_________________________________________________________________ Title: Of God and His Creatures Creator(s): Aquinas, Thomas, Saint (1225?-1274) CCEL Subjects: All; Classic; LC Call no: BS2555 LC Subjects: The Bible New Testament Special parts of the New Testament _________________________________________________________________ Of God and His Creatures OF GOD AND HIS CREATURES An Annotated Translation (With some Abridgement) of the SVMMA CONTRA GENTILES Of SAINT THO^S AQUINAS By JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J., M.A. Lond: B.Sc. Oxon., Author of “Aquinas Ethicus” &c. &c. BURNS & OATES B. HERDER ORCHARD STREET 17 SOUTH BROADWAY LONDON W ST LOUIS MO PIAE MEMORIAE LEONIS XIII SACERDOTIS MAGNI QUI IN VITA SUA SUFFULSIT DOMUM ET IN DIEBUS SUIS CORROBORAVIT TEMPLUM _________________________________________________________________ Preface SOME years ago, a priest of singularly long and varied experience urged me to write “a book about God.” He said that wrong and imperfect notions of God lay at the root of all our religious difficulties. Professor Lewis Campbell says the same thing in his own way in his work, Religion in Greek Literature, where he declares that the age needs “a new definition of God.” Thinking the need over, I turned to the Summa contra Gentiles. I was led to it by the Encyclical of Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, urging the study of St Thomas. A further motive, quite unexpected, was supplied by the University of Oxford in 1902 placing the Summa Contra Gentiles on the list of subjects which a candidate may at his option offer in the Final Honour School of Literae Humaniores, -- a very unlikely book to be offered so long as it remains simply as St Thomas wrote it. Lastly I remembered that I had in 1892 published under the name of Aquinas Ethicus a translation of the principal portions of the second part of St Thomas’s Summa Theologica: thus I might be reckoned some thing of an expert in the difficult art of finding English equivalents for scholastic Latin. There are two ways of behaving towards St Thomas’s writings, analogous to two several treatments of a church still standing, in which the saint might have worshipped. One way is to hand the edifice over to some Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments: they will keep it locked to the vulgar, while admitting some occasional connoisseur: they will do their utmost to preserve every stone identically the same that the mediaeval builder laid. And the Opera Omnia of St Thomas, handsomely bound, may fill a library shelf, whence a volume is occasionally taken down for the sole purpose of knowing what St Thomas said and no more. Another thirteenth-century church may stand, a parish church still, in daily use; an ancient monument, and something besides; a present-day house of prayer, meeting the needs of a twentieth-century congregation; and for that purpose refitted, repainted, restored, repaired and modernised; having had that done to it which its mediaeval architects would have done, had they lived in our time. Nothing is more remarkable in our old English churches than the sturdy self-confidence, and the good taste also lasting for some centuries, with which each successive age has superimposed its own style upon the architecture of its predecessors. If St Thomas’s works are to serve modern uses, they must pass from their old Latinity into modern speech: their conclusions must be tested by all the subtlety of present-day science, physical, psychological, historical; maintained, wherever maintainable, but altered, where tenable no longer. Thus only can St Thomas keep his place as a living teacher of mankind. For the history of the Contra Gentiles I refer the reader to the folio edition printed at the Propaganda Press in 1878 cura et studio Petri Antonii Uccellii, pp. xiii-xxxlx. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) came to the University of Paris in 1245, and there for three years heard the lectures of Albertus Magnus, taking his Bachelor’s degree in 1248. He returned to the University in 1253, took his Master’s degree in 1257, and thereupon lectured in theology for two or three years, leaving the University in 1259 or 1260. He wrote the Summa contra Gentiles in Italy, under the pontificate of Urban IV (1261-1264), at the request of St Raymund of Pennafort. He went for the third time to the University of Paris in 1269, finally returning to Italy in 1271. Though the Summa contra Gentiles was written in Italy, there is reason to believe that the substance of it was got together during the Saint’s second residence at Paris, and formed the staple of his lectures in the University. The more celebrated Summa Theologica was a later work. The Summa contra Gentiles is in the unique position of a classic whereof the author’s manuscript is still in great part extant. It is now in the Vatican Library. The manuscript consists of strips of parchment, of various shades of colour, contained in an old parchment cover to which they were originally stitched. The writing is in double columns, minute and difficult to decipher, abounding in abbreviations, often passing into a kind of shorthand. Through many passages a line is drawn in sign of erasure: but these remain not less legible than the rest, and are printed as foot notes in the Propaganda edition: they do not appear in the present translation. To my mind, these erasures furnish the best proof of the authenticity of the autograph, which is questioned by S. E. Fretté, editor of Divi Thomae Opera Omnia (Vivès, Paris, 1874), vol. XII, preface iv-vi. An inscription on the cover states that the manuscript is the autograph of St Thomas, and that it was brought from Naples to the Dominican convent at Bergamo in 1354: whence its name of the ‘Bergamo autograph.’ Many leaves were lost in the sack of the convent by the armies of the first French Revolution; and the whole of Book IV is missing. The frequent erasures of the Saint himself lend some countenance to the omissions of his translator. Re-reading his manuscript in the twentieth century, St Thomas would have been not less ready than he showed himself in the thirteenth century to fulfil the Horatian precept, saepe stylum vertas. J. R. Pope’s Hall, Oxford, Michaelmas 1905 Nihil obstat: T. M. TAAFFE S.J., Censor deputatus Imprimatur: GULIELMUS PRAEPOSITUS JOHNSON, Vicarius Generalis Westmonasterii, die 12 Septembris 1905 _________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS Book I Of God As He Is In Himself 1 The Function of the Wise Man 1 2 Of the Author’s Purpose 2 3 That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories 2 4 That it is an Advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on Faith 4 5 That it is an Advantage for things that cannot be searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith 5 6 That there is no Lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason 6 7 That the Truth of Reason is not contrary to the Truths of Christian Faith 7 8 Of the relation of Human Reason to the First Truth of Faith 7 9 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work 8 10 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot be proved, being a Self-evident Truth 9 11 Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons 9 12 Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot be demonstrated 11 13 Reasons in proof of the Existence of God 11 14 That in order to a Knowledge of God we must proceed by the method of Negative Differentiation 13 15 That God is Eternal 14 16 That in God there is no Passive Potentiality 14 18 That in God there is no Composition 15 20 That God is Incorporeal 15 21 That God is His own Essence 16 22 That in God Existence and Essence are the same 17 23 That in God there is no Accident 18 24 That the Existence of God cannot be characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia 19 25 That God is not in any Genus 19 26 That God is not the Formal or Abstract Being of all things 20 28 That God is Universal Perfection 22 29 How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures 22 30 What Names can be predicated of God 23 31 That the Plurality of Divine Names is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Being predicated of God and of other Beings 24 32 That nothing is predicated of God and of other Beings synonymously 24 33 That it is not at all true that the application of common Predicates to God and to Creatures involves nothing beyond a mere Identity of Name 25 34 That the Things that are said of God and of Creatures are said analogously 26 35 That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous 27 36 That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of Meaning 27 38 That God is His own Goodness 28 39 That in God there can be no Evil 28 40 That God is the Good of all Good 29 42 That God is One 29 43 That God is Infinite 30 44 That God has Understanding 32 45 That in God the Act of Understanding is His very Essence 33 46 That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence 34 47 That God perfectly understands Himself 34 48 That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone 35 49 That God knows other things besides Himself 35 50 That God has a Particular Knowledge of all things 35 51 Some Discussion of the question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects 36 52 Reasons to show how the Multitude of Intelligible Ideal Forms has no Existence except in the Divine Understanding 37 53 How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding 37 54 That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible 39 55 That God understands all things at once and together 40 56 That there is not Habitual Knowledge in God 41 57 That God’s Knowledge is not a Reasoned Knowledge 42 58 That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas 43 59 That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God 43 60 That God is Truth 44 61 That God is Pure Truth 44 62 That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth 45 63 Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual Things 45 64 A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge 47 65 That God knows Individual Things 47 66 That God knows things which are not 47 67 That God knows Individual Contingent Events 49 68 That God knows the Motions of the Will 51 69 That God knows Infinite Things 51 70 That God knows Base and Mean Things 53 71 That God knows Evil Things 54 72 That God has a Will 56 73 That the Will of God is His Essence 56 74 That the Object of the Will of God in the first place is God Himself 57 75 That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself 57 76 That with one and the same Act of Will God wills Himself and all other beings 57 77 That the Multitude of the Objects of God’s Will is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of His Substance 58 78 That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences 58 79 That God wills things even that as yet are not 59 80 That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness 59 81 That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself 60 82 Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine, and Solution of the same 51 83 That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity 62 84 That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible 63 85 That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things 63 86 That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will 63 87 That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will 64 88 That there is Free Will in God 65 89 That there are no Passions in God 65 90 That there is in God Delight and Joy 66 91 That there is Love in God 67 92 In what sense Virtues can be posited in God 68 93 That there are in God the Virtues which regulate Action 69 94 That the Contemplative (intellectual) Virtues are in God 70 95 That God can will no Evil 71 96 That God hates nothing 71 97 That God is Living 72 98 That God is His own Life 72 99 That the Life of God is everlasting 73 100 That God is Happy 73 101 That God is His own Happiness 74 102 That the Happiness of God is most Perfect, and exceeds all other Happiness 74 Book II God The Origin of Creatures 1 Connexion of what follows with what has gone before 79 4 That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from different Standpoints 79 5 Order of matters to be treated 80 6 That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence 80 7 That there is in God Active Power 80 8 That God’s Power is His Substance 81 9 That God’s Power is His Action 81 10 In what manner Power is said to be in God 81 11 That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures 82 12 That the Relations, predicated of God in regard of Creatures, are not really in God 82 13 How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God 83 14 That the Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being 83 15 That God is to all things the Cause of their being 84 16 That God has brought things into being out of nothing 85 17 That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change 86 18 Solution of Arguments against Creation 87 19 That Creation is not Successive 87 21 That it belongs to God alone to create 88 22 That God is Almighty 89 23 That God’s action in creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will 90 24 That God acts by His Wisdom 91 25 In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty 92 26 That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain Fixed Effects 93 28 That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of justice 94 29 How in the production of a creature there may be found a Debt of justice in respect of the Necessary Sequence of something Posterior upon something Prior 95 30 How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation 95 31 That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from Eternity 96 32, 35 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same 97 33, 36 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of Creatures, with Answers to the same 101 34, 37 Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of the fact of its Production, with Answers to the same 102 38 Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same 104 41 That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime Agents 105 44 That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits 106 45 The real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures 107 46 That it was necessary for the Perfection of the Universe that there should be some Intellectual Natures 108 47 That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents 109 48 That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will 109 49 That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal 111 52 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence 111 53 That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality 112 55 That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable 112 56, 69 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be United with a Body, with a Solution of the Arguments alleged to prove that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be United with a Body as its Form 115 57 Plato’s Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body 118 58 That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in Man Three Souls 120 59 That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from Matter 122 60 That a Man is not a member of the Human Species by possession of Passive Intellect, but by possession of Potential Intellect 125 61 That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle 127 62 Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential Intellect 129 64 That the Soul is not a Harmony 130 65 That the Soul is not a Body 131 66 Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same 131 67 Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the Phantasy 132 68 How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body 132 69 Solution of the Arguments alleged to show that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be united with a Body as the Form of that Body 134 73 That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all men 135 74 Of the Opinion of Avicenna, who supposed Intellectual Forms not to be preserved in the Potential Intellect 141 75 Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect 144 76 That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, but a Faculty of the Soul 148 77 That it is not Impossible for the Potential and the Active Intellect to be united in the one Substance of the Soul 150 78 That it was not the Opinion of Aristotle that the Active Intellect is a separately Subsistent Intelligence, but rather that it is a Part of the Soul 151 79 That the Human Soul does not perish with the Body 152 80, 81 Arguments of those who wish to prove that the Human Soul perishes with the Body, with Replies to the same 155 82 That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal 159 83, 84 Apparent Arguments to show that the Human Soul does not begin with the Body, but has been from Eternity, with Replies to the same 159 85 That the Soul is not of the Substance of God 162 86 That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation 163 87 That the Human Soul is brought into being by a Creative Act of God 164 88, 89 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their Solution 165 91 That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies 172 93 That Intelligences Subsisting apart are not more than One in the same Species 173 94 That an Intelligence Subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species 174 96 That Intelligences Subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense 174 97 That the Mind of an Intelligence Subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding 176 98 How one Separately Subsisting Intelligence knows another 176 99 That Intelligences Subsisting apart know Material Things, that is to say, the Species of Things Corporeal 177 100 That Intelligences Subsisting apart know Individual Things 178 101 Whether to Separately Subsisting Intelligences all parts of their Natural Knowledge are simultaneously present 179 Book III God the End of Creatures 1 Preface to the Book that follows 183 2 That every Agent acts to some End 185 3 That every Agent acts to some Good 186 4 That Evil in Things is beside the Intention of the Agent 186 5, 6 Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the same 187 7 That Evil is not a Nature or Essence 189 8, 9 Arguments against the aforesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same 190 10 That the Cause of Evil is Good 191 11 That Evil is founded in some Good 194 12 That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good 195 14 That Evil is an Accidental Cause 196 15 That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of all Evils 196 16 That the End in view of everything is some Good 196 17 That all things are ordained to one End, which is God 197 18 How God is the End of all things 197 19 That all things aim at Likeness to God 198 20 How things copy the Divine Goodness 198 21 That things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other things 200 24 That all things seek Good, even things devoid of Consciousness 200 25 That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God 202 26 That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will 204 27 That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures 207 28, 29 That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory 209 30 That Man’s Happiness does not consist in Riches 209 31 That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power 210 32 That Happiness does not consist in Goods of the Body 210 34 That the Final Happiness of Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues 210 37 That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God 211 38 That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the Majority of Mankind 212 39 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration 212 40 That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith 213 41 - 45 [Untitled] 214 46 That the Soul in this Life does not understand itself by itself 214 47 That we cannot in this Life see God as He essentially is 216 48 That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life 218 49 That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God 221 50 That the Desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God 222 51 How God is seen as He essentially is 224 52 That no Created Substance can of its Natural Power arrive to see God as He essentially is 224 53 That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence 225 54 Arguments against the aforesaid Statements and their Solutions 225 55 That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance 227 56 That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him 227 57 That every Intelligence of every Grade can be partaker of the Vision of God 229 58 That one may see God more perfectly than another 230 59 How they who see the Divine Substance see all things 230 60 That they who see God see all things in Him at once 232 61 That by the Sight of God one is made partaker of Life Everlasting 232 62 That they who see God will see Him for ever 232 63 How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled 233 64 That God governs things by His Providence 235 65 That God preserves things in Being 236 66 That nothing gives Being except in so much as it acts in the Power of God 238 67 That God is Cause of Activity in all Active Agents 238 68 That God is everywhere and in all things 238 69 Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions 239 70 How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent 241 71 That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation 242 72 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation 244 73 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will 244 74 That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance 245 75 That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things 246 76 That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things 247 77 That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes 248 78 That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God 248 81 Of the Subordination of Men one to another 249 88 That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions 249 89 That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will 250 90 That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence 251 91 How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes 251 92 In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes 253 93 Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is 254 94 Of the Certainty of Divine Providence 254 95, 96 That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer 257 96 That God does not hear all Prayers 259 97 How the Arrangements of Divine Providence follow a Plan 260 99 How God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes 262 100 That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature 263 101 Of Miracles 264 102 That God alone works Miracles 265 103 How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles 266 104 That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres 267 105 Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy 267 106 That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances, is not Good in both Categories of Being 268 107 That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature 269 109 That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how 270 108, 110 Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same 271 112 That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and other Creatures in reference to them 273 113 That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Individual 275 114 That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God 276 115 That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God 276 116 That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God 276 117 That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour 277 118 That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith 278 119 That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God 279 120 That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone 280 121 That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things 282 122 Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage 283 123 That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble 285 124 That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman 287 125 That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred 288 126 That not all Sexual Intercourse is Sin 289 127 That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself 289 128 How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour 291 129 That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the Law enacts them, but also according to Nature 291 130 That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government 293 131 Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law 297 132, 135 Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies 298 133, 136 Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty 300 134 In what the Good of Poverty consists 305 137 Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies 306 139 Against those who find fault with Vows 307 140 That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal 309 141 That a Man’s Acts are punished or rewarded by God 311 142 Of the Difference and Order of Punishments 312 143 That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal 313 144 Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End 314 145 That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable 315 146 That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful 317 147 That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments 317 148 That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness 318 149 That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue 319 150 That Man cannot merit beforehand the said Assistance 320 151 That the aforesaid Assistance is called ‘Grace,’ and what is the meaning of ‘Grace constituting a State of Grace’ 321 152 That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God 322 153 That Divine Grace causes in us Faith 323 154 That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness 324 155 Of Graces given gratuitously 324 156 That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to Persevere in Good 326 157 That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace 327 158 That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace 328 159 How Man is delivered from Sin 329 160 That it is reasonably reckoned a Man’s own Fault if he be not converted to God, although he cannot be converted without Grace 330 161 That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace 331 162 That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin 332 163 That God is Cause of Sin to no Man 333 164 Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election 334 Book IV Of God in His Revelation 1 Preface 337 2 Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God 340 3 That the Son of God is God 340 4, 9 The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God and its Rejection 341 5 Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God 343 6 Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God 344 7 Rejection of Arius’s Position 344 8 Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself 346 12 How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God 349 17 That the Holy Ghost is true God 349 18 That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person 351 20 Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation 351 21 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in Scripture in the way of Gifts bestowed on the Rational Creature 352 22 Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God 353 23 Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost 354 24 That the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Son 356 26 That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost 358 27 Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture 359 28 Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation 360 29 Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation 360 32, 33 Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ 362 34 Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man 362 35 Against the Error of Eutyches 366 36 Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ 367 39 The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation 369 41 Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation 369 40, 49 Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies 371 44 That the Human Nature, assumed by the Word, was perfect in Soul and Body in the instant of Conception 373 45 That Christ was born of a Virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity 374 46, 47 That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost 374 54 Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things 374 55 Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation 376 50 That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity 379 51, 52 Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies 380 56 Of the Need of Sacraments 383 57 Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law 383 58 Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law 384 59 Of Baptism 385 60 Of Confirmation 386 61 Of the Eucharist 386 63 Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ 387 64 An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place 388 65 The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining 389 66 What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away 390 67 Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host 390 68 The Explanation of a Text 391 69 Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament 391 70 That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace 392 71 That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace 393 72 Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof 393 73 Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction 396 74 Of the Sacrament of Order 397 75 Of the Distinction of Orders 399 76 Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme 399 77 That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers 401 78 Of the Sacrament of Matrimony 402 79 That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place 403 81 Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection 404 82 That Men shall rise again Immortal 406 83 That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or Intercourse of the Sexes 406 84 That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before 408 85 That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before 408 86 Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies 409 88 Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection 411 89 Of the Quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost 412 90 How Incorporeal Subsistent Spirits suffer from Corporeal Fire, and are befittingly punished with Corporeal Punishments 413 91 That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies 414 92 That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good 415 93 That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil 416 94 Of the Immutability of the Will of Souls detained in Purgatory 417 95 Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body 417 96 Of the Last judgement 419 97 Of the State of the World after the Judgement 419 INDEX 421 _________________________________________________________________ BOOK I _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER I—The Function of the Wise Man My mouth shall discuss truth, and my lips shall detest the ungodly (Prov. vii, 7). ACCORDING to established popular usage, which the Philosopher considers should be our guide in the naming of things, they are called ‘wise’ who put things in their right [1] order and control them well. Now, in all things that are to be controlled and put in order to an end, the measure of control and order must be taken from the end in view; and the proper end of everything is something good. Hence we see in the arts that art A governs and, as it were, lords it over art B, when the proper end of art B belongs to A. [2] Thus the art of medicine lords it over the art of the apothecary, because health, the object of medicine, is the end of all drugs that the apothecary’s art compounds. These arts that lord it over others are called ‘master-building,’ or ‘masterful arts’; and the ‘master-builders’ who practise them arrogate to themselves the name of ‘wise men.’ But because these persons deal with the ends in view of certain particular things, without attaining to the general end of all things, they are called ‘wise in this or that particular thing,’ as it is said, ‘As a wise architect I have laid the foundation’ (1 Cor. iii, 10); while the name of ‘wise’ without qualification is reserved for him alone who deals with the last end of the universe, which is also the first beginning of the order of the universe. Hence, according to the Philosopher, it is proper to the wise man to consider the highest causes. Now the last end of everything is that which is intended by the prime author or mover thereof. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence, as will be shown later (B. II, Chap. [1]XXIII, [2]XXIV). Therefore the last end of the universe must be the good of the intelligence, and that is truth. Truth then must be the final end of the whole universe; and about the consideration of that end [3] wisdom must primarily be concerned. And therefore the Divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, testifies that He came into the world for the manifestation of truth: For this was I born, and unto this I came into the World, to give testimony to the truth (John xvii, 37). The Philosopher also rules that the first philosophy is the science of truth, not of any and every truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, and appertains to the first principle of the being of all things; hence its truth is the principle of all truth, for things are in truth as they are in being. It is one and the same function to embrace either of two contraries and to repel the other. Hence, as it is the function of the wise man to discuss truth, particularly of the first beginning, so it is his also to impugn the contrary error. Suitably therefore is the double function of the wise man displayed in the words above quoted from the Sapiential Book, namely, to study, and upon study to speak out the truth of God, which of all other is most properly called truth, and this is referred to in the words, My mouth shall discuss truth, and to impugn error contrary to truth, as referred to in the words, And my lips shall detest the ungodly. _________________________________________________________________ [1] For directe read recte. [2] The idea is in Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1, opening. [3] Read Circa ejus finis considerationem. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER II—Of the Author’s Purpose OF all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime, the more useful, and the more agreeable. The more perfect, because in so far as a man gives himself up to the pursuit of wisdom, to that extent he enjoys already some portion of true happiness. Blessed is the man that shall dwell in wisdom (Ecclus xiv, 22). The more sublime, because thereby man comes closest to the likeness of God, who hath made all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24). The more useful, because by this same wisdom we arrive at the realm of immortality. The desire of wisdom shall lead to an everlasting kingdom (Wisd. vi, 21). The more agreeable, because her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any weariness, but gladness and joy (Wisd. viii, 16). But on two accounts it is difficult to proceed against each particular error: first, because the sacrilegious utterances of our various erring opponents are not so well known to us as to enable us to find reasons, drawn from their own words, for the confutation of their errors: for such was the method of the ancient doctors in confuting the errors of the Gentiles, whose tenets they were readily able to know, having either been Gentiles themselves, or at least having lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their doctrines. Secondly, because some of them, as Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognising the authority of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New. But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to. But in the things of God natural reason is often at a loss. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER III—That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories BECAUSE not every truth admits of the same mode of manifestation, and “a well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits,” as is very well remarked by the Philosopher (Eth. Nicom. I, 1094b), we must first show what mode of proof is possible for the truth that we have now before us. The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason, most manifestly appears. For since the leading principle of all knowledge of any given subject-matter is an understanding of the thing’s innermost being, or substance — according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, that the essence is the principle of demonstration — it follows that the mode of our knowledge of the substance must be the mode of knowledge of whatever we know about the substance. Hence if the human understanding comprehends the substance of anything, as of a stone or triangle, none of the points of intelligibility about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason. [4] But this is not our case with regard to God. The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. But things of sense cannot lead our understanding to read in them the essence of the Divine Substance, inasmuch as they are effects inadequate to the power that caused them. Nevertheless our understanding is thereby led to some knowledge of God, namely, of His existence and of other attributes that must necessarily be attributed to the First Cause. There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason, and other points that altogether transcend the power of human reason. [5] The same thing may be understood from consideration of degrees of intelligibility. [6] Of two minds, one of which has a keener insight into truth than the other, the higher mind understands much that the other cannot grasp at all, as is clear in the ‘plain man’ (in rustico), who can in no way grasp the subtle theories of philosophy. Now the intellect of an angel excels that of a man more than the intellect of the ablest philosopher excels that of the plainest of plain men (rudissimi idiotae). The angel has a higher standpoint in creation than man as a basis of his knowledge of God, inasmuch as the substance of the angel, whereby he is led to know God by a process of natural knowledge, is nobler and more excellent than the things of sense, and even than the soul itself, whereby the human mind rises to the knowledge of God. But the Divine Mind exceeds the angelic much more than the angelic the human. For the Divine Mind of its own comprehensiveness covers the whole extent of its substance, and therefore perfectly understands its own essence, and knows all that is knowable about itself; but an angel of his natural knowledge does not know the essence of God, because the angel’s own substance, whereby it is led to a knowledge of God, is an effect inadequate to the power of the cause that created it. Hence not all things that God understands in Himself can be grasped by the natural knowledge of an angel; nor is human reason competent to take in all that an angel understands of his own natural ability. As therefore it would be the height of madness in a ‘plain man’ to declare a philosopher’s propositions false, because he could not understand them, so and much more would a man show exceeding folly if he suspected of falsehood a divine revelation given by the ministry of angels, on the mere ground that it was beyond the investigation of reason. [7] The same thing manifestly appears from the incapacity which we daily experience in the observation of nature. We are ignorant of very many properties of the things of sense; and of the properties that our senses do apprehend, in most cases we cannot perfectly discover the reason. Much more is it beyond the competence of human reason to investigate all the points of intelligibility in that supreme excellent and transcendent substance of God. Consonant with this is the saying of the Philosopher, that “as the eyes of bats are to the light of the sun, so is the intelligence of our soul to the things most manifest by nature” (Aristotle, Metaphysics I, min. l). To this truth Holy Scripture also bears testimony. For it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the traces of God, and fully discover the Almighty (Job xi, 7). And, Lo, God is great, and surpassing our knowledge (Job xxxvi, 26). And, We know in part (I Cor. xiii, 9). Not everything, therefore, that is said of God, even though it be beyond the power of reason to investigate, is at once to be rejected as false. _________________________________________________________________ [4] Kant’s distinction between understanding and reason is not to be looked for in St Thomas, nor in his translator. St Thomas frequently uses the two terms indiscriminately: when he does distinguish them, it is inasmuch as understanding is intuitive, reason discursive. Understanding thus is the higher faculty. Understanding, not reason, is ascribed to God and the angels. [5] This argument will sound superfluous to most modern ears, content as men now are to register and argue phenomena, without regard to essences and substances, or altogether disbelieving in such ‘things in themselves.’ We have thousands of practical electricians; but who knows the essence of electricity? Even if molecular science shall ever conduct us to an accepted theory of the ultimate constituents of matter, we can scarcely hope thence to deduce the phenomena even of a pebble or one grain of sand. They are likely to prove complex beyond human calculation. The only essences that we know, and can use as a basis of deduction, are those which answer to certain abstract conceptions, as ‘triangle,’ ‘fortitude,’ ’sovereignty.’ Starting with implicit confidence in the dicta of Aristotle, and lightly landing in conclusions by a priori methods, mediaeval philosophers generally had no idea of the vast complexity of nature and of their own ignorance of physics. We know more physics than they did, and we know our own ignorance better. We stand stupefied and bewildered before the intricacy and vastness of nature. And if nature is so far unknowable to us, how must God transcend our knowledge? This St Thomas recognises (B. IV, Chap. I). Not the mystery and unknowableness of God needs to be brought home to the modern mind, but the fact that anything can be known with certainty about God at all. [6] Measured objectively, that is the higher degree of intelligibility, which it takes a higher intelligence to understand. It contains more matter of understanding. [7] What the man might more reasonably suspect would be the fact of the thing having been divinely revealed by the ministry of angels. There is the whole difficulty of faith, not in the thing revealed, e.g., transubstantiation, but in the fact of revelation. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER IV—That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith IF a truth of this nature were left to the sole enquiry of reason, three disadvantages would follow. One is that the knowledge of God would be confined to few. The discovery of truth is the fruit of studious enquiry. From this very many are hindered. Some are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must be in human society some men devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative enquiry to arrive at the highest point of human enquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by sloth. The knowledge of the truths that reason can investigate concerning God presupposes much previous knowledge. Indeed almost the entire study of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over to be learnt last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of Divinity. [8] Thus, only with great labour of study is it possible to arrive at the searching out of the aforesaid truth; and this labour few are willing to undergo for sheer love of knowledge. Another disadvantage is that such as did arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would take a long time over it, on account of the profundity of such truth, and the many prerequisites to the study, and also because in youth and early manhood, the soul, tossed to and fro on the waves of passion, is not fit for the study of such high truth: only in settled age does the soul become prudent and scientific, as the Philosopher says. Thus, if the only way open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best instrument for making men perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and to those few after a considerable lapse of time. A third disadvantage is that, owing to the infirmity of our judgement and the perturbing force of imagination, there is some admixture of error in most of the investigations of human reason. This would be a reason to many for continuing to doubt even of the most accurate demonstrations, not perceiving the force of the demonstration, and seeing the divers judgements of divers persons who have the name of being wise men. Besides, in the midst of much demonstrated truth there is sometimes an element of error, not demonstrated but asserted on the strength of some plausible and sophistic reasoning that is taken for a demonstration. And therefore it was necessary for the real truth concerning divine things to be presented to men with fixed certainty by way of faith. Wholesome therefore is the arrangement of divine clemency, whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held on faith, so that all might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that without doubt and error. [9] Hence it is said: Now ye walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their own notions, having the understanding darkened (Eph. iv, 17, 18); and, I will make all thy sons taught of the Lord (Isa. liv, 1, 5). _________________________________________________________________ [8] Metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, answers pretty well to what is now called natural theology. In the order of sciences, then, natural theology comes last in philosophy, and presupposes a knowledge of all the rest. Ethics therefore do not presuppose natural theology, but are presupposed by it. It follows that ethical conclusions should be first reached by ethical reasonings, not by theological. This point is further explained in my Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 123-125. [9] It is true, absolutely speaking, that, without revelation, mankind might take their theology on trust from philosophers, relying for their spirituality upon philosophic experts, as upon legal experts for the maintenance of their proprietary rights. But then we should expect of the Providence of God a greater concord of religious views among philosophers than at present obtains. Philosophy, were she our sole guide, should not be permitted to say and unsay. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER V—That it is an advantage for things that cannot he searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith SOME may possibly think that points which reason is unable to investigate ought not to be proposed to man to believe, since Divine Wisdom provides for every being according to the measure of its nature; and therefore we must show the necessity of things even that transcend reason being proposed by God to man for his belief. 1. One proof is this. No one strives with any earnestness of desire after anything, unless it be known to him beforehand. Since, then, as will be traced out in the following pages (B. III, Chap. [3]CXLVIII), Divine Providence directs men to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life, the mental faculties ought to be evoked and led onward to something higher than our reason can attain at present, learning thereby to desire something and earnestly to tend to something that transcends the entire state of the present life. And such is the special function of the Christian religion, which stands alone in its promise of spiritual and eternal goods, whereas the Old Law, carrying temporal promises, proposed few tenets that transcended the enquiry of human reason. [10] 2. Also another advantage is thence derived, to wit, the repression of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some so presumptuous of their own genius as to think that they can measure with their understanding the whole nature of the Godhead, thinking all that to be true which seems true to them, and that to be false which does not seem true to them. In order then that the human mind might be delivered from this presumption, and attain to a modest style of enquiry after truth, it was necessary for certain things to be proposed to man from God that altogether exceeded his understanding. 3. There is also another evident advantage in this, that any knowledge, however imperfect, of the noblest objects confers a very high perfection on the soul. And therefore, though human reason cannot fully grasp truths above reason, nevertheless it is much perfected by holding such truths after some fashion at least by faith. And therefore it is said: Many things beyond the understanding of man are shown to thee (Ecclus iii, 23). And, The things that are of God, none knoweth but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them through his Spirit (1 Cor. ii, 10, 11). _________________________________________________________________ [10] Cf. Vatican Council, Sess. 2, cap. 2: “Though it is due to divine revelation that truths of God, in themselves not inaccessible to human reason, in the present condition of mankind can be known by all readily, with firm certitude, and without admixture of error; still not on that account is revelation to be called absolutely necessary, but because God in His infinite goodness has destined man to a supernatural end, that is, to a share in the good things of God, which altogether surpass the intelligence of the human mind.” Faith is the indispensable prelude to the beatific vision, the supernatural end of man. Both are immediate knowledges of God, faith the hearing of His word on earth, vision the seeing of His face in heaven. Without revelation there would be some natural knowledge of God, but not the knowledge of faith. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER VI—That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason THE Divine Wisdom, that knows all things most fully, has deigned to reveal these her secrets to men, and in proof of them has displayed works beyond the competence of all natural powers, in the wonderful cure of diseases, in the raising of the dead, and what is more wonderful still, in such inspiration of human minds as that simple and ignorant persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Ghost, have gained in an instant the height of wisdom and eloquence. [11] By force of the aforesaid proof, without violence of arms, without promise of pleasures, and, most wonderful thing of all, in the midst of the violence of persecutors, a countless multitude, not only of the uneducated but of the wisest men, flocked to the Christian faith, wherein doctrines are preached that transcend all human understanding, pleasures of sense are restrained, and a contempt is taught of all worldly possessions. That mortal minds should assent to such teaching is the greatest of miracles, and a manifest work of divine inspiration leading men to despise the visible and desire only invisible goods. Nor did this happen suddenly nor by chance, but by a divine disposition, as is manifest from the fact that God foretold by many oracles of His prophets that He intended to do this. The books of those prophets are still venerated amongst us, as bearing testimony to our faith. This argument is touched upon in the text: Which (salvation) having begun to be uttered by the Lord, was confirmed by them that heard him even unto us, God joining in the testimony by signs and portents and various distributions of the Holy Spirit (Heb. ii, 3, 4). This so wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is so certain a sign of past miracles, that they need no further reiteration, since they appear evidently in their effects. It would be more wonderful than all other miracles, if without miraculous signs the world had been induced by simple and low-born men to believe truths so arduous, to do works so difficult, to hope for reward so high. And yet even in our times God ceases not through His saints to work miracles for the confirmation of the faith. [12] _________________________________________________________________ [11] The reference is to the miraculous endowments, called charismata, of the Apostles and first Christians. Acts ii, 4; x, 44-46; 1 Cor. xiv. [12] The whole argument of this chapter, a favourite with Cardinal Newman, is drawn out in the concluding pages of the Grammar of Assent, pp. 456-492, ed. 1895. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER VII—That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith THE natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true: it is impossible to think of their being otherwise. Nor a gain is it permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are false, being so evidently confirmed by God. [13] Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason. 2. Whatever is put into the disciple’s mind by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless the teacher is teaching dishonestly, which would be a wicked thing to say of God. But the knowledge of principles naturally known is put into us by God, seeing that God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore these principles also are contained in the Divine Wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to these principles is contrary to Divine Wisdom, and cannot be of God. 3. Contrary reasons fetter our intellect fast, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If therefore contrary informations were sent us by God, our intellect would be thereby hindered from knowledge of the truth: but such hindrance cannot be of God. 4. What is natural cannot be changed while nature remains. [14] But contrary opinions cannot be in the same mind at the same time: therefore no opinion or belief is sent to man from God contrary to natural knowledge. And therefore the Apostle says: The word is near in thy heart and in thy mouth, that is, the word of faith which we preach (Rom. x, 8). But because it surpasses reason it is counted by some as contrary to reason, which cannot be. To the same effect is the authority of Augustine (Gen. ad litt. ii, 18): “ What truth reveals can nowise be contrary to the holy books either of the Old or of the New Testament.” Hence the conclusion is evident, that any arguments alleged against the teachings of faith do not proceed logically from first principles of nature, principles of themselves known, and so do not amount to a demonstration; but are either probable reasons or sophistical; hence room is left for refuting them. [15] _________________________________________________________________ [13] The evidently refers to believers. To other men the thing is not so evident: why, it is not for us to enquire. But to one who has the faith, “the tenets of faith” are “so evidently confirmed by God” that he feels that for him to reject any of these tenets would be tantamount to throwing over his God. [14] A notable pronouncement against the Nominalists. [15] A reference to the Aristotelian ‘demonstration’ by strict logical reasoning from necessary truths, as laid down in the Posterior Analytics. This chapter goes to set aside the notion that unsound theology may still be sound philosophy. But as a truth, undiscernible by reason, may be discerned by revelation, so also may an error, or a flaw in an argument, be evident on grounds of revelation only, and not on any other grounds, where the argument is complicated and the matter removed from every-day experience, as in many Old Testament difficulties. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER VIII—Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith [16] THE things of sense, from whence human reason takes its beginning of knowledge, retain in themselves some trace of imitation of God, inasmuch as they are, and are good; yet so imperfect is this trace that it proves wholly insufficient to declare the substance of God Himself. Since every agent acts to the producing of its own likeness, effects in their several ways bear some likeness to their causes: nevertheless the effect does not always attain to the perfect likeness of the agent that produces it. In regard then to knowledge of the truth of faith, which can only be thoroughly known to those who behold the substance of God, human reason stands so conditioned as to be able to argue some true likenesses to it: which likenesses however are not sufficient for any sort of demonstrative or intuitive comprehension of the aforesaid truth. Still it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasonings, however feeble, provided there be no presumptuous hope of perfect comprehension or demonstration. With this view the authority of Hilary agrees, who says (De Trinitate, ii, 10), speaking of such truth: “In this belief start, run, persist; and though I know that you will not reach the goal, still I shall congratulate you as I see you making progress. But intrude not into that sanctuary, and plunge not into the mystery of infinite truth; entertain no presumptuous hope of comprehending the height of intelligence, but understand that it is incomprehensible.” _________________________________________________________________ [16] The “first truth of faith” is God, not only that He is (His existence), but also what He is (His essential nature). _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER IX—The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason. This truth of things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things. To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth, which we may hope to do, since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The special mode of refutation to be employed against an opponent of this second sort of truth is by alleging the authority of Scripture confirmed from heaven by miracles. There are however some probable reasons available for the declaration of this truth, to the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they thinking that we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak. [17] According then to the manner indicated we will bend our endeavour, first, to the manifestation of that truth which faith professes and reason searches out, alleging reasons demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the books of philosophers and saints, for the establishment of the truth and the confutation of the opponent. Then, to proceed from what is more to what is less manifest in our regard, we will pass to the manifestation of that truth which transcends reason, solving the arguments of opponents, and by probable reasons and authorities, so far as God shall enable us, declaring the truth of faith. Taking therefore the way of reason to the pursuit of truths that human reason can search out regarding God, the first consideration that meets us is of the attributes of God in Himself; secondly of the coming forth of creatures from God; thirdly of the order of creatures to God as to their last end. [18] _________________________________________________________________ [17] I invite the reader, especially if he be an ‘adversary,’ carefully to read this sentence and bear it in mind throughout the book. The arguments alleged are never fanciful or frivolous, if you understand them, except where they involve some mediaeval ignorance of physics, cases usually omitted in this translation. But they frequently fall short of demonstration, as their author was well aware, who was often content with probabilities. [18] These three divisions answer to Books I, II, III respectvely. Book IV is devoted to that truth of God which transcends reason, and is known only, or principally, by faith. These first nine chapters form the introduction to the work. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER X—Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot he proved, being a Self-evident Truth THIS opinion rests on the following grounds: [19] 1. Those truths are self-evident which are recognised at once, as soon as the terms in which they are expressed are known. Such a truth is the assertion that God exists: for by the name ‘God’ we understand something greater than which nothing can be thought. This notion is formed in the understanding by whoever hears and understands the name ‘God,’ so that God must already exist at least in the mind. Now He cannot exist in the mind only: for what is in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only; but nothing is greater than God, as the very meaning of the name shows: it follows that the existence of God is a self evident truth, being evidenced by the mere meaning of the name. 2. The existence of a being is conceivable, that could not be conceived not to exist; such a being is evidently greater than another that could be conceived not to exist. Thus then something greater than God is conceivable if He could be conceived not to exist; but anything ‘greater than God’ is against the meaning of the name ‘God.’ It remains then that the existence of God is a self-evident truth. 3. Those propositions are most self-evident which are either identities, as ‘Man is man,’ or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subjects, as ‘Man is an animal.’ But in God of all beings this is found true, that His existence is His essence, as will be shown later ([4]Chap. XXII); and thus there is one and the same answer to the question ‘What is He?’ and ‘Whether He is.’ [20] Thus then, when it is said ‘God is,’ the predicate is either the same with the subject or at least is included in the definition of the subject; and thus the existence of God will be a self-evident truth. 4. Things naturally known are self-evident: for the knowledge of them is not attained by enquiry and study. But the existence of God is naturally known, since the desire of man tends naturally to God as to his last end, as will be shown further on (B. III, Chap. [5]XXV). 5. That must be self-evident whereby all other things are known; but such is God; for as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual cognition. _________________________________________________________________ [19] This opinion is St Anselm’s, and the first two arguments alleged for it are his “Ontological argument for the existence of God,” revived by Descartes, rejected by Kant. See Fr Bödder’s Natural Theology, pp. 24-29 (Manuals of Catholic Philosophy). [20] The answer is that given in Exodus iii, 14: I am who am. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XI—Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons THE above opinion arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of nature; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident. Partly also it owes its origin to the neglect of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the existence of God is self-evident, since God’s essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God’s essence, his existence is not self-evident relatively to us. 1. Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meaning of the name ‘God’ is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit the existence of God, that God is something greater than which nothing can be conceived, since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal usage understands by the name ‘God’ something greater than which nothing can be conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater than which nothing can be conceived. For ‘thing’ and “notion implied in the name of the thing” must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what is declared by this name ‘God’ it does not follow that God exists otherwise than in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise than in the mind; and from this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the nonexistence of God goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought outrunning the greatness of any given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater. [21] 2. Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfection or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our understanding, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the effects which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him. 3. As it is self-evident to us that the whole is greater than its part, so the existence of God is most self-evident to them that see the divine essence, inasmuch as His essence is His existence. But because we cannot see His essence, we are brought to the knowledge of His existence, not by what He is in Himself but by the effects which He works. [22] 4. Man knows God naturally as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness, which is a certain likeness to the divine goodness. Thus it is not necessary that God, considered in Himself, should be naturally known to man, but a certain likeness of God. Hence man must be led to a knowledge of God through the likenesses of Him that are found in the effects which He works. 5. God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without His being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us. _________________________________________________________________ [21] St Thomas means: ‘If I form a notion of a thing, and then get a name to express that notion, it does not follow that the thing, answering to such name and notion, exists.’ St Anselm’s disciples reply: ‘True of the notions of all other things, as islands or dollars, which may or may not be; but not true of the notion of that one thing, whereof existence is a very part of the notion.’ In other words, whereas St Thomas denies the lawfulness of the transition from the ideal to the actual order, they maintain that the transition is lawful in arguing the existence of that one Being, who is the actuality of all that is ideal. ‘But is such actuality possible?’ ‘It is conceivable, therefore possible.’ ‘It may be conceivable, only because it is conceived inadequately, without insight into the inconsistencies which it involves.’ ‘You have no right to assume inconsistencies where you discern none,’ rejoins Leibnitz. And so this ‘ontological argument’ will be tossed up and down, as an apple of discord, to the end. [22] ‘Is a conceptual view of His essence a sufficient argument of His existence?’ That is the question which St Anselm raises. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XII—Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot be demonstrated THE falseness of this opinion is shown to us as well by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to argue causes from effects, as also by the order of the sciences, for if there be no knowable substance above sensible substances, there will be no science above physical science; as also by the efforts of philosophers, directed to the proof of the existence of God; as also by apostolic truth asserting: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i, 20). [23] The axiom that in God essence and existence are the same is to be understood of the existence whereby God subsists in Himself, the manner of which is unknown to us, as also is His essence; not of the existence which signifies an affirmative judgement of the understanding. For in the form of such affirmative judgement the fact that there is a God falls under demonstration; as our mind is led by demonstrative reasons to form such a proposition declaratory of the existence of God. [24] In the reasonings whereby the existence of God is demonstrated it is not necessary to assume for a premise the essence or quiddity [25] of God: but instead of the quiddity the effect is taken for a premise, as is done in demonstrations a posteriori from effect to cause. All the names of God are imposed either on the principle of denying of God Himself certain effects of His power, or from some habitude of God towards those effects. [26] Although God transcends sense and the objects of sense, nevertheless sensible effects are the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. Thus the origin of our own knowledge is in sense, even of things that transcend sense. _________________________________________________________________ [23] As also by the Vatican Council defining: “If any one says that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certitude by the natural light of reason through the things that are made, let him be anathema” (Sess. 3, can. 1, De Revel.) [24] Compositionem intellectus. In the language of the schoolmen, componere et dividere, ‘to put together or put asunder notions,’ means to make judgements, affirmative and negative. [25] Quiddity, quidditas, the answer to the question quid est? — ‘What is the thing essentially?’ [26] Uncreated, as a name of God, would be an example of the first; Father, of the second. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XIII—Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God WE will put first the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove the existence of God from the consideration of motion as follows. Everything that is in motion is put and kept in motion by some other thing. It is evident to sense that there are beings in motion. A thing is in motion because something else puts and keeps it in motion. That mover therefore either is itself in motion or not. If it is not in motion, our point is gained which we proposed to prove, namely, that we must posit something which moves other things without being itself in motion, and this we call God. But if the mover is itself in motion, then it is moved by some other mover. Either then we have to go on to infinity, or we must come to some mover which is motionless; but it is impossible to go on to infinity, therefore we must posit some motionless prime mover. In this argument there are two propositions to be proved: that everything which is in motion is put and kept in motion by something else; and that in the series of movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity. [27] The Philosopher also goes about in another way to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the series of efficient causes, but we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. The way is more or less as follows. In every series of efficient causes, the first term is cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is cause of the last. But if in efficient causes there is a process to infinity, none of the causes will be the first: therefore all the others will be taken away which are intermediate. But that is manifestly not the case; therefore we must posit the existence of some first efficient cause, which is God. [28] Another argument is brought by St John Damascene (De Fid. Orthod. I, 3), thus: It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one harmonious order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore there must be some Power by whose providence the world is governed; and that we call God. [29] _________________________________________________________________ [27] I refrain from translating the rest of this lengthy argument, based upon the treacherous foundation of Aristotelian Physics. See Aristotle, Physics, vii, viii Metaphysics, xi, 7. Whoever will derive an argument for the divine existence from the mechanism of the heavens must take his principles from Newton, not from Aristotle. Besides Motion he must take account of Force and Energy, not to say of Cosmic Evolution. He must know not only the motion of impact, as when a row of ninepins knock one another down from a push given to the first, but also the motion that is set up by gravitation. Aristotle knew nothing of gravitation; and only half knew the inertia of matter declared by Newton’s first law of motion. He supposed that motion, of its own nature, not only needed starting but also needed continual keeping up by some continually acting cause. He did not know that the question with a moving body is, not what there is to keep it in motion, but what there is to stop it. It would be a mistake to represent the Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover as referring to some primitive push, or some rotary motion started in the primitive nebula, at the first creation of matter. Matter, to Aristotle, to Plato, and to the Greeks generally, is eternal, not created. I need hardly add that between an immovable Prime Mover and a Personal God a wide gulf intervenes which Aristotle does not bridge over. See however [6]Chapter XXIII of this Book. The whole idea of a Prime Mover has vanished from modern physics. The whole universe, as we know it, is a congeries of sun-and-planet systems — some of them apparently still in process of formation — arranged possibly in the shape of a huge convex lens. These bodies act and react on each other. And besides these molar motions there are also molecular motions quite as real. The causes of these motions are innumerable forces. The study of them carries us back to consider the ‘primitive collocation’ of the forces of the universe, a collocation whereby they were arranged in a ‘position of advantage,’ so that out of their interaction has ensued this orderly world, and in it our earth, fit habitation for living things. On this ‘primitive collocation,’ Father Bödder writes (Natural Theology, p. 56): “Although we have nothing to say against the assumption made by astronomers, that our cosmic system resulted from the condensation and division of a primitive rotating nebula; yet we cannot admit this nebula without observing that there must have been a first arrangement of the material elements which constituted it, one which already contained the present system, or else the said system could never have resulted from it. Now this first arrangement was neither the effect of the forces of matter, nor was it essential to matter. . . . Therefore if we would explain the origin of that system without violation of reason, we are forced to say that its first beginning, nebular or otherwise, is due to an intelligent cause.” To this effect he adds this quotation from Huxley (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 201, 202): “The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe.” Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, I translate “Everything in motion is put and kept in motion by another”: such is the sense of St Thomas and of Aristotle. The ab alio however is not in Aristotle. His words are: “Everything in motion must be put and kept in motion by something” (Phys. vii, 1); and he adds: “Everything in local motion is moved either by itself or by another” (Physics, vii, 2) Things that had souls he thought were moved by themselves, and especially the heavenly bodies, which were guided by some sort of animating soul in perpetual circular motion. St Thomas (B. III, Chap. [7]LXXXVII, in the Latin) has his doubts as to the heavenly bodies being animated. He considers however (B. III, Chap. [8]LXXXII) “that sublunary bodies are ruled by God through the heavenly bodies.” Taking ‘movement’ for ‘local motion,’ the argument of the Prime Mover, for a modern mind, resolves itself into the question of ‘primitive collocation.’ Some collocation is presupposed to every mechanical problem. ‘Why this collocation rather than that?” is a question answerable only either by a regressus in infinitum (Q.E.A.) or by an invocation of Mind and Design. The argument however may, avail itself of a wider meaning of motus, namely, change; and contend that, at the back of the changes apparent everywhere, there must he some Changeless Being, author and guide of this changing universe. So presented, it is sometimes called the ‘argument from contingent to necessary being.’ [28] A rough outline of the argument of the First Cause. There is some trace of it in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii, 3. [29] The argument from Design, on which see Bödder, Nat. Theol., pp. 46-61. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XIV—That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation [30] AFTER showing that there is a First Being, whom we call God, we must enquire into the conditions of His existence. We must use the method of negative differentiation, particularly in the consideration of the divine substance. For the divine substance, by its immensity, transcends every form that our intellect can realise; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. [31] The more we can negatively differentiate it, or the more attributes we can strike off from it in our mind, the more we approach to a knowledge of it: for we know each thing more perfectly, the fuller view we have of its differences as compared with other things; for each thing has in itself a proper being, distinct from all others. Hence in dealing with things that we can define, we first place them in some genus, by which we know in general what the thing is; and afterwards we add the differentias whereby the thing is distinguished from other things; and thus is achieved a complete knowledge of the substance of the thing. But because in the study of the divine substance we cannot fix upon anything for a genus (Chap. [9]XXV), nor can we mark that substance off from other things by affirmative differentias, we must determine it by negative differentias. In affirmative differentias one limits the extension of another, and brings us nearer to a complete designation of the thing under enquiry, inasmuch as it makes that thing differ from more and more things. And the same holds good also of negative differentias. For example, we may say that God is not an accident, in that He is distinguished from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a body, we shall further distinguish Him from some substances; and so in order by such negations He will be further distinguished from everything besides Himself; and then there will be a proper notion of His substance, when He shall be known as distinct from all. Still it will not be a perfect knowledge, because He will not be known for what He is in Himself. [32] To proceed therefore in the knowledge of God by way of negative differentiation, let us take as a principle what has been shown in a previous chapter, that God is altogether immovable, which is confirmed also by the authority of Holy Scripture. For it is said: I am the Lord and change not (Mal. iii, 6); With whom there is no change (James i, 17); God is not as man, that he should change (Num. xxiii, 19). [33] _________________________________________________________________ [30] ‘Negative differentiation,’ the chapter will explain the phrase. In St Thomas it is remotio. [31] St Gregory Nazianzen, in one of his poems, calls God “one and all things and nothing.” In the Summa Theologica, B. I, q. 13, art. 2, St Thomas guards his statement thus: “Of the names that are predicated of God absolutely and affirmatively, as ‘good,’ ‘wise,’ and the like, some have said that all such names are invented rather to remove something from God than to posit anything in Him. . . . . But this account is unsatisfactory. . . . And therefore we must say otherwise, that such names do signify the divine substance . . . . but fail to represent it perfectly. . . . None of them is a perfect expression of the substance of God, but each of them signifies it imperfectly, as creatures also represent it imperfectly.” [32] Not every notion can be absolutely denied of God, as ’spirit,’ ‘power,’ ‘wise,’ ‘just.’ Although He is none of these things in a purely human sense, He is all of them in a more excellent way. [33] St Thomas passes from ‘immovable’ to ‘immutable.’ Aristotle (Physics, vii, 2), distinguishes three sorts of ‘motion’: ‘local motion’ (now the subject matter of dynamics); ‘change,’ or ‘motion in quality’ (now the matter of chemistry); ‘growth and decay,’ or ‘motion in quantity’ (matter of biology). Thus three incongruous things were labelled with one name, to the prejudice of science for many centuries. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XV—That God is Eternal THE beginning of anything and its ceasing to be is brought about by motion or change. But it has been shown that God is altogether unchangeable: He is therefore eternal, without beginning or end. [34] 2. Those things alone are measured by time which are in motion, inasmuch as time is an enumeration of motion. [35] But God is altogether without motion, and therefore is not measured by time. Therefore in Him it is impossible to fix any before or after: He has no being after not being, nor can He have any not being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being, because all this is unintelligible without time. He is therefore without beginning and without end, having all His being at once, wherein consists the essence of eternity. 3. If at some time God was not, and afterwards was, He was brought forth by some cause from not being to being. But not by Himself, because what is not cannot do anything. But if by another, that other is prior to Him. But it has been shown that God is the First Cause; therefore He did not begin to be: hence neither will He cease to be; because what always has been has the force of being always. 4. We see in the world some things which are possible to be and not to be. But everything that is possible to be has a cause: for seeing that of itself it is open to two alternatives, being and not being; if being is to be assigned to it, that must be from some cause. But we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes: therefore we must posit something that necessarily is. Now everything necessary either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, [36] or not from elsewhere, but is of itself necessary. But we cannot proceed to infinity in the enumeration of things necessary that have the cause of their necessity from elsewhere: therefore we must come to some first thing necessary, that is of itself necessary; and that is God. Therefore God is eternal, since everything that is of itself necessary is eternal. Hence the Psalmist: But thou, O Lord, abidest for ever: thou art the self-same, and thy years shall not fail (Ps. ci, 13-28). _________________________________________________________________ [34] But all our experience of life involves change. Our experience lends itself more readily to the conception of eternal death than of eternal life. To our eye, the motionless and changeless is the dead, the effete and exhausted, or the inanimate. Yet we dare to predicate eternity of a living God! The difficulty is met in the next chapter, where it is argued that God is pure actuality, an activity and life so full as to be above change. [35] “An enumeration of motion in respect of before and after,” says Aristotle, Physics, iv, 11 ult. The unit in this enumeration is one revolution of the earth on its axis. [36] In which case it is what Aristotle calls ‘not absolutely necessary, but following necessarily’ upon the existence of something else, which may or may not be. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XVI—That in God there is no Passive Potentiality [37] EVERYTHING that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is in God no potentiality. 2. Although in order of time that which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in actuality, is in potentiality before it is in actuality, yet, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality, [38] because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but is brought into actuality by something which is already in actuality. [39] Everything therefore that is any way in potentiality has something else prior to it. But God is the First Being and the First Cause, and therefore has not in Himself any admixture of potentiality. 4. Everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. [40] Whatever then is not all actuality, does not act by its whole self, but by something of itself. But what does not act by its whole self, is not a prime agent; for it acts by participation in something else, not by its own essence. The prime agent then, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure actuality. 6. We see that there is that in the world which passes from potentiality to actuality. But it does not educe itself from potentiality to actuality, because what is in potentiality is not as yet, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be some other prior thing, whereby this thing may be brought out from potentiality to actuality. And again, if this further thing is going out from potentiality to actuality, there must be posited before it yet some other thing, whereby it may be reduced to actuality. But this process cannot go on for ever: therefore we must come to something that is only in actuality, and nowise in potentiality; and that we call God. [41] _________________________________________________________________ [37] Potentia passiva, the Aristotelian ‘potentiality’ in its opposition to ‘act.’ Taken actively, the word potentia is to be rendered ‘Power,’ not ‘potentiality.’ As God possesses the power to create whatever can be made at all, there is in Him the promise and potency of all possible being. In Him all things that are or ever can be exist ‘eminently and virtually.’ He is all that they are, but in a better and more excellent way, — in some such way as a seal is in regard of all the impressions that ever can be taken of it, or as a king in regard of a viceroy or lord-lieutenant: so much so that actual creation makes no addition to God or to the sum total of Being absolutely speaking. — Cf. Isa. xl. [38] ‘Actuality is prior to potentiality.’ The whole metaphysical proof of the existence of God may be said to be summed up in these words. [39] A metaphysical and therefore more general statement of the physical law of inertia. [40] ‘Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality,’ is a favourite axiom of the schoolmen, to which there is a reciprocal: ‘Everything that is acted upon is acted upon inasmuch as it is in potentiality’: which is also put thus, ‘Everything received is received according to the mode of the recipient.’ ‘To be in actuality,’ is something akin to the modern conception of ‘energy.’ Every agent then acts according to its proximately available energy. A man does only what he is ‘up to doing.’ [41] This last is in substance the whole argument of Chap. XIII. St Thomas is thinking of such an instance in the first place as the birth of a child, or the growth of a crop of wheat. Intellectual agents have some limited power of educing themselves from potentiality to actuality, e.g., from armed peace to war: but their case is not under consideration here. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XVIII—That in God there is no Composition IN every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of things cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being in a manner tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus got together are in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, after having been potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: therefore there is not in Him any composition. [42] 3. Every compound is potentially soluble in respect of its being compound, although in some cases there may be some other fact that stands in the way of dissolution. But what is soluble is in potentiality not to be, which cannot be said of God, seeing that He is of Himself a necessary Being. _________________________________________________________________ [42] Read: “Non enim plura possunt fieri unum, nisi aliquid ibi sit actus et aliquid potentia. Quae enim non sunt unum simpliciter, actu non uniuntur, nisi quasi colligata vel sicut congregata: in quibus etiam ipsae partes congregatae sunt sicut in potentia respectu unionis.” _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XX—That God is Incorporeal EVERY corporeal thing, being extended, is compound and has parts. But God is not compound: therefore He is not anything corporeal. 5. According to the order of objects is the order and distinction of powers: therefore above all sensible objects there is some intelligible object, existing in the nature of things. But every corporeal thing existing in nature is sensible: therefore there is determinable above all corporeal things something nobler than they. If therefore God is corporeal, He is not the first and greatest Being. [43] With this demonstrated truth divine authority also agrees. For it is said: God is a spirit (John iv, 24): To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, only God (1 Tim. i, 17): The invisible things of God are understood and discerned by the things that are made (Rom. i, 29). For the things that are discerned, not by sight but by understanding, are incorporeal. Hereby is destroyed the error of the first natural philosophers, who posited none but material causes. The Gentiles also are refuted, who set up the elements of the world, and the powers therein existing, for gods; also the follies of the Anthropomorphite heretics, who figured God under bodily lineaments; also of the Manicheans, who thought God was an infinite substance of light diffused through infinite space. The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking of divine things, men came under the influence of the imagination, which can be cognisant only of bodily likeness. And therefore we must transcend imagination in the study of things incorporeal. _________________________________________________________________ [43] I have not translated the rest of this long chapter, founded as most of it is upon Aristotelian physics. One leading characteristic of bodies, inertia, may be confidently fixed upon as not predicable of the Supreme Being. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXI—That God is His own Essence [44] IN everything that is not its own essence, quiddity, or nature, there must be some composition. For since in everything its own essence is contained, — if in anything there were contained nothing but its essence, the whole of that thing would be its essence, and so itself would be its own essence. If then anything is not its own essence, there must be something in that thing besides its essence, and so there must be in it composition. Hence also the essence in compound things is spoken of as a part, as humanity in man. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. God therefore is His own essence. 2. That alone is reckoned to be beyond the essence of a thing, which does not enter into its definition: for the definition declares what the thing essentially is. But the accidents of a thing are the only points about it which fall not within the definition: therefore the accidents are the only points about a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown (Chap. [10]XXIII): therefore there is nothing in Him besides His essence. 3. The forms that are not predicable of subsistent things, whether in the universal or in the singular, are forms that do not of themselves subsist singly, individualised in themselves. It is not said that Socrates or man or animal is whiteness; because whiteness is not anything subsisting singly in itself, but is individualised by the substance in which it exists. Also the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualised according to the definite matter of this or that individual, although the generic or specific quiddity includes form and matter in general: hence it is not said that Socrates or man is humanity. But the Divine Essence is something existing singly by itself, and individualised in itself, as will be shown ([11]Chap. XLII). The Divine Essence therefore is predicated of God in such a way that it can be said: ‘God is His own essence.’ [45] _________________________________________________________________ [44] That is to say, whatever God is, He essentially is, which cannot be said of man: for there are many things in and about every man over and above what is essential to his being man [45] Humanity is not man, but Deity is God. In every man, besides his humanity, or specific nature, there are his individual characteristics (accidentia individuantia). God is not made up of a specific nature with individual characteristics. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXII—That in God Existence and Essence is the same [46] IT has been shown above (Chap. [12]XV, n. 4) that there is an Existence which of itself necessarily is; and that is God. If this existence, which necessarily is, is contained in some essence not identical with it, then either it is dissonant and at variance with that essence, as subsistent existence is at variance with the essence of whiteness; or it is consonant with and akin to that essence, as existence in something other than itself is consonant with whiteness. In the former case, the existence which of itself necessarily is will not attach to that essence, any more than subsistent existence will attach to whiteness. In the latter case, either such existence must depend on the essence, or both existence and essence depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the existence. The former two suppositions are against the idea of a being which of itself necessarily is; because, if it depends on another thing, it no longer is necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that that essence is accidental and adventitious to the thing which of itself necessarily is; because all that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it; and thus the supposed essence will not be the essence at all. God therefore has no essence that is not His existence. 2. Everything is by its own existence. Whatever then is not its own existence does not of itself necessarily exist. But God does of Himself necessarily exist: therefore God is His own existence. 4. ‘Existence’ denotes a certain actuality: for a thing is not said to ‘be’ for what it is potentially, but for what it is actually. But everything to which there attaches an actuality, existing as something different from it, stands to the same as potentiality to actuality. If then the divine essence is something else than its own existence, it follows that essence and existence in God stand to one another as potentiality and actuality. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing of potentiality (Chap. [13]XVI), but that He is pure actuality. Therefore God’s essence is not anything else but His existence. [47] 5. Everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of several things is compound. But nothing in which essence is one thing, and existence another, can be except by the concurrence of several things, to wit, essence and existence. Therefore everything in which essence is one thing, and existence another, is compound. But God is not compound, as has been shown (Chap. [14]XVIII). Therefore the very existence of God is His essence. This sublime truth was taught by the Lord to Moses (Exod. iii, 13, 14) If they say to me, What is his name? what shall I say to them? Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you: showing this to be His proper name, He who is. But every name is given to show the nature or essence of some thing. Hence it remains that the very existence or being of God is His essence or nature. _________________________________________________________________ [46] That is to say, it is the same thing for God to be at all and to be exactly what He is. ‘Godhead’ and ‘this God’ are identical. No one possibly could be God save Him alone who actually is God. In God the ideal order and the actual order coincide, the order of thought (essence) and the order of being (existence). [47] This distinction of actuality and potentiality is the saving of philosophy. Even physical science in our day has found ‘potential’ a convenient term. The distinction is heedlessly abolished by those who put activity for being, and seem to think that the human mind itself would perish the moment it ceased to act, as though there could be no reality that was not actualised. But perfect actuality can be nothing less than God: so that if actuality alone exists without potentiality, God alone exists. Nature by the institution of sleep teaches us to distinguish the potential from the actual. If mind may be dormant and yet not cease to be, so may the objects of mind be dormant — unobserved by human sense, unpictured in human imagination, unrecalled in human memory, or even wholly out of the ken of human knowledge, — and still really and truly be, as “permanent possibilities of sensation” or of cognition. This phrase of J. S. Mill is felicitous, if we remember, as he did not, that a “permanent possibility” is something raised above nothingness. Here then we have the confutation of idealism, of Berkeley and Kant and all their tribe. Phenomena, or appearances, cannot be actual to man except as objects of sensation or other human cognition: but they may very well be and are potential, observable though unobserved, out of all human mind. Potentiality however cannot be mere potentiality: it must rest on something actual. The actuality on which potential phenomena, appearances or accidents rest, is the substance in which they inhere. The horns then of idealism are broken. Subject is not percipere; object is not percipi. If any one claims the liberty of using such a terminology, he must at least be brought to an admission that there is much of Mind which is not subject in his sense, and much of Matter that is not object. Mind and Matter are like sea and land, two vast potentialities. They meet on the coast-line: but the coast-line of percipere and percipi is far from being the whole reality. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXIII—That in God there is no Accident EVERYTHING that is in a thing accidentally has a cause for its being therein, seeing that it is beside the essence of the thing wherein it is. If then there is anything in God accidentally, this must be by some cause. Either therefore the cause of the accident is the Divinity itself, or something else. If something else, that something must act upon the divine substance: for nothing induces any form, whether substantial or accidental, in any recipient, except by acting in some way upon it, because acting is nothing else than making something actually be, which is by a form. Thus God will be acted upon and moved by some agent, which is against the conclusions of Chapter [15]XIII. But if the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident supposed to be in it, then, — inasmuch as it cannot possibly be the cause of it in so far as it is the recipient of it, because at that rate the same thing in the same respect would actualise itself, — then this accident, supposed to be in God, needs must be received by Him in one respect and caused by Him in another, even as things corporeal receive their proper accidents by the virtue of their matter, and cause them by their form. Thus then God will be compound, the contrary of which has been above proved. [48] > 4. In whatever thing anything is accidentally, that thing is in some way changeable in its nature: for accident as such may be and may not be in the thing in which it is. If then God has anything attaching to Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable, the contrary of which has above been proved (Chap. [16]XIII, [17]XV). 5. A thing into which an accident enters, is not all and everything that is contained in itself: because accident is not of the essence of the subject. But God is whatever He has in Himself. Therefore in God there is no accident. — The premises are proved thus. Everything is found more excellently in cause than in effect. [49] But God is cause of all: therefore whatever is in Him is found there in the most excellent way possible. But what most perfectly attaches to a thing is the very thing itself. This unity of identity is more perfect than the substantial union of one element with another, e.g., of form with matter; and that union again is more perfect than the union that comes of one thing being accidentally in another. It remains therefore that God is whatever He has. Hence Augustine (De Trinitate, v, c. 4, n. 5): “There is nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or perishable.” The showing forth of this truth is the confutation of sundry Saracen jurists, who suppose certain “ideas” superadded to the Divine Essence. [50] _________________________________________________________________ [48] A body, according to St Thomas, is made up of a potential subject, called ‘matter,’ connaturally extended in space; and further of an actuating principle of energy, called ’substantial form,’ which is so united to the potential subject, or ‘matter,’ that the latter thereby becomes an individual body within a definite species, deriving its power of action from the ’substantial form,’ or principle of energy. [49] Shakespeare’s genius was a better thing than Shakespeare’s Othello. Ordinarily, the cause is not permanently exhausted by the effort of causation; more remains behind than has been put into the effect. A man is more proud of what he can do than of what he has done. There would be small satisfaction in viewing a work of your mind, or of your hands, if you felt that your hand had lost its cunning, and your mind was now effete. [50] Intentiones. For intentio meaning idea, see B. I, Chap. LIII. The reference is to archetypal ideas of creation, something akin to the Platonic Ideas, the “multitude of things intelligible,” discussed in Chap. L-LV of this book. The ‘Saracen jurists’ (Saracenorum in jure loquentium) are apparently Avicenna and his school, against whom these chapters are directed. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXIV—That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia [51] IT is impossible for anything actually to be, unless all things exist whereby its substantial being is characterised. An animal cannot actually be without being either a rational or an irrational animal. Hence the Platonists, in positing Ideas, did not posit self-existent Ideas of genera, seeing that genera are characterised and brought to specific being by addition of essential differentias; but they posited self-existent Ideas of species alone, seeing that for the (further) characterising of species (in the individuals belonging to it) there is no need of essential differentias. [52] If then the existence of God is characterised and receives an essential characteristic by the addition of something else, that existence will not of itself actually be except by having that other thing superadded to it. But the existence of God is His own very substance, as has been shown. It would follow that the substance of God could not actually be except by something supervening upon it; and thence the further conclusion would ensue that the substance of God is not of itself necessarily existent, the contrary of which has been shown above (Chap. [18]XV, n. 4) 2. Everything that needs something superadded to enable it to be, is in potentiality in respect of that addition. Now the divine substance is not in any way in potentiality, as has been shown (Chap. [19]XVI), but God’s own substance is God’s own being. Therefore His existence cannot be characterised by any superadded substantial characteristic. _________________________________________________________________ [51] This and the next chapter go to show that the logical arrangement is inapplicable to God, by which genus and differentia together constitute the species or definition, as animal and rational make up man. [52] There is an ideal or typical man in the Platonic scale, but no ideal animal. The former is specific in reference to Socrates, the latter would be generic. The type stops at the species. This piece of Platonism is not formulated in the writings of Plato. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXV—That God is not in any Genus EVERYTHING that is in any genus has something in it whereby the nature of the genus is characterised and reduced to species: for there is nothing in the genus that is not in some species of it. But this is impossible in God, as has been shown in the previous chapter. 2. If God is in any genus, He is either in the genus of accident or the genus of substance. He is not in the genus of accident, for an accident cannot be the first being and the first cause. Again, He cannot be in the genus of substance: for the substance that is a genus is not mere existence [53] : otherwise every substance would be its own existence, since the idea of the genus is maintained in all that is contained under the genus: at that rate no substance would be caused by another, which is impossible (Chap. [20]XIII, [21]XV). But God is mere existence: therefore He is not in any genus. 3. Whatever is in a genus differs in point of existence from other things that are in the same genus: otherwise genus would not be predicated of several things. But all things that are in the same genus must agree in the quiddity, or essence, of the genus: because of them all genus is predicated so as to answer the question what (quid) each thing is. [54] Therefore the existence of each thing that exists in a genus is something over and above the quiddity of the genus. But that is impossible in God. [55] 4. Everything is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity. But the quiddity of God is His own mere (full) existence [56] . Now a thing is not ranked in a genus on the score of mere (bare) existence: otherwise ‘being,’ in the sense of mere (bare) existence, would be a genus. But that ‘being’ cannot be a genus is proved in this way. If ‘being’ were a genus, some differentia would have to be found to reduce it to species. But no differentia participates in its genus: I mean, genus is never comprehended in the idea of the differentia: because at that rate genus would be put twice over in the definition of the species. [57] Differentia then must be something over and above what is understood in the idea of genus. Now nothing can be over and above what is understood by the idea of ‘being’; since ‘being’ enters into the conceivability of all things whereof it is predicated, and thus can be limited by no differentia. [58] Hence it is also apparent that God cannot be defined, because every definition is by genus and differentias. It is apparent also that there can be no demonstration of God except through some effect of His production: because the principle of demonstration is a definition of the thing defined. [59] _________________________________________________________________ [53] There is always an ambiguity in this term of ‘mere existence,’ ipsum esse, auto to einai. Either it means ens abstractissimum, the thinnest and shallowest of concepts, denoting the barest removal from nothingness: or it is ens plenissimum, being that includes (virtually at least) all other being, as the Platonic auto to kalon virtually includes all beauty. In this latter sense the term is predicable of God alone. In God ‘mere existence’ means pure actuality. [54] Quod quid est, to ti ēn einai, where quod is a clumsy equivalent for to. [55] God is mere and sheer existence, not existence modelled upon some quiddity (Chap. XXII). In this study it should be borne in mind that ‘essence’ represents the ideal order: ‘existence’ the actual. God is the unity of essence and existence, of the ideal and the actual; the point at which the potential finally vanishes into the actual. In every existent being, under God, there is an admixture of potentiality. This is to be kept steadily in view in bringing St Thomas to bear upon Kant and Hegel. [56] If God and the creatures were included in one genus, the genus could not he the ‘full existence’ (esse plenissimum) of God, for that is not predicable of the creature. We should have to fall back upon the other meaning of ipsum esse, namely, ‘bare existence,’ and upon that St Thomas argues. [57] As if we took ‘living’ for a differentia attachable to the genus ‘animal,’ and so formed a species ‘living animal.’ [58] Being means anything and everything that in any way is, and can at all be said to be removed from the merest nothing. There is being in thought, conceptual, or ideal being; and there is being of thing, — actually existent being. Being in this latter sense of what actually exists cannot be a genus, because the whole apparatus of genus, species and differentia belongs to the business of definition; and definition does not lay down actual existence (esse), but ideal being (essentia). It is no part of the definition of a triangle to state that any such things as triangles do actually exist. Therefore we read in this chapter (n. 3): “The existence of each thing that exists in a genus is something over and above the quiddity of the genus.” In other words, ‘existence’ lies outside every possible generic notion. Nor again can being in the sense of what is in thought be a genus, because such conceptual being penetrates and pervades the whole ideal order, to which genus, species and differentia belong: it is the fundamental notion of the order, and appears everywhere, and therefore cannot be screened off as a genus. — See Metaphysics in the Stonyhurst Series of “Manuals of Catholic Philosophy,” pp. 35-38. [59] God cannot be demonstrated in the Aristotelian sense, as truths are demonstrated in the exact sciences, notably mathematics. You can demonstrate in this sense nothing but what you thoroughly comprehend. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXVI—That God is not the formal or abstract being of all things THINGS are not distinguished from one another in so far as they all have being, because in this they all agree. If therefore things do differ from one another, either ‘being’ itself must be specified by certain added differentias, so that different things have a different specific being; or things must differ in this that ‘being’ itself attaches to specifically different natures. The first alternative is impossible, because no addition can be made to ‘being,’ in the way that differentia is added to genus, as has been said (Chap. [22]XXV, n. 4). It remains therefore that things differ in that they have different natures, to which ‘being’ accrues differently. But the divine being is not something accessory to any nature, but is the very nature or essence of God (Chap. [23]XXII). If therefore the divine being were the formal and abstract being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one. [60] 4. What is common to many is not anything over and above the many except in thought alone. For example, ‘animal’ is not anything over and above Socrates and Plato and other animals, except in the mind that apprehends the form of ‘animal’ despoiled of all individualising and specifying marks: for what is really animal is man: otherwise it would follow that in Plato there were several animals, to wit, animal in general, and man in general, and Plato himself. Much less then is bare being in general anything over and above all existing things, except in the mind alone. If then God be being in general, God will be nothing more than a logical entity, something that exists in the mind alone. This error is set aside by the teaching of Holy Scripture, which confesses God lofty and high (Isa. vi, 1), and that He is above all (Rom. ix, 5). For if He is the being of all, then He is something of all, not above all. The supporters of this error are also cast out by the same sentence which casts out idolaters, who gave the incommunicable name of God to stocks and stones (Wisd. xiv, 8, 21). For if God were the being of all, it would not be more truly said, ‘A stone is a being,’ than ‘A stone is God.’ What has led men into this error is a piece of faulty reasoning. For, seeing that what is common to many is specialised and individualised by addition, they reckoned that the divine being, to which no addition is made, was not any individual being, but was the general being of all things: failing to observe that what is common or universal cannot really exist without addition, but merely is viewed by the mind without addition. ‘Animal’ cannot be without ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ as a differentia, although it may be thought of without these differentias. [61] Moreover, though the universal be thought of without addition, yet not without susceptibility of addition. ‘Animal’ would not be a genus if no differentia could be added to it; and so of other generic names. But the divine being is without addition, not only in thought, but also in rerum natura; and not only without addition, but without even susceptibility of addition. Hence from this very fact, that He neither receives nor can receive addition, we may rather conclude that God is not being in general, but individual being: for by this very fact His being is distinguished from all other beings, that nothing can be added to it. (Chap. [24]XXIV). _________________________________________________________________ [60] If all things agreed in being — and that the divine being — all things would agree also in nature, since the being of God is simply identical with His nature. Agreeing at once in being and in nature, they would agree all over, all would be absolutely one, and one great and sole Reality would pervade and constitute the universe. To erect such a ‘Reality,’ or ‘Idea,’ or ‘Absolute,’ and then to proclaim it God, is pantheism. St Thomas argues that this all-pervading entity is not the universe, still less is it God: it has no concrete existence whatever: it is the shallowest, poorest and barest of the mind’s creations, extending to and denoting everything, and therefore meaning and comprehending next to nothing. In its fourth canon, De Deo Creatore, the Vatican Council anathematises any who say that “God is a universal or indefinite being, which by self-determination constitutes the universe.” [61] This statement, along with the previous ([25]n. 4), is St Thomas’s repudiation of ultra-realism, a doctrine with which the schoolmen are often charged, as though they gave the objects of universal concepts, as universal, a place in rerum natura. The neo-Kantian school, identifying reality with thought, may be more open to the accusation. Is not the old mediaeval strife about ‘universals’ still being waged under other names? Modern scholars make a great difficulty of admitting that the “common element” in a number of similar objects, e.g., of dogs, can be thought of without addition of colour, size, and other points, which go to individualise this dog. Take all those points away, they say, and you have nothing left. Certainly you have no picture in the imagination left. But cursory, rapid thinking, — and such is our usual thinking, — is done without any picture in the imagination; we think vaguely, or, as Cardinal Newman in the Grammar of Assent calls it, “notionally.” Only in vivid thought is a sensible picture in the imagination formed, and the apprehension becomes what Newman calls “real.” The object then appears with its individualising features upon the imaginative canvas, the mind meanwhile remarking to itself that this figure, e.g., of this dog, is a specimen or type, to which other objects will conform with various differences. _________________________________________________________________ CHAPTER XXVIII—That God is Universal Perfection AS all perfection and nobility is in a thing inasmuch as the thing is, so every defect is in a thing inasmuch as the thing in some manner is not. As then God has being in its totality, so not-being is totally removed from Him, because the measure in which a thing has being is the measure of its removal from not-being. Therefore all defect is absent from God: He is t