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   Title: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by
   Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo
   Creator(s): Anselm, Saint, Archbishop of Canterbury (1033-1109)
   CCEL Subjects: All; Classic; Theology; Proofed;
   LC Call no: B765 .A83 P73
   LC Subjects:

   Philosophy (General)

   By Period (Including individual philosophers and schools of philosophy)
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ST. ANSELM

                            PROSLOGIUM; MONOLOGIUM;

                 AN APPENDIX IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL BY GAUNILON;

  AND

                                 CUR DEUS HOMO

  TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN

  BY

  SIDNEY NORTON DEANE, B. A.

    WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND REPRINTS

    OF THE OPINIONS OF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS AND

    WRITERS ON THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT


    REPRINT EDITION


    CHICAGO

    THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

    1926

   TRANSLATION OF

   PROSLOGIUM, MONOLOGIUM, AND APPENDIX

   COPYRIGHTED BY

   THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

   1903
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                                 INTRODUCTION.

   THE present volume of St. Anselm's most important philosophical and
   theological writings contains: (1) The Proslogium (2) the Monologium,
   (3) the Cur Deus Homo, and (4) by way of historical complement, an
   Appendix to the Monologium entitled In Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon,
   a monk of Marmoutiers. The Proslogium (which, though subsequent in
   point of time to the Monologium, is here placed first, as containing
   the famous ontological argument), the Monologium and the Appendix
   thereto were translated by Mr. Sidney Norton Deane, of New Haven,
   Conn.; the Cur Deus Homo was rendered by James Gardiner Vose, formerly
   of Milton, Conn., and later of Providence, R. I., and published in 1854
   and 1855 in the Bibliotheca Sacra, then issued at Andover, Mass., by
   Warren F. Draper. The thanks of the reading public are due to all these
   gentlemen for their gratuitous labors in behalf of philosophy.

   Welch's recent book Anselm and His Work, by its accessibility, renders
   any extended biographical notice of Anselm unneccessary. We append,
   therefore, merely a few brief paragraphs from Weber's admirable History
   of Philosophy on Anselm's position in the world of thought, and we
   afterwards add (this, at the suggestion of Prof. George M. Duncan, of
   Yale University) a series of quotations regarding Anselm's most
   characteristic contribution to philosophy --the ontological argument
   --from Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Dorner, Lotze,
   and Professor Flint. A bibliography also has been compiled. Thus the
   work will give full material and indications for the original study of
   one of the greatest exponents of Christian doctrine.
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   ANSELM'S PHILOSOPHY.

   (AFTER WEBER. [1] )

   "The first really speculative thinker after Scotus is St. Anselmus, the
   disciple of Lanfranc. He was born at Aosta (1033), entered the
   monastery of Bec in Normandy (1060), succeeded Lanfranc as Abbot
   (1078), and as Archbishop of Canterbury (1093). He died in 1109. He
   left a great number of writings, the most important of which are: the
   Dialogus de grammatico, the Monologium de divinitatis essentia sive
   Exemplum de ratione fidei, the Proslogium sive Fides quoerens
   intellectum, the De veritate, the De fide trinitatis, and the Cur Deus
   Homo?

   "The second Augustine, as St. Anselmus had been called, starts out from
   the same principle as the first; he holds that faith precedes all
   reflection and all discussion concerning religious things. The
   unbelievers, he says, strive to understand because they do not believe;
   we, on the contrary, strive to understand because we believe. They and
   we have the same object in view; but inasmuch as they do not believe,
   they cannot arrive at their goal, which is to understand the dogma. The
   unbeliever will never understand. In religion faith plays the part
   played by experience in the understanding of the things of this world.
   The blind man cannot see the light, and therefore does not understand
   it; the deaf-mute, who has never perceived sound, cannot have a clear
   idea of sound. Similarly, not to believe means not to perceive, and not
   to perceive means not to understand. Hence, we do not reflect in order
   that we may believe; on the contrary, we believe in order that we may
   arrive at knowledge. A Christian ought never to doubt the beliefs and
   teachings of the Holy Catholic Church. All he can do is to strive, as
   humbly as possible, to understand her teachings by believing them, to
   love them, and resolutely to observe them in his daily life. Should he
   succeed in understanding the Christian doctrine, let him render thanks
   to God, the source of all intelligence! In case he fails, that is no
   reason why he should obstinately attack the dogma, but a reason why he
   should bow his head in worship. Faith ought not merely to be the
   starting-point, --the Christian's aim is not to depart from faith but
   to remain in it, --but also the fixed rule and goal of thought, the
   beginning, the middle, and the end of all philosophy.

   "The above almost literal quotations might give one the impression that
   St. Anselmus belongs exclusively to the history of theology. Such is
   not the case, however. This fervent Catholic is more independent, more
   of an investigator and philosopher than he himself imagines. He is a
   typical scholastic doctor and a fine exponent of the alliance between
   reason and faith which forms the characteristic trait of mediaeval
   philosophy. He assumes, a priori, that revelation and reason are in
   perfect accord. These two manifestations of one and the same Supreme
   Intelligence cannot possibly contradict each other. Hence, his point of
   view is diametrically opposed to the credo quia absurdum. Moreover, he
   too had been besieged by doubt. Indeed, the extreme ardor which impels
   him to search everywhere for arguments favorable to the dogma, is a
   confession on his part that the dogma needs support, that it is
   debatable, that it lacks self-evidence, the criterion of truth. Even as
   a monk, it was his chief concern to find a simple and conclusive
   argument in support of the existence of God and of all the doctrines of
   the Church concerning the Supreme Being. Mere affirmation did not
   satisfy him; he demanded proofs. This thought was continually before
   his mind; it caused him to forget his meals, and pursued him even
   during the solemn moments of worship. He comes to the conclusion that
   it is a temptation of Satan, and seeks deliverance from it. But in
   vain. After a night spent in meditation, he at last discovers what be
   has been seeking for years: the incontrovertible argument in favor of
   the Christian dogma, and he regards himself as fortunate in having
   found, not only the proof of the existence of God, but his peace of
   soul. His demonstrations are like the premises of modern rationalism.

   "Everything that exists, he says, has its cause, and this cause may be
   one or many. If it is one, then we have what we are looking for: God,
   the unitary being to whom all other beings owe their origin. If it is
   manifold, there are three possibilities: (1) The manifold may depend on
   unity as its cause; or (2) Each thing composing the manifold may be
   self-caused; or (3) Each thing may owe its existence to all the other
   things. The first case is identical with the hypothesis that everything
   proceeds from a single cause; for to depend on several causes, all of
   which depend on a single cause, means to depend on this single cause.
   In the second case, we must assume that there is a power, force, or
   faculty of self-existence common to all the particular causes assumed
   by the hypothesis; a power in which all participate and are comprised.
   But that would give us what we had in the first case, an absolute
   unitary cause. The third supposition, which makes each of the `first
   causes' depend on all the rest, is absurd; for we cannot hold that a
   thing has for its cause and condition of existence a thing of which it
   is itself the cause and condition. Hence we are compelled to believe in
   a being which is the cause of every existing thing, without being
   caused by anything itself, and which for that very reason is infinitely
   more perfect than anything else: it is the most real (ens realissimum),
   most powerful, and best being. Since it does not depend on any being or
   on any condition of existence other than itself it is a se and per se;
   it exists, not because something else exists, but it exists because it
   exists; that is, it exists necessarily, it is necessary being.

   "It would be an easy matter to deduce pantheism from the arguments of
   the Monologium. Anselmus, it is true, protests against such an
   interpretation of his theology. With St. Augustine he assumes that the
   world is created ex nihilo. But though accepting this teaching, he
   modifies it. Before the creation, he says, things did not exist by
   themselves, independently of God; hence we say they were derived from
   non-being. But they existed eternally for God and in God, as ideas;
   they existed before their creation in the sense that the Creator
   foresaw them and predestined them for existence.

   "The existence of God, the unitary and absolute cause of the world,
   being proved, the question is to determine his nature and attributes.
   God's perfections are like human perfections; with this difference,
   however, that they are essential to him, which is not the case with us.
   Man has received a share of certain perfections, but there is no
   necessary correlation between him and these perfections; it would have
   been possible for him not to receive them; he could have existed
   without them. God, on the contrary, does not get his perfections from
   without: he has not received them, and we cannot say that he has them;
   he is and must be everything that these perfections imply; his
   attributes are identical with his essence. Justice, an attribute of
   God, and God are not two separate things. We cannot say of God that he
   has justice or goodness; we cannot even say that be is just; for to be
   just is to participate in justice after the manner of creatures. God is
   justice as such, goodness as such, wisdom as such, happiness as such,
   truth as such, being as such. Moreover, all of God's attributes
   constitute but a single attribute, by virtue of the unity of his
   essence (unum est quidquid essentialiter de summa substantia dicitur).

   "All this is pure Platonism. But, not content with spiritualising
   theism, Anselmus really discredits it when, like a new Carneades, he
   enumerates the difficulties which he finds in the conception. God is a
   simple being and at the same time eternal, that is, diffused over
   infinite points of time; he is omnipresent, that is, distributed over
   all points of space. Shall we say that God is omnipresent and eternal?
   This proposition contradicts the notion of the simplicity of the divine
   essence. Shall we say that he is nowhere in space and nowhere in time?
   But that would be equivalent to denying his existence. Let us therefore
   reconcile these two extremes and say that God is omnipresent and
   eternal, without being limited by space or time. The following is an
   equally serious difficulty: In God there is no change and consequently
   nothing accidental. Now, there is no substance without accidents. Hence
   God is not a substance; he transcends all substance. Anselmus is
   alarmed at these dangerous consequences of his logic, and he therefore
   prudently adds that, though the term `substance' may be incorrect, it
   is, nevertheless, the best we can apply to God --si quid digne dici
   potest --and that to avoid or condemn it might perhaps jeopardise our
   faith in the reality of the Divine Being.

   "The most formidable theological antinomy is the doctrine of the
   trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence. The Word is the
   object of eternal thought; it is God in so far as he is thought,
   conceived, or comprehended by himself. The Holy Spirit is the love of
   God for the Word, and of the Word for God, the love which God bears
   himself. But is this explanation satisfactory? And does it not
   sacrifice the dogma which it professes to explain to the conception of
   unity? St. Anselmus sees in the Trinity and the notion of God
   insurmountable difficulties and contradictions, which the human mind
   cannot reconcile. In his discouragement be is obliged to confess, with
   Scotus Erigena, St. Augustine, and the Neo-Platonists, that no human
   word can adequately express the essence of the All-High. Even the words
   `wisdom' (sapientia) and `being' (essentia) are but imperfect
   expressions of what he imagines to be the essence of God. All
   theological phrases are analogies, figures of speech, and mere
   approximations.

   "The Proslogium sive Fides quoerens intellectum has the same aim as the
   Monologium: to prove the existence of God. Our author draws the
   elements of his argument from St. Augustine and Platonism. He sets out
   from the idea of a perfect being, from which he infers the existence of
   such a being. We have in ourselves, he says, the idea of an absolutely
   perfect being. Now, perfection implies existence. Hence God exists.
   This argument, which has been termed the ontological argument, found an
   opponent worthy of Anselmus in Gaunilo, a monk of Marmoutiers in
   Touraine. Gaunilo emphasises the difference between thought and being,
   and points out the fact that we may conceive and imagine a being, and
   yet that being may not exist. We have as much right to conclude from
   our idea of an enchanted island in the middle of the ocean that such an
   island actually exists. The criticism is just. Indeed, the ontological
   argument would be conclusive, only in case the idea of God and the
   existence of God in the human mind were identical. If our idea of God
   is God himself, it is evident that this idea is the immediate and
   incontrovertible proof of the existence of God. But what the theologian
   aims to prove is not the existence of the God-Idea of Plato and Hegel,
   but the existence of the personal God. However that may be, we hardly
   know what to admire most, --St. Anselmus's broad and profound
   conception, or the sagacity of his opponent who, in the seclusion of
   his cell, anticipates the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant.

   "The rationalistic tendency which we have just noticed in the
   Monologium and the Proslogium meets us again in the Cur Deus Homo? Why
   did God become man? The first word of the title sufficiently indicates
   the philosophical trend of the treatise. The object is to search for
   the causes of the incarnation. The incarnation, according to St.
   Anselmus, necessarily foIlows from the necessity of redemption. Sin is
   an offence against the majesty of God. In spite of his goodness, God
   cannot pardon sin without compounding with honor and justice. On the
   other hand, he cannot revenge himself on man for his offended honor;
   for sin is an offence of infinite degree and therefore demands infinite
   satisfaction; which means that he must either destroy humanity or
   inflict upon it the eternal punishments of hell. Now, in either case,
   the goal of creation, the happiness of his creatures, would be missed
   and the honor of the Creator compromised. There is but one way for God
   to escape this dilemma without affecting his honor, and that is to
   arrange for some kind of satisfaction. He must have infinite
   satisfaction, because the offence is immeasurable. Now, in so far as
   man is a finite being and incapable of satisfying divine justice in an
   infinite measure, the infinite being himself must take the matter in
   charge; he must have recourse to substitution. Hence, the necessity of
   the incarnation. God becomes man in Christ; Christ suffers and dies in
   our stead; thus he acquires an infinite merit and the right to an
   equivalent recompense. But since the world belongs to the Creator, and
   nothing can be added to its treasures, the recompense which by right
   belongs to Christ falls to the lot of the human race in which he is
   incorporated: humanity is pardoned, forgiven, and saved.

   "Theological criticism has repudiated Anselmus's theory, which bears
   the stamp of the spirit of chivalry and of feudal customs. But,
   notwithstanding the attacks of a superficial rationalism, there is an
   abiding element of truth in it: over and above each personal and
   variable will there is an absolute, immutable, and incorruptible will,
   called justice, honor, and duty, in conformity with the customs of the
   times."
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   [1] From Weber's History of Philosophy. Trans. by F. Thilly. New York
   Scribner's. Price, $2 50.
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   CRITICISMS OF ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL

   ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF GOD.
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   DESCARTES [2] ^

   "But now, if from the simple fact that I can draw from my thought the
   idea of anything it follows that all that I recognise clearly and
   distinctly to pertain to this thing pertains to it in reality, can I
   not draw from this an argument and a demonstration of the existence of
   God? It is certain that I do not find in me the less the idea of him,
   that is, of a being supremely perfect, than that of any figure or of
   any number whatever; and I do not know less clearly and distinctly that
   an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature than I know that
   all that I can demonstrate of any figure or of any number belongs truly
   to the nature of that figure or that number: and accordingly, although
   all that I have concluded in the preceding meditations may not turn out
   to be true, the existence of God ought to pass in my mind as being at
   least as certain as I have up to this time regarded the truths of
   mathematics to be, which have to do only with numbers and figures:
   although, indeed, that might not seem at first to be perfectly evident,
   but might appear to have some appearance of sophistry. For being
   accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence
   and essence, I easily persuade myself that existence may perhaps be
   separated from the essence of God, and thus God might be conceived as
   not existent actually. But nevertheless, when I think more attentively,
   I find that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God
   than from the essence of a rectilinear triangle can be separated the
   equality of its three angles to two right angles, or, indeed, if you
   please, from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley; so that there
   would be no less contradiction in conceiving of a God --that is, of a
   being supremely perfect, to whom existence was wanting, that is to say,
   to whom there was wanting any perfection --than in conceiving of a
   mountain which had no valley.

   "But although, in reality, I might not be able to conceive of a God
   without existence, no more than of a mountain without a valley,
   nevertheless, as from the simple fact that I conceive a mountain with a
   valley, it does not follow that there exists any mountain in the world,
   so likewise, although I conceive God as existent, it does not follow,
   it seems, from that, that God exists, for my thought does not impose
   any necessity on things; and as there is nothing to prevent my
   imagining a winged horse, although there is none which has wings, so I
   might, perhaps, be able to attribute existence to God, although there
   might not be any God which existed. So far from this being so, it is
   just here under the appearance of this objection that a sophism lies
   hid; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a
   valley, it does not follow that there exists in the world any mountain
   or any valley, but solely that the mountain and the valley, whether
   they exist or not, are inseparable from one another; whereas from the
   fact alone that I cannot conceive God except as existent, it follows
   that existence is inseparable from him, and, consequently, that he
   exists in reality; not that my thought can make it to be so, or that it
   can impose any necessity upon things; but on the contrary the necessity
   which is in the thing itself, that is to say, the necessity of the
   existence of God, determines me to have this thought.

   "For it is not at my will to conceive of a God without existence, that
   is to say, a being supremely perfect without a supreme perfection, as
   it is at my will to conceive a horse with wings or without wings.

   "And it must not also be said here that it is necessarily true that I
   should affirm that God exists, after I have supposed him to possess all
   kinds of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that my first
   supposition is not necessary, no more than it is necessary to affirm
   that all figures of four sides may be inscribed in the circle, but
   that, supposing I had this thought, I should be constrained to admit
   that the rhombus can be inscribed there, since it is a figure of four
   sides, and thus I should be constrained to admit something false. One
   ought not, I say, to allege this; for although it may not be necessary
   that I should ever fall to thinking about God, nevertheless, when it
   happens that I think upon a being first and supreme, and draw, so to
   speak, the idea of him from the store-house of mind, it is necessary
   that I attribute to him every sort of perfection, although I may not go
   on to enumerate them all, and give attention to each one in particular.
   And this necessity is sufficient to bring it about (as soon as I
   recognise that I should next conclude that existence is a perfection)
   that this first and supreme being exists: while, just as it is not
   necessary that I ever imagine a triangle, but whenever I choose to
   consider a rectilinear figure, composed solely of three angles, it is
   absolutely necessary that I attribute to it all the things which serve
   for the conclusion that there three angles are not greater than two
   right angles, although, perhaps, I did not then consider this in
   particular."
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   [2] The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from His Writings. H. A. P.
   Torrey. New York, 1892. P. 161 et seq.
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   SPINOZA [3]

   PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting, of infinite attributes, of
   which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily
   exists.

   "Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not
   exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop.
   vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

   "Another Proof. --Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be
   assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence --e. g.,
   if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its
   existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be
   granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This
   reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in
   question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the
   non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely,
   because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the
   existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as
   its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

   "But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not
   follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of
   universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either
   that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it
   should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a
   thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which
   prevents its existence.

   "If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
   existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly
   conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause,
   should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God,
   or be external to him --that is, drawn from another substance of
   another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very
   fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could
   have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be
   unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

   "As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence
   cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause
   must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature,
   which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about
   a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd;
   therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature,
   can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence.
   Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q. E. D.

   "Another proof. --The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of
   power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is
   obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite
   beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely
   infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists,
   or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we
   exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily
   exists (see Axiom i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely
   infinite --in other words, God (Def. vi.) --necessarily exists. Q. E.
   D.

   "Note. --In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence a
   posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not
   because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow a
   priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows
   that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so
   also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being
   absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely
   infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist.
   Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this
   proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things
   which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those
   which quickly come to pass --that is, quickly come into existence
   --quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
   accomplishment --that is, not so easily brought into existence --those
   things which they conceive as more complicated.

   "However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the
   measure of truth in the proverb, `What comes quickly, goes quickly,'
   nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all
   things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only remark, that I am
   not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external
   to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be
   produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external
   causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
   perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their
   external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the
   perfection by their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise,
   whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external
   cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its
   own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection
   of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts
   it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot
   be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of
   a being absolutely infinite or perfect --that is, of God. For inasmuch
   as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute
   perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away,
   and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will
   be evident to every moderately attentive reader."
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   [3] The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R.H.M.Elwes.
   London, 1848. VoI. II., P. 51 at seq.
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   LOCKE [4]

   "Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God. --How
   far the idea of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind,
   does or does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine.
   For, in the different make of men's tempers, and application of their
   thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for
   the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think this I may say,
   that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing
   atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon
   that sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God in
   their minds (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than
   none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity; and
   out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least
   endeavor to invalidate, all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken
   to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence
   and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to
   our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to
   withstand them."
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   [4] An Fssay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Ward, Lock, Co. P.
   529 et seq.
     __________________________________________________________________

   LEIBNITZ [5]

   "Although I am for innate ideas, and in particular for that of God, I
   do not think that the demonstrations of the Cartesians drawn from the
   idea of God are perfect. I have shown fully elsewhere (in the Actes de
   Leipsic, and in the Memoires de Trevoux) that what Descartes has
   borrowed from Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, is very beautiful and
   really very ingenious, but that there is still a gap therein to be
   filled. This celebrated archbishop, who was without doubt one of the
   most able men of his time, congratulates himself, not without reason,
   for having discovered a means of proving the existence of God a priori,
   by means of its own notion, without recurring to its effects. And this
   is very nearly the force of his argument: God is the greatest or (as
   Descartes says) the most perfect of beings, or rather a being of
   supreme grandeur and perfection, including all degrees thereof. That is
   the notion of God. See now how existence follows from this notion. To
   exist is something more than not to exist, or rather, existence adds a
   degree to grandeur and perfection, and as Descartes states it,
   existence is itself a perfection. Therefore this degree of grandeur and
   perfection, or rather this perfection which consists in existence, is
   in this supreme all-great, all-perfect being: for otherwise some degree
   would be wanting to it, contrary to its definition. Consequently this
   supreme being exists. The Scholastics, not excepting even their Doctor
   Angelicus, have misunderstood this argument, and have taken it as a
   paralogism; in which respect they were altogether wrong, and Descartes,
   who studied quite a long time the scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit
   College of La Fleche, had great reason for re-establishing it. It is
   not a paralogism, but it is an imperfect demonstration, which assumes
   something that must still be proved in order to render it
   mathematically evident; that is, it is tacitly assumed that this idea
   of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible, and implies no
   contradiction. And it is already something that by this remark it is
   proved that, assuming that God is Possible, he exists, which is the
   privilege of divinity alone. We have the right to presume the
   possibility of every being, and especially that of God, until some one
   proves the contrary. So that this metaphysical argument already gives a
   morally demonstrative conclusion, which declares that according to the
   present state of our knowledge we must judge that God exists, and act
   in conformity thereto. But it is to be desired, nevertheless, that
   clever men achieve the demonstration with the strictness of a
   mathematical proof, and I think I have elsewhere said something that
   may serve this end."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [5] New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Translated by A.G.
   Langley. New York, 1896. P. 502 at seq.
     __________________________________________________________________

   KANT [6]

   "Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something
   that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the admission
   of a thing, and of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is
   merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is almighty,
   contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and
   almightiness. The small word is, is not an additional predicate, but
   only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then,
   I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of
   almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new
   predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself,
   with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both
   must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been
   added to the concept, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking
   its object as simply, given and saying, it is. And thus the real does
   not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not
   contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter
   signify the concept, the former the object and its position by itself,
   it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my
   concept would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be
   its adequate concept. In my financial position no doubt there exists
   more by one hundred real dollars, than by their concept only (that is
   their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained
   analytically in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a
   determination of my state), synthetically: but the conceived hundred
   dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is
   outside my concept.

   "By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing (even
   in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add
   that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists,
   but something more than was contained in the concept, and I could not
   say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay, even if I were to
   think in a thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality
   would not be supplied by my saying that so defective a thing exists,
   but it would exist with the same defect with which I thought it; or
   what exists would be different from what I thought. If, then, I try to
   conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the
   question still remains, whether it exists or not. For though in my
   concept there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a
   thing in general, something is wanting in its relation to my whole
   state of thinking, namely, that the knowledge of that object should be
   possible a posteriori also. And here we perceive the cause of our
   difficulty. If we were concerned with an object of our senses, I could
   not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere concept of it; for by
   the concept the object is thought as only in harmony with the general
   conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it
   is thought as contained in the whole content of experience. Through
   this connection with the content of the whole experience, the concept
   of an object is not in the least increased; our thought has only
   received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are
   thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder
   that we cannot find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere
   possibility.

   "Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must
   always step outside it, in order to attribute to it existence. With
   objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with
   any one of my perceptions, according to empirical laws; with objects of
   pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence,
   because it would have to be known entirely a priori, while our
   consciousness of every kind of existence, whether immediately by
   perception, or by conclusions which connect something with perception,
   belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and any existence outside
   that field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impossible,
   is a presupposition that cannot be justified by anything.

   "The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful
   idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by
   itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even
   do so much as to inform us any further as to its possibility. The
   analytical characteristic of possibility, which consists in the absence
   of contradiction in mere positions (realities), cannot be denied to it;
   but the connection of all real properties in one and the same thing is
   a synthesis the possibility of which we cannot judge a priori because
   these realities are not given to us as such, and because, even if this
   were so, no judgment whatever takes place, it being necessary to look
   for the characteristic of the possibility of synthetical knowledge in
   experience only, to which the object of an idea can never belong. Thus
   we see that the celebrated Leibnitz is far from having achieved what we
   thought he had, namely, to understand a priori the possibility of so
   sublime an ideal Being.

   "Time and labor therefore are lost on the famous ontological
   (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from mere
   concepts; and a man might as well imagine that he could become richer
   in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to
   improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash
   account."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [6] Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by F. Max Muller. New York,
   1896. P-483 et seq.
     __________________________________________________________________

   HEGEL [7]

   "This proof was included among the various proofs up to the time of
   Kant, and --by some who have not yet reached the Kantian standpoint
   --it is so included even to the present day. It is different from what
   we find and read of amongst the ancients. For it was said that God is
   absolute thought as objective; for because things in the world are
   contingent, they are not the truth in and for itself --but this is
   found in the infinite. The scholastics also knew well from the
   Aristotelian philosophy the metaphysical proposition that potentiality
   is nothing by itself, but is clearly one with actuality. Later, on the
   other hand, the opposition between thought itself and Being began to
   appear with Anselm. It is noteworthy that only now for the first time
   through the Middle Ages and in Christianity, the universal Notion and
   Being, as it is to ordinary conception, became established in this pure
   abstraction as these infinite extremes; and thus the highest law has
   come to consciousness. But we reach our profoundest depths in bringing
   the highest opposition into consciousness. Only no advance was made
   beyond the division as such, although Anselm also tried to find the
   connection between the sides. But while hitherto God appeared as the
   absolute existent, and the universal was attributed to Him as
   predicate, an opposite order begins with Anselm --Being becomes
   predicate, and the absolute Idea is first of all established as the
   subject, but the subject of thought. Thus if the existence of God is
   once abandoned as the first hypothesis, and established as a result of
   thought, self-consciousness is on the way to turn back within itself.
   Then we have the question coming in, Does God exist? while on the other
   side the question of most importance was, What is God?

   "The ontological proof, which is the first properly metaphysical proof
   of the existence of God, consequently came to mean that God as the Idea
   of existence which unites all reality in itself, also has the reality
   of existence within Himself; this proof thus follows from the Notion of
   God, that He is the universal essence of all essence. The drift of this
   reasoning is, according to Anselm (Proslogium, C. 2), as follows: `It
   is one thing to say that a thing is in the understanding, and quite
   another to perceive that it exists. Even an ignorant person (insipiens)
   will thus be quite convinced that in thought there is something beyond
   which nothing greater can be thought ; for when he hears this he
   understands it, and everything that is understood is in the
   understanding. But that beyond which nothing greater can be thought
   cannot certainly be in the understanding alone. For if it is accepted
   as in thought alone, we may go on farther to accept it as existent;
   that, however, is something greater' than what is merely thought. `Thus
   were that beyond which nothing greater can be thought merely in the
   understanding, that beyond which nothing greater can be thought would
   be something beyond which something greater can be thought. But that is
   truly impossible; there thus without doubt exists both in the
   understanding and in reality something beyond which nothing greater can
   be thought.' The highest conception cannot be in the understanding
   alone; it is essential that it should exist. Thus it is made clear that
   Being is in a superficial way subsumed under the universal of reality,
   that to this extent Being does not enter into opposition with the
   Notion. That is quite right; only the transition is not demonstrated
   --that the subjective understanding abrogates itself. This, however, is
   just the question which gives the whole interest to the matter. When
   reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is not yet
   posited as existent, it is something thought, and rather opposed to
   Being than that this is subsumed under it.

   "This mode of arguing held good until the time of Kant; and we see in
   it the endeavor to apprehend the doctrine of the Church through reason.
   This opposition between Being and thought is the starting-point in
   philosophy, the absolute that contains the two opposites within itself
   --a conception, according to Spinoza, which involves its existence
   likewise. Of Anselm it is however to be remarked that the formal
   logical mode of the understanding, the process of scholastic reasoning
   is to be found in him; the content indeed is right, but the form
   faulty. For in the first place the expression `the thought of a
   Highest' is assumed as prius. Secondly, there are two sorts of objects
   of thought --one that is and another that is not; the object that is
   only thought and does not exist, is as imperfect as that which only is
   without being thought. The third point is that what is highest must
   likewise exist. But what is highest, the standard to which all else
   must conform, must be no mere hypothesis, as we find it represented in
   the conception of a highest acme of perfection, as a content which is
   thought and likewise is. This very content, the unity of Being and
   thought, is thus indeed the true content, but because Anselm has it
   before him only in the form of the understanding, the opposites are
   identical and conformable to unity in a third determination only --the
   Highest --which, in as far as it is regulative, is outside of them. In
   this it is involved that we should first of all have subjective
   thought, and then distinguished from that, Being. We allow that if we
   think a content (and it is apparently indifferent whether this is God
   or any other), it may be the case that this content does not exist. The
   assertion `Something that is thought does not exist' is now subsumed
   under the above standard and is not conformable to it. We grant that
   the truth is that which is not merely thought but which likewise is.
   But of this opposition nothing here is said. Undoubtedly God would be
   imperfect, if He were merely thought and did not also have the
   determination of Being. But in relation to God we must not take thought
   as merely subjective; thought here signifies the absolute, pure
   thought, and thus we must ascribe to Him the quality of Being. On the
   other hand if God were merely Being, if He were not conscious of
   Himself as self-consciousness, He would not be Spirit, a thought that
   thinks itself.

   "Kant, on the other hand, attacked and rejected Anselm's proof --which
   rejection the whole world afterwards followed up --on the ground of its
   being an assumption that the unity of Being and thought is the highest
   perfection. What Kant thus demonstrates in the present day --that Being
   is different from thought and that Being is not by any means posited
   with thought --was a criticism offered even in that time by a monk
   named Gaunilo. He combated this proof of Anselm's in a Liber pro
   insipiente to which Anselm himself directed a reply in his Liber
   apologeticus adversus insipientem. Thus Kant says (Kritik der reinen
   Vernunft, P. 464 of the sixth edition): If we think a hundred dollars,
   this conception does not involve existence. That is certainly true:
   what is only a conception does not exist, but it is likewise not a true
   content, for what does not exist, is merely an untrue conception. Of
   such we do not however here speak, but of pure thought; it is nothing
   new to say they are different --Anselm knew this just as well as we do.
   God is the infinite, just as body and soul, Being and thought are
   eternally united; this is the speculative, true definition of God. To
   the proof which Kant criticises in a manner which it is the fashion to
   follow now-a-days, there is thus lacking only the perception of the
   unity of thought and of existence in the infinite; and this alone must
   form the commencement."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [7] Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E. S. Haldane
   and F.H. Simson. London, 1896. Vol. III., p. 62 et seg.
     __________________________________________________________________

   J. A. DORNER [8]

   "According to the Monologium, we arrive at the mental representation of
   God by the agency of faith and conscience, therefore by a combined
   religious and moral method; by the same means we arrive at the
   representation of the relativity of the world. But as there seemed to
   Anselm something inadequate in making the Being of the Absolute
   dependent upon the existence of the Relative, as if the latter were
   more certain than the former, he has interpolated in the Proslogium
   (Alloquium Dei) the Ontological method. The thought of God, which is
   always given, and the being of which is to be proved, claims, at any
   rate, to be the highest thought possible; indeed, upon close comparison
   with all other thoughts which come and go, with thoughts of such things
   as may just as well not exist as exist, it has the essential
   peculiarity, the prerogative, so to speak, --and this is Anselm's
   discovery, --that, if it is actually thought of as the highest
   conceivable thought, it is also thought of as existent. Were it not
   thought of as being, it would not for a moment be actually thought.
   Anselm then proceeds with his proof as follows: `We believe Thou art
   something, beyond which nothing greater can be thought. The fool (Ps.
   xiv.) denies the existence of such a Being. Is He therefore
   non-existent? But the very fool hears and understands what I say,
   "something, greater than which there is nothing," and what he
   understands is in his understanding. That it also exists without him
   would thus have to be proved. But that, beyond which nothing greater
   can be thought, cannot exist in mere intellect. For did it exist only
   in intellect, the thought might be framed that it was realised, and
   that would be a greater thought. Consequently, were that, a greater
   than which cannot be thought, existent in mere intellect, the thought
   quo majus cogitari non potest would at the same time be quo majus
   cogitari potest, which is impossible. Consequently, there exists, in
   reality as well as in the understanding, something a greater than which
   cannot be thought. And this is so true that its non-existence cannot be
   thought. Something may be thought which is only to be thought as
   existent, and that is a majus than that the non-existence of which may
   be thought, and that Thou art, O Lord, my God, I must think though I
   did not believe.' The nerve of the Anselmic argument lies therefore in
   the notion that an idea which has an objective existence is a majus
   than that to which mere subjective existence appertains; that,
   consequently, as under the idea of God the highest thought possible is
   at any rate expressed, the idea of God is not thought unless it is
   thought as existent. For, he says in another place, it may be thought
   of everything that it does not exist, with the exception of that quod
   summe est to which being pre-eminently belongs. That is, the
   non-existence may be thought of everything which has beginning or end,
   or which is constituted of parts and is nowhere whole. But that, and it
   alone, cannot be thought as non-existent which has neither beginning
   nor end, and is not constituted of parts, but is thought of as
   everywhere existing whole. Gaunilo, Count of Montigny, makes a twofold
   answer in defence of the atheist. He says that that highest essence has
   no being in the understanding; it only exists therein by the ear, not
   by being; it only exists as a man who has heard a sound endeavors to
   embrace a thing wholly unknown to him in an image. And therein, he
   says, it is concluded that the mental representation of God in mankind
   is already a purely contingent one, and is produced from without by the
   sound of words; its necessary presence in the spirit is not proved.
   Thus, he adds, much is wanting to the ability of inferring its
   existence from the finding of such an image in the spirit. In the
   sphere of mere imagination no one thing has a less or a greater
   existence than any other thing; each has equally no existence at all.
   Therefore, he writes, granted that the presence of the idea of God in
   the spirit is not contingent, still the thought or the concept of God
   does not essentially argue the being of God. Similarly says Kant later
   on: `We are no richer if we think of our ability as one cipher more.'
   That Anselm also undoubtedly knew, but he opined that the concept of
   God is different to any other thought, which remains unaltered, whether
   it is thought of as existent or non-existent; the concept of God is
   that thought, which is no longer thought unless it is thought as
   existent, and which, therefore, essentially involves being. But, of
   course, it is insufficiently established by Anselm that a concept of
   God which does not necessarily include existence, is not the highest
   thought, and therefore is not the concept of God, and that,
   consequently, the really highest thought must also be thought of as
   existent. To this the following objection attaches. Inasmuch as Anselm
   treated existence as a majus compared with non-existence, he treated
   existence as an attribute, whereas it is the bearer of all attributes.
   So it is not proved by Anselm that the origin of this idea, which, when
   thought, is thought as existent, is not contingent to the reason, but
   necessary; and that reason only remains reason by virtue of this idea.
   Finally, Anselm thinks, thus overrating the Ontological moment, that he
   has already attained therein the full concept of God. These
   shortcomings were to be obviated, stage by stage, by his successors."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [8] A System of Christian Doctrine. Translated by A. Cave and J. S.
   Banks, Edinburgh, 1880. Vol. I., p. 216 et seq
     __________________________________________________________________

   LOTZE [9]

   "To conclude that because the notion of a most perfect Being includes
   reality as one of its perfections, therefore a most perfect Being
   necessarily exists, is so obviously to conclude falsely, that after
   Kant's incisive refutation any attempt to defend such reasoning would
   be useless. Anselm, in his more free and spontaneous reflection, has
   here and there touched the thought that the greatest which we can
   think, if we think it as only thought, is less than the same greatest
   if we think it as existent. It is not possible that from this
   reflection either any one should develop a logically cogent proof, but
   the way in which it is put seems to reveal another fundamental thought
   which is seeking for expression. For what would it matter if that which
   is thought as most perfect were, as thought, less than the least
   reality? Why should this thought disturb us? Plainly for this reason,
   that it is an immediate certainty that what is greatest, most
   beautiful, most worthy is not a mere thought, but must be a reality,
   because it would be intolerable to believe of our ideal that it is an
   idea produced by the action of thought but having no existence, no
   power, and no validity in the world of reality. We do not from the
   perfection of that which is perfect immediately deduce its reality as a
   logical consequence; but without the circumlocution of a deduction we
   directly feel the impossibility of its non-existence, and all semblance
   of syllogistic proof only serves to make more clear the directness of
   this certainty. If what is greatest did not exist, then what is
   greatest would not be, and it is not impossible that that which is
   greatest of all conceivable things should not be."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [9] Microcosmus. Translated by E. Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones.
   Edinburgh, 1887. Vol. II., p. 669 et seq.
     __________________________________________________________________

   PROFESSOR ROBERT FLINT [10]

   "Anselm was the founder of that kind of argumentation which, in the
   opinion of many, is alone entitled to be described as a priori or
   ontological. He reasoned thus: `The fool may say in his heart, There is
   no God; but he only proves thereby that he is a fool, for what he says
   is self-contradictory. Since he denies that there is a God, he has in
   his mind the idea of God, and that idea implies the existence of God,
   for it is the idea of a Being than which a higher cannot be conceived.
   That than which a higher cannot be conceived cannot exist merely as an
   idea, because what exists merely as an idea is inferior to what exists
   in reality as well as in idea. The idea of a highest Being which exists
   merely in thought, is the idea of a highest Being which is not the
   highest even in thought, but inferior to a highest Being which exists
   in fact as well as in thought.' This reasoning found unfavorable
   critics even among the contemporaries of Anselm, and has commended
   itself completely to few. Yet it may fairly be doubted whether it has
   been conclusively refuted, and some of the objections most frequently
   urged against it are certainly inadmissible. It is no answer to it, for
   example, to deny that the idea of God is innate or universal. The
   argument merely assumes that be who denies that there is a God must
   have an idea of God. There is also no force, as Anselm showed, in the
   objection of Gaunilo, that the existence of God can no more be inferred
   from the idea of a perfect being, than the existence of a perfect
   island is to be inferred from the idea of such an island. There neither
   is nor can be an idea of an island which is greater and better than any
   other that can ever be conceived. Anselm could safely promise that he
   would make Gaunilo a present of such an island when he had really
   imagined it. Only one being --an infinite, independent, necessary being
   --can be perfect in the sense of being greater and better than every
   other conceivable being. The objection that the ideal can never
   logically yield the real --that the transition from thought to fact
   must be in every instance illegitimate --is merely an assertion that
   the argument is fallacious. It is an assertion which cannot fairly be
   made until the argument has been exposed and refuted. The argument is
   that a certain thought of God is found necessarily to imply His
   existence. The objection that existence is not a predicate, and that
   the idea of a God who exists is not more complete and perfect than the
   idea of a God who does not exist, is, perhaps, not incapable of being
   satisfactorily repelled. Mere existence is not a predicate, but
   specifications or determinations of existence are predicable. Now the
   argument nowhere implies that existence is a predicate; it implies only
   that reality, necessity, and independence of existence are predicates
   of existence; and it implies this on the ground that existence in re
   can be distinguished from existence in conceptu, necessary from
   contingent existence, self-existence from derived existence. Specific
   distinctions must surely admit of being predicated. That the exclusion
   of existence --which here means real and necessary existence --from the
   idea of God does not leave us with an incomplete idea of God, is not a
   position, I think, which can be maintained. Take away existence from
   among the elements in the idea of a perfect being, and the idea becomes
   either the idea of a nonentity or the idea of an idea, and not the idea
   of a perfect being at all. Thus, the argument of Anselm is
   unwarrantably represented as an argument of four terms instead of
   three. Those who urge the objection seem to me to prove only that if
   our thought of God be imperfect, a being who merely realised that
   thought would be an imperfect being; but there is a vast distance
   between this truism and the paradox that an unreal being may be an
   ideally perfect being."
     __________________________________________________________________

   [10] Theism. New York, 1893. Seventh edition. P. 278 et seq.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

   BIBLIOGRAPHY.

   Patrologioe Cursus Completus. Series Secunda. Tomi CLVIIICLIX. S.
   Anselmus. [Ed. ABBE MIGNE]. Paris, 1853.

   CHURCH. A. W. St. Anselm. [Third Edition]. London, 1873

   FRANCK, G F. Anselm von Canterbury. Tubingen, 1842.

   HASSE, F. R. Anselm von Canterbury. Leipzig, 1843. 2 volumes.

   -The same. Translated and abridged by W.Turner. London, 1850.

   REMUSAT, CHARLES DE. Anselme de Canterbury. Paris, 1854; 2nd ed., 1868.

   RIGG, J. M. St. Anselm of Canterbury. London, 1896.

   RULE M. The Ltfe and Times of St. Anselm. London, 1883. 2 volumes.

   DE VOSGES, LE COMTE DOMET. Saint Anselme, in the series Les Grands
   Philosophes. Paris, 1901.

   WELCH, A. C. Anselm and His Work. Edinburgh, 1901.

   BAUR, F. C. Vorlesungen uber die christliche Dogmengeschichte. Leipzig,
   1866. Zweiter Band, 249-251, 298 ff.

   ERDMANN, J. E. A History of Philosophy. English Translation [Ed. W. S.
   HOUGH]. London, 1891. Vol I., 303-314.

   HEGEL, G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated from
   the German by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. London, 1896. Vol. III.,
   61-67.

   HOOK, W. T. Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury. London, 1862. Vol.
   VIII., 169-276.

   MAURICE, F.D. Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. London, 1882. Vol. I.,
   507-533.

   PFLEIDERER, 0. The Philosophy of Religion. Translated by A. Menzies.
   London, 1888. Vol. III., 271-276.

   UEBERWEG, F.^1 History of Philosophy. Translated by G. S. Morris. New
   York, 1892. Vol. I., 377-386.

   ^1 Ueberweg gives the titles of German and Latin dissertations on
   Anselm not included in this list.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

                              ANSELM'S PROSLOGIUM

OR DISCOURSE ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
     __________________________________________________________________

  PREFACE.

   In this brief work the author aims at proving in a single argument the
   existence of God, and whatsoever we believe of God. --The difficulty of
   the task. --The author writes in the person of one who contemplates
   God, and seeks to understand what he believes. To this work he had
   given this title: Faith Seeking Understanding. He finally named it
   Proslogium, --that is, A Discourse.

   AFTER I had published, at the solicitous entreaties of certain
   brethren, a brief work (the Monologium) as an example of meditation on
   the grounds of faith, in the person of one who investigates, in a
   course of silent reasoning with himself, matters of which he is
   ignorant; considering that this book was knit together by the linking
   of many arguments, I began to ask myself whether there might be found a
   single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself
   alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists,
   and that there is a supreme good requiring nothing else, which all
   other things require for their existence and well-being; and whatever
   we believe regarding the divine Being.

   Although I often and earnestly directed my thought to this end, and at
   some times that which I sought seemed to be just within my reach, while
   again it wholly evaded my mental vision, at last in despair I was about
   to cease, as if from the search for a thing which could not be found.
   But when I wished to exclude this thought altogether, lest, by busying
   my mind to no purpose, it should keep me from other thoughts, in which
   I might be successful; then more and more, though I was unwilling and
   shunned it, it began to force itself upon me, with a kind of
   importunity. So, one day, when I was exceedingly wearied with resisting
   its importunity, in the very conflict of my thoughts, the proof of
   which I had despaired offered itself, so that I eagerly embraced the
   thoughts which I was strenuously repelling.

   Thinking, therefore, that what I rejoiced to have found, would, if put
   in writing, be welcome to some readers, of this very matter, and of
   some others, I have written the following treatise, in the person of
   one who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeks
   to understand what he believes. In my judgment, neither this work nor
   the other, which I mentioned above, deserved to be called a book, or to
   bear the name of an author; and yet I thought they ought not to be sent
   forth without some title by which they might, in some sort, invite one
   into whose hands they fell to their perusal. I accordingly gave each a
   title, that the first might be known as, An Example of Meditation on
   the Grounds of Faith, and its sequel as, Faith Seeking Understanding.
   But, after, both had been copied by many under these titles, many urged
   me, and especially Hugo, the reverend Archbishop of Lyons, who
   discharges the apostolic office in Gaul, who instructed me to this
   effect on his apostolic authority --to prefix my name to these
   writings. And that this might be done more fitly, I named the first,
   Monologium, that is, A Soliloquy; but the second, Proslogium, that is,
   A Discourse.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER I.

   Exhortation of the mind to the contemplation of God. --It casts aside
   cares, and excludes all thoughts save that of God, that it may seek
   Him. Man was created to see God. Man by sin lost the blessedness for
   which he was made, and found the misery for which he was not made. He
   did not keep this good when he could keep it easily. Without God it is
   ill with us. Our labors and attempts are in vain without God. Man
   cannot seek God, unless God himself teaches him; nor find him, unless
   he reveals himself. God created man in his image, that he might be
   mindful of him, think of him, and love him. The believer does not seek
   to understand, that he may believe, but he believes that he may
   understand: for unless he believed he would not understand.

   UP now, slight man! flee, for a little while, thy occupations; hide
   thyself, for a time, from thy disturbing thoughts. Cast aside, now, thy
   burdensome cares, and put away thy toilsome business. Yield room for
   some little time to God; and rest for a little time in him. Enter the
   inner chamber of thy mind; shut out all thoughts save that of God, and
   such as can aid thee in seeking him; close thy door and seek him. Speak
   now, my whole heart! speak now to God, saying, I seek thy face; thy
   face, Lord, will I seek (Psalms xxvii. 8). And come thou now, O Lord my
   God, teach my heart where and how it may seek thee, where and how it
   may find thee.

   Lord, if thou art not here, where shall I seek thee, being absent? But
   if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly thou
   dwellest in unapproachable light. But where is unapproachable light, or
   how shall I come to it? Or who shall lead me to that light and into it,
   that I may see thee in it? Again, by what marks, under what form, shall
   I seek thee? I have never seen thee, O Lord, my God; I do not know thy
   form. What, O most high Lord, shall this man do, an exile far from
   thee? What shall thy servant do, anxious in his love of thee, and cast
   out afar from thy face? He pants to see thee, and thy face is too far
   from him. He longs to come to thee, and thy dwelling-place is
   inaccessible. He is eager to find thee, and knows not thy place. He
   desires to seek thee, and does not know thy face. Lord, thou art my
   God, and thou art my Lord, and never have I seen thee. It is thou that
   hast made me, and hast made me anew, and hast bestowed upon me all the
   blessing I enjoy; and not yet do I know thee. Finally, I was created to
   see thee, and not yet have I done that for which I was made.

   O wretched lot of man, when he hath lost that for which he was made! O
   hard and terrible fate! Alas, what has he lost, and what has he found?
   What has departed, and what remains? He has lost the blessedness for
   which he was made, and has found the misery for which he was not made.
   That has departed without which nothing is happy, and that remains
   which, in itself, is only miserable. Man once did eat the bread of
   angels, for which he hungers now; he eateth now the bread of sorrows,
   of which he knew not then. Alas! for the mourning of all mankind, for
   the universal lamentation of the sons of Hades! He choked with satiety,
   we sigh with hunger. He abounded, we beg. He possessed in happiness,
   and miserably forsook his possession; we suffer want in unhappiness,
   and feel a miserable longing, and alas! we remain empty.

   Why did he not keep for us, when he could so easily, that whose lack we
   should feel so heavily? Why did he shut us away from the light, and
   cover us over with darkness? With what purpose did he rob us of life,
   and inflict death upon us? Wretches that we are, whence have we been
   driven out; whither are we driven on? Whence hurled? Whither consigned
   to ruin? From a native country into exile, from the vision of God into
   our present blindness, from the joy of immortality into the bitterness
   and horror of death. Miserable exchange of how great a good, for how
   great an evil! Heavy loss, heavy grief, heavy all our fate!

   But alas! wretched that I am, one of the sons of Eve, far removed from
   God! What have I undertaken? What have I accomplished? Whither was I
   striving? How far have I come? To what did I aspire? Amid what thoughts
   am I sighing? I sought blessings, and lo! confusion. I strove toward
   God, and I stumbled on myself. I sought calm in privacy, and I found
   tribulation and grief, in my inmost thoughts. I wished to smile in the
   joy of my mind, and I am compelled to frown by the sorrow of my heart.
   Gladness was hoped for, and lo! a source of frequent sighs!

   And thou too, O Lord, how long? How long, O Lord, dost thou forget us;
   how long dost thou turn thy face from us? When wilt thou look upon us,
   and hear us? When wilt thou enlighten our eyes, and show us thy face?
   When wilt thou restore thyself to us? Look upon us, Lord; hear us,
   enlighten us, reveal thyself to us. Restore thyself to us, that it may
   be well with us, --thyself, without whom it is so ill with us. Pity our
   toilings and strivings toward thee since we can do nothing without
   thee. Thou dost invite us; do thou help us. I beseech thee, O Lord,
   that I may not lose hope in sighs, but may breathe anew in hope. Lord,
   my heart is made bitter by its desolation; sweeten thou it, I beseech
   thee, with thy consolation. Lord, in hunger I began to seek thee; I
   beseech thee that I may not cease to hunger for thee. In hunger I have
   come to thee; let me not go unfed. I have come in poverty to the Rich,
   in misery to the Compassionate; let me not return empty and despised.
   And if, before I eat, I sigh, grant, even after sighs, that which I may
   eat. Lord, I am bowed down and can only look downward; raise me up that
   I may look upward. My iniquities have gone over my head; they overwhelm
   me; and, like a heavy load, they weigh me down. Free me from them;
   unburden me, that the pit of iniquities may not close over me.

   Be it mine to look up to thy light, even from afar, even from the
   depths. Teach me to seek thee, and reveal thyself to me, when I seek
   thee, for I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find thee,
   except thou reveal thyself. Let me seek thee in longing, let me long
   for thee in seeking; let me find thee in love, and love thee in
   finding. Lord, I acknowledge and I thank thee that thou hast created me
   in this thine image, in order that I may be mindful of thee, may
   conceive of thee, and love thee; but that image has been so consumed
   and wasted away by vices, and obscured by the smoke of wrong-doing,
   that it cannot achieve that for which it was made, except thou renew
   it, and create it anew. I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy
   sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but
   I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes
   and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I
   believe in order to understand. For this also I believe, --that unless
   I believed, I should not understand.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER II.

   Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, There
   is no God.

   AND so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me,
   so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art
   as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed, we
   believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be
   conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his
   heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very
   fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak --a being than which
   nothing greater can be conceived --understands what he hears, and what
   he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand
   it to exist.

   For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and
   another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first
   conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his
   understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has
   not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has
   it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he
   has made it.

   Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the
   understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived.
   For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is
   understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which
   nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding
   alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can
   be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

   Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists
   in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater
   can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But
   obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there
   exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it
   exists both in the understanding and in reality.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER III.

   God cannot be conceived not to exist. --God is that, than which nothing
   greater can be conceived. --That which can be conceived not to exist is
   not God.

   AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to
   exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be
   conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be
   conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can
   be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which
   nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable
   contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing
   greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not
   to exist;. and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

   So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst
   not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could
   conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the
   Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is,
   except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone,
   therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and
   hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists
   does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to
   exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God
   (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou
   dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull
   and a fool?
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER IV.

   How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived. --A thing
   may be conceived in two ways: (1) when the word signifying it is
   conceived; (2) when the thing itself is understood As far as the word
   goes, God can be conceived not to exist; in reality he cannot.

   BUT how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or
   how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since
   it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

   But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said
   in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not
   conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the
   heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the
   word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity,
   which the object is, is understood.

   In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in
   the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water
   are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the
   facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So,
   then, no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not
   exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any or
   with some foreign, signification. For, God is that than which a greater
   cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly
   understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept
   can it be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God so
   exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.

   I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly
   believed by thy bounty, I now so understand by thine illumination, that
   if I were unwilling to believe that thou dost exist, I should not be
   able not to understand this to be true.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER V.

   God is whatever it is better to be than not to be; and he, as the only
   self-existent being, creates all things from nothing.

   WHAT art thou, then, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be
   conceived? But what art thou, except that which, as the highest of all
   beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from
   nothing? For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be
   conceived of. But this cannot be conceived of thee. What good,
   therefore, does the supreme Good lack, through which every good is?
   Therefore, thou art just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better
   to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just; better
   to be blessed than not blessed.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER VI.

   How God is sensible (sensibilis) although he is not a body. --God is
   sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, passionless; for it is better to
   be these than not be. He who in any way knows, is not improperly said
   in some sort to feel.

   BUT, although it is better for thee to be sensible, omnipotent,
   compassionate, passionless, than not to be these things; how art thou
   sensible, if thou art not a body; or omnipotent, if thou hast not all
   powers; or at once compassionate and passionless? For, if only
   corporeal things are sensible, since the senses encompass a body and
   are in a body, how art thou sensible, although thou art not a body, but
   a supreme Spirit, who is superior to body? But, if feeling is only
   cognition, or for the sake of cognition, --for he who feels obtains
   knowledge in accordance with the proper functions of his senses; as
   through sight, of colors; through taste, of flavors, --whatever in any
   way cognises is not inappropriately said, in some sort, to feel.

   Therefore, O Lord, although thou art not a body yet thou art truly
   sensible in the highest degree in respect of this, that thou dost
   cognise all things in the highest degree; and not as an animal
   cognises, through a corporeal sense.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER VII.

   How he is omnipotent, although there are many things of which he is not
   capable. --To be capable of being corrupted, or of lying, is not power,
   but impotence. God can do nothing by virtue of impotence, and nothing
   has power against him.

   BUT how art thou omnipotent, if thou art not capable of all things? Or,
   if thou canst not be corrupted, and canst not lie, nor make what is
   true, false --as, for example, if thou shouldst make what has been done
   not to have been done, and the like. --how art thou capable of all
   things? Or else to be capable of these things is not power, but
   impotence. For, he who is capable of these things is capable of what is
   not for his good, and of what he ought not to do; and the more capable
   of them he is, the more power have adversity and perversity against
   him; and the less has he himself against these.

   He, then, who is thus capable is so not by power, but by impotence.
   For, he is not said to be able because he is able of himself, but
   because his impotence gives something else power over him. Or, by a
   figure of speech, just as many words are improperly applied, as when we
   use "to be" for "not to be," and "to do" for what is really not to
   do,"or to do nothing." For, often we say to a man who denies the
   existence of something: "It is as you say it to be," though it might
   seem more proper to say, "It is not, as you say it is not." In the same
   way, we say, "This man sits just as that man does," or, "This man rests
   just as that man does"; although to sit is not to do anything, and to
   rest is to do nothing.

   So, then, when one is said to have the power of doing or experiencing
   what is not for his good, or what he ought not to do, impotence is
   understood in the word power. For, the more he possesses this power,
   the more powerful are adversity and perversity against him, and the
   more powerless is he against them.

   Therefore, O Lord, our God, the more truly art thou omnipotent, since
   thou art capable of nothing through impotence, and nothing has power
   against thee.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER VIII.

   How he is compassionate and passionless. God is compassionate, in terms
   of our experience, because we experience the effect of compassion. God
   is not compassionate, in terms of his own being, because he does not
   experience the feeling (affectus) of compassion.

   BUT how art thou compassionate, and, at the same time, passionless?
   For, if thou art passionless, thou dost not feel sympathy; and if thou
   dost not feel sympathy, thy heart is not wretched from sympathy for the
   wretched ; but this it is to be compassionate. But if thou art not
   compassionate, whence cometh so great consolation to the wretched? How,
   then, art thou compassionate and not compassionate, O Lord, unless
   because thou art compassionate in terms of our experience, and not
   compassionate in terms of thy being.

   Truly, thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not so in
   terms of thine own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we
   experience the effect of compassion, but thou dost not experience the
   feeling. Therefore, thou art both compassionate, because thou dost save
   the wretched, and spare those who sin against thee; and not
   compassionate because thou art affected by no sympathy for
   wretchedness.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER IX.

   How the all-just and supremely just God spares the wicked, and justly
   pities the wicked. He is better who is good to the righteous and the
   wicked than he who is good to the righteous alone. Although God is
   supremely just, the source of his compassion is hidden. God is
   supremely compassionate, because he is supremely just. He saveth the
   just, because justice goes with them; he frees sinners by the authority
   of justice. God spares the wicked out of justice; for it is just that
   God, than whom none is better or more powerful, should be good even to
   the wicked, and should make the wicked good. If God ought not to pity,
   he pities unjustly. But this it is impious to suppose. Therefore, God
   justly pities.

   BUT how dost thou spare the wicked, if thou art all just and supremely
   just? For how, being all just and supremely just, dost thou aught that
   is not just? Or, what justice is that to give him who merits eternal
   death everlasting life? How, then, gracious Lord, good to the righteous
   and the wicked, canst thou save the wicked, if this is not just, and
   thou dost not aught that is not just? Or, since thy goodness is
   incomprehensible, is this hidden in the unapproachable light wherein
   thou dwellest? Truly, in the deepest and most secret parts of thy
   goodness is hidden the fountain whence the stream of thy compassion
   flows.

   For thou art all just and supremely just, yet thou art kind even to the
   wicked, even because thou art all supremely good. For thou wouldst be
   less good if thou wert not kind to any wicked being. For, he who is
   good, both to the righteous and the wicked, is better than he who is
   good to the wicked alone; and he who is good to the wicked, both by
   punishing and sparing them, is better than he who is good by punishing
   them alone. Therefore, thou art compassionate, because thou art all
   supremely good. And, although it appears why thou dost reward the good
   with goods and the evil with evils; yet this, at least, is most
   wonderful, why thou, the all and supremely just, who lackest nothing,
   bestowest goods on the wicked and on those who are guilty toward thee.

   The depth of thy goodness, O God! The source of thy compassion appears,
   and yet is not clearly seen! We see whence the river flows, but the
   spring whence it arises is not seen. For, it is from the abundance of
   thy goodness that thou art good to those who sin against thee; and in
   the depth of thy goodness is hidden the reason for this kindness.

   For, although thou dost reward the good with goods and the evil with
   evils, out of goodness, yet this the concept of justice seems to
   demand. But, when thou dost bestow goods on the evil, and it is known
   that the supremely Good hath willed to do this, we wonder why the
   supremely just has been able to will this.

   O compassion, from what abundant sweetness and what sweet abundance
   dost thou well forth to us! O boundless goodness of God how
   passionately should sinners love thee! For thou savest the just,
   because justice goeth with them; but sinners thou dost free by the
   authority of justice. Those by the help of their deserts; these,
   although their deserts oppose. Those by acknowledging the goods thou
   hast granted; these by pardoning the evils thou hatest. O boundless
   goodness, which dost so exceed all understanding, let that compassion
   come upon me, which proceeds from thy so great abundance! Let it flow
   upon me, for it wells forth from thee. Spare, in mercy; avenge not, in
   justice.

   For, though it is hard to understand how thy compassion is not
   inconsistent with thy justice; yet we must believe that it does not
   oppose justice at all, because it flows from goodness, which is no
   goodness without justice; nay, that it is in true harmony with justice.
   For, if thou art compassionate only because thou art supremely good,
   and supremely good only because thou art supremely just, truly thou art
   compassionate even because thou art supremely just. Help me, just and
   compassionate God, whose light seek; help me to understand what I say.

   Truly, then, thou art compassionate even because thou art just. Is,
   then, thy compassion born of thy justice? And dost thou spare the
   wicked, therefore, out of justice? If this is true, my Lord, if this is
   true, teach me how it is. Is it because it is just, that thou shouldst
   be so good that thou canst not be conceived better; and that thou
   shouldst work so powerfully that thou canst not be conceived more
   powerful? For what can be more just than this? Assuredly it could not
   be that thou shouldst be good only by requiting (retribuendo) and not
   by sparing, and that thou shouldst make good only those who are not
   good, and not the wicked also. In this way, therefore, it is just that
   thou shouldst spare the wicked, and make good souls of evil.

   Finally, what is not done justly ought not to be done; and what ought
   not to be done is done unjustly. If, then, thou dost not justly pity
   the wicked, thou oughtest not to pity them. And, if thou oughtest not
   to pity them, thou pityest them unjustly. And if it is impious to
   suppose this, it is right to believe that thou justly pityest the
   wicked.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER X.

   How he justly punishes and justly spares the wicked. --God, in sparing
   the wicked, is just, according to his own nature because he does what
   is consistent with his goodness; but he is not just, according to our
   nature, because he does not inflict the punishment deserved.

   BUT it is also just that thou shouldst punish the wicked. For what is
   more just than that the good should receive goods, and the evil, evils?
   How, then, is it just that thou shouldst punish the wicked, and, at the
   same time, spare the wicked? Or, in one way, dost thou justly punish,
   and, in another, justly spare them? For, when thou punishest the
   wicked, it is just, because it is consistent with their deserts; and
   when, on the other hand, thou sparest the wicked, it is just, not
   because it is compatible with their deserts, but because it is
   compatible with thy goodness.

   For, in sparing the wicked, thou art as just, according to thy nature,
   but not according to ours, as thou art compassionate, according to our
   nature, and not according to thine; seeing that, as in saving us, whom
   it would be just for thee to destroy, thou art compassionate, not
   because thou feelest an affection (affectum), but because we feel the
   effect (effectum); so thou art just, not because thou requitest us as
   we deserve, but because thou dost that which becomes thee as the
   supremely good Being. In this way, therefore, without contradiction
   thou dost justly punish and justly spare.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XI.

   How all the ways of God are compassion and truth; and yet God is just
   in all his ways. --We cannot comprehend why, of the wicked, he saves
   these rather than those, through his supreme goodness: and condemns
   those rather than these, through his supreme justice.

   BUT, is there any reason why it is not also just, according to thy
   nature, O Lord, that thou shouldst punish the wicked? Surely it is just
   that thou shouldst be so just that thou canst not be conceived more
   just; and this thou wouldst in no wise be if thou didst only render
   goods to the good, and not evils to the evil. For, he who requiteth
   both good and evil according to their deserts is more just than he who
   so requites the good alone. It is, therefore, just, according to thy
   nature, O just and gracious God, both when thou dost punish and when
   thou sparest.

   Truly, then, all the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth (Psalms xxv.
   10); and yet the Lord is righteous in all his ways (Psalms cxlv. 17).
   And assuredly without inconsistency: For, it is not just that those
   whom thou dost will to punish should be saved, and that those whom thou
   dost will to spare should be condemned. For that alone is just which
   thou dost will; and that alone unjust which thou dost not will. So,
   then, thy compassion is born of thy justice.

   For it is just that thou shouldst be so good that thou art good in
   sparing also; and this may be the reason why the supremely Just can
   will goods for the evil. But if it can be comprehended in any way why
   thou canst will to save the wicked, yet by no consideration can we
   comprehend why, of those who are alike wicked, thou savest some rather
   than others, through supreme goodness; and why thou dost condemn the
   latter rather than the former, through supreme justice.

   So, then, thou art truly sensible (sensibilis), omnipotent,
   compassionate, and passionless, as thou art living, wise, good,
   blessed, eternal: and whatever it is better to be than not to be.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XII.

   God is the very life whereby he lives; and so of other like attributes.

   BUT undoubtedly, whatever thou art, thou art through nothing else than
   thyself. Therefore, thou art the very life whereby thou livest; and the
   wisdom wherewith thou art wise; and the very goodness whereby thou art
   good to the righteous and the wicked; and so of other like attributes.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XIII.

   How he alone is uncircumscribed and eternal, although other spirits are
   uncircumscribed and eternal. --No place and time contain God. But he is
   himself everywhere and always. He alone not only does not cease to be,
   but also does not begin to be.

   BUT everything that is in any way bounded by place or time is less than
   that which no law of place or time limits. Since, then, nothing is
   greater than thou, no place or time contains thee; but thou art
   everywhere and always. And since this can be said of thee alone, thou
   alone art uncircumscribed and eternal.How is it, then, that other
   spirits also are said to be uncircumscribed and eternal?

   Assuredly thou art alone eternal; for thou alone among all beings not
   only dost not cease to be but also dost not begin to be.

   But how art thou alone uncircumscribed? Is it that a created spirit,
   when compared with thee is circumscribed, but when compared with
   matter, uncircumscribed? For altogether circumscribed is that which,
   when it is wholly in one place, cannot at the same time be in another.
   And this is seen to be true of corporeal things alone. But
   uncircumscribed is that which is, as a whole, at the same time
   everywhere. And this is understood to be true of thee alone. But
   circumscribed, and, at the same time, uncircumscribed is that which,
   when it is anywhere as a whole, can at the same time be somewhere else
   as a whole, and yet not everywhere. And this is recognised as true of
   created spirits. For, if the soul were not as a whole in the separate
   members of the body, it would not feel as a whole in the separate
   members. Therefore, thou, Lord, art peculiarly uncircumscribed and
   eternal; and yet other spirits also are uncircumscribed and eternal.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XIV.

   How and why God is seen and yet not seen by those who seek him.

   HAST thou found what thou didst seek, my soul? Thou didst seek God.
   Thou hast found him to be a being which is the highest of all beings, a
   being than which nothing better can be conceived; that this being is
   life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed
   eternity; and that it is every where and always.

   For, if thou hast not found thy God, how is he this being which thou
   hast found, and which thou hast conceived him to be, with so certain
   truth and so true certainty? But, if thou hast found him, why is it
   that thou dost not feel thou hast found him? Why, O Lord, our God, does
   not my soul feel thee, if it hath found thee? Or, has it not found him
   whom it found to be light and truth? For how did it understand this,
   except by seeing light and truth? Or, could it understand anything at
   all of thee, except through thy light and thy truth?

   Hence, if it has seen light and truth, it has seen thee; if it has not
   seen thee, it has not seen light and truth. Or, is what it has seen
   both light and truth; and still it has not yet seen thee, because it
   has seen thee only in part, but has not seen thee as thou art? Lord my
   God, my creator and renewer, speak to the desire of my soul, what thou
   art other than it hath seen, that it may clearly see what it desires.
   It strains to see thee more; and sees nothing beyond this which it hath
   seen, except darkness. Nay, it does not see darkness, of which-there is
   none in thee; but it sees that it cannot see farther, because of its
   own darkness.

   Why is this, Lord, why is this? Is the eye of the soul darkened by its
   infirmity, or dazzled by thy glory? Surely it is both darkened in
   itself, and dazzled by thee. Doubtless it is both obscured by its own
   insignificance, and overwhelmed by thy infinity. Truly, it is both
   contracted by its own narrowness and overcome by thy greatness.

   For how great is that light from which shines every truth that gives
   light to the rational mind? How great is that truth in which is
   everything that is true, and outside which is only nothingness and the
   false? How boundless is the truth which sees at one glance whatsoever
   has been made, and by whom, and through whom, and how it has been made
   from nothing? What purity, what certainty, what splendor where it is?
   Assuredly more than a creature can conceive.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XV.

   He is greater than can be conceived.

   THEREFORE, O Lord, thou art not only that than which a greater cannot
   be conceived, but thou art a being greater than can be conceived. For,
   since it can be conceived that there is such a being, if thou art not
   this very being, a greater than thou can be conceived. But this is
   impossible.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XVI.

   This is the unapproachable light wherein he dwells.

   TRULY, O Lord, this is the unapproachable light in which thou dwellest;
   for truly there is nothing else which can penetrate this light, that it
   may see thee there. Truly, I see it not, because it is too bright for
   me. And yet, whatsoever I see, I see through it, as the weak eye sees
   what it sees through the light of the sun, which in the sun itself it
   cannot look upon. My understanding cannot reach that light, for it
   shines too bright. It does not comprehend it, nor does the eye of my
   soul endure to gaze upon it long. It is dazzled by the brightness, it
   is overcome by the greatness, it is overwhelmed by the infinity, it is
   dazed by the largeness, of the light.

   O supreme and unapproachable light! O whole and blessed truth, how far
   art thou from me, who am so near to thee! How far removed art thou from
   my vision, though I am so near to thine! Everywhere thou art wholly
   present, and I see thee not. In thee I move, and in thee I have my
   being; and I cannot come to thee. Thou art within me, and about me, and
   I feel thee not.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XVII.

   In God is harmony, fragrance, sweetness, pleasantness to the touch,
   beauty, after his ineffable manner.

   STILL thou art hidden, O Lord, from my soul in thy light and thy
   blessedness; and therefore my soul still walks in its darkness and
   wretchedness. For it looks, and does not see thy beauty. It hearkens,
   and does not hear thy harmony. It smells, and does not perceive thy
   fragrance. It tastes, and does not recognize thy sweetness. It touches,
   and does not feel thy pleasantness. For thou hast these attributes in
   thyself, Lord God, after thine ineffable manner, who hast given them to
   objects created by thee, after their sensible manner; but the sinful
   senses of my soul have grown rigid and dull, and have been obstructed
   by their long listlessness.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XVIII.

   God is life, wisdom, eternity, and every true good. --Whatever is
   composed of parts is not wholly one; it is capable, either in fact or
   in concept, of dissolution. In God wisdom, eternity, etc., are not
   parts, but one, and the very whole which God is, or unity itself, not
   even in concept divisible.

   AND lo, again confusion; lo, again grief and mourning meet him who
   seeks for joy and gladness. My soul now hoped for satisfaction; and lo,
   again it is overwhelmed with need. I desired now to feast, and lo, I
   hunger more. I tried to rise to the light of God, and I have fallen
   back into my darkness. Nay, not only have I fallen into it, but I feel
   that I am enveloped in it. I fell before my mother conceived me. Truly,
   in darkness I was conceived, and in the cover of darkness I was born.
   Truly, in him we all fell, in whom we all sinned. In him we all lost,
   who kept easily, and wickedly lost to himself and to us that which when
   we wish to seek it, we do not know; when we seek it, we do not find;
   when we find, it is not that which we seek.

   Do thou help me for thy goodness' sake! Lord, I sought thy face; thy
   face, Lord, will I seek; hide not thy face far from me (Psalms xxvii.
   8). Free me from myself toward thee. Cleanse, heal, sharpen, enlighten
   the eye of my mind, that it may behold thee. Let my soul recover its
   strength, and with all its understanding let it strive toward thee, O
   Lord. What art thou, Lord, what art thou? What shall my heart conceive
   thee to be?

   Assuredly thou art life, thou art wisdom, thou art truth, thou art
   goodness, thou art blessedness, thou art eternity, and thou art every
   true good. Many are these attributes: my straitened understanding
   cannot see so many at one view, that it may be gladdened by all at
   once. How, then, O Lord, art thou all these things? Are they parts of
   thee, or is each one of these rather the whole, which thou art? For,
   whatever is composed of parts is not altogether one, but is in some
   sort plural, and diverse from itself; and either in fact or in concept
   is capable of dissolution.

   But these things are alien to thee, than whom nothing better can be
   conceived of. Hence, there are no parts in thee, Lord, nor art thou
   more than one. But thou art so truly a unitary being, and so identical
   with thyself, that in no respect art thou unlike thyself; rather thou
   art unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and
   wisdom and the rest are not parts of thee, but all are one; and each of
   these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are.

   In this way, then, it appears that thou hast no parts, and that thy
   eternity, which thou art, is nowhere and never a part of thee or of thy
   eternity. But everywhere thou art as a whole, and thy eternity exists
   as a whole forever.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XIX.

   He does not exist in place or time, but all things exist in him.

   BUT if through thine eternity thou hast been, and art, and wilt be; and
   to have been is not to be destined to be; and to be is not to have
   been, or to be destined to be; how does thine eternity exist as a whole
   forever? Or is it true that nothing of thy eternity passes away, so
   that it is not now; and that nothing of it is destined to be, as if it
   were not yet?

   Thou wast not, then, yesterday, nor wilt thou be to-morrow; but
   yesterday and to-day and to-morrow thou art; or, rather, neither
   yesterday nor to-day nor to-morrow thou art; but simply, thou art,
   outside all time. For yesterday and to-day and to-morrow have no
   existence, except in time; but thou, although nothing exists without
   thee, nevertheless dost not exist in space or time, but all things
   exist in thee. For nothing contains thee, but thou containest all.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XX.

   He exists before all things and transcends all things, even the eternal
   things. --Tbe eternity of God is present as a whole with him; while
   other things have not yet that part of their eternity which is still to
   be, and have no longer that part which is past.

   HENCE, thou dost permeate and embrace all things. Thou art before all,
   and dost transcend all. And, of a surety, thou art before all; for
   before they were made, thou art. But how dost thou transcend all? In
   what way dost thou transcend those beings which will have no end? Is it
   because they cannot exist at all without thee; while thou art in no
   wise less, if they should return to nothingness? For so, in a certain
   sense, thou dost transcend them. Or, is it also because they can be
   conceived to have an end; but thou by no means? For so they actually
   have an end, in a certain sense; but thou, in no sense. And certainly,
   what in no sense has an end transcends what is ended in any sense. Or,
   in this way also dost thou transcend all things, even the eternal,
   because thy eternity and theirs is present as a whole with thee; while
   they have not yet that part of their eternity which is to come, just as
   they no longer have that part which is past? For so thou dost ever
   transcend them, since thou art ever present with thyself, and since
   that to which they have not yet come is ever present with thee.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXI.

   Is this the age of the age, or ages of ages? --The eternity of God
   contains the ages of time themselves, and can be called the age of the
   age or ages of ages.

   Is this, then, the age of the age, or ages of ages? For, as an age of
   time contains all temporal things, so thy eternity contains even the
   ages of time themselves. And these are indeed an age, because of their
   indivisible unity; but ages, because of their endless immeasurability.
   And, although thou art so great, O Lord, that all things are full of
   thee, and exist in thee; yet thou art so without all space, that
   neither midst, nor half, nor any part, is in thee.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXII.

   He alone is what he is and who be is. --All things need God for their
   being and their well-being.

   THEREFORE, thou alone, O Lord, art what thou art; and thou art he who
   thou art. For, what is one thing in the whole and another in the parts,
   and in which there is any mutable element, is not altogether what it
   is. And what begins from non-existence, and can be conceived not to
   exist, and unless it subsists through something else, returns to
   non-existence; and what has a past existence, which is no longer, or a
   future existence, which is not yet, --this does not properly and
   absolutely exist.

   But thou art what thou art, because, whatever thou art at any time, or
   in any way, thou art as a whole and forever. And thou art he who thou
   art, properly and simply; for thou hast neither a past existence nor a
   future, but only a present existence; nor canst thou be conceived as at
   any time non-existent. But thou art life, and light, and wisdom, and
   blessedness, and many goods of this nature. And yet thou art only one
   supreme good; thou art all-sufficient to thyself, and needest none; and
   thou art he whom all things need for their existence and wellbeing.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXIII.

   This good is equally Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. And this is a
   single, necessary Being, which is every good, and wholly good, and the
   only good. --Since the Word is true, and is truth itself, there is
   nothing in the Father, who utters it, which is not accomplished in the
   Word by which he expresses himself. Neither is the love which proceeds
   from Father and Son unequal to the Father or the Son, for Father and
   Son love themselves and one another in the same degree in which what
   they are is good. Of supreme simplicity nothing can be born, and from
   it nothing can proceed, except that which is this, of which it is born,
   or from which it proceeds.

   THIS good thou art, thou, God the Father; this is thy Word, that is,
   thy Son. For nothing, other than what thou art, or greater or less than
   thou, can be in the Word by which thou dost express thyself; for the
   Word is true, as thou art truthful. And, hence, it is truth itself,
   just as thou art; no other truth than thou; and thou art of so simple a
   nature, that of thee nothing can be born other than what thou art. This
   very good is the one love common to thee and to thy Son, that is, the
   Holy Spirit proceeding from both. For this love is not unequal to thee
   or to thy Son; seeing that thou dost love thyself and him, and he, thee
   and himself, to the whole extent of thy being and his. Nor is there
   aught else proceeding from thee and from him, which is not unequal to
   thee and to him. Nor can anything proceed from the supreme simplicity,
   other than what this, from which it proceeds, is.

   But what each is, separately, this is all the Trinity at once, Father,
   Son, and Holy Spirit; seeing that each separately is none other than
   the supremely simple unity, and the supremely unitary simplicity which
   can neither be multiplied nor varied. Moreover, there is a single
   necessary Being. Now, this is that single, necessary Being, in which is
   every good; nay, which is every good, and a single entire good, and the
   only good.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXIV.

   Conjecture as to the character and the magnitude of this good. --If the
   created life is good, how good is the creative life!

   AND now, my soul, arouse and lift up all thy understanding, and
   conceive, so far as thou canst, of what character and how great is that
   good! For, if individual goods are delectable, conceive in earnestness
   how delectable is that good which contains the pleasantness of all
   goods; and not such as we have experienced in created objects, but as
   different as the Creator from the creature. For, if the created life is
   good, how good is the creative life! If the salvation given is
   delightful, how delightful is the salvation which has given all
   salvation! If wisdom in the knowledge of the created world is lovely,
   how lovely is the wisdom which has created all things from nothing!
   Finally, if there are many great delights in delectable things, what
   and how great is the delight in him who has made these delectable
   things.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXV.

   What goods and how great, belong to those who enjoy this good. --Joy is
   multiplied in the blessed from the blessedness and joy of others.

   WHO shall enjoy this good? And what shall belong to him, and what shall
   not belong to him? At any rate, whatever he shall wish shall be his,
   and whatever he shall not wish shall not be his. For, these goods of
   body and soul will be such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither
   has the heart of man conceived (Isaiah lxiv. 4; I Corinthians ii. 9).

   Why, then, dost thou wander abroad, slight man, in thy search for the
   goods of thy soul and thy body? Love the one good in which are all
   goods, and it sufficeth. Desire the simple good which is every good,
   and it is enough. For, what dost thou love, my flesh? What dost thou
   desire, my soul? There, there is whatever ye love, whatever ye desire.

   If beauty delights thee, there shall the righteous shine forth as the
   sun (Matthew xiii. 43). If swiftness or endurance, or freedom of body,
   which naught can withstand, delight thee, they shall be as angels of
   God, --because it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body
   (I Corinthians xv. 44) --in power certainly, though not in nature. If
   it is a long and sound life that pleases thee, there a healthful
   eternity is, and an eternal health. For the righteous shall live for
   ever (Wisdom v. 15), and the salvation of the righteous is of the Lord
   (Psalms xxxvii. 39). If it is satisfaction of hunger, they shall be
   satisfied when the glory of the Lord hath appeared (Psalms xvii. 15).
   If it is quenching of thirst, they shall be abundantly satisfied with
   the fatness of thy house (Psalms xxxvi. 8). If it is melody, there the
   choirs of angels sing forever, before God. If it is any not impure, but
   pure, pleasure, thou shalt make them drink of the river of thy
   pleasures, O God (Psalms xxxvi. 8).

   If it is wisdom that delights thee, the very wisdom of God will reveal
   itself to them. If friendship, they shall love God more than
   themselves, and one another as themselves. And God shall love them more
   than they themselves; for they love him, and themselves, and one
   another, through him, and he, himself and them, through himself. If
   concord, they shall all have a single will.

   If power, they shall have all power to fulfil their will, as God to
   fulfil his. For, as God will have power to do what he wills, through
   himself, so they will have power, through him, to do what they will.
   For, as they will not will aught else than he, he shall will whatever
   they will; and what he shall will cannot fail to be. If honor and
   riches, God shall make his good and faithful servants rulers over many
   things (Luke xii. 42); nay, they shall be called sons of God, and gods;
   and where his Son shall be, there they shall be also, heirs indeed of
   God, and joint-heirs with Christ (Romans viii. 17).

   If true security delights thee, undoubtedly they shall be as sure that
   those goods, or rather that good, will never and in no wise fail them;
   as they shall be sure that they will not lose it of their own accord;
   and that God, who loves them, will not take it away from those who love
   him against their will; and that nothing more powerful than God will
   separate him from them against his will and theirs.

   But what, or how great, is the joy, where such and so great is the
   good! Heart of man, needy heart, heart acquainted with sorrows, nay,
   overwhelmed with sorrows, how greatly wouldst thou rejoice, if thou
   didst abound in all these things! Ask thy inmost mind whether it could
   contain its joy over so great a blessedness of its own.

   Yet assuredly, if any other whom thou didst love altogether as thyself
   possessed the same blessedness, thy joy would be doubled, because thou
   wouldst rejoice not less for him than for thyself. But, if two, or
   three, or many more, had the same joy, thou wouldst rejoice as much for
   each one as for thyself, if thou didst love each as thyself. Hence, in
   that perfect love of innumerable blessed angels and sainted men, where
   none shall love another less than himself, every one shall rejoice for
   each of the others as for himself.

   If, then, the heart of man will scarce contain his joy over his own so
   great good, how shall it contain so many and so great joys? And
   doubtless, seeing that every one loves another so far as he rejoices in
   the other's good, and as, in that perfect felicity, each one should
   love God beyond compare, more than himself and all the others with him;
   so he will rejoice beyond reckoning in the felicity of God, more than
   in his own and that of all the others with him.

   But if they shall so love God with all their heart, and all their mind,
   and all their soul, that still all the heart, and all the mind, and all
   the soul shall not suffice for the worthiness of this love; doubtless
   they will so rejoice with all their heart, and all their mind, and all
   their soul, that all the heart, and all the mind, and all the soul
   shall not suffice for the fulness of their joy.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER XXVI.

   Is this joy which the Lord promises made full? --The blessed shall
   rejoice according as they shall love; and they shall love according as
   they shall know.

   My God and my Lord, my hope and the joy of my heart, speak unto my soul
   and tell me whether this is the joy of which thou tellest us through
   thy Son: Ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full (John xvi.
   24). For I have found a joy that is full, and more than full. For when
   heart, and mind, and soul, and all the man, are full of that joy, joy
   beyond measure will still remain. Hence, not all of that joy shall
   enter into those who rejoice; but they who rejoice shall wholly enter
   into that joy.

   Show me, O Lord, show thy servant in his heart whether this is the joy
   into which thy servants shall enter, who shall enter into the joy of
   their Lord. But that joy, surely, with which thy chosen ones shall
   rejoice, eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither has it entered into
   the heart of man (Isaiah lxiv. 4; I Corinthians ii. 9). Not yet, then,
   have I told or conceived, O Lord, how greatly those blessed ones of
   thine shall rejoice. Doubtless they shall rejoice according as they
   shall love; and they shall love according as they shall know. How far
   they will know thee, Lord, then! and how much they will love thee!
   Truly, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into
   the heart of man in this life, how far they shall know thee, and how
   much they shall love thee in that life.

   I pray, O God, to know thee, to love thee, that I may rejoice in thee.
   And if I cannot attain to full joy in this life may I at least advance
   from day to day, until that joy shall come to the full. Let the
   knowledge of thee advance in me here, and there be made full. Let the
   love of thee increase, and there let it be full, that here my joy may
   be great in hope, and there full in truth. Lord, through thy Son thou
   dost command, nay, thou dost counsel us to ask; and thou dost promise
   that we shall receive, that our joy may be full. I ask, O Lord, as thou
   dost counsel through our wonderful Counsellor. I will receive what thou
   dost promise by virtue of thy truth, that my joy may be full. Faithful
   God, I ask. I will receive, that my joy may be full. Meanwhile, let my
   mind meditate upon it; let my tongue speak of it. Let my heart love it;
   let my mouth talk of it. Let my soul hunger for it; let my flesh thirst
   for it; let my whole being desire it, until I enter into thy joy, O
   Lord, who art the Three and the One God, blessed for ever and ever.
   Amen.
     __________________________________________________________________

                              ANSELM'S MONOLOGIUM

ON THE BEING OF GOD.
     __________________________________________________________________

  PREFACE.

   In this book Anselm discusses, under the form of a meditation, the
   Being of God, basing his argument not on the authority of Scripture,
   but on the force of reason. lt. contains nothing that is inconsistent
   with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially nothing that is
   inconsistent with those of St. Augustine. --The Greek terminology is
   employed in Chapter LXXVIII., where it is stated that the Trinity may
   be said to consist of three substances, that is, three persons.

   CERTAIN brethren have often and earnestly entreated me to put in
   writing some thoughts that I had offered them in familiar conversation,
   regarding meditation on the Being of God, and on some other topics
   connected with this subject, under the form of a meditation on these
   themes. It is in accordance with their wish, rather than with my
   ability, that they have prescribed such a form for the writing of this
   meditation; in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the
   authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of
   independent investigation should declare to be true, should, in an
   unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple argument, be
   briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly expounded in the
   light of truth. It was their wish also, that I should not disdain to
   meet such simple and almost foolish objections as occur to me.

   This task I have long refused to undertake. And, reflecting on the
   matter, I have tried on many grounds to excuse myself; for the more
   they wanted this work to be adaptable to practical use, the more was
   what they enjoined on me difficult of execution. Overcome at last,
   however, both by the modest importunity of their entreaties and by the
   not contemptible sincerity of their zeal; and reluctant as I was
   because of the difficulty of my task and the weakness of my talent, I
   entered upon the work they asked for. But it is with pleasure inspired
   by their affection that, so far as I was able, I have prosecuted this
   work within the limits they set.

   I was led to this undertaking in the hope that whatever I might
   accomplish would soon be overwhelmed with contempt, as by men disgusted
   with some worthless thing. For I know that in this book I have not so
   much satisfied those who entreated me, as put an end to the entreaties
   that followed me so urgently. Yet, somehow it fell out, contrary to my
   hope, that not only the brethren mentioned above, but several others,
   by making copies for their own use, condemned this writing to long
   remembrance. And, after frequent consideration, I have not been able to
   find that I have made in it any statement which is inconsistent with
   the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or especially with those of St.
   Augustine. Wherefore, if it shall appear to any man that I have offered
   in this work any thought that is either too novel or discordant with
   the truth, I ask him not to denounce me at once as one who boldly
   seizes upon new ideas, or as a maintainer of falsehood; but let him
   first read diligently Augustine's books on the Trinity, and then judge
   my treatise in the light of those.

   In stating that the supreme Trinity may be said to consist of three
   substances, I have followed the Greeks, who acknowledge three
   substances in one Essence, in the same faith wherein we acknowledge
   three persons in one Substance. For they designate by the word
   substance that attribute of God which we designate by the word person.

   Whatever I have said on that point, however, is put in the mouth of one
   debating and investigating in solitary reflection, questions to which
   he had given no attention before. And this method I knew to be in
   accordance with the wish of those whose request I was striving to
   fulfil. But it is my prayer and earnest entreaty, that if any shall
   wish to copy this work, he shall be careful to place this preface at
   the beginning of the book, before the body of the meditation itself.
   For I believe that one will be much helped in understanding the matter
   of this book, if he has taken note of the intention, and the method
   according to which it is discussed. It is my opinion, too, that one who
   has first seen this preface will not pronounce a rash judgment, if he
   shall find offered here any thought that is contrary to his own belief.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER I.

   There is a being which is best, and greatest, and highest of all
   existing beings.

   IF any man, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the
   existence of one Nature which is highest of all existing beings, which
   is also sufficient to itself in its eternal blessedness, and which
   confers upon and effects in all other beings, through its omnipotent
   goodness, the very fact of their existence, and the fact that in any
   way their existence is good; and if he has no knowledge of many other
   things, which we necessarily believe regarding God and his creatures,
   he still believes that he can at least convince himself of these truths
   in great part, even if his mental powers are very ordinary, by the
   force of reason alone.

   And, although he could do this in many ways, I shall adopt one which I
   consider easiest for such a man. For, since all desire to enjoy only
   those things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that this man
   should, at some time, turn his mind's eye to the examination of that
   cause by which these things are good, which he does not desire, except
   as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason leads the way and
   follows up these considerations, he advances rationally to those truths
   of which, without reason, he has no knowledge. And if, in this
   discussion, I use any argument which no greater authority adduces, I
   wish it to be received in this way: although, on the grounds that I
   shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as if necessarily,
   yet it is not, for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but
   merely that it can appear so for the time being.

   It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are goods so
   innumerable, whose great diversity we experience by the bodily senses,
   and discern by our mental faculties, must we not believe that there is
   some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good? Or are they
   good one through one thing and another through another? To be sure, it
   is most certain and clear, for all who are willing to see, that
   whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute in such a way that
   in mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or
   less, or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue of some fact,
   which is not understood to be one thing in one case and another in
   another, but to be the same in different cases, whether it is regarded
   as existing in these cases in equal or unequal degree. For, whatsoever
   things are said to be just, when compared one with another, whether
   equally, or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except through
   the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and
   another in another.

   Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, would
   prove either equally or unequally good, necessarily they are all good
   by virtue of something which is conceived of as the same in different
   goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by
   virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another. For, apparently it
   is by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, because he is
   strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because he is
   swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his
   strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and
   strength do not appear to be the same thing.

   But if a horse, because he is strong and swift, is therefore good, how
   is it that a strong, swift robber is bad? Rather, then, just as a
   strong, swift robber is bad, because he is harmful, so a strong, swift
   horse is good, because he is useful. And, indeed, nothing is ordinarily
   regarded as good, except either for some utility -- as, for instance,
   safety is called good, and those things which promote safety --or for
   some honorable character -- as, for instance, beauty is reckoned to be
   good, and what promotes beauty.

   But, since the reasoning which we have observed is in no wise
   refutable, necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honorable,
   if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which
   all goods exist, whatever that being is. But who can doubt this very
   being, through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must be,
   then, a good through itself, since ever other good is through it.

   It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another
   being than that which they themselves are, and this being alone is good
   through itself. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone
   good through itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other
   beings, that it is neither equalled nor excelled. But that which is
   supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one
   being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the
   highest of all existing beings.
     __________________________________________________________________

  CHAPTER II.

   The same subject continued.

   BUT, just as it has been proved that there is a being that is supremely
   good, since all goods are good through a single being, which is good
   through itself; so it is ne