Chapter 34
52. Therefore it is one thing to know the laws of inference, and another to
know the truth of opinions. In the former case we learn what is consequent,
what is inconsequent, and what is incompatible. An example of a consequent is,
"If he is an orator, he is a man;" of an inconsequent, "If he is a man, he is
an orator;" of an incompatible, "If he is a man, he is a quadruped." In these
instances we judge of the connection. In regard to the truth of opinions,
however, we must consider propositions as they stand by themselves, and not in
their connection with one another; but when propositions that we are not sure
about are joined by a valid inference to propositions that are true and
certain, they themselves, too, necessarily become certain. Now some, when they
have ascertained the validity of the inference, plume themselves as if this
involved also the truth of the propositions. Many, again, who hold the true
opinions have an unfounded contempt for themselves, because they are ignorant
of the laws of inference; whereas the man who knows that there is a
resurrection of the dead is assuredly better than the man who only knows that
it follows that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not
risen.
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