prosperity, in case of their obedience, and threatening the
   severest national punishment, in case they forsook him, and joined in the
   idolatry of their Pagan neighbours. It contains also a prediction of a
   particular person to appear in the fulness of time, in whom all the promises
   of God to the Jews were to be fulfilled: and it relates, that, at the time
   expected, a person did actually appear, assuming to be the Saviour foretold;
   that he worked various miracles among them, in confirmation of his divine
   authority; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and put to death by the
   very people who had long desired and waited for his coming; but that his
   religion, in spite of all opposition, was established in the world by his
   disciples, invested with supernatural powers for that purpose; of the fate
   and fortunes of which religion there is a prophetical description, carried
   down to the end of time. Let any one now, after reading the above history,
   and not knowing whether the whole were not a fiction, be supposed to ask,
   Whether all that is here related be true? and instead of a direct answer,
   let him be informed of the several acknowledged facts, which are found to
   correspond to it in real life; and then let him compare the history and
   facts together, and observe the astonishing coincidence of both: such a
   joint review must appear to him of very great weight, and to amount to
   evidence somewhat more than human. And unless the whole series, and every
   particular circumstance contained in it, can be thought to have arisen from
   accident, the truth of Christianity is proved. [48]

   The view here given of the moral and religious systems of Bishop Butler, it
   will immediately be perceived, is chiefly intended for younger students,
   especially for students in Divinity; to whom it is hoped it may be of use,
   so as to encourage them to peruse, with proper diligence, the original works
   of the Author himself. For it may be necessary to observe, that neither of
   the volumes of this excellent Prelate are addressed to those who read for
   amusement, or curiosity, or to get rid of time. All subjects are not to be
   comprehended with the same ease; and morality and religion, when treated as
   sciences, each accompanied with difficulties of its own, can neither of them
   be understood as they ought without a very peculiar attention. But morality
   and religion are not merely to be studied as sciences, or as being
   speculatively true; they are to be regarded in another and higher light, as
   the rule of life and manners, as containing authoritative directions by
   which to regulate our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite
   importance of them, considered, it can never be an indifferent matter
   whether they be received or rejected. For both claim to be the voice of God;
   and whether they be so or not, cannot. be known, till their claims be
   impartially examined. If they indeed come from Him, we are bound to conform
   to them at our peril; nor is it left to our choice, whether we will submit
   to the obligations they impose upon us or not; for submit to them we must,
   in such a sense, as to incur the punishments denounced by both against
   wilful disobedience to their injunctions.
     _________________________________________________________________

   [1] The account here alluded to is subjoined to this Preface.

   [2] Prov. xxiii. 17.

   [3] 1 Cor. vi. 19.

   [4] Dr Butler, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain piece of
   marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. This, which was
   intended by the blameless Prelate merely as a sign or memorial, that true
   Christians are to bear their cross, and not to be ashamed of following a
   crucified Master, was considered as affording a presumption that he was
   secretly inclined to Popish forms and ceremonies, and had no great dislike
   to popery itself. And, on account of the offence it occasioned, both at the
   time and since, it were to be wished, in prudence, it had not been done.

   [5] Rom. vi. 11.

   [6] Gal. v. 24.

   [7] Matt. xi. 19.

   [8] Analogy, Part II. Chap. I

   [9] Ser. xvi.

   [10] Matt. xxii. 38.

   [11] Many of the sentiments, in these Two Discourses of Bishop Butler,
   containing the sovereign good of man; the impossibility of procuring it in
   the present life; the unsatisfactoriness of earthly enjoyments; together
   with the somewhat beyond and above them all, which once attained, there will
   rest nothing further to be wished or hoped; and which is then only to be
   expected, when we shall have put off this mortal body, and our union with
   God shall be complete; occur in Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity. Book I. §
   11.

   [12] Serm. xvii.

   [13] Serm. xx.

   [14] When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in vain
   endeavoured to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop Butler was
   accused of having died a Papist, and Archbishop Secker’s replies to them;
   though I well remembered to have read both, when they first appeared in the
   public prints. But a learned Professor ill the University of Oxford has
   furnished me with the whole controversy in its original form; a brief
   history of which it may not be unacceptable to offer here to the curious
   reader. The attack was opened in the year 1767, in an anonymous pamphlet,
   entitled, ‘The Root of Protestant Errors examined;” in which the author
   asserted, that, “by an anecdote lately given him, that same Prelate” (who at
   the bottom of the page is called B—p of D—m) “is said to have died in the
   communion of a Church, that makes much use of saints, saints’ days, and all
   the trumpery of saint worship.” When this remarkable fact, now first
   divulged, came to be generally known, it occasioned, as might be expected,
   no little alarm; and intelligence of it was no sooner conveyed to Archbishop
   Secker, than in a short letter, signed Misopseudes, and printed in the St
   James’s Chronicle of May 9, he called upon the writer to produce his
   authority for publishing “so gross and scandalous a falsehood.” To this
   challenge an immediate answer was returned by the author of the pamphlet,
   who, now assuming the name of Phileleutheros, informed Misopseudes, through
   the channel of the same paper, that “such anecdote had been given him; and
   that he was yet of opinion, that there was nothing improbable in it; when it
   is considered that the same Prelate put up the Popish insignia of the cross
   in his chapel, when at Bristol; and in his last Episcopal Charge has
   squinted very much towards that superstition.” Here we find the accusation
   not only repeated, but supported by reasons, such as they are, of which it
   seemed necessary that some notice should be taken: nor did the Archbishop
   conceive it unbecoming his own dignity to stand up on this occasion, as the
   vindicator of innocence against the calumniator of the helpless dead.
   Accordingly, in a second letter in the same newspaper of May 23, and
   subscribed Misopseudes as before, after reciting from Bishop Butler’s Sermon
   before the Lords the very passage here printed in the Preface, and
   observing, that “there are, in the same Sermon, declarations as strong as
   can be. made against temporal punishments for heresy, schism, or even for
   idolatry;” His Grace expresses himself thus: “Now he (Bishop Butler) was
   universally esteemed throughout his life, a man of strict piety and honesty,
   as well as uncommon abilities. He gave all the proofs, public and private,
   which his station led him to give, and they were decisive and daily, of his
   continuing to the last a. sincere member of the Church of England. Nor had
   ever any of his acquaintance, or most intimate friends, nor have they to
   this day, the least doubt of it.” As to putting up a cross in his chapel,
   the Archbishop frankly owns, that for himself he wishes he had not; and
   thinks that in so doing the Bishop did amiss. But then he asks, “Call that
   be opposed, as any proof of Popery, to all the evidence on the other side;
   or even to the single evidence of the above-mentioned Sermon? Most of our
   churches have crosses upon them: are they therefore Popish churches? The
   Lutherans have more than crosses in theirs: are the Lutherans therefore
   Papists?” And as to the Charge, no Papist, his Grace remarks, would have
   spoken as Bishop Butler there does, of the observances peculiar to Roman
   Catholics, some of which he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious,
   and others, as made subservient to the purposes of superstition, and, on
   these accounts, abolished at the Reformation. After the publication of this
   letter Phileleutheros replied in a short defence of his own conduct, but
   without producing any thing new in confirmation of what he had advanced. And
   here the controversy, so far as the two principals were concerned, seems to
   have ended.. But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For
   in the same year. and in the same newspaper of July 21, another letter
   appeared; in which the author not only contended that the cross in the
   Episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the Charge to the Clergy of Durham in 1751,
   amount to full proof of a strong attachment to the idolatrous communion of
   the Church of Rome, but, with the reader’s leave, he would fain account for
   the Bishop’s “tendency this way.” And this he attempted to do, “from the
   natural melancholy and gloominess of Dr Butler’s disposition; from his great
   fondness for the lives of Romish saints, and their books of mystic piety;
   from his drawing his notions of teaching men religion, not from the New
   Testament, but from philosophical and political opinions of his own; and
   above all, from his transition from a strict Dissenter amongst the
   Presbyterians to a rigid Churchman, and his sudden and unexpected elevation
   to great wealth and dignity in the Church.” The attack, thus renewed,
   excited the Archbishop’s attention a second time, and drew from him a fresh
   answer, subscribed also Misopseudes, in the St James’s Chronicle of August
   4. In this letter, our excellent Metropolitan, first of all obliquely
   hinting, at the unfairness of sitting in judgment on the character of a man
   who had been dead fifteen years; and then reminding his correspondent, that
   “full proof had been already published, that Bishop Butler abhorred Popery
   as a vile corruption of Christianity, and that it might be proved, if
   needful, that he held the Pope to be Antichrist;” (to which decisive
   testimonies of undoubted aversion from the Romish Church, another is also
   added in the Postscript, his taking, when promoted to the see of Durham, for
   his domestic Chaplain, Dr Nath. Forster, who had published, not four years
   before, a Sermon, entitled, Popery destructive of the Evidence of
   Christianity;) proceeds to observe, “that the natural melancholy of the
   Bishop’s temper would rather have fixed him amongst his first friends, than
   prompted him to the change he made: that he read books of all sorts, as well
   as books of mystic piety, and knew how to pick the good that was in them out
   of the bad: that his opinions were exposed without reserve in his Analogy
   and his Sermons, and if the doctrine of either be Popish or unscriptural,
   the learned world hath mistaken strangely in admiring both: that, instead of
   being a strict Dissenter, he never was a communicant in any Dissenting
   assembly; on the contrary, that he went occasionally, from his early years,
   to the established worship, and became a constant conformist to it when he
   was barely of age, and entered himself, in 1714, of Oriel College: that his
   elevation to great dignity in the Church, far from being sudden and
   unexpected, was a gradual and natural rise, through a variety of
   preferments, and a period of thirty-two years: that, as Bishop of Durham, he
   had very little authority beyond his brethren, and in ecclesiastical
   matters, had none beyond them; a larger income than most of them h3 had; but
   this he employed, not, as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of worship
   in his cathedral, where indeed it is no greater than in others, but for the
   purposes of clarity, and in the repairing of his houses.” After these
   remarks, the letter closes with the following words: “Upon the whole, few
   accusations, so entirely groundless, have been so pertinaciously, I am
   unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as the present: and surely it is
   high time for the authors and abettors of it, in mere common prudence, to
   show some regard, if not to truth, at least to shame.” It only remains to be
   mentioned, that the above letters of Archbishop Secker had such an effect on
   a writer, who signed himself in the St. James’s Chronicle of August 25, A
   Dissenting Minister, that he declared it as his opinion, that “the author of
   the pamphlet, called, ‘The Root of Protestant Errors examined,’ and his
   friends, were obliged in candour, in justice, and in honour to retract their
   charge, unless they could establish it on much better grounds than had
   hitherto appeared: and he expressed his “hopes, that it would be understood
   that the Dissenters in general had no hand in the accusation, and that it
   had only been the act of two or three mistaken men.” Another person also,
   “a foreigner by birth,” as he says of himself, who had been long an admirer
   of Bishop Butler, and had perused with great attention all that had been
   written on both sides in the present controversy, confesses he had been
   “wonderfully pleased with observing, with what candour amid temper, as well
   as clearness and solidity, he was vindicated from the aspersions laid
   against him.” All the adversaries of our Prelate, however, had not the
   virtue or sense to be thus convinced; some of whom still continued, under
   the signatures of Old Martin, Latimer, An Impartial Protestant, Paulinus,
   Misonothos, to repeat their confuted falsehoods in the public prints; as if
   the curse of calumniators had fallen upon them, and their memory, by being
   long a traitor to truth, had taken at last a severe revenge, and compelled
   them to credit their own lie. The first of these gentlemen, Old Martin, who
   dates from Newcastle, May 29, from the rancour and malignity with which his
   letter abounds, and from the particular virulence he discovers towards the
   characters of Bishop Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no other
   than the very person who had already figured in this dispute, so early as
   the year 1752; of whose work, entitled, “A Serious Inquiry into the Use and
   Importance of External Religion,” the reader will find some account in the
   notes subjoined to the Bishop’s Charge in the volume of Sermons.

   [15] The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour of our
   present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remember, wrapped together
   under one cover; on the back of which is written, in Archbishop Secker’s own
   hand, the following words, or words to this effect: “Presumptive Arguments
   that Bishop Butler d not die a Papist.”

   [16] Psalm xxxvii. 37.

   [17] Numb. xxiii. 10.

   [18] 1 Cor. xii. 8.

   [19] Serm. vi.

   [20] “Far be it from me,” says the excellent Dr T. Balguy (Discourse ix.)
   “to dispute the reality of a moral principle in the human heart. I feel its
   existence: I clearly discern its use and importance. But in no respect is it
   more important, than as it suggests the idea of a moral Governor. Let this
   idea be once effaced, and the principle of conscience will soon be found
   weak and ineffectual. Its influence on men’s conduct has, indeed, been too
   much undervalued by some philosophical inquirers. But be that influence,
   while it lasts, more or less, it is not a steady and permanent principle of
   action. Unhappily we always have it in our power to lay it asleep.—Neglect
   alone will suppress and stifle it, and bring it almost into a state of
   stupefaction. Nor can any thing, less than the terrors of religion, awaken
   our minds from this dangerous and deadly sleep. It can never be a matter of
   indifference to a thinking man, whether he is to be happy or miserable
   beyond the grave.”

   [21] Serm. xi.

   [22] See the second Dissertation “On the Nature of Virtue,” at the end of
   the Analogy.

   [23] See Serm. i. and xi. and the preface to the volume of Sermons.

   [24] See the Notes to Serm. i. and v.

   [25] Eccles. xlii. 24.

   [26] Mr Mainwaring’s Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons.

   [27] Part I. chap. i.

   [28] Chap. ii.

   [29] Chap. iii.

   [30] Chap. iv.

   [31] Part I. chap. v.

   [32] Chap. vi.

   [33] See a treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr Thomas BaIguy, part ii.

   [34] The ignorance of man, is a favorite doctrine with Bishop Butler. It
   occurs in the Second Part of the Analogy; it makes the subject of his
   Fifteenth Sermon; and we meet with it again in his Charge. Whether sometimes
   it be not carried to a length which is excessive, may admit of doubt.

   [35] Part I. chap. vii.

   [36] Admirable to this purpose are the words of Dr T. Balguy, in the Ninth
   of his Discourses already referred to, p. xxv. “The doctrine of a life to
   come, some persons will say, is a doctrine of natural religion; and can
   never therefore be properly alleged to show the importance of revelation.
   They judge perhaps from the frame of the world, that the present system is
   imperfect; they see designs in it, not yet completed; and they think they
   have grounds for expecting another state, in which these designs shall be
   farther carried on, and brought to a conclusion, worthy of infinite wisdom.
   I am not concerned to dispute the justness of this reasoning; nor do I wish
   to dispute it. But how far will it reach? Will it lead us to the Christian
   doctrine of a judgment to come? Will it give us the prospect of an eternity
   of happiness? Nothing of all this. It shows us only, that death is not the
   end of our being; that we are likely to pass hereafter into other systems,
   more favourable than the present to the great ends of God’s providence, the
   virtue and the happiness of his intelligent creatures. But into what systems
   we are to be removed; what new scenes are to be presented to us, either of
   pleasure or pain; what new parts we shall have to act, and to what trials
   and temptations we may yet be exposed; on all these subjects we know just
   nothing. That our happiness for ever depends on our conduct here, is a most
   important proposition, which we learn only form revelation.”

   [37] Part II. chap. i.

   [38] “In the common affairs of life, common experience is sufficient to
   direct us. But will common experience serve to guide our judgment concerning
   the fall and redemption of mankind? From what we see every day, can we
   explain the commencement, or foretell the dissolution of the world? To judge
   of events like these, we should be conversant in the history of other
   planets; should be distinctly informed of God’s various dispensations to all
   the different orders of rational beings. Instead then of grounding our
   religious opinions on what we call experience, let us apply to a more
   certain guide, let us hearken to the testimony of God himself. The
   credibility of human testimony, and the conduct of human agents, are
   subjects perfectly within the reach of our natural faculties; and we ought
   to desire no firmer foundation for our belief of religion, than for the
   judgments we form in the common affairs of life where we see a little plain
   testimony easily outweighs the most specious conjectures, and not seldom
   even strong probabilities.” Dr Balguy’s Fourth Charge. See also an excellent
   pamphlet, entitled, “Remarks on Mr Hume’s Essay on the Natural History of
   Religion,” sect. 5; and the Sixth of Dr Powell’s Discourses.

   [39] Chap. ii.

   [40] Chap. iii.

   [41] Chap. iv.

   [42] Dr Arthur Ashley Sykes, from whose writings some good may be collected
   out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, in what he is pleased
   to call “The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption,” (see the observations on the
   texts cited in his first chapter, and also in chapters the fifth and sixth,)
   opposes what is here advanced by Bishop Butler; quoting his words, but
   without mentioning his name. If what is said above be not thought a
   sufficient answer to the objections of this author, the reader may do well
   to consult a Charge “On the Use and Abuse of Philosophy in the Study of
   Religion,” by the late Dr Powell; who seems to me to have had the
   observations of Dr Sykes in his view, where he is confuting the reasonings
   of certain philosophizing Divines against the doctrine of the Atonement.
   Powell’s Discourse. Charge III. p. 342-348.

   [43] Ephes. ii. 1.

   [44] 1 Pet. iii. 18.

   [45] Colos. i. 14.

   [46] Chap. v.

   [47] Chap. vi

   [48] Chap. vii. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both
   originally inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Identity, in
   which are contained some strictures on Mr Locke, who asserts that
   consciousness makes or constitutes personal identity: whereas, as our Author
   observes, consciousness makes only personality, or is necessary to the idea
   of a person, i. e. a thinking intelligent being, but presupposes, and
   therefore cannot constitute, personal identity: just as knowledge
   presupposes truth, but does not constitute it. Consciousness of past actions
   does indeed show us the identity of ourselves, or gives us a certain
   assurance that we are the same persons or living agents now, which we were
   at the time to which our remembrance can look back: but still we should be
   the same persons as we were, though this consciousness of what is past were
   wanting, though all that had been done by us formerly were forgotten; unless
   it be true, that no person has existed a single moment beyond what he can
   remember. The other Dissertation is On the Nature of Virtue, which properly
   belongs to the moral system of our Author, already explained.
     _________________________________________________________________

THE LIFE OF DR BUTLER.

   DR JOSEPH BUTLER, a Prelate of the most distinguished character and
   abilities, was born at Wantage, in Berkshire, in the year 1692. His father,
   Mr Thomas Butler, who was a substantial and reputable shopkeeper in that
   town, observing in his son Joseph [49] an excellent genius and inclination
   for learning, determined to educate him for the ministry, among the
   Protestant Dissenters of the Presbyterian denomination. For this purpose,
   after he had gone through a proper course of grammatical literature, at the
   free grammar school of his native place, under the care of the Rev. Mr
   Philip Barton, a Clergyman of the Church of England, he was sent to a
   Dissenting academy, then kept at Gloucester, but which was soon afterwards
   removed to Tewkesbury. The principal tutor of this academy was Mr Jones, a
   man of uncommon abilities and knowledge, who had the honour of training up
   several scholars, who became of great eminence, both in the Established
   Church and among the Dissenters. At Tewkesbury Mr Butler made an
   extraordinary progress in the study of Divinity; of which he gave a
   remarkable proof, in the letters addressed by him, while he resided at
   Tewkesbury, to Dr Samuel Clarke, laying before him the doubts that had
   arisen in his mind, concerning the conclusiveness of some arguments in the
   Doctor’s demonstration of the being and attributes of God. The first of
   these letters was dated the 4th of November, 1713; and the sagacity and
   depth of thought displayed in it, immediately excited Dr Clarke’s particular
   notice. This condescension encouraged Mr Butler to address the Doctor again
   upon the same subject, which likewise was answered by him; and the
   correspondence being carried on in three other letters, the whole was
   annexed to the celebrated treatise before mentioned, and the collection has
   been retained in all the subsequent editions of that work. The management of
   this correspondence was entrusted by Mr Butler to his friend and
   fellow-pupil, Mr Secker, who, in order to conceal the affair, undertook to
   convey the letters to the post-office at Gloucester, and to bring back Dr
   Clarke’s answers. When Mr Butler’s name was discovered to the Doctor, the
   candour, modesty, and good sense, with which he had written, immediately
   procured him the friendship of that eminent and excellent man. Our young
   student was not, however, during his continuance at Tewkesbury, solely
   employed in metaphysical speculations and inquiries. Another subject of his
   serious consideration was, the propriety of his becoming a Dissenting
   minister. Accordingly, he entered into an examination of the principles of
   non-conformity; the result of which was, such a dissatisfaction with them,
   as determined him to conform to the Established Church. This intention was,
   at first, disagreeable to his father, who endeavoured to divert him from his
   purpose; and, with that view, called in the assistance of some eminent
   Presbyterian Divines; but finding his son’s resolution to be fixed, he at
   length suffered him to be removed to Oxford, where he was admitted a
   commoner of Oriel College, on the 17th of March, 1714. At what time he took
   Orders doth not appear, nor who the Bishop was by whom he was ordained; but
   it is certain that he entered into the Church soon after his admission at
   Oxford, if it be true, as is asserted, that he sometimes assisted Mr Edward
   Talbot in the divine service, at his living of Hendred, near Wantage. With
   this gentleman, who was the second son of Dr William Talbot, successively
   Bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and Durham, Mr Butler formed an intimate
   friendship at Oriel College; which friendship laid. the foundation of all
   his subsequent preferments, and procured for him a very honourable
   situation, when he was only twenty-six years of age. For it was in 1718
   that, at the recommendation of Mr Talbot, in conjunction with that of Dr
   Clarke, he was appointed by Sir Joseph Jekyll to be preacher at the Rolls.
   This was three years before he had taken any degree at the University, where
   he did not go out Bachelor of Law till the 10th of June, 1721, which,
   however, was as soon as that degree could suitably be conferred upon him. Dr
   Butler continued at the Rolls till 1726; in the beginning of which year he
   published, in one volume, octavo, “Fifteen Sermons preached at that
   Chapel.” In the mean while, by the patronage of Dr Talbot, Bishop of Durham,
   to whose notice he had been recommended (together with Mr Benson and Mr
   Secker) by Mr Edward Talbot, on his death-bed, our Author had been presented
   first to the rectory of Haughton, near Darlington, and afterwards to that of
   Stanhope, in the same diocese. The benefice of Haughton was given to him in
   1722, and that of Stanhope in 1725. At Haughton there was a necessity for
   rebuilding a great part of the parsonage-house, and Mr Butler had neither
   money nor talents for that work. Mr Secker, therefore, who had always the
   interest of his friends at heart, and had acquired a very considerable
   influence with Bishop Talbot, persuaded that Prelate to give Mr Butler, in
   exchange for Haughton, the rectory of Stanhope, which was not only free from
   any such incumbrance, but was likewise of much superior value, being indeed
   one of the richest parsonages in England. Whilst our Author continued
   preacher at the Rolls Chapel, he divided his time between his duty in town
   and country; but when he quitted the Rolls, he resided during seven years,
   wholly at Stanhope, in the conscientious discharge of every obligation
   appertaining to a good parish priest. This retirement, however, was too
   solitary for his disposition, which had in it a natural cast of gloominess.
   And though his recluse hours were by no means lost, either to private
   improvement or public utility, yet he felt at times, very painfully, the
   want of that select society of friends to which he had been accustomed, and
   which could inspire him with the greatest cheerfulness. Mr Secker,
   therefore, who knew this, was extremely anxious to draw him out into a more
   active and conspicuous scene, and omitted no opportunity of expressing this
   desire to such as he thought capable of promoting it. Having himself been
   appointed King’s Chaplain in 1732, he took occasion, in a conversation which
   he had the honour of holding with Queen Caroline, to mention to her his
   friend Mr Butler. The Queen said she thought he had been dead. Mr Secker
   assured her he was not. Yet her Majesty afterwards asked Archbishop
   Blackburn, if he was not dead: his answer was, “No, madam; but he is
   buried.” Mr Seeker continuing his purpose of endeavouring to bring his
   friend out of his retirement, found means, upon Mr Charles Talbot’s being
   made Lord Chancellor, to have Mr Butler recommended to him for his Chaplain.
   His Lordship accepted, and sent for him; and this promotion calling him to
   Town, he took Oxford in his way, and was admitted there to the degree of
   Doctor of Law, on the 8th of December, 1733. The Lord Chancellor, who gave
   him also a prebend in the church of Rochester, had consented that he should
   reside at his parish of Stanhope one half of the year.

   Dr Butler being thus brought back into the world, his merit and his talents
   soon introduced him to particular notice, and paved the way for his rising
   to those high dignities which he afterwards enjoyed. In 1736 he was
   appointed Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline; and, in the same year, he
   presented to her Majesty a copy of his excellent Treatise, entitled, “The
   Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
   Nature.” His attendance upon his Royal Mistress, by her especial command,
   was from seven to nine in the evening every day: and though this particular
   relation to that excellent and learned Queen was soon determined by her
   death, in 1737, yet he had been so effectually recommended by her, as well
   as by the late Lord Chancellor Talbot, to his Majesty’s favour, that in the
   next year he was raised to the highest order of the Church, by a nomination
   to the bishopric of Bristol; to which see he was consecrated on the 3d of
   December 1738. King George II. not being satisfied with this proof of his
   regard to Dr Butler, promoted him, in 1740, to the Deanery of St Paul’s,
   London, into which he was installed on the 24th of May in that year. Finding
   the demands of this dignity to be incompatible with his parish duty at,
   Stanhope, he immediately resigned that rich benefice. Besides our Prelate’s
   unremitted attention to his peculiar obligations, he was called upon to
   preach several discourses on public occasions, which were afterwards
   separately printed, and have since been annexed to the latter editions of
   the Sermons at the Rolls Chapel. In 1746, upon the death of Dr Egerton,
   Bishop of Hereford, Dr Butler was made Clerk of the Closet to the King; and,
   on the 16th of October 1750, he received another distinguished mark of his
   Majesty’s favour, by being translated to the see of Durham. This was on the
   16th of October in that year, upon the decease of Dr Edward Chandler. Our
   Prelate being thus appointed to preside over a diocese with which he had
   long been connected, delivered his first, and indeed his last Charge to his
   Clergy, at his primary visitation in 1751. The principal object of it was
   “External Religion.” The Bishop having observed, with deep concern, the
   great and growing neglect of serious piety in the kingdom, insisted strongly
   on the usefulness of outward forms and institutions, in fixing and
   preserving a sense of devotion and duty in the minds of men. In doing this,
   he was thought by several persons to speak too favourably of Pagan and
   Popish ceremonies, and to countenance, in a certain degree, the cause of
   superstition. Under that apprehension, an able and spirited writer, who was
   understood to be a Clergyman of the Church of England, published, in 1752, a
   pamphlet, entitled, “A Serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance of
   External Religion; occasioned by some Passages in the Right Rev. the Lord
   Bishop of Durham’s Charge to the Clergy of that Diocese;—Humbly addressed to
   his Lordship.” Many persons, however, and we believe the greater part of the
   Clergy of the diocese, did not think our Prelate’s Charge so exceptionable
   as it appeared to this author. The Charge, being printed at Durham, and
   having never been annexed to any of Dr Butler’s other works, is now become
   extremely scarce; and it is observable, that it is the only one of his
   publications which ever produced him a direct literary antagonist.

   By this promotion, our worthy Bishop was furnished with ample means of
   exerting the virtue of charity; a virtue which eminently abounded in him,
   and the exercise of which was his highest delight. But this gratification he
   did not long enjoy. He had been but a short time seated in his new
   bishopric, when his health began visibly to decline; and having been
   complimented, during his indisposition, upon account of his great
   resignation to the Divine will, he is said to have expressed some regret,
   that he should be taken from the present world so soon after he had been
   rendered capable of becoming much more useful in it. In his illness he was
   carried to Bristol, to try the waters of that place; but these proving
   ineffectual, he removed to Bath, where, being past recovery, he died on the
   16th of June, 1752. His corpse was conveyed to Bristol, and interred in the
   cathedral there, where a monument, with an inscription, is erected to his
   memory.

   On the greatness of Bishop Butler’s character we need not enlarge; for his
   profound knowledge, and the prodigious strength of his mind, are amply
   displayed in his incomparable writings. His piety was of the most serious
   and fervent, and, perhaps, somewhat of the ascetic kind. His benevolence was
   warm, generous, and diffusive. Whilst he was Bishop of Bristol, he expended,
   in repairing and improving the episcopal palace, four thousand pounds, which
   is said to have been more than the whole revenues of the bishopric amounted
   to, during his continuance in that see. Besides his private benefactions, he
   was a contributor to the infirmary at Bristol, and a subscriber to three of
   the hospitals at London. He was likewise a principal promoter, though not
   the first founder, of the infirmary at Newcastle, in Northumberland. In
   supporting the hospitality and dignity of the rich and powerful diocese of
   Durham, he was desirous of imitating the spirit of his patron, Bishop
   Talbot. In this spirit he set apart three days every week for the reception
   and entertainment of the principal gentry of the country. Nor were even the
   Clergy who had the poorest benefices neglected by him. He not only
   occasionally invited them to dine with him, but condescended to visit them
   at their respective parishes. By his will he left five hundred pounds to the
   Society for propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and some legacies to
   his friends and domestics. His executor and residuary legatee was his
   chaplain, the Rev. Dr Nathanael Forster, a divine of distinguished
   literature. Bishop Butler was never married. Soon after his decease, the
   following lines, by way of epitaph, were written concerning him; and were
   printed first, if we recollect aright, in the London Magazine.


   Beneath this marble Butler lies entomb’d,

   Who, with a soul inflamed by love divine,

   His life in presence of his God consumed,

   Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine.

   His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraught

   His eloquence was like a chain of gold,

   That the wild passions of mankind controll’d;

   Merit, wherever to be found, he sought.

   Desire of transient riches he had none;

   These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense:

   Bent to fulfill the ends of Providence;

   His heart still fix’d on an immortal crown.

   His heart a mirror was, of purest kind,

   Where the bright image of his Maker shined;

   Reflecting faithful to the throne above,

   Th’ irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove.

   THE following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr Nathanael Forster, is
   inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of Bristol, placed
   over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler are deposited; and which,
   as it is now almost obliterated, it may be worth while here to preserve.

   H. S.
   Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater
   JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D.
   Hujusce primo Diœceseos
   Deinde Dunelmensis Episcopus.
   Qualis quantusque Vir erat
   Sua libentissime agnovit ætas:
   Et si quid Præsuli aut Scriptori ad famam valant
   Mens altissima,
   Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Vis,
   animusque pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis,
   Mortui haud facile evanescet memoria.
   Obiit Bathoniæ 16 Kalend. Julii,
   A. D. 1752.
   Annos natus 60.
     _________________________________________________________________

   [49] He was the youngest of eight children.
     _________________________________________________________________
     _________________________________________________________________

                                 INTRODUCTION.

   PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this,
   that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest
   moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a
   thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it; because, as
   there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some
   against it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget
   that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably
   true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a
   probability, appears from hence; that such low presumption often repeated,
   will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb
   and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the
   lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation
   of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has
   been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.

   That which chiefly constitutes Probability is expressed in the word Likely,
   i. e. like some truth, [50] or true event; like it, in itself, in its
   evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we determine
   a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass,
   it is from the mind’s remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which
   we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless
   daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event
   has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that the like
   event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so far as our observation
   reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like
   occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child if it lives twenty years,
   will grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute
   to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of
   days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our
   hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations
   that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and our judgment that
   such actions proceed from such principles; all these rely upon our having
   observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our
   having observed the like, either with respect to others or ourselves. And
   thus, whereas the prince [51] who had always lived in a warm climate,
   naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as
   water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and
   yielding: we, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is no
   presumption at all against this: that it is supposable there may be frost in
   England any given day in January next; probable that there will on some day
   of the month; and that there is a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an
   expectation without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter.

   Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of
   information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited
   capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether
   past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence; since
   it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or
   certainly false. But to us, probability is the very guide of life.

   From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as
   are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not
   seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole,
   any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, ox a greater
   presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater; this
   determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and in matters of
   practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of
   prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low probability,
   though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the
   truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the
   whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his
   happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so. Nay further, in questions of
   great consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark
   lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more
   than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the
   other: nay, such as but amount to much less even than this. For numberless
   instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a
   man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and
   with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much
   less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his
   succeeding. [52]

   It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and
   measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget
   that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is
   formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every
   one; or to guard against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is
   liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject
   which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I shall not take upon
   me to say, how far the extent, compass, and force, of analogical reasoning,
   can be reduced to general heads and rules; and the whole be formed into a
   system. But though so little in this way has been attempted by those who
   have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does
   not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that
   analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment
   and our practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those
   cases, because persons, either giver to dispute, or who require things to be
   stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of in
   practical matters, may find other cases in. which it is not easy to say,
   whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies,
   which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe,
   that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive.
   For there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise tomorrow
   and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in
   that of a square.

   Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen [53] has with singular
   sagacity observed, that he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from
   him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of
   difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of Nature. And in a
   like way of reflection it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to
   have been from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very
   same reason deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if
   there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and
   dispensation of Providence, which Revelation informs us of, and that system
   of things and dispensation of Providence, which Experience together with
   Reason. informs us of, i. e. the known course of Nature; this is a
   presumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so far
   as to answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn from any
   thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is
   acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of Nature is here supposed.

   Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon
   reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether
   from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon
   hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from
   principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no
   ground to apply them (like those who explain the structure of the human
   body, and the nature of diseases and medicines from mere mathematics without
   sufficient data,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed
   in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. But it must be
   allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and
   argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from that
   part of the Divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under
   our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is
   beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or
   not incredible, will be hereafter.

   This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and what, if
   we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life;
   being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, proportionable to the degree
   and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness; and having so great
   authority for its introduction into the subject of religion, even revealed
   religion; my design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural
   and revealed: taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of
   Nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption
   against this prior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with
   accumulated evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from
   abstract reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from
   the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to
   be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied
   with the evidence of religion.

   As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact the
   constitution of Nature, form their notions of God’s government upon
   hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain and idle
   speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than
   it is; and upon supposition that things might, in imagining that they
   should, have been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what
   appears in the present disposition and conduct of them. Suppose now a person
   of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at length
   fixed upon some particular plan of Nature, as appearing to him the best—One
   shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human understanding, if
   one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person
   wouid fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of mei, probably would
   not be the very best, even according to his own notions of best; whether he
   thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise
   of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happiness,
   or that these two were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the
   same plan. However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be
   the amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system
   of nature, or how far they would mislead us. And it seems there could be no
   stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all creatures
   should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever
   being: that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them
   to do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all: or
   certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, whether
   necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do what was right and
   most conducive to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite power
   to effect; either by not giving them any principles which would endanger
   their going wrong; or by laying the right motive of action in every instance
   before their minds continually in so strong a manner, as would never fail of
   inducing them to act conformably to it: and that the whole method of
   government by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward
   round-about method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal
   purpose, for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely,
   happiness.

   Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the several
   parts of this train of folly and extravagance; what has been above
   intimated, is a full direct general answer to it, namely, that we may see
   beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For
   though it be admitted that, from the first principles of our nature, we
   unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves
   preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up
   into one, that this one is absolutely the best; and consequently that we
   must conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of Nature and
   conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are
   far from being able to judge what particular disposition of things would be
   most friendly and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely
   necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our
   own world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should
   suppose it detached from the whole of things. Indeed we are so far from
   being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the
   necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest
   perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of
   the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not
   competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to
   ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him.
   And this will for ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to such
   as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice of God
   speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that virtue must be the
   happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; and that regularity and
   order and right cannot but prevail finally in a universe under his
   government. But we are in no sort judges, what are the necessary means of
   accomplishing this end.

   Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of
   forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our
   thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to
   intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general laws or rules of
   administration, in the same way as many of the laws of Nature respecting
   inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. And let us compare the
   known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral
   system of Nature; the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that
   government which we find ourselves under, with what religion teaches us to
   believe and expect; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece.
   And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very
   much so: that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved
   into the same principles of divine conduct.

   The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, and
   consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact. In some few
   instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical proof; in others not so.
   Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise. It will
   undeniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of
   Religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior
   to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of Nature be
   so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the
   system both of natural and revealed Religion; though not perhaps an answer
   in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the
   objections against the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and
   objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are
   different things.

   Now the divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion in
   general and of Christianity, contains in it; that mankind is appointed to
   live in a future state; [54] that there every one shall be rewarded or
   punished; [55] rewarded or punished respectively for all that behaviour
   here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious, morally good
   or evil: [56] that our present life is a probation, a state of trial, [57]
   and of discipline, [58] for that future one; notwithstanding the objections,
   which men may fancy they have, from notions of Necessity, against there
   being any such moral plan as this at all; [59] and whatever objections may
   appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so
   imperfectly made known to us at present: [60] that this world being in a
   state of apostasy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense
   both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this
   gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost
   importance; [61] proved by miracles; [62] but containing in it many things
   appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected; [63] a dispensation
   of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things; [64] carried on by the
   mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the
   world; [65] yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest
   possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but only to such a
   part of mankind, and with such particular evidence, as the wisdom of God
   thought fit. [66] The design then of the following Treatise will be to show,
   that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and
   Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof
   which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular parts
   principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are analogous to
   what is experienced in the constitution and course of Nature, or Providence;
   that the thief objections themselves which are alleged against the former,
   are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter,
   where they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument from
   analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of
   religion, [67] notwithstanding the Objections which may seem to lie against
   it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to
   the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a
   general account of what may be looked for in the following Treatise. And I
   shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all
   our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration; I mean a
   Future Life.
     _________________________________________________________________

   [50] Verisimile.

   [51] The story is told by Mr Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

   [52] See Part II. Chap. vi.

   [53] Chrē min toi ge ton hapax paradexamenon tou ptisantos ton kosmon einai
   tautas tas graphas pepeisthai hoti hosa peri tēs ktiseōs apanta tois zētousi
   ton peri autēs logon, tauta kai peri tōn graphōn. Philocal. p. 23. Ed. Cant.

   [54] Ch. i.

   [55] Ch. ii.

   [56] Ch. iii.

   [57] Ch. iv.

   [58] Ch. v.

   [59] Ch. vi.

   [60] Ch. vii.

   [61] Part II. Ch. i.

   [62] Ch. ii.

   [63] Ch. iii.

   [64] Ch. iv.

   [65] Ch. v.

   [66] Ch. vi, vii.

   [67] Ch. viii.
     _________________________________________________________________

                           THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION.
     _________________________________________________________________

PART I.

OF NATURAL RELIGION.
     _________________________________________________________________

  CHAP. I.

  OF A FUTURE LIFE.

   STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal identity,
   or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing now
   and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; which whoever thinks it
   worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation at the end of this
   Treatise. But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the
   analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and
   those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to
   the effect which death may, or may not, have upon us; and whether it be not
   from thence probable, that we may survive this change, and exist in a future
   state of life and perception.

   I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect
   state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it
   to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures,
   the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with
   capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their
   being, greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it.
   And in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their
   capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and in
   maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their
   locomotive powers by such change: and birds and insects bursting the shell
   If their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, furnished
   with new accommodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action
   assigned them; these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all
   the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into
   consideration here. But the states of life in which we ourselves existed
   formerly in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our
   present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive